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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL

Title: Interview of [REDACTED] *7C*

Docket Number: 1-2003-051F

Location: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

Date: Wednesday, January 7, 2004

Work Order No.: NRC-1268

Pages 1-97

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

INTERVIEW

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IN THE MATTER OF: :

INTERVIEW OF : OI Case No. 1-2003-051F

[REDACTED] :

(Closed) TC :

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January, October 7, 2004

Human Resources Department

Hope Creek/Salem Generating Station

TB2 Building

Hancocks Bridge, NJ

The above-entitled interview was conducted, at
4:20 p.m.,

BEFORE:

JEFFREY TEATOR, Special Agent

4:20 p.m.

1
2
3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's approximately
4 4:20 in the afternoon. My name is Jeffrey Teator.
5 I'm a Senior Special Agent with the NRC's Office of
6 Investigations. And today's date, is it the 8th?
7 [REDACTED] 7th.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 7th. January 7th.
9 The year is 2004. And today I am conducting a follow
10 up interview of [REDACTED] This interview is
11 being conducted at the Salem/Hope Creek Station in TB2
12 Building in a private office in the Human Resources
13 area.

14 I interviewed [REDACTED] back on October
15 6, 2003 as part of his Safety Conscious Work
16 Environment review/investigation that OI is helping
17 the region conduct down here at Salem/Hope Creek. And
18 shortly after that interview [REDACTED] contacted me
19 indicating that he had some additional information
20 that he would like to share. And since October, I
21 have identified a couple of other issues I'm going to
22 ask [REDACTED] about today, a couple of other
23 technical type of issues.

24 [REDACTED] again this is a voluntary
25 interview. Do you understand that?

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1 [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And you wish
3 to go forward?

4 [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, again, this is
6 not a wrongdoing investigation in what I'm looking at
7 here today. No one's accused you of doing anything
8 wrong. Regarding what I'm going to be talking to you
9 about today there's no potential violation because
10 there's no SCWE rule, Safety Conscious Work
11 Environment rule. Be that as it may, this information
12 is still material to the NRC. The NRC looks to the
13 Safety Conscious Work Environment as being a very
14 important issue and because of that, your answers the
15 Commission expects that your information you're
16 providing is truthful and correct. Do you understand
17 that?

18 [REDACTED] I understand.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you have any
20 objection to providing sworn testimony then today?

21 [REDACTED] No.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Raise your
23 right hand for me, please. [REDACTED] do you swear
24 the information that you are about to provide to me is
25 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

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[REDACTED] I do.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thanks.

Are you still the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Just wanted to get that in the record. All right.

And you now report to [REDACTED] (phonetic)?

[REDACTED] That's correct.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And you have some information that you wanted to share with the Commission as involved to my first interview. Go right ahead, please.

[REDACTED] Yes. What I did was after our first interview, Jeff, I went through and I have a series of documents in front of me. What they are, in this portion of the interview what I'd like to do is to clarify some areas and perhaps spawn some further thought with the documents in front of me that you may have to provide some more clarification on plant events, particularly that happened at Salem/Hope Creek in the February and mainly March time frame of 2003.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] When I was first interviewed

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1 in October of 2003, we went through the interview
2 process and I was a little uncomfortable with my
3 recollection of what the facts were and the time line.
4 And I didn't think I could give my best answers. I
5 did the research and went back and made copies. As I
6 said to you before we went on the record, these are
7 available off of the company information site and
8 could be made available to the residents or are made
9 available to the residents information that they have.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] What I have in front of me,
12 Jeff, it's an acronym called at TARP (phonetic)
13 report. It's a management response report to an event
14 of an issue that happened at the plant. I'll just go
15 over the titles for a moment.

16 One is the February 25, 2003 an
17 operability issue we had at Hope Creek on the Bravo
18 diesel and it surrounds exhaust fumes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, we talked
20 about that.

21 [REDACTED] There's information on that.

22 I actually have skylines on -- that
23 provide more detailed time line on when events
24 occurred. Because when we first interviewed it was --
25 I think we were mixing and matching what our time

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1 lines were. And I have that data with me.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

3 [REDACTED] There was a Salem Unit 1 load
4 reduction due to river grass problems on March 3rd. I
5 have a report on that.

6 I have a schedule that I needed to go back
7 to on the Hope Creek Research seal and turbine bypass
8 valve outage that's available that could clear up some
9 time line facts.

10 I actually have the root cause from -- and
11 I can give you these numbers if you want to write them
12 down, that could help out [REDACTED] or anyone, if
13 that's necessary.

14 The root cause on the Bravo research seal
15 excessive fuel leakage at Hope Creek, this was written
16 after we got into the drywall and had to change out
17 the seal in March of 2003.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

19 [REDACTED] The planned outage report
20 critique for -- that was written by my organization
21 for the outage that occurred at Hope Creek on the
22 Bravo Research pump seal. I got information on that.

23 There's actually what we call a tech
24 issues that has some -- helped with some time line on.
25 I got questioned by you back in October on some --

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1 what exactly were the facts around some meetings that
2 occurred in the OCC, the Outage Control Center, during
3 the outage on bypass valve operability at Hope Creek.
4 I believe it was -- it was on the startup. But we
5 could go through that if you'd like.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's the Hope
7 Creek turbine bypass valve issue?

8 [REDACTED] That's correct.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Yes, I'd
10 like to go through that.

11 [REDACTED] Okay. And I don't think
12 we're going to need this, but I have it available.

13 This has -- I have another document here
14 that has some time line information on the Hope Creek
15 turbine bypass valve, which it'll probably help you
16 out. You may need to refer to that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

18 [REDACTED] And I have -- this is off the
19 website. It's completed, but I don't have the signed
20 version of the Hope Creek reactivity event root cause.
21 That's where the operators were shutting down and they
22 had a power point. There's some information in there.

23 And I think that's going to be okay for
24 now. I have other TARP reports from that time period
25 that we may refer to them if we have to. What I would

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1 propose is rather than putting them on the record
2 right now, if we'd go to them we'll just put it on the
3 record at that time.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All right.

5  What I have is, and I'm going
6 back from my notes, Jeff, is one level on March 3rd
7 was a unit one load reduction due to grassing at Salem
8 Station, very -- to 40 percent. From March 7th to
9 March 14th the Hope Creek unit shuts down for a forced
10 outage, originally to change out the seal on the
11 research pump. 7C

12 And we can go through these in details and
13 we'll talk about how best to answer questions and need
14 to feel comfortable with having given you all the
15 information that I can in a second here.

16 But on March 14th what I got from the
17 information was the number two bypass valve does not
18 go closed when the generator is synchronized at the
19 completion of the research pump outage. And I have a
20 question in my notes that I can probably answer by
21 going through this thing. I'll need to refresh my
22 memory.

23 We had this decision on a shutdown
24 meeting.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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1 [REDACTED] And that was a touch meeting
2 in there. And the decision took quite a while. I
3 think we can pin that day down if that's important to
4 you.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. Is that the
6 meeting where [REDACTED] is pushing --

7 [REDACTED] Yes.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- people in that
9 meeting. People that meet thought it was a black and
10 white issue, we need to go --

11 [REDACTED] That's the one.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- check out the
13 value. That's -- Okay.

14 [REDACTED] That's the one.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, I'd like to
16 talk about that.

17 [REDACTED] So we can go back into that
18 if you want.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

20 [REDACTED] I think, you know, I might
21 have to leaf through some paper as we do that.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] But I have several pages
24 highlighted here. 70

25 And three days later on March 17 we go

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1 through, we decide to shut the unit down because the
2 bypass valve, the number 2 bypass valve won't go
3 closed and there's information in here about metallic
4 sounds and all --

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

6 [REDACTED] -- on the valve stroking.

7 And we shut the unit down on March 17th. And that is
8 the time when -- and it was -- it was an infrequently
9 performed test in evolution because it was difficult
10 because the bypass valve would not go full closed.
11 And the operators experienced power slings at that
12 time, and that was a reactivity event I mentioned
13 when I was going through the --

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 [REDACTED] -- data or the documents I
16 had in front of me.

17 And that's it for high level on the time
18 line.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The reactivity
20 event and the bypass valve issue are tied together?

21 [REDACTED] Oh, yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] Oh, yes. They were bang,
24 bang. As a matter of fact, we can look at the
25 calendar and the date, but I think we start up, I

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1 believe -- I believe the 14th was either a Thursday or
2 a Friday and I believe that the 17th was a Sunday that
3 we make these decisions. And then we have the problem
4 when we sink the generator.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. That's what
6 you call as a reactivity event.

7 [REDACTED] The subsequent shutdown and
8 the complications that we had from that, yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Talk about--
10 if you don't mind me asking a couple of questions,
11 about the bypass value issue with the metallic sound.

12 [REDACTED] Let's go through that.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. When was that
14 first heard or identified that there may be something
15 wrong with that.

16 [REDACTED] Okay. This will work out if
17 we do it this way.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's fine.

19 [REDACTED] So you've got your gaps and
20 it's probably most time efficient, and I'm not
21 carrying on, you know, with information you don't need
22 (inaudible).

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

24 [REDACTED] So let me find this stuff.
25 I got all this stuff highlighted. Let me read through

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1 it and then I can answer your question directly.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. I'll turn
3 the tape off while you're looking at that.

4 [REDACTED] Oh, I'm almost done.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

6 [REDACTED] I can go. Okay.

7 So here it is. This document is from
8 3/15/03. That's the one on the number 2 bypass valve
9 stuck at 38 percent.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] It's called a tech issue.
12 What a tech issues is, Jeff, we've got engineering
13 folks that are supporting the outage.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 [REDACTED] And they're trained on
16 systematically going through a problem that's
17 presented to them.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 [REDACTED] And I'll show you in some of
20 these things. They have a spreadsheet that they fill
21 in the blanks so they don't miss anything.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

23 [REDACTED] Okay. And that's what tech
24 issues really is; it's a procedure we use.

25 And what they did was on March the 15th

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1 they look at it and they go through this
2 troubleshooting procedure -- let me go to my sheet
3 here. This document says -- and this is what the
4 engineer would have been working on out of the OCC on
5 that day.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] All right.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A normal work
9 assignment then?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. At that
12 point it's still not --

13 [REDACTED] It didn't happen over -- it
14 didn't happen over, Jeff, go out there and
15 troubleshoot this thing and you come back in two
16 hours.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

18 [REDACTED] It happened over the course
19 of probably 24 hours.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And you'll see that when we
22 go through this right now. So basically you got the
23 normal work assignment, if you will.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

25 [REDACTED] From the engineering support

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1 organization. And I just don't want to miss anything.
2 And they go through and say hey the valve won't go
3 closed.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

5 [REDACTED] All right. We think the
6 generator valve won't go closed. Okay. What they'll
7 do is, they go through and say what are the possible
8 causes and they list them.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED] All right. And you can see
11 them there. I highlighted the one that eventually
12 turns out to be the problem was the bolt FME. FME
13 stands for foreign material excluded. But then what
14 they do is they split up each cause into what could be
15 the problem -- or excuse me. Data that supports what
16 it could be or data that just proves what it could be.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

18 [REDACTED] As you can see, this is metal
19 to metal sound supports it. The valve doesn't --
20 consistently does go anymore than 38 percent with a
21 full drive signal, it's a hydraulic valve.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

23 [REDACTED] And what the engineering
24 department in that case said was well there's no
25 reason why it couldn't be this.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

2 [REDACTED] All right. So we
3 systematically went through the problem and said -- I
4 can go through this in more detail if you'd like. But
5 said this is it.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Does this
7 show when it was first discovered?

8 [REDACTED] Not directly. This -- what
9 I have on this document is March 15th.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] Now what you'll see is, and
12 I know that -- I know that -- let's go off the record
13 just to save the tape time.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure.

15 (Whereupon, off the record.)

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. It's about
17 4:35. We've going over the documents regarding this
18 event.

19 Why don't we just go right into it. When
20 was the problem with the valve first identified that
21 it wouldn't shut?

22 [REDACTED] Okay. I'm reading from the
23 critique from the planned outage report for the Bravo
24 research pump seal replacement. AT 2154 on March 14,
25 2003 the generator was synchronized and therefore the

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1 way the plant works, the valve did not shut at that
2 time, and that's when we were first aware of it.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. What
4 happened next then?

5 [REDACTED] What happened next was I'm
6 going from my memory as well as from reading the
7 documents. Engineering support was garnered from the
8 Outage Control Center. This tech issues that I
9 mentioned before, which is dated March 15th which
10 would obviously be after midnight on that Friday night
11 into Saturday.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The tech issue
13 factsheet.

14 [REDACTED] The tech issue factsheet,
15 that's correct.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All right.

17 [REDACTED] Lists all the possible
18 causes, the data that supports your data that
19 disproves it. And in that document it states that FME
20 in the valve seat could be a possible cause; that's
21 one of probably 12 or 13. And from my memory also,
22 Jeff, I recall that the first thing that they did that
23 night was -- I'm reading from another one of these
24 tech issues sheet -- is that they tried to remove the
25 anthanal (phonetic) plug which physically sends the

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1 signal to the servo (phonetic) value to tell it to
2 open or close. And the value would fail closed. There
3 was no response, which that was the easiest thing for
4 them to prove or disapprove. It told them it wasn't
5 an electrical problem.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] And that led them down the
8 road that this was probably a mechanical problem that
9 they needed to work on.

10 And then we start the process from my
11 memory, and we can go into some more documents, on
12 further management notifications on that Saturday.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

14 [REDACTED] And ultimately leading to
15 management review meetings and a decision to shut the
16 unit down.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I wanted to
18 get into that a little bit, the decision making
19 process.

20 [REDACTED] Okay.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Where eventually on
22 the 16th, which is a Sunday at 1824 the plant is taken
23 out of service to repair the valve.

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In the first

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1 interview we talked about the one meeting that went on
2 for two, three hours. [REDACTED] yourself, others.

3 [REDACTED] Right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But it sounded
5 there were meetings before then; yes or no?

6 [REDACTED] Now let's talk for a few
7 minutes while I'm looking at some other documents. I
8 think from what we have right now from reading the
9 documents is that the meeting that we talked about in
10 October with [REDACTED] and the OCC --

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 [REDACTED] -- would have been during the
13 day late on day shift on Saturday.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] Whatever that date is.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That would have
17 been--

18 [REDACTED] The 15th.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Saturday was the
20 15th?

21 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes. It would have been
22 during the day on the 15th. And that's my
23 recollection now that we're piecing things together.

24 So we talked about my concern of, you
25 know, it seems sort of black and white.

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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] And as I recall, the tape would -- with -- that you have with -- I can't remember her name.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Dr. Harmon (phonetic)?

[REDACTED] Kim Harmon -- Kim Harmon alluded to that as well.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] And from what I'm gaining here was, I think that was on a Saturday. The point I was trying to make there in October was with the -- with Dr. Harmon's interview or tape in an interview from October was the date I have in front of me now was -- one thing we haven't talked about is we have a valve that's -- not to be technical on the tape or anything, but it's a hydraulic valve that generates 1600 pounds per square inch. It will drive through a concrete wall if it has to if there's nothing in the way. And it's making a metallic sound.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] It's repeatable. It won't close. And we're basically without knowing exactly what power level we're at, we're within six percent, seven percent power level of where it's not allowed to

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1 operate by --

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

3 [REDACTED] And it was pretty
4 straightforward to myself, and not speaking for others
5 in the room, I think they felt the same way by
6 Saturday that there was compelling evidence that we
7 needed to shut the reactor down.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

9 [REDACTED] We talked about [REDACTED]
10 having contraian point of views in his -- on his
11 behalf you look at this and there -- when you read
12 through this technical issues document there are a
13 list of causes that it could be. I mean, when you go
14 through the actual technical issues. So -- and to go
15 through those is, you know, in a meeting is certainly
16 fair. But as far as the tone of the meeting goes, we
17 did not go through that. I don't recall going through
18 that document that we're doing right now very closely.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED]: In a systematic manner.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 [REDACTED] So --

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, then legally
24 you were okay with your --

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because you weren't
2 at the power level, which was 25 percent --

3 [REDACTED] That's correct.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- which would have
5 caused an automatic shut -- immediate shutdown? You
6 weren't there yet?

7 [REDACTED] From my recollection of the
8 events, from reading these documents we didn't -- and
9 from what I remember, we didn't violate --

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 [REDACTED] -- any laws.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

13 [REDACTED]: Or admin limits by the
14 company.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Good.

16 [REDACTED] To my knowledge.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Then if you don't
18 recall [REDACTED] going through the tech issue
19 factsheet and the things that were pulled out of what
20 it could or couldn't be, can you offer now more --
21 what he was asking the group to do, what he was going
22 over to make sure you were proceeding correctly?

23 [REDACTED] I'll tell you what I'd like
24 to do, is it helps me when I go through these things
25 because I highlighted, like I said, to get ready for

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1 this what they were. To fairly answer that question,
2 I'd like to look at a few more things.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] And it might spark some
5 memory.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's good.

7 [REDACTED] I don't have a real good
8 answer right now.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. We'll
10 go off. It's about quarter of 5:00.

11 (Whereupon, a recess.)

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're back
13 on. It's almost 5:00. And my last question was what
14 was [REDACTED] basis for his position and where he was
15 coming from. But really to get at this, why don't we
16 just go right through Saturday night, which would have
17 been March 15, 2003; what happened then and then going
18 from there forward, how did this thing roll out.

19 [REDACTED] Okay. In response to that,
20 what I want to do is I'm reading from the reactivity
21 event root cause at Hope Creek. I'm going to supply
22 Jeff the order number so he has it, 70030270. He can
23 jot down any reference he needs if he needs to talk to
24 the resident.

25 But on Saturday night -- I'm reading from

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
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1 the document and paraphrasing. But on Saturday night
2 the reactor's at 20 percent power. This tech issue
3 process is through. And for all intents and purposes,
4 and it looks like the valve was mechanically down.

5 Station management has come to a
6 conclusion that we're going to need to shut down. It
7 appears from this document, and I spoke to Jeff
8 somewhat off the record, that there were several
9 meetings on other events. And my memory can get
10 confused from one meeting to another during that time
11 frame, because there were several issues.

12 But it appears that the main focus of that
13 meeting on Saturday night was we got through the
14 shutdown decision and on Saturday night the basis of
15 how we were going to shutdown the plant was discussed
16 to some detail with some significant ops involvement.
17 Because the valve was stuck and controlling the cool
18 down rate after the reactor was shutdown was a point
19 of concern for the management team.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did they put people
21 through like just in time type training to prepare
22 them for what needed to be done to bring the plant
23 down?

24 : Exactly. That's exactly what
25 had to be done on Saturday. The decision on when to

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1 do it was made, and then how to do and then operations
2 had to get their crews into the simulator to get
3 working at that time, which they did. And ultimately
4 the crew on Sunday night was the one who shut the
5 reactor down.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that why it took
7 to Sunday evening to shut the plant down? They had to
8 prepare to do that? They couldn't just go and do it?

9 [REDACTED] That's correct. That was the
10 delay to get the -- get the plans in place.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

12 [REDACTED] The training done and the
13 readiness. We actually had what we call an
14 infrequently performed task and management review in
15 place as well.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: On Saturday evening
17 when the decision is about to be made to shut the
18 plant down, there's a meeting that we talked about
19 during the first interview.

20 [REDACTED] Right.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] Right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Anything more on
24 where -- what he said, his basis that you can offer
25 now that we didn't talk about earlier?

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1 [REDACTED]: I don't think so, Jeff. My
2 memory is, and I'm going purely from my memory not
3 reading from a document at this point, was that he did
4 challenge us on other opportunities it could be or --

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Causes?

6 [REDACTED] Causes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] That's a better word. Causes
9 it could be. And once we got to the mechanical
10 binding, from my memory, his attitude changed. And I
11 remember a conference call that I could cite later on
12 that night of how we're going to get the reactor shut
13 down safely.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 [REDACTED] And we had gone home around
16 dinnertime. And [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] led a conference call later
18 that evening. And after he had explored the
19 opportunities and figured out with his team on what
20 the best way to do it was. And [REDACTED] was all in favor
21 of that. So --

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

23 [REDACTED] And then the training
24 started.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

1 [REDACTED] In the simulator and the
2 like.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You read something
4 from a document here about how this decision was
5 reached and where it could have been better. What
6 document is that, and I'll read it on the record.

7 [REDACTED] I can read it.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Go
9 ahead.

10 [REDACTED] I'm reading from the planned
11 outage report from the Bravo Research pump seal
12 replacement. Once again, it was written by [REDACTED]
13 (phonetic). The date that I have, copy I have, is
14 April 25, 2003.

15 And it states that -- I'll just read it:
16 "The management team failed to determine who was
17 responsible to make the final decision on some issues
18 and achieve alignment on the decision. The basis for
19 the decision resulted in some decisions being made at
20 the [REDACTED] The
21 organization could not decide on what actions had to
22 be performed to resolve BK-400" that would be the
23 Bravo Control Room at Hope Creek. "The Alpha Research
24 pump seal purge relief valve," which we talked about
25 in October.

1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

2 [REDACTED] "And the number 2 turbine
3 bypass valve," which we're talking about tonight as
4 well as last October. The last sentence of the
5 statement is "Once a decision was made the
6 organization failed to obtain alignment at various
7 levels of management."

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So it talks about
9 three issues there.

10 [REDACTED] That's correct.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Where this scenario
12 played out.

13 [REDACTED] Right.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All right.

15 [REDACTED] That killer example was one
16 that I don't personally have a lot of documentation
17 with. I do recall it. It was during this outage. It
18 involved a freon leakage and compliance with some
19 environmental laws.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Now once a
21 decision -- any more on that?

22 [REDACTED] No. We could talk about this
23 -- the notification piece on this reactivity event.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're going to go
25 to that next.

1 [REDACTED] Okay.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'll just go right
3 to that. Yes, well, was there some type of issue with
4 how the -- the Control Room operators handled that and
5 their communication over that issue?

6 [REDACTED] Right. One thing I wanted to
7 put on the record was that I'm reading from the
8 reactivity event root cause that I mentioned earlier.
9 And I'm reading from the event response. But I also
10 recall personally that this is the way the
11 notification to -- into the corrective action system
12 and the management team happened. 7C

13 During the shutdown, and you can get the
14 exact details of it from the report, but at a
15 relatively low power level there was a power
16 oscillation that the crew experienced. It was
17 basically due to, in my words, a misunderstanding with
18 the intent of a procedural step. And that's all
19 documented in the cause report. But the thing I
20 wanted to point out was that that was not brought to
21 management's attention, communicated to senior
22 management until two days following the transient.
23 That's from the root cause report and from a planned
24 outage report. It also says that even that I'm
25 talking about here was not communicated to the

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1 [REDACTED] until the next day, which would
2 have been Monday, whatever that date is. And then the
3 notification was written at that point and then it was
4 raised in priority and significance the following day,
5 which would have been Tuesday. And my recollection is
6 by -- at [REDACTED] request recognizing the
7 potential significance of the event.

8 So in that regard [REDACTED] looked at--
9 very clearly saw the safety significance of an issue
10 and the opportunity to get to the cause and correct it
11 for the future.

12 Just one other thing I wanted to say on
13 that, Jeff, was that I have some personal memory from
14 this, if it helps anytime in the future with the
15 investigation. Myself and the [REDACTED]
16 (phonetic) and there's two other individuals who are
17 involved in training at the time, [REDACTED]
18 (phonetic) and [REDACTED] were asked by [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED] on the following Friday evening, that would
20 have been -- what date would that have been?

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The 21st?

22 [REDACTED] Yes. Yes, the 21st --

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Of March?

24 [REDACTED] I remember that night, I
25 don't know if it's in here or not, but he asked us to

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1 come together and with the data that we had at the
2 time from this which ultimately became the root cause,
3 there was a lot of work done from when he asked the
4 significance to be raised on Tuesday until that Friday
5 night. What did we see being experienced on the unit
6 as well as boiling water reactors and the Control
7 Room's behavior and do an independent assessment of
8 that, which we did.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you uncover why
10 the operators didn't notify management until two days
11 after?

12 [REDACTED] It looked at that, and it
13 talks about it to some extent in this root cause.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you remember
15 what their basis or the reason was for not notifying
16 management?

17 [REDACTED] Not really.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

19 [REDACTED] Not really.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's in the report,
21 though, isn't it?

22 [REDACTED] I believe so, yes.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

24 [REDACTED] It says -- I can -- I can
25 read it right here.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

2 [REDACTED] I do want to qualify one
3 thing. What I said was -- or what I was given the
4 charter was, rather, on Friday night was do you see
5 this thing -- what's the significance of this thing as
6 you see it and from the event -- or from the
7 information that we had. And -- and myself and [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] and -- said, yes, it's a root cause, there
9 should be a root cause and it should be -- it should
10 be significant.

11 You asked me about why -- why they
12 wouldn't bring it up. And -- I'm reading from -- I
13 actually highlighted this when I read it before I came
14 in here. It's on page 30 of the root cause. And it
15 talks about the shift manager related that he was
16 asked that question that you just asked me. The shift
17 manager related that he wanted to clearly review and
18 define the problem prior to entering a notification in
19 (inaudible) and did not believe that the time delay in
20 entering a notification was significant. It states
21 that QA personnel who were there did not recognize the
22 significance. (inaudible) engineering supervisor
23 discussed the matter with his manager. Decided to see
24 if the ops department self-identified the issue.

25 So, I wasn't part of the root cause, but

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1 that's what -- that's what in the document.
2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] that night?
4 [REDACTED] I can look it up. I think it
5 was [REDACTED] I'm not sure if it's in this
6 document or not.
7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
8 [REDACTED] I'm pretty sure
9 it was him. I'm not sure if it's in this document or
10 not.
11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
12 [REDACTED]: So that's what's going on
13 with that.
14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now, in this event
15 and [REDACTED] involvement would have been something--
16 his involvement, his drive, his direction was
17 something -- was it something you viewed as positive?
18 [REDACTED] Yes.
19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
20 [REDACTED] Definitely.
21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
22 [REDACTED] Definitely. Yes. And in
23 bringing out something that could have been a blind
24 spot for the rest of the organization.
25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

1 [REDACTED] Yes. Anything more on that
2 issue?

3 [REDACTED] No, I don't think so. I'd
4 encourage you to -- if you have more interest in it,
5 I mean I -- to look through this and harass the
6 residents or for somebody in the region to look
7 through it.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

9 [REDACTED] I think that could help you
10 out.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So we've
12 gone over in a little bit more detail the bypass valve
13 issue and this -- the shutdown and then the reactivity
14 issue?

15 [REDACTED] Right.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From what we've
17 talked about the first time, is there more you want to
18 add on that or other things that we've talked about?
19 If not, I was going to move to where management is now
20 and how you see things are down here now at the site.

21 [REDACTED] I don't think I have anything
22 further at this time. I mean, I could continue, but I
23 don't think -- I don't think it would be that helpful
24 to you.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Now,

1 before we go to differences between the way it was
2 then at that meeting, I guess 2003 time period, March
3 2003 time period under the old management regime and
4 now, I have a couple of questions on some technical
5 issues that we've --

6 [REDACTED] Good.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- come up that I
8 think I'll --

9 [REDACTED]: Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And then when we
11 get through that, we'll go --

12 [REDACTED] That'd be good.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Just let me stop
14 for just a second.

15 (Whereupon, a recess).

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're back
17 on. It's about quarter after 5:00.

18 The first issue I wanted to see if you
19 have any knowledge or can provide some insight in is
20 coming out of a Salem spring 2001 outage -- now I'm
21 going back a little bit here.

22 [REDACTED]: Okay.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I have full power
24 for a very short time and some type of electrical type
25 issue caused a generator trip, turbine trip or reactor

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1 trip. It all happened. Some type of electrical type
2 of issue. [REDACTED] would have been -- I think he
3 would have been the [REDACTED] at that time.

4 [REDACTED]: Could have been, yes.
5 Probably.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Does that issue
7 ring a bell to you at all; up for a very short period
8 of time, something happens electrical that --

9 [REDACTED]: From a technical standpoint
10 I could guess what it was, but I don't think that
11 would really help your investigation.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No.

13 [REDACTED]: It's probably was something
14 to do with lightening arresters on a transformer.
15 But--

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No. I think it was
17 something inside the plant, not on the outside.

18 [REDACTED]: Oh, really?

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. I think it was
20 something inside.

21 [REDACTED]: An electrical problem?

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

23 [REDACTED]: I'd have to look a few things
24 up.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, the thing I

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1 wanted to talk about was, you know at that point in
2 time were there concerns here among -- that were maybe
3 voiced to you about if this happens, it can make our
4 performance indicator go from green to white? Do you
5 remember that kind of concern --

6 [REDACTED] No.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- being floated
8 around, discussed at high levels down here at the
9 site? You know, the NRC went to that color code --

10 [REDACTED] Yes, I remember. I remember-

11 -

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And certain things
13 could cause a plant's performance indicator to change.
14 And I know this is a while ago, spring of '01.

15 [REDACTED] I can't really remember that.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You remember that--

17 [REDACTED] No.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- being an issue
19 at all? Having to shut a plant down, how long it
20 would take to get back up before an indicator might
21 change in the NRC's eyes? Do you remember that --

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- being a concern
24 or a --

25 [REDACTED] No, I don't remember having

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1 conversations about that or of that ever being an
2 issue.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. This is
4 a Salem issue, this next one.

5 SJ check (phonetic) values.

6 [REDACTED] Okay.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Four and five, 12
8 to 13 were leaking.

9 [REDACTED] Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Approximately two
11 years ago, so that would be --

12 [REDACTED]: I'm not heavy technically on
13 Salem. I know which ones you're talking about.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But the issue was
15 that there was -- these valves were leaking and at
16 that time it was a surveillance requirement.

17 [REDACTED] Yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You know, if it
19 fails the surveillance, it may cause you to do other
20 certain things.

21 [REDACTED] Right.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was done here
23 was eventually that was -- it was engineered away.
24 Those valves were -- something was done to design to
25 cause that not to be a surveillance requirement

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1 anymore in those valves.

2 [REDACTED] Okay.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know about
4 that particular issue?

5 [REDACTED] Very little.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Tell me what you
8 know?

9 [REDACTED] Well --

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm not being real
11 helpful here, but these are some of the things we've
12 tripped on I'm picking your brain about what you might
13 know about it.

14 [REDACTED] Well, with my background I'm
15 a lot better on when you go into the path on the Hope
16 Creek side --

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I know.

18 [REDACTED]: -- than I am on the Salem
19 side.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I know.

21 [REDACTED]: That's my --

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I recognize that.

23 [REDACTED]: If you go to the second or
24 third question and we get starting getting into what
25 specifically what the event was, I might know nothing

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1 at all.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No. It's more like
3 the decision. I guess shift managers and the AOM
4 wanted leak testing done.

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The decision was
7 made above their level we're not going to do that.

8 [REDACTED] And see, I wouldn't be in the
9 loop on that.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

11 [REDACTED] Because I don't -- I was in
12 [REDACTED] at the time. I know what the valves
13 are.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 [REDACTED] I know what their requirement
16 is. I know we've had a problem with them.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

18 [REDACTED]: Ad we're doing the testing
19 with them in the past. And it's conversational at
20 best. I would never have been in a meeting like, say,
21 with a bypass valve line because that's not where my
22 expertise was.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Supposedly

24 [REDACTED] (phonetic) made a decision or provided
25 direction --

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[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- to the staff that no we're not going to do the testing. Here's what we're going to do.

[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] I wouldn't know.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Another Salem issue.

[REDACTED] All right. It's possible, I mean I look --

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Salem 1, October 2003.

[REDACTED] Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The BF-19 valve issue?

[REDACTED] Oh, FME. The foreign material on the valve?

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. And the issue was identified. It took a number of hours to get to where the decision was made to do it.

[REDACTED] Yes, I know a little bit about this one. It's more recent and --

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] That was a fault?

1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. Salem 1.

2 [REDACTED] And I don't know all the
3 players. I can give, you know, a little bit of the
4 players and some of the stuff that went on.

5 So this valve sits there and it feeds the
6 steam generators and it can -- (inaudible). And
7 somebody figures out the valve isn't moving. I don't
8 know if they actually picked it up on a level change
9 or the thing just wasn't moving.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 [REDACTED] And so they start going in
12 and asking questions, and they do -- it sounds -- from
13 my memory, Jeff, it was a -- and I don't mean this is
14 in the teeth gnashing sense, but I mean it was -- the
15 way I remember it is it's a -- I don't have all the
16 details like I do on the bypass valve part. From my
17 position --

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 [REDACTED] -- it was a -- it was a
20 decision done properly where the bypass valve took too
21 long.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

23 [REDACTED] In my position. And once
24 again, I wasn't involved in the details, but from my
25 memory it lasted about a shift. We -- we had

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1 dispatched [REDACTED] (phonetic), he's one of the
2 guys that works in the plant for our department whose
3 a valve expert. And the same thing happened in a
4 sense of is it a positioner problem or a control
5 problem, or is a mechanical problem.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED] And there was -- without --
8 I don't know all the details, but there was time
9 compression, if you will, with a bypass valve example
10 where if the bypass valve took two days, just a shift
11 to go through that process.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Right.

13 [REDACTED] And there was a plant manager
14 who decided. And it never had to get a million people
15 into a room that was, okay, what is it, the tech
16 issues processes goes on and boom, boom, boom. Okay.
17 And I think they actually had to train --

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, there was
19 training done. Yes.

20 [REDACTED] And as I recall the shutdown
21 was done well --

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

23 [REDACTED] -- under somewhat challenging
24 circumstances.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Some people have

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1 said that they thought even and compared to the other
2 issue we talked about, this is a lot shorter.

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It was still too
5 long.

6 [REDACTED] Yes. And that would be a
7 judgment call.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Anything on what --

9 [REDACTED] I had not -- go ahead.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: On what may have
11 caused that or can you say it was excessively long?

12 [REDACTED] From my opinion it was not
13 excessively long.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

15 [REDACTED] Having been in those shoes
16 before, you know, I think you need -- you need to go
17 through systematically a -- what all the matters could
18 be.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

20 [REDACTED] And then -- and then
21 eliminate the easy ones and get to that point. If
22 that's -- and I don't recall what exactly how long it
23 took. But if that's a shift, the way you have to go
24 through that systematically and then make the
25 decision, I don't think that's too long -- like two

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1 days.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.

3 The [REDACTED] steam leak issue at
4 Salem. I don't think we talked about that the first
5 time.

6 [REDACTED] I don't think so. I've been
7 interviewed by our corporate personnel on that.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Did you have
9 involvement in --

10 [REDACTED] No.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

12 [REDACTED] I know something of the
13 issue, though.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Shooting the dart,
15 what can you offer about --

16 [REDACTED] Okay. There's -- I don't
17 remember the time frame and all that. I don't remember
18 if the individual -- I think -- I think my memory of
19 the circumstance was the individual -- or [REDACTED] was not
20 on shift.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 [REDACTED] I think he was the [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] And he was -- there was some type of leak
24 in the turbine building on one of the units. And the
25 valve was in the overhead.

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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] And I seem to remember it was -- I don't know which valve it is, but it was a rather large valve, it at least had a big handle on it.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] It was a manual valve. And-- and the direction was to shut the valve and you go into it remote -- remotely or locally is a better word.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED]: Using the valve handle. There was no motor operator control from a local panel or from the control room.

And I think that there was some disagreement with the crew in the OS on being able to safely shut the valve.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There was steam coming out of it.

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] I guess it was out of the packing plant. I don't recall.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] And from my understanding [REDACTED] did shut the valve.

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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] And --

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And people had --
certain people -- the union people had problems with
what --

[REDACTED] That's my understanding.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] That's my understanding.

That's -- that's the level of detail I know.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] I know socially from being
asked if before kind of having been explained -- I was
involved in the investigation or anything like that.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So the --

[REDACTED] Nor do I know what the
ramifications were to [REDACTED] or anything.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I guess the
issue is there are certain conduct of operations.

[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's an issue, I
guess.

[REDACTED] Yes. Right. Exactly.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And the company
conducted their own investigation on that . . .

(Whereupon, off the record. End side 1,

1 tape 1).

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Water's coming out
3 of the ground. You had to excavation around the pipe.
4 They built a -- a little station was built there.

5 [REDACTED] At the intake --

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

7 [REDACTED] Okay.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, no, as it's
9 coming into the --

10 [REDACTED] Into the plant?

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- plant. They had
12 to build a little structure for the operator to watch
13 it to observe. Because at some point if there is
14 enough leakage to cause a plant to shutdown.

15 [REDACTED]: Yes, I know about this. No,
16 this was out by the river.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I thought it
18 was where it came into the building.

19 [REDACTED] What's your time? Do you
20 have a date on it?

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No. I probably do.

22 [REDACTED] It should have been like
23 around Christmas time two years ago or something.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let me go check.

25 (Whereupon, a recess).

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Just
2 for clarification, [REDACTED] This issue we're talking
3 about, you believe it happened December time frame?

4 [REDACTED]: That would be my -- I could
5 be off by a year. I remember it being cold outside.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED]: And I remember it being
8 around Christmas time.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And we're talking
10 about the same issue?

11 [REDACTED]: That's correct. Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But in your job
13 duties at that time, were you responsible for any of
14 the work on that or identifying the problem, or
15 resolving the issue?

16 [REDACTED]: No.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Maybe you
18 can just tell me what you know about it?

19 [REDACTED]: My recollection is from my
20 job duties, I had the [REDACTED] at the
21 time. And it's exactly what you said, Jeff. There
22 was -- there was some water bubbling up from the
23 ground between the intake structure out by the river
24 at service water and the macadam roadway there, a
25 space of 25 to 30 feet where there was soil. And

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1 there was water bubbling up.

2 And here's my memory. The first thing
3 that it could be was that there was a backwash line
4 from the strainers that's underground that could have
5 been -- could have been leaking. And -- and they do
6 little tests on that, and that wasn't it.

7 Well, that left only one option, and that
8 was the --

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Surface water
10 pipes.

11 [REDACTED] The big surface water pipes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 [REDACTED] That were buried underground.

14 And so we had to -- we had to go get that.

15 And there was some experience in the
16 maintenance department. [REDACTED] had some as well from his
17 days at ComEd.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] Yes. And some other fellas
20 that they had to repair that. And I think there was
21 another fella up from -- had some experience at Three
22 Mile Island.

23 But anyway, to make a long story short,
24 when you dig that stuff up the soil itself is built
25 and compacted such that it's part of a restraining

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1 thing, so it's like a seismic support, if you will.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, okay.

3 [REDACTED] So the pipe doesn't fall
4 apart in an earthquake.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

6 [REDACTED]: So you have to keep it
7 compacted. So taken apart, you just don't get a
8 backhoe in there and dig it up and find the pipe. You
9 have to be very careful to maintain operability.

10 So, I don't know if time line was a
11 concern or was brought up as a concern as part of the
12 investigation you're doing, but that was something --
13 that was something that needed to be planned.

14 The other thing was that there was --
15 there was other pipes, obviously, in the way and you
16 didn't want to effect those. But anyway, so that was
17 dug up. That took a little bit of time to plan up.
18 And that was around the holidays.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED] And ultimately what you had
21 was, you had a cover for it and there was some backhoe
22 operation and there was actually quite a bit of manual
23 digging until they got to the thing. And it was
24 bubbling up like, you know like spring water.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

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1 [REDACTED] And you had mentioned about
2 operators being stationed out there.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

4 [REDACTED] There was like a cover and it
5 was -- there was a -- a mud sucker kind of pump that
6 went into the hole. And then that pump would pump out
7 into a storm drain. And that had to be monitored. And
8 there was some type of leakage rate that was defined--

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED] -- that could be -- maintain
11 operability of the header.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Correct.

13 [REDACTED] And I don't know what that
14 number was, but it was equated to the run time on a
15 pump or something. And in case things changed
16 quickly, there was an operator that was required to be
17 staged out there.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 [REDACTED] And literally an aluminum hut
20 just like you would have a back yard of a --

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A shed?

22 [REDACTED] A shed. Yes. And it wasn't
23 great working conditions, but that guy sat there with
24 his radio. And that lasted, from my memory, Jeff,
25 four weeks.

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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] Six weeks, until we could line up the repairs. Because this is a specialty repair that had to be done and the folks came in. And they came in and fixed it. But during that my memory is a four to six week time frame is when there was operators stationed out there.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] And I had probably stopped by there three or four times in my travels through the plant: (A) to kind of cheer up who was ever there; (B) see what was going on, see if the standards were being maintained and all that.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In your eyes they were?

[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] Yes. You know --there was -- I recall one time that there was a safety issue that I noticed with another individual I was walking around with at the time (inaudible) brought up, and we fixed it. The hose was being run and was being supported off the aluminum shed.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] And it was full of water. And

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1 I had a bit of an industrial safety concern with that.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

3 [REDACTED]: That could be. That's my
4 memory of it. It's fairly vivid because it wasn't an
5 ideal working conditions out there.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED]: And he (inaudible).

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think I'm done
9 with my new technical issues, but I want to just make
10 sure and then we'll go to where we were then.

11 [REDACTED]: Okay.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And where we are
13 now.

14 [REDACTED]: Okay.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We'll have some
16 discussion about that.

17 [REDACTED]: Sure.

18 (Whereupon, a recess.)

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The time is 20 of
20 5:00 and I've gone -- 20 of 6:00. I'm sorry. I've
21 gone over some of the technical issues that I wanted
22 to talk to [REDACTED] about.

23 Now, I mean, you've got a new management
24 group in here now.

25 [REDACTED]: Right.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And we talked in
 2 October, it's not January. And [REDACTED] and his
 3 regime before, well why don't we talk about him a
 4 little bit and then get through to where we are --
 5 where you see management today and how they're running
 6 things and doing things here in the plant. And then
 7 that's what they're saying to people by what they're
 8 saying and doing.

9 [REDACTED]: Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why don't you just
 11 go right ahead and go into it?

12 [REDACTED]: Sure. I had shared some of
 13 this off the record with Jeff, but this is my
 14 reflections on what I wanted to provide NRC on this
 15 investigation for Safety Conscious Work Environment
 16 and how some of the management theme, if you will,
 17 comes through. And so in light of Jeff's comments
 18 I'll start in August of 2000.

19 There was a lightening strike which
 20 effected the Hope Creek Station. And there was some
 21 reduction in power. And the unit was brought back to
 22 power and without seed water heating, which the valves
 23 had isolated. And [REDACTED] had talked to all the
 24 operators at that time and one of the -- four of the
 25 words that I remember from that was, you know, "You

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1 don't get it" was what I determine the theme of his
2 speech. And the "You don't get it" was about -- it
3 was all about safety and it was all about he was very
4 in tune with safety. And I don't mean to imply that
5 he ever was not. I don't mean that by those comments
6 at all.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 [REDACTED] However, when he was saying
9 "You don't get it" to the operators, what he was
10 saying was that you don't have the authority to raise
11 power as a licensed operator. That's management's
12 responsibility. They're given that responsibility.

13 And after the August 2000 -- and he had
14 both Salem and Hope Creek operators in there.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] And that was the theme of
17 that speech. And one of the corrective actions that
18 came out of that event was this TARP process that we
19 talked about earlier tonight.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 [REDACTED] And what it is is a
22 management response process for events. We use it
23 very infrequently now. We'll talk about some of the
24 changes here at the end.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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[REDACTED] But that management response process, you probably have been given some briefing on it. But the theme of it was for the operators to stabilize the plant, turn it over to the management response team and let them deal with the issue.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would that be for a decision to raise power as well as bring power down?

[REDACTED] That and lower threshold items as well.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED] It could be things that did not directly effect reactivity.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] It could be items where a piece of equipment like a chiller or something trips unexpectedly, something unexpected happens. And there was criterias set in the procedure regs.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] So, the effect of that, Jeff, was over the course of time, and it didn't take a heck of a long time either, was in my words disempowerment of the operators.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED] It was counter intuitive to all the training you receive ultimately leading up to

1 the NRC examine as a license operator.

2 So they never felt good about that and
3 never came to just terms with it in their minds.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Even up to the
5 shift manager level?

6 [REDACTED] That's correct.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] That's correct. It became a
9 way of life, but I would say that -- I would say that
10 in my opinion I would agree with the ~~shift manager~~
11 comment.

12 I think when we talked earlier, Jeff,
13 about -- and I'll talk about some other issues here
14 that you did not bring up, but when you talk about
15 this bypass valve issue and some meetings, these
16 contentious meetings, that undercurrent is there.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You don't it?

18 [REDACTED] Right. And we talked about
19 the Vice President has to make the decision.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] When I talk about that,
22 that's the undercurrent that's dawned in my mind from
23 August 2000 and evolved into the turbine bypass valve
24 type issue. -7

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

1 [REDACTED] I'm jumping around a little
2 bit, but I think you know all the issues well enough
3 now. When I answer a question on the BF-19 at Salem
4 in August of 2003 and I say, gosh, it went better. It
5 was the right people involved. It was not only
6 shorter but more timely and the right people were
7 involved; that's the framework that I'm coming from.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

9 [REDACTED] That would be like in my
10 world the way I answer questions from you, that's --
11 that's -- to jump to the end, that's a concrete
12 difference I see today than yesterday.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A good change?

14 [REDACTED] Yes.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] Yes. And that can be
17 judgmental with yourself and other members of the NRC,
18 but that's the way I see things.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED] I wanted to talk about some
21 other stuff on the TARP and overall. From a
22 management perspective, and I don't want to blame
23 everything on this TARP thing, but when you get into
24 this management response thing management like myself
25 and many others up here and level below me during that

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1 time frame are always running from fire to fire.
2 Always running from fire to fire. And when we talked
3 about that March 2003 thing and the plants don't run
4 well, and this is not a well performing site, but when
5 they don't, then you can never ground the site on the
6 programs and processes needed to move forward in a
7 systematic and controlled fashion because to get to
8 this process you're always being demanded to run from
9 fire to fire.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 [REDACTED] And the disempowerment or
12 disengagement tends to feed on itself at that point.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

14 [REDACTED]: And tends to feed up, okay.
15 You know, we talked about the shift managers on the
16 TARP. It tends to feed up, okay. And you get in that
17 thing where we talked about it I believe off the
18 record where I'm just going to wait for the Vice
19 President to make the decision on the shutdown.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 [REDACTED]: Okay. So that's where the
22 context of those answers come in.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's what [REDACTED]
24 basically said in that meeting, though.

25 [REDACTED] Yes.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: People -- that the
2 operator at the control room level don't have the
3 power to make that decision.

4 [REDACTED] Right.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's management.

6 [REDACTED] Right.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Above that.

8 [REDACTED] Right.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

10 [REDACTED]: And that was -- that's my
11 point. That's my point on that.

12 I think there's two other points on this
13 organizational aspect and then we'll move on to
14 another subject that did not help the whole thing,
15 that's different today than it was yesterday. So
16 maybe I'm answering the end question also.

17 We didn't have plant managers, and we
18 talked about with the regional. Not knowing whose
19 making a decision, I'm using plant managers as one
20 example of many that can be done through this reorg
21 and what's different today than yesterday. That was
22 a real problem before.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 [REDACTED]: That was a very real problem
25 in the eyes of the folks who worked in the plant

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1 before. And the other one that's a little bit more
2 hidden and that Hub (phonetic) likes to bring up all
3 the time and he's right on the money, is the system
4 engineering role. It has been functionally eliminated
5 and functionally reinstated it.

6 So when you look at this, what I call this
7 TARP process, it was really -- in reality it was a
8 Band-Aid for not having whose accountable for the
9 plant or whose accountable for maintenance or ops, or
10 whatnot, and whose accountable down to the equipment,
11 to the system.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 [REDACTED] If you have that, you don't
14 need that TARP process. And then if you have somebody
15 whose accountable and they do get it.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

17 [REDACTED] Okay. And so in my words
18 whether they're on the mark or not, what I believe is
19 that's the primary differences between today and
20 yesterday.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now you have plant
22 managers where before you didn't.

23 [REDACTED] Functionally reinstated
24 system engineers.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And now you have

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1 system engineers. Under whose regime were the system
2 engineering taken away? Was it [REDACTED] or was it
3 before that?

4 [REDACTED] I think it was before it,
5 actually.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED] I think it was before it.
8 And we said we had them, but we didn't.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED] We didn't.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And who --

12 [REDACTED] And some poor guy who had
13 surf water and service water at Salem and Hope Creek,
14 can you imagine having those four systems on the -- I
15 don't know how well you know this site.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I've heard a
17 lot about service water in the last three or four
18 months. So I couldn't imagine doing much more than
19 that even.

20 [REDACTED] It's a horrible thing.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And when was the
22 system engineering group reconstituted? Was it fairly
23 recent?

24 [REDACTED]: In the reorg this summer.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

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[REDACTED] Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] Yes. Some of those guys have the same things, but they're -- and it's not perfect. It's not perfect. They got a long way to go.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] They got a lot of catching up to do. But they're on the right track.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. You now on the right book.

[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're talking about people being given titles and responsibility?

[REDACTED] Right. Right.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But now you have new people running the site now also?

[REDACTED] Right.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We talked about that some.

[REDACTED] I'd like to --

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or you want to get to that in a little bit.

[REDACTED] I'd like to get to that in a little bit.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

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1 [REDACTED] Yes, if I could.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

3 [REDACTED]: Because I think that -- I
4 think at least in my heart I'm giving you some tone
5 and perspective on some of the events that will help
6 you draw lines along with the residents and others and
7 other interviews you have. But anyway, I'll take some
8 more stabs and hopefully it'll help you out.

9 Whether it assists empowerment or not, I
10 won't pass any more judgments. But in my opinion
11 there was clearly some leadership issues that we had
12 in the examples that you've asked me about.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

14 [REDACTED]: And whether -- I'm not going
15 to pass judgment on why.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

17 [REDACTED]: But here's my words. The
18 several examples where department managers failed to
19 draw "lines in the sand" and say that's enough. And
20 the classic example I could give you, which I'm sure
21 you've been interviewing people on, is this exhaust
22 leakage on the Bravo diesel at Hope Creek where these
23 guys --

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You brought that
25 up.

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[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: During our first interview.

[REDACTED]

Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. The manifold leak that's leaking out.

[REDACTED]

It's like keeping your car running and in the garage.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In the garage.

[REDACTED]

And going in to work on your circular saw. You just wouldn't do it.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED]

And we should have shut it down. We should have shut it down and fixed it. Ultimately, we probably could have done it in 30 hours safety in an LCO (phonetic), but that time cite if we had planned it up right. But that was inappropriate. And the research seal, which we've talked about, could be another example of that.

Can we go off the record for a second? I'll read some of these notes here and then I'll come back.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED]

I just don't want to miss anything.

1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 5:51.

2 (Whereupon, a recess).

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Back on. It's
4 about 5:53.

5 We were going to talk about the IMPO
6 (phonetic) evaluation, the last IMPO evaluation of the
7 plant.

8 [REDACTED] Yes. On the IMPO evaluation,
9 you asked me some questions, Jeff, in October on the--
10 on the IMPO stuff. And I'm losing track. We've been
11 on and off the record a couple of times. I don't think
12 I've said this on the record or not yet, but --

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, we haven't
14 talked about this tonight.

15 [REDACTED] Okay. In my experience with
16 corporate at public service, and corporate being
17 senior management and anyone else involved in the
18 operation from Newark, I haven't -- I could not point
19 to an event or an issue at my level or my involvement
20 that I saw that was -- [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] (phonetic) up there, you know those type
23 people, putting business pressures on us that were
24 undue.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

1 [REDACTED] I don't -- that's just not --
2 at least I interface with them several times a year,
3 not on a regular basis, but I never saw or heard or
4 felt a notion of that. And I wanted to talk about
5 some examples that -- about the IMPO thing.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I mean, I
7 think I asked you this the first time we talked; when
8 [REDACTED] is being so strongly positioned on the
9 turbine bypass valve issue.

10 [REDACTED] Right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I asked you do you
12 have any knowledge of him getting any direction from
13 Newark management on that issue? You looked at me
14 like I was crazy. And still you --

15 [REDACTED] I don't know. And then the
16 thing that disturbed me was I made some reference on
17 that tape --

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 [REDACTED] With Dr. Harmon on there.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There is a
21 reference to Newark, right.

22 [REDACTED] Yes. And I -- the reason I'm
23 going past this, what I'm reading from here is this is
24 what I wrote that Saturday or Sunday after -- after
25 that initial interview with you.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. Okay.

2 [REDACTED] And I don't know where --
3 whether that reference that I said in Dr. Harmon's
4 office came from. Okay. I'm not disputing,
5 obviously, that I said it.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 [REDACTED] But I don't -- I honestly
8 searched my brain and thought down and wrote several
9 things down. And I couldn't come up with a tie that
10 would make me say that.

11 And I do have -- I did come up with a
12 reference that I thought could be useful for the
13 investigation, perhaps, but that wasn't -- that wasn't
14 any undue pressure, schedule pressure that --

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] was
17 putting on.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, go ahead.

19 [REDACTED] The reference is this,
20 obviously site operations is the IMPO thing haven't
21 been that great and we get this -- this IMPO 3 grade,
22 the low grade --

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 [REDACTED] -- in 2002, in the summer of
25 2002. And I'm in a meeting on October 9th where in

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1 this building here, in the CNO's office with the
2 senior management team here. This was after the IMPO
3 evaluation. I mean, we had some presentation to do on
4 what our plan was. It was accountability meeting.
5 And the attendees were [REDACTED]

6

7

8

[REDACTED] (phonetic), but I'm not sure.

9

10 And we went through some -- what our plans
11 were and what we're going to do for the next two years
12 to kind of improve. And nobody was feeling great
13 about where we were.

14

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15

[REDACTED] And he was quiet --

16

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who's that?

17

[REDACTED]
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

18

19 [REDACTED]: He was very pointed when he
20 said it, and he said "All I'm looking for is results
21 and matrix on improvement that this is a healthy
22 nuclear operation." And he was very pointed. He was
23 very short. He wasn't -- he wasn't screaming. He
24 wasn't cursing. He wasn't doing anything -- any
25 haranguing. He was all about he wants excellent
operations down here. "And if you can't deliver it,"

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1 this was the quote as I re member it, "If you can't
2 deliver it, I'm capable of finding somebody who will."

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 [REDACTED]: And whatever operations
5 haven't been satisfactory, whatever, it's internally
6 generated whether there's oversight that provides the
7 feedback. I've been around the guy and the company
8 since he's been a [REDACTED] That's his manner.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED]: And I -- so that's the most
11 recent example I could give, which was very direct. I
12 was in the room and I went through the whole painful
13 grading process with him sitting in there. And then
14 six weeks later. So having to sit through this
15 meeting and -- and I believe that that's what he's
16 about. And I believe that those under him are the
17 same way, they reflect that. So that's my position
18 there.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Could people have
20 taken it the wrong way, though? Like, I mean, he
21 wanted nuclear operating excellence? Is that the
22 words that [REDACTED] used?

23 [REDACTED]: Yes. He knows -- he knows
24 what it takes to --

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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1 [REDACTED] -- you know, have a good
2 operating facility at a nuclear site.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But if
4 you're not operating at near peak or near peak
5 capacity, then --

6 [REDACTED] No, this guys was -- this guy
7 was at one time, you know, I forget what the title is.
8 But the head utility guy down at IMPO and he knows all
9 the elements of a health nuclear organization.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He's from a nuclear
11 background, you're saying?

12 [REDACTED] Yes. He used to work at
13 Millstone I think he started his career as a reactor
14 engineer there at Millstone many years ago.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] Oh, yes, he -- he knows
17 probably as well as any CEO that's in the fleet.

18 So --

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you take his
20 comment or direction as a indication that he wanted
21 peak capacity maybe when it --

22 [REDACTED] No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- through plant
24 operations or couldn't support that?

25 [REDACTED] No. That's what I'm saying.

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1 I know where you're leading. I never -- I can't
2 emphasize this enough. I never got that impression.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That he was placing
4 undue pressure on the site to keep the plant up?

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Keep the plant
7 operating dispute what's really going on?

8 [REDACTED]: Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Never got that,
10 never saw that, never heard that, is that right?

11 [REDACTED]: That's correct. The whole
12 focus from our corporate operation is, you know, if
13 there's ever a physical challenge, it's from a
14 business -- from a cost control end. To give you what
15 you need but then you hit what you say you're going to
16 hit.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

18 [REDACTED] Money wise.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED] And that's -- now that
21 question for you, okay, the only thing I can say is
22 is, you know, I don't know where your goal here is and
23 everything you can flush out, but that question needs
24 to be asked to levels above me. Because I'm just
25 giving you a lot of buffer between me and what's at

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1 Newark. But that's what I know.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You know, talking
3 about costs and they give you what they need, have
4 there been issues down here where if it's determined
5 that the cost is going to be a corporate cost and not
6 a nuclear cost, the decision's easier to okay let's go
7 ahead and do it then?

8 [REDACTED] No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because I got a --
10 I forgot about this.

11 [REDACTED] I don't know what you mean by
12 corporate nuclear cost.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right There's an
14 issue where the -- in September of this year, there's
15 arcing out in the switchyard.

16 [REDACTED] Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know about
18 this?

19 [REDACTED] Yes. Because Hurricane
20 Isabel --

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, the
22 hurricane. [REDACTED] is involved in this.

23 [REDACTED] Yes.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And --

25 [REDACTED] I don't believe he was there

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1 that night.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And from
3 what I understand, he actually went out to the
4 switchyard, saw what he was being told.

5 [REDACTED] Right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And then when the
7 problem then becomes a corporate type piece of
8 equipment, okay, we'll go ahead and now do what we
9 have to do. Because it's not in our cost anymore. Do
10 you know anything about that?

11 [REDACTED] Yes, I know a lot about it.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you get a whiff
13 of it being the way I just described it?

14 [REDACTED] No.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Any --

16 [REDACTED]: No. This is -- this is -- I'm
17 glad you brought this one up. I mean, this is another
18 one like --

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is fresh. This
20 is fairly fresh.

21 [REDACTED]: Yes. Like we were talking
22 about a little bit ago in the service water thing.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 [REDACTED] I mean, I was pretty involved
25 in this, and from my experience when you asked deltas

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1 between, you know, I use the names [REDACTED]
2 (phonetic) regimes?

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 [REDACTED]: This is one of those good
5 story/bad story things.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED]: The good story on the Isabel
8 thing is well the preps were good. You know, you got
9 the salting thing. It looked like the Pacific Ocean
10 out there when I was here that day and when it was
11 storming.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 [REDACTED]: And [REDACTED] actually here on
14 midnight where he staffed up the emergency response
15 facility.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

17 [REDACTED]: And he's the senior guy.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because a
19 hurricane's coming in. Right.

20 [REDACTED]: This is actually the day
21 after the hurricane, as I'm sure where you live, too,
22 we got a heck of a lot of wind but we didn't get as
23 much rain as we thought.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

25 [REDACTED]: But what happened was, it was

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1 blowing up here and that salt water went into the air,
2 into the atmosphere and it blew onto the insulator.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 [REDACTED] So then on that Friday night,
5 I think it was, I remember this was going on -- or
6 Thursday night it all evaporated of the ground. What
7 was left was the salt deposits.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

9 [REDACTED] And -- and it was a
10 (inaudible) out there.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

12 [REDACTED] And we had had a problem with
13 the Hope Creek unit, it was down during the hurricane.
14 And at the Salem units, [REDACTED] was here and along with
15 some others. [REDACTED] (phonetic) was the [REDACTED] I
16 remember him, too. And [REDACTED] was actually the one that
17 made the recommendation, you know, the unit's going to
18 -- has a strong likelihood of tripping --

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED]: -- that night because the
21 thing -- if one of these arcs make it to ground, well
22 that'll be enough to trip things in the switch yard
23 and then that'll ultimately take the unit out of
24 service. So we ought to take the units out of service
25 for lack of that.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

2 [REDACTED]: And we did.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 [REDACTED]: And we did. And went through
5 cleaning all the insulators and whatnot.

6 I think -- I don't know where you're
7 getting your information, Jeff, but my memory is the
8 phone calls had to go up to Newark that we were --
9 that we had to shut both units down. Obviously we had
10 to call them. But we had to shut both units down and
11 here was why. And then what happened was there was
12 questions afterwards the next morning on whose
13 responsible to clean the insulators because of the
14 divisions of -- it wasn't a revenue thing.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. It's a cost
16 thing.

17 [REDACTED]: Yes. Yes. Well, it was like
18 a maintenance cost thing on -- you know, we got to
19 come down here and we had to go clean off all the
20 insulators in the whole switchyard.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

22 [REDACTED]: And there were -- there were
23 people from the regulated side of the business.
24 Because the regulated side of the business in, at
25 least in New Jersey, starts at the step up transformer

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1 out of the plant.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

3 [REDACTED]: Or just after it. So that's
4 what that was all about.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

6 [REDACTED]: I think that's about the
7 maintenance costs of cleaning the insulators during
8 that following week. Not about the lost generation --

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED]: -- of bringing the units
11 down.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about -- talk
13 about this particular issue.

14 [REDACTED]: Sure.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Old regime versus
16 new regime?

17 [REDACTED]: Oh, for this one?

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

19 [REDACTED]: Oh, yes. Well, this is like
20 a dichotomy type thing that I talked about before. I
21 mean, my view of this is, you know, everybody gets on
22 a conference call. And, hey, you know in the old
23 regime this was TARP, everybody drive in. You know,
24 I say everybody; some duty guys they have to muster
25 up. And we had the luxury of already having the

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1 emergency response facility here.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

3 [REDACTED] But in this case it was -- so
4 we had a decision maker there. But nevertheless, the
5 [REDACTED] who was [REDACTED] I was on two conference
6 calls that night I remember. And the first one was he
7 calls up [REDACTED]

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

9 (phonetic)?

10 [REDACTED] Yes. And the [REDACTED]
11 I'm not sure if he was there or not, [REDACTED]
12 (phonetic). And [REDACTED] says I want to get these five
13 guys on the line because I want to talk about this.
14 And I was one of those guys. Okay. So I got on the
15 line. Because [REDACTED] just wants input, right?

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

17 [REDACTED] This is around 1:00 in the
18 morning. And it was a very short conversation. And
19 [REDACTED] said basically what we just talked about. It's
20 a light show out there. I'm concerned about it and I
21 want to bring the units down. It was actually "I'm
22 concerned about, I have these concerns."

23 And I think [REDACTED] was the one who said, my
24 recollection of it, he says to the OS, he says "Well,
25 what do you want to do?" And he says "I think we

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1 ought to shut down."

2 And he says okay. And then somebody says,
3 you know what, there's ERO (phonetic) folks here and
4 then someone said it was either -- because we're
5 sitting at home, right? In the middle of the night
6 what are you going to do? You're not there looking at
7 it.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

9 [REDACTED] And then somebody says well
10 why don't just get another set of eyes. So they
11 staffed up a bunch of ERO or trapped a bunch of ERO
12 people, [REDACTED] of which was the leading guy.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's ERO?

14 [REDACTED]: Emergency response
15 organization.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

17 [REDACTED] Who were here for the storm
18 recovery anyway.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED] And [REDACTED] goes out there and
21 looks at it --

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] Yes. With [REDACTED] and
24 there's another conference call in like 20 minutes.

25 And --

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's [REDACTED]'s say?
2 Anything?

3 [REDACTED]: Let's go.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Go meaning?

5 [REDACTED]: Let's shut down. Don't wait.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 [REDACTED]: And nobody even came in. It
8 was like, okay, we're on board.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. All is go
10 with that?

11 [REDACTED]: Yes. He made the decision
12 and let's go. I mean, the whole thing happened in my
13 recollection -- my recollection was two phone calls.
14 I don't know how long it was. It seemed like it was
15 a short amount of time.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

17 [REDACTED]: It certainly wasn't anything
18 more than an hour.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 [REDACTED]: And they were moving the
21 plant. And I believe -- I believe it would have been
22 similar even if [REDACTED] wasn't there. I don't think that
23 that was a major player, and so --

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: More that you want
25 to go into or you want to go right to --

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[REDACTED]

No.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk about like you and I first talked in October.

[REDACTED]

Yes.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: October 6th. Have you seen changes in management decision making processes. Can we talk about that a little bit?

[REDACTED]

Sure.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is it better down here? Is it getting better progressively under the new management regime that we could talk from that standpoint? If it is, let's talk about it. If not, then we'll talk that, too.

[REDACTED]

I think it is.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED]

I can answer on several levels.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Please.

[REDACTED]

Let's start on the levels that we've been on. The plant manager level and dealing with the plants. We've used several examples which you can draw from. We've already talked about the most recent be the insulators, you know, and some of this moving away from this thought process and everything else we've talked about.

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1 I think that comes from having
2 accountability and the right folks in the right spots.
3 So, and -- well, I'll talk little bit more about that
4 in a second, but that's all very positive.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

6 [REDACTED] And the plants and equipment
7 aren't running as well as we'd like them to do, and
8 we've got a lot of work to do there.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 [REDACTED]: But from our ability to make
11 decisions at the right levels with the right folks,
12 that change is dramatic. And I think I've enough
13 examples on that I don't need to go into that anymore.

14 One thing we haven't talked about that I
15 see is an improvement is, you know, we talked about
16 some of the negative effects of this TARP thing and
17 all, but you take somebody like -- someone in my
18 position or someone in [REDACTED] position. He's the

19 [REDACTED]

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 [REDACTED] And the folks who work for
22 us, now we have -- you know, all the engineering
23 positions and design engineering, system engineering,
24 component engineering, the (inaudible) and whatnot,
25 outages, work management; those people aren't being

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1 drawn to the fire when something happens. They're
2 being handled within the station.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 [REDACTED] Now, they have the expertise
5 where necessary they are. But what I'm talking about
6 was this thought process. So I think what we're going
7 to see is in time we're going to get to what you
8 normally -- well, it's already happening. But what
9 you normally see in nuclear organizations where people
10 are focusing on being held accountable for processes
11 and aren't being pulled out everyday like hit sock
12 (phonetic) or go chase whatever the --

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The fire is?

14 [REDACTED]: -- the most recent fire is.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 [REDACTED] A piece of equipment. And
17 that we're already starting in my world from when I
18 look at data and know what I'm doing kind of deeper in
19 the organization, we're already seeing -- starting to
20 see the benefits of that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good.

22 [REDACTED]: One example I've used on the
23 record would be the PM program. And not to go into
24 details --

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The what program?

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[REDACTED]

The preventive maintenance program.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

[REDACTED]

And I think we're starting to see some benefits there. And I think I see -- you'll see positive going forward. And so -- on the -- on the plant manager level, on the plant level I think that's very positive.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about the corrective action process?

[REDACTED]

Very similar to that with a-- with a probably new spin is -- there's people dedicated to running the process. I think that's better. I think it's going to take time to see the changes. A lot of these things that you get were corrective action often times are latent -- you know.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED]

They're time delayed by some level depending on the organization you're looking at. Design engineering is going to be very long, plan issues can be a couple of months. However, I think that's better.

I think that the other thing that you see is I'm fairly positive about that, too, the ownership in the plants. And [REDACTED] (phonetic) is probably

1 the best example of this where he really changes the
2 mindset of the value of corrective action for the
3 folks. He's one of the [REDACTED] at Hope Creek.
4 As opposed to [REDACTED] (phonetic) at Salem. So I
5 think that's helping as well.

6 I think that's going to take a longer
7 time, Jeff, to really see the fruits. And I think we
8 got -- well, I don't think. We have quite a bit of gap
9 to make up there.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

11 [REDACTED] But I think you're seeing
12 this on the right track with some of this stuff
13 already.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you seen -- I
15 mean, of that senior management group it seems like
16 [REDACTED] is still the only one here. [REDACTED]
17 gone. [REDACTED] gone.

18 [REDACTED] is
19 here.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] is gone.

22 Have you seen any change -- because

23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED] Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And at one

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1 point he as [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED] Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And then [REDACTED]
4 took over for him?

5 [REDACTED] Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But have you seen
7 a change in how he's handling issues, addressing
8 issues since the new management team has come on site
9 here? Have you seen a change in him?

10 [REDACTED] I have to think about that
11 one. I guess. I don't know if I have concrete
12 examples there. Are you talking specifically about

13 [REDACTED]
14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. Well, let me
15 ask you this question, you had that one dealing with
16 [REDACTED] in a meeting where he pushed the meeting
17 to the last --

18 [REDACTED] Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It was an
20 excessively long meeting where everybody thought it
21 was a black and white issues?

22 [REDACTED] Right. Right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Had you ever
24 experienced similar conduct from [REDACTED] on an
25 issue like that?

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[REDACTED] No.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: An operability of tech spec type issues?

[REDACTED] No. Not really. Not really.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

[REDACTED] Well, obviously where my mind is going, Jeff, was the -- I was going to answer the question completely differently, so --

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you answer--

[REDACTED] Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- you know, the way you think you need to. And I'll ask a follow-up if I got a question.

[REDACTED] Okay. [REDACTED] comes in, and I've talked off the record a little bit, but [REDACTED] having worked for several of these guys, you know, has a really unique style that he -- he's -- he's completely hands off as far as -- directly as far as the operation goes, and really -- really holds you accountable, if you will, I mean in a positive way.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED] To execute. And then he has his plan on how you get better. And I don't know if you know [REDACTED] or not, but --

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, I don't.

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1 [REDACTED] But if you engage him in
2 conversation, he'd be happy to walk through the steps
3 of how you make one of these operations spin. And
4 he's implementing that plan. And the first step was
5 a reorganization step and establishing metrics and
6 monitoring those metrics. And going back and
7 adjusting again based on what the metrics tell you.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

9 [REDACTED] And it's working. And it
10 obviously works. He's done this four or five times
11 successfully.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You mentioned his
13 management style; has he empowered the plant managers,
14 the shift managers --

15 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- to be able to
17 make the decisions where before it didn't exist or
18 they weren't given the authority from [REDACTED] "You don't
19 get it." He's given the people, the proper people --

20 [REDACTED] Absolutely.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- the decision
22 making authority now? That's good. You see that as
23 a positive?

24 [REDACTED] Oh, absolutely. I can give
25 you examples of that.

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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED]: And we'll get back to [REDACTED] in a second.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

[REDACTED]: Okay.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's got to get on the record.

[REDACTED]: Because I still didn't answer your full question. But the way [REDACTED] does it, and I'm smiling because I've sat in for [REDACTED] (inaudible), [REDACTED].

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

[REDACTED]: And he's been on the road a couple of times for various things. And he's moved as well as recently for business reasons, I'm his stand in. And I've had to call [REDACTED] a couple of times with some of these plant movements. And I start giving him some details. And he stops me. And I'm training now. But he says, "Look, [REDACTED] he says "First of all, this is what you have to do; is the plant safe?" Answer the question. Is the plant safe? All right. Here's the condition and okay, good. "Are all the people safe?" Yes. "Nobody have any challenges and whatnot?" And -- and -- I forget what the third one is. And he a question about is everybody on board

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1 with what the situation is. Basically if they're on
2 it. Yes. He goes "That's fine." I mean that's all
3 he wants to know.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

5 [REDACTED] He doesn't -- so it's great.
6 It's very refreshing. And then he'll come back with
7 a day later with how we doing with the plant, did it
8 recovery and give you time to do it.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good.

10 [REDACTED] So it's very -- he has a very
11 long term view.

12 So anyway, the reason I brought up [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] was --

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

15 [REDACTED]: Let me get back to [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] The way I was trying to
19 answer the question was, was I think with that change,
20 with the [REDACTED] change --

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

22 [REDACTED] -- anybody at that level is
23 going to have -- officers for the company are going to
24 have anxiety whether they're still here or not, right?

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

1 [REDACTED] Both physically and
2 emotionally and support wise. So they work through
3 that. And so when you asked me the question, I think
4 that there was some anxiety with [REDACTED] okay, on that
5 score. I think he went through that phase. I think
6 what we're starting to see now is we're moving into
7 the management team. And then [REDACTED] is on
8 board, this is a new member, and [REDACTED] has a
9 different role. I think they had to get into their
10 lanes again . . .

11 (Whereupon, off the record. End of tape
12 1 side 2.)

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're on to tape 2.
14 And we were talking about [REDACTED] his new
15 management style and [REDACTED] And why don't you
16 go ahead.

17 [REDACTED] Yes. I think I'm ready to
18 wrap up that. And if there's any other questions.

19 My opinion is -- the way I was going to
20 answer your question was that [REDACTED] seems to be
21 understanding his role now as the [REDACTED]
22 and really getting grounds in the metrics and building
23 a team, being a member of the team with a senior
24 leadership. And it looks to me like -- like he's
25 settling in. So, that's my overall answer.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Generally
2 speaking --

3 [REDACTED] Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- do you feel the
5 work environment has improved since the new management
6 has come on board?

7 [REDACTED] I do.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: For the reasons
9 we've talked about?

10 [REDACTED] Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And people being
12 empowered, bringing systems engineering back, bringing
13 plant managers and others -- we've talked about lots
14 of --

15 [REDACTED] Right. All the examples
16 we've talked about.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Those are some of
18 the --

19 [REDACTED] I'm pretty comfortable with
20 all that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 [REDACTED] And I think there's more to
23 come. I mean, I'm --

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, he hasn't been
25 here that long.

TC

1 [REDACTED] Right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right? I mean, and
3 this is a big site.

4 [REDACTED] Right.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: One of the biggest.

6 [REDACTED] There's more to come.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And we did
8 hit on this just a few minutes ago, but the direction
9 from and the decision making from the senior
10 management at the [REDACTED] type level, it
11 doesn't sound like that that's -- they're not waiting
12 indirectly. They're, like you said, you had them on
13 the phone, he's asking you is the plant safe, are the
14 people safe.

15 [REDACTED] Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We aligned? Fine.
17 And then a couple of days later --

18 [REDACTED] Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- the follow-up
20 question might be how we doing in recovery of the
21 plant.

22 [REDACTED]: Right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If you have to turn
24 it off?

25 [REDACTED] Right.

1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's a different
2 thing how it used to be under the [REDACTED]
3 regime.

4 [REDACTED] Yes.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right?

6 [REDACTED] Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is the TARP team
8 concept done with here?

9 [REDACTED] It's -- it's still there on
10 paper. I believe it's been scaled back procedurally.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 [REDACTED] But we're using it very
13 sparingly. I think that's -- I think we scaled it
14 back significantly by the procedure. Certainly not to
15 where we see some of these issues that we talked about
16 in this interview and in October.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. One more
18 thing on senior management direct input involved in
19 the decision making. When did that first start?
20 Before [REDACTED] came on or did it start after the
21 8/2000 meeting where [REDACTED] says "You don't get it?"

22 [REDACTED] My answer from my perspective
23 is the 8/2000.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Fine.

25 [REDACTED] Before that -- before that

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1 was the recovery of the Salem units. And my answer
2 from my -- where I sit is the 8/2000 thing.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. I don't have
4 anything else.

5 [REDACTED] Let me check my notes one
6 more time. I don't think I do either.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 [REDACTED] I just wanted to say this on
9 the record, I asked to talk to you. And I know we're
10 both very busy. I know you probably wanted to look a
11 few more things before you got back to me and talked
12 to a few more people. I respect that. And I will tell
13 you this, you know, I'm more than willing to share
14 this information that we talked about today and look
15 for some other things. Because I'm interested in
16 fixing it.


17 So if there's other stuff you need in the
18 future, let me know.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I appreciate that.
20 People don't usually tell me that.

21 [REDACTED] I can understand that. 70

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Listen, I
23 appreciate your time tonight, your patience and
24 answering the questions I've asked. If there's
25 anything more you want to add?

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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's about 6:25.

This interview is concluded. Thank you.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded at

6:25 p.m.)

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Docket Number: 1-2003-051F TC

Location: Hancocks Bridge, NJ

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