

### **C.I.6. Engineered Safety Features**

Chapter 6 of the final safety analysis report (FSAR) should provide a discussion of how the design meets the applicable regulatory requirements and available regulatory guidance. The applicant should state its intentions with regard to adopting risk-informed categorization, and treating structures, systems, and components in accordance with Title 10, Section 50.69, of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 50.69).

Generic design control documents (DCDs) typically address the equipment and materials used to manufacture the components in the engineered safety feature (ESF) system. If applicable, this information may be incorporated by reference.

ESFs are provided to mitigate the consequence of postulated accidents in the unlikely event that an accident occurs. Together with 10 CFR 50.55a, General Design Criteria (GDCs) 1, 4, 14, 31, 35, and 41, as set forth in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, require that certain systems must be provided to serve as ESFs systems. To meet GDC 14, the fluids used in ESF systems, when interacting with the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB), should have a low probability of causing abnormal leakage, rapidly propagating failure, and gross rupture. Containment systems, residual heat removal systems, emergency core cooling systems (ECCSs), containment heat removal systems (CHRSs), containment atmosphere cleanup systems, and certain cooling water systems are typical of the systems that are required to be provided as ESFs. The application should include information on the plant's ESFs in sufficient detail to permit an adequate evaluation of the performance capability of these features.

The ESF systems provided in plant designs may vary. The ESF systems explicitly discussed in this chapter are those that are commonly used to limit the consequences of postulated accidents in light-water-cooled power reactors, and should be treated as illustrative of the ESF systems and of the kind of informative material that is needed. This section should list each system that is considered to be part of the ESF systems.

The information included in this section is to ensure compatibility of the materials with the specific fluids to which the materials are subjected. The application should include adequate information to ensure compliance with the applicable Commission regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 (including the applicable GDCs), the positions of applicable regulatory guides and branch technical positions, and the applicable provisions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (hereinafter "the Code"), including Sections II, III, and XI.

#### **C.I.6.1 Engineered Safety Feature Materials**

Provide a discussion of the materials used in ESF components, as well as the material interactions with ECCS fluids that could potentially impair operation of ESF systems in this section.

### **C.I.6.1.1 Metallic Materials**

#### **C.I.6.1.1.1 *Materials Selection and Fabrication***

Provide information on the selection and fabrication of the materials in the plant's ESF systems, such as the ECCS, CHRS, and containment air purification and cleanup systems. Include materials treated, as well as the treatment processes used, to enhance corrosion resistance, strength, hardness, etc. Materials for use in ESF systems should be selected for compatibility with core coolant and containment spray solutions as described in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Articles NC-2160 and NC-3120:

- (1) List the material specifications for all pressure-retaining ferritic materials, austenitic stainless steels, and nonferrous metals, including bolting and welding materials, in each component (e.g., vessels, piping, pumps, and valves) that are part of the ESF systems. Identify the grade or type and final metallurgical conditions of the materials placed in service. Provide adequate information to demonstrate that the materials proposed for the ESFs comply with Appendix I to Code Section III; Parts A, B, and C of Code Section II; or RG 1.84, "Design, Fabrication, and Materials Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section III."
- (2) List the ESF construction materials that would be exposed to the core cooling water and containment sprays in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Provide test data and service experience to show that the construction materials used are compatible with the core cooling and containment spray solutions.
- (3) Provide the following information to demonstrate that the integrity of safety-related components of the ESF systems will be maintained during all stages of component manufacture and reactor construction:
  - (a) Provide sufficient details regarding the means used to avoid significant sensitization during fabrication and assembly of austenitic stainless steel components of the ESF systems. In so doing, demonstrate that the degree of freedom from sensitization will be comparable to that obtainable by following the recommendations of RG 1.44, "Control of the Use of Sensitized Stainless Steel." This RG describes acceptable criteria for preventing intergranular corrosion and intergranular stress-corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of stainless steel components of the ESF systems. The application should discuss the measures in place to prevent furnace-sensitized material from being used in the ESF systems, and how methods described in this guide are followed in testing the materials prior to fabrication to ensure that no deleterious sensitization occurs during welding. It should also include sufficient information to verify that materials used in ESF portions of austenitic stainless steel piping comply with staff positions on boiling-water reactor (BWR) materials described in Attachment A to Generic Letter (GL) 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," or the recommendations of NUREG-0313, Revision 2, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping," for materials that are resistant to stress corrosion cracking.
  - (b) Provide sufficient details on process controls used to limit the exposure of austenitic stainless steel ESF components to contaminants that are capable of causing stress-corrosion cracking. Show that the degree of surface cleanliness during all stages of component manufacture and reactor construction will be comparable to that obtainable by following the recommendations of RGs 1.44 and 1.37, "Quality Assurance Requirements for Cleaning of Fluid Systems and Associated Components of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

- (c) Cold-worked austenitic stainless steel should not be used for pressure boundary applications. It may be used for other applications when there is no proven alternative available. Use of such materials should be supported by service experience and laboratory testing that simulates the environment to which the components will be exposed. Cold work should be controlled, measured, and documented during each fabrication process. Augmented inservice inspection should be proposed to ensure the structural integrity of such components during service. Provide assurance that cold-worked austenitic stainless steels will have a maximum 0.2 percent offset yield strength of 620 MPa (90,000 psi) to reduce the probability of stress corrosion cracking in ESF systems.
  - (d) Provide sufficient information on the selection, procurement, testing, storage, and installation of nonmetallic thermal insulation to demonstrate that the leachable concentrations of chloride, fluoride, sodium, and silicate are comparable to those recommended in RG 1.36, "Nonmetallic Thermal Insulation for Austenitic Stainless Steel."
  - (e) Operating experience has indicated that certain nickel-chromium-iron alloys (e.g., Alloy 690 and Alloy 182) are susceptible to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) attributable to corrosion. Alloy 690 has improved stress corrosion cracking resistance in comparison to Alloy 600 previously used in reactor applications. If nickel-chromium-iron alloys are proposed for use as ESF materials, provide an acceptable technical basis, either by identification (based on demonstrated satisfactory use in similar applications) or by presentation of information to support use of the material under the expected environmental conditions (e.g., exposure to reactor coolant).
  - (f) Provide sufficient information to show that the fracture toughness properties of the ferritic materials comply with the requirements of the Code.
  - (g) Describe the controls imposed on abrasive work performed on austenitic stainless steel surfaces to minimize cold working of surfaces and introduction of contaminants that promote stress corrosion cracking of the materials.
- (4) Provide sufficient information to determine that the corrosion allowances specified for ESF materials that are exposed to process fluids are supported by adequate technical bases, and that the specified corrosion allowances are adequate for the proposed design life of affected components and piping.
  - (5) Provide sufficient information to show that the preheat temperatures for welding low-alloy steel comply with RG 1.50, "Control of Preheat Temperature for Welding of Low-Alloy Steel," and for welding carbon steel materials, the preheat temperatures comply with Section III, Appendix D, Article D1000 of the ASME Code.
  - (6) Provide sufficient information to ensure that moisture control on low hydrogen welding materials comply with the requirements in Section III of the ASME Code, unless alternative procedures are justified.
  - (7) Provide sufficient information to show that the methods for qualifying welders for making welds at locations where access is limited, and the methods for monitoring and certifying such welds, are in accordance with RG 1.71, "Welder Qualification for Areas of Limited Accessibility."
  - (8) Provide sufficient information to show that the applicable guidance pertaining to material selection and fabrication provided in Chapters 5 and 10 will also be met.

**C.I.6.1.1.2 *Composition and Compatibility of Core Cooling Coolants and Containment Sprays***

Provide the following information regarding the composition and compatibility of the core cooling water and containment sprays and other processing fluids, as they relate to the materials of the ESF systems:

- (1) Describe the method used to establish and control the pH of the ESF coolants during a LOCA to avoid stress-corrosion cracking of the austenitic stainless steel components, and to avoid excessive generation of hydrogen attributable to corrosion of containment metals. For all postulated design-basis accidents (DBAs) involving release of water into the containment building, estimate the time-history of the pH of the aqueous phase in each drainage area of the building. Identify and quantify all soluble acids and bases within the containment.
- (2) Describe the process used to evaluate the compatibility of the materials used in ESF systems and the composition of the core cooling and spray solutions and any other fluids that might occur during operation of the ESF systems.
- (3) Provide information to verify the compatibility of materials used in manufacturing ESF components with the ESF fluids.
- (4) Describe the process used to verify that ESF components and systems are cleaned in accordance with RG 1.37.
- (5) Describe the process used to determine whether nonmetallic thermal insulation will be used on components of the ESF systems and, if so, how it is verified that the amount of leachable impurities in the specified insulation will be within the “acceptable analysis area” in Figure 1 of RG 1.36.
- (6) Provide information concerning the proposed approach to control the chemistry of the water used for the ECCS and containment spray solutions (CSS) and during the operation of the systems. Describe the methods and bases to evaluate the short-term compatibility (during the mixing process) and long-term compatibility of the water used for the ECCS and CSS with all safety-related components within the containment.
- (7) Describe the methods to be employed to store the ESF fluids to reduce deterioration, which may occur as a result of either chemical instability or corrosive attack on the storage vessel. Describe the effects that such deterioration could have on the compatibility of these ESF coolants with both the ESF materials of construction and other materials within the containment.
- (8) Describe how the release of hydrogen attributable to corrosion of metals by ECCS and CSS will be controlled so that the amount released is in accordance with RG 1.7 (Safety Guide 7), “Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident.” Outline the paths that solutions from the ECCS and CSS would follow in the containment to the sump, for both injection and recirculation, in order to verify that no areas accumulate very high to low pH solutions, and to validate any assumptions regarding pH in modeling containment spray fission product removal.
- (9) Provide the following information to evaluate whether hydrogen release is controlled in accordance with RG 1.7:
  - (a) description of the experience, tests at simulated accident conditions, or conservative extrapolations from existing knowledge that supports the selection of component materials (to minimize adverse interaction) upon which the operation of the feature is based
  - (b) evidence that the materials used in fabricating ESF components will withstand the postulated accident environment, including radiation levels, and radiolytic decomposition products that may occur will not interfere with it or other ESFs

- (c) adequate information on compatibility of ESF fluids with organic materials (coatings) and use of coatings in containment, including their qualifications
- (d) adequate information to determine the adequacy of post-LOCA hydrogen control, including control of the volume of hydrogen gas expected to be generated by metal-water reaction involving the fuel cladding and radiolytic decomposition of the reactor coolant, and corrosion of metals by emergency core cooling and containment spray solutions

#### **C.I.6.1.2 Organic Materials**

Identify and quantify all organic materials that exist in significant amounts within the containment building. Such organic materials include wood, plastics, lubricants, paint or coatings, insulation, and asphalt. Plastics, paints, and other coatings should be classified and references listed. Coatings not intended for 40-year service without overcoating should include total coating thicknesses expected to be accumulated over the service life of the substrate surface.

#### **C.I.6.2 *Containment Systems***

##### **C.I.6.2.1 Containment Functional Design**

Describe how the basic functional design requirements for the containment meet GDCs 4, 16, and 50 in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR 50.46. GDC 4 provides the basic environmental and dynamic effects design requirements for all structures, systems, and components important to safety. GDC 16 establishes the fundamental requirement to design a containment that is essentially a leak-tight barrier against release of radioactivity to the environment. GDC 50, among other things, requires consideration of the potential consequences of degraded ESFs, such as the CHRS and ECCS, limitations in defining accident phenomena, and conservatism in the calculations of models and input parameters, in assessing containment design margins. 10 CFR 50.46 provides methods and criteria for the analysis and design of the ECCS.

For new plant applicants and those pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) that are subject to the guidance in GL 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," discuss the containment analyses, considering shutdown conditions, when appropriate, to provide a basis for procedures, instrumentation, operator response, equipment interactions, and equipment response. Include shutdown thermodynamic states and physical configurations to which the plant may be subjected during shutdown conditions (such as time to core uncover during a loss of shutdown decay heat removal capability), and provide sufficient depth so that adequate bases can be developed.

##### **C.I.6.2.1.1 *Containment Structure***

###### **(1) Design Bases**

Discuss the design bases for the containment to withstand a spectrum of LOCA and main steam line break accidents. In particular, this discussion should include the following information:

- (a) Discuss the postulated accident conditions and the extent of simultaneous occurrences (e.g., loss of offsite power and single active failures) that determine the containment accident pressure (including both internal and external design pressure requirements). Only seismically qualified equipment should be credited for accident mitigation in containment safety analyses. State the maximum calculated accident pressure and temperature.

- (b) Discuss the postulated accident conditions and the extent of simultaneous occurrences (e.g., loss of offsite power and single active failures) that determine the accident pressure and temperature requirements for the internal structures of pressure-suppression-type containments, with reference to the design evaluation in Item 3(b) of this section. Only seismically qualified equipment should be credited for accident mitigation in containment safety analyses.
- (c) Discuss the sources and amounts of mass and energy that might be released into the containment and the post-accident time-dependence of the mass and energy releases, with reference to the design evaluations provided in Sections 6.2.1.3 and 6.2.1.4.
- (d) Discuss the capability for energy removal from the containment under various postulated single-failure conditions in ESFs.
- (e) Discuss the bases for establishing the containment depressurization rate, and justify (with references) the assumptions used in the analysis of offsite radiological consequences of the accident.
- (f) Discuss the bases for the analysis of the minimum containment pressure used in the ECCS performance studies for PWR reactor systems, with reference to the design evaluation in Section 6.2.1.5.
- (g) Discuss other design bases, such as hydrodynamic loads unique to pressure-suppression-type containments, with reference to the design evaluation in Item 3(b) of this section.

(2) Design Features

In this section, discuss the hydrodynamic loads experienced in the containment, describe the design features of the containment and internal structures, and include appropriate general arrangement drawings. Provide the following information:

- (a) Describe the qualification tests proposed to demonstrate the functional capability of the structures, systems, and components in pressure-suppression-type containments and nonpressure-suppression type containments. Discuss the status of any incomplete developmental test programs.
- (b) Describe the design provisions to protect the integrity of the containment structure under external pressure loading conditions resulting from inadvertent operation of the CHRS or other possible modes of plant operation that could result in significant external structural loadings, and discuss the functional capability of these provisions. Specify the design values of the external design pressure of the containment and the lowest expected internal pressure.
- (c) Identify the locations in the containment where water may be trapped and prevented from returning to the containment sump. Specify the quantity of water involved. Discuss how the retained water may effect the static head for recirculation pumps. Discuss any provisions that permit the water entering the refueling canal to be drained to the sump.

(3) Design Evaluation

Provide evaluations of the functional capability of the containment design. The information to be included depends on the type of containment being considered (i.e., dry containments, or BWR water pressure-suppression-type containments), as indicated below. Provide information of a similar nature for new types of containment designs:

- (a) PWR Dry Containment. Provide analyses of the containment pressure response to a spectrum of postulated reactor coolant system pipe ruptures [e.g., hot leg, cold leg (pump suction), and cold leg (pump discharge) breaks]. Specify the break size and location of each postulated LOCA analyzed. Graphically present the containment pressure and temperature response and the sump water temperature response as functions of time for each accident analyzed, up to the time that includes all important aspects of the transient.

Identify the containment computer codes used to determine the pressure and temperature response. Discuss and justify the inherent conservatisms in the assumptions made in the analyses regarding initial containment conditions (pressure, temperature, free volume, and humidity), containment heat removal, and ECCS operability.

Provide the results of a failure modes and effects analysis of the ECCS and containment cooling systems to determine single active failures that result in maximum accident pressure and temperature.

Provide the types of information described in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 at the end of this section of DG-1145. Summarize and tabulate the results of each LOCA analyzed as shown in Table 6-3 at the end of this section of DG-1145.

Provide analyses of the temperature and pressure response of the containment to postulated secondary system pipe ruptures (e.g., steam and feedwater line breaks). Specify the break size and location of each postulated break analyzed. Describe the method of analysis, and identify the computer codes used (present detailed mass and energy release analyses in Section 6.2.1.4). Discuss and justify the assumptions made regarding the operating conditions of the reactor, closure times of secondary system isolation valves, single active failures, and ESF actuation times. Tabulate the results of each accident analyzed, as shown in Table 6-3 at the end of this section of DG-1145.

Tabulate the structural heat sinks within the containment in accordance with Tables 6-4A through 6-4D at the end of this section of DG-1145. With respect to modeling heat sinks for heat transfer calculations, provide and justify the computer mesh spacing used for concrete, steel, and steel-lined concrete heat sinks. Justify the steel-concrete interface resistance used for steel-lined concrete heat sinks, as well as the heat transfer correlations used in heat transfer calculations. Graphically illustrate the condensing heat transfer coefficient as a function of time for the most severe hot leg, cold leg (pump suction), cold leg (pump discharge), and steam or feedwater line pipe breaks.

Discuss the provisions to protect the integrity of the containment structure against the consequences of inadvertent operation of the CHRS or other systems that could result in pressures lower than the external design pressure of the containment structure. Provide a reference if discussed in Chapter 7. Also, discuss the administrative controls and/or electrical interlocks that would prevent such occurrences. Identify the “worst case” single failure that could result in inadvertent operation of the CHRS. Discuss the analytical methods and assumptions used to determine the containment pressure response, and provide the results of analyses performed. Specify the external design pressure of the containment, as well as the setpoint for actuation of the vacuum relief system.

For the most severe reactor coolant system hot leg, cold leg (pump suction), and cold leg (pump discharge) pipe breaks, provide accident chronologies. Indicate the time of occurrence (in seconds after the break occurs) of events, such as the following:

- beginning of core flood tank injection
- beginning of the ECCS injection phase
- peak containment pressure during the blowdown phase
- end of the blowdown phase
- beginning of fan-cooler operation
- beginning of the containment spray injection phase (specify the water level in the water storage tank)
- peak containment pressure subsequent to the end of the blowdown phase
- end of the core reflood phase,
- end of the ECCS injection phase and beginning of the recirculation phase (specify the water level in the water storage tank)
- end of the containment spray injection phase (specify the water level in the water storage tank)
- beginning of the containment spray recirculation phase (specify the water level in the water storage tank)
- end of steam generator energy release for the post-reflood phase
- time of depressurization of the containment at 50 percent of containment accident pressure for conventional dry containments

For the most severe reactor coolant system pipe breaks [that is, the most severe pipe break in the hot leg, cold leg (pump discharge,) and cold leg (pump suction) lines and the most severe secondary coolant system pipe break], provide energy inventories that show the distribution of energy prior to the accident, at the time of peak pressure, at the end of the blowdown phase, at the end of the core reflood phase (for LOCAs), and steam generator energy release during the post-reflood phase (for LOCAs).

Describe the model for determining the distribution of mass and energy from the postulated break in the containment atmosphere and sump.

Provide a reference to Chapter 7 for a description of the instrumentation provided to monitor and record containment pressure, temperature, and sump or suppression pool temperature during the course of an accident within the containment. Discuss the range,

accuracy, and response of the instrumentation, as well as the tests conducted to qualify the instruments for use in the post-accident containment environment (or reference Chapter 7).

- (b) BWR Containments. Provide the types of containment design information identified in Tables 6-5 and 6-6 at the end of this section of DG-1145.

Provide the results of analyses of the BWR drywell and wetwell responses to a postulated rupture of the recirculation line. Provide the results of analyses of the drywell, wetwell, and containment pressure responses to postulated ruptures of the main steam line. Specify and justify the assumptions used in the analyses regarding the initial containment conditions, initial reactor operating conditions, energy sources, mass and energy release rates, and break areas. Graphically illustrate the drywell and wetwell pressures, as well as containment pressure and deck differential pressure where applicable, as functions of time and energy addition (e.g., blowdown, decay heat, sensible heat, pump heat) and energy removal [e.g., the residual heat removal (RHR) system, heat sinks] as a function of time.

Specify and justify the assumptions used in the analyses. Describe provisions for orificing and/or leak detection and isolation to limit the mass and energy released. Discuss the functional capability of these provisions. Graphically illustrate the containment and drywell pressures and temperatures as functions of time.

Provide tables showing the following:

- (i) initial reactor coolant system and containment conditions as identified in Table 6-7 at the end of this section of DG-1145
- (ii) energy source information as identified in Table 6-8 at the end of this section of DG-1145
- (iii) mass and energy release data in the format given in Table 6-9 (at the end of this section of DG-1145) for each pipe break accident analyzed
- (iv) information identified in Table 6-10 ( at the end of this section of DG-1145) on the passive heat sinks that may have been used
- (v) results of the postulated pipe break accidents for each postulated line break in the format given in Table 6-11 at the end of this section of DG-1145

Provide the results of the analyses of transients that could lead to external pressure loads on the drywell and wetwell. Show that the transient used for design purposes in each case is the controlling event for external pressure loading. Discuss and justify the conservatism in the assumptions used in the analyses. Graphically illustrate the wetwell and drywell pressures as functions of time. For Mark II or similar containments, describe how the wetwell-to-drywell vacuum relief system will prevent backflooding of the suppression pool water into the lower drywell and protect the integrity of the steel diaphragm floor slab between the drywell and wetwell, and between the wetwell and drywell structures and liner plate.

Provide heat sink data and justify conservatism.

Provide the results of analyses of the containment's capability to tolerate direct steam bypass of the suppression pool for the spectrum of potential reactor coolant system break sizes. Discuss the measures planned to minimize the potential for steam bypass, and describe any systems provided to mitigate the consequences of steam bypass. Discuss and demonstrate the conservatism in the assumptions used in the analyses.

Describe the manner in which suppression pool dynamic loads resulting from postulated LOCAs and transients (e.g., relief valve actuation) have been integrated into the affected containment structures. Illustrate all equipment and structural surfaces that could be subjected to pool dynamic loads in the containment drawings. For each structure or group of structures, specify the dynamic loads as a function of time, as well as the relative magnitude of the pool dynamic load compared to the design-basis load for each structure. Justify each of the dynamic load histories by the use of appropriate experimental data and/or analyses.

Describe the manner by which potential asymmetric loads were considered in the containment design. Characterize the types and magnitudes of possible asymmetric loads, as well as the capabilities of the affected structures to withstand such a load profile. Include consideration of seismically induced pool motion that could lead to locally deeper submergences for certain drywell-to-wetwell vents (BWRs).

Describe in detail the analytical models used to evaluate the containment and drywell responses to the postulated accidents and transients identified above. Discuss the conservatism in the models and the assumptions made. Refer to applicable test data to support the selected analytical methods. Discuss the sensitivity of the analyses to changes in key parameters.

Describe the instrumentation provided to monitor and record the drywell and wetwell pressures and temperatures and the suppression pool temperature during the course of an accident within the containment. Discuss the range, accuracy, and response of the instrumentation, as well as the tests conducted to qualify the instruments for use in the post-accident containment environment. Describe the recording system provided for these instruments, as well as the accessibility of the recorders to control room personnel during a LOCA. Incorporate by reference material included in Chapter 7.

#### **C.I.6.2.1.2 Containment Subcompartments**

##### **(1) Design Bases**

Discuss the design bases for the containment subcompartments, including the following information:

- (a) synopsis of the pipe break analyses performed, as well as justification for the selection of the DBA [break size, considering leak-before-break (LBB) where applicable, and location] for each containment subcompartment
- (b) extent to which pipe restraints are used to limit the break area of pipe ruptures

(2) Design Features

Describe each subcompartment analyzed, and provide plan and elevation drawings showing component and equipment locations, routing of high-energy lines, and vent locations and configurations. Tabulate the subcompartment free volumes and vent areas. Identify the vent areas that become available only after the occurrence of a postulated pipe break accident (e.g., as a result of insulation collapsing or blowing out, blowout panels being blown out, or hinged doors swinging open), and describe the manner in which they are treated. Justify the availability of these vent areas. Provide dynamic analyses of the available vent area as a function of time, and support it with appropriate test data.

(3) Design Evaluation

Identify the computer program(s) used, and/or present or reference a detailed description of the analytical model, for subcompartment pressure response analyses. Present the results of the analyses, and include the following information:

- (a) Describe the computer program used to calculate the mass and energy releases from a postulated pipe break. Provide the nodalization scheme for the system model, and specify the assumed initial operating conditions of the system. Discuss the conservatism of the blowdown model with respect to the pressure response of the subcompartment.
- (b) Specify the assumed initial operating conditions of the plant, such as reactor power level and subcompartment pressure, temperature, and humidity.
- (c) Describe and justify the subsonic and sonic flow models used in vent flow calculations. Discuss and justify the degree of entrainment assumed for the vent flow.
- (d) Identify the piping system within a subcompartment that is assumed to rupture, the location of the break within the subcompartment, and the break size. Provide the inside diameter of the ruptured line, as well as the locations and sizes of any flow restrictions within the line that is postulated to fail.
- (e) Provide subcompartment nodalization information, in accordance with the formats shown in Figure 6-1 and Tables 6-12 and 6-13 at the end of this section of DG-1145. Demonstrate that the selected nodalization maximizes differential pressures as a basis for design pressures for structures and component supports.
- (f) Graph the pressure response within a subcompartment as a function of time to permit evaluation of the effects on structures and component supports.
- (g) Provide mass and energy release data for the postulated pipe breaks in tabular form, with time in seconds, mass release rate in lbm/sec, enthalpy of mass released in Btu/lbm, and energy release rate in Btu/sec.
- (h) For all vent flow paths, specify the flow conditions (subsonic or sonic) up to the time of peak pressure.
- (i) Provide a detailed description of the method used to determine vent loss coefficients. Tabulate the vent paths and loss coefficients for each subcompartment.

### **C.I.6.2.1.3 *Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents***

Identify the computer codes used, and present or reference detailed descriptions of the analytical models employed to calculate the mass and energy released following a postulated LOCA. Discuss the analyses performed on various reactor coolant system pipe break locations [e.g., hot leg, cold leg (pump suction), and cold leg (pump discharge)] and a spectrum of pipe break sizes at each location to identify the most severe pipe break location and size (the design-basis LOCA). Divide the discussion into the accident phases in which different physical processes occur, as follows:

- (1) blowdown phase (i.e., when the primary coolant is being rapidly injected into the containment)
- (2) refill phase
- (3) core reflood phase (i.e., when the core is being re-covered with water)
- (4) long-term cooling phase (i.e., when core decay heat and remaining stored energy in the primary and secondary systems are being added to the containment)

Include the following information:

- (1) Mass and Energy Release Data

For each break location, provide the mass and energy release data for the most severe break size during the first 24 hours following the accident. (Provide justification if a shorter time period is selected for some accidents.) Using the tabular form shown in Table 6-14 at the end of this section of DG-1145, present this information with time in seconds, mass release rate in lbm/second, and enthalpy of mass released in Btu/lbm. Tabulate the safety injection fluid (assumed to spill from the break directly to the containment floor) as a function of time.

- (2) Energy Sources

Identify the sources of generated and stored energy in the reactor coolant system and secondary coolant system considered in analyses of LOCAs, and describe the methods used and assumptions made in calculations of the energy available for release from these sources. Address the conservatism in the calculation of the available energy for each source. Tabulate the stored energy sources and the amounts of stored energy. For each source of generated energy, provide curves showing the energy release rate and integrated energy released.

- (3) Description of the Blowdown Model

Describe the procedure used to calculate the mass and energy released from the reactor coolant system during the blowdown phase of a LOCA (or reference as appropriate). Include all significant equations and correlations used in the analysis. Discuss conservatism in the mass and energy release calculations from the standpoint of predicting the highest containment pressure response, and justify any assumptions. For example, describe the calculations used to determine the energy transferred to the primary coolant from heated surfaces, as well as the release of primary coolant to the containment during blowdown. Also, present the heat transfer correlations used, and justify their application.

(4) Description of the Core Reflood Model

Describe the calculations used to determine the mass and energy released to the containment during the core reflood phase of a LOCA (or reference as appropriate). Include all significant equations and correlations used in the analysis. Discuss and justify the conservatism in the mass and energy release calculations, from the standpoint of predicting the highest containment pressure response. For example, discuss and justify the methods used to calculate the energy transferred to the emergency core cooling injection water from primary system metal surfaces and the core, the core inlet and exit flow rates, and the energy transferred from the steam generators. Justify the carryout fraction used to predict the mass flow rate out of the core by comparing it to experimental data. Justify any assumptions made regarding the quenching of steam by ECCS injection water by comparison to appropriate experimental data. Provide the carryout fractions, core inlet flow rate, and core inlet temperature as a function of time.

(5) Description of the Long-Term Cooling Model

Describe the calculations used to determine the mass and energy released to the containment during the long-term cooling (or post-reflood) phase of a LOCA (or reference as appropriate). Include (or reference) all significant equations and correlations used in the analysis. Discuss and justify the conservatism in the mass and energy release calculations, from the standpoint of predicting the highest containment pressure response. For example, discuss and justify the methods used to calculate (1) core inlet and exit flow rates and (2) removal of all sensible heat from primary system metal surfaces and the steam generators. Describe the heat transfer correlations used, and justify their application. Describe liquid entrainment correlations for fluid leaving the core and entering the steam generators, and provide justification by comparison with experimental data. Provide experimental data to justify any assumptions made regarding steam quenching by ECCS water.

(6) Single-Failure Analysis

Provide a failure modes and effects analysis of the ECCS to determine the single active failure that maximizes the energy release to the containment following a LOCA. Provide analyses for each postulated break location.

(7) Metal-Water Reaction

Discuss the potential for additional energy being added to the containment as a result of metal-water reaction within the core. Provide a conservative analysis of the containment pressure as a function of metal-water reaction energy addition, and demonstrate that the metal-water reaction time is conservative.

(8) Energy Inventories

For the worst hot leg, cold-leg pump suction, and cold-leg pump discharge pipe breaks, provide inventories of the energy transferred from the primary and secondary systems to the containment, as well as the energy remaining in the primary and secondary systems, in a tabular form similar to that shown in Table 6-15 at the end of this section of DG-1145.

(9) Additional Information Required for Confirmatory Analysis

To enable confirmatory analyses to be performed, tabulate the elevations, flow areas, and friction coefficients within the primary system, which are used for the containment analyses, as well as the safety injection flow rate as a function of time. Provide representative values with justification for empirical correlations (such as those used to predict heat transfer and liquid entrainment) that are significant to the analysis.

#### ***C.I.6.2.1.4 Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment (PWR)***

Identify the computer code used, and present (or reference) a detailed description of the analytical model used to calculate the mass and energy released following a secondary system steam and feedwater line break. Analyze a spectrum of break sizes and various reactor operating conditions to ensure that the most severe secondary system pipe rupture as been identified. Consider smaller break areas of steam line breaks starting with the double-ended rupture, until no liquid entrainment is calculated to occur. Provide justification for the entrainment values assumed. Include the following information:

(1) Mass and Energy Release Data

Present mass and energy release data for the most severe secondary system pipe rupture with regard to break size and location and operating power level of the reactor, in tabular form with time in seconds, mass flow rate in lbm/sec, and corresponding enthalpy in Btu/lbm. Provide separate tables for the mass and energy released from each side of a double-ended break.

(2) Single-Failure Analysis

Perform a failure modes and effects analysis to determine the most severe single active failure for each break location, for the purpose of maximizing the mass and energy released to the containment and the containment pressure response. This analysis should consider, for example, the failure of a steam or feedwater line isolation valve, the feedwater pump to trip, and containment heat removal equipment.

(3) Initial Conditions

Describe the analysis, including assumptions, to determine the fluid mass available for release into the containment. In general, perform the analysis in a manner that is conservative from a containment response standpoint (i.e., maximizes the fluid mass available for release).

(4) Description of Blowdown Model

Identify the computer code used, and describe the procedure used for calculations including all significant equations (or reference the appropriate report). Calculations of the energy transferred from the primary system to the secondary system, stored energy removed from the secondary system metal, break flow, and steam-water separation should be conservative for containment analysis. Discuss and justify this conservatism. Provide and justify the correlations used to calculate the heat transferred from the steam generator tubes and shell.

(5) Energy Inventories

For the most severe secondary system pipe rupture, provide inventories of the energy transferred from the primary and secondary systems to the containment.

(6) Additional Information Required for Confirmatory Analyses

To permit confirmatory analyses to be performed, tabulate the elevations, flow areas, and friction coefficients within the secondary system, as well as the feedwater flow rate as a function of time. Provide representative values with justification for empirical correlations (such as those used to predict heat transfer and liquid entrainment) that are significant to the analysis.

**C.I.6.2.1.5 Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis for Performance Capability Studies of the Emergency Core Cooling System (PWR)**

Identify the computer codes used, or present detailed descriptions of the analytical models used to calculate (1) mass and energy released from the RCS following a postulated LOCA and (2) containment pressure response for the purpose of determining the minimum containment pressure that should be used in analyzing the effectiveness of the ECCS. Plot the containment pressure and temperature responses, as well as the sump water temperature response, as functions of time. Provide the following information:

(1) Mass and Energy Release Data

For the most severe break, state the size of the break and provide the mass and energy release data used for the minimum containment pressure analysis. This information should be presented in a tabular form, with time in seconds, mass release rate in lbm/sec, and enthalpy of mass released in Btu/lbm. Tabulate the mass and energy of safety injection fluid that is assumed to spill from the break directly to the containment floor as a function of time. Discuss and justify the conservatism in the mass and energy release analysis, with regard to minimizing containment pressure.

(2) Initial Containment Internal Conditions

Specify the initial containment conditions (i.e., temperature, pressure, and humidity) assumed in the analysis. Show that the initial conditions selected are conservative with respect to minimizing containment pressure.

(3) Containment Volume

Specify the assumed containment net free volume. Show that the estimated free volume has been maximized to ensure conservative prediction of the minimum containment pressure. Discuss the uncertainty in determining the volume of the internal structures and equipment that should be subtracted from the gross containment volume to arrive at the net free volume.

(4) Active Heat Sinks

Identify the CHRS and ECCS equipment that is assumed to be operative for the containment analyses. Discuss the conservatism of this assumption with respect to minimizing containment pressure. Maximize the heat removal capacity of the engineered safeguards by using the minimum temperature of stored water and cooling water, and minimum delay times in bringing the equipment into service. Provide a figure or table showing the heat removal rate of fan cooling units as a function of containment temperature. State the containment spray flow rate and temperature assumed for the containment minimum pressure analyses. State and justify the assumptions used in establishing the actuation times for the active heat removal systems.

(5) Steam-Water Mixing

Discuss the potential for mixing and condensation of containment steam with any spilled ECCS water during blowdown and core reflood. Provide comparisons with appropriate experimental data.

(6) Passive Heat Sinks

With regard to the heat sink data displayed in Table 6-4A through 6-4D, discuss the uncertainty in accounting for heat sinks and determining the heat sink parameters (such as mass, surface area, thickness, volumetric heat capacity, and thermal conductivity) in the plant.

(7) Heat Transfer To Passive Heat Sinks

Discuss and justify condensing heat transfer coefficients between the containment atmosphere and passive heat sinks. Provide (or reference) comparisons with appropriate experimental data. Graphically illustrate the condensing heat transfer coefficients as a function of time for the passive heat sinks.

(8) Other Parameters

Identify any other parameters that may have a substantial effect on the minimum containment pressure analysis, and discuss how they affect the analysis. If the containment purge system is used during plant power operations, discuss the effect of a LOCA during the plant purge operation on the minimum containment pressure analysis. Discuss radiological consequences of a LOCA during containment purge in Chapter 15 (or provide a reference to where it is discussed).

**C.I.6.2.1.6 Testing and Inspection**

Provide information on the containment inservice testing (IST) and inspection program to meet the ASME Code requirements with regard to preoperational testing and periodic inservice surveillance to ensure the functional capability of the containment and associated structures, systems, and components. Emphasize those tests and inspections that are considered essential to determine that performance objectives have been achieved, and performance capability will be maintained above preestablished limits throughout the plant's lifetime. Such tests may include, for example, tests to ensure that suppression pool bypass leakage is within allowable limits, operability tests of vacuum relief systems and mechanical devices that are required to open to provide vent area following a pipe break accident within a subcompartment, and tests to ensure the integrity of the X-quencher or T-quencher anchors (or reference Chapter 3). Include information on the following:

- (1) planned tests and inspections, including the need and purpose of each test and inspection
- (2) selected frequency for performing each test and inspection, including justification
- (3) the manner in which tests and inspections will be conducted
- (4) requirements and bases for acceptability
- (5) action to be taken in the event that acceptability requirements are not met

Emphasize those surveillance-type tests that are of such importance to safety that they may become part of the technical specifications of an operating license. Discuss the bases for such surveillance requirements.

**C.I.6.2.1.7 Instrumentation Requirements**

Discuss the instrumentation proposed to be installed to monitor conditions inside the containment and to actuate safety functions when abnormal conditions are sensed. Reference the section of the application that discusses the design details and logic of the instrumentation.

### **C.I.6.2.2 Containment Heat Removal Systems**

GDC 38 requires that systems to remove heat from the reactor containment must be provided to rapidly reduce the containment pressure and temperature following a LOCA (consistent with the functioning of other associated systems) and to maintain them at acceptably low levels. In addition, GDCs 39 and 40 require that the CHRS must be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to ensure the system's integrity and operability. The systems provided for containment heat removal may include fan cooler and spray systems, or passive systems. Describe the design and functional capability of these systems, as well as the capability to remove heat from the suppression pool in BWRs.

Similarly, GDC 41 requires that systems to control fission products that may be released to the containment must be provided (as necessary) to reduce the concentration and quantity of fission products released to the environs following postulated accidents (consistent with the functioning of other associated systems). The systems designed for containment heat removal may also possess the capability to meet this requirement. The fission product removal effectiveness of the CHRS should be considered in Section 6.5.2 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.2.2.1 Design Bases**

Discuss the design bases (i.e., the functional and mechanical and electrical design requirements) for the CHRS. These design bases should include considerations such as the following:

- (1) sources of energy, energy release rates as a function of time, and integrated energy released following postulated LOCAs and steam line breaks for sizing each heat removal system
- (2) extent to which operation of the heat removal systems is relied upon to attenuate the post-accident conditions imposed on the containment (i.e., the minimum required availability of the CHRS)
- (3) required containment depressurization time
- (4) capability to remain operable in the accident environment
- (5) capability to remain operable assuming a single failure
- (6) capability to withstand the safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) without loss of function
- (7) capability to withstand dynamic effects
- (8) capability for periodic inspection and testing of the systems and/or their components

#### **C.I.6.2.2.2 System Design**

Describe the design features, and provide piping and instrumentation diagrams of the CHRS. Provide a table with the design and performance data for each CHRS and its components. Discuss system design requirements for redundancy and independence to ensure single-failure protection. Discuss the system design provisions that facilitate periodic inspection and operability testing of the systems and their components. Identify the codes, standards, and guides applied in the design of the CHRS and system components. Specify the plant protection system signals and setpoints that actuate the CHRS; alternatively, reference the section in the application where this information is tabulated. Provide the rationale for selecting the actuation signals and determining the setpoints.

Specify the times following postulated accidents that the containment heat removal systems are assumed to be fully operational. Discuss the delay times following receipt of the system actuation signals that are inherent in bringing the systems into service. Discuss the extent to which the CHRS and system components are required to be operated remotely or manually from the main control room, and the extent of operator intervention in the operation of the systems. Describe qualification tests that have been (or will be) performed on system components, such as spray nozzles, fan cooler heat exchangers, recirculation heat exchangers, pump and fan motors, valves, valve operators, and instrumentation.

Provide the following additional information if the applicant proposes to use a fan cooler system:

- (1) Identify the ductwork and equipment housings that must remain intact following a LOCA or main steam line break.
- (2) Discuss the design provisions (e.g., pressure relief devices, conservative structural design) that ensure that the ductwork and equipment housings will remain intact.
- (3) Provide plan and elevation drawings of the containment showing the routing of airflow guidance ductwork.

Describe the design features of the recirculation intake structures (sumps). Provide plan and elevation drawings of the structures; show the level of water in the containment following a LOCA in relation to the structures. Compare the design of the recirculation intake structures to the positions in RG 1.82, Revision 3, "Sumps for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Spray Systems." Address how the design considers the following adverse effects:

- debris generation
- chemicals from buffering agents and metal interactions
- head loss attributable to severe blockage
- debris effects generated from the use of unqualified coatings (which may not adhere to the surface)
- downstream effects of small particles that penetrate the screen and cause blockage

Specify the mesh size of each stage of screening, as well as the maximum particle size that could be drawn into the recirculation piping. Of the systems that may receive water from the recirculation intake structures under post-accident conditions, identify the system component that places the limiting requirement on the maximum particle size of debris that may be allowed to pass through the intake structure screening, and specify the limiting particle size that the component can circulate without impairing system performance. Describe how the screening is attached to the intake structures to preclude the possibility of debris bypassing the screening.

Discuss the potential for the intake structure screening to become clogged with debris (e.g., insulation), in light of the effective flow area of the screening and approach velocity of the water. Identify and discuss the kinds of debris that might be developed following a LOCA. Consider the following potential sources of debris:

- (1) piping and equipment insulation
- (2) sand plug materials
- (3) all structures displaced by accident pressure to provide vent area
- (4) loose insulation in the containment
- (5) debris generated by failure of nonsafety-related equipment

Describe the precautions taken to minimize the potential for debris clogging the screens.

Discuss the types of insulation used inside the containment and identify where and in what quantities each type is used. List the materials used in fabricating the identified insulation, and describe the behavior of the insulation during and after a LOCA. Describe the tests performed, or reference test reports available to the Commission that determined the behavior of the insulation under simulated LOCA conditions. Describe the methods used to attach the insulation to piping and components.

#### **C.I.6.2.2.3 *Design Evaluation***

Describe and present the results of the spray nozzle test program to determine the drop size spectrum and mean drop size emitted from each type of nozzle as a function of pressure drop across the nozzles. Describe the analytical method employed to determine the mean spray drop size.

Provide plan and elevation drawings of the containment, showing the expected spray patterns, and discuss how the patterns were obtained. Specify the volume of the containment covered by the sprays, as well as the extent to which the sprays overlap. Provide an analysis of the heat removal effectiveness of the sprays. Provide justification for the parameter values used in the analysis (e.g., spray system flow rate as a function of time, and mean spray drop size) for both full- and partial-spray system operation.

Graphically show the heat removal rate of the fan cooler as a function of the containment atmosphere temperature under LOCA conditions. Graphically depict the fan cooler heat removal rate as a function of the degrees of superheat for a family of curves that bound the expected containment steam-to-air ratio for the main steam line break accident. Describe the test program conducted to determine the heat removal capability of a fan cooler heat exchanger. Discuss the potential for the cooling water to cause surface fouling on the secondary side of the fan cooler heat exchanger, as well as the effect on the heat removal capability of the fan cooler.

Provide analyses of the net positive suction head (NPSH) available to the recirculation pumps, in accordance with the recommendations of RG 1.83, Revision 3, "Water Surfaces for Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident." Tabulate the values of containment pressure head, vapor pressure head of pumped fluid, suction head, and friction head used in the analyses. Describe the extent to which containment accident pressure is credited in determining the available NPSH. Discuss the uncertainty in determining the NPSH. Compare the calculated values of available NPSH to the required NPSH for the recirculation pumps. Demonstrate the conservatism of the analyses by assuming, for the postulated LOCA, conditions that maximize the sump temperature and minimize the containment pressure.

Provide failure modes and effects analyses of the CHRS.

Provide a graphic display of the integrated energy content of the containment atmosphere and recirculation water, as functions of time following the postulated design-basis LOCA. Graphically illustrate the integrated energy absorbed by the structural heat sinks and removed by the fan cooler and/or recirculation heat exchangers.

Provide an estimate of the amount of debris that could be generated during a LOCA, as well as the amount of debris to which sump inlet screens may be subjected during postulated pipe break accidents.

#### **C.I.6.2.2.4 Tests and Inspections**

Describe the program for initial performance testing after installation, as well as subsequent periodic operability testing of the CHRS and system components. Discuss the scope and limitations of the tests. Describe the periodic inspection program for the systems and system components. Provide the results of tests performed, as well as a detailed updated testing program in the application.

#### **C.I.6.2.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements**

Describe the instrumentation provisions for actuating and monitoring the performance of the CHRS and system components. Identify the plant conditions and system operating parameters to be monitored, and justify the selection of the setpoints for system actuation or alarm annunciation. Specify the locations outside the containment for instrumentation readout and alarm. Reference the discussion of the instrumentation design details and logic in Chapter 7 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.2.3 Secondary Containment Functional Design**

The secondary containment system includes the secondary containment structure and safety-related systems provided to control the ventilation and cleanup of potentially contaminated volumes (exclusive of the primary containment) following a DBA. This section should discuss the secondary containment functional design. The ventilation systems (i.e., systems used to depressurize and clear the secondary containment atmosphere) should be discussed in Section 6.5.3, “Fission Product Control Systems,” and Chapter 15, “Accident Analyses.”

##### **C.I.6.2.3.1 Design Bases**

This section should discuss the design bases (i.e., the functional design requirements) of the secondary containment system, including the following considerations:

- (1) conditions that establish the need to control leakage from the primary containment structure to the secondary containment structure
- (2) functional capability of the secondary containment system to depressurize and/or maintain a negative pressure throughout the secondary containment structure and resist the maximum potential for ex-filtration under all wind loading conditions that are characteristic of the site
- (3) seismic design, leak-tightness, and internal and external design pressures of the secondary containment structure
- (4) capability for periodic inspection and functional testing of the secondary containment structure

##### **C.I.6.2.3.2 System Design**

Describe the design features of the secondary containment structure, and provide plan and elevation drawings of the plant showing the boundary of the structure.

Tabulate the design and performance data for the secondary containment structure.

Discuss the performance objectives of the secondary containment structure. Identify the codes, standards, and guides applied in the design of the secondary containment structure.

Describe the valve isolation features used in support of the secondary containment. Specify the plant protection system signals that isolate and/or activate the secondary containment isolation systems, or reference the section of the application that provides this information.

Discuss the design provisions that prevent primary containment leakage from bypassing the secondary containment filtration systems and escaping directly to the environment. Include a tabulation of potential bypass leakage paths.

Provide an evaluation of potential bypass leakage paths, considering realistic equipment design limitations and test sensitivities. The following leakage barriers in paths that do not terminate within the secondary containment should be considered potential bypass leakage paths around the leakage collection and filtration systems of the secondary containment:

- (1) isolation valves in piping that penetrates both the primary and secondary containment barriers
- (2) seals and gaskets on penetrations that pass through both the primary and secondary containment barriers
- (3) welded joints on penetrations (e.g., guard pipes) that pass through both the primary and secondary containment barriers

Specify and justify the maximum allowable fraction of primary containment leakage that may bypass the secondary containment structure. Technical specifications for identification and testing of bypass leakage paths and determination of the bypass leakage fraction should be provided in Chapter 16 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.2.3.3 *Design Evaluation***

Provide analyses of the functional capability of the ventilation and/or cleanup systems to depressurize and/or maintain a uniform negative pressure throughout the secondary containment structure following the design-basis LOCA. These analyses should include the effect of single active failures that could compromise the performance objective of the secondary containment system. For example, for containment purge lines that have three isolation valves in series and a leakoff valve that can be opened to the secondary containment volume between the two outboard valves, show that the failure of the outboard isolation valve to close will not prevent a negative pressure from being maintained in the secondary containment structure or result in leakage from the primary containment across the inboard valve to the environment.

If the secondary containment design leakage rate is in excess of 100%/day, provide an evaluation of the secondary containment system's ability to function as intended under adverse wind loading conditions that are characteristic of the plant site.

For analyses of the secondary containment system, provide the following information for each secondary containment volume:

- (1) pressure and temperature as functions of time
- (2) primary containment wall temperature as a function of time
- (3) purge flow rate and recirculation flow rate as a function of fan differential pressure
- (4) manner in which heat transfer from the primary containment atmosphere to the secondary containment atmosphere is calculated, including the heat transfer coefficients and material properties
- (5) initial conditions assumed for the secondary containment structure and atmosphere (and justification therefor)

- (6) manner in which equipment heat loads within the secondary containment are considered
- (7) decrease in the secondary containment volume as a result of thermal and pressure expansion of the primary containment structure, and the methods used to calculate the volume reduction (and justification therefor)

Identify all high-energy lines within the secondary containment structure, and provide analyses of line ruptures for any lines that are not equipped with guard pipes.

#### **C.I.6.2.3.4 Tests and Inspections**

Describe the program for initial performance testing and subsequent periodic functional testing of the secondary containment structures and secondary containment isolation system and system components. Discuss the scope and limitations of the tests. Describe the inspection program for the systems and system components.

#### **C.I.6.2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements**

This section should describe the instrumentation to be employed to monitor and actuate the ventilation and cleanup systems. Design details and logic of the instrumentation should be discussed in Chapter 7 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.2.4 Containment Isolation System**

GDCs 54–57 address design and isolation requirements for piping systems that penetrate the primary reactor containment. The design and functional capability of the containment isolation system should be considered in this section.

##### **C.I.6.2.4.1 Design Bases**

Discuss the design bases for the containment isolation system, including the following:

- (1) governing conditions under which containment isolation becomes mandatory
- (2) criteria used to establish the isolation provisions for fluid systems that penetrate the containment
- (3) criteria used to establish the isolation provisions for fluid instrument lines that penetrate the containment
- (4) design requirements for containment isolation barriers

##### **C.I.6.2.4.2 System Design**

Provide a table of design information regarding the containment isolation provisions for fluid system and instrument lines that penetrate the containment. This table should include the following information:

- (1) containment penetration number
- (2) GDC or RG recommendations that have been met (or other defined bases for acceptability)
- (3) system name
- (4) fluid contained
- (5) line size (inches)

- (6) engineered safety feature system (yes or no)
- (7) through-line leakage classification (dual containments)
- (8) reference to a figure in the application showing arrangement of containment isolation barriers
- (9) isolation valve number
- (10) location of valve (inside or outside containment)
- (11) Type C leakage test (yes or no)
- (12) length of pipe from containment to outermost isolation valve (or the maximum length that will not be exceeded)
- (13) valve type and operator
- (14) primary mode of valve actuation
- (15) secondary mode of valve actuation
- (16) normal valve position
- (17) shutdown valve position
- (18) post-accident valve position
- (19) power failure valve position
- (20) containment isolation signals
- (21) valve closure time
- (22) power source

Specify the plant protection system signals that initiate closure of the containment isolation valves, or refer to the section of the application that provides this information.

Provide justification for any containment isolation provisions that differ from the explicit requirements of GDCs 55–57.

Discuss the bases for the containment isolation valve closure times and, in particular, the closure times of isolation valves in system lines that can provide an open path from the containment to the environs (e.g., containment purge system).

Describe the extent to which the containment isolation provisions for fluid instrument lines meet the recommendations of RG 1.11 (Safety Guide 11), “Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containment.”

Discuss the design requirements for containment isolation barriers, including the following:

- (1) extent to which the quality standards and seismic design classification of the containment isolation provisions follow the recommendations of RG 1.26, “Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water-, Steam-, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants,” and RG 1.29, “Seismic Design Classification”
- (2) assurance of protection against loss of function from missiles, jet forces, pipe whip, and earthquakes. Describe the provisions to ensure that closure of the isolation valves will not be prevented by debris that could become entwined in the escaping fluid
- (3) assurance of the operability of valves and valve operators in the containment atmosphere under normal plant operating conditions and postulated accident conditions
- (4) qualification of closed systems inside and outside the containment as isolation barriers

- (5) qualification of a valve as an isolation barrier
- (6) required isolation valve closure times
- (7) mechanical and electrical redundancy to preclude common-mode failures
- (8) primary and secondary modes of valve actuation

Discuss the provisions to detect leakage from a remote manually controlled system (such as an ESF system) for the purpose of determining when to isolate the affected system or system train.

Discuss the design provisions to test the operability of the isolation valves and the leakage rate of the containment isolation barriers. Show on system drawings the design provisions to test the leakage rate of the containment isolation barriers. Discuss the design and functional capability of associated containment isolation systems (such as isolation valve seal systems) that provide a sealing fluid or vacuum between isolation barriers, as well as the design and functional capability of fluid-filled systems that serve as seal systems.

Describe the environmental qualification tests that have been (or will be) performed on mechanical and electrical components that may be exposed to the accident environment inside the containment. Discuss the test results. Demonstrate that the environmental test conditions (temperature, pressure, humidity, and radiation) are representative of conditions that would be expected to prevail inside the containment following an accident. Graphically show the environmental test conditions as functions of time, or refer to the section of the FSAR where this information can be found.

Identify the codes, standards, and guides applied in the design of the system and its components.

#### **C.I.6.2.4.3 *Design Evaluation***

Provide an evaluation of the functional capability of the containment isolation system, in conjunction with a failure mode and effects analysis of the system.

Provide evaluations of the functional capability of isolation valve seal systems and fluid-filled systems that serve as seal systems.

#### **C.I.6.2.4.4 *Tests and Inspections***

Describe the program for initial functional testing and subsequent periodic operability testing of the containment isolation system and associated isolation valve seal systems (if they are provided). Discuss the scope and limitations of the tests. Describe the inspection program for the isolation system and its components.

#### **C.I.6.2.5 *Combustible Gas Control in Containment***

GDC 41 requires that systems must be provided, as necessary, to control the concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen that may be released into the containment following postulated accidents to ensure that containment integrity is maintained.

The systems provided for combustible gas control include systems to mix the containment atmosphere, monitor combustible gas concentrations within containment regions, and reduce combustible gas concentrations within the containment. The design and functional capability of these systems should be considered in this section.

#### **C.I.6.2.5.1 *Design Bases***

Discuss the design bases for the combustible gas control systems (i.e., the conditions under which combustible gas control may be necessary) and the functional and mechanical design requirements of the systems. The design bases should include considerations such as the following:

- (1) generation and accumulation of combustible gases within the containment
- (2) capability to uniformly mix the containment atmosphere for as long as accident conditions require and to prevent high concentrations of combustible gases from forming locally
- (3) capability to monitor combustible gas concentrations within containment regions, and to alert the operator in the main control room of the need to activate systems to reduce combustible gas concentrations
- (4) capability to prevent combustible gas concentrations within the containment from exceeding the concentration limits in RG 1.7 (Safety Guide 7), "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident"
- (5) capability to remain operable, assuming a single failure
- (6) capability to withstand dynamic effects
- (7) capability to withstand the SSE without loss of function
- (8) capability to remain operable in the accident environment
- (9) capability to periodically inspect and test systems and/or system components
- (10) sharing of combustible gas control equipment between nuclear units at multi-unit sites
- (11) capability to transport portable hydrogen recombiner units after a LOCA
- (12) protection of personnel from radiation in the vicinity of the operating hydrogen recombiner units
- (13) capability to purge the containment as a backup means for combustible gas control

#### **C.I.6.2.5.2 *System Design***

Describe the design features and provide piping and instrumentation diagrams of the systems (or portions thereof) that comprise the combustible gas control systems and the backup purge system.

Tabulate the design and performance data for each system and its components.

Discuss system design requirements for redundancy and independence. Discuss the design provisions that facilitate periodic inspection and operability testing of the systems and their components. Identify the codes, standards, and guides applied in designing the systems and their components.

Specify the plant protection system signals that actuate the combustible gas control systems, and backup purge system, and their components, or refer to the section of the application that provides this information.

Discuss the extent to which systems or system components are required to be manually operated from the main control room or another point outside the containment that is accessible following an accident.

Describe the environmental qualification tests that have been (or will be) performed on systems (or portions thereof) and their components that may be exposed to the accident environment. Describe the test results and their applicability to the system design. Demonstrate that the environmental test conditions (temperature, pressure, humidity, and radiation) are representative of conditions that would be expected to prevail inside the containment following a LOCA. Graphically show the environmental test conditions as functions of time, or refer to the section of the application that provides this information.

With regard to the fan systems that are relied on to mix the containment atmosphere, provide the following additional information:

- (1) Identify the ductwork that must remain intact following a LOCA.
- (2) Discuss the design provisions (e.g., pressure relief devices, conservative structural design) that ensure that the ductwork and equipment housings will remain intact.
- (3) Provide plan and elevation drawings of the containment, showing the routing of the airflow guidance ductwork.

Describe the design features of the containment internal structures that promote and permit mixing of gases within the containment and subcompartments. Identify the subcompartments that are dead-ended or would not be positively ventilated following a LOCA, and provide analyses, assumptions, and mathematical models to ensure that combustible gases will not accumulate within those subcompartments.

With regard to the system provided to continuously monitor combustible gas concentrations within the containment following a LOCA, provide the following information:

- (1) operating principle and accuracy of the combustible gas analyzers
- (2) tests conducted to demonstrate the performance capability of the analyzers (or a reference to the report where such information may be found)
- (3) locations of the multiple sampling points within the containment
- (4) capability to monitor combustible gas concentrations within the containment independent of the operation of the combustible gas control systems
- (5) failure modes and effects analyses of the containment combustible gas concentration monitoring systems

With regard to the recombiner system provided to reduce combustible gas concentrations within the containment, provide the following additional information:

- (1) operating principle of the system
- (2) developmental program conducted to demonstrate the performance capability of the system, as well as the program results (or a reference to the report where this information can be found)
- (3) any differences between the recombiner system on which the qualification tests were conducted and the recombiner system that is proposed
- (4) extent to which equipment will be shared between nuclear power units at a multi-unit site, and the availability of the shared equipment

### **C.I.6.2.5.3 Design Evaluation**

Provide an analysis of the production and accumulation of combustible gases within the containment following a postulated LOCA, including the following information:

- (1) assumed corrosion rate of aluminum plotted as a function of time
- (2) assumed corrosion rate of zinc plotted as a function of time
- (3) inventory of aluminum inside the containment, with the mass and surface area of each item
- (4) inventory of zinc inside the containment, with the total mass and surface area
- (5) mass of Zircaloy fuel cladding
- (6) quantities of hydrogen and oxygen contained in the reactor coolant system
- (7) total fission product decay power as a fraction of operating power plotted versus time after shutdown, with a comparison to the decay power (specify the reactor core thermal power rating and the assumed operating history of the reactor core)
- (8) beta, gamma, and beta plus gamma energy release rates and integrated energy releases plotted as functions of time for the fission product distribution model based on the thermal power rating and operating history of the reactor core assumed in Item 7 above (indicate the extent to which the model presented in Table 1 of RG 1.7 is utilized)
- (9) integrated production of combustible gas within the containment, plotted as a function of time for each source, as well as the concentration of combustible gas in the containment, plotted as a function of time for all sources
- (10) combustible gas concentration in the containment, plotted as a function of time with operation of the combustible gas reduction system assumed at full and partial capacity, as well as combustible gas concentration in the containment, plotted as a function of time with operation of the backup purge system assumed
- (11) basis (time or combustible gas concentrations) for activation of the combustible gas reduction and backup purge systems, as well as the design flow rates and the flow rates used in the analysis for both systems
- (12) Analyses of the functional capability of the spray and/or fan systems to mix the containment atmosphere and prevent accumulation of combustible gases within containment subcompartments (provide plan and elevation drawings of the containment, showing the airflow patterns that would be expected to result from operation of the spray and/or fan systems with a single failure assumed)
- (13) analyses or test results that demonstrate the capability of the airflow guidance ductwork and equipment housings to withstand, without loss of function, the external differential pressures and internal pressure surges that may be imposed on them following a LOCA

Provide failure modes and effects analyses of the combustible gas control systems.

#### **C.I.6.2.5.4 Tests and Inspections**

Describe the program for initial performance testing and subsequent periodic operability testing of the combustible gas control systems and system components. Discuss the scope and limitations of the tests. Describe the inspection programs for the systems and their components. For equipment that will be shared between nuclear power units at multi-unit sites, describe the program that will be conducted to ensure that the equipment can be transported safely and by qualified personnel within the allotted time.

#### **C.I.6.2.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements**

Discuss the instrumentation provisions to actuate the combustible gas control systems and backup purge system (e.g., automatically or remote manually) and monitor the performance of the systems and their components. Identify the plant conditions and system operating parameters to be monitored, and justify the selection of setpoints for system actuation or alarm annunciation. Specify the instrumentation readout and alarm location(s) outside the containment. Design details and logic of the instrumentation should be discussed in Chapter 7 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.2.6 Containment Leakage Testing**

GDCs 52–54 require that the reactor containment, containment penetrations, and containment isolation barriers must be designed to permit periodic leakage rate testing. In addition, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, “Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors,” specifies the leakage testing requirements for the reactor containment, containment penetrations, and containment isolation barriers.

This section should present a proposed testing program that complies with the requirements of the GDCs and Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. All exceptions to the explicit requirements of the GDCs and Appendix J should be identified and justified.

##### **C.I.6.2.6.1 Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test**

Specify the maximum allowable containment integrated leakage rate. Describe the testing sequence for the containment structural integrity test and the containment leakage rate test.

Discuss the pretest requirements, including the requirements for inspecting the containment, taking corrective action and retesting in the event that structural deterioration of the containment is found, and reporting. Also discuss the criteria for positioning isolation valves, the manner in which isolation valves will be positioned, and the requirements for venting or draining fluid systems prior to containment testing.

Fluid systems that will be vented or opened to the containment atmosphere during testing should be listed, and systems that will not be vented should be identified and justified.

Describe the measures that will be taken to ensure stabilization of containment conditions (temperature, pressure, humidity) prior to containment leakage rate testing.

Describe the methods and procedures to be used during containment leakage rate testing, including local leakage testing methods, test equipment and facilities, period of testing, and verification of leak test accuracy.

Identify the acceptance criteria for containment leakage rate tests and verification tests. Discuss the provisions for additional testing in the event acceptance criteria cannot be met.

#### **C.I.6.2.6.2 *Containment Penetration Leakage Rate Test***

Provide a listing of all containment penetrations. Identify the containment penetrations that are exempt from leakage rate testing and give the reasons why they are exempted.

Describe the test methods that will be used to determine containment penetration leakage rates. Specify the test pressure to be used.

Provide the acceptance criteria for containment penetration leakage rate testing. Specify the leakage rate limits for the containment penetrations.

#### **C.I.6.2.6.3 *Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Rate Test***

Provide a listing of all containment isolation valves. Identify the containment isolation valves that are not included in the leakage rate testing, and provide justification.

Describe the test methods that will be used to determine isolation valve leakage rates. Specify the test pressure to be used.

Provide the acceptance criteria for leakage rate testing of the containment isolation valves. Specify the leakage rate limits for the isolation valves.

#### **C.I.6.2.6.4 *Scheduling and Reporting of Periodic Tests***

Provide the proposed schedule for performing preoperational and periodic leakage rate tests for each of the following:

- (1) containment integrated leakage rate
- (2) containment penetrations
- (3) containment isolation valves

Describe the test reports that will be prepared, and include provisions for reporting test results that fail to meet acceptance criteria.

#### **C.I.6.2.6.5 *Special Testing Requirements***

Specify the maximum allowable leakage rate for the following:

- (1) in-leakage to subatmospheric containment
- (2) in-leakage to the secondary containment of dual containments

Describe the test procedures for determining the above in-leakage rates. Describe the leakage rate testing that will be conducted to determine the leakage from the primary containment that bypasses the secondary containment and other plant areas that are maintained at a negative pressure following a LOCA. Specify the maximum allowable bypass leakage.

Describe the test procedures for determining the effectiveness (following postulated accidents) of isolation valve seal systems and fluid-filled systems that serve as seal systems.

### C.I.6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System

#### C.I.6.3.1 Design Bases

Provide a summary description of the ECCS. Identify all major subsystems of the ECCS, such as active high- and low-pressure safety injection systems; passive safety injection tanks in the evolutionary design; and passive residual heat removal system, core makeup tanks, pools, accumulators, automatic depressurization system, and in-containment refueling water storage tank in the passive ECCS design. Reference nuclear plants or designs that employ the same ECCS design and are operating or have been licensed or certified. Describe the purpose of the ECCS, and identify each accident or transient for which the required protection includes actuating the ECCS.

Describe how the ECCS design complies with relevant rules, regulations, and regulatory requirements, including the following:

- (1) GDC 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena."
- (2) GDC 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases."
- (3) GDC 5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components."
- (4) GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems."
- (5) GDC 27, "Combined Reactivity Control Systems Capability."
- (6) GDC 35, "Emergency Core Cooling."
- (7) GDC 36, "Inspection of Emergency Core Cooling System."
- (8) GDC 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System."
- (9) 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors."

Describe how the ECCS design meets relevant items of Three-Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.34(f), including, for example, Items II.K.3.15, II.K.3.18, II.K.3.21, II.K.3.28, II.K.3.45, and III.D.1.1.

Describe how the ECCS design and analysis incorporate the resolutions of the relevant unresolved safety issues (USIs), and medium- and high-priority generic safety issues (GSIs) that are specified in the version of NUREG-0933, "Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues," that is current 6 months before the application submittal date. Examples include USIs (Task Action Plan Items) A-1, A-2, A-24, A-40, A-43, B-61, and GSIs 23, 24, 105, 122.2, 185, and 191.

Describe how the ECCS design incorporates operating experience insights from generic letters and bulletins issued up to 6 months before the docket date of application. Examples include GLs 80-014, 80-035, 81-021, 85-16, 86-07, 89-10, 91-07, 98-0, and Bulletins 80-01, 80-18, 86-03, 88-04, 93-02, 95-02, 96-03, 2001-01, 2002-01.

It should be noted that the items listed in the above lists of GDCs, TMI Action Items, USIs, GSIs, GLs, and BLs may not constitute the total sets of relevant requirements. It is the COL applicant's responsibility to identify all relevant items applicable to their reactor designs.

Describe how the ECCS design meets the relevant Commission policy, as described in SECY papers and corresponding staff requirement memoranda (SRMs). For example, in SECY-94-084,

“Policy and Technical Issues Associated with Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems in Passive Plant Designs,” Item B, “Definition of Passive Failure,” the staff recommended redefining check valves in the passive safety systems (except those for which proper function can be demonstrated and documented) as active components subject to single-failure consideration.

Specify the design bases for selecting the functional requirements, such as emergency core decay heat removal, RCS emergency makeup and boration, safety injection, safe shutdown, long-term cooling, and containment pH control, for each ECCS subsystem. Discuss the bases for selecting such system parameters as operating pressure, emergency core cooling (ECC) flow delivery rate, ECC storage capacity, boron concentration, and hydraulic flow resistance of ECCS piping and valves.

Specify the design bases concerned with reliability requirements. Describe the protection against single failure in terms of piping arrangement and layout, selection of valve types and locations, redundancy of various system components, redundancy of power supplies, redundant sources of actuation signals, and redundancy of instrumentation. Describe how ECCS actuation and operation are protected against valve motor flooding and spurious single failures.

Specify the requirements that have been established to protect the ECCS from physical damage. This discussion should include design bases for ECCS support structure design, pipe whip protection, missile protection, and protection against such accident loads as LOCA or seismic loads.

Specify the environmental design bases concerned with the high-temperature steam atmosphere and containment sump water level that might exist in the containment during ECCS operation.

### **C.I.6.3.2 System Design**

#### ***C.I.6.3.2.1 Schematic Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams***

Provide piping and instrumentation diagrams showing the location of all components, piping, storage facilities, points where connecting systems and subsystems tie together and into the reactor system, and instrumentation and controls associated with subsystem and component actuation for all modes of ECCS operation, along with a complete description of component interlocks.

#### ***C.I.6.3.2.2 Equipment and Component Descriptions***

Describe each component of the system, and identify its significant design parameters. State the design and operating pressure and temperature of components for various portions of the system, and explain the bases for their selection. State the available quantity of coolant (e.g., in each safety injection tank, pools, refueling water storage tank, condensate storage tank, torus). Provide pump characteristic curves and pump power requirements. Specify the available and required NPSH for the ECCS pumps, and identify any exceptions to the regulatory position stated in RG 1.82 Revision 3. Provide elevations of tanks and pools in the passive systems, with reference to core elevation. Describe heat exchanger characteristics, including design flow rates, inlet and outlet temperatures for the cooling fluid and the fluid being cooled, the overall heat transfer coefficient, and the heat transfer area.

State the relief valve capacity and settings or venting provisions included in the system. Specify design requirements for ECCS delivery lag times. Describe provisions with respect to control circuits for motor-operated isolation valves in the ECCS, including consideration of inadvertent actuation prior to or during an accident. This description should include discussions of the controls and interlocks for these valves (e.g., intent of IEEE Std 279-1971 and 603) and considerations for automatic valve closure (e.g., reactor coolant system pressure exceeds design pressure of residual heat removal system), automatic

valve opening (e.g., preselected reactor coolant system pressure or ECCS signal), valve position indications, valve interlocks, and alarms.

#### **C.I.6.3.2.3 *Applicable Codes and Classifications***

Identify the applicable industry codes and classifications for the design of the system. An acceptable method to implement safety and pressure integrity classification of ECCS components is to use ANSI/ANS-58.14-1993 (or later version).

#### **C.I.6.3.2.4 *Material Specifications and Compatibility***

Identify the material specifications for the ECCS, and discuss material compatibility and chemical effects of all sorts. List the materials used in or on the ECCS by their commercial names, quantities (estimate where necessary), and chemical composition. Show that the radiolytic or pyrolytic decomposition products, if any, of each material will not interfere with the safe operation of this or any other ESF.

#### **C.I.6.3.2.5 *System Reliability***

Discuss the reliability considerations incorporated in the design to ensure that the system will start when needed and will deliver the required quantity of coolant within specified lag times (e.g., redundancy and separation of components, transmission lines, and power sources). Provide a failure mode and effects analysis of the ECCS. Identify the functional consequences of each possible single failure, including the effects of any single failure or operator error that causes any manually controlled electrically operated valve to move to a position that could adversely affect the ECCS. Discuss how all potential passive failures of fluid systems, as well as single failures of active components, were considered for long-term cooling.

Applicants for PWR plants should discuss how the single-failure analysis for the potential boron precipitation problem was considered as an integral part of the requirement to provide for long-term core cooling. Identify the specific equipment arrangement for the plant design, and provide an evaluation to ensure that valve motor operators located within containment will not become submerged following a LOCA. Include all equipment in the ECCS or any other system that may be needed to limit boric acid precipitation in the reactor vessel during long-term cooling, or may be required for containment isolation.

Describe how containment sump recirculation debris screen design meets the guidelines in RG 1.82, Revision 3.

Describe how the design considered the adverse impact of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping on the ECCS operability, including water hammer and pump operability.

For a passive safety system design that relies exclusively on natural forces to perform design-basis safety functions, and includes active systems to provide defense-in-depth capabilities for reactor coolant makeup and decay heat removal, describe how the passive system reliability and the impact of adverse system interactions on the safety functions was considered. Describe how the regulatory oversight of the active nonsafety systems was considered in using the process of “regulatory treatment of non-safety systems” described in SECY-94-084.

Discuss the bases for not treating check valves in the passive ECCS design that operate with low-differential pressure and require repositioning to perform their safety function as active components subject to single-failure consideration. Justify any assumptions.

#### **C.I.6.3.2.6 Protection Provisions**

Describe the provisions to protect the system (including connections to the reactor coolant system or other connecting systems) against damage that might result from movement (between components within the system and connecting systems), from missiles, thermal stresses, or other causes (LOCA, seismic events).

#### **C.I.6.3.2.7 Provisions for Performance Testing and Inspection**

Describe the provisions to facilitate performance testing and inspection of components (e.g., bypasses around pumps, sampling lines, etc.).

#### **C.I.6.3.2.8 Manual Actions**

Identify all manual actions that an operator is required to take in order for the ECCS to operate properly. Identify all process instrumentation available to the operator in the control room to assist in assessing post-accident conditions. Discuss the information available to the operator, the time delay during which the operator's failure to act properly will have no unsafe consequences, and the consequences if the operator fails to perform the action at all.

#### **C.I.6.3.3 Performance Evaluation**

Discuss the ECCS performance through the safety analyses of a spectrum of postulated accidents. These analyses should be included in Chapter 15, "Transient and Accident Analyses." In this section, list the accidents discussed in Chapter 15 that will result in ECCS operation. Summarize the conclusions of the accident analyses. Provide the bases for any operational restrictions, such as minimum functional capacity or testing requirements that might be appropriate for inclusion in the technical specifications of the license. Indicate all existing criteria that are used to judge the adequacy of ECCS performance, including those contained in 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors." ECCS cooling performance evaluation should include an evaluation of single failures, potential boron precipitation (PWRs), submerged valve motors, and containment pressure assumptions (PWRs) used to evaluate the ECCS performance capability.

Provide simplified functional flow diagrams showing the alignment of valves, flow rates in the system, and the capacity of the ECC water supply for typical accident conditions (e.g., small- and large-break LOCA, steam line break). Typical flow delivery curves as a function of time should also be given for the various accidents, and the time sequence of ECCS operation for short- and long-term cooling should be discussed. Analysis supporting the selection of lag times (e.g., the period between the time an accident has occurred and the time ECC is discharged into the core) should include valve opening time, pump starting time, and other pertinent parameters. Indicate if credit is taken for operator action.

Discuss the extent to which components or portions of the ECCS are required for operation of other systems, and the extent to which components or portions of other systems are required for operation of the ECCS. An analysis of how these dependent systems would function should include system priority (which system takes preference) and conditions under which various components or portions of one system function as part of another system [e.g., when the water level in the reactor is below a limiting value, the recirculation pumps (i.e., residual or decay heat removal pumps) or feed pumps will supply water to the ECCS and not to the containment spray system]. Delineate any limitations on operation or maintenance included to ensure minimum capability (e.g., the storage facility common to both core cooling and containment spray systems should have provisions to ensure that the quantity available for core cooling will not be less than some specified quantity).

State the bounds within which principal system parameters must be maintained in the interest of constant standby readiness (such as the minimum poison concentrations in the coolant, minimum coolant reserve in storage volumes, maximum number of inoperable components, and maximum allowable time period for which a component can be out of service). The failure modes and effects analysis presented in Section 6.3.2.5 identifies possible degraded ECCS performances caused by single component failures. The accident analyses presented in Chapter 15 consider each of the degraded ECCS cases in the selection of the worst single failure to be analyzed. The conclusions of the various accident analyses should be discussed to show that the ECCS is adequate to perform its intended function.

#### **C.I.6.3.4 Tests and Inspections**

##### **C.I.6.3.4.1 *ECCS Performance Tests***

Provide a description, or reference the description of the pre-operational test program performed for the ECCS. The program should provide for testing each train of the ECCS under both ambient and simulated hot operating conditions. The tests should demonstrate that the flow rates delivered through each injection flow path using all pump combinations are within the design specifications. Describe how the testing under maximum startup loading conditions was performed to verify the adequacy of the electric power supply. Include recirculation tests in the program to demonstrate system capability to realign valves and injection pumps to recirculate coolant from the containment sump. Justify any exceptions to the regulatory position in RG .79, "Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Pressurized-Water Reactors."

##### **C.I.6.3.4.2 *Reliability Tests and Inspections***

The ECCS is a standby system that is not normally operating. Consequently, a measure of the system's readiness to operate in the event of an accident must be achieved by tests and inspections. Identify the periodic test and inspection program, and explain the reasons why the planned program is believed to be appropriate. This discussion should include the following information:

- (1) description of planned tests
- (2) considerations that led to periodic testing and the selected test frequency
- (3) test methods to be used
- (4) requirements and bases for acceptability of observed performance
- (5) description of the program for inservice inspection, including items to be inspected, accessibility requirements, and the types and frequency of inspection

Provide a cross-reference if this information is available anywhere else in the application for the planned tests; repetition is not necessary.

Emphasize those surveillance-type tests that are of such importance to safety that they may become part of the technical specifications of an operating license. Provide the bases for such surveillance requirements as part of the application.

#### **C.I.6.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements**

Discuss the instrumentation provisions for various actuation methods (e.g., automatic, manual) and locations. Include the conditions requiring system actuation, as well as the bases for their selection (e.g., during periods when the system is to be available, whenever the reactor coolant system pressure is less than some specified pressure, the core spray system will be actuated automatically using equipment designed to IEEE Std 279-1971 and 603 requirements). Design details and logic of the instrumentation should be discussed in Chapter 7 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.4 Habitability Systems**

The term “habitability systems” refers to the equipment, supplies, and procedures provided to ensure that control room operators can remain in the control room and take actions to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions, and maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions, including LOCAs, as required by GDC 19. Habitability systems should include systems and equipment to protect control room operators against such postulated releases as radioactive materials, toxic gases, smoke, and steam, and should provide materials and facilities to permit them to remain in the control room for an extended period.

As defined in Regulatory Guide 1.197, “Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,” May 2003, on Page 1.197-2, the “Control Room” is the plant area, defined in the facility licensing basis, in which actions can be taken to operate the plant safely under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe condition during accident situations. It encompasses the instrumentation and controls necessary for a safe shutdown of the plant and typically includes the critical document reference file, the computer room (if used as an integral part of the emergency response plan), shift supervisor's office, the operator wash room and kitchen, and other critical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy may be necessary in the event of an accident.

Also, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.197, “Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,” May 2003, on Page 1.197-2, the “Control Room Envelope (CRE)” is the plant area, defined in the facility licensing basis, that in the event of an emergency can be isolated from the plant areas and the environment external to the CRE. This area is served by an emergency ventilation system, with the intent of maintaining the habitability of the control room. This area encompasses the control room and may encompass other non-critical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is not necessary in the event of an accident.

Habitability systems for the control room should include shielding, air purification systems, control of climatic conditions, storage capacity for food and water, and kitchen and sanitary facilities. Detailed descriptions of these systems should be included in the application, together with an evaluation of their performance. The evaluation should provide assurance that the systems will operate under all postulated conditions to permit the control room operators to remain in the control room and take appropriate actions as required by GDC 19. Provide sufficient information to permit an independent evaluation of the systems’ adequacy. Reference information and evaluations in other sections of the application that relate to adequacy of the habitability systems (see Sections 6.5.1, 9.4.1, and 15.X.X, paragraph 5).

#### **C.I.6.4.1 Design Basis**

In this section, summarize the bases for which the functional design of the habitability systems and their features. For example, provide the criteria used to establish the following:

- (1) control room envelope
- (2) period of habitability
- (3) capacity (number of people)
- (4) food, water, medical supplies, and sanitary facilities
- (5) radiation protection
- (6) toxic or noxious gas protection
- (7) respiratory, eye, and skin protection for emergencies
- (8) habitability system operation during emergencies
- (9) emergency monitors and control equipment

Food, water, medical supplies, and sanitary facilities must be located inside an accessible area within the control room envelope.

#### **C.I.6.4.2 System Design**

##### ***C.I.6.4.2.1 Definition of Control Room Envelope***

Identify the areas, equipment, and materials to which the control room operator could require access during an emergency. List those spaces requiring continuous or frequent operator occupancy. The selection of those spaces included in the control room envelope should be based on need during postulated emergencies. Summarize this information in this section.

##### ***C.I.6.4.2.2 Ventilation System Design***

Present the design features and fission product removal and protection capability of the control room ventilation system. Although this discussion should emphasize the emergency ventilation portion of the system, the normal ventilation system and its components should also be discussed insofar as they may affect control room habitability during a DBA. Specifically, include the following information, which is pertinent to the evaluation of control room ventilation:

- (1) schematic of the control room ventilation system, including equipment, ducting, dampers, and instrumentation, and highlight the air flows for both normal and emergency modes, with references to all dampers and valves by section number if portions of this information appear elsewhere in the application with appropriate labeling (e.g., normally open or closed, manually or motor operated, fail closed, or fail open)
- (2) list of major components, with their flow rates, capacities, and major design parameters including isolation dampers, as well as the leakage characteristics and closure times of the isolation dampers
- (3) seismic classifications of components, instrumentation, and ducting, as well as identification of components that are protected against missiles
- (4) layout drawings of the control room, showing doors, corridors, stairwells, shielded walls, and the placement and type of equipment within the control room
- (5) elevation and plan views, showing building dimensions and locations, locations of potential radiological and toxic gas releases, and locations of control room air inlets

- (6) description and placement of ventilation system controls and instruments, including instruments that monitor the control room for radiation and toxic gases
- (7) description of the charcoal filter train, including design specifications, flow parameters, and charcoal type, weight, and distribution; high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter type and specifications; specifications for any additional components; and the extent to which the recommendations of RG 1.52, "Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," are followed and claimed filter efficiencies listed (reference may be made to Section 6.5.1)

#### **C.I.6.4.2.3 *Leak-Tightness***

Summarize the exfiltration and infiltration analyses performed to determine unfiltered in-leakage or pressurization air flow requirements. Include a listing of all potential leak paths (such as cable, pipe, and ducting penetrations, doors, dampers, construction joints, and construction materials) and their appropriate leakage characteristics. Describe precautions and methods used to limit leakage out of or into the control room. Periodic leakage rate testing is normally required, and a summary of the test procedures should be included in Section 6.4.5.

#### **C.I.6.4.2.4 *Interaction With Other Zones and Pressure-Containing Equipment***

Provide a sufficiently detailed discussion to show that the following interactions have been considered:

- (1) potential adverse interactions between the control room ventilation zone and adjacent zones that may enhance the transfer of toxic or radioactive gases into the control room [Identify any other heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment (e.g., ducts, air handling units) that may service other ventilation zones (e.g., cable spreading room, battery room) but may be physically located within the control room habitability zone. Provide a description of any leak paths with respect to such equipment (e.g., pilot traverse holes, hatch covers in ducts). Provide the direction and magnitude of the pressure difference across these leak paths.]
- (2) isolation from the control room of all pressure-containing tanks, equipment, or piping (e.g., CO firefighting containers, steam lines) that, upon failure, could cause transfer of hazardous material to the control room.

#### **C.I.6.4.2.5 *Shielding Design***

Consider DBA sources of radiation other than that attributable to airborne contaminants within the control room. Principal examples include fission products released to the reactor containment atmosphere, airborne radioactive contaminants surrounding the control room, and sources of radiation attributable to potentially contaminated equipment (e.g., control room charcoal filters and steam lines) in the vicinity of the control room. Include a description of radiation attenuation by shielding and separation. Present the corresponding evaluation of DBA doses to control room operators in Section 15.X.X, paragraph 5. Specifically, describe the radiation shielding for the control room in a DBA, and include the following information:

- (1) accident radiation source description in terms of its origin, strength, geometry, radiation type, energy, and dose conversion factors (sources should include primary and secondary containments, ventilation systems, external cloud, and adjacent building air spaces)
- (2) radiation attenuation parameters (i.e., shield thickness, separation distances, and decay considerations) with respect to each source

- (3) description of potential sources of radiation streaming that may affect control room operators and the measures taken to reduce streaming to acceptable levels
- (4) isometric drawing of the control room and associated structures identifying distances and shield thicknesses with respect to each radiation source identified in (1), above

Information pertinent to this section appearing elsewhere in the application should be referenced here.

#### **C.I.6.4.3 System Operational Procedures**

Discuss the method of operation during normal and emergency conditions. Discuss the automatic actions and manual procedures required to ensure effective operation of the system. If more than one emergency mode of operation is possible, indicate how the optimum mode is selected for a given condition.

#### **C.I.6.4.4 Design Evaluations**

##### ***C.I.6.4.4.1 Radiological Protection***

C.I.15.6.5, "Radiological Consequences," sets forth the documentation requirements for the evaluation of radiological exposures to plant operators from DBAs. The information presented in Chapter 15 should be referenced here.

##### ***C.I.6.4.4.2 Toxic Gas Protection***

Perform a hazards analysis as recommended in RG 1.78, "Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release" for each toxic material identified in NUREG/CR-6624, "Recommendations for Revision of Regulatory Guide 1.78," July 1999.

For any of these materials that are used in the operation of the nuclear power plant, describe the container types and methods of connection to the system serviced. The distances between the storage locations and air intakes to the control room should be listed, along with the storage quantities. An analysis of the severity of postulated accidents involving these materials should be provided, and the steps to mitigate accident consequences should be discussed. Include descriptions of the following:

- (1) principal toxic gas detector characteristics, such as sensitivity, response time, principle of operation, testing and maintenance procedures, environmental qualifications, and physical location relative to the outside air intake
- (2) isolation damper transient characteristics (time to open and close) and leakage
- (3) description of the number and type of individual respiratory devices, type of operator training for respirator use, estimated time for deploying or donning the equipment, length of time the equipment can be used, and testing and maintenance procedures
- (4) description of special ventilation system operation modes, if any, provided specifically for toxic or noxious gas conditions (e.g., bottled air pressurization, manually selected control room air purge periods)

The description of the analyses should clearly list all assumptions. RG 1.78 describes acceptable calculational methods. If chlorine has been identified as a potential hazard to the operator, specific guidance is provided by RG 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release."

#### **C.I.6.4.5 Testing and Inspection**

Provide information about the test and inspection program applicable to (1) pre-operational testing and (2) inservice surveillance to ensure continued integrity.

Emphasize those tests and inspections that are considered essential to determine that performance objectives have been achieved and performance capabilities are maintained above pre-established limits throughout the plant lifetime. For example, this section should include the following information:

- (1) planned tests and their purposes
- (2) considerations that led to the selected test frequency
- (3) test methods to be used, including a sensitivity analysis
- (4) requirements and bases for acceptability of observed performance
- (5) action to be taken if acceptability requirements are not met

#### **C.I.6.4.6 Instrumentation Requirement**

Describe the instrumentation to be used to monitor and actuate the habitability systems. Design details and logic of the instrumentation should be discussed in Chapter 7 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.5 Fission Product Removal and Control Systems**

Provide information in sufficient detail to permit the NRC staff to evaluate the performance capability of the fission product removal and control systems. Design criteria for other safety functions of the systems should be provided in other appropriate sections of this chapter. Fission product removal and control systems are considered to be those systems for which credit is taken in reducing accidental release of fission products.

The filter systems and containment spray systems for fission product removal are discussed in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, and the fission product control systems in Section 6.5.3.

##### **C.I.6.5.1 ESF Filter Systems**

Discuss all ESF filter systems that are required to perform a safety-related function following a DBA. This could include filter systems internal to the primary containment, control room filters, filters on secondary confinement volumes, fuel-handling-building filters, and filters for areas containing ESF components. (Chapter 15 should indicate which of these filters are used in mitigating the consequences of accidents.) The types of information outlined below should be provided for each of the systems. Some systems may be described in detail in other sections (such as Section 9.4), but should be listed in this section with specific references the locations of the information requested in each of the following sections.

###### **C.I.6.5.1.1 *Design Bases***

Provide the design bases for each filter, including (for example) the following:

- (1) conditions that establish the need for the filters
- (2) bases employed for sizing the filters, fans, and associated ducting
- (3) bases for the fission product removal capability of the filters

#### **C.I.6.5.1.2 *System Design***

Compare the design features and fission product removal capability of each filter system to each position detailed in RG 1.52. For each ESF atmosphere cleanup system, present (in tabular form) a comparison between the features of the proposed system and the appropriate acceptable methods and/or characteristics presented in RG 1.52. For each design item for which an exception is taken, the acceptability of the proposed design should be justified in detail.

#### **C.I.6.5.1.3 *Design Evaluation***

Provide evaluations of the filter systems to demonstrate their capabilities to attain the claimed filter efficiencies under the relevant accident conditions.

#### **C.I.6.5.1.4 *Tests and Inspections***

Provide information concerning the test and inspection program applicable to pre-operational testing and inservice surveillance to ensure a continued state of readiness required to reduce the radiological consequences of an accident as discussed in RG 1.52.

#### **C.I.6.5.1.5 *Instrumentation Requirements***

Describe the instrumentation to be employed to monitor and actuate the filter system, including the extent to which the recommendations of RG 1.52 are followed. Discuss the instrumentation design details and logic in Chapter 7 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.5.1.6 *Materials***

List by commercial name, quantity (estimate where necessary), and chemical composition the materials used in or on the filter system. Show that the radiolytic or pyrolytic decomposition products, if any, of each material will not interfere with the safe operation of this or any other ESF.

#### **C.I.6.5.2 *Containment Spray Systems***

Provide a detailed description of the fission product removal function of the containment spray system, if the system is relied upon to perform this function following a DBA.

##### **C.I.6.5.2.1 *Design Bases***

Provide the design bases for the fission product removal function of the containment spray system, including (for example) the following:

- (1) postulated accident conditions that determine the design requirements for fission product scrubbing of the containment atmosphere
- (2) list of the fission products (including the species of iodine) that the system is designed to remove, and the extent to which credit is taken for the cleanup function in the analyses of the radiological consequences of the accidents discussed in Chapter 15 of the application
- (3) bases employed for sizing the spray system and any components required for execution of the atmosphere cleanup function of the system

#### **C.I.6.5.2.2 System Design (for Fission Product Removal)**

Provide a description of systems and components employed to carry out the fission product removal function of the spray system, including the method of additive injection (if any) and delivery to the containment. This description should include the following details:

- (1) methods and equipment used to ensure adequate delivery and mixing of the spray additive (where applicable)
- (2) source of water supply during all phases of spray system operation
- (3) spray header design, including the number of nozzles per header, nozzle spacing, and nozzle orientation (a plan view of the spray headers, showing nozzle location and orientation, should be included)
- (4) spray nozzle design, including information on the drop size spectrum produced by the nozzles, with a histogram of the observed drop size frequency for the spatial drop size distribution; if a mean diameter is used in calculating spray effectiveness, all assumptions used for the conversion to a temporal drop size mean should be stated
- (5) operating modes of the system, including the time of system initiation, time of first additive delivery through the nozzles, length of injection period, time of initiation of recirculation (if applicable), and length of recirculation operation (spray and spray additive flow rates should be supplied for each period of operation, assuming minimum spray operation coincident with maximum and minimum safety injection flow rates, and vice versa)
- (6) regions of the containment covered by the spray, including a list of containment volumes that are not covered by the spray and an estimate of forced or convective post-accident ventilation of these unsprayed volumes (indicate the extent to which credit is taken for the operability of ductwork, dampers, etc.)

#### **C.I.6.5.2.3 Design Evaluation**

Provide an evaluation of the fission product removal function of the containment spray system. The system should be evaluated for fully effective and minimum safeguards operation, including the condition of a single failure of any active component. If the calculation of spray effectiveness is performed for a single set of post-accident conditions, attention should be given to the effects of such parameters as temperature, spray and sump pH (and the resulting change in iodine partition), drop size, and pressure drop across the nozzle, in order to ascertain whether the evaluation has been performed for a conservative set of these parameters.

#### **C.I.6.5.2.4 Tests and Inspections**

Provide a description of provisions to test all essential functions required for iodine-removal effectiveness of the system. In particular, this section should include the following information:

- (1) description of the tests to be performed to verify the capability of the systems, as installed, to deliver the spray solution with the required concentration of spray additives to be used for iodine removal (if the test fluids are not the actual spray additives, describe the liquids of similar density and viscosity to be employed; also discuss the correlation of the test data with the design requirements)
- (2) description of the provisions made for testing the containment spray nozzles
- (3) provisions for periodic testing and surveillance of any of the spray additives to verify their continued state of readiness

Provide bases for surveillance, test procedures, and test intervals deemed appropriate for the system.

#### **C.I.6.5.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements**

Provide a description of any spray system instrumentation required to actuate the system and monitor its fission product removal function. Instrumentation design details and logic should be discussed in Chapter 7 of the application.

#### **C.I.6.5.2.6 Materials**

Specify and discuss the chemical composition, concentrations in storage, susceptibility to radiolytic or pyrolytic decomposition, corrosion properties, etc., of the spray additives (if any), spray solution, and containment sump solution.

#### **C.I.6.5.3 Fission Product Control Systems**

Provide a detailed discussion of the operation of all fission product control systems following a DBA. Both anticipated and conservative operation should be described. Reference should be made to other FSAR sections when appropriate. Fission product control systems are considered to be those systems whose performance controls the release of fission products following a DBA. These systems are exclusive of the containment isolation system and any fission product removal system, although they may operate in conjunction with fission product removal systems.

##### **C.I.6.5.3.1 Primary Containment**

Summarize information regarding the ability of the primary containment to control fission product releases following a DBA. Include information such as that presented in Table 6-16 at the end of this section of DG-1145. Provide layout drawings of the primary containment and the hydrogen purge system.

Discuss operation of containment purge systems prior to and during an accident. Also describe operation of the primary containment (e.g., anticipated and conservative leak rates as a function of time after initiation of the accident), as it applies to fission product control following a DBA. Where applicable, indicate when fission product removal systems are effective relative to the time sequence for operation of the primary containment following a DBA.

##### **C.I.6.5.3.2 Secondary Containments**

Provide a discussion of the operation of each system used to control the release of fission products leaking from the primary containment following a DBA. Include the time sequence of events assumed in performing the dose estimates. Provide a table of events related to time following the DBA, including various parameters. For each time interval, indicate which fission product removal systems are effective.

Indicate both anticipated and conservative assumptions. Provide drawings that show each secondary containment volume and its associated ventilation system. Indicate the locations of intake and return headers for recirculation systems, as well as exhaust intakes for once-through ventilation systems. Reference should be made to non-ESF systems that are used to control pressure in the volume.

#### **C.I.6.5.4 Ice Condenser as a Fission Product**

This section is not applicable to certified or anticipated standard designs.

#### **C.I.6.5.5 Pressure Suppression Pool as a Fission Product Cleanup System**

Consider the fission product cleanup function separately from its heat removal aspects; it should be described in this section only if credit is taken in the accident analysis in Chapter 15.

##### **C.I.6.5.5.1 *Design Bases***

Provide the design bases for the fission product removal function, including (for example) the following:

- (1) postulated accident conditions and the extent of simultaneous occurrences that determine the design requirements for fission
- (2) list of fission products (including the species of Iodine) that the system is designed to remove, and extent to which credit is taken for the cleanup function in the analyses of radiological consequences of the accidents discussed in Chapter 15

##### **C.I.6.5.5.2 *System Design (for the Fission Product Removal)***

Describe aspects of the design that significantly affect the system's fission product removal function. This description should include (for example) the following information:

- (1) Specify the concentrations of all additives to the containment sump solution following an accident.
- (2) Provide an evaluation of the system's fission product removal function. The system should be evaluated for fully effective and minimum safeguards operation, including the condition of a single failure of any active component. If the calculation of effectiveness is performed for a single set of post-accident conditions, give attention to the effects of such parameters as recirculation flow rate, temperature, pressure, and sump pH (and the resulting change in iodine partition), in order to ascertain that the evaluation has been performed for a conservative set of these parameters.

##### **C.I.6.5.5.4 *Tests and Inspections***

Provide a description of provisions to test all essential functions for iodine-removal effectiveness and surveillance of the system.

#### **C.I.6.6 Inservice Inspection of Class 2 and 3 Components**

Discuss the inservice inspection program for Quality Group B and C components (i.e., Class 2 and 3 components in Section III of the ASME Code).

##### **C.I.6.6.1 Components Subject to Examination**

Indicate whether all Quality Group B components, including those listed in Table IWC-2500 of Section XI of the ASME Code will be examined in accordance with Code requirements. Indicate the extent to which Quality Group C components, including those listed in Subarticle IWD-2500 of Section XI, will be examined in accordance with the Code.

A detailed inservice inspection program, including information on areas subject to examination, method of examination, and extent and frequency of examination, should be provided in the technical specifications.

#### **C.I.6.6.2 Accessibility**

Indicate whether the design and arrangement of Class 2 and 3 system components will provide adequate clearances to conduct the required examinations at the Code-required inspection interval. Describe any special design arrangements for those components that are to be examined during normal reactor operation.

#### **C.I.6.6.3 Examination Techniques and Procedures**

Indicate the extent to which the examination techniques and procedures described in Section XI of the ASME Code will be used. Describe any special examination techniques and procedures that might be used to meet the Code requirements.

#### **C.I.6.6.4 Inspection Intervals**

Indicate whether an inspection schedule for Class 2 system components will be developed in accordance with the guidance in Section XI, Subarticle IWC-2400, of the ASME Code, and whether a schedule for Class 3 system components will be developed according to Subarticle IWD-2400.

#### **C.I.6.6.5 Examination Categories and Requirements**

Indicate whether the inservice inspection categories and requirements for Class 2 components are in agreement with Section XI and IWC-2500 of the ASME Code. Indicate the extent to which inservice inspection categories and requirements for Class 3 components are in agreement with Section XI, Subarticle IWD-2500.

#### **C.I.6.6.6 Evaluation of Examination Results**

Indicate whether the evaluation of Class 2 component examination results will comply with the requirements in Article IWA-3000 of Section XI of the ASME Code. Describe the method to be used in evaluating examination results for Class 3 components and, until publication of IWD-3000, indicate the extent to which these methods are consistent with requirements in Article IWA-3000 of Section XI. In addition, indicate whether repair procedures for Class 2 components will comply with the requirements in Article IWC-4000 of Section XI. Describe the procedures to be used to repair Class 3 components, and indicate the extent to which these procedures are in agreement with Article IWD-4000 of Section XI.

#### **C.I.6.6.7 System Pressure Tests**

Indicate whether the program for Class 2 system pressure testing will comply with the criteria in Article IWC-5000 of Section XI of the ASME Code. Also, indicate whether the program for Class 3 system pressure testing will comply with the criteria in Article IWD-5000.

#### **C.I.6.6.8 Augmented Inservice Inspection to Protect Against Postulated Piping Failures**

Provide an augmented inservice inspection program for high-energy fluid system piping between containment isolation valves or, where no isolation valve is used inside containment, between the first rigid pipe connection to the containment penetration or the first pipe whip restraint inside containment and the outside isolation valve. This program should contain information concerning areas subject to examination, method of examination, and extent and frequency of examination.

### **C.I.6.7 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Leakage Control System (BWRs)**

Describe the design bases and criteria to be applied, as well as the preliminary system design and operation, and describe how these requirements have been met.

#### **C.I.6.7.1 Design Bases**

Provide design bases for the main steam isolation valve leakage control system (MSIVLCS), in terms of the following considerations:

- (1) safety-related function of the system
- (2) system functional performance requirements, including the ability to function following a postulated loss of offsite power
- (3) seismic and quality group classification of the system
- (4) requirements for protection from missiles, pipe whip, and jet forces, as well as its ability to withstand adverse environments associated with a postulated LOCA
- (5) requirements of the MSIVLCS to function following an assumed single active failure
- (6) system capabilities to provide sufficient capacity, diversity, reliability, and redundancy to perform its safety function consistent with the need to maintain containment integrity for as long as postulated LOCA conditions require
- (7) requirements for the system to prevent or control radioactive leakage from component parts or subsystems, including methods of processing, diluting, and discharging any leakage to minimize contributing to site radioactive releases
- (8) requirements for system initiation and actuation consistent with the requirements for instrumentation, controls, and interlocks provided for engineered safety systems
- (9) requirements for inspection and testing during and subsequent to power operations

Indicate the extent to which the design guidelines of RG 1.96, "Design of Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Systems for Boiling Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants," will be followed.

#### **C.I.6.7.2 System Description**

Provide a detailed description of the MSIVLCS, including piping and instrumentation diagrams, system drawings, and location of components in the station complex. The description and drawings should also include subsystems, system operation (function), system interactions, components utilized, connection points, and instrumentation and controls utilized.

#### **C.I.6.7.3 System Evaluation**

Provide an evaluation of the capability of the MSIVLCS to prevent or control the release of radioactivity from the main steam lines during and following a LOCA. This evaluation should include the following considerations:

- (1) ability of the system to maintain its safety function when subjected to missiles, pipe whip, jet forces, adverse environmental conditions, and loss of offsite power coincident with the LOCA
- (2) ability of the system to withstand the effects of a single active failure (including the failure of any one MSIV to close)

- (3) protection afforded the system from the effects of failure of any nonseismic Category I system or component
- (4) capability of the system to provide effective isolation of components and nonessential systems or equipment
- (5) capability of the system to detect and prevent or control leakage of radioactive material to the environment, as well as the quantity of material that could be released and the time release for each release path (an analysis of radiological consequences associated with performance of this system following a design-basis LOCA should be presented in Chapter 15)
- (6) failure modes and effects analysis to demonstrate that appropriate safety-grade instrumentation, controls, and interlocks will provide safe operating conditions, ensure system actuation following a LOCA, and preclude inadvertent system actuation
- (7) assurance that a system malfunction or inadvertent operation will not have an adverse effect on other safety-related systems, components, or functions

#### **C.I.6.7.4 Instrumentation Requirements**

Describe the system instrumentation and controls. Demonstrate the adequacy of safety-related interlocks to meet the single-failure criterion.

#### **C.I.6.7.5 Inspection and Testing**

Provide the inspection and testing requirements for the MSIVLCS. Describe the provisions to accomplish such inspections and testing.




FIGURE 6-1. Example of Subcompartment Nodalization Diagram

**Table 6-1. Information To Be Provided for PWR Dry Containments  
(Including Subatmospheric Containments)**

- I. General Information
  - A. External Design Pressure, psig
  - B. Internal Design Pressure, psig
  - C. Design Temperature, EF
  - D. Free Volume, ft<sup>3</sup>
  - E. Design leak Rate, %/day @ psig
  
- II. Initial Conditions
  - A. Reactor Coolant Systems (at design overpower of 102% and at normal liquid levels)
    - 1. Reactor Power Level, MWt
    - 2. Average Coolant Temperature, EF
    - 3. Mass of Reactor Coolant Systems Liquid, 1bm
    - 4. Mass of Reactor Coolant Systems Steam, 1bm
    - 5. Liquid plus Steam Energy, \* Btu
  
  - B. Containment
    - 1. Pressure, psig
    - 2. Temperature, EF
    - 3. Relative Humidity, %
    - 4. Service Water Temperature, EF
    - 5. Refueling water Temperature, EF
    - 6. Outside Temperature, EF
  
  - C. Stored Water (as applicable)
    - 1. Borated-Water Storage Tank, ft<sup>3</sup>
    - 2. All accumulators (safety injection tanks), ft<sup>3</sup>
    - 3. Condensate Storage Tanks, ft<sup>3</sup>

\* All energies are relative to 32EF.

**Table 6-2. PWR Engineered Safety Feature Systems Information**

As indicated below, this information should be provided for two conditions: (1) full-capacity operation and (2) the capacities used in the containment analysis.

		<b>Full Capacity</b>	<b>Value Used for Containment Analysis</b>
I.	Passive Safety Injection Systems		
	A. Number of Accumulators (Safety Injection Tanks)		
	B. Pressure Setpoint, psig		
II.	Active Safety Injection Systems		
	A. High-Pressure Safety Injection		
	1. Number of Lines		
	2. Number of Pumps		
	3. Flow Rate, gpm		
	B. Low-Pressure Safety Injection		
	1. Number of Lines		
	2. Number of Pumps		
	3. Flow Rate, gpm		
III.	Containment Spray System		
	A. Injection Spray		
	1. Number of Lines		
	2. Number of Pumps		
	3. Number of Headers		
	4. Flow Rate, gpm		
	B. Recirculation Spray		
	1. Number of Lines		
	2. Number of Pumps		
	3. Number of Headers		
	4. Flow Rate, gpm		

**Table 6-2 (Continued)**

	<b>Full Capacity</b>	<b>Value Used for Containment Analysis</b>
IV.	Containment Fan Cooler System	
A.	Number of units	
B.	Air-Side Flow Rate, cfm	
C.	Heat Removal Rate at Design Temperature, 106 Btu/hr	
D.	Overall Heat Transfer Coefficient, Btu/hr-ft <sup>2</sup> -EF	
V.	Heat Exchangers	
A.	Recirculation Systems	
1.	Systems	
2.	Type	
3.	Number	
4.	Heat Transfer Area, ft <sup>2</sup>	
5.	Overall Heat Transfer Coefficient, Btu/hr-ft <sup>2</sup> -F	
6.	Flow Rate:	
a.	Recirculation Side, gpm	
b.	Exterior Side, gpm	
7.	Source of Cooling Water	
8.	Flow Begins, sec	
VI.	Other	

**Table 6-3. Summary of Calculated Containment Pressure and Temperatures**

Calculated Value

Pipe Break Location and Break Area, ft<sup>2</sup>

Peak Pressure, psig

Peak Temperature, EF

Time of Peak Pressure, sec

Energy Released to Containment up to the End of  
Blowdown, 10<sup>6</sup> Btu

**Table 6-4. Passive Heat Sinks**

**A. Listing of Passive Heat Sinks\***

The following structures, components, and equipment are examples of passive heat sinks that should be included in the submittal, as appropriate:

**Containment Building**

- (1) Building/liner
- (2) External concrete walls
- (3) Building liner steel anchor
- (4) Building floor and sump
- (5) Personnel hatches
- (6) Equipment hatches

**Internal Structures**

- (7) Internal separation walls and floors
- (8) Refueling pool and fuel transfer pit walls and floors
- (9) Crane wall
- (10) Primary shield walls
- (11) Secondary shield walls
- (12) Piping tunnel
- (13) Pressurizer room
- (14) Reheat exchanger room
- (15) Value room
- (16) Fuel canal shielding
- (17) Jet impingement deflectors
- (18) Regenerative heat exchanger shield
- (19) Other
- (20) Lifting rig
- (21) Refueling machine
- (22) Vessel head lifting rig
- (23) Polar crane
- (24) Manipulator crane
- (25) Other Supports
- (26) Reactor vessel supports
- (27) Steam generator supports
- (28) Fuel canal support

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\*Provided best estimates of these heat sinks in the PSAR stage and a detailed listing in the FSAR.

**Table 6-4 (Continued)**

- (29) Reactor coolant pump supports
- (30) Safety injection tank supports
- (31) Pressure relief tank supports
- (32) Drain tank supports
- (33) Fan cooler support
- (34) Other

**Storage Racks**

- (35) Fuel storage
- (36) Head storage
- (37) Other

**Gratings, Ladders, etc.**

- (38) Ladders, stairways
- (39) Floor plates
- (40) Steel handrails and plates railings
- (41) Steel gratings
- (42) Steel risers
- (43) Steel tread and stringers

**Electrical Equipment**

- (44) Cables, conduits
- (45) Cable trays
- (46) Instrumentation and control equipment, electrical boxes
- (47) Electric penetrations

**Piping Support Equipment**

- (48) Restraints
- (49) Hangers
- (50) Piping penetrations

**Components**

- (51) Reactor heat removal pumps and motors
- (52) Reactor coolant pump motors
- (53) Hydrogen recombiners
- (54) Fan coolers
- (55) Reactor cavity and support cooling units
- (56) Air filter units
- (57) Air blowers

**Table 6-4 (Continued)**

- (58) Air heating equipment
- (59) Safety injection tanks
- (60) Pressurizer quench tank
- (61) Reactor drain tank
- (62) Other

**Uninsulated Cold-Water-Filled Piping and Fittings**

- (63) Reactor heat removal system
- (64) Service water system
- (65) Component cooling water system
- (66) Other

**Drained Piping and Fittings**

- (67) Containment spray piping and headers
- (68) Other

**Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning**

- (69) Ducting
- (70) Duct dampers

**Table 6-4 (Continued)**

**B. Modeling of Passive Heat Sinks**

The following data should be provided for the passive heat sinks listed in Table 6-4A (a detailed listing in the FSAR stage):

Passive Heat Sink	Paint Material Thickness ft	Material	Exposed Surface Area by Thickness Group** 1 2....ft <sup>2</sup>	Total Mass, 1b	Updated Material	
					Concrete Exposed Surface Thickness	Painted Surfaces/ Unpainted Surfaces
1. Vessel steel plate						
2. External concrete walls						
3. Vessel liner steel anchors						

**C. Thickness Groups**

Material	Group Designation	Thickness Range, in.
	1	0-0.125
	2	0.125-0.25
	3	0.25-0.5
	4	0.5-1.00
	5	1.00-2.50
	6	>2.50
	a	0-3.0
	b	>3.0

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\*\* All Energies are relative to 32EF.

**TABLE 6-4 (Continued)**

**D. Thermophysical Properties of Passive Heat Sink Materials**

<b>Material</b>	<b>Density, 1/bft<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Specific Heat Btu/1b-EF</b>	<b>Thermal Conductivity Btu/hr-ft EF</b>
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**Table 6-5. Information to Be Provided for Water Pool Pressure-Suppression Containments**

A. Drywell

1. Internal Design Pressure, psig (Mark III)
2. Drywell Deck Design Differential Pressure, psid (Mark III)
3. Drywell Design Differential Pressure, psid (Mark III)
4. External Design Pressure, psig
5. Design Temperature, EF
6. Free Volume, ft<sup>3</sup>
7. Design Leak Rate, %/day @ psig

B. Containment (Wetwell)

1. Internal Design Pressure, psig
2. External Design Pressure, psig
3. Design Temperature, EF
4. Air Volume (min/max), ft<sup>3</sup>
5. Wetwell Air Volume, ft<sup>3</sup> (Mark III)
6. Pool Volume (min/max), ft<sup>3</sup>
7. Suppression Pool Makeup Volume, ft<sup>3</sup> (Mark III)
8. Pool Surface Area, ft<sup>2</sup>
9. Pool Depth (min/max), ft
10. Design Leak Rate, %/day @ psig
11. Hydraulic Control Unit Floor Flow Restriction, % restricted (Mark III)

C. Vent System

1. Number of Vents
2. Vent Diameter, ft
3. Net Free Vent Area, ft<sup>2</sup>
4. Vent Submergence(s) (min/max), ft
5. Vent System Loss Factors
6. Drywell Wall to Weir Wall Distance, ft (Mark III)
7. Net Weir Annulus Cross-Sectional Area, ft<sup>2</sup> (Mark III)

**Table 6-6. Engineered Safety Feature Systems Information for Water-Pool Pressure-Suppression Containment**

This information should be provided for two conditions: (1) full-capacity operations and (2) the capacities used in the containment analysis.

A. Containment Spray System

1. Number of Spray Pumps
2. Capacity per Pump, gpm
3. Number of Spray Headers
4. Spray Flow Rate - Drywell, lb/hr
5. Spray Flow Rate - Wetwell, lb/hr
6. Spray Thermal Efficiency, %

B. Containment Cooling System

1. Number of Pumps
2. Capacity per Pump, gpm
3. Number of Heat Exchangers
4. Heat Exchanger Type
5. Heat Transfer Area per Exchanger, ft<sup>2</sup>
6. Overall Heat-Transfer Coefficient, Btu/hr ft<sup>2</sup> EF
7. Secondary Coolant Flow Rate per Exchanger, lb/hr
8. Design Service Water Temperature (min/max), EF

**Table 6-7. Initial Conditions for Analysis of Water-Pool  
Pressure-Suppression Containment**

- A. Reactor Coolant System (at design overpower of 102% and at normal liquid levels)
  - 1. Reactor Power Level, Mwt
  - 2. Average Coolant Pressure, psig
  - 3. Average Coolant Temperature, EF
  - 4. Mass of Reactor Coolant System Liquid, lb
  - 5. Mass of Reactor Coolant System Steam, lb
  - 6. Volume of Water in Reactor Vessel, ft<sup>3</sup>
  - 7. Volume of Steam in Reactor Vessel, ft<sup>3</sup>
  - 8. Volume of Water in Recirculation Loops, ft<sup>3</sup>
  
- B. Drywell
  - 1. Pressure, psig
  - 2. Temperature, EF
  - 3. Relative Humidity, %
  
- C. Containment (suppression chamber)
  - 1. Pressure, psig
  - 2. Air Temperature, EF
  - 3. Water Temperature, EF
  - 4. Relative Humidity, %
  - 5. Water Volume, ft<sup>3</sup>
  - 6. Vent Submergence, ft

**Table 6-8. Energy Sources for Water-Pool Pressure-Suppression  
Containment Accident Analysis**

- A. Decay heat rate, Btu/sec, as a function of time
- B. Primary system sensible heat release to containment, Btu/sec, as a function of time
- C. Metal-water reaction heat rate, Btu/sec, as a function of time
- D. Heat release rate from other sources, Btu/sec, as a function of time

**Table 6-9. Mass and Energy Release Data for Analysis of Water-Pool Pressure-Suppression Containment Accidents**

A. Recirculation Line Break

1. Pipe I.D., in.
2. Effective Total Break Area, ft<sup>2</sup>, versus time
3. Name of Blowdown Code
4. Blowdown Table

Time, sec	Flow, lb/sec	Enthalpy, Btu/lb	Reactor Vessel Pressure, psig
0			
t <sub>1</sub>			
t <sub>2</sub>			
t <sub>n</sub>		-BLOWDOWN COMPLETED-	

B. Main Steam Line Break

1. Pipe I.D., in.
2. Effective Total Break Area, ft<sup>2</sup>, versus time
3. Name of Blowdown Code
4. Blowdown Table

Time, sec	Flow, lb/sec	Enthalpy, Btu/lb	Reactor Vessel Pressure, psig
0			
t <sub>1</sub>			
t <sub>2</sub>			
.			
.			
t <sub>n</sub>			

**Table 6-10. Passive Heat Sinks Used in the Analysis of BWR  
Pressure-Suppression Containments  
(If Applicable)**

A. Listing of Passive Heat Sinks

Provide a listing of all structures, components, and equipment used as passive heat sinks (see Table 6-4A).

B. Detailed Passive Heat Sink Data

The information to be provided and the format are given in Table 6-4B, 6-4C, and 6-4D.

C. Heat Transfer Coefficients

Graphically show the condensing heat sink transfer coefficients as functions of time for the design-basis accident.

**Table 6-11. Results of Water-Pool Pressure-Suppression  
Containment Accident Analyses**

A. Accident Parameters

		<u>Recirculation Line Break</u>	<u>Steam Line Break</u>
1.	Peak Drywell Pressure, psig (Mark II)		
2.	Peak Drywell Deck Design Differential Pressure, psid (Mark III)		
3.	Drywell Design Differential Pressure, psid (Mark III)		
4.	Time(s) of Peak Pressures, sec		
5.	Peak Drywell Temperature, EF		
6.	Peak Containment (Suppression Chamber) Pressure, psig		
7.	Time of Peak Containment Pressure, sec		
8.	Peak Wetwell Pressure, psig		
9.	Time of Peak Wetwell Pressure, sec		
10.	Peak Containment Atmospheric Temperature, EF		
11.	Peak Suppression Pool Temperature, EF		

The above tabulation should be supplemented by plots of containment and drywell pressure and temperature, vent flow rate, energy release rate, and energy removal rate as functions of time to at least 106 seconds.

**Table 6-11 (Continued)**

B. Energy Balance of Sources and Sinks

		Time, sec		
		Drywell Peak Pressure	End of Blowdown	Long-Term Peak Pressure
Initial				
0				
		Energy, 10 <sup>6</sup> Btu		
1.	Reactor Coolant			
2.	Fuel and Cladding			
3.	Core Internals			
4.	Reactor Vessel Metal			
5.	Reactor Coolant System Piping, Pumps, and Valves			
6.	Blowdown Enthalpy			
7.	Decay Heat			
8.	Metal-Water Reaction Heat			
9.	Drywell Structures			
10.	Drywell Air			
11.	Drywell Steam			
12.	Containment Air			
13.	Containment Steam			
14.	Suppression Pool Water			
15.	Heat Transferred by Heat Exchangers			
16.	Passive Heat Sinks			

**Table 6-12. Subcompartment Vent Path Description**

VENT PATH NO.	FROM VOL. NODE NO.	TO VOL. NODE NO.	DESCRIPTION OF		AREA ft <sup>2</sup>	LENGTH ft	HYDRAULIC DIAMETER ft	HEAD LOSS, K				TOTAL
			<u>VENT PATH FLOW</u> CHOKED	UNCHOKED				FRICTION K, ft/d	TURNING LOSS, K	EXPAN- SION, K	CONTRAC- TION, K	

**Table 6-13. Subcompartment Nodal Description**

VOLUME NO.	DESCRIPTION	HEIGHT, ft	CROSS- SECTIONAL AREA, ft <sup>2</sup>	INITIAL CONDITIONS			DBA BREAK CONDITIONS				CALC.	DESIGN	DESIGN
				TEMP. EF	PRESS. psia	HUMID. %	BREAK LOC. VOL. NO.	BREAK LINE	BREAK AREA ft <sup>2</sup>	BREAK TYPE	PEAK PRESS DIFF. psig	PEAK PRESS DIFF. psig	MARGIN, %

**Table 6-14. Mass and Energy Release Rate Data  
For Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents**

Pipe I.D., in.

Break Area, ft<sup>2</sup>

Time, sec	Mass Release Rate, lbm/sec	Enthalpy, Btu/lbm	Reactor Vessel Pressure, psig
0			
<sup>t</sup> 1			
<sup>t</sup> 2			
.			
.			
.			
<sup>t</sup> End of Blowdown			
.			
.			
.			
<sup>t</sup> End of Core Reflood			
.			
.			
.			
<sup>t</sup> End of Post-Reflood			
.			
.			
.			
<sup>t</sup> End of Problem			

**Table 6-15. Reactor Containment Building Energy Distribution  
Pipe Break Location and Pipe Break Area**

Note: The datum temperature is 32EF unless otherwise noted.

	Energy,		10 <sup>6</sup> Btu		
	Prior to LOCA	At Peak Pressure Prior to End of Blowdown	End of Blowdown	At Peak Pressure after End of Blowdown	End of Core Reflood
Reactor Coolant Internal Energy					
Core Flood Tank Coolant Internal Energy					
Energy Stored in Core					
Energy Stored in RV Intervals					
Energy Generated During Shutdown from Decay Heat					
Energy Stored in Pressurizer, Primary Piping, Valves, and Pumps					
Energy Stored in Steam Generator Metal					
Secondary Coolant Internal Energy (in Steam Generators)					
Energy Content of RCB Atmosphere*					

**Table 6-15 (Continued)**

	Energy,		10 <sup>6</sup> Btu			
	Prior to LOCA	At Peak Pressure Prior to End of Blowdown	End of Blowdown	At Peak Pressure after End of Blowdown	End of Core Reflood	One Day into Recirc.
Energy Content of RCB and Internal Structures **						
Energy Content of Recirculation Intake Water						
Energy Content of BWST Water						
Energy Removed by Decay Heat Removal Coolers						
Energy Removed by Reactor Containment Building Fan Coolers						

\* Atmospheric constituent datums are 120EF for air and 32EF for water vapor.

\*\* Datum for energy content of Reactor Contamination Building and internal structures is 120EF.

**Table 6-16. Primary Containment Operations  
Following a Design-Basis Accident**

General

Type of Structure  
 Appropriate Internal fission Product Removal Systems  
 Free Volume of Primary Containment  
 Mode of Hydrogen Purge (e.g., direct to environs, to recirculation system, to annulus)

<u>Time-Dependent Parameters</u>	<u>Anticipated</u>	<u>Conservative</u>
----------------------------------	--------------------	---------------------

Leak Rate of Primary Containment  
 Leakage Fractions to Volumes  
     Outside the Primary Containment (including the environment)  
 Effectiveness of Fission Product Removal Systems  
 Initiation of Hydrogen Purge  
 Hydrogen Purge Rate