



## Technical Specification 5.5.14

*A subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation*

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102-05491-SAB/TNW/RKR  
May 11, 2006

ATTN: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

**Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)  
Units 1, 2 and 3  
Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530  
Technical Specifications Bases Revision 37 Update**

Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 37, implemented on April 19, 2006. The Revision 37 insertion instructions and replacement pages are provided in the Enclosure.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Thomas N. Weber at (623) 393-5764.

Sincerely,

*TN Weber... for  
SA Bauer*

SAB/TNW/RKR/gt

Enclosure: PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 37 Insertion Instructions  
and Replacement Pages

cc: B. S. Mallett NRC Region IV Regional Administrator  
M. B. Fields NRC NRR Project Manager  
G. G. Warnick NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS

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*A001*

**ENCLOSURE**

**PVNGS  
Technical Specification Bases  
Revision 37**

**Insertion Instructions and  
Replacement Pages**

**PVNGS Technical Specifications Bases  
Revision 37  
Insertion Instructions**

**Remove Page:**

Cover page

List of Effective Pages,  
Pages 1/2 through  
List of Effective Pages,  
Page 7/8

B 2.1.1-3/2.1.1-4  
B 3.1.10-3/3.1.10-4  
B 3.1.10-5/3.1.10-6  
B 3.3.12-3/3.3.12-4  
B 3.7.2-3/3.7.2-4  
B 3.7.3-3/3.7.3-4  
B 3.8.1-23/3.8.1-24  
B 3.8.4-1/3.8.4-2  
B 3.8.4-9/3.8.4-10  
B 3.8.4-11/blank  
B 3.8.6-5/3.8.6-6

**Insert New Page:**

Cover page

List of Effective Pages,  
Pages 1/2 through  
List of Effective Pages,  
Page 7/8


B 2.1.1-3/2.1.1-4  
B 3.1.10-3/3.1.10-4  
B 3.1.10-5/3.1.10-6  
B 3.3.12-3/3.3.12-4  
B 3.7.2-3/3.7.2-4  
B 3.7.3-3/3.7.3-4  
B 3.8.1-23/3.8.1-24  
B 3.8.4-1/3.8.4-2  
B 3.8.4-9/3.8.4-10  
B 3.8.4-11/blank  
B 3.8.6-5/3.8.6-6

**PVNGS**

*Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station  
Units 1, 2, and 3*

# Technical Specification Bases

Revision 37  
April 19, 2006



**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev. No.</b>	<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev No.</b>
B 2.1.1-1	0	B 3.1.4-5	0
B 2.1.1-2	0	B 3.1.5-1	0
B 2.1.1-3	37	B 3.1.5-2	28
B 2.1.1-4	21	B 3.1.5-3	28
B 2.1.1-5	23	B 3.1.5-4	28
B 2.1.2-1	0	B 3.1.5-5	28
B 2.1.2-2	31	B 3.1.5-6	28
B 2.1.2-3	0	B 3.1.5-7	1
B 2.1.2-4	23	B 3.1.5-8	28
B 2.1.2-5	0	B 3.1.5-9	28
B 3.0-1	0	B 3.1.5-10	28
B 3.0-2	0	B 3.1.5-11	28
B 3.0-3	0	B 3.1.6-1	0
B 3.0-4	0	B 3.1.6-2	0
B 3.0-5	0	B 3.1.6-3	0
B 3.0-6	1	B 3.1.6-4	0
B 3.0-7	0	B 3.1.7-1	0
B 3.0-8	0	B 3.1.7-2	0
B 3.0-9	0	B 3.1.7-3	28
B 3.0-10	14	B 3.1.7-4	34
B 3.0-11	14	B 3.1.7-5	25
B 3.0-12	14	B 3.1.7-6	0
B 3.0-13	0	B 3.1.7-7	0
B 3.0-14	0	B 3.1.7-8	0
B 3.0-15	0	B 3.1.7-9	0
B 3.0-16	17	B 3.1.8-1	28
B 3.0-17	17	B 3.1.8-2	28
B 3.0-18	17	B 3.1.8-3	28
B 3.0-19	17	B 3.1.8-4	28
B 3.1.1-1	28	B 3.1.8-5	28
B 3.1.1-2	0	B 3.1.9-1	0
B 3.1.1-3	28	B 3.1.9-2	0
B 3.1.1-4	12	B 3.1.9-3	0
B 3.1.1-5	27	B 3.1.9-4	0
B 3.1.1-6	31	B 3.1.9-5	28
B 3.1.2-1	28	B 3.1.9-6	1
B 3.1.2-2	0	B 3.1.10-1	0
B 3.1.2-3	31	B 3.1.10-2	28
B 3.1.2-4	28	B 3.1.10-3	0
B 3.1.2-5	0	B 3.1.10-4	37
B 3.1.2-6	0	B 3.1.10-5	37
B 3.1.2-7	12	B 3.1.10-6	0
B 3.1.2-8	0	B 3.1.11-1	0
B 3.1.2-9	0	B 3.1.11-2	28
B 3.1.3-1	0	B 3.1.11-3	0
B 3.1.3-2	0	B 3.1.11-4	34
B 3.1.3-3	0	B 3.1.11-5	0
B 3.1.3-4	0	B 3.2.1-1	28
B 3.1.3-5	0	B 3.2.1-2	10
B 3.1.3-6	0	B 3.2.1-3	28
B 3.1.4-1	0	B 3.2.1-4	0
B 3.1.4-2	31	B 3.2.1-5	0
B 3.1.4-3	0	B 3.2.1-6	0
B 3.1.4-4	0	B 3.2.1-7	0

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

Page No.	Rev. No.	Page No.	Rev. No.
B 3.2.1-8	0	B 3.3.1-20	35
B 3.2.2-1	28	B 3.3.1-21	35
B 3.2.2-2	10	B 3.3.1-22	35
B 3.2.2-3	0	B 3.3.1-23	35
B 3.2.2-4	28	B 3.3.1-24	35
B 3.2.2-5	1	B 3.3.1-25	35
B 3.2.2-6	0	B 3.3.1-26	35
B 3.2.2-7	0	B 3.3.1-27	35
B 3.2.3-1	28	B 3.3.1-28	35
B 3.2.3-2	10	B 3.3.1-29	35
B 3.2.3-3	0	B 3.3.1-30	35
B 3.2.3-4	28	B 3.3.1-31	35
B 3.2.3-5	0	B 3.3.1-32	35
B 3.2.3-6	0	B 3.3.1-33	35
B 3.2.3-7	0	B 3.3.1-34	35
B 3.2.3-8	0	B 3.3.1-35	35
B 3.2.3-9	0	B 3.3.1-36	35
B 3.2.3-10	0	B 3.3.1-37	35
B 3.2.4-1	28	B 3.3.1-38	35
B 3.2.4-2	10	B 3.3.1-39	35
B 3.2.4-3	0	B 3.3.1-40	35
B 3.2.4-4	28	B 3.3.1-41	35
B 3.2.4-5	25	B 3.3.1-42	35
B 3.2.4-6	25	B 3.3.1-43	35
B 3.2.4-7	27	B 3.3.1-44	35
B 3.2.4-8	31	B 3.3.1-45	35
B 3.2.4-9	31	B 3.3.1-46	35
B 3.2.4-10	31	B 3.3.1-47	35
B 3.2.5-1	28	B 3.3.1-48	35
B 3.2.5-2	10	B 3.3.1-49	35
B 3.2.5-3	0	B 3.3.1-50	35
B 3.2.5-4	28	B 3.3.1-51	35
B 3.2.5-5	0	B 3.3.1-52	35
B 3.2.5-6	28	B 3.3.1-53	35
B 3.2.5-7	0	B 3.3.1-54	35
B 3.3.1-1	35	B 3.3.1-55	35
B 3.3.1-2	25	B 3.3.1-56	35
B 3.3.1-3	25	B 3.3.1-57	35
B 3.3.1-4	25	B 3.3.1-58	35
B 3.3.1-5	25	B 3.3.1-59	35
B 3.3.1-6	27	B 3.3.1-60	35
B 3.3.1-7	25	B 3.3.2-1	35
B 3.3.1-8	25	B 3.3.2-2	0
B 3.3.1-9	34	B 3.3.2-3	1
B 3.3.1-10	35	B 3.3.2-4	35
B 3.3.1-11	35	B 3.3.2-5	35
B 3.3.1-12	35	B 3.3.2-6	35
B 3.3.1-13	35	B 3.3.2-7	35
B 3.3.1-14	35	B 3.3.2-8	35
B 3.3.1-15	35	B 3.3.2-9	35
B 3.3.1-16	25	B 3.3.2-10	35
B 3.3.1-17	35	B 3.3.2-11	35
B 3.3.1-18	35	B 3.3.2-12	35
B 3.3.1-19	35	B 3.3.2-13	35

# **TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES** **LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

Page No.	Rev. No.	Page No.	Rev. No.
B 3.3.2-14	35	B 3.3.5-14	0
B 3.3.2-15	35	B 3.3.5-15	35
B 3.3.2-16	35	B 3.3.5-16	35
B 3.3.2-17	35	B 3.3.5-17	35
B 3.3.2-18	35	B 3.3.5-18	35
B 3.3.3-1	25	B 3.3.5-19	35
B 3.3.3-2	27	B 3.3.5-20	35
B 3.3.3-3	25	B 3.3.5-21	35
B 3.3.3-4	25	B 3.3.5-22	35
B 3.3.3-5	25	B 3.3.5-23	35
B 3.3.3-6	25	B 3.3.5-24	35
B 3.3.3-7	27	B 3.3.5-25	35
B 3.3.3-8	27	B 3.3.5-26	35
B 3.3.3-9	27	B 3.3.5-27	35
B 3.3.3-10	25	B 3.3.5-28	35
B 3.3.3-11	25	B 3.3.5-29	35
B 3.3.3-12	25	B 3.3.5-30	35
B 3.3.3-13	25	B 3.3.6-1	0
B 3.3.3-14	25	B 3.3.6-2	0
B 3.3.3-15	27	B 3.3.6-3	0
B 3.3.3-16	25	B 3.3.6-4	0
B 3.3.3-17	25	B 3.3.6-5	31
B 3.3.3-18	25	B 3.3.6-6	0
B 3.3.3-19	27	B 3.3.6-7	27
B 3.3.3-20	27	B 3.3.6-8	27
B 3.3.3-21	27	B 3.3.6-9	0
B 3.3.4-1	0	B 3.3.6-10	0
B 3.3.4-2	0	B 3.3.6-11	0
B 3.3.4-3	0	B 3.3.6-12	0
B 3.3.4-4	0	B 3.3.6-13	0
B 3.3.4-5	0	B 3.3.6-14	0
B 3.3.4-6	31	B 3.3.6-15	0
B 3.3.4-7	0	B 3.3.6-16	0
B 3.3.4-8	0	B 3.3.6-17	27
B 3.3.4-9	0	B 3.3.6-18	0
B 3.3.4-10	0	B 3.3.6-19	0
B 3.3.4-11	0	B 3.3.6-20	0
B 3.3.4-12	0	B 3.3.6-21	1
B 3.3.4-13	0	B 3.3.6-22	1
B 3.3.4-14	0	B 3.3.7-1	2
B 3.3.4-15	0	B 3.3.7-2	2
B 3.3.5-1	0	B 3.3.7-3	0
B 3.3.5-2	0	B 3.3.7-4	0
B 3.3.5-3	0	B 3.3.7-5	0
B 3.3.5-4	35	B 3.3.7-6	0
B 3.3.5-5	0	B 3.3.7-7	0
B 3.3.5-6	0	B 3.3.7-8	0
B 3.3.5-7	0	B 3.3.7-9	2
B 3.3.5-8	31	B 3.3.8-1	0
B 3.3.5-9	0	B 3.3.8-2	0
B 3.3.5-10	0	B 3.3.8-3	0
B 3.3.5-11	0	B 3.3.8-4	0
B 3.3.5-12	1	B 3.3.8-5	0
B 3.3.5-13	0	B 3.3.8-6	1

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev. No.</b>	<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev. No.</b>
B 3.3.8-7	0	B 3.4.3-4	2
B 3.3.8-8	0	B 3.4.3-5	2
B 3.3.9-1	0	B 3.4.3-6	0
B 3.3.9-2	2	B 3.4.3-7	0
B 3.3.9-3	21	B 3.4.3-8	2
B 3.3.9-4	10	B 3.4.4-1	0
B 3.3.9-5	1	B 3.4.4-2	7
B 3.3.9-6	0	B 3.4.4-3	7
B 3.3.9-7	0	B 3.4.4-4	0
B 3.3.10-1	0	B 3.4.5-1	0
B 3.3.10-2	0	B 3.4.5-2	34
B 3.3.10-3	0	B 3.4.5-3	30
B 3.3.10-4	0	B 3.4.5-4	0
B 3.3.10-5	18	B 3.4.5-5	6
B 3.3.10-6	0	B 3.4.6-1	0
B 3.3.10-7	0	B 3.4.6-2	6
B 3.3.10-8	14	B 3.4.6-3	6
B 3.3.10-9	14	B 3.4.6-4	6
B 3.3.10-10	14	B 3.4.6-5	6
B 3.3.10-11	14	B 3.4.7-1	0
B 3.3.10-12	14	B 3.4.7-2	6
B 3.3.10-13	14	B 3.4.7-3	6
B 3.3.10-14	32	B 3.4.7-4	2
B 3.3.10-15	32	B 3.4.7-5	0
B 3.3.10-16	32	B 3.4.7-6	0
B 3.3.10-17	32	B 3.4.7-7	27
B 3.3.10-18	32	B 3.4.8-1	0
B 3.3.10-19	32	B 3.4.8-2	6
B 3.3.10-20	32	B 3.4.8-3	6
B 3.3.10-21	33	B 3.4.9-1	0
B 3.3.10-22	32	B 3.4.9-2	31
B 3.3.11-1	0	B 3.4.9-3	34 Corrected
B 3.3.11-2	2	B 3.4.9-4	0
B 3.3.11-3	2	B 3.4.9-5	0
B 3.3.11-4	2	B 3.4.9-6	0
B 3.3.11-5	19	B 3.4.10-1	0
B 3.3.11-6	2	B 3.4.10-2	7
B 3.3.11-7	2	B 3.4.10-3	0
B 3.3.12-1	15	B 3.4.10-4	0
B 3.3.12-2	15	B 3.4.11-1	0
B 3.3.12-3	37	B 3.4.11-2	7
B 3.3.12-4	37	B 3.4.11-3	0
B 3.3.12-5	6	B 3.4.11-4	0
B 3.3.12-6	6	B 3.4.11-5	0
B 3.4.1-1	10	B 3.4.11-6	0
B 3.4.1-2	28	B 3.4.12-1	1
B 3.4.1-3	0	B 3.4.12-2	34
B 3.4.1-4	0	B 3.4.12-3	0
B 3.4.1-5	0	B 3.4.12-4	0
B 3.4.2-1	7	B 3.4.12-5	31
B 3.4.2-2	1	B 3.4.13-1	0
B 3.4.3-1	0	B 3.4.13-2	0
B 3.4.3-2	0	B 3.4.13-3	1
B 3.4.3-3	0	B 3.4.13-4	0



**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev. No.</b>	<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev. No.</b>
B 3.4.13-5	0	B 3.5.3-3	0
B 3.4.13-6	0	B 3.5.3-4	0
B 3.4.13-7	2	B 3.5.3-5	0
B 3.4.13-8	2	B 3.5.3-6	2
B 3.4.13-9	0	B 3.5.3-7	2
B 3.4.13-10	2	B 3.5.3-8	1
B 3.4.14-1	0	B 3.5.3-9	0
B 3.4.14-2	34	B 3.5.3-10	2
B 3.4.14-3	34	B 3.5.4-1	15
B 3.4.14-4	7	B 3.5.4-2	0
B 3.4.14-5	2	B 3.5.4-3	0
B 3.4.14-6	2	B 3.5.5-1	0
B 3.4.14-7	34	B 3.5.5-2	7
B 3.4.15-1	0	B 3.5.5-3	4
B 3.4.15-2	0	B 3.5.5-4	4
B 3.4.15-3	0	B 3.5.5-5	0
B 3.4.15-4	0	B 3.5.5-6	0
B 3.4.15-5	0	B 3.5.5-7	0
B 3.4.15-6	35	B 3.5.6-1	0
B 3.4.15-7	35	B 3.5.6-2	1
B 3.4.16-1	2	B 3.5.6-3	0
B 3.4.16-2	10	B 3.5.6-4	24
B 3.4.16-3	0	B 3.5.6-5	27
B 3.4.16-4	0	B 3.6.1-1	0
B 3.4.16-5	0	B 3.6.1-2	35
B 3.4.16-6	0	B 3.6.1-3	0
B 3.4.17-1	0	B 3.6.1-4	29
B 3.4.17-2	27	B 3.6.1-5	29
B 3.4.17-3	0	B 3.6.2-1	0
B 3.4.17-4	0	B 3.6.2-2	35
B 3.4.17-5	0	B 3.6.2-3	0
B 3.4.17-6	0	B 3.6.2-4	0
B 3.5.1-1	0	B 3.6.2-5	0
B 3.5.1-2	35	B 3.6.2-6	0
B 3.5.1-3	7	B 3.6.2-7	0
B 3.5.1-4	0	B 3.6.2-8	0
B 3.5.1-5	0	B 3.6.3-1	27
B 3.5.1-6	0	B 3.6.3-2	27
B 3.5.1-7	1	B 3.6.3-3	27
B 3.5.1-8	1	B 3.6.3-4	27
B 3.5.1-9	0	B 3.6.3-5	27
B 3.5.1-10	35	B 3.6.3-6	27
B 3.5.2-1	0	B 3.6.3-7	27
B 3.5.2-2	35	B 3.6.3-8	27
B 3.5.2-3	0	B 3.6.3-9	27
B 3.5.2-4	0	B 3.6.3-10	27
B 3.5.2-5	0	B 3.6.3-11	27
B 3.5.2-6	0	B 3.6.3-12	27
B 3.5.2-7	1	B 3.6.3-13	27
B 3.5.2-8	22	B 3.6.3-14	27
B 3.5.2-9	1	B 3.6.3-15	27
B 3.5.2-10	35	B 3.6.3-16	27
B 3.5.3-1	0	B 3.6.3-17	27
B 3.5.3-2	0	B 3.6.3-18	27

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

Page No.	Rev. No.	Page No.	Rev. No.
B 3.6.3-19	27	B 3.7.6-1	0
B 3.6.4-1	35	B 3.7.6-2	28
B 3.6.4-2	1	B 3.7.6-3	28
B 3.6.4-3	1	B 3.7.6-4	0
B 3.6.5-1	0	B 3.7.7-1	0
B 3.6.5-2	1	B 3.7.7-2	1
B 3.6.5-3	0	B 3.7.7-3	1
B 3.6.5-4	0	B 3.7.7-4	1
B 3.6.6-1	0	B 3.7.7-5	1
B 3.6.6-2	0	B 3.7.8-1	1
B 3.6.6-3	35	B 3.7.8-2	1
B 3.6.6-4	7	B 3.7.8-3	1
B 3.6.6-5	1	B 3.7.8-4	1
B 3.6.6-6	0	B 3.7.9-1	0
B 3.6.6-7	1	B 3.7.9-2	1
B 3.6.6-8	1	B 3.7.9-3	0
B 3.6.6-9	0	B 3.7.10-1	10
B 3.6.7-1	0	B 3.7.10-2	1
B 3.6.7-2	0	B 3.7.10-3	1
B 3.6.7-3	0	B 3.7.10-4	1
B 3.6.7-4	0	B 3.7.11-1	0
B 3.6.7-5	0	B 3.7.11-2	0
B 3.7.1-1	28	B 3.7.11-3	21
B 3.7.1-2	34	B 3.7.11-4	10
B 3.7.1-3	34	B 3.7.11-5	10
B 3.7.1-4	34	B 3.7.11-6	10
B 3.7.1-5	34	B 3.7.12-1	1
B 3.7.1-6	28 Corrected	B 3.7.12-2	21
B 3.7.2-1	0	B 3.7.12-3	21
B 3.7.2-2	0	B 3.7.12-4	10
B 3.7.2-3	31	B 3.7.13-1	0
B 3.7.2-4	37	B 3.7.13-2	0
B 3.7.2-5	0	B 3.7.13-3	0
B 3.7.2-6	0	B 3.7.13-4	0
B 3.7.3-1	1	B 3.7.13-5	0
B 3.7.3-2	1	B 3.7.14-1	0
B 3.7.3-3	37	B 3.7.14-2	21
B 3.7.3-4	0	B 3.7.14-3	21
B 3.7.3-5	0	B 3.7.15-1	3
B 3.7.4-1	0	B 3.7.15-2	3
B 3.7.4-2	31	B 3.7.16-1	7
B 3.7.4-3	31	B 3.7.16-2	0
B 3.7.4-4	0	B 3.7.16-3	0
B 3.7.5-1	0	B 3.7.16-4	0
B 3.7.5-2	0	B 3.7.17-1	23
B 3.7.5-3	0	B 3.7.17-2	3
B 3.7.5-4	27	B 3.7.17-3	3
B 3.7.5-5	9	B 3.7.17-4	3
B 3.7.5-6	9	B 3.7.17-5	3
B 3.7.5-7	9	B 3.7.17-6	3
B 3.7.5-8	9	B 3.8.1-1	35
B 3.7.5-9	9	B 3.8.1-2	2
B 3.7.5-10	9	B 3.8.1-3	34
B 3.7.5-11	9	B 3.8.1-4	34

# **TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

Page No.	Rev. No.		Page No.	Rev. No.	
B 3.8.1-5	20		B 3.8.3-9	0	
B 3.8.1-6	27		B 3.8.4-1	0	
B 3.8.1-7	34		B 3.8.4-2	37	
B 3.8.1-8	2		B 3.8.4-3	0	
B 3.8.1-9	27		B 3.8.4-4	2	
B 3.8.1-10	2		B 3.8.4-5	2	
B 3.8.1-11	2		B 3.8.4-6	2	
B 3.8.1-12	2		B 3.8.4-7	35	
B 3.8.1-13	2		B 3.8.4-8	35	
B 3.8.1-14	2		B 3.8.4-9	35	
B 3.8.1-15	2		B 3.8.4-10	37	
B 3.8.1-16	20		B 3.8.4-11	37	
B 3.8.1-17	20		B 3.8.5-1	1	
B 3.8.1-18	20		B 3.8.5-2	1	
B 3.8.1-19	20		B 3.8.5-3	21	
B 3.8.1-20	20		B 3.8.5-4	21	
B 3.8.1-21	20		B 3.8.5-5	2	
B 3.8.1-22	20		B 3.8.5-6	2	
B 3.8.1-23	37		B 3.8.6-1	0	
B 3.8.1-24	37		B 3.8.6-2	0	
B 3.8.1-25	20		B 3.8.6-3	0	
B 3.8.1-26	20		B 3.8.6-4	6	
B 3.8.1-27	35		B 3.8.6-5	37	
B 3.8.1-28	35		B 3.8.6-6	37	
B 3.8.1-29	35		B 3.8.6-7	0	
B 3.8.1-30	35		B 3.8.7-1	0	
B 3.8.1-31	35		B 3.8.7-2	0	
B 3.8.1-32	35		B 3.8.7-3	0	
B 3.8.1-33	35		B 3.8.7-4	0	
B 3.8.1-34	35		B 3.8.8-1	1	
B 3.8.1-35	35		B 3.8.8-2	1	
B 3.8.1-36	35		B 3.8.8-3	21	
B 3.8.1-37	35		B 3.8.8-4	21	
B 3.8.1-38	35		B 3.8.8-5	1	
B 3.8.1-39	35		B 3.8.9-1	34	
B 3.8.1-40	35		B 3.8.9-2	0	
B 3.8.1-41	35		B 3.8.9-3	0	
B 3.8.1-42	35		B 3.8.9-4	0	
B 3.8.1-43	35		B 3.8.9-5	0	
B 3.8.1-44	35		B 3.8.9-6	0	
B 3.8.2-1	0		B 3.8.9-7	0	
B 3.8.2-2	0		B 3.8.9-8	0	
B 3.8.2-3	0		B 3.8.9-9	0	
B 3.8.2-4	21		B 3.8.9-10	0	
B 3.8.2-5	21		B 3.8.9-11	0	
B 3.8.2-6	0		B 3.8.10-1	0	
B 3.8.3-1	0		B 3.8.10-2	21	
B 3.8.3-2	0		B 3.8.10-3	0	
B 3.8.3-3	34	Corrected	B 3.8.10-4	0	
B 3.8.3-4	0		B 3.9.1-1	34	Corrected
B 3.8.3-5	34		B 3.9.1-2	0	
B 3.8.3-6	0		B 3.9.1-3	0	
B 3.8.3-7	0		B 3.9.1-4	0	
B 3.8.3-8	0		B 3.9.2-1	15	

**TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES  
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES**

<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev. No.</b>	<b>Page No.</b>	<b>Rev No.</b>	<b>Rev</b>
B 3.9.2-2	15			
B 3.9.2-3	15			
B 3.9.2-4	15			
B 3.9.3-1	18			
B 3.9.3-2	19			
B 3.9.3-3	27			
B 3.9.3-4	19			
B 3.9.3-5	19			
B.3.9.3-6	19			
B 3.9.4-1	0			
B 3.9.4-2	1			
B 3.9.4-3	0			
B 3.9.4-4	0			
B 3.9.5-1	0			
B 3.9.5-2	16			
B 3.9.5-3	27			
B 3.9.5-4	16			
B.3.9.5-5	16			
B 3.9.6-1	0			
B 3.9.6-2	0			
B 3.9.6-3	0			
B 3.9.7-1	0			
B 3.9.7-2	0			
B 3.9.7-3	0			

BASES

APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

- h. Log Power Level - High trip;
- i. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low trip; and
- j. Steam Generator Safety Valves.

The limitation that the average enthalpy in the hot leg be less than or equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid also ensures that the  $\Delta T$  measured by instrumentation used in the protection system design as a measure of the core power is proportional to core power.

The SL represents a design requirement for establishing the protection system trip setpoints identified previously. LCO 3.2.1, "Linear Heat Rate (LHR)," and LCO 3.2.4, "Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)," or the assumed initial conditions of the safety analyses (as indicated in the UFSAR, Ref. 2) provide more restrictive limits to ensure that the SLs are not exceeded.

SAFETY LIMITS

SL 2.1.1.1 and SL 2.1.1.2 ensure that the minimum DNBR is not less than the safety analyses limit and that fuel centerline temperature remains below melting.

The minimum value of the DNBR during normal operation and design basis AOOs is limited to 1.34, based on a statistical combination of CE-1 CHF correlation and engineering factor uncertainties, and is established as an SL. Additional factors such as rod bow and spacer grid size and placement will determine the limiting safety system settings required to ensure that the SL is maintained. Maintaining the dynamically adjusted peak LHR to  $\leq 21$  kW/ft or peak fuel centerline temperature  $< 5080^\circ\text{F}$  (decreasing by  $58^\circ\text{F}$  per 10,000 MWD/MTU for burnup and adjusting for burnable poisons per CENPD-382-P-A), ensures that fuel centerline melt will not occur during normal operating conditions or design AOOs.

The design melting point of new fuel with no burnable poison is  $5080^\circ\text{F}$ . The melting point is adjusted downward from this temperature depending on the amount of burnup and amount and type of burnable poison in the fuel. The  $58^\circ\text{F}$  per 10,000 MWD/MTU adjustment for burnup was accepted by the NRC in

(continued)

BASES

SAFETY LIMITS  
(continued)

Topical Report CEN-386-P-A, "Verification of the Acceptability of a 1-Pin Burnup Limit of 60 MWD/kgU for Combustion Engineering 16x16 PWR Fuel," August 1992. Adjustments for burnable poisons are established based on NRC approved Topical Report CENPD-382-P-A, "Methodology for Core Designs Containing Erbium Burnable Absorbers," August 1993.

A steady state peak linear heat rate of 21 kW/ft has been established as the Limiting Safety System Setting to prevent fuel centerline melting during normal steady state operation. Following design basis anticipated operational occurrences, the transient linear heat rate may exceed 21 kW/ft provided the fuel centerline melt temperature is not exceeded. However, if the transient linear heat rate does not exceed 21 kW/ft, then the fuel centerline melt temperature is also not exceeded.

APPLICABILITY

SL 2.1.1.1 and SL 2.1.1.2 only apply in MODES 1 and 2 because these are the only MODES in which the reactor is critical. Automatic protection functions are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1 and 2 to ensure operation within the reactor core SLs. The steam generator safety valves or automatic protection actions serve to prevent RCS heatup to the reactor core SL conditions or to initiate a reactor trip function, which forces the unit into MODE 3. Setpoints for the reactor trip functions are specified in LCO 3.3.1.

In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, Applicability is not required, since the reactor is not generating significant THERMAL POWER.

SAFETY LIMIT  
VIOLATIONS

The following violation responses are applicable to the reactor core SLs.

2.2.1

If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated, the requirement to go to MODE 3 places the unit in a MODE in which this SL is not applicable.

The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour recognizes the importance of bringing the unit to a MODE where this SL is not applicable and reduces the probability of fuel damage.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

The safety analysis (Ref. 6) places limits on allowable THERMAL POWER during PHYSICS TESTS and requires that the LHR and the departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) parameter be maintained within limits. The power plateau of  $\leq 85\%$  RTP and the associated trip setpoints are required to ensure these limits are maintained.

The individual LCOs governing CEA group height, insertion and alignment, ASI, total planar radial peaking factor, total integrated radial peaking factor, and  $T_q$ , preserve the LHR limits. Additionally, the LCOs governing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow, reactor inlet temperature ( $T_c$ ), and pressurizer pressure contribute to maintaining DNB parameter limits. The initial condition criteria for accidents sensitive to core power distribution are preserved by the LHR and DNB parameter limits. The criteria for the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are specified in 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors" (Ref. 7). The criteria for the loss of forced reactor coolant flow accident are specified in Reference 7. Operation within the LHR limit preserves the LOCA criteria; operation within the DNB parameter limits preserves the loss of flow criteria.

During PHYSICS TESTS, one or more of the LCOs that normally preserve the LHR and DNB parameter limits may be suspended. The results of the accident analysis are not adversely impacted, however, if LHR and DNB parameters are verified to be within their limits while the LCOs are suspended. Therefore, SRs are placed as necessary to ensure that LHR and DNB parameters remain within limits during PHYSICS TESTS. Performance of these Surveillances allows PHYSICS TESTS to be conducted without decreasing the margin of safety.

PHYSICS TESTS include measurement of core parameters or exercise of control components that affect process variables. Among the process variables involved are total planar radial peaking factor, total integrated radial peaking factor,  $T_q$ , and ASI, which represent initial condition input (power peaking) to the accident analysis. Also involved are the shutdown and regulating CEAs, which affect power peaking and are required for shutdown of the reactor. The limits for these variables are specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE PHYSICS TESTS meet the criteria for inclusion in the  
SAFETY ANALYSES Technical Specifications, since the component and process  
(continued) variable LCOs suspended during PHYSICS TESTS meet  
Criteria 1, 2, and 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO This LCO permits individual CEAs to be positioned outside of  
their normal group heights and insertion limits during the  
performance of PHYSICS TESTS, such as those required to:

- a. Measure CEA worth;
- b. Determine the reactor stability index and damping factor under xenon oscillation conditions;
- c. Determine power distributions for nonnormal CEA configurations;
- d. Measure rod shadowing factors; and
- e. Measure temperature and power coefficients.

Additionally, it permits the center CEA to be misaligned during PHYSICS TESTS required to determine the isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC), MTC, and power coefficient.

The requirements of LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, LCO 3.1.7, LCO 3.1.8, LCO 3.2.2, LCO 3.2.3, LCO 3.2.5 and LCO 3.3.3, may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided THERMAL POWER is restricted to test power plateau, which shall not exceed 85% RTP and that a minimum amount of CEA worth is immediately available for reactivity control.

APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODES 1 and 2 because the reactor must be critical at various THERMAL POWER levels to perform the PHYSICS TESTS described in the LCO section. Limiting the test power plateau to  $\leq 85\%$  RTP ensures that LHRs are maintained within acceptable limits.

(continued)

(continued)



BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

If THERMAL POWER exceeds the test power plateau in MODE 1, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to restore the additional thermal margin provided by the reduction. The 15 minute Completion Time ensures that prompt action shall be taken to reduce THERMAL POWER to within acceptable limits.

B.1 and B.2

If Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, PHYSICS TESTS must be suspended within 1 hour. Allowing 1 hour for suspending PHYSICS TESTS allows the operator sufficient time to change any abnormal CEA configuration back to within the limits of LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, and LCO 3.1.7. Suspension of PHYSICS TESTS exceptions requires restoration of each of the applicable LCOs to within specification.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.10.1

Verifying that THERMAL POWER is equal to or less than that allowed by the test power plateau, as specified in the PHYSICS TEST procedure and required by the safety analysis, ensures that adequate LHR and departure from nucleate boiling ratio margins are maintained while LCOs are suspended. The 1 hour Frequency is sufficient, based upon the slow rate of power change and increased operational controls in place during PHYSICS TESTS. Monitoring LHR ensures that the limits are not exceeded.

SR 3.1.10.2

Verification of the position of each partially or fully withdrawn full strength, part length, or part strength CEA is necessary to ensure that the minimum negative reactivity requirements for insertion on a trip are preserved. A 2 hour Frequency is sufficient for the operator to verify that each CEA position is within the acceptance criteria.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

13A8

- REFERENCES
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Section XI.
  2. 10 CFR 50.59.
  3. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, August 1978.
  4. ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-1985, December 13, 1985.
  5. UFSAR, Chapter 14.
  6. UFSAR, Section 15.3.
  7. 10 CFR 50.46.
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BASES (continued)

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ACTIONS

A channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. These criteria are outlined in the LCO section of the Bases.

A.1

With one required channel inoperable, Required Action A.1 requires the RCS boron concentration to be determined immediately and at the applicable monitoring Frequency specified in the COLR. The RCS boron concentration is determined by RCS sampling. The RCS sample should be from the hot leg if one or more Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) are running or from the discharge of the operating pump providing shutdown cooling flow with no RCPs running. The monitoring Frequency specified in the COLR ensures that a decrease in the boron concentration during a boron dilution event will be detected. The boron concentration measurement and the OPERABLE BDAS channel provide alternate methods of detection of boron dilution with sufficient time for termination of the event before the reactor achieves criticality.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.1

With two required channels inoperable Required Action B.1 requires the RCS boron concentration to be determined by a redundant method immediately and at the monitoring Frequency specified in the COLR. The redundant method uses independent collection and analysis of two RCS samples. The RCS sample should be from the hot leg if one or more Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) are running or from the discharge of the operating pump providing shutdown cooling flow with no RCPs running. The use of independent collection and analysis of two RCS samples to monitor the RCS boron concentration provides alternate indications of inadvertent boron dilution. This will allow detection with sufficient time for termination of boron dilution before the reactor achieves criticality.

C.1

Condition C is entered when the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A or B are not met. If the Required Actions associated with these Conditions cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the neutron flux level monitoring function cannot be reliably performed. The absence of reliable neutron flux level monitoring makes it difficult to ensure SDM is maintained. Required Action C.1 therefore requires that all positive reactivity additions that are under operation control, such as boron dilution or Reactor Coolant System temperature changes, be halted immediately preserving SDM.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

main steam header downstream of the closed MSIVs in the intact loops.

- b. A break outside of containment and upstream from the MSIVs. This scenario is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the MSIVs isolates the break, and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.
- c. A break downstream of the MSIVs. This type of break will be isolated by the closure of the MSIVs. Events such as increased steam flow through the turbine or the steam bypass valves will also terminate on closure of the MSIVs.
- d. A steam generator tube rupture. For this scenario, closure of the MSIVs isolates the affected steam generator from the intact steam generator. In addition to minimizing radiological releases, this enables the operator to maintain the pressure of the steam generator with the ruptured tube high enough to allow flow isolation while remaining below the MSSV setpoints, a necessary step toward isolating the flow through the rupture.
- e. The MSIVs are also utilized during other events such as a feedwater line break. These events are less limiting so far as MSIV OPERABILITY is concerned.

The MSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO requires that the MSIV in each of the four steam lines be OPERABLE. The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal. The MSIVs have redundant actuator trains. An MSIV is OPERABLE with one train of hydraulics unavailable to shut the valve. Only one OPERABLE MSIV is allowed to have an unavailable hydraulic train.

This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) limits.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

**APPLICABILITY** The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 and in MODES 2, 3 and 4 except when all MSIVs are closed and deactivated when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing their safety function.

In MODES 5 and 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.

**ACTIONS**

A.1 and A.2

With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, time is allowed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Some repairs can be made to the MSIV with the unit hot. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the probability of an accident occurring during the time period that would require closure of the MSIVs.

The 4 hour Completion Time is consistent with that normally allowed for containment isolation valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The MFIVs must be OPERABLE whenever there is significant mass and energy in the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators. This ensures that, in the event of an HELB, a single failure cannot result in the blowdown of more than one steam generator.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the MFIVs are required to be OPERABLE, except when they are closed and deactivated or isolated by a deactivated and closed power operated valve, in order to limit the amount of available fluid that could be added to containment in the case of a secondary system pipe break inside containment. When the valves are closed or isolated by a closed power operated valve, they are already performing their safety function.

In MODES 5 and 6, steam generator energy is low. Therefore, the MFIVs are not required.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

A.1 and A.2

With one MFIV inoperable, action must be taken to close or isolate the inoperable valves within 72 hours. When these valves are closed or isolated, they are performing their required safety function (e.g., to isolate the line).

The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths.

Inoperable MFIVs that are closed to comply with Required Action A.1 must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The seven day completion time is responsible, based on engineering judgement, MFIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure these valves are in the closed position.

BASES

FIGURE

ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

If more than one MFIV in the same flow path cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, then there may be no system to operate automatically and perform the required safety function. Under these conditions, valves in each flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status, closed, or the flow path isolated within 8 hours. This action returns the system to the condition where at least one valve in each flow path is performing the required safety function. The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable to close an MFIV or otherwise isolate the affected flow path.

Inoperable MFIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time, but are closed or isolated, must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or isolated. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure that these valves are closed or isolated.

C.1 and C.2

If the MFIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, closed, or isolated in the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7

These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs are modified by a Note to indicate that all DG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.

For the purposes of SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 testing, the DGs are started from standby condition. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the engine lube oil and coolant temperatures are maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. Additionally, during standby conditions the diesel engine lube oil is circulated continuously and the engine coolant is circulated on and off via thermostatic control.

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, the DG manufacturer recommends a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. This is the intent of Note 3, which is only applicable when such modified start procedures are recommended by the manufacturer.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

SR 3.8.1.2 Note 4 and SR 3.8.1.7 Note 2 state that the steady state voltage and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and  $\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref. 12), and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref. 13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

SR 3.8.1.7 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions with the engine at normal keep-warm conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds, and subsequently achieves steady state required voltage and frequency ranges. The 10 second start requirement supports the assumptions of the design basis LOCA analysis in the FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 5).

A minimum voltage and frequency is specified rather than an upper and a lower limit because a diesel engine acceleration at full fuel (such as during a fast start) is likely to "overshoot" the upper limit initially and then go through several oscillations prior to a voltage and frequency within the stated upper and lower bounds. The time to reach "steady state" could exceed 10 seconds, and be cause to fail the SR. However, on an actual emergency start, the EDG would reach minimum voltage and frequency in  $\leq 10$  seconds at which time it would be loaded. Application of the load will dampen the oscillations. Therefore, only specifying the minimum voltage and frequency (at which the EDG can accept load) demonstrates the necessary capability of the EDG to satisfy safety requirements without including a potential for failing the Surveillance.

While reaching minimum voltage and frequency (at which the DG can accept load) in  $\leq 10$  seconds is an immediate test of OPERABILITY, the ability of the governor and voltage regulator to achieve steady state operation, and the time to do so are important indicators of continued OPERABILITY. Therefore, the time to achieve steady state voltage and

(continued)

## B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### B 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating

#### BASES

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##### BACKGROUND

The station DC electrical power system provides the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment and preferred AC vital instrument bus power (via inverters). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system also conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).

The 125 VDC electrical power system consists of two independent and redundant safety related Class 1E DC electrical power subsystems (Train A and Train B). Each subsystem consists of two 125 VDC batteries (each battery  $\geq$  100% capacity), the associated battery charger(s) for each battery, and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling. Each subsystem contains two DC power channels. There are four channels designated as A and C for Train A, and B and D for Train B for each unit (See 3.8.4 LCO Bases section for detailed description).

Additionally there is one backup battery charger per subsystem, which provides backup service in the event that the normal battery charger is out of service. If the backup battery charger is substituted for one of the normal battery chargers, then the requirements of independence and redundancy between subsystems are maintained.

During normal operation, the 125 VDC load is powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC load is automatically powered from the station batteries.

The Train A and Train B DC electrical power subsystems provide the control power for its associated Class 1E AC power load group, 4.16 kV switchgear, and 480 V load centers. The DC electrical power subsystems also provide DC electrical power to the inverters, which in turn power the AC vital instrument buses.

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## BASES

### BACKGROUND (continued)

The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," and for LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for at least 2 hours as discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 4).

Each 125 VDC battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each subsystem is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other subsystem to ensure that a single failure in one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E subsystems, such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels.

In addition, each DC electrical power subsystem contains a backup battery charger which is manually transferable to either channel of a subsystem. The transfer mechanism is mechanically interlocked to prevent both DC channels of a subsystem from being simultaneously connected to the backup battery charger.

The batteries for Train A and Train B DC electrical power subsystems are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating. The voltage limit is 2.13 V per cell, which corresponds to a total minimum voltage output of 128 V per battery discussed in the Design Basis Manual (Ref. 12).

Each Train A and Train B DC electrical power subsystem has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 12 hours while supplying normal steady state loads discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 4).

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.6 (continued)

OPERABILITY would perturb the electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems. This restriction from normally performing the surveillance in MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 is further amplified to allow portions of the surveillance to be performed for the purpose of reestablishing OPERABILITY (e.g., post work testing following corrective maintenance, corrective modification, deficient or incomplete surveillance testing, and other unanticipated OPERABILITY concerns) provided an assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced. This assessment shall, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes and transients associated with a failed partial surveillance, a successful partial surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or on-site system when they are tied together or operated independently for the partial surveillance; as well as the operator procedures available to cope with these outcomes. These shall be measured against the avoided risk of a plant shutdown and startup to determine that plant safety is maintained or enhanced when portions of the surveillance are performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. Risk insights or deterministic methods may be used for this assessment.

SR 3.8.4.7

A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations, or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 18 months.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a battery performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 in lieu of a service test since both performance discharge test parameters envelope the service test. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would perturb the electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.4.8

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the "as found" condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates: the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle (but in no case lower than the performance test rate), followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated one minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test.

A modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test.

Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.8. In addition, either of the performance discharge tests may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.8 while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.7 at the same time, because the test parameters envelope the service test described in SR 3.8.4.7.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 9) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 5). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer rating. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.

The surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.8 (continued)

battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is < 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity  $\geq 100\%$  of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test, or when it is  $\geq 10\%$  below the manufacturer's rating.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would perturb the electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR.50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
2. Regulatory Guide 1.6, March 10, 1971.
3. IEEE-308-1974.
4. UFSAR, Chapter 8.3.2.
5. IEEE-485-1983, June 1983.
6. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
7. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
8. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
9. IEEE-450-1980.
10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, Revision 0, August 11, 1972.
11. Regulatory Guide 1.129, Revision 1, February 1978.
12. Design Basis Manual "Class 1E 125 VDC Power System".
13. Calculation 1.2.3ECPK207.





BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote (a) to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours.

The Category A limit specified for float voltage is  $\geq 2.13$  V per cell. This value is based on the battery vendor recommendation which states that prolonged operation of cells  $< 2.13$  V can reduce the life expectancy of cells.

The Category A limit specified for specific gravity for each pilot cell is  $\geq 1.200$  (0.015 below the vendor fully charged nominal specific gravity or a battery charging current that had stabilized at a low value). This value is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. According to IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), the specific gravity readings are based on a temperature of 77°F (25°C).

The specific gravity readings are corrected for actual electrolyte temperature and level. For each 3°F (1.67°C) above 77°F (25°C), 1 point (0.001) is added to the reading; 1 point is subtracted for each 3°F below 77°F. The specific gravity of the electrolyte in a cell increases with a loss of water due to electrolysis or evaporation.

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected cell. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

The Category B limits specified for electrolyte level and float voltage are the same as those specified for Category A and have been discussed above. Footnote (d) to Table 3.8.6-1 is applicable to Category B float voltage. Footnote (d) requires correction for average electrolyte temperature. The Category B limit specified for specific gravity for each connected cell is  $\geq 1.195$  (0.020 below the vendor fully charged, nominal specific gravity) with the average

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

of all connected cells  $\geq 1.205$  (0.010 below the vendor fully charged, nominal specific gravity). These values are based on vendor's recommendations. The minimum specific gravity value required for each cell ensures that the effects of a highly charged or newly installed cell will not mask overall degradation of the battery.

Category C defines the limit for each connected cell. These values, although reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C limit specified for electrolyte level (above the top of the plates and not overflowing) ensures that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability. The Category C Allowable Value for float voltage is based on vendor recommendations which state that a cell voltage of 2.07 V or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement.

The Category C limit of average specific gravity  $\geq 1.195$  is based on vendor recommendations (0.020 below the vendor recommended fully charged, nominal specific gravity). In addition to that limit, it is required that the specific gravity for each connected cell must be no less than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells. This limit ensures that the effect of a highly charged or new cell does not mask overall degradation of the battery.

Footnotes (b) and (c) to Table 3.8.6-1 are applicable to Category A, B, and C specific gravity. Footnote (b) to Table 3.8.6-1 requires specific gravity correction for electrolyte level and temperature, with the exception that level correction is not required when battery charging current is  $< 2$  amps on float charge. This current provides, in general, an indication of overall battery condition.

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