

May 8, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: **Docket Nos. 50-362**
Licensee Event Report No. 2004-002-01
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Reference: Raymond Waldo (SCE) letter to NRC Document Control Desk, "Licensee Event Report No. 2004-002", dated August 9, 2004.

Dear Sir or Madam:

In the letter referenced above, SCE provided a Licensee Event Report (LER) in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) to report violations of Technical Specifications due to an incomplete post-maintenance calibration of Logarithmic Power Level-High Channel "A". When this LER was first submitted, SCE's cause evaluation was in progress. SCE is revising this LER to incorporate the updated findings from the cause evaluation.

Any actions listed are intended to ensure continued compliance with existing commitments as discussed in applicable licensing documents; this LER contains no new commitments. If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,



LER No. 3-2004-002-01

cc: **B. S. Mallett, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV**
C. C. Osterholtz, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3

NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104			EXPIRES: 06/30/2007			
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) <small>(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)</small>					Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.						
1. FACILITY NAME San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 3					2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000362			3. PAGE 1 OF 3			
4. TITLE Incomplete post-maintenance calibration of Logarithmic Power Level-High Channel "A" results in Technical Specification Violations.											
5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED		
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
06	06	2004	2004-002-01			05	08	2006			
9. OPERATING MODE		3		11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)							
10. POWER LEVEL		0		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	
				20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
				20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		73.71(a)(4)	
				20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(5)	
				20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
				20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)			
				20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)			
				20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			
				20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
				20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER											
NAME D. P. Breig, Station Manager, Nuclear Generation						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 949-368-9263					
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	
				N							
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED							15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)							X NO				
16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)											
<p>During a recent plant outage, SCE repaired Channel "A" of Log Power by replacing a discriminator card and calibrating the channel. Channel "A" was placed in-service for the plant startup that was completed on 6/6/2004. On 6/8/2004, plant personnel were reviewing calibration records and noticed that one portion of the calibration procedure had not been completed. Completing a startup without a valid calibration for Log Power Channel "A" violated TS 3.3.1, TS 3.3.2, and TS 3.0.4.</p> <p>This event resulted from a miscommunication between Maintenance personnel during a shift turnover.</p> <p>SCE has counseled/coached the individuals as appropriate. The expectation to use formal communication during turnovers was reinforced by a communication to site personnel on September 15, 2004. Other related corrective actions that were taken include training and proceduralizing the use of communications as an event defense.</p> <p>This event had no safety significance because Log Power Channels "B", "C", and "D" were unaffected by this occurrence and were fully Operable.</p>											

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	6. LER NUMBER			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 3	05000362	2004	--002--	01	2 of 3

Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 3
 Event Date: June 6, 2004
 Discovery Date: June 8, 2004
 Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering
 Mode: Mode 3 – Hot Standby
 Power: 0 percent

Background

SONGS Unit 3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] includes four channels ("A" through "D") of Logarithmic Power Level-High trip (Log Power) to protect against an unplanned criticality from a shutdown condition. A reactor trip is initiated by the Logarithmic Power Level-High trip at a less than or equal to 0.93 percent of Rated Thermal Power (RTP) unless this trip is bypassed by the operator. The bypass is automatically removed when the logarithmic power level decreases below 1E-4 percent of RTP.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1, RPS Instrumentation-Operating, and TS 3.3.2, RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown, together require four Log Power and Operating Bypass Removal channels to be Operable in Modes 2, 3, 4, and 5 when any reactor trip circuit breaker (RTCB) [BKR] is closed and any control element assembly is capable of being withdrawn. If one channel of Log Power becomes inoperable in Modes 2, 3, 4, or 5, these TSs require the inoperable channel to be placed in bypass within one hour and to be returned to Operable status prior to entering Mode 2 following the next entry into Mode 5.

On January 26, 2004, Action Request 040101660 was written when Unit 3 Log Power Channel "A" failed a TS surveillance because it was reading about one decade lower than the other three channels. Operators bypassed this channel until no longer required by TS 3.3.2, RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown, and TS 3.3.1, RPS Instrumentation-Operating.

On June 4, 2004, at 0445 PDT, plant operators manually tripped the Unit 3 reactor due to degraded circulating water pump [P] suction caused by heavy influx of sea grass across the traveling screens [SCN] during very low tide conditions. Unit 3 remained in Mode 3 until it was returned to full power operation about two days later. That event was reported to the NRC in LER 3-2004-001.

Description of the Event

Although not required by the TS, SCE used the June 4, 2004 outage as an opportunity to repair Log Power Channel "A." Plant technicians (utility, non-licensed) replaced a discriminator card and performed the TS-required channel calibration procedure. Control Room (utility, licensed) personnel returned the channel to Operable status at 2305 PST on June 5, 2004 and then proceeded with an orderly plant startup. Unit 3 entered Mode 2 at 0023 PST on June 6, 2004 and Mode 1 at 0317 PST on the same date.

On June 8, 2004 (discovery date), plant personnel (utility, non-licensed) reviewing Log Power channel "A" maintenance records noticed a conflict between the "work done" section of the maintenance order (MO) and the steps signed as "complete" in the calibration procedure. After investigating the conflicting information, it was determined that part of the calibration procedure was not performed in accordance with the procedural requirements. Control Room personnel were informed and declared this channel inoperable.

Completing a plant startup without placing a TS-inoperable Log Power Channel in bypass within one hour resulted in the following TS violations:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	6. LER NUMBER			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 3	05000362	2004	--002--	01	3 of 3

1. TS 3.3.2 requires four channels of Log Power to be Operable whenever the plant is in Modes 3, 4, or 5 and with one or more reactor trip circuit breakers (RTCB) closed and any control element assembly capable of being withdrawn. Action "A" requires an inoperable channel of Log Power to be placed in bypass within one hour, which was not done.
2. TS 3.3.1 requires four channels of Log Power to be Operable when any RTCB is closed. Action "A" requires an inoperable channel of Log Power to be placed in bypass within one hour, which was not done.
3. TS 3.0.4 requires an LCO to be met prior to entry into a Mode or other condition specified in the LCO applicability statement. TS 3.0.4 was not met because operators changed plant Mode without having Log Power Channel "A" in bypass.

SCE is providing this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Cause of the event:

This event resulted from a miscommunication between Maintenance personnel during a shift turnover. During the day shift, Maintenance personnel found they could not complete the channel calibration procedure (required to return the log channel to Operable status) because the available test equipment did not meet all the acceptance criteria. Because the calibration procedure could not be completed, Management decided to complete functional testing, return the maintenance order to planning status, and start up the plant with the Log Power Channel "A" bypassed (and not operable) as allowed by the TSs. During the turnover meeting, the oncoming swing shift supervisor misunderstood the message that the paperwork should be returned to planning status, without returning the Log Power Channel "A" to service. Instead, the swing shift supervisor, after verifying the functional test was performed satisfactorily, incorrectly signed off the work as being complete and informed Operations that the equipment could be returned to Operable status.

Corrective Actions:

SCE counseled/coached the individuals as appropriate. The expectation to use formal communication during turnovers was reinforced by a communication to site personnel on September 15, 2004 (AR 040101660). Other related corrective actions that were taken include training and proceduralizing the use of communications as an event defense (AR 050500737). Additional corrective actions may be identified and implemented.

Safety Significance:

This event had no safety significance. Log Power instrumentation Channels "B", "C", and "D" were unaffected by this occurrence and were fully Operable. As noted in the background section of this report, the TS allows continued operation with one channel of Log Power in bypass.

Additional Information:

In the past three years, SCE has not reported any other occurrences placing an RPS channel in service with an incomplete TS calibration.