

NRC FORM 699 (9-2003)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DATE

05/24/2006

CONVERSATION RECORD

TIME

9:00am

NAME OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU

TELEPHONE NO.

TYPE OF CONVERSATION

Donald Warren

VISIT

ORGANIZATION

CONFERENCE

Public Stakeholder

TELEPHONE

SUBJECT

INCOMING

Status on response to questions from Oyster Creek 2005 Annual Assessment public meeting on April 24, 2006.

OUTGOING

SUMMARY (Continue on Page 2)

BACKGROUND

During the Oyster Creek 2005 Annual Assessment public meeting on April 24, 2006 a public stakeholder (Donald Warren) provided the NRC 13 questions concerning a variety of issues including, the reactor vessel (core shroud), harden vent, spent fuel pool, thermolag 330, drywell liner/"sand bed region", tritium, and cooling towers. The Senior Resident Inspector (Marc S. Ferdas) committed to provide Mr. Warren a response to his question. On May 23, 2006 Mr. Warren sent an email to Mr. Ferdas inquiring about the answers to his questions, additionally Mr. Warren provided some clarifying information to his original questions. The questions provided by Mr. Warren on April 24 and May 23 2006 are summarized on page 2.

CONVERSATION RECORD

I contacted Mr. Warren at his home on May 24, 2006, however he was not at home when I called. I left a message on his answering machine informing him that I was still gathering information in order to respond to his questions and would be prepared to speak to him in 2 to 3 weeks from today. Included in my message was an update of upcoming public meetings being conducting by the NRC concerning Oyster Creek License Renewal, including the June 1, 2006 meeting at NRC headquarters to discuss drywell shell time-limited aging analysis and the July 13, 2006 meeting New Jersey to discuss License Renewal Environmental Scoping results. Mr. Ryan Treadway, Resident Inspector - Oyster Creek, was also present when I made the phone call.

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ACTION REQUIRED

No additional actions required, will provide a response to Mr. Warrens questions by June 9, 2006 via telecon. If additional information is required it will be provided via email.

NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION

SIGNATURE

DATE

Marc S. Ferdas

05/24/2006

ACTION TAKEN

No additional actions, see above for details.

TITLE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION

SIGNATURE OF PERSON TAKING ACTION

DATE

Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek

05/24/2006

CONVERSATION RECORD (Continued)

SUMMARY (Continue on Page 3)

QUESTIONS PROVIDED BY MR. WARREN ON APRIL 24 AND MAY 23, 2006.

- 1) Have you tested the many fracture cracks in the concrete drywell containment shield for increases in size and number?
- 2) Are these cracks wet or dry and how have you tested to determine this?
- 3) It is my understanding that vertical steel rods were installed in an attempt to restore some strength lost by the fracturing of the concrete reactor. Are these being tested for corrosion and has any been identified especially at the potentially brittle welds?
- 4) There is an 8" steel vent pipe that was jury rigged to vent directly from the drywell Torus to the 300 ft stack as a means to attempt to prevent the complete failure of drywell containment since in 1986, Harold Denton (Director of the NRC) stated there was a "90% probability of that containment failing". Since this venting bypasses the charcoal bed radiation filtration, are there calculations of the potential radiation release to the community in the event of a loss of reactor containment.
- 5) Why didn't the Fitzpatrick Plant with the same design install a vent pipe?
- 6) Who controls the decision, the NRC or Oyster Creek on when to open this vent pipe and directly release large amounts of unfiltered radioactivity into the community?
- 7) There is only a mere 30 PSI rupture disc after the butterfly valve on this vent pipe, Is this because 30 PSI is what operators feel to be the safe pressure limit to assure a lack of drywell failure?
- 8) In light of the high vulnerability of an elevated spent fuel pool filled with 35 yrs of highly radioactive waste in tightly packed fuel assemblies to Tornados, Hurricanes and Terrorist Aircraft Attacks, what provisions have been made to enclose the this structure in a reinforced concrete containment building and if this is not being done why not?
- 9) Since Thermolag 330 fire barrier was determined not to adequately protect essential wiring from fire and Oyster Creek never complied with replacement, how are operators expected to be able to "manually operate" critical safety components when fire and smoke precludes entrance into critical areas.
- 10) Since this drywell was designed prior to 1969 with detailed specifications available to the entire industry for over 35 yrs, how is raw Ultrasonic test data "state of the art Technology that could benefit competing companies" as claimed by Amergen representative Pete Resler and why is Excelon/Amergen claiming that Ultrasonic test data from 1996 is proprietary information with the NRC's compliance in not releasing this data when all ultrasonic test data prior to 1996 was public domain?
- 11) In light of the recent disclosure that Excellon deceived about the tritium leaks at other plants they own and operate, are ground wells at Oyster Creek being tested for radioactive particulate contamination by multiple radionuclides (eg. alpha, beta and gamma emitters)? If not, why?
- 12) Does the NRC plan to require OC to install a cooling tower as recommended by the NJDEP to prevent further "grassing" hazards while decreasing degradation and fish kills of Barnegat bay and if not, why since this would seem to be the most prudent solution to prevent unsafe cooling water loss from "grassing".

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