



**FINAL
Exercise Report**

**ROBERT E. GINNA
NUCLEAR POWER STATION**

Licensee: **Constellation Energy**

Exercise Date: **July 19, 2005 – Plume Phase**
July 20-21, 2005 – Ingestion Phase

Report Date: 01-12-06

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
REGION II
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
II. INTRODUCTION.....	7
III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW.....	6
A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description	10
B. Exercise Participants.....	12
C. Exercise Timelines	17
IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS	19
A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation	20
B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated	26
 <i>Plume and Post-Plume Phase Activities and Out of Sequence Demonstrations</i>	
1. NEW YORK STATE	28
1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center.....	28
1.2 State Warning Point	29
1.3 State Accident Assessment.....	30
1.4 Emergency Operations Facility.....	30
1.5 Joint News Center	31
1.6 Emergency Alert System Radio Station.....	33
1.7 Personnel Monitoring Center	34
1.8 State Post Plume Phase Field Monitoring Teams	35
1.9 State Laboratory	35

2.	RISK JURISDICTIONS	37
2.1	Monroe County.....	37
2.1.1	Monroe County Emergency Operations Center	37
2.1.2	Monroe County Warning Point	38
2.1.3	Monroe County Accident Assessment.....	38
2.1.4	Monroe County Radiological Field Monitoring Team.....	38
2.1.5	School Evacuation (Webster School Bus Depot).....	39
2.1.6	Reception Center (Rush Henrietta)	41
2.1.7	Special Population Bus Run (Regional Transit Service)	42
2.1.8	Traffic Control Points	42
2.1.9	School Interviews (Webster, Schlegel Road School)	43
2.1.10	Medical Drill (Rural Metro – Transportation)	43
2.1.11	Medical Drill (Rochester General).....	44
2.1.12	Backup Route Alerting.....	44
2.2.	WAYNE COUNTY	45
2.2.1	Wayne County Emergency Operation Center	45
2.2.2	Wayne County Warning Point	47
2.2.3	Wayne County Accident Assessment	47
2.2.4	Wayne County Radiological Field Monitoring Team	47
2.2.5	School Evacuation (Marion, Penfield, Wayne Central)	48
2.2.6	Reception Center (Palmyra High School)	48
2.2.7	Special Population Bus Run (Sodus).....	49
2.2.8	Traffic Control Points.....	49
2.2.9	School Interviews (Marion, BOCES, Williamson, Wayne Central).....	50
2.2.10	Medical Drill (Not Demonstrated This Year).....	50
2.2.11	Backup Route Alerting.....	51

List of Appendices

APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.....	52
APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS	54
APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT.....	57
APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO	98

List of Tables

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline	17
Table 2 - Summary of Plume and Ingestion Activities.	18
Table 3 - Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.....	22

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 19, 2005 an exercise was conducted in the 10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway, emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station by the State and local governments and evaluated by the State and local government with Federal participation and was evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region II. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.

On July 20-21, 2005, an exercise was conducted in the 50-mile Ingestion Pathway Zone (IPZ) around the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region II. The purpose of the Ingestion Pathway Exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency within the IPZ. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

The most recent full-scale exercise at this site was conducted on March 4, 2003. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on January 21, 1982.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in New York State, Monroe County, Wayne County and the ingestion counties of Cayuga, Genesee, Livingston, Onondaga, Ontario, Orleans, Oswego, Seneca, Wyoming, and Yates that participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities:

Function	Date	Location
New York State		
State Ingestion Field Teams	7/20	Ingestion Counties
State Laboratory	7/20	Albany, NY
State PMC	5/18	Pittsford, NY
Monroe County		
Monroe County Reception Center	6/28	- Rush Henrietta High School
Monroe County School Interviews	5/19	- Schlegel Road Elementary School - Plank Road North Elementary School - Plank Road South Elementary School - Willink Middle School
Monroe School Evacuation Bus Co. Interview	5/17	Webster School Bus Depot
Monroe Special Population Bus Co. Interview	5/19	Regional Transit Service
Monroe County MS-1 Drill	5/20 8/11	Rural Metro (Transportation) Rochester General (Medical)
Monroe Backup Route Alerting	5/19	Monroe County Sheriff Webster Police Department
Wayne County		
Wayne County Reception Center	7/19	Palmyra High School
Wayne County School Interviews	5/11& 26	Marion, BOCES, Williamson, Wayne Central.
Wayne County School Evacuation Bus Co. Interviews	5/17	Marion, Penfield, Wayne Central School Districts
Wayne County Special Population Bus Co. Interviews	5/17	Sodus
Wayne County MS-1 Drill	NA	Not Demonstrated this year

The State and local organizations except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies and nine Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified as a result of this exercise.

II. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of the RERP and associated procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
- Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- U.S. Department of Commerce,
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
- U.S. Department of Energy,
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
- U.S. Department of Transportation,
- U.S. Department of Agriculture,
- U.S. Department of the Interior, and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station to FEMA Region II by the State of New York, Monroe County and Wayne County occurred on June 17, 1985. Formal approval of the RERPs was granted by FEMA on August 19, 1986, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was conducted on July 19-21, 2005 by FEMA Region II to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 (hereafter referred to as NUREG-0654);

- FEMA Interim REP Program Manual, August 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway and ingestion EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, titled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the July 19-21, 2005 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume and ingestion pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities, which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

A. Plume EPZ Description

The Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station site is located on the south shore of Lake Ontario, in the township of Ontario, in the northwest corner of Wayne County, New York.

The surface of the land on the southern shore of Lake Ontario at the site and East and West of it is either flat or gently rolling. It slopes upward to the south from an elevation of about 225 feet above mean sea level near the edge of the lake; to 440 feet at Ridge Road (New York State Highway 104) 32 miles South of the lake; and then to about 1,600 feet at the northern edge of the Appalachian Plateau, 30 to 40 miles to the South. Southward from Ridge Road, the terrain progressively roughens, with a series of small abrupt hills, commencing about 10 miles south of the site.

There are no public highways or railroads that traverse the site area.

Monroe County

Monroe County is bordered by Orleans and Genesee Counties to the West, by Livingston and Ontario Counties to the South, by Wayne County to the East and by Lake Ontario to the North. There are many manufacturing activities centered in and around the city of Rochester. Approximately 22% of the County's 67 square miles is in urban development, about 28% is vacant, wooded or water surface and 50% is farmland. Of Monroe County's workers, 45% are employed in manufacturing, 20% in service industries, 16% in retail, 1.4% in agriculture and the remainder in other activities.

The population of Monroe County is dispersed among the City of Rochester, nineteen towns and ten villages. In terms of population size and growth, Monroe is number one in the 8-county Genesee/Finger Lakes Region.

Wayne County

Ginna Station is located in the Town of Ontario (the northwest corner of Wayne County). Wayne County is bordered by Monroe County to the west, by Ontario and Seneca Counties to the south, by Cayuga County to the east and Lake Ontario to the north.

Since its settlement in the 19th Century, Wayne County has been predominately rural in character. The northern portion of the county, especially the area between Ridge Road and Lake Ontario, is primarily orchards. Cherries, pears and apples are the chief crops produced. In the southeastern portion of the County highly productive muck lands can be found that produce, for the most part, corn, potatoes and onions. In the southwest, grains such as corn, oats and wheat are grown. Dairy farms are also located throughout the County. Roughly 70% of the county's 600 square miles is utilized for approximately 2,500 farms. About 34% of the County's workers are employed in manufacturing operations; 18% in service industries; 16% in retail trade; 19% in agriculture and 13% in other occupations.

The population is dispersed among fifteen towns and eleven villages. Many residents of the western portion of Wayne County (including the four EPZ towns) commute to jobs in Monroe County.

B. Exercise Participants

The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station exercise on July 19, 2005.

STATE OF NEW YORK

New York State Agencies/Organizations -

New York State Emergency Management Office
New York State Department of Health
New York State Police
New York State Department of Education
New York State Department of Transportation
New York State Department of Labor
New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission
New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
New York State Public Service Commission
New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs
New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation
New York State Thruway Authority
New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
New York State Office of General Services
New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance
New York State Office of Mental Health
New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
Cyber Security Critical Infrastructure Coordination
Office of Children & Family Services
New York State Department of Correctional Services
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services

New York State Office for the Aging
New York State Office of Homeland Security
New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control

Federal Agencies/Organizations -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
United States Department of Agriculture

Private/Volunteer Organizations -

RACES
Greater Rochester American Red Cross
Salvation Army
New York Power Authority
State University of New York
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
DOE Radiological Assistance Program Team
Brookhaven National Laboratory

RISK JURISDICTIONS

MONROE COUNTY

County Agencies/Organizations

Monroe County Office of the County Executive
Monroe County Office of Emergency Preparedness
Monroe County Sheriff
Monroe County Department of Communications and Special
Events
Monroe County Department of Environmental Services
Monroe County Department of Public Health
Monroe County Law Department
Monroe County Fire Bureau
Monroe County Security Department
Monroe County Human Services

Monroe County Probation Department
Monroe County Department of Transportation
Monroe County Information Services
Monroe County Public Safety Communications Department
Monroe County Public Safety
Monroe County Water Authority
Monroe County Shelter/Evacuation
Rochester Emergency Communications Dept./911
Rochester Police Department
Rochester Fire Department
Webster School District
Webster Police Department
Monroe County Emergency Medical Services

New York State Agencies/Organizations -

New York State Police
New York Department of Transportation
New York State Agriculture and Markets
New York State Department of Health

Private/Volunteer Organizations -

RACES
Lift Line
Greater Rochester American Red Cross
Regional Transit Service
Frontier Telephone Company
Constellation Energy
Xerox Corporation
WHAM

WAYNE COUNTY

County Agencies/Organizations -

Wayne County Board of Supervisors
Wayne County Emergency Management Office

Wayne County Department of Health
Wayne County Sheriffs Department
Wayne County Department of Highways
Wayne County Department of Public Health
Ontario Fire Department
Palmyra Fire District
Wayne Central School District
Palmyra – Macedon School District
Marion School District
Sodus School District
Williamson School District
Lyons School District
Wayne County Social Services
Wayne County 9-1-1 Center
Wayne County Fire Coordinator
Wayne County Board of Cooperative Educational Services
Wayne County Sheriff's Department
Wayne County Emergency Medical Services Coordinator

New York State Agencies/Organization -

New York State Police
New York State Health Department
New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets
New York State Department of Health

Private/Volunteer Organizations -

Radio Station WHAM
RACES
Constellation Energy
Wayne County Chapter of the American Red Cross
Civil Air Patrol

INGESTION JURISDICTIONS

Monroe
Wayne
Cayuga
Genesee
Livingston
Onondaga
Ontario
Orleans
Oswego
Seneca
Wyoming
Yates

PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS

Radio Station WHAM
RACES
Civil Air Patrol

C. Exercise Timeline

Tables 1 & 2, on the following pages, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station exercise on July 19-21, 2005. Also included are times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

Robert E. Ginna Plume and Ingestion Exercise

Table - 2

July 19-21, 2005

TIME	DATE	EVENT	LOCATION	REMA
Per Scenario	Tuesday July 19, 2005	Plume Phase Activities Begin	Per Exercise Agreement	
0816		Alert Notification of Unusual Event	Per Exercise Agreement	Times shown represent utility d of this report shows individual t
0857		Alert	Per Exercise Agreement	Times shown represent utility d of this report shows individual t
0958		Early Precautionary Actions	Per Exercise Agreement	Clear lakes, beaches & parks. E Wayne & Monroe County. Dair water – 10 mile EPZ. Schools a
1026		Site Area Emergency	Per Exercise Agreement	Times shown represent utility d of this report shows individual t
1055		General Emergency	Per Exercise Agreement	Times shown represent utility d of this report shows individual t
1300		Animal Advisory	Per Exercise Agreement	Dairy animals on stored food an Quarantine farm products & liv M3.
1530		Ingestion Activities Begin Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Advanced Party Meeting & conference call with State and counties.	State Emergency Coordination Center, Albany, NY	FRMAC Advance Party confere affected counties. Federal and S responsibilities identified. FRM requested. Counties informed of maps and other related informat Infrastructure Application progr Information System (GIS) was t dairy forage and vegetable crop sampling plan was developed to pathway zone (IPZ).

Robert E. Ginna Plume and Ingestion Exercise

Table – 2

July 19- 21, 2005

TIME	DATE	EVENT	LOCATION	REM/
1000	Wednesday July 20, 2005	New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC) Chairman conf. call with all affected ingestion counties	State Emergency Coordination Center Albany, NY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DPC review of current status - Evacuation of ERPAs W1& - Shelter all others. - Food remains quarantined i analysis is completed. - Fax action request forms to - Cattle on stored feed and w - Two State and Federal Field gathering samples of water, r - Milk pathway results will b - Review of fly over maps. Verify hotspots.
1500		New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC) Chairman conf. call with all affected ingestion counties	State Emergency Coordination Center Albany, NY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DPC review of fly over m - Vegetation sampling in pr - Food embargo possible by - Request for Disaster Deck - Request for Federal Labor samples.

Robert E. Ginna Plume and Ingestion Exercise

July 19- 21, 2005

Table – 2

TIME	DATE	EVENT	LOCATION	REM/
1100	Thursday July 21, 2005	New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC) Chairman conf. call with all affected ingestion counties	State Emergency Coordination Center Albany, NY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DPC review of current status - Review of flyover maps inadequate. Protective action guidelines for leafy vegetables, milk, and water - FRMAC fixed wing flyover, map, field team sampling local protective action category major ingestion counties via the State - The ingestion pathway was confirmed for A, B, & C. Map locations designated for A and Monroe counties were identified - There were no restricted areas returning.
1500		New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC) Chairman conf. call with all affected ingestion counties 30 day time jump per exercise EOP	State Emergency Coordination Center Albany, NY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DPC review of current status - No further protective actions - PAG's for food are still executing
1515		EXERCISE TERMINATED		

V. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the July 19 – 21, 2005 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ and 50 mile IPZ surrounding the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise criterion contained in the FEMA Interim REP Program Manual, August 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 3

The matrix presented in Table 3 on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria from FEMA-REP-14 that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criterion is indicated by the use of the following letters:

- M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)
- D - Deficiency assessed
- A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
- N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)

SITE Robert E. Ginna DATE July 19-21,	Mobilization	Facilities	Direction & Control	Communications Equipment	Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations	Emergency Worker Exposure Control	Rad Assmt PARs Based on Avail Information	Rad Assmt PADs for General Public	Prot Action Decisions for Special Population's	Rad Assmt & Decision Making for Ingest Exposure	Rad Assmt & Dec Making for Relo/Re-entry/ & Return	Implementation of Emergency Wkr Exposure Control	Implementation of KI Decision	Implementation of PADs for Special Population's	Implementation of PADs for Schools	Implementation of Traffic Access & Control	Impediments to Evac & Traf are Identified & Resolved	Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	Impl of IP Decisions Show Strat & Instr Material	Impl of Relocation/Re-entry/Return Decisions	Plume Phase Measurement & Analysis Equip	Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Mgmt		
	EMERGENCY OPNS MANAGEMENT					PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING					PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION										FI			
	1a1	1b1	1c1	1d1	1e1	2a1	2b1	2b2	2c1	2d1	2e1	3a1	3b1	3c1	3c2	3d1	3d2	3e1	3e2	3f1	4a1	4a2	4a3	
	LOCATION - NY STATE																						MEASUR	ANAL
EOC	M		M	M	M				M	M			M						A	M	M			
Accident Assessment					M	M	M			M	M	M												
State Lab																								
Field Monitoring Team											M													
Joint News Center	M	M	M	M	M																			
EAS Station				M																				
EOF	M	M	M	M	M																		M	
Personnel Monitoring Center											M	M												
Warning Point	M			M	M																			

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCAs from Prior Exercises)
N - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained in Section IV.B)
Blank - Not Scheduled for Demonstration or Not Assigned to Facility/Function
A - ARCA(s) Assessed Exercises
A1- ARCA Assessed
D - Deficiency

SITE
Robert E. Ginna

DATE
July 19-21, 2005

LOCATION - MONROE COUNTY	EMERGENCY OPNS MANAGEMENT					PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING					PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION					FIELD MEAS & ANAL								
	1a1	1b1	1c1	1d1	1e1	2a1	2b1	2b2	2c1	2d1	2e1	3a1	3b1	3c1	3c2	3d1	3d2	3e1	3e2	3f1	4a1	4a2	4a3	
	EOC	M	M	M	M	M				M	M		M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M				
Accident Assessment					M	M				M	M												M	
Field Monitoring Team	M				M							M	M									A		M
School Bus Interviews												M	M		M									
Reception Center												M	M											
MS-1 Drill												M	M											
Special Population Bus Co.												M	M	M										
School Interviews															M									
Traffic Control Points												M	M			M								
Backup Route Alerting												M	M											
Warning Point	M				M	M																		

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCAs from Prior Exercises)
 N - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained in Section IV.B)
 D - Deficiency

A - ARCA(s) Assessed Exercises
 Blank - Not Scheduled

SITE
Robert E. Ginna

DATE
July 19 - 21, 2005

LOCATION - WAYNE COUNTY	EMERGENCY OPNS MANAGEMENT					PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING					PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION					FIELD MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS								
	1a1	1b1	1c1	1d1	1e1	2a1	2b1	2b2	2c1	2d1	2e1	3a1	3b1	3c1	3c2	3d1	3d2	3e1	3e2	3f1	4a1	4a2	4a3	
	EOC	M		M	M	A			M	M			M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M			
Accident Assessment					M	M	M			M	M													M
Field Monitoring Team	M			M								M	M										M	N
Palmyra HS Reception Center					M							M	M											
Special Population Bus												M	M	M										
School Bus Interviews												M	M		M									
Traffic Control Points												M	M			M								
School Interviews												M	M		M									
Warning Point	M			M	M																			
Backup Route Alerting												M	M											

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) Assessed and no Unresolved ARCAs from Prior Exercises
N - Not Demonstrated as Scheduled (Reason Explained in Section IV.B)

A - ARCA(s) Assessec Exercises
Blank - Not Scheduled
D - Deficiency

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated

This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction based, issues only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.

- **Met** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
- **Deficiency** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
- **Area Requiring Corrective Actions** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
- **Not Demonstrated** - Listing of the exercise criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
- **Prior ARCAs - Resolved** - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
- **Prior ARCAs - Unresolved** - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in this report.

- A **Deficiency** is defined as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
- An **ARCA** is defined as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

- **Plant Site Identifier** - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
- **Exercise Year** - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
- **Evaluation Criteria Number** – An alphanumeric corresponding to the evaluation criterion in the FEMA Interim REP Program Manual (e.g., 1.a.1).
- **Issue Classification Identifier** - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
- **Exercise Issue Identification Number** - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

1. NEW YORK STATE

1.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 2.b.2; 2.c.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1; 3.d.1; 3.e.2; 3.f.1; 5.a.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** TWO

Issue No.: 27-05-3.e.1-A-01

CONDITION: The Wayne County USDA representative sent a message [by e-mail at 1604, Day 2, to the State Agriculture and Marketing representative in the Emergency Coordination Center (ECC)], that the State Dairy Farm database was not up-to-date.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The State Agencies computer database in the ECC is new and further coordination is needed to ensure that all information is current.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, J.9., 11.

EFFECT: The message listed one farm in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone that was not in business and an additional two farms that were in (milk) production. The State Department of Agriculture and Markets and local US Department of Agriculture officials will each be coordinating with the Farmers, consequently the agencies must ensure that their databases are maintained current.

RECOMMENDATION: Each agency must establish a coordination method to ensure that the ECC database is current and up-to-date.

Issue No.: 27-05-5.b.1-A-02

CONDITION: News Release #8 made reference to a map that was not in accordance with the wording in the release. The release stated that Area A includes the town of Ontario and the town of Webster. However, the map shows that only a part of the town of Webster is in Area A.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The release and map were not compared for exactness prior to release.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, E, 5, 7; G,3.a; G,4.a.b.c.

EFFECT: The difference in the release and map could cause confusion on the part of county personnel and the public. The public in $\frac{3}{4}$ of the town would take actions that they should not be required to take.

RECOMMENDATION: When maps are issued as a part of news releases, assure that the two documents exactly match in all aspects.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** ONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.2 State Warning Point

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

- e. **PRIOR ARCAs – RESOLVED: ONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

1.3 State Accident Assessment

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.e.1; 2.a.1; 2.b.1; 2.d.1; 2.e.1; 3.a.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs – RESOLVED: ONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

1.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.b.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 4.a.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

1.5 Joint News Center (JNC)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.b.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 5.a.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** THREE

Issue No.: 27-05-5.b.1-A-03

CONDITION: The status boards in the Public Inquiry area and the utility/state/local media work area and the map where affected areas were posted in the media work area had inaccurate information regarding the protective action decision. The status board in the media work area did not list ERPA M-3 as evacuating. The status board in the PI room indicated that ERPA M3 was to shelter; whereas it was to be evacuated. The map in the media area used colored plastic overlays to identify evacuated and sheltered areas. However, ERPA M-3 was never correctly identified.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The individual(s) posting the status boards and map did not understand that the information to shelter ERPA M-3 was only a *recommendation* and that the final protective action *decision* was different. The posting to the status boards was the licensee PAR and not the final PAD.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, E. 5.,7., G.3.a., G.4,a.,b.,c.

EFFECT: Individuals who called in for information would have been given inaccurate information. Likewise, this would be inconsistent with the EAS message and press releases that indicated that ERPA M-3 was to evacuate and would add confusion to anyone who called in after hearing the opposite on television or radio.

RECOMMENDATION: Review information carefully to ensure that accurate information is posted.

Issue No.: 27-05-5.b.1.-A-04

CONDITION: The Public Inquiry/media monitoring forms were not completed as required. Every form has a brief statement as to the inquiry but with the exception of two forms, there is no indication of what information, if any, was provided to the caller. In addition, the form used was not the form in the Ginna Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Work Plan, 2005, page IV-6.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The Public Inquiry/media monitors did not complete the forms as required. Likewise, the supervisor did not check to see if the forms were completed as required. The staff was not overwhelmed by many calls as there were 12 public inquiry staff that were receiving phone calls made by three people for a total of 54 calls.

REFERENCE: (NUREG-0654, E. 5.,7., G.3.a., G.4.a.,b.,c.) Ginna Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Work Plan, 2005, pages IV-2; IV-3, IV-4, IV-6.

EFFECT: If there was a question or challenge to what was provided to the public and/or media there is no record. The use of different forms could have added to the confusion in not completing the forms. Likewise, the supervisor has responsibility to review the forms and this was not done.

RECOMMENDATION: Review information carefully to ensure that the accurate information is posted. Follow established procedure for review and tracking.

Issue No.: 27-05-5.b.1-A.05

CONDITION: Media monitoring reports containing inaccurate and/or false information were not reported to the State or County Spokespersons or respective PIOs. There were six reports from Media Monitoring (controller injects) that contained false or inaccurate information.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The Public Inquiry Supervisor did not follow procedures as set out in the Ginna Joint News Center Procedure 2005.

When, media monitoring identifies false or misleading information being released that should immediately be taken by the PI Supervisor to the PIOs for verification and to the bullpen sessions for inclusion in the next media briefing. In addition, state and local spokespersons should be made aware of media glitches and ensure they are addressed in the next media briefing.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a., G.4.c. Ginna Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Work Plan, 2005, pages IV-2; IV-3, IV-4, IV-6.

EFFECT: Refutation of misinformation and other false information not included in the State, local, and utility statements in media briefings can create panic, confusion, and distrust of those who are attempting to provide accurate and consistent information.

RECOMMENDATION: Review procedures for media monitoring issues. Provide additional training to all personnel at the JNC on the need to provide the PI function with any and all inaccurate information being disseminated.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs – RESOLVED:** TWO
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.6 Emergency Alert System Radio Station - WHAM

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.d.1; 5.a.1; 5.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.7 Personnel Monitoring Center (Pittsford, May 18, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.a.1; 6.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.8 State Post-Plume Phase Field Monitoring Teams

Post-Plume Field Monitoring Team 1

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 4.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

Post-Plume Field Monitoring Team 2

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 4.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

Post-Plume Field Monitoring Team 3

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 4.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.9 State Laboratory

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criterion: 4.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE

- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2 RISK JURISDICTIONS

2.1 MONROE COUNTY

2.1.1 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center (MCEOC)

- a. MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.b.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1; 2.b.2; 2.c.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1; 3.c.2; 3.d.1; 3.d.2; 3.e.1; 3.e.2; 3.f.1; 5.a.1; 5.a.3; 5.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.2 Monroe County Warning Point

- a. MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1
- b. DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.3 Monroe County Accident Assessment

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.e.1; 2.a.1; 2.b.1; 2.d.1; 2.e.1; 4.a.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.4 Monroe County Radiological Field Monitoring Team

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 4.a.3
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** TWO

Issue No.: 27-05-4.a.1-A-06

CONDITION: The Radeco H809C air sampler was set up with two particulate filters in front of the silver zeolite cartridge. This is not in accordance with the Monroe County Radiological Emergency Plan, Procedure K, Attachment 4A.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Procedure K, Attachment 4A, figure 4 indicates the air sampler should have one particulate filter. The field team was asked why two filters were used. The team leader indicated that they had determined the rotometer (flow meter) on the air sampler would go above the highest rotometer indication (30 liters per minute) if only one filter was used.

The air sampler was then tested with one filter; the flow rate indicated approximately 34 liters/minute (the estimation is based on scale indicated on the rotometer). When two filters were placed in line, the flow rate measured approximately 15 liters/minute. The field teams had determined that placing two filters in line would enable them to accurately measure the flow rate without compromising the effectiveness of the sample. Their training did not include instruction to use two filters and their procedure (Attachment 4A, figure 4) did not specify two filters.

The Radeco H809C is capable of drawing 28.3 – 56.6 liters/minute (1-2 cubic feet per minute- cfm) with one filter/silver zeolite cartridge. With two particulate filters, the flow rate was reduced to approximately 14.16 liters/minute (.5 cfm). The additional load on the air sampler results in extending the time required to obtain a 283.17 liter/minute sample (the minimum sample volume). During the exercise, a 20-minute sample time was required.

REFERENCE: Monroe County Radiological Emergency Response Plan Procedure K, Attachment 4A.

EFFECT: If the field monitoring team were working in an area with a high radiation exposure rate, they would receive additional avoidable exposure by utilizing the “two filter” method of sampling.

RECOMMENDATION: The Radeco H809-C air sampler rotometer should be rescaled so it can be used to measure flow with one particulate filter. With one filter in place the sample time can be reduced to less than ten minutes, and may result in a significant reduction in radiation exposure for the field team.

CONDITION: The Eberline E-140 Geiger-Muller detector was not source checked in accordance with the Monroe County Radiological Emergency Plan, Procedure K, Attachment 4A.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The Eberline E-140 was source checked using a Cs-137 test jig. The individual performing the source check held the detector at an unspecified distance from the source and verified that the instrument responded to the source. This method is not in accordance with the instructions in Attachment 4A. The source check jig included an instruction sheet for source checking the RO-20. Instructions for source checking the E-140N were imbedded in section B, "Actions for the Field Survey Team" section of the procedure; they were not Section C, "Operational Checks for Radiological Instruments", where other instrument operational check instructions are located. The procedure layout, and the lack of instruction on the instruction sheet located inside the source check jig, may have been contributing factors to the oversight. The procedure should be modified to include instructions for source checking the E-140N in the section with other instrument operability checks.

REFERENCE: Monroe County Radiological Emergency Response Procedure K, Attachment 4A, Sections B and C

EFFECT: If the radiation survey meter response is not verified to be accurate (prior to use), it could unknowingly over or under respond to a radiation field. Particulate and iodine air samples are counted using this instrument. An inaccurate instrument response could result in inaccurate sample results. Those results may be used to confirm dose projections and make protective action recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION: Redemonstrate using correct procedure.

REDEMONSTRATION: The controller stopped the player and indicated that the team should review their procedure, and then re-demonstrate the

instrument source check. After reviewing appropriate procedure steps, the team successfully tested instrument response by holding the detector six inches away from the source. The meter correctly responded at approximately 20,000 counts per minute, as indicated in the procedure. This issue was resolved.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.5 School Evacuation (Webster School Bus Depot – May 17, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.6 Reception Center (Rush Henrietta – June 28, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.a.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.7 Special Population Bus Run (Regional Transit Service – May 19, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.8 Traffic Control Points (Zone A - May 19, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.d.1; 3.d.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE

f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.9 School Interviews (Schlegel Road, Plank Road North, Plank Road South Elementary Schools and, Willink Middle School. – May 19, 2005)

a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.c.2

b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE

c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE

d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE

f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.10 Medical Drill (Rural Metro Ambulance, Transportation Component – May 20, 2005)

a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.d.1

b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE

c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE

d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE

f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.11 Medical Drill (Rural Metro (Rochester General, Medical Component - August 1, 2005)

- a. **MET:** NONE
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.d.1
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.12 Backup Route Alerting (May 19, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 5.a.3
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2 WAYNE COUNTY

2.2.1 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center (WCEOC)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.b.1; 1.c.1; 1.d.1; 2.b.2; 2.c.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1; 3.c.2; 3.d.1; 3.d.2; 3.e.1; 3.e.2; 3.f.1; 5.a.1; 5.a.3; 5.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** TWO

Issue No.: 27-05-1.e.1-A-08

CONDITION: EOC displays in Operations Room not kept up to date with current information.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: No one was delegated the responsibility to make sure the displays were kept current.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654

EFFECT: Personnel in the EOC Operations Room could give out old or incorrect data from these boards, or take inappropriate actions because of the lack of up-to-date information.

RECOMMENDATION: Have one person dedicated to the displays that need to have information placed on them. Also, in the Incident Command System this is a function of a Situation Unit, therefore it may be beneficial to create a Situation Unit and have a Situation Unit leader that will be accountable for keeping all displays kept up to date.

Issue No.: 27-05-1.e.1-A-09

CONDITION: The Operations Room had one window-mounted air conditioning unit that was not powerful enough to keep the room at a comfortable temperature on a hot day, during activation. It was also noted that in the break room when the air conditioner and the coffee pots were on the same circuit, the circuit could not handle the power and kept tripping.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The Wayne County Operations Room air conditioner is not rated for a room that would have over 20 people in it, nor is the electrical system designed to handle the large amount of power that these pieces of equipment are drawing.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654

EFFECT: Personnel were not comfortable and the situation was unsuitable for long-term operations.

RECOMMENDATION: The County should consider replacing the Operations Room air conditioner unit with a stronger unit that is over rated for the size of that room and mounting it into the wall since the window will not support a unit that size. The County should also consider creating separate electrical lines for the powerful appliances that draw a lot of electricity, i.e. the air conditioners.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.22 Wayne County Warning Point

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 1.e.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.3 Wayne County Accident Assessment

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.e.1; 2.a.1; 2.b.1; 2.d.1; 2.e.1; 4.a.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.4 Wayne County Radiological Field Monitoring Team

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.a.1; 1.d.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 4.a.1; 4.a.3

- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** TWO
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.5 School Evacuation (Marion District Buses; May 12, 2005 - Penfield School Buses; May, 25, 2005 - Wayne Central School Buses; May 26, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.6 Reception Center (Palmyra High School – July 19, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 1.e.1; 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.a.1; 6.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.7 Special Population Bus Run (Sodus – May 17, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.8 Traffic Control Points

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.9 School Interviews (3 Locations: Williamson, BOCES & Marion Schools – May 11, 2005; Wayne Central School Districts – May 26, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** ONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.10 Medical Drill (Not Demonstrated This Year)

- a. **MET:** NONE
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 6.d.1
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.11 Backup Route Alerting (Ontario Fire Department – July 20, 2005)

- a. **MET:** Evaluation Criteria: 3.a.1; 3.b.1; 5.a.3
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

APPENDIX 1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which were used in this report.

ANL	Argonne National Laboratory
ARCA	Area Requiring Corrective Action
BOCES	Board of Cooperative Educational Services
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
USDOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
EAL	Emergency Action Level
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
USEPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPIP	Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERPA	Emergency Response Planning Area
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FR	Federal Register
JENC	Joint Emergency News Center
KI	Potassium Iodide
MCC	Monroe Community College
MCEOC	Monroe County Emergency Operations Center
MCFA	Monroe County Field Activities
mR	milliroentgen
mR/h	milliroentgen per hour
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG-0654	NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, <i>"Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980</i>
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
PIO	Public Information Officer

PMC	Personnel Monitoring Center
R	Roentgen
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
RECS	Radiological Emergency Communications System
REM	Roentgen Equivalent Man
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
RG&E	Rochester Gas and Electric
R/h	Roentgen(s) per hour
RTS	Regional Transport Service
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SEMO	State Emergency Management Office
TBD	To Be Determined
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TL	Team Leader
UE	Unusual Event
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
WCEOC	Wayne County Emergency Operations Center
WCFA	Wayne County Field Activities
WHAM	Emergency Alert System Radio Station for Ginna area.

APPENDIX 2

EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station exercise on July 19-21, 2005 and the out of sequence drills. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters "(TL)" after their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
USDOT	Department of Transportation
USEPA	Environmental Protection Agency
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ICF	ICF Consulting

<u>EVALUATION SITE</u>	<u>EVALUATOR</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
Exercise Oversight	Rebecca Thomson	RAC Chair FEMA
NEW YORK STATE		
SEOC	Roy Smith (TL)	ICF
SEOC	Wendy Swygert	ICF
SEOC	Henry Christiansen	ICF
SEOC - Accident Assessment	Daryl Thome (TL)	ICF
EOF	Craig Gordon	NRC
EOF	Michele Rollino	FEMA
PMC	Sam Nelson (TL)	ICF
JNC	Jane Young (TL)	FEMA
JNC	Mabel Santiago	FEMA
JNC	Miriam Weston	FEMA
EAS Station	Ernest Boaze	ICF
Ingestion Field Teams	Sam Nelson	ICF
Ingestion Field Teams	Marcy Campbell	ICF
Ingestion Field Teams	Eric Simpson	USEPA

<u>EVALUATION SITE</u>	<u>EVALUATOR</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
NEW YORK STATE		
State Laboratory	Carol Herzenberg	ICF
MONROE COUNTY		
EOC	Brian Hasemann (TL)	FEMA
EOC	Lauren DeMarco	FEMA
EOC	Terry Sheehan	USDOT
EOC	Russell Fox	FEMA
EOC	Michele Sturman	FEMA
EOC – Accident Assessment	Deborah Blunt	ICF
Field Monitoring Team	Marcy Campbell	ICF
Traffic Control *	Sam Nelson	ICF
Special Population Evacuation*	Sam Nelson	ICF
School Evacuation*	Sam Nelson	ICF
Reception Center*	Sam Nelson/Joe Keller	ICF
School Interview*	Sam Nelson	ICF
Medical Drill*	Sam Nelson	ICF
Backup Route Alerting*	Sam Nelson	ICF
Warning Point	Ernest Boaze	ICF

* Indicates an out of sequence drill or demonstration.

<u>EVALUATION SITE</u>	<u>EVALUATOR</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
WAYNE COUNTY		
EOC	Bill Cullen (TL)	FEMA
EOC	Sam Nelson	ICF
EOC	William Wark	ICF
EOC	Richard Ohlsen	FEMA
EOC	Todd Sniffin	ICF
EOC – Accident Assessment	Joe Keller	ICF
Special Population Evacuation*	Sam Nelson	ICF
School Evacuations*	Sam Nelson	ICF
Reception Center*	Ron Biernacki	ICF
Reception Center*	Marcy Campbell	ICF
Field Monitoring Teams	Ron Bernacki	ICF
Traffic Control	Paul Malool	FEMA
School Interviews	Sam Nelson	ICF
Medical Drill*	Sam Nelson	ICF
Backup Route Alerting	Richard Ohlsen	FEMA
Warning Point	Paul Malool	FEMA

* Indicates an out of sequence drill or demonstration.

APPENDIX 3

EXERCISE CRITERION AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

This appendix lists the exercise criterion and the extent-of-play agreement, which were scheduled for demonstration in the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station exercise on July 19, 2005.

The exercise evaluation criteria, contained in the FEMA Interim REP Program Manual, August 2002, represent the application of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 to an emergency response exercise.

Because the exercise evaluation criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the criterion. The following extent-of-play agreement was approved by FEMA Region II on July 15, 2005.

ROBERT E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

OFFSITE EXTENT OF PLAY

**FULL – PARTICIPATION
EXERCISE**

July 19, 2005 – PLUME PHASE

July 20-21, 2005 – INGESTION PHASE

EXTENT

OF

PLAY

EXTENT-OF-PLAY GROUND RULES

- **REAL LIFE EMERGENCIES TAKE PRIORITY OVER EXERCISE PLAY**
- The Scenario Development Team will develop free play messages. The State Controller will inject the message to the County Emergency Management Director/Administrator or other staff for action.
- Free play messages for the Plume Phase for Public Inquiry at the JNC will be developed by the Scenario Development Team. Public Inquiry messages will be injected at the JNC by a control cell to enable the public inquiry function to identify trends and rumors.
- The State Controller will inject radiological data for any radiological field activities.
- According to REP Program Strategic Initiative 1.5, “ During tabletop exercises, drills and other demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence from an integrated exercise, if FEMA and the offsite response organizations (ORO) agree, the FEMA Evaluator may have participants re-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate corrective of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized only if it would not be disruptive and interrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation Areas.” This initiative is not applicable to EOC/JNC/EOF demonstrations during the July19, 20 ,21 exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

WARNING POINTS (NYS and Wayne and Monroe Counties)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The latest revised call lists will be provided at the Federal/State evaluators briefing session the day before the exercise, if requested by FEMA. The lists will contain home and business telephone numbers and it is requested that these lists remain confidential.
- There will be no free play messages introduced at the Warning Points.

EOCs (NYS and Wayne and Monroe Counties)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The State Liaison will be pre-positioned and will arrive at the County EOC no sooner than 30 minutes after notification to respond. The Utility Technical Liaison assigned to the State ECC will be pre-positioned and arrive at the State ECC no sooner than 30 minutes after notification to respond.

Counties will respond in accordance with plans and procedures

EOF

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- State liaisons will be pre-positioned and will arrive at the EOF no sooner than 30 minutes after the notification to respond.

- **Counties will respond in accordance with plans and procedures.**

JNC

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **(PLUME) State JNC Staff will be pre-positioned and arrive at the JNC no sooner than 30 minutes after notification to respond.**
- **(INGESTION) State JNC will operate at the State ECC in Albany for Day 2 and 3 activities.**
- **County staff will respond in accordance with plans and procedures**

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.b – Facilities

**Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
(NUREG-0654, H.3)**

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **Back-up power is available, but will not be activated, at the State ECC and County EOC's.**

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a., b.)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **The State Controller will inject free play messages to the County Emergency Management Director/Administrator or designee for action.**
- **Public Inquiry messages will be injected at the JNC by a “control cell”.**

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **A State Controller will inject a free play message to the County Emergency Management Director/Administrator or designee to initiate the demonstration of backup systems at/or to communicate with the SECC, EOF, JNC, MCEOC, WCEOC, and Field Monitoring Teams.**

Wayne County

	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Backup</u>
SECC	ExHotline	telephone
EOF	RECS	telephone
JNC	telephone	e-mail
MCEOC	ExHotline/RECS	telephone
Field Teams	RACES	EOC radio
R/C	telephone	RACES

Monroe County

	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Backup</u>
SECC	ExHotline	telephone
EOF	RECS	telephone
JNC	telephone	e-mail

WEOC	ExHotline/RECS	telephone
Field teams	RACES	F/T hand held radios
R/C	telephone	RACES

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- No equipment such as barriers, traffic cones, signs, etc. will be deployed to the field.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.a – Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e, f; K.4)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- A State Controller will inject a free play message to the field monitoring team that will initiate a discussion between the F/T coordinator and the field team regarding actions to be taken if the exposure limits are reached. This will be a discussion only activity.
- Wayne county plans do not utilize a turn-back value.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

SCHOOLS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

SPECIAL FACILITIES

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.d. –Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.11).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, I.10; J.9; M.1)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.d. –Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.11).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, I.10; J.9; M.1)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10. e)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).

EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- Bus companies will be interviewed as per the offsite extent of play activities schedule.
- Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.
- During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the transportation providers (telephone call) by the Transportation Coordinator/Highway Superintendent. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at the County EOC.
- There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles during the exercise.

NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The hearing impaired list will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The list will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator. The procedures for notification will also be discussed at the County EOC.
- There will be no actual notification of hearing impaired individuals during the exercise.
- The equipment and location will be identified and observed.

- A TDD to TDD test message will be demonstrated between the EOC and 911 location.

EVACUATION OF NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The list of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The lists will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator.
- There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles for transport of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals.
- During the exercise, there will be no actual contact of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals identified on the list.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).

EVACUATION OF SCHOOL POPULATIONS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **Bus companies will be interviewed as per the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.**
- **Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.**
- **During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the schools (telephone call) by the School Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at the County EOC.**

SCHOOL INTERVIEWS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **Schools will be interviewed as per the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.**
- **All schools will be interviewed using the REP schools questionnaire.**

SPECIAL FACILITIES

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the special facilities (telephone call). Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at the County EOC.**
- **There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles to the special facilities.**

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (TCPs and ACPs)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **During the exercise, law enforcement officials will discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs in the field at mutually agreed upon locations.**
- **There will be interviews of law enforcement agencies responsible for staffing the designated TCPs/ACPs. (Note: Monroe County Sheriff has lead for TCP's, Wayne County Sheriff and NY State Police have lead for TCP's)**
- **Each designated law enforcement agency will provide officers for interviews. Monroe Sheriff- 2 persons, Wayne County Sheriff-1 person, NYSP- 1 person**
- **The TCPs/ACPs will be identified by a free play message provided by the State Controller to the County Emergency Management Director/Administrator or designee.**
- **No equipment such as barriers, traffic cones, signs, etc. will be deployed to the field.**

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

**Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
(NUREG-0654, J.10.k).**

IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The County will demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with at least two (2) impediments to evacuation.
- The State Controller in the County EOC will hand the free play messages to the County Emergency Management Director/Administrator or designee for action to test the procedures for the removal of traffic impediments.
- No equipment (Barriers, Traffic cones, Signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field.
- This demonstration will not involve the dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the scene of a simulated impediment. Initial contact of resource providers will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at the County EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).

Extent-of-Play Agreement

- **Distribution and communications with protective actions and protective measures with the agri-industries will be simulated.**
- **Instructional or informational messages will be developed for news briefings, broadcast of actual message will be simulated. This activity will occur at the State EOC,(Day 2,3)**

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.f. – Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.**

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I.9).

FIELD MONITORING TEAMS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- Each County will dispatch one (1) radiological monitoring team. Each team will be provided with a State Controller and FEMA evaluator.
- The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. Each team will demonstrate contamination control techniques utilizing booties and gloves, subsequent changes will be simulated and actions will be verbalized to evaluator.
- Each team will take at least six (6) ambient radiation measurements and at least two (2) air samples. All teams must take the air samples as though they were in the presence of the plume (even teams that may not be impacted by the plume).
- There will be actual packaging, but not transport of samples to the laboratory. EOC staff will be questioned only regarding means of transportation of air samples to a central point and the location of the laboratory. Field teams will demonstrate how to obtain air samples during the exercise and will be questioned only regarding the procedures for the pick-up point of air samples.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.b – Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, I.8; J.11)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The State will dispatch 3 teams on Day 2 to collect two samples each water, milk, vegetables, leafy vegetation, soil, particulate and air samples, this activity will be out of sequence from the scenario.
- The teams will deliver samples to a designated location for transport to the lab(s). Actual transport will be simulated. Discussions on all necessary transport activities will be conducted at the sample transfer location.
- The teams will be integrated teams consisting of NYSDOH, NYS Ag and MKTS, BNL RAP, and FRMAC, other state agencies may participate as necessary on the teams.
- NYS sampling procedures will be utilized by the integrated teams for FEMA evaluations.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **The State lab will be demonstrated on day 2 out of sequence and independent of other scenario activities.**
- **The lab demonstration will begin with delivery of samples to the loading dock.**
- **The vehicle shall deliver two samples of the following: water, milk, vegetables, leafy vegetation, soil, particulate filters and air sample cartridges.**
- **The NYS lab shall demonstrate communication of the sample results to the State EOC. Data will be provided for the simulated contaminated samples.**

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D & NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- There will be no actual siren sounding, no actual tone alert radio activation, and no broadcasting of EAS messages. The R.E. Ginna siren system was last successfully tested on 5/05/2005. Airing of at least one EAS message will be simulated with the radio station.
- Contact with the radio station for subsequent EAS messages may be simulated.
- Regular programming responsibilities of the radio station may preclude participation at the time of the issuance of the simulated EAS message.
- Wayne and Monroe Counties will perform a silent siren test in sequence with the scenario for the first EAS activation only. If siren failure(s) are indicated on the silent test, procedures will be followed for backup notifications, this activity will be an EOC discussion only.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.2: RESERVED

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- **There are no exception areas that require supplementary route alerting.**
- **During the exercise, one (1) simulated siren failure will be discussed at each County EOC. The State Controller will inject a free play message regarding this siren failure to the individual responsible for route alerting activities.**
- **As per the out of sequence activities schedule, one representative with a vehicle capable of public notification will actually drive the route for the simulated siren failure identified during the exercise.**

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c).

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

PUBLIC INQUIRY

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The public inquiry function at the JNC will be staffed by at least 4 operators with one supervisor.
- Inject messages will indicate false or misleading information to enable the public inquiry function to identify 2 trends /false rumors.
- Plume Phase- conduct at least 2 actual briefings as selected by the federal evaluators. All briefings will be prepared/developed up to the point of performance of actual briefing.

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The Reception Center will be demonstrated as per the offsite extent of play activities schedule.
- Monitoring and Decon staff and technique will be demonstrated as follows. Staff will be provided to simulate evacuees.
- One lane for vehicle monitoring with at least 1 monitor monitoring at least 2 vehicles; (Monroe County will utilize a vehicle portal monitor)
- One portal monitoring station monitoring at least 6 individuals;
- One registration station (social services) with 2 personnel registering at least 2 individuals each;
- One male or one female decon station with 2 monitors to simulate at least 1 personnel decon each;
- One vehicle decon station with at least 1 monitor to simulate at least 2 vehicle decons;
- Other staff will be demonstrated through the use of rosters;
- The facility will be set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place with the exception that Reception Center floors will not be covered with paper/plastic.
- Decontamination techniques will be simulated.

- **The monitoring and decontamination teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.**
- **(Normal and back-up communications) will be discussed between the Reception Center and the County EOC during the demonstration.**

← - - - Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b).

Extent-of-Play Agreement

- The County Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center's (EWPMC) will be not demonstrated during exercise.
- A state EWPMC will be demonstrated as per the out of sequence activities schedule.

← - - - Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Not demonstrated this exercise

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The offsite transportation and facility component of this medical drill will be demonstrated as per the offsite extent-of-play agreement schedule.
- The offsite transportation component of this drill will end when the vehicle is ready to depart for the hospital with the patient from an offsite location.
- The facility component of this drill will involve the transport of a patient to the Hospital for treatment. This component will be evaluated on

Deleted: Nine Mile Point
Deleted: December 13, 2002.

8/10/2005.

- The use of flashing lights and sirens for exercise play is not required.