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Energy to Serve Your WorldSM

April 20, 2006

Docket Nos.: 50-348
50-364

NL-06-0808

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Units 1 and 2
Licensee Event Report 2006-001-00
Security Computer Access Control Software Deficiency

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2006-001-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71 (a)(4) and 10 CFR Part 73 Appendix G (I)(c).

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L. M. Stinson".

L. M. Stinson

LMS/SYA/sdl

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2006-001-00

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President
Mr. J. R. Johnson, General Manager – Plant Farley
RTYPE: CFA04.054; LC# 14429

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator
Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager – Farley
Mr. C. A. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector – Farley

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000 348	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
Security Computer Access Control Software Deficiency

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	14	2006	2006	- 001 -	00	04	20	2006	Farley Unit 2	05000 364
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE 1	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)									
10. POWER LEVEL 100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)						
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A							

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME J. R. Johnson – Nuclear Plant General Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 334-899-5156
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73 Appendix G (I) (c). At 1615 on March 14, 2006, it was determined that a potential vulnerability existed in a safeguard system. A One-Hour report was made per 10 CFR 73.71 at 1708 on March 14, 2006. It was determined that under certain circumstances, the access control software could assign additional access levels to a badge beyond what was intended. A contractor employee had passed background screening and other requirements for Unescorted Access Authorization that would have allowed both Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) access. Although his badge was to have been administratively restricted to PA access only, it was found to allow VA access. Compensatory measures were established pending verification that all badge access levels were assigned correctly. Following this verification, compensatory measures were terminated at 2200 on March 14, 2006. This event was caused by a software design error by the security software vendor. No Vital Area entries without Unescorted Access Authorization actually occurred. All badges have been verified to have correct access levels assigned. With vendor assistance, an enhanced procedure for setting badge access was developed and implemented on March 16, 2006. A software patch to correct the deficiency was developed by the vendor (ARINC of Carrollton, TX), installed, and tested by April 5, 2006.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2) NUMBER	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit - 1	05000348	2006	- 001	- 00	2 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor
 Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Description of Event

Background: A contractor employee had passed background screening and other requirements for Unescorted Access Authorization that would have allowed both Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) access. His need to enter a VA to obtain keys was not foreseen and therefore, he had been administratively restricted to only PA access. He had held a VA badge on previous occasions of employment at the site. The individual's job function was operating a mobile crane in the Protected Area. The individual had entered a Vital Area several times to obtain the keys to the crane. While in the Protected Area performing work, the individual conversed with a Security Officer and asked where he could go with a PA badge. When told he could only go into the Protected Area, the individual told the officer he had been entering the VA to get the crane keys and the card reader was not denying access. This was reported at 1427 on March 10, 2006. The individual's badge was updated at 1435 on March 10, 2006 and tested satisfactorily to verify it did not allow VA access. This event constituted a loggable but not reportable event since the individual had Unescorted Access Authorization and only lacked administrative clearance to enter the VA. All PA badges were placed on Hold at 1710 on March 10, 2006 pending investigation.

During investigation of the above event by FNP and the security software vendor, at 1615 on March 14, 2006, it was determined that a software deficiency allowed the badging software to set access for different areas than intended under certain circumstances. As a compensatory measure, guards were stationed at VA doors with an access authorization list independent of the security computer, to check personnel access authorization, at 1620 on March 14, 2006. This condition constituted a reportable event per 10 CFR 73.71(a) (4). A One Hour Report was made on this issue at 1708 on March 14, 2006. Security computer active badging records were compared with access authorization training records, no other discrepancies were identified, and compensatory measures were discontinued at 2200 on March 14, 2006. With vendor assistance, an enhanced procedure for setting badge access was developed and implemented on March 16, 2006 to prevent incorrect assignment of access levels.

Cause of Event

This event was caused by a functional design deficiency in the vendor (ARINC of Carrollton, TX) supplied software for the security computer.

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NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Safety Assessment

A review of the VA door logs for access by the individual involved showed that he had only entered the VA for very short periods, validating that his VA entries were for the legitimate purpose of obtaining keys to the mobile crane he was to operate.

A review of all active badges identified no badge set for more access than was intended (other than the individual's badge that triggered this investigation).

All personnel granted any PA or VA access have passed Unescorted Access Authorization. However, they are only administratively cleared to enter specific areas based on job need. Therefore, this event did not allow anyone without Unescorted Access Authorization to enter any Vital Area of the plant. A three year review was conducted of all badges incorrectly assigned wrong access levels by the computer and no other entry into an area not administratively cleared occurred.

Therefore, this event did not result in anyone without Unescorted Access Authorization entering the Protected Area or Vital Area.

Corrective Action

With vendor assistance an enhanced procedure for setting badge access was developed and implemented on March 16, 2006 to prevent incorrect assignment of access levels.

The vendor developed a software patch that was installed and tested satisfactorily on April 5, 2006.

Additional Information

There have been no similar LERs in the past two years.