

# **Quad Cities Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Meeting**

March 16, 2006

# Introduction

Patrick Simpson  
Licensing Manager

# Agenda

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- Introductions
- Root Cause Evaluation and Conclusions
- EPU Extent-of-Condition (EOC) Review
- Quad Cities Unit 2 (QC2) Outage Inspection Scope
- Planned Design Changes
  - Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) Modification
  - Acoustic Side Branch (ASB) Modification
- QC2 Startup Test Plan Overview
- Planned NRC Interactions
- Summary and Conclusions

# ERV Root Cause Evaluation

Karl Moser

Site Engineering Director


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# Root Cause Evaluation



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## Quad Cities ERV Root Cause Team



# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Root Cause Team
  - A multi-discipline team comprised of expertise inside and outside of Exelon resulted in a thorough and comprehensive root cause product
- Investigation Scope
  - Review details surrounding failure and wear of the ERV solenoid actuators
  - Review maintenance practices and operating experience
  - Perform historical review (ERV performance issues and previous corrective actions taken)
  - Evaluate EOC
  - Review of organizational factors by Corporate Human Performance subject matter expert

# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Root Cause
  - Failure to correct the source of Main Steam Line (MSL) vibrations
    - Vibration effects were historically addressed at the component level through enhanced/increased preventive maintenance and modifications that hardened individual components
    - EPU increased MSL vibrations
      - EPU task report projected a 50% increase and made recommendations that included establishment of a start-up monitoring plan for MSL vibrations with specific acceptance criteria
        - » Monitoring plan included location of accelerometers based on analysis and testing of ERVs
        - » Analysis and testing of ERV and actuator failed to identify the impact EPU operation would have on ERV actuators

# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Contributing Factors
  - Inadequate design test control for ERV actuators
    - Unique ERV endurance testing (no Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) guidance existed)
    - Although wear was replicated, testing did not predict type of failure observed in this event
  - Inadequate ERV rebuild and inspection procedure
    - Lessons learned from 2003 event not fully incorporated
    - Preventive maintenance procedure did not identify all critical ERV parts requiring inspection
    - Preventive maintenance procedure did not provide details on identification and correction of actuator tolerances

# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Contributing Organizational Factors
  - A systematic approach was not used to evaluate decisions
    - Although equipment issues were being addressed, not all organizational contributors were addressed
  - Exelon demonstrated an over-reliance on contractor products and expertise and, in some cases, their approach and methodology was less than adequate
  - Some decisions were based on the best information available; however, the collective conditions were not clearly understood

# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
  - Plant design change
    - Provide design change to reduce overall MSL vibrations to a level that supports safe and reliable operation of the MSLs and attached components during future operating cycles at EPU power levels

# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Key Corrective Actions
  - Plant design changes
    - Design and install ASB to reduce overall MSL vibrations
    - Design and install more robust ERV actuators
  - Development of a comprehensive test control program that includes Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for critical projects
  - Revisions to ERV actuator/pilot valve rebuild and inspection procedures to address preventive maintenance weaknesses

# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Key Corrective Actions (cont.)
  - Revise and provide training to Engineering on the requirements and application of OP-AA-106-101-1006, "Operational and Technical Decision Making Process," for engineering
    - Proven systematic approach to complex decision-making
    - Provides guidance on developing plans to address complex issues
    - Includes a systematic approach to evaluating decisions
      - Revision will include lessons learned from the ERV root cause and applying investigative analysis

# Root Cause Evaluation

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- Key Corrective Actions (cont.)
  - Revise HU-AA-1212, "Technical Task Risk/Rigor Assessment, Pre-Job Brief, Independent Third Party Review, and Post-Job Brief," and provide training to Engineering on the requirements and application for vendors providing high-risk or critical analyses for station use
    - Changes to this procedure will include a link to OP-AA-101-1006 for complex Engineering decisions and products which involve historical data, repeat equipment failure, risk, and complex analysis

# EPU EOC Review

Bruce Rash  
Corporate Design  
Engineering Director

# EOC Review (What and Why)

- Purpose is to evaluate fatigue and wear susceptibility
- Scope includes components on the MSLs from vessel to turbine control valves, including High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) piping
- Relative importance of evaluations
  - Potential event initiators
    - Piping failure that causes scram or requires shutdown
    - Inadvertent relief valve opening
    - Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure
    - Turbine main stop or control valve closure/failure
    - MSIV limit switch failure potential scram
  - Potential mitigating system impacts
    - Main Steam relief valve capacity
    - HPCI and RCIC

# EOC Review (When)

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- Project divided into multiple phases to evaluate conditions prior to and following modifications to reduce vibration
  - Phase I: Past measured plant EPU vibration data used as input - complete
  - Phase II: Projected post modification data used as input - complete
  - Phase III: Actual measured post modification data will be used as input – scheduled to complete shortly after achieving full EPU power

# EOC Review (How)

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- Methodical approach for each component
  - Identify the applicable spectra of vibrations
  - Obtain and review existing documentation including drawings, qualification reports, vendor manuals, and other documents
  - Review documentation to determine potential vulnerabilities to vibration for frequencies and amplitudes considered
  - Identify natural frequencies and assess potential amplification due to frequency content considered
  - Determined wear susceptibility and fatigue sensitivity

- Determined wear susceptibility and fatigue sensitivity
  - Analytical models developed for components and subsystems
  - Vibration data input and susceptibility determined
  - Wear reviewed by evaluation where possible with confirmation by walkdowns of selected samples
  - As-built configurations will be verified
  - Results will be integrated and assessed collectively

# EOC Review

## Results To Date

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- Phase I potential vulnerabilities identified
  - Target Rock vacuum breaker
  - Local leak rate test (LLRT) taps
  - Small bore piping
  - Limitorque SMB000 actuators
  - Turbine control valve accumulators
  - MSIV limit switch
- Phase II results
  - No significant new insights
- Phase III activities
  - Walkdowns
  - Reanalysis with plant data

# EOC Review

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- Going forward acceptance criteria
  - Installed instrumentation will monitor component vibrations and collect data for analysis
  - Installed more instrumentation on key components
  - Data will be evaluated against established acceptance criteria determined by analytical evaluation

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

Steve Boline

Deputy Engineering Director

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

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- ERV inspections
- EOC inspections
  - EOC team identified components potentially susceptible to vibration-related wear at EPU conditions
  - Evaluations considered external wear (interference with nearby components) and internal wear
  - Components with low margin selected for additional inspections/evaluations
  - Selected components will be visually inspected during MSL walkdowns; certain components to be removed for additional inspections to confirm acceptability for operation at EPU
- EPU vulnerability inspections
- Inspection results will be documented and evaluated within the Corrective Action Program

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

## ERV Actuators

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- ERV Actuator Inspections
  - As-found testing will be performed
  - Shop inspections will be performed to identify potential vibration-related degradation
    - Inspection guidance detailed in approved work package
  - Results will be evaluated to determine appropriate actions for QC1 and Dresden Nuclear Power Station
- 3E ERV turnbuckle will receive non-destructive examination (NDE)

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

## EOC Inspections

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- Outage inspection team
  - Team lead involved with EOC reviews
  - Inspectors will include system manager, check-valve and MOV engineers, VT-3 qualified personnel
- Detailed inspection guidance developed
  - Component-level inspection criteria
- Component evaluations
  - Power Labs
  - Corporate Engineering
  - Plant Engineering

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

## EOC Inspections



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- MSL piping from vessel to turbine control valves
  - Penetrations, supports, LLRT taps, snubbers, drain piping, insulation
- HPCI and RCIC steam piping to outboard isolation valve
  - Penetrations, supports, LLRT taps, snubbers, drain piping, isolation valves
- Steam system valves
  - MSIVs including limit switches, actuators, accumulators, air lines, solenoids, flex hose, temperature elements
  - ERVs, Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs), Safety/Relief Valve (S/RV) including small bore lines, actuators, temperature and acoustic monitors, electrical junctions, pressure switches
  - Turbine control and stop valves including accumulators, pressure switches, supports

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

## EOC Inspections

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- Components selected for internal inspections
  - Target Rock S/RV
    - Pressure switch (bellows switch interface)
    - Solenoid internals
    - Bellows cap and spring
  - Main turbine control valve – Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) pressure switch
  - Inboard MSIV limit switch
  - MSIV solenoid actuator and valve
  - Main turbine steam seal supply manual isolation valve
  - Limitorque operators
    - Inboard RCIC/HPCI steam supply
    - Inboard MSL drain line

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

## EPU Vulnerability Inspections



- EPU vulnerability assessments completed in June 2004
  - Identified potential EPU-related vulnerabilities and actions to prevent failures
  - Actions included component inspections and piping system walkdowns

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope


## EPU Vulnerability Inspections

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- Component inspections
  - Shroud head
    - Locking pin window
    - Head bolt ring gussets
    - Standpipe welds (sample)
  - Feedwater spargers
    - Including end-bracket pin hardware
  - Jet pump assembly restrainer gate wedges
  - Selected system valves
    - Feedwater pump minimum flow valve and actuator
    - Heater level control valve actuator and positioner
    - Turbine control valve mechanical and electrical connections
  - Low pressure turbine inner casing and extraction boxes inspections

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

## EPU Vulnerability Inspections



- Piping system walkdowns
  - Feedwater and Condensate
    - Heater drains and vents
  - EHC
  - Extraction steam

# QC2 Outage Inspection Scope

## Additional Inspection Activities




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- Shroud tie rod assemblies (Plant Hatch operating experience)
- Steam dryer (BWRVIP-139)

# ERV Actuator Modification

Bruce Rash  
Corporate Design  
Engineering Director

# ERV Actuator Modification



# ERV Actuator Modification

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
- Several ERV actuator replacement options evaluated
- General Electric design selected – significantly improves vibration resistance
- Material improvements
  - Stellite 6B guides and guideposts
  - Stainless steel pivot pins
  - Larger diameter springs, non-buckling arrangement
  - Improved vibration isolation achieved using silicone gasket between solenoid and baseplate
  - Tighter tolerances

# ERV Actuator Modification

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- Actuator rigidity improved
  - Upper angle bracket added to fix guide post alignment
- Guide posts attached to stainless steel brace assembly
- Actuator performance demonstrated through qualification testing
  - Timing tests
  - Vibration endurance (shaker table tests)

# ERV Actuator Modification



# Design Issues and Resolutions

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Resolution</b>
Guidepost and Spring Interaction	Component Failure Origin	Redesigned Frame, Post, Springs
Pivot Bolt Wear	Impacts Cutout Switch Operation	New Material, Bushing in Angle
Electrical Connection	Potential to Lose Coil Connection	3 Wire Changed to 1 Wire w/Strain Relief
Base Angle Iron Crack	Actuator Could Fail Mechanically	Gussets Added for Strength

# Initial Test Results

<b>Actuator</b>	<b>Initial Measurement</b>	<b>Final Measurement</b>	<b>Wear</b>
Dresser #1 Prior to Jan	Guidepost 501	Guidepost 420	Guidepost 81 Mils
Dresser #2 Current Model	Guidepost 501	Guidepost 433	Guidepost 68 Mils
Dresser#3 New Actuator	Guidepost 505	Guidepost 502	Guidepost 3 Mils

# ASB Modification


Roman Gesior  
Director – Engineering Programs

# ASB Modification


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- Operation at EPU has increased acoustic loads due to increased steam velocity
- Testing confirms the source of the vibrations to be from ERV and MSSV standpipes
  - Vortex shedding frequency excites acoustic standing wave in the valve standpipe
- ASB modification reduces overall MSL vibrations by reducing the acoustic pressure oscillation
  - Reduces MSL component vibration degradation
  - Reduces the steam dryer pressure oscillation load

# ASB Modification Theory




# ASB Modification Theory



- The addition of the ASB increases the effective length ( $L$ ) of the standpipe decreasing the frequency ( $f$ ) of the acoustic standing wave
- The vortex shedding frequency remains unchanged at the same power level, but when the acoustic and vortex shedding frequencies are no longer coupled, resonance does not occur
- The decrease in the acoustic frequency lowers the velocity at which the vortex shedding will excite the acoustic standing wave (i.e., the acoustic signal occurs at lower plant power levels)
- The addition of screen mesh material inside the ASB introduces a damping medium that absorbs the energy of the standing wave
- The end result is a reduced acoustic pressure oscillation that occurs at a lower point in power operation

# ASB Modification

What Frequency Is Causing Degradation to the ERVs?




**The majority of degradation on the ERVs is caused by acoustic signals in a frequency range of 150 – 160 Hz**

# ASB Modification


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- Rigorous test plan has confirmed ASB performance
  - Scale model testing has demonstrated expected frequency shift and amplitude reduction
  - Standpipe acoustic characteristics and mesh effectiveness validated by full scale resonance test
  - Shaker table testing confirmed vibration endurance
  - Full flow testing demonstrated no adverse impact on ERV/MSSV performance
- Further verification will occur during planned startup testing


# ASB Modification



# SMT As-Built Comparison




In-plant dryer pressure sensor EPU power



SMT dryer pressure sensor EPU power

# Post-ASB Installation



SMT dryer pressure sensor at EPU with ASBs  
installed on SV/ERVs

# Conclusions

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- Testing has demonstrated that the ASB is effective in reducing the 150 – 160 Hz MSL pressure oscillation to pre-EPU levels
- This reduction will significantly reduce MSL vibrations and steam dryer loads
- A design has been tested and demonstrated robust for MSL application

# QC2 Startup Test Plan

Karl Moser

Site Engineering Director

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

# QC2 Startup Test Plan


- Startup plan verifies plant parameters and equipment performance remain within established acceptance criteria
- Data will be collected throughout the full range of operation from pre-EPU to EPU conditions
- Power ascension will occur incrementally in a controlled manner
  - Test plan includes 18 plateau test conditions (TCs) starting at approximately 8% thermal power
  - Acceptance criteria provided at specified TCs
- PORC will evaluate test results and authorize continued testing above pre-EPU power (>2511 MWt)
- Following completion of the test plan, power will be returned to pre-EPU, unless all Level 1 and Level 2 criteria are satisfied

# QC2 Startup Test Plan

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- Vibration data will be collected using installed strain gauges and accelerometers located on the MSLS and associated components
  - Additional instrumentation will be installed during the upcoming QC2 refueling outage
- Throughout the power ascension, vibration data will be compared to pre-established acceptance criteria (AC)
  - AC validated at TC 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, and 18
  - Level 1 criteria established to ensure plant safety
    - If exceeded, power will be returned to a level where the AC is known to be met based on prior testing until formal engineering evaluation is completed
  - Level 2 criteria are associated with design expectations
    - If exceeded, testing may continue if authorized by the Test Director and Plant Manager


# QC2 Startup Test Plan



# Planned NRC Interactions

Patrick Simpson  
Manager - Licensing

# Planned Interactions



# Summary and Conclusions

Randy Gideon  
Plant Manager  
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

# Summary and Conclusions



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- Exelon is committed to resolving vibration-related concerns prior to returning QC1 and QC2 to EPU power
- The root cause of the ERV degradation has been identified
- Modifications are planned that will improve ERV actuator performance and significantly reduce MSL vibrations
- A comprehensive EOC evaluation has been performed to evaluate components sensitive to MSL vibration
  - Additional inspections planned during upcoming QC2 refueling outage
- A comprehensive startup testing program will confirm ASB performance by monitoring vibration levels on key MSL components
- The NRC will continue to be updated through normal communication channels