

Exelon Nuclear Limerick Generating Station P.O. Box 2300 Pottstown, PA 19464 www.exeloncorp.com

Nuclear

10 CFR50.73

May 18, 2006

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

> Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-39 NRC Docket No. 50-352

Subject: LER 1-06-002, SRV Position Indication on Remote Shutdown Panel

This Licensee Event Report (LER) addresses three Safety Relief Valve (SRV) position lights on the Remote Shutdown Panel which failed after a brief period of operation during a refueling surveillance test. This condition was prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.7.4 when at power Modes 1 and 2.

Report Number:

1-06-002

Revision:

00

Event Date:

March 19, 2006

Discovered Date:

March 19, 2006

Report Date:

May 18, 2006

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

There are no commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely.

Rorf J. DeGregorio

Vice President - LGS

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Attachment LER 1-06-002

cc: S. Collins, Administrator Region I, USNRC

S. Hansell, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, LGS

TE22

NRC FO	RM 366			U.S. NUCL	AR R	EGULATOR	RY COMM	SSION	API	PROVE	D BY OME	3: NO. 3150-01	04	EXPIR	S: 06/30/2007		
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)										Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may							
digits/characters for each block)										Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.							
1. FACILITY NAME Limerick Generating Station Unit 1									2. C	DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE 05000 352 1					3		
4. TITLE									.								
	SRV Position Indication on the Remote Shutdown Panel Inoperable 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED																
5. E	VENT C	ATE	6. 1			7. R	EPORT D	ATE	F.	ACILITY		OTHER FAC	ILITIES INV		ET NUMBER		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAF		ACILITY	ALABAT:				5000 ET NUMBER		
03	19	2006	2006	- 002 -	00	05	18	2006	5					0:	5000		
9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)																	
□ 20.2203(a)(1) □ 20.2203(c)(1) □ 50.36(c)(1) □ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) □ 50.36(c)(1) □ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) □ 50.36(c)(1) □ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) □ 50.46(a)(1)						0.2203(a) 0.2203(a) 0.36(c)(1) 0.36(c)(1) 0.36(c)(2) 0.46(a)(3) 0.73(a)(2) 0.73(a)(2)	(3)(ii) (4) (i)(A) (ii)(A) (ii) (i)(A) (i)(B)		0000000	50.73(a) 50.73(a) 50.73(a) 50.73(a) 50.73(a) 50.73(a)	(2)(ii)(A) (2)(ii)(B) (2)(iii) (2)(iv)(A) (2)(v)(A) (2)(v)(B) (2)(v)(C)	50. 50. 50. 50. 73. 73.	73(a)(2)(73(a)(2)(73(a)(2)(73(a)(2)(73(a)(2)(71(a)(4) 71(a)(5) HER cify in Abs	viii)(A) viii)(B) ix)(A) x) stract below			
FACILITY N	IAME				1	2. LICENS	EE CONT	ACT FO	OR 1	HIS L	ER	TEL	EPHONE NUMB	ER (Include	Area Code)		
Robert	E. Kre	eider, M	anager :	Regulatory	Assı	irance	$\mathcal{S}(t) = \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{A}^{(t)}_{t}}$		j .				0-718-340				
			13. COM	PLETE ONE	LINE	OR EACH	COMPO	NENT F	AIL	URE D	ESCRIB	ED IN THIS F	EPORT				
CAU	SE	SYSTEM	СОМРО	NENT FACTU		REPOR TO E		C,	AUSE	•	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU- FACTURE		PORTABLE TO EPIX		
В		JL	HS	. G0	80	Y	7			-	1						
		14	. SUPPL	EMENTAL R	POR	EXPECT	ED					XPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)						⊠ NO				MISSION DATE							
ABSTRA	CT (Lim	it to 1400	spaces, i	l.e., approxima	itely 1	5 single-sp	paced type	written	lines)			<u></u>				
Remote Shutdon position function was a the res	te Shubwn Pin (de- n. The faulty sulting display	and Sa energiz e loss o circuit o "kickba s were	Panel (Ifety Re Ifed) folion Ifed indic Ife	eling outa (RSP) was elief Valve lowing the ation did r When th forced ent ed and EC), which w	beir s (C ope ot al e en irely CR 0	ng perfo , A, and n function ffect the ergy of the into the 6-00138	ormed. N) when on (ene ability the sole red light change.	The reen the regized of the enoid's not bulk end the end of the en	ed/d). d). SF s m b, w	open RV so On s RV to agne hich rcuit	bulbs- blenoid subseq be ope tic field becan design	fatied for the was returned to the was returne	the three ned to th ation, the ne cause s upon d ight befo 111 to ind	Remore closed lights of the e-energy region of the corporate to the corpor	te ed failed to event gization, ent out. ate a		
			•														

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

	FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET (2)		PAGE (3)				
				YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Limerick Gene	erating Station, Unit	<u>1</u>	05000352	2006	- 002	- - 00	2	O F	3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Unit Conditions Prior to the Event

Unit 1 was in Operational Condition (OPCON) 5 (Refueling Mode) in 1R11 Outage on March 19, 2006. There were no structures, systems or components out of service that contributed to this event.

Description of the Event

During the performance of ST-4-041-470-1, "Cyclic Test Of Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Solenoid And Air Operator Assemblies" on March 19, 2006 in outage 1R11, the red/open bulbs for the PSV-41-1F013C, PSV-41-1F013A and PSV-41-1F013N SRVs failed when the SRV solenoids were de-energized. The red/open lights come on when the handswitches for the valves are taken to OPEN. When the handswitches were taken back to CLOSE, the red bulbs became very bright for a short period of time before they went out. On subsequent operations of the handswitches/solenoids, the red indications did not function. Troubleshooting revealed that the red/open bulbs were burned out. This same condition occurred for the C, A, and N SRVs (all of the SRVs controlled at the Remote Shutdown Panel [EIIS:JL]). This is the first time that the SRV solenoids have been operated using the handswitches at the RSP for surveillance testing. The testing was enhanced resulting in a change of methodology from contact resistance to valve manipulation.

A review of C61-1050-E-010, Elementary Diagram for Remote Shutdown System, was performed. When the handswitches for the SRVs (S38, S39, and S40) are taken from OPEN to CLOSE, the red bulb remains in the circuit with the solenoid. When the energy of the solenoid's magnetic field collapses upon de-energization, the resulting "kickback" is forced entirely into the red light bulb, which becomes very bright before it burns out.

The open indication works on the first opening of the RSP SRVs. If the SRVs are closed and re-opened, there will not be any open indication until the bulbs are replaced. This condition does not occur when the SRVs are operated from the Main Control Room (MCR).

This event resulted in a review that indicated that the plant likely operated in a condition that was prohibited by Technical Specifications since initial startup. This condition was prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.7.4 when at power Modes 1 and 2. The valve position indication of Tech Spec Table 3.3.7.4-1 for the SRVs was inoperable. However, the operator has alternate means to determine the status of the SRVs. Therefore, this LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Analysis of the Event

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. The potential safety consequences of this event were minimal since the three SRVs would have operated as required although there would not have been proper open indication.

There was no adverse impact and very low safety significance since no transient requiring the remote shutdown panel occurred during the outage. The valve open indication would have burned out if operated from the RSP.

Cause of the Event

The event was caused by a faulty design for the SRV control circuit at the remote shutdown panel.

NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	. •	LER NUMBER (PAGE (3)			
·		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			•
Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1	05000352	2006	- - 002	- - 00	3	O F	3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The extent of condition is limited to Unit 1. Field Deviation Disposition Request (FDDR) HH24733 added a Metal Oxide Varister (MOV) to the Unit 2 wiring during construction.

Corrective Action Completed

An MOV was added to the Unit 1 circuit similar to what was done for Unit 2 and the SRVs were tested satisfactorily.

Previous Similar Occurrences

There were no previous similar occurrences where the SRV lights failed to relight following operation from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Component data:

Cause:

В

(Design, Manufacturing,

Construction/Installation)

System:

JL

Panels System

Component:

HS

Switch Hand

Manufacturer:

G080

General Electric

Model:

N/A

Reportable to EPIX: Yes