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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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SER 354/06-001-00
SALEM AND HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATIONS
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70, DPR-75 AND NPF-57
DOCKET NOS. 50-272, 50-311 AND 50-354

This Safeguards Event Report entitled, "Inadequate Compensatory Measures for a loss of the Security Computer" is being submitted pursuant to the requirement of 10CFR73.71(d).

Sincerely,

Michael J. Massaro

Michael J. Massaro
Plant Manager – Hope Creek

Attachment

FDP

C Distribution

JE74

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Hope Creek Generating Station	05000354	1 OF 3

4. TITLE

Inadequate Compensatory Measures For A Loss Of The Security Computer

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									Salem Generating Station Unit 1	50-272
02	06	2006	2006	- 001 -	00	04	07	2006	Salem Generating Station Unit 2	50-311

9. OPERATING MODE

1

10. POWER LEVEL

100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: *(Check all that apply)*

- ☐ 20.2201(b)
- ☐ 20.2201(d)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(1)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- ☐ 20.2203(a)(4)
- ☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
- ☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
- ☐ 50.36(c)(2)
- ☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- ☐ 73.71(a)(4)
- ☐ 73.71(a)(5)
- ☒ OTHER

Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Francis D. Possessky, Licensing Engineer	856-339-1160

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
N/A					N/A				

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES *(If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)* ☒ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On February 06, 2006, during maintenance of security equipment, power was lost to some assessment equipment and the required compensatory measures were not in place within the time specified in the Site Physical Security Plan. A 1-hour report was made to the NRC. Following the recovery from this event, operational testing was performed to ensure all security equipment was operable and the compensatory measures were secured. Later it was discovered that the testing of the security systems should have been performance testing, not operational testing and another 1-hour report was made. Performance testing on the affected equipment was performed and all testing was satisfactory. The root cause of the security computer event is that the work management process did not adequately consider security risk. The work management prioritization process will be revised to properly prioritize security work and consider security risk. The cause of the incorrect testing is inadequate procedural guidance. The security procedures have been revised. This report is being submitted pursuant to the requirement of 10CFR73.71(d).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Hope Creek Generating Station	05000354	2006	001	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Hope Creek - General Electric – Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Salem 1 and 2 – Westinghouse – Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR/4)
Plant Security System - {IA}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Event Date: February 06, 2006
Discovery Date: February 06, 2006
Discovery Date: February 09, 2006

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Salem Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 with reactor power at approximately 100% prior to the loss of the security computers. Hope Creek was in operational condition 1 with reactor power at approximately 100% prior to the loss of the security computers. There was no other equipment out of service that contributed to this event.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 6, 2006 at 1328, during maintenance on security equipment, power to some Salem / Hope Creek (SHC) security equipment was lost. This resulted in the loss of some assessment capability. The planning for the work had determined that only the Hope Creek assessment equipment would be affected and the appropriate compensatory measures had been identified and were implemented prior to commencing the work. When other assessment equipment was impacted, Security implemented the required compensatory measures for that equipment. These measures were not expected to be completed in the required timeframe, so a 1-hour report was made to the NRC.

Power was restored to the security computers at approximately 1525 on February 6, 2006. Operational testing of the security computers was performed in accordance with station security procedures. This testing confirmed that the assessment equipment was functional. At this point, the compensatory measures were secured.

On February 9, 2006, an NRC inspector reviewed the event. The NRC identified a conflict between the testing that was performed to verify operability of the security computer systems and the testing required by Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.44. The NRC inspector identified that due to improper retesting, the compensatory measures were secured prior to verifying that each zone that lost power was performance tested. The incorrect retest of computer functions was reported to the NRC in another 1 hour report.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The Site Physical Security Plan requires compensatory measures be employed when assessment equipment is inoperable. In this event testing was incorrect and the compensatory measures were secured. However, subsequent performance testing verified that all systems affected by the loss of power were capable of performing their functions after power was restored on February 06, 2006.

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CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of the maintenance event is that the work management process did not adequately consider security risk. As a result, the removal of the inverter was inadequately reviewed for system impacts. A contributing cause is that the Security Operations Supervisor who performed the review did not have sufficient technical knowledge to perform the review. Another contributing cause is the difficulty in determining which specific loads are powered from the security panel. The cause of the failure to completely retest all security computer functions is inadequate procedural guidance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Security procedures with specific retesting requirements have been revised.

Revise the work management prioritization process to properly prioritize security work and evaluate security risk.

Develop load lists for specific security related power supplies.

Provide power supply training to Security staff.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

In July 2005, while performing maintenance on security equipment, some communications were lost. The security and digital systems security engineers reviewed the proposed work plan and were aware of the potential impact on required compensatory measures. During this evolution a fuse blew. The partial communication loss appears to be from a loss of equipment that was not assessed adequately prior to removing the inverter from service.