Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000

Mike Skaggs Site Vice President, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

APR 1 0 2006

10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Tennessee Valley Authority) Docket No. 50-390

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 390/2006-002 - POTENTIAL LOSS OF COOLING TO THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER DURING AN APPENDIX R FIRE

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) provides details concerning WBN's evaluation of another utility's LER. This evaluation address a potential loss of cooling water to the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Seal Water Heat Exchanger during an Appendix R fire. The report contains information regarding this event which is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (ii) (B).

Should there be questions regarding this submittal, please contact Paul L. Pace at (423) 365-1824.

Sincerely. Mike ^øSkaggs

Enclosure cc: See Page 2

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Enclosure

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cc (Enclosure): NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381

> Mr. D. V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08G9a One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957

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1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000 390 year sciences 2 of 4 17. NARRATIVE // more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 360/1 1. Plant Concilions: 2 of 4 17. NARRATIVE // more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 360/1 1. Plant Concilions: 2 of 4 17. NARRATIVE // more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 360/1 1. Plant Concilions: 2 of 4 17. NARRATIVE // more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 360/1 1. Plant Concilions: 4 18. Descriptior of Event: A Event: On January 27, 2005, engineering personnal reviewed operating experience from another station involving a potential to of coding water (Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Ocd CCP) to the Chemical and Volume Control System in adopting the codin coding more coding is the DCPS of the event, CPS to codin to adopting the proving of the PSH. During Purp (CP) [EIIS Code CRP) register Storage Trank (RWST) [EIIS Code BP/TS), normal charging and letdown (EIIS Code CR) rescluted in the Relevent Notare Storage and a potential loss of RCS (EIIS Code AB) (NereNST). The result is that the C2P and the Reactor Cooland the volut is near How (red 2) gan) are not cooled. The outlet of the Reactor Cooland Puer MEOY ESC Code CRP seal rigetur How (red 2) g	-2001)	LIC	CENSEE EVENT R	EPORT	(LER)			
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000 330 YEAR RELIMPTIVE	1. FACILITY	NAME	2. DOCKET		6. LER NUM	BER		3. PAGE
2006 - 002 - 00 7. NARRATIVE (iff more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3664) 1. Plant Conclinons: Watts Bar, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. 11. Descriptior of Event: A. Event: On January 27, 2006, engineering personnel reviewed operating experience from another station involving a potential los of cooling water (Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Code CC) to the Chemical and Volume Control System (CCCS) Sol Water Heat Exchanger (EIIS) Code CDP view (EIIS) Code CDP view (EIIS) Code CDP view) Marks 2007 (Energy Industry Identification System (CCS) Sol Water Heat Exchanger (EIIS) Code CDP view) The scenario involves a loss of component Cooling System (CCS) Iow to the CVCS Seal Water Heat Exchanger (EIIS) Code CDP view) (ECP) (EIIS Code CDP) causing a loss of adequate suction head (NPSH). During an Appendix P Hate Exchanger (CDP) seal injection flow path. If the search Coolant Bystem (RCS) is via the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)(EIIS Code ABP) seal injection flow path. If the search Type recoling is loss of the search review cooling is loss of the search review cooling is loss of the search review cooling to sol, the CCP recurdiation flow PAH. The review is the search review cool and the approximate There search with cool water from the RWST. The net result is that the CCP search term biol (PCP)(EIIS Code ABP) sear injection flow path. If the search coolant Bystem (RCS) is via the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)(EIIS Code ABP) resultion flow path. If the cool cooled to add the approximate increase could be high enough to potentially damade perturbation. The RCP seal, which would result in increased seal leakage and a potential bis of RCS (EIIS Code AB) inventory. This ite	Natts Bar Nuclear Plant 1 Ini	+ 1	05000.390	YEAR	SEQUENT NUMBE	R R	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 4
 17. NARRATIVE :// more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3864) 1. Plant Conclitions: Watts Bar, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. 11. Descriptior of Event: A. Event: On January 27, 2006, engineering personnel reviewed operating experience from another station involving a potential los of cooling water (Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Code CC) to the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Soal Water Heat Exchanger (EIIS) Code CC) to the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Soal Water Heat Exchanger (EIIS) Code CC) to the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Soal Water Heat Exchanger (EIIS) Code CC) to the Chemical and Volume Control System (CCS) low to the CVCS Seal Water Heat Exchanger (EIIS) Code CC) is one to be comage results in a potentia high suction temperature on the runing CVCS Centitugal Charging Pump (CCP) (EIIS Code CB/P) causing a loss of a deequate suction head (NPSH). During an Appendix A If re event, CCP suction is aligned in the Refueling Water Storage Tark (RWST) (EIIS Code BPT/R), normal Charging and letdown (EIIS Code CB/P) causing a loss of a net cool water with real text hanger (CO) is on the Refueling Water Storage Tark (RWST) (EIIS Code BPT/R), normal Charging and letdown (EIIS Code CB/P) causing a loss of a net cool water with real text from the RWST. The net result is that the CCP soution thread truth real exchanger combines with cool water from the RWST. The net result is that the CCP and the RCP seals, which would result in increase could be high enough to potentially damage both the CCP and the RCP seals, which would result in increase could be high enough to potentially damage both the CCP and the RCP seals, which would result in increase could be high enough to potentially damage both the CCP and the RCP seals, which would result in the contributed to the event. C. Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences Date & Time Occurrences January 27,	valle bai Nuclear Flam, On			2006	002		00	
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No other systems or secondary functions were affected by this event. E. Method of Discovery This condition was discovered during a review of operating experience of another utility's Licensee Event Report.	D. Other Systems or Sec	ondary Functions	s Affected					
E. Method of Discovery This condition was discovered during a review of operating experience of another utility's Licensee Event Report.	No other systems or s	econdary function	ns were affected by this e	vent.				
This condition was discovered during a review of operating experience of another utility's Licensee Event Report.	E. Method of Discovery							
	This condition was disc	covered during a	review of operating exper	ience of an	other utility	's Licen	see Event	Report.

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NRC FORM 366A (1-2001)

NRC FORM 366A		U.S. NUCLEAR REG	ULATORY CONIMISSION
LICEN	SEE EVENT F	REPORT (LER)	
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER	3. PAGE
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1	05000 390	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER	3 OF 4
		2006 002 00	
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional of	copies of NRC Form 3	66A)	
F. Operator Actions			
No operator actions were required.			
G. Safety System Responses			
Not applicable - No safety system response	es were required.		
III. CAUSE OF EVENT			
A. Immediate Cause:			
The immediate cause of the condition was fa effects of an Appendix R fire.	ailure to protect coo	ling water flow to the seal water heat ex	changer from the
B. Root Cause			:
The cause of the event is a latent error in W preparation and review of the analysis did no Seal Water Heat Exchanger.	BN Fire Safe Shutd ot evaluate the rami	lown Analysis. The subject matter expe ifications of not protecting cooling water	rts involved in r flow to the CVCS
C. Contributing Factor:			
There were not contributing factors for this c	ondition.		
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT			
The following five areas are affected by this c	ondition:		
1. Auxiliary Building Room 713.0-A1 betweer	n column lines A1-A	3 and S-U	
2. Auxiliary Building Room 737.0-A1, betwee	n column lines A1-/	A6 and Q-U	
3. Auxiliary Building Room 737.0-A3, Heat ar	nd Vent Equipment	Room	
4. Auxiliary Building Room 757.0-A2, 6.9kv a	nd 480V Shutdown	Board Room A	
5. Auxiliary Building Room 772.0-A1, 480V B	oard Room 1A		
The conclition identified is applicable to fire an Exchanger. Since the design of the heat exch safety significance is applicable for the affecte standby functions.	eas which affect the hanger is such that i ed fire areas in whic	e availability of cooling for the Seal Wat it can only be cooled by the A-Train hea h the CCS A-Train header cannot be c	er Heat ader of CCS, the redited for hot
The fire areas identified include full area autor identified, the installed fire protection features all probability, prevent a fire from developing t exchanger. Additional defense in depth again	matic suppression a would identify and to the extent that the st the affect of a fire	and detection systems. Therefore, for the control the fire, and the onsite fire departure would be a loss of CCS to the seal the is provided by posting fire watches in	he fire areas Irtment would, in water heat the affected areas.
Based on it being unlikely that a plant fire wou low safety significance.	ld result in a loss o	f CCS to the seal water heat exchange	r, the condition has

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NRC	FORM 366A.			U.S. N	UCLEAR REG	ULATORY CONIMISSION			
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)									
	1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		6. LER NUMB	ER	3. PAGE			
Watt	s Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1	05000 390	YEAR	SEQUENTIA NUMBER	AL REVISION NUMBER	4 OF 4			
			2006	002	00	,,			
17. N/	ARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional cop	oles of NRC Form 30	56A)						
V.	ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES	i							
	Based on the above "Analysis of The Event," this the general public.	s event did not ac	lversely affe	ct the health	and safety of	plant personnel or			
VI.	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS								
	A. Immediate Corrective Actions								
	Upon learning of another station's operating e engineering completed their assessment of th consecuences of the event. Upon engineerin were adjusted and limited to the areas describ	xperience, WBN e issue, and WBI g confirmation the bed above.	placed rovin N put in plac at this condit	g fire watche e interim ope ion existed a	s in the suspe rator actions t t WBN, the ro	ected areas until o mitigate the ving fire watches			
	B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence (T TVA's corrective action program tracks complete	VA does not consection of these act	sider these i ions.)	tems to cons	titute regulato	ry commitmerats.			
	The condition identified by this LER is considered to be a non-conforming condition, due to the fact that the current Fire Safe Shutdown analysis did not recognize the need to protect the seal water heat exchanger, or to evaluate the ramifications of not protecting the heat exchanger. TVA has evaluated various options to address this condition. The resolut on involves maintaining cooling water supply to the CVCS Seal Water Heat Exchanger by implementing a design change to reroute and/or provide protection for the identified vulnerable cables.								
VII.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION								
	A. Failed Components								
	There were no failed components involved in	this LER.							
	B. Previcus LERs on Similar Events								
	A review of previous WBN LERs revealed no other similar events within three years of this event that involved a failure to recognize the need to protect a component or to evaluate the ramifications of not protecting this component from a fire.								
	C. Additional Information:								
	None.								
	D. Safety System Functional Failure								
	This event did not involve a safety system functional failure as defined in NEI 99 02, Revision 0. E. Loss of Normal Heat Removal Consideration								
	This event is not considered a scram with los	s of normal heat	removal.						
VII.	COMMITMENTS								
	None								
						I			
C FOR	M 266A (1.20)1)								

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