



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 26, 2006

MEMORANDUM TO: James Baptist, Resident Inspector, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

FROM: William D. Travers, Regional Administrator **/RA/**

SUBJECT: SPECIAL INSPECTION CHARTER TO EVALUATE FARLEY UNIT 1
MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FAILURES

You have been selected to lead a Special Inspection to assess the circumstances surrounding three outboard main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) that failed to close at Farley Unit 1 on or around April 8, 2006. Your inspection should begin on April 25, 2006. Mr. Mike Scott, Division of Reactor Safety, will be assisting you in this effort.

A. Basis

On or around April 8, 2006, the licensee conducted an as-found closure test of the Unit 1 MSIVs following unit shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage. Two of three outboard MSIVs failed to move and one outboard MSIV achieved only a partial stroke. All inboard MSIVs, which are of similar design, appear to have functioned properly and fully closed.

In accordance with Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program," deterministic and conditional risk criteria were used to evaluate the level of NRC response for this operational event. The review concluded that the circumstances of the event met the MD 8.3 deterministic criteria due to the multiple failures which occurred exhibiting potential common mode repetitive failure scenarios. Specifically, three of six Unit 1 MSIVs failed to close on demand during valve closure testing. The failures also involved possible adverse generic implications as related to Unit 2 MSIV operability. The risk review indicated the CCDP for the event met criterion for a Special Inspection. Subsequently, Region II determined that the appropriate level of NRC response was the conduct of a Special Inspection.

This Special Inspection is chartered to identify the circumstances surrounding this event and review the licensee's actions following discovery of the conditions.

Contact: Curtis W. Rapp, RPB2/DRP
(404) 562-4653

B. Scope

The inspection is expected to perform data gathering and fact-finding in order to address the following:

1. Develop a sequence of events, including applicable management decision points prior to the time the MSIVs failed through troubleshooting and repair activities.
2. Review licensee documents to assess if the licensee had previous failures of MSIVs to close and also review current and previous maintenance practices for the MSIVs.
3. Assess any corrective action the licensee took prior to the event to address MSIV closure problems and determine if the actions were appropriate and timely.
4. Assess operating procedures and operator training concerning this scenario and determine if the procedures and training were adequate for operators to compensate for the lack of MSIV closure.
5. As requested by the Regional SRA, assist in the collection of data necessary to support completion of the significance determination process.
6. Review the licensee's MSIV operability determination for Unit 2.
7. Review this event for generic safety implications.

C. Guidance

Inspection Procedure 93812, "Special Inspection," provides additional guidance to be used during the conduct of the Special Inspection. Your duties will be as described in Inspection Procedure 93812. The inspection should emphasize fact-finding in its review of the circumstances surrounding the MSIV failures. Safety or security concerns identified that are not directly related to the event should be reported to the Region II office for appropriate action.

You will conduct an entrance and begin inspection no later than April 25, 2006. It is anticipated that the on-site portion of the inspection will be completed by May 2, 2006, at which time you should conduct an exit of the inspection results with the licensee. A daily Region II Management status briefing (4:00 p.m. EST) summarizing your inspection results should be provided beginning on April 26, 2006. A report documenting the results of the inspection should be issued within 45 days of the completion of the inspection.

This Charter may be modified should you develop significant new information that warrants review. Should you have any questions concerning this Charter, contact Scott Shaeffer at (404) 562-4521.

References:

1. NRC Inspection Procedure 93812, Special Inspection
2. Region II ROI 2296, Management Directive 8.3 Decision Documentation Form
3. Management Directive 8.3, NRC Incident Investigation Program
4. Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports
5. Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364

License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

cc: W. Kane, OEDO
S. Lee, OEDO
J. Dyer, NRR
C. Haney, NRR
R. Martin, NRR
R. Zimmerman, NSIR
L. Plisco, RII
C. Casto, RII
V. McCree, RII

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ADAMS: Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: _____

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| OFFICE | RII:DRP | RII:DRS | RII:DRP | RII:ORA | | |
| SIGNATURE | | | | | | |
| NAME | SShaeffer | VMcCree | CCasto | LPlisco | | |
| DATE | 4/ /2006 | 4/ /2006 | 4/ /2006 | 4/ /2006 | | |
| E-MAIL COPY? | YES NO | YES NO | YES NO | YES NO | | |