

June 1, 2006

MEMORANDUM TO: Richard J. Laufer, Chief
Plant Licensing Branch A
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing

FROM: John A. Nakoski, Chief */RA/*
PWR Reactor Systems Branch
Division of Safety Systems

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: SHIFTING THE
REACTOR TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP INTERLOCK FROM P-7 TO
P-8 (TAC NOS. MD0496 AND MD0497)

Plant Name: D.C. Cook Units 1 and 2
Utility: Indiana & Michigan Power Company
TAC No.: MD0496 and MD0497
Docket Nos.: 50-315 and 50-316
Operating License Nos.: DPR-58 and DPR-74
Project Directorate: A
Project Manager: Peter Tam
Review Branch: DSS/SPWB
Review Status: Not complete

By letter dated March 7, 2006, Indiana & Michigan Power Company (I&M), the licensee, proposed certain modifications to the reactor protection systems of the D.C. Cook units, and to these plants' Technical Specifications, to shift the interlock of reactor trip on turbine trip from the P-7 permissive to the P-8 permissive. The proposed modifications would result in reactor trip, due to turbine trip, when the P-8 permissive is active (at 31% power and above). Currently, the reactor would trip when the turbine trips when the P-7 permissive is active (at 10% power and above).

The staff, in order to complete its review of the licensee's proposal, requests the additional information that is identified in the attachment.

Enclosure: As stated

CONTACT: S. Miranda, NRR/DSS/SPWB
415-2303

June 1, 2006

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OFFICE	DSS/SPWB/PM	DSS/SPWB/BC
NAME	SMiranda	JNakoski
DATE	6 / 1 /2006	6 / 1 /2006

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Request for Additional Information

1. Please provide copies of all Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letters (NSALs) that allude to permissives P-7 and P-8.
2. If applicable, describe how these NSALs have been used in preparing the proposal to shift the reactor trip on turbine trip interlock from P-7 to P-8.
3. Please provide a safety analysis or evaluation to show that tripping one reactor coolant pump, when the plant is at 31% power, will satisfy all ANS Condition II acceptance criteria without crediting the low flow reactor trip.
4. Please provide a safety analysis or evaluation to show that the seizure of one reactor coolant pump rotor or the shearing of one reactor coolant pump shaft, when the plant is at 31% power, will satisfy all ANS Condition IV acceptance criteria without crediting the low flow reactor trip.
5. The Cook UFSARs state, "ANS Condition II occurrences are faults that may occur with moderate frequency during the life of the plant. They are accommodated with, at most, a reactor shutdown with the plant being capable of returning to operation after a corrective action. In addition, no ANS Condition II occurrence shall cause consequential loss of function of fuel cladding and reactor coolant system barriers." Show that inadvertent actuation of the emergency core cooling system would not cause a consequential loss of the reactor coolant system barrier (by filling the pressurizer; causing the pressurizer power-operated relief valves to open, to discharge water, and consequently, to fail to reseal properly). See RIS 2005-29 for more information.