

1.2 PACKAGE DESCRIPTION

1.2.1 Packaging

The HI-STAR 100 System consists of an MPC designed for BWR or PWR spent nuclear fuel, an overpack that provides the containment boundary and a set of impact limiters that provide energy absorption capability for the normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport. Each of these components is described below, including information with respect to component fabrication techniques and designed safety features. This discussion is supplemented by a set of drawings in Section 1.4. Section 1.3 provides the HI-STAR 100 design code applicability and details any alternatives to the ASME Code.

Before proceeding to present detailed physical data on HI-STAR 100, it is contextual to summarize the design attributes that set it apart from the prior generation of spent fuel transportation packages.

There are several features in the HI-STAR 100 System design that increase its effectiveness with respect to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Some of the principal features of the HI-STAR 100 System that enhance its effectiveness are:

- the honeycomb design of the MPC fuel basket
- the effective distribution of neutron and gamma shielding materials within the system
- the high heat rejection capability
- the structural robustness of the multi-shell overpack construction

The honeycomb design of the MPC fuel baskets renders the basket into a multi-flanged plate weldment where all structural elements (box walls) are arrayed in two orthogonal sets of plates. Consequently, the walls of the cells are either completely coplanar (no offset) or orthogonal with each other. There is complete edge-to-edge continuity between contiguous cells.

Among the many benefits of the honeycomb construction is the uniform distribution of the metal mass over the body of the basket (in contrast to the “box and spacer disk” construction where the support plates are localized mass points). Physical reasoning suggests that a uniformly distributed mass provides a more effective shielding barrier than can be obtained from a nonuniform (box and spacer disk) basket. In other words, the honeycomb basket is a more effective radiation attenuation device.

The complete cell-to-cell connectivity inherent in the honeycomb basket structure provides an uninterrupted heat transmission path, making the HI-STAR 100 MPC an effective heat rejection device.

The multi-layer shell construction in the overpack provides a natural barrier against crack propagation in the radial direction across the overpack structure. If, during a hypothetical

accident (impact) event, a crack was initiated in one layer, the crack could not propagate to the adjacent layer. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that a crack would initiate as the thinner layers are more ductile than a thicker plate.

In this Safety Analysis Report the HI-STAR 100 System design is demonstrated to have predicted responses to accident conditions that are clearly acceptable with respect to certification requirements for post-accident containment system integrity, maintenance of subcriticality margin, dose rates, and adequate heat rejection capability. Table 1.2.18 presents a summary of the HI-STAR 100 System performance against these aspects of post-accident performance at two levels. At the first level, the integrity of the MPC boundary prevents release of radioactive material or helium from the MPC, and ingress of moderator. The integrity of the MPC is demonstrated by the analysis of the response of this high quality, ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB-designed, pressure vessel to the accident loads while in the overpack. With this demonstration of MPC integrity, the excellent performance results listed in the second column of Table 1.2.18 constitutes an acceptable basis for certification of the HI-STAR 100 System for the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel. However, no credit is taken for MPC integrity for certification of the HI-STAR 100 System for the transport of intact or damaged fuel assemblies. Credit is only taken for the additional containment boundary of the MPC-68F and MPC-24EF for the transport of fuel classified as fuel debris in order to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 71.63(b).

The HI-STAR 100 System provides a large margin of safety. The third column in Table 1.2.18 summarizes the performance if the MPC is postulated to suffer gross failure in the post-accident analysis. Even with this postulated failure, the performance of the HI-STAR 100 System is acceptable for the transport of intact and damaged fuel assemblies, showing the defense-in-depth methodology incorporated into the HI-STAR 100 System.

The containment boundary of the HI-STAR 100 System is shown to satisfy the special requirements of 10CFR71.61 for irradiated nuclear fuel shipments.

To meet the requirements of 10CFR71.63(b) for plutonium shipments, which is considered applicable for the transport of fuel classified as fuel debris, double containment is provided by the containment boundary of the overpack and the secondary containment boundary of the MPC-68F and MPC-24EF, serving as a separate inner container.

1.2.1.1 Gross Weight

The gross weight of the HI-STAR 100 System depends on which of the MPCs is loaded into the HI-STAR 100 overpack for shipment. Table 2.2.1 summarizes the maximum calculated component weights for the HI-STAR 100 overpack, impact limiters, and each MPC loaded to maximum capacity with design basis SNF. The maximum gross transport weight of the HI-STAR 100 System is to be marked on the packaging nameplate.

1.2.1.2 Materials of Construction, Dimensions, and Fabrication

All materials used to construct the HI-STAR 100 System are ASME Code materials, except the neutron shield, neutron poison, optional aluminum heat conduction elements, thermal expansion foam, seals, pressure relief devices, aluminum honeycomb, pipe couplings, and other material classified as Not Important to Safety. The specified materials of construction along with outline dimensions for important-to-safety items are provided in the drawings in Section 1.4.

The materials of construction and method of fabrication are further detailed in the subsections that follow. Section 1.3 provides the codes applicable to the HI-STAR 100 packaging for materials, design, fabrication, and inspection, including NRC-approved alternatives to the ASME Code.

1.2.1.2.1 HI-STAR 100 Overpack

The HI-STAR 100 overpack is a heavy-walled steel cylindrical vessel. A single overpack design is provided that is capable of transporting each type of MPC. The inner diameter of the overpack is approximately 68-3/4 inches and the height of the internal cavity is approximately 191-1/8 inches. The overpack inner cavity is sized to accommodate the MPCs. The outer diameter of the overpack is approximately 96 inches and the height is approximately 203-1/4 inches.

Figure 1.2.1 provides a cross sectional elevation view of the overpack containment boundary. The overpack containment boundary is formed by a steel inner shell welded at the bottom to a bottom plate and, at the top, to a heavy top flange with a bolted closure plate. Two concentric grooves are machined into the closure plate for the seals. The closure plate is recessed into the top flange and the bolted joint is configured to protect the closure bolts and seals in the event of a drop accident. The closure plate has test and vent ports that are closed by a threaded port plug with a seal. The bottom plate has a drain port that is also closed by a threaded port plug with a seal. The containment boundary forms an internal cylindrical cavity for housing the MPC.

The outer surface of the overpack inner shell is buttressed with intermediate shells of gamma shielding that are installed in a manner to ensure a permanent state of contact between adjacent layers. Besides serving as an effective gamma shield, these layers provide additional strength to the overpack to resist puncture or penetration. Radial channels are vertically welded to the outside surface of the outermost intermediate shell at equal intervals around the circumference. These radial channels act as fins for improved heat conduction to the overpack outer enclosure shell surface and as cavities for retaining and protecting the neutron shielding. The enclosure shell is formed by welding enclosure shell panels between each of the channels to form additional cavities. Neutron shielding material is placed into each of the radial cavity segments formed by the radial channels, the outermost intermediate shell, and the enclosure shell panels. The exterior flats of the radial channels and enclosure shell panels form the overpack outer enclosure shell (Figure 1.2.2). Atop the outer enclosure shell, pressure relief devices (e.g., rupture disks) are positioned in a recessed area. The relief devices relieve internal pressure that may develop as a result of the fire accident and subsequent off-gassing of the neutron shield material. Within each radial channel, a layer of silicone sponge is positioned to act as a thermal expansion foam to compress as the neutron shield expands in the axial direction. Appendix 1.C

provides material information on the thermal expansion foam. Figure 1.2.2 provides a mid-plane cross section view of the overpack, depicting the inner shell, intermediate shells, radial channels, outer enclosure shell, and neutron shield.

The exposed steel surfaces (except seal seating surfaces) of the overpack and the intermediate shell layers are coated to prevent corrosion. Coating materials are chosen based on the expected service conditions, considering the dual purpose certification status of the HI-STAR 100 System under 10 CFR 72 for spent fuel storage as well as transportation. The coatings applied to the overpack exposed exterior and interior surfaces are specified on the drawings in Section 1.4. The material data on the coatings is provided in Appendix 1.C. The inner cavity of the overpack is coated with a material appropriate to its high temperatures and the exterior of the overpack is coated with a material appropriate for fuel pool operations and environmental exposure. The coating applied to the intermediate shells acts as a surface preservative and is not exposed to the fuel pool or ambient environment.

Lifting trunnions are attached to the overpack top flange for lifting and rotating the cask body between vertical and horizontal positions. The lifting trunnions are located 180° apart in the sides of the top flange. On overpack serial numbers 1020-001 through 1020-007, pocket trunnions are welded to the lower side of the overpack 180° apart to provide a pivoting axis for rotation. The pocket trunnions are slightly off-center to ensure proper rotation direction of the overpack. As shown in Figure 1.1.4, the trunnions do not protrude beyond the cylindrical envelope of the overpack outer enclosure shell. This feature reduces the potential for direct impact on a trunnion in the event of an overpack side impact. After fabrication of HI-STAR overpack serial number 1020-007, the pocket trunnions were deleted from the overpack design.

1.2.1.2.2 Multi-Purpose Canisters

1.2.1.2.2.1 General Description

In this subsection, discussion of those attributes applicable to all of the MPC models is provided. Differences among the models are discussed in subsequent subsections. Specifications for the authorized contents of each MPC model, including non-fuel hardware and neutron sources are provided in Section 1.2.3.

The HI-STAR 100 MPCs are welded cylindrical structures with flat ends. Each MPC is an assembly consisting of a honeycombed fuel basket, a baseplate, a canister shell, a lid with vent and drain ports and cover plates, and a closure ring. The outer diameter of all MPCs and cylindrical height of each generic design MPC is fixed (see discussion in Subsection 1.2.1.2.2.3 regarding Trojan plant-specific MPCs). The number of spent nuclear fuel storage locations in each of the MPCs depends on the fuel assembly characteristics. As the generic MPCs are interchangeable, they correspondingly have identical exterior dimensions. The outer dimension of the MPC is nominally 68-3/8 inches and the length is nominally 190-1/4 inches. Figures 1.2.3-1.2.5 depict the cross sectional views of the different MPCs. Drawings of the MPCs are provided in Section 1.4. Key system data for the HI-STAR 100 System are outlined in Tables 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.

The generic MPC-24/24E/24EF and Trojan plant MPC-24E/EF differ in construction from the MPC-32 and MPC-68/68F in one important aspect: the fuel cells are physically separated from one another by a flux trap between each cell for criticality control (Figures 1.2.3 and 1.2.4). All MPC baskets are formed from an array of plates welded to each other, such that a honeycomb structure is created that resembles a multi-flanged, closed-section beam in its structural characteristics.

The MPC fuel basket is positioned and supported within the MPC shell by a series of basket supports welded to the inside of the MPC shell. In the peripheral area created by the basket, the MPC shell, and the basket supports, optional aluminum heat conduction elements are installed in some early production MPC-68 and MPC-68F models (see Figure 1.2.3). These heat conduction elements are fabricated from thin aluminum alloy 1100 in shapes and a design that allow a snug fit in the confined spaces and ease of installation. The heat conduction elements are along the full length of the MPC basket, except at the drain pipe location, to create a nonstructural thermal connection that facilitates heat transfer from the basket to the shell. In their operating condition, the heat conduction elements conform to, and contact the MPC shell and basket walls. In SAR Revision 10, a refined thermal analysis, described in Chapter 3, has allowed the elimination of these heat conduction elements from the MPC design, thus giving this design feature “optional” status.

Lifting lugs attached to the inside surface of the MPC canister shell serve to permit placement of the empty MPC into the overpack, and are considered non-structural, non-pressure retaining attachments to the MPC pressure boundary. The lifting lugs also serve to axially locate the MPC lid prior to welding. These internal lifting lugs are not used to handle a loaded MPC, since the MPC lid blocks access to the lifting lugs.

The top of the HI-STAR 100 MPC incorporates a redundant closure system. Figure 1.2.6 provides a sketch of the MPC closure details. The MPC lid is a circular plate (fabricated from one piece, or two pieces - split top and bottom) that is edge-welded to the MPC shell. If the two-piece lid design is employed, only the top piece is analyzed as part of the enclosure vessel pressure boundary. The bottom piece acts primarily as a radiation shield and is attached to the top piece with a non-structural, non-pressure retaining weld, as depicted on the MPC enclosure vessel drawing in Section 1.4. The MPC lid is equipped with vent and drain ports that are used to remove moisture and gas from the MPC and backfill the MPC with a specified pressure of inert gas (helium). The vent and drain ports are sealed closed by cover plates welded to the MPC lid before the closure ring is installed. The closure ring is a circular ring edge-welded to the MPC shell and MPC lid. The MPC lid provides sufficient rigidity to allow the entire MPC loaded with SNF to be lifted by the threaded holes in the MPC lid during transfer from the storage-only HI-STORM 100 System to the HI-STAR 100 overpack for transportation. Threaded insert plugs are installed to provide shielding when the threaded holes are not in use.

All MPCs are designed to handle intact fuel assemblies, damaged fuel assemblies, and fuel classified as fuel debris. Damaged fuel and fuel debris must be transported in damaged fuel containers or other approved damaged/failed fuel canister. At this time, only BWR damaged fuel and fuel debris from the Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay plants is certified for transportation in the MPC-68 and the MPC-68F. Similarly, only PWR damaged fuel and fuel debris from the

Trojan plant is certified for transportation in the Trojan plant-specific MPC-24E and the MPC-24EF. The definitions, and applicable specifications for all authorized contents, including the requirements for canning certain fuel, are provided in Subsection 1.2.3.

Intact SNF can be placed directly into the MPC. Damaged SNF and fuel debris must be placed into a Holtec damaged fuel container or other authorized canister for transportation inside the MPC and the HI-STAR 100 overpack. Figures 1.2.10 through 1.2.11 provide sketches of the containers authorized for transportation of damaged fuel and fuel debris in the HI-STAR 100 System. One Dresden Unit 1 Thoria rod canister, shown in Figure 1.2.11A, is also authorized for transportation in HI-STAR 100.

In order to qualify the MPC-68F and MPC-24EF shells as a secondary containment boundary for the transportation of Dresden Unit 1/Humboldt Bay and Trojan plant fuel debris, respectively, the MPC-68 and MPC-24E enclosure vessels have been slightly modified to further strengthen the lid-to-shell joint area. These fuel debris MPCs are given the “F” suffix (hence, MPC-68F and MPC-24EF)[†]. The differences between the standard and “F-model” MPC lid-to-shell joints are shown on Figure 1.2.17, and include a thickened upper shell, a larger lid-to-shell weld size, and a correspondingly smaller lid diameter. The design of the rest of the enclosure vessel is identical between the standard MPC and the “F-model” MPC.

The MPC-68F and MPC-24EF provide the separate inner container per 10CFR71.63(b) for the HI-STAR 100 System transporting fuel classified as fuel debris to ensure double containment. The overpack containment boundary provides the primary containment boundary.

1.2.1.2.2.2 MPC-24/24E/24EF

The MPC-24 is designed to transport up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits specified in Subsection 1.2.3. The MPC 24E is designed to transport up to 24 PWR intact and up to four PWR damaged fuel assemblies in damaged fuel containers. The MPC-24EF is designed to transport up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies and up to four PWR damaged fuel assemblies or fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris. At this time, however, generic PWR damaged fuel and fuel debris are not authorized for transportation in the MPC-24E/EF.

All MPC-24-series fuel baskets employ the flux trap design for criticality control, as shown in the drawings in Section 1.4. The fuel basket design for the MPC-24E is an enhanced MPC-24 basket layout designed to improve the fuel storage geometry for criticality control. The fuel basket design of the MPC-24EF is identical to the MPC-24E. The MPC-24E/EF basket designs also employ a higher ¹⁰B loading than the MPC-24, as shown in Table 1.2.3. The differences between the MPC-24EF enclosure vessel design and the MPC-24/24E enclosure vessel are discussed in Subsection 1.2.1.2.2.1.

[†] The drawing in Section 1.4 also denotes an MPC-68FF fuel debris canister design. However, the MPC-68FF is not authorized for use in transportation under the HI-STAR 100 10 CFR 71 CoC.

1.2.1.2.2.3 Trojan Plant MPC-24E/EF

The Trojan plant MPC-24E and -24EF models are designs that have been customized for that plant's fuel and the concrete storage cask being used at the Trojan plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) (Docket 72-0017). The design features that are unique to the Trojan plant MPCs are specifically noted on the MPC enclosure vessel and MPC-24E/EF fuel basket drawings in Section 1.4. These differences include:

- a shorter MPC fuel basket and cavity length to match the shorter Trojan fuel assembly length
- shorter corner fuel storage cell lengths to accommodate the Trojan Failed Fuel Cans
- a different fuel storage cell and flux trap dimension in the corner cells to accommodate the Trojan Failed Fuel Cans
- a different configuration of the flow holes at the bottom of the fuel basket (rectangular vs. semi-circular)

All other design features in the Trojan MPCs are identical to the generic MPC-24E/EF design. The HI-STAR 100 overpack design has not been modified for the Trojan MPC design.

The technical analyses described in this SAR were verified in most cases to bound the Trojan-specific design features. Where necessary, Trojan plant-specific evaluations were performed and are summarized in the appropriate SAR section. To accommodate the shorter Trojan plant MPC length in a standard-length HI-STAR 100 overpack, a spacer was designed for installation into the overpack above the Trojan MPC (see Figure 1.1.5 and the drawing in Section 1.4) for transportation in the standard-length HI-STAR 100 overpack. This spacer prevents the MPC from moving more than the MPC was analyzed to move in the axial direction and serves to transfer the axial loads from the MPC lid to the overpack top closure plate within the limits of the supporting analyses. See Section 2.7.1.1 for additional discussion of the spacer used with the Trojan MPC design. Hereafter in this SAR, the Trojan plant-specific MPC design is only distinguished from the generic MPC-24E/EF design when necessary to describe unique evaluations performed for those MPCs.

1.2.1.2.2.4 MPC-32

~~NOTE: The MPC-32 is not certified for transportation at this time.~~

The MPC-32 is designed to transport up to 32 PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the specifications in Subsection 1.2.3. Damaged fuel and fuel debris are not permitted to be transported in the MPC-32. The MPC-32 enclosure vessel design is identical to the MPC-24/24E enclosure vessel design as shown on the drawings in Section 1.4. The MPC-32 fuel basket does not employ flux traps for criticality control. Credit for burnup of the fuel is taken in the criticality analyses for accident conditions and to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 71.55(b). Because the MPC is designed to preclude the intrusion of moderator under all normal and

credible accident conditions of transport, the moderator intrusion condition analyzed as required by 10 CFR 71.55(b) is a non-mechanistic event for the HI-STAR 100 System.

1.2.1.2.2.5 MPC-68/68F

The MPC-68 is designed to transport up to 68 BWR intact fuel assemblies and damaged fuel assemblies meeting the specifications in Subsection 1.2.3. Zircaloy channels are permitted. At this time, only damaged fuel from the Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay plants is authorized for transportation in the MPC-68. The MPC-68F is designed to transport only fuel and other authorized material from the Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay plants meeting the specifications in Subsection 1.2.3. The sole difference between the MPC-68 and MPC-68F fuel basket design is a reduction in the required ¹⁰B areal density in the Boral. A reduction in the required ¹⁰B areal density of the Boral is possible for the MPC-68F due to limited types of fuel and low enrichments permitted to be transported in this MPC model. The differences between the MPC-68F enclosure vessel design and the MPC-68 enclosure vessel are discussed in Subsection 1.2.1.2.2.1.

1.2.1.2.2.6 Alloy X

The HI-STAR MPC is constructed entirely from stainless steel alloy materials (except for the neutron absorber and aluminum vent and drain cap seal washers in all MPCs, and the aluminum heat conduction elements in the first several production units of MPC-68 and MPC-68F). No carbon steel parts are used in the design of the HI-STAR 100 MPC. Concerns regarding interaction of coated carbon steel materials and various MPC operating environments [1.2.1] are not applicable to the HI-STAR MPCs. All structural components in a HI-STAR MPC will be fabricated of Alloy X, a designation that warrants further explanation.

Alloy X is a fictitious material that should be acceptable as a Mined Geological Depository System (MGDS) waste package and that meets the thermophysical properties set forth in this document.

At this time, there is considerable uncertainty with respect to the material of construction for an MPC that would be acceptable as a waste package for the MGDS. Candidate materials being considered for acceptability by the DOE include:

- Type 316
- Type 316LN
- Type 304
- Type 304LN

The DOE material selection process is primarily driven by corrosion resistance in the potential environment of the MGDS. As the decision regarding a suitable material to meet disposal requirements is not imminent, this application requests approval for use of any one of the four Alloy X materials.

For the MPC design and analysis, Alloy X (as defined in this SAR) may be one of the following materials. Any steel part in an MPC may be fabricated from any of the acceptable Alloy X materials listed below, except that all steel pieces comprising the MPC shell (i.e., the 1/2" thick cylinder) must be fabricated from the same Alloy X stainless steel type:

- Type 316
- Type 316LN
- Type 304
- Type 304LN

The Alloy X approach is accomplished by qualifying the MPC for all mechanical, structural, neutronic, radiological, and thermal conditions using material thermophysical properties that are the least favorable for the entire group for the analysis in question. For example, when calculating the rate of heat rejection to the outside environment, the value of thermal conductivity used is the lowest for the candidate material group. Similarly, the stress analysis calculations use the lowest value of the ASME Code allowable stress intensity for the entire group. Stated differently, we have defined a material, which is referred to as Alloy X, whose thermophysical properties, from the MPC design perspective, are the least favorable of the candidate materials group. The evaluation of the Alloy X constituents to determine the least favorable properties is provided in Appendix 1.A.

The Alloy X approach is conservative because no matter which material is ultimately utilized, the Alloy X approach guarantees that the performance of the MPC will exceed the analytical predictions contained in this document.

1.2.1.3 Impact Limiters

The HI-STAR 100 overpack is fitted with aluminum honeycomb impact limiters, termed AL-STAR™, one at each end, once the overpack is positioned and secured in the transport frame. The impact limiters ensure the inertia loadings during the normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport are maintained below design levels. The impact limiter design is discussed further in Chapter 2 and drawings are provided in Section 1.4.

1.2.1.4 Shielding

The HI-STAR 100 System is provided with shielding to minimize personnel exposure. The HI-STAR 100 System will be transported by exclusive use shipment to ensure the external radiation requirements of 10CFR71.47 are met. During transport, a personnel barrier is installed to restrict access to the overpack to protect personnel from the HI-STAR 100 exterior surface temperature in accordance with 10CFR71.43(g). The personnel barrier provides a stand-off equal to the exterior radial dimension of the impact limiters. Figure 1.2.8 provides a sketch of the personnel barrier being installed.

The initial attenuation of gamma and neutron radiation emitted by the radioactive spent fuel is provided by the MPC fuel basket structure built from inter-welded plates and Boral neutron poison panels with sheathing attached to the fuel cell walls. The MPC canister shell, baseplate,

and lid provide additional thicknesses of steel to further reduce gamma radiation and, to a smaller extent, neutron radiation at the outer MPC surfaces. No shielding credit is taken for the aluminum heat conduction elements installed in some of the early production MPC-68 and MPC-68F units.

The primary HI-STAR 100 shielding is located in the overpack and consists of neutron shielding and additional layers of steel for gamma shielding. Neutron shielding is provided around the outside circumferential surface of the overpack. Gamma shielding is provided by the overpack inner, intermediate and enclosure shells with additional axial shielding provided by the bottom plate and the top closure plate. During transport, the impact limiters will provide incremental gamma shielding and provide additional distance from the radiation source at the ends of the package. An additional circular segment of neutron shielding is contained within each impact limiter to provide neutron attenuation.

1.2.1.4.1 Boral Neutron Absorber

Boral is a thermal neutron poison material composed of boron carbide and aluminum alloy 1100. Boron carbide is a compound having a high boron content in a physically stable and chemically inert form. The boron carbide contained in Boral is a fine granulated powder that conforms to ASTM C-750-80 nuclear grade Type III. The aluminum alloy 1100 is a lightweight metal with high tensile strength that is protected from corrosion by a highly resistant oxide film. The two materials, boron carbide and aluminum, are chemically compatible and ideally suited for long-term use in the radiation, thermal, and chemical environment of a nuclear reactor, spent fuel pool, or dry cask.

The documented historical applications of Boral, in environments comparable to those in spent fuel pools and fuel storage casks, dates to the early 1950s (the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's AE-6 Water-Boiler Reactor [1.2.2]). Technical data on the material was first printed in 1949, when the report "Boral: A New Thermal Neutron Shield" was published [1.2.3]. In 1956, the first edition of the "Reactor Shielding Design Manual" [1.2.4], contains a section on Boral and its properties.

In the research and test reactors built during the 1950s and 1960s, Boral was frequently the material of choice for control blades, thermal-column shutters, and other items requiring very good thermal-neutron absorption properties. It is in these reactors that Boral has seen its longest service in environments comparable to today's applications.

Boral found other uses in the 1960s, one of which was a neutron poison material in baskets used in the shipment of irradiated, enriched fuel rods from Canada's Chalk River laboratories to Savannah River. Use of Boral in shipping containers continues, with Boral serving as the poison in many cask designs.

Boral has been licensed by the NRC for use in numerous BWR and PWR spent fuel storage racks and has been extensively used in international nuclear installations.

Boral has been exclusively used in fuel storage applications in recent years. Its use in spent fuel pools as the neutron absorbing material can be attributed to its proven performance and several unique characteristics, such as:

- The content and placement of boron carbide provides a very high removal cross section for thermal neutrons.
- Boron carbide, in the form of fine particles, is homogeneously dispersed throughout the central layer of the Boral panels.
- The boron carbide and aluminum materials in Boral do not degrade as a result of long-term exposure to radiation.
- The neutron absorbing central layer of Boral is clad with permanently bonded surfaces of aluminum.
- Boral is stable, strong, durable, and corrosion resistant.

Boral absorbs thermal neutrons without physical change or degradation of any sort from the anticipated exposure to gamma radiation and heat. The material does not suffer loss of neutron attenuation capability when exposed to high levels of radiation dose.

Holtec International's QA Program ensures that Boral is manufactured under the control and surveillance of a Quality Assurance/Quality Control Program that conforms to the requirements of 10CFR71, Subpart H and 10CFR72, Subpart G. Holtec International has procured over 200,000 panels of Boral from AAR Advanced Structures for over 20 projects. Boral has always been purchased with a minimum ^{10}B loading requirement. Coupons extracted from production runs were tested using the "wet chemistry" procedure. The actual ^{10}B loading, out of thousands of coupons tested, has never been found to fall below the design specification. The size of this coupon data base is sufficient to provide confidence that all future procurements will continue to yield Boral with full compliance with the stipulated minimum loading. Furthermore, the surveillance, coupon testing, and material tracking processes that have so effectively controlled the quality of Boral are expected to continue to yield Boral of similar quality in the future. Nevertheless, to add another layer of insurance, only 75% ^{10}B credit of the fixed neutron absorber is assumed in the criticality analysis.

The oxide layer that is created from the reaction of the outer aluminum cladding and the edges of the Boral panels with air and water provides a barrier to further reaction of the aluminum cladding with air or the spent fuel pool water during loading and unloading operations. However, with extended submergence in an MPC filled with water or in the plant's spent fuel pool, the hydrostatic pressure can drive water into the Boral core (comprised of particulate B_4C and aluminum powder) where previously unexposed aluminum powder may react with the water to create hydrogen. The rate of hydrogen generation and the total hydrogen generated is dependent on several variables:

- Aluminum particle size: Aluminum particle size in the Boral core and associated porosity affects the amount of aluminum available for reaction with water. Larger aluminum particles yield less surface area for reaction, but higher porosity for aluminum-water interaction; smaller aluminum particles yield more surface area for reaction, but lower porosity for aluminum-water reaction.
- Presence of trace impurities: The presence of trace impurities in the Boral core due to the manufacturing process (i.e., sodium hydroxide, boron oxide, and iron-oxide) can affect the rate of hydrogen production, both increasing and suppressing the reaction. Sodium dissolved in the water increases the pH and tends to increase the rate of hydrogen production. This is counteracted by the boron oxide, which hydrolyzes to boric acid (H_3BO_3) and reduces the rate of hydrogen production. Trace impurities do not affect the total amount of hydrogen generated.
- Pool water chemistry: Chemicals in the plant spent fuel pool water (e.g., copper, boron) can affect the rate of hydrogen production, both increasing (copper) and suppressing (boron) the reaction.
- MPC loading operations: Operating needs or preferences by individual utilities as to when, and for how long the MPC is kept at varying water depths in the spent fuel pool, and how long the MPC is kept filled with water outside the spent fuel pool can affect the amount of aluminum in the Boral core that may be exposed to water.

Due to the variability in hydrogen generation from the Boral-water reaction, the operating procedures in Chapter 7 require monitoring for combustible gases and either exhausting or purging the space beneath the MPC lid during loading and unloading operations when an ignition event could occur (i.e., when the space beneath the MPC lid is open to the welding or cutting operation).

1.2.1.4.2 Holtite-ATM Neutron Shielding

The specification for the overpack and impact limiter neutron shield material is predicated on functional performance criteria. These criteria are:

- Attenuation of neutron radiation and associated neutron capture to appropriate levels;
- Durability of the shielding material under normal conditions, in terms of thermal, chemical, mechanical, and radiation environments;
- Stability of the homogeneous nature of the shielding material matrix;
- Stability of the shielding material in mechanical or thermal accident conditions to the desired performance levels; and

- Predictability of the manufacturing process under adequate procedural control to yield an in-place neutron shield of desired function and uniformity.

Other aspects of a shielding material, such as ease of handling and prior nuclear industry use, are also considered, within the limitations of the main criteria. Final specification of a shield material is a result of optimizing the material properties with respect to the main criteria, along with the design of the shield system, to achieve the desired shielding results.

Holtite-A is the only approved neutron shield material that fulfills the aforementioned criteria. Holtite-A is a poured-in-place solid borated synthetic neutron-absorbing polymer. Holtite-A is specified with a nominal B₄C loading of 1 weight percent for the HI-STAR 100 System. Appendix 1.B provides the Holtite-A material properties germane to its function as a neutron shield. Holtec has performed confirmatory qualification tests on Holtite-A under the company's QA program.

In the following, a brief summary of the performance characteristics and properties of Holtite-A is provided.

Density

The nominal specific gravity of Holtite-A is 1.68 g/cm³ as specified in Appendix 1.B. To conservatively bound any potential weight loss at the design temperature and any inability to reach the theoretical density, the density is reduced by 4% to 1.61 g/cm³. The density used for the shielding analysis is assumed to be 1.61 g/cm³ to underestimate the shielding capabilities of the neutron shield.

Hydrogen

The nominal weight concentration of hydrogen is 6.0%. However, all shielding analyses conservatively assume 5.9% hydrogen by weight in the calculations.

Boron Carbide

Boron carbide dispersed within Holtite-A in finely dispersed powder form is present in 1% (nominal) weight concentration. Holtite-A may be specified with a B₄C content of up to 6.5 weight percent. For the HI-STAR 100 System, Holtite-A is specified with a nominal B₄C weight percent of 1%.

Design Temperature

The design temperature of Holtite-A is set at 300°F. The maximum spatial temperature of Holtite-A under all normal operating conditions must be demonstrated to be below this design temperature.

Thermal Conductivity

It is evident from Figure 1.2.2 that Holtite-A is directly in the path of heat transmission from the inside of the overpack to its outside surface. For conservatism, however, the design basis thermal conductivity of Holtite-A under heat rejection conditions is set equal to zero. The reverse condition occurs under a postulated fire event when the thermal conductivity of Holtite-A aids in the influx of heat to the stored fuel in the fuel basket. The thermal conductivity of Holtite-A is conservatively set at 1 Btu/hr-ft-°F for all fire accident analyses.

The Holtite-A neutron shielding material is stable at normal design temperatures over the long term and provides excellent shielding properties for neutrons.

1.2.1.4.3 Gamma Shielding Material

For gamma shielding, HI-STAR 100 utilizes carbon steel in plate stock form. Instead of utilizing a thick forging, the gamma shield design in the HI-STAR 100 overpack borrows from the concept of layered vessels from the field of ultra-high pressure vessel technology. The shielding is made from successive layers of plate stock. The fabrication of the shell begins by rolling the inner shell plate and making the longitudinal weld seam. Each layer of the intermediate shells is constructed from two halves. The two halves of the shell are precision sheared, beveled, and rolled to the required radii. The two halves of the second layer are wrapped around the first shell. Each shell half is positioned in its location and while applying pressure using a specially engineered fixture, the halves are tack welded. The beveled edges to be joined are positioned to make contact or have a slight gap. The second layer is made by joining the two halves using two longitudinal welds. Successive layers are assembled in a like manner. Thus, the welding of every successive shell provides a certain inter-layer contact (Figure 1.2.7).

A thick structural component radiation barrier is thus constructed with four key features, namely:

- The number of layers can be increased as necessary to realize the required design objectives.
- The layered construction is ideal to stop propagation of flaws.
- The thinner plate stock is much more ductile than heavy forgings used in other designs.
- Post-weld heat treatment is not required by the ASME Code, simplifying fabrication.

1.2.1.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Devices

The HI-STAR 100 overpack is equipped with two lifting trunnions located in the top flange. The lifting trunnions are designed in accordance with 10CFR71.45, NUREG-0612 [1.2.11], and ANSI N14.6 [1.3.3], manufactured from a high strength alloy, and are installed in threaded openings. The lifting trunnions may be secured in position by optional locking pads, shaped to make conformal contact with the curved overpack. Once the locking pad is bolted in position, the inner diameter is sized to restrain the trunnion from backing out. The two off-center pockets

located near the overpack bottom plate on overpack serial numbers 1020-001 through 1020-007 are pocket trunnions. The pocket trunnions were eliminated from the design after serial number 1020-007 was fabricated and are no longer considered qualified tie-down devices. However, the pocket trunnions on these overpacks may still be used for normal handling activities such as upending and downending.

The lifting, upending, and downending of the HI-STAR 100 System requires the use of external handling devices. A lifting yoke is utilized when the cask is to be lifted or set in a vertical orientation. For those overpacks that have been fabricated with the pocket trunnions, transport and rotation cradles may include rotation trunnions that interface with the pocket trunnions to provide a pivot axis. A lift yoke may be connected to the lifting trunnions and the crane hook used for upending or downending the HI-STAR 100 System by rotating on the pocket trunnions for these overpacks. For those overpacks fabricated without pocket trunnions, the overpack must be transferred into the transport saddle with appropriate lift rigging. If an overpack having pocket trunnions is secured to the transport vehicle without engaging the pocket trunnions, plugs are required to be installed in the pocket to provide radiation shielding (see the overpack drawing in Section 1.4).

For transportation, the HI-STAR 100 System is engineered to be mounted on a transport frame secured to the transporter bed. Figure 1.2.8 provides a sketch of the HI-STAR 100 System secured for transport and the drawing in Section 1.4 provides additional details. The transport frame has a lower saddle with attachment points for belly slings around the cask body designed to prevent excessive vertical or lateral movement of the cask during normal transportation. The impact limiters affixed to both ends of the cask are designed to transmit the design basis axial loads into the cradle structure. See Section 2.5 for discussion of the qualification of tie-down devices.

The top of the MPC lid is equipped with four threaded holes that allow lifting of the loaded MPC. These holes allow the loaded MPC to be raised/lowered from the HI-STAR overpack. For users of the HI-STORM 100 Dry Storage System, MPC handling operations are performed using a HI-TRAC transfer cask of the HI-STORM 100 System (Docket No. 72-1014). The HI-TRAC transfer cask allows the sealed MPC loaded with spent fuel to be transferred from the HI-STORM 100 overpack (storage-only) to the HI-STAR 100 overpack, or vice versa. The threaded holes in the MPC lid are designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6 and are plugged during transportation to prevent radiation streaming.

1.2.1.6 Heat Dissipation

The HI-STAR 100 System can safely transport SNF by maintaining the fuel cladding temperature below the limits specified in Table 1.2.3 for normal and accident conditions. These limits have been established consistent with the guidance in NRC Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) document No. 11, Revision 23 (Ref. [1.2.14]). The temperature of the fuel cladding is dependent on the decay heat and the heat dissipation capabilities of the cask. The total heat load per BWR and PWR MPC is identified in Table 1.2.3. The SNF decay heat is passively dissipated without any mechanical or forced cooling.

The HI-STAR 100 System must meet the requirements of 10CFR71.43(g) for the accessible surface temperature limit. To meet this requirement the HI-STAR 100 System is shipped as an exclusive use shipment and includes an engineered personnel barrier during transport.

The primary heat transfer mechanisms in the HI-STAR 100 System are conduction and surface radiation.

The free volume of the MPC and the annulus between the external surface of the MPC and the inside surface of the overpack containment boundary are filled with 99.995% pure helium gas during fuel loading operations. Table 1.2.3 specifies the acceptance criteria for helium fill pressure in the MPC internal cavity. Besides providing an inert dry atmosphere for the fuel cladding, the helium also provides conductive heat transfer across any gaps between the metal surfaces inside the MPC and in the annulus between the MPC and overpack containment boundary. Metal conduction transfers the heat throughout the MPC fuel basket, through the MPC aluminum heat conduction elements (if installed) and shell, through the overpack inner shell, intermediate shells, steel radial connectors and finally, to the outer neutron shield enclosure shell. The most adverse temperature profiles and thermal gradients for the HI-STAR 100 System with each of the MPCs are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The thermal analysis in Chapter 3 no longer takes credit for the aluminum heat conduction elements and they have been designated as optional equipment.

1.2.1.7 Coolants

There are no coolants utilized in the HI-STAR 100 System. As discussed in Subsection 1.2.1.6 above, helium is sealed within the MPC internal cavity. The annulus between the MPC outer surface and overpack containment boundary is also purged and filled with helium gas.

1.2.1.8 Pressure Relief Systems

No pressure relief system is provided on the HI-STAR 100 packaging containment boundary.

The sole pressure relief devices are provided in the overpack outer enclosure (Figure 1.1.4). The overpack outer enclosure contains the neutron shield material. Normal loadings will not cause the rupture disks to open. The rupture disks are installed to relieve internal pressure in the neutron shield cavities caused by the fire accident. The overpack outer enclosure is not designed as a pressure vessel. Correspondingly, the rupture disks are designed to open at relatively low pressures as stated below.

Relief Device location	Set pressure, psig
Overpack outer enclosure	30, +/- 5

1.2.1.9 Security Seal

The HI-STAR 100 packaging provides a security seal that while intact, provides evidence that the package has not been opened by unauthorized persons. When installed, the impact limiters cover all penetrations into the HI-STAR 100 packaging containment boundary. Therefore, the security seal is placed to ensure that the impact limiters are not removed which thereby ensures that the package has not been opened. As shown on the HI-STAR transport assembly drawing in Section 1.4, security seals are provided on one impact limiter attachment bolt on the top impact limiter and through two adjacent bolts on the bottom impact limiter. A hole is provided in the head of the bolt and the impact limiter. Lockwire shall be threaded through the hole and joined with a security seal.

1.2.1.10 Design Life

The design life of the HI-STAR 100 System is 40 years. This is accomplished by using materials of construction with a long proven history in the nuclear industry and specifying materials known to withstand their operating environments with little to no degradation. A maintenance program, as specified in Chapter 8, is also implemented to ensure the HI-STAR 100 System will exceed its design life of 40 years. The design considerations that assure the HI-STAR 100 System performs as designed throughout the service life include the following:

HI-STAR Overpack

- Exposure to Environmental Effects
- Material Degradation
- Maintenance and Inspection Provisions

MPC

- Corrosion
- Structural Fatigue Effects
- Maintenance of Helium Atmosphere
- Allowable Fuel Cladding Temperatures
- Neutron Absorber Boron Depletion

1.2.2 Operational Features

Table 1.2.7 provides the sequence of basic operations necessary to load fuel and prepare the HI-STAR 100 System for transport. More detailed guidance for transportation-related loading, unloading, and handling operations is provided in Chapter 7 and is supported by the drawings in Section 1.4. A summary of the loading and unloading operations is provided below. Figures 1.2.9 and 1.2.16 provide a pictorial view of the loading and unloading operations, respectively.

1.2.2.1 Applicability of Operating Procedures for the Dual-Purpose HI-STAR 100 System

The HI-STAR 100 System is a dual-purpose system certified for use as a dry storage cask under 10 CFR 72 and a transportation package under 10 CFR 71. In addition, the MPC is certified for use under 10 CFR 72 in the storage-only HI-STORM 100 System (a ventilated concrete cask system). Therefore, it is possible that the HI-STAR 100 overpack and/or the MPC may be loaded, prepared, and sealed under the operating procedures for storage, delineated in the HI-STAR 100 storage FSAR (Docket 72-1008) or the HI-STORM 100 storage FSAR (Docket 72-1014). In those cases, the operating procedures governing MPC and overpack preparation for storage would apply. The MPC and HI-STAR 100 overpack, as applicable, must be confirmed to meet all requirements of the Part 71 Certificate of Compliance before being released for shipment.

For those instances where the MPC is being loaded and shipped off-site in a HI-STAR 100 overpack under 10 CFR 71 without first being deployed at an ISFSI (known as “load-and-go” operations), the operating procedures in Chapter 7 (and summarized below) apply for preparation of the MPC and HI-STAR overpack. For those cases where the MPC is transferred from storage in a HI-STORM overpack to a HI-STAR overpack for shipment, the operating procedures in Chapter 7 (and summarized below) govern the preparation activities for the HI-STAR overpack.

Loading Operations

At the start of loading operations, the overpack is configured with the closure plate removed. The lift yoke is used to position the overpack in the designated preparation area or setdown area for overpack inspection and MPC insertion. The annulus is filled with plant demineralized water and an inflatable annulus seal is installed. The inflatable seal prevents contact between spent fuel pool water and the MPC shell reducing the possibility of contaminating the outer surfaces of the MPC. The MPC is then filled with spent fuel pool water or plant demineralized water (borated as required for MPC-32). The overpack and MPC are lowered into the spent fuel pool for fuel loading using the lift yoke. Pre-selected assemblies are loaded into the MPC and a visual verification of the assembly identification is performed.

While still underwater, a thick shielding lid (the MPC lid) is installed. The lift yoke is remotely engaged to the overpack lifting trunnions and is used to lift the overpack close to the spent fuel pool surface. The MPC lift bolts (securing the MPC lid to the lift yoke) are removed. As the overpack is removed from the spent fuel pool, the lift yoke and overpack are sprayed with demineralized water to help remove contamination.

The overpack is removed from the pool and placed in the designated preparation area. The top surfaces of the MPC lid and the top flange of the overpack are decontaminated. The inflatable annulus seal is removed, and an annulus shield is installed. The annulus shield provides additional personnel shielding at the top of the annulus and also prevents small items from being dropped into the annulus (foreign material exclusion). If used, the Automated Welding System (AWS) is installed. The MPC water level is lowered slightly and the space under the MPC lid is purged or exhausted and monitoring is performed. The MPC lid is seal-welded using the AWS. Liquid penetrant examinations are performed on the root and final passes and ultrasonic

examination is also performed on the MPC lid-to-shell weld or, in place of the ultrasonic examination, the weld may be inspected by multiple-pass liquid penetrant examination at approximately every 3/8 inch of weld depth. Then a small volume of the water is displaced with helium gas. The helium gas is used for leakage testing. A helium leakage rate test is performed on the MPC lid confinement weld (lid-to-shell) to verify weld integrity and to ensure that the leakage rates are within acceptance criteria. The MPC water is displaced from the MPC by blowing pressurized helium or nitrogen gas into the vent port of the MPC, thus displacing the water through the drain line. At the appropriate time in the sequence of activities, based on the type of test performed (hydrostatic or pneumatic), a pressure test of the MPC enclosure vessel is performed.

The Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) System is connected to the MPC and is used to remove residual water from the MPC and reduce the level of moisture in the MPC to acceptable levels. This is accomplished by recirculating dry, heated helium through the MPC cavity to absorb the moisture. When the helium exiting the MPC is determined to meet the required moisture limit, the MPC is considered sufficiently dried for transportation (see Section 3.4.1.1.16 for a description of the FHD System).

Following MPC drying operations, the MPC is backfilled with a predetermined amount of helium gas. The helium backfill ensures adequate heat transfer, provides an inert atmosphere for fuel cladding integrity, and provides the means of future leakage rate testing of the MPC enclosure vessel boundary welds. Cover plates are installed and seal-welded over the MPC vent and drain ports with liquid penetrant examinations performed on the root and/or final passes, depending on the number of weld passes required. That is, if only a single weld pass is required, only a final liquid penetrant examination is performed. The cover plates are helium leakage tested to confirm that they meet the established leakage rate criteria.

The MPC closure ring is then placed on the MPC, aligned, tacked in place, and seal welded, providing redundant closure of the MPC enclosure vessel closure welds. Tack welds are visually examined, and the root and/or final welds (depending on the number of weld passes required) are inspected using the liquid penetrant examination technique to ensure weld integrity. The annulus shield is removed and the remaining water in the annulus is drained. The AWS is removed. The overpack closure plate is installed and the bolts are torqued. The overpack annulus is dried using the vacuum drying system (VDS).

If the MPC being transported is an “F-model” canister, a helium leakage test on the canister must be performed to confirm the integrity of the secondary containment boundary prior to backfilling the overpack annulus.

The overpack annulus is backfilled with helium gas for heat transfer and seal testing. Concentric metallic seals in the overpack closure plate prevent the leakage of the helium gas from the annulus and provide the containment boundary to the release of radioactive materials. The seals on the overpack vent and drain port plugs are leak tested along with the overpack closure plate inner seal. Cover plates with metallic seals are installed over the overpack vent and drain ports to provide redundant closure of the overpack penetrations. A port plug with a metallic seal is

installed in the overpack closure plate test port to provide fully-redundant closure of all overpack penetrations.

The overpack is surveyed for removable contamination and secured on the transport vehicle with impact limiters installed, the security seals are attached, and the personnel barrier is installed. The HI-STAR 100 packaging is then ready for transport.

Unloading Operations

The HI-STAR 100 System unloading procedures describe the general actions necessary to prepare the MPC for unloading, cool the stored fuel assemblies in the MPC (if necessary), flood the MPC cavity, remove the lid welds, unload the spent fuel assemblies, and recover the overpack and empty MPC. Special precautions are outlined to ensure personnel safety during the unloading operations, and to prevent the risk of MPC overpressurization and thermal shock to the stored spent fuel assemblies.

After removing the impact limiters, the overpack and MPC are positioned in the designated preparation area. At the site's discretion, a gas sample is drawn from the overpack annulus and analyzed. The gas sample provides an indication of MPC enclosure vessel performance. The annulus is depressurized, the overpack closure plate is removed, and the annulus is filled with plant demineralized water. The annulus shield is installed to protect the annulus from debris produced from the lid removal process. Similarly, overpack top surfaces are covered with a protective fire-retarding blanket.

The Weld Removal System (WRS) is positioned on the MPC lid. The MPC closure ring is core drilled over the locations of the vent and drain port cover plates. The MPC closure ring and vent and drain port cover plates are core drilled to the extent necessary to allow access by the Remote Valve Operating Assemblies (RVOAs). Local ventilation is established around the vent and drain ports. The RVOAs are connected to allow access to the MPC cavity for re-flooding operations.

The MPC cavity gas is verified to be below an appropriate temperature (approximately 200°F) to allow water flooding. Depending on the time since initial fuel loading and the age and burnup of the contained fuel, mechanical cooling of the MPC cavity gas may or may not be required to ensure the cavity gas temperature meets the acceptance criterion. A thermal evaluation should be performed to determine the MPC bulk cavity gas temperature at the time of unloading. Based on that thermal evaluation, if the MPC cavity gas temperature does not already meet the acceptance limit, any appropriate means to cool the cavity gas may be employed to reduce the gas temperature to the acceptance criterion. Typically, this may involve intrusive means, such as recirculation cooling of the MPC cavity helium, or non-intrusive means, such as cooling of the exterior surface of the MPC enclosure vessel with water or air. The thermal evaluation should include an evaluation of the cooling process, if required, to determine the appropriate criteria for the cooling process, such as fluid flow rate(s), fluid temperature(s), and the cooling duration required to meet the acceptance criterion. Following fuel cool-down (if required), the MPC is flooded with water. The WRS is positioned for MPC lid-to-shell weld removal. The WRS is then removed with the MPC lid left in place.

The annulus shield is removed and the inflatable annulus seal is installed and pressurized. The MPC lid is rigged to the lift yoke and the lift yoke is engaged to overpack lifting trunnions. The overpack is placed in the spent fuel pool and the MPC lid is removed. All fuel assemblies are returned to the spent fuel storage racks. The overpack and MPC are returned to the designated preparation area. The annulus water is drained and the MPC and overpack are dispositioned for re-use or waste.

1.2.3 Contents of Package

The HI-STAR 100 packaging is classified as a Type B package under 10CFR71. As the HI-STAR 100 System is designed to transport spent nuclear fuel, the maximum activity of the contents requires that the HI-STAR 100 packaging be classified as Category I in accordance with Regulatory Guide 7.11 [1.2.10]. This section delineates the authorized contents permitted for shipment in the HI-STAR 100 System, including fuel assembly types; non-fuel hardware; neutron sources; physical parameter limits for fuel assemblies and sub-components; enrichment, burnup, cooling time, ~~and~~ decay heat limits, **and core operating parameters, as applicable**; location requirements; and requirements for canning the material.

1.2.3.1 Determination of Design Basis Fuel

The HI-STAR 100 package is designed to transport most types of fuel assemblies generated in the commercial U.S. nuclear industry. Boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies have been supplied by General Electric (GE), Siemens (SPC), Exxon Nuclear, ANF, UNC, ABB Combustion Engineering, Allis-Chalmers (AC) and Gulf Atomic. Pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies are generally supplied by Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, ANF, and ABB Combustion Engineering. ANF, Exxon, and Siemens are historically the same manufacturing company under different ownership. Within this report, SPC is used to designate fuel manufactured by ANF, Exxon, or Siemens. Publications such as Refs. [1.2.6], [1.2.7], and [1.2.15] provide a comprehensive description of fuel discharged from U.S. reactors. A central object in the design of the HI-STAR 100 System is to ensure that a majority of SNF discharged from the U.S. reactors can be transported in one of the MPCs.

The cell openings in the fuel basket have been sized to accommodate all BWR and PWR assemblies listed in Refs. [1.2.6], [1.2.7], and [1.2.15], except as noted below. Similarly, the cavity length of the MPC has been set at a dimension that permits transportation of most types of PWR fuel assemblies and BWR fuel assemblies with or without fuel channels. The one exception is as follows:

- The South Texas Units 1 & 2 SNF, and CE 16x16 System 80TM SNF are too long to be accommodated in the available MPC cavity length.

In addition to satisfying the cross sectional and length compatibility, the active fuel region of the SNF must be enveloped in the axial direction by the neutron absorber located in the MPC fuel basket. Alignment of the neutron absorber with the active fuel region is ensured by the use of upper and lower fuel spacers suitably designed to support the bottom and restrain the top of the

fuel assembly. The spacers axially position the SNF assembly such that its active fuel region is properly aligned with the neutron absorber in the fuel basket. Figure 1.2.15 provides a pictorial representation of the fuel spacers positioning the fuel assembly active fuel region. Both the upper and lower fuel spacers are designed to perform their function under normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport. Due to the shorter, custom MPC design for Trojan plant fuel, only lower fuel spacers are needed for certain fuel assemblies that do not contain integral control rod assemblies. This creates the potential for a slight misalignment between the active fuel region of a fuel assembly and the neutron absorber panels affixed to the cell walls of the Trojan MPCs. This condition is addressed in the criticality evaluations described in Chapter 6.

In summary, the geometric compatibility of the SNF with the MPC designs does not require the definition of a design basis fuel assembly. This, however, is not the case for structural, containment, shielding, thermal-hydraulic, and criticality criteria. In fact, the same fuel type in a category (PWR or BWR) may not control the cask design in all of the above-mentioned criteria. To ensure that no SNF listed in Refs. [1.2.6], [1.2.7], and [1.2.15] that is geometrically admissible in the HI-STAR MPC is precluded from loading, it is necessary to determine the governing fuel specification for each analysis criteria. To make the necessary determinations, potential candidate fuel assemblies for each qualification criteria were considered. Table 1.2.8 lists the PWR fuel assemblies evaluated. These fuel assemblies were evaluated to define the governing design criteria for PWR fuel. The BWR fuel assembly designs evaluated are listed in Table 1.2.9. Tables 1.2.10 and 1.2.11 provide the fuel characteristics determined to be acceptable for transport in the HI-STAR 100 System. Each “array/class” listed in these tables represents a bounding set of parameters for one or more fuel assembly types. The array/classes are defined in SAR Section 6.2. Table 1.2.12 lists the BWR and PWR fuel assembly designs that are found to govern for the qualification criteria, namely reactivity, shielding, and thermal. Thermal is broken down into three criteria, namely: 1) fuel assembly effective planar conductivity, 2) fuel basket effective axial conductivity, and 3) MPC density and heat capacity. Substantiating results of analyses for the governing assembly types are presented in the respective chapters dealing with the specific qualification topic. Tables 1.2.10, 1.2.11, and 1.2.21 through 1.2.36 provide the specific limits for all material authorized to be transported in the HI-STAR 100 System. Additional information on the design basis fuel definition is presented in the following subsections.

1.2.3.2 Design Payload for Intact Fuel

Intact fuel assemblies are defined as fuel assemblies without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks and hairline cracks, and which can be handled by normal means. The design payload for intact fuel to be transported in the HI-STAR 100 System is provided in Tables 1.2.10, 1.2.11, and 1.2.22 through 1.2.36. The placement of a single stainless steel clad fuel assembly in an MPC necessitates that all fuel assemblies (stainless steel clad or Zircaloy clad) stored in that MPC meet the maximum heat generation requirements for stainless steel clad fuel. Stainless steel clad fuel assemblies are not authorized for transportation in the MPC-68F or MPC-32.

Fuel assemblies without fuel rods in fuel rod locations cannot be classified as intact fuel unless dummy fuel rods, which occupy a volume equal to or greater than the original fuel rods, replace

the missing rods prior to loading. Any intact fuel assembly that falls within the geometric, thermal, and nuclear limits established for the design basis intact fuel assembly can be safely transported in the HI-STAR 100 System.

The fuel characteristics specified in Tables 1.2.10, 1.2.11, and 1.2.21 have been evaluated in this SAR and are acceptable for transport in the HI-STAR 100 System.

1.2.3.3 Design Payload for Damaged Fuel and Fuel Debris

Damaged fuel and fuel debris are defined in Table 1.0.1. The only PWR damaged fuel and fuel debris authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System is that from the Trojan plant. The only BWR damaged fuel and fuel debris authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System is that from the Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay plants.

Damaged fuel may only be transported in the MPC-24E, MPC-24EF, MPC-68, or MPC-68F as shown in Tables 1.2.23 through 1.2.26. Fuel debris may only be transported in the MPC-24EF and the MPC-68F as shown in Tables 1.2.24 and 1.2.26. Damaged fuel and fuel debris must be transported in stainless steel Holtec damaged fuel containers (DFCs) or other approved stainless steel damaged/failed fuel canister in the HI-STAR 100 System. The list of approved damaged/failed fuel canisters and associated SAR figures are provided below:

- Holtec-designed Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay Damaged Fuel Container (Figure 1.2.10)
- Sierra Nuclear-designed Trojan Failed Fuel Can (Figure 1.2.10A) containing Trojan damaged fuel, fuel debris, or Trojan Fuel debris process cans; or containing Trojan Fuel Debris Process Can Capsules (Figure 1.2.10C), which themselves contain Trojan Fuel Debris Process Cans (Figure 1.2.10B).
- Holtec-designed Damaged Fuel Container for Trojan plan fuel (Figure 1.2.10D)
- Dresden Unit 1's TN Damaged Fuel Container (Figure 1.2.11)
- Dresden Unit 1's Thoria Rod Canister (Figure 1.2.11A)

1.2.3.3.1 BWR Damaged Fuel and Fuel Debris

Dresden Unit 1 (UO₂ fuel rods and MOX fuel rods) and Humboldt Bay fuel arrays (Assembly Classes 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A) are authorized for transportation as damaged fuel in the MPC-68 and damaged fuel or fuel debris in the MPC-68F. No other BWR damaged fuel or fuel debris is authorized for transportation.

The limits for transporting Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay damaged fuel and fuel debris are given in Table 1.2.23 and 1.2.24. The placement of a single damaged fuel assembly in an MPC-68 or MPC-68F, or a single fuel debris damaged fuel container in an MPC-68F necessitates that

all fuel assemblies (intact, damaged, or debris) placed in that MPC meet the maximum heat generation requirements specified in Tables 1.2.23 and 1.2.24.

The fuel characteristics specified in Tables 1.2.11, 1.2.23 and 1.2.24 for Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay fuel arrays have been evaluated in this SAR and are acceptable for transport as damaged fuel or fuel debris in the HI-STAR 100 System. Because of the long cooling time, small size, and low weight of spent fuel assemblies qualified as damaged fuel or fuel debris, the DFC and its contents are bounded by the structural, thermal, and shielding analyses performed for the intact BWR design basis fuel. Separate criticality analysis of the bounding fuel assembly for the damaged fuel and fuel debris has been performed in Chapter 6.

As Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris have significant cladding damage, no cladding integrity is assumed. To meet the double containment criteria of 10CFR71.63(b) for plutonium shipments, the MPC-68F provides the secondary containment boundary (separate inner container), while the overpack provides the primary containment boundary.

The fuel characteristics specified in Table 1.2.11 for the Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay fuel arrays (Assembly Classes 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A) have been evaluated in this SAR and are acceptable for transport as damaged fuel or fuel debris in the HI-STAR 100 System after being placed in a damaged fuel container.

1.2.3.3.2 PWR Damaged Fuel and Fuel Debris

The PWR damaged fuel and fuel debris authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System is limited to that from the Trojan plant. The limits for transporting Trojan plant damaged fuel and fuel debris in the Trojan MPC-24E/EF are given in Tables 1.2.10, 1.2.25 and 1.2.26. All Trojan plant damaged fuel, and fuel debris listed below is authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System [1.2.12]:

- Damaged fuel assemblies in Trojan failed fuel cans
- Damaged fuel assemblies in Holtec's Trojan plant PWR damaged fuel container
- Fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris in Trojan failed fuel cans
- Trojan fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris in Holtec's Trojan damaged fuel container
- Fuel debris consisting of loose fuel pellets, fuel pellet fragments, and fuel assembly metal fragments (portions of fuel rods, portions of grid assemblies, bottom nozzles, etc.) in Trojan failed fuel cans
- Trojan fuel debris process cans loaded into Trojan fuel debris process can capsules and then into Trojan failed fuel cans. The fuel debris process cans contain fuel debris (metal fragments) and were used to process organic media removed from the Trojan spent fuel

pool during cleanup operations in preparation for decommissioning the pool. The fuel debris process cans have metallic filters in the can bottom and lid that allowed removal of water and organic media using high temperature steam, while retaining the solid residue from the processed media and fuel debris inside the process can[†]. Up to five process cans can be loaded into a process can capsule, which is vacuumed, purged, backfilled with helium, and seal-welded closed to provide a sealed containment for the fuel debris.

One Trojan Failed Fuel Can is not completely filled with fuel debris. Therefore, a stainless steel failed fuel can spacer is installed in this FFC to minimize movement of the fuel debris during normal transportation and hypothetical accident conditions. The spacer is a long, square tube with a baseplate that rests atop the fuel debris inside the Trojan FFC. A drawing of the Trojan failed fuel can spacer is provided in Section 1.4. A summary of the structural analysis of the FFC spacer is provided in Section 2.6.1.3.1.3.

1.2.3.4 Structural Payload Parameters

The main physical parameters of an SNF assembly applicable to the structural evaluation are the fuel assembly length, envelope (cross sectional dimensions), and weight. These parameters, which define the mechanical and structural design, are listed in Tables 1.2.22 through 1.2.27 for the various MPC models. The centers of gravity reported in Chapter 2 are based on the maximum fuel assembly weight. Upper and lower fuel spacers (as appropriate) maintain the axial position of the fuel assembly within the MPC basket and, therefore, the location of the center of gravity. The upper and lower spacers are designed to withstand normal and accident conditions of transport. An axial clearance of approximately 2 inches is provided to account for the irradiation and thermal growth of the fuel assemblies. The suggested upper and lower fuel spacer lengths are listed in Tables 1.2.16 and 1.2.17. Due to the custom design of the Trojan MPCs, only lower fuel spacers are required with Trojan plant fuel assemblies not containing non-fuel hardware or neutron sources. In order to qualify for transport in the HI-STAR 100 MPC, the SNF must satisfy the physical parameters listed in Tables 1.2.21 through 1.2.36, as applicable.

1.2.3.5 Thermal Payload Parameters

The principal thermal design parameter for the fuel is the peak fuel cladding temperature, which is a function of the maximum heat generation rate per assembly and the decay heat removal capabilities of the HI-STAR 100 System. The maximum heat generation rate per assembly for the design basis fuel assembly is based on the fuel assembly type with the lowest thermal performance characteristics. The parameters that define this decay heat design basis fuel are listed in Table 1.2.12. The governing thermal parameters to ensure that the range of SNF discussed previously are bounded by the thermal analysis discussed in detail and specified in Chapter 3. By utilizing these bounding thermal parameters, the calculated peak fuel rod cladding temperatures are conservative for the actual spent fuel assemblies, which are apt to have a higher thermal conductivity.

[†] The Trojan Fuel Debris Process Cans were used in the spent fuel pool cleanup effort conducted as part of plant decommissioning. This project is complete and not associated with certification of Trojan fuel debris for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System under 10 CFR 71.

The peak fuel cladding temperature limit for normal conditions of transport is 400°C (752°F), which is consistent with the guidance in ISG-11, Revision 32 [1.2.14]. Tables 1.2.21 through 1.2.27 provide the maximum heat generation for all fuel assemblies authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System. The basis for these limits is discussed in Chapter 3.

Finally, the axial variation in the heat emission rate in the design basis fuel is defined based on the axial burnup distribution. For this purpose, the data provided in Refs. [1.2.8], [1.2.9], and [1.2.12] are utilized and summarized in Table 1.2.15 and Figures 1.2.13, 1.2.13A, and 1.2.14, for reference. These distributions are representative of fuel assemblies with the design burnup levels considered. These distributions are used for analysis only, and do not provide a criteria for fuel assembly acceptability for transport in the HI-STAR 100 System.

1.2.3.6 Radiological Payload Parameters

The principal radiological design criteria are the 10CFR71.47 and 10CFR71.51 radiation dose rate and release requirements for the HI-STAR 100 System. The radiation dose rate is directly affected by the gamma and neutron source terms of the SNF assembly.

The gamma and neutron sources are separate and are affected differently by enrichment, burnup, and cool time. It is recognized that, at a given burnup, the radiological source terms increase monotonically as the initial enrichment is reduced. The shielding design basis fuel assembly is, therefore, evaluated for different combinations of maximum burnup, minimum cooling time, and minimum enrichment. The shielding design basis intact fuel assembly thus bounds all other intact fuel assemblies.

The design basis dose rates can be met by a variety of burnup levels, cooling times, and minimum enrichments. Tables 1.2.21 through 1.2.36 include the burnup and cooling time values that meet the radiological dose rate requirements for all authorized contents to be transported in each MPC model. The allowable maximum burnup, minimum cooling time, and minimum enrichment limits were chosen strictly based on the dose rate requirements. All allowable burnup, cooling time, and minimum enrichment combinations result in calculated dose rates less than the regulatory dose rate limits.

Table 1.2.15 and Figures 1.2.13, 1.2.13A, and 1.2.14 provide the axial distribution for the radiological source term for PWR and BWR fuel assemblies, and for Trojan plant-specific fuel, based on the actual burnup distribution. The axial burnup distributions are representative of fuel assemblies with the design basis burnup levels considered. These distributions are used for analysis only, and do not provide criteria for fuel assembly acceptability for transport in the HI-STAR 100 System.

Thoria rods placed in Dresden Unit 1 Thoria Rod Canisters meeting the requirements of Table 1.2.21 and Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one Antimony-Beryllium neutron source have been qualified for transport. Up to one Dresden Unit 1 Thoria Rod Canister plus any combination of damaged fuel assemblies in damaged fuel containers and intact fuel, up to a total of 68 may be transported.

1.2.3.7 Criticality Payload Parameters

As discussed earlier, the MPC-68/68F and MPC-32 feature a basket without flux traps. In these fuel baskets, there is one panel of neutron absorber between adjacent fuel assemblies. The MPC-24/24E/24EF employs a construction wherein two neighboring fuel assemblies are separated by two panels of neutron absorber with a water gap between them (flux trap construction). The MPC-24 flux trap basket can accept a much higher enrichment fuel than a non-flux trap basket without taking credit for fuel assembly burnup in the criticality analysis. The maximum initial ^{235}U enrichment for PWR and BWR fuel authorized for transport is specified by fuel array/class in Tables 1.2.10 and 1.2.11, respectively. Trojan plant fuel is limited to a lower maximum initial enrichment of 3.7 wt.% ^{235}U compared to other fuel in its array/class, based on the specific analysis performed for the custom-designed Trojan MPCs containing only Trojan plant fuel.

The MPC-24 Boral ^{10}B areal density is specified at a minimum loading of 0.0267 g/cm^2 . The MPC-24E/EF, MPC-32, and MPC-68 Boral ^{10}B areal density is specified at a minimum loading of 0.0372 g/cm^2 . The MPC-68F Boral ^{10}B areal density is specified at a minimum loading of 0.01 g/cm^2 .

For all MPCs, the ^{10}B loading areal density used for analysis is conservatively established at 75% of the minimum ^{10}B areal density to demonstrate that the reactivity under the most adverse accumulation of tolerances and biases is less than 0.95. The reduction in ^{10}B areal density credit meets NUREG-1617 [1.0.5], which requires a 25% reduction in ^{10}B areal density credit. A large body of sampling data accumulated by Holtec from thousands of manufactured Boral panels indicates the average ^{10}B areal densities to be approximately 15% greater than the specified minimum.

Credit for burnup of the fuel, in accordance with the intent of the guidance in Interim Staff Guidance Document 8 (ISG-8) [1.2.13], is taken in the criticality analysis to allow the transportation of certain PWR fuel assemblies in MPC-32. Burnup credit is a required input to qualify PWR fuel for transportation in the MPC-32, considering the inleakage of moderator (i.e., unborated water) under accident conditions. This hypothetical event is non-credible given the double barrier design engineered into the HI-STAR 100 System with the fully welded MPC enclosure vessel (designed for 60 g's) surrounded by the sealed overpack, which is designed for deep submersion under water (greater than 650 feet submersion) without breach. The details of the burnup credit analyses are provided in Chapter 6, including detailed discussion of how the recommendations of ISG-8 were implemented. Exceptions to some of the recommendations in ISG-8 were necessary (e.g., partial credit for fission products) in order to develop burnup versus enrichment curves that can be practically implemented at the plants. These exceptions are described in Chapter 6.

1.2.3.7.1 Core Operating Parameters[†]

[†] This subsection is included by reference into Appendix A of the CoC.

For burnup credit in the MPC-32, assemblies must meet certain operating limits during their in-core depletion. These limits are listed in Table 1.2.27. For each assembly, the parameters Soluble Boron Concentration (SBC), Specific Power (SP), and Moderator Temperature (MT) must be calculated using the following equations. In these equations, and the symbols used therein, the subscript i denotes the cycle. The summation (\sum) in these equation is to be performed over all cycles i that the assembly was in the core.

Given

B_i Assembly-average burnup
 BC_i Core-average burnup
 SB_i Average In-Core Soluble Boron Concentration
 T_i Length of Cycle
 CIT_i Core Inlet Temperature
 COT_i Core Outlet temperature

the values to compared to the limits in Table 1.2.27 are to be calculated as follows:

Soluble Boron:

$$SB = \sum (SB_i * B_i) / \sum B_i$$

Specific Power:

$$SP = \sum B_i * \sum T_i$$

Moderator Temperature:

$$CFC_i = B_i/BC_i \quad \text{Correction Factor; if } CFC_i < 1 \text{ then set } CFC_i = 1$$

$$MT = \sum (B_i * (CIT_i + CFC_i * (COT_i - CIT_i))) / \sum B_i$$

1.2.3.7.2 Burnup Measurements^{††}

For the MPC-32, the burnup that is used to qualify the assembly by comparison with the limits listed in Table 1.2.34 shall be confirmed by burnup measurements. Two equally acceptable approaches may be used:

- Burnup measurements of every assembly to be loaded. In this case, the measured burnup value is used for comparison with the limit, but shall be reduced by the uncertainty of the burnup measurement.
- Burnup measurements of a representative set of assemblies. In this case, the reactor record burnup value is used for the comparison with the limit, but shall be reduced by the uncertainty of the reactor record burnup value, compared to the measured burnup,

^{††} This subsection is included by reference into Appendix A of the CoC.

combined with the uncertainty of the burnup measurement. The uncertainty of the reactor burnup value shall be determined at a 95 percent confidence level. Burnup measurements from a different plant or different plants may be used if it can be shown that they are applicable to the fuel to be qualified. This applicability review should include a comparison of the fuel type and general core design and operation, and may be supplemented by a small number of confirmatory burnup measurements.

In both cases, the measurement technique may be calibrated to the reactor records for a representative set of assemblies.

1.2.3.7.3 Combined Burnup and Enrichment Curves

In addition to the minimum burnup requirements for the MPC-32 form burnup credit (Table 1.2.34), there are also maximum burnup limits based from the dose rate requirements (Tables 1.2.32 and 1.2.33). As a result, there is an acceptable burnup range for each enrichment. As an example, Figure 1.2.18 shows the lower burnup limits for B&W 15x15 assemblies (solid line), Configuration A, together with the upper burnup limits for assemblies with Zircaloy grid spacers (dashed lines). Acceptable assemblies must have a burnup between these two lines.

1.2.3.8 Non-Fuel Hardware and Neutron Sources

BWR fuel is permitted to be stored with or without Zircaloy channels. Control blades and stainless steel channels are not authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System. Dresden Unit 1 (D-1) neutron sources are authorized for transportation as shown in Tables 1.2.23 and 1.2.24. The D-1 neutron sources are single, long rods containing Sb-Be source material that fits into a water rod location in a D-1 fuel assembly.

Except for Trojan plant fuel, no PWR non-fuel hardware or neutron sources are authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System. For Trojan plant fuel only, the following non-fuel hardware and neutron sources are permitted for transportation in specific quantities as shown in Tables 1.2.25 and 1.2.26:

- Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs) with cladding made of Type 304 stainless steel and Ag-In-Cd neutron absorber material.
- Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs) with cladding made of Type 304 stainless steel and borosilicate glass tube neutron poison material.
- Thimble Plug Devices made of Type 304 stainless steel.
- Neutron source assemblies with cladding made of Type 304 stainless steel - two (2) californium primary source assemblies and four (4) antimony-beryllium secondary source assemblies.

These devices are designed with thin rods of varying length and materials as discussed above, that fit into the fuel assembly guide tubes within the fuel rod lattice. The upper fittings for each

device can vary to accommodate the handling tool (grapple) design. During reactor operation, the positions of the RCCAs are controlled by the operator using the control rod drive system, while the BPRAs, TPDs, and neutron sources stay fully inserted.

A complete list of the authorized non-fuel hardware and neutron sources, including appropriate limits on the characteristics of this material, is provided in Tables 1.2.23 through 1.2.36, as applicable.

1.2.3.9 Summary of Authorized Contents

The criticality safety index for the HI-STAR 100 Package is zero. A fuel assembly is acceptable for transport in a HI-STAR 100 System if it fulfills the following criteria.

- a. It satisfies the physical parameter characteristics listed in Tables 1.2.10 or 1.2.11, as applicable..
- b. It satisfies the cooling time, decay heat, burnup, enrichment, and other limits specified in Tables 1.2.21 through 1.2.36, as applicable.
- c. Deleted.
- d. Deleted.

A damaged fuel assembly shall be transported in a damaged fuel container or other authorized damaged/failed fuel canister, and shall meet the characteristics specified in Tables 1.2.23 through 1.2.26 for transport in the MPC-68, MPC-68F, MPC-24E, or MPC-24EF. Fuel classified as fuel debris shall be placed in a damaged fuel container or other authorized damaged/failed fuel canister and shall meet the characteristics specified in Tables 1.2.24 or 1.2.26 for transport in the MPC-68F or MPC-24EF.

Stainless steel clad fuel assemblies shall meet the characteristics specified in Tables 1.2.22 through 1.2.33 for transport in the MPC-24, MPC-24E, MPC-24EF, or MPC-68.

MOX BWR fuel assemblies shall meet the requirements of Tables 1.2.23 or 1.2.24 for intact and damaged fuel/fuel debris.

Thoria rods placed in Dresden Unit 1 Thoria Rod Canisters meeting the requirements of Table 1.2.21 and Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one Antimony-Beryllium neutron source have been qualified for transport. Up to one Dresden Unit 1 Thoria Rod Canister plus any combination of damaged fuel assemblies in damaged fuel containers and intact fuel, up to a total of 68 may be transported.

Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one Antimony-Beryllium neutron source are authorized for loading in the MPC-68 or MPC-68F.

Table 1.2.2 summarizes the key system data for the HI-STAR 100 System. Table 1.2.3 summarizes the key parameters and limits for the HI-STAR 100 MPCs. Tables 1.2.10, 1.2.11, and 1.2.21 through 1.2.37 and other tables referenced from these tables provide the limiting conditions for all material to be transported in the HI-STAR 100 System.

Table 1.2.1

TABLE INTENTIONALLY DELETED

Table 1.2.2

SUMMARY OF KEY SYSTEM DATA FOR HI-STAR 100

PARAMETER	VALUE (Nominal)	
Types of MPCs in this SAR	6	4 for PWR 2 for BWR
MPC capacity	MPC-24	Up to 24 intact ZR or stainless steel clad PWR fuel assemblies
	MPC-24E	Up to 24 intact ZR or stainless steel clad PWR fuel assemblies. Up to four (4) Trojan plant fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel, each in a Trojan Failed Fuel Can or a Holtec damaged fuel container, and the complement intact fuel assemblies.
	MPC-24EF	Up to 24 intact ZR or stainless steel clad PWR fuel assemblies. Up to four (4) Trojan plant fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel or fuel debris, each in a Trojan Failed Fuel Can or a Holtec damaged fuel container; or other Trojan fuel debris stored in Trojan Process Cans either placed directly into a Trojan Failed Fuel Can or placed inside Trojan Process Can Capsules and then in Trojan Failed Fuel Cans; and the complement intact fuel assemblies.
	MPC-32	Up to 32 intact ZR-clad PWR fuel assemblies.
	MPC-68	Up to 68 intact ZR or stainless steel clad BWR fuel assemblies or damaged ZR clad fuel assemblies* in damaged fuel containers within an MPC-68
	MPC-68F	Up to 4 damaged fuel containers with ZR clad BWR fuel debris* and the complement intact or damaged* ZR clad BWR fuel assemblies within an MPC-68F. *Only damaged fuel and fuel debris from Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay is authorized for transportation in the MPC-68 and MPC-68F.

Table 1.2.3
KEY PARAMETERS FOR HI-STAR 100 MULTI-PURPOSE CANISTERS

PARAMETER	PWR	BWR
Unloaded MPC weight (lb)	See Table 2.2.1	See Table 2.2.1
Minimum neutron absorber ¹⁰ B loading (g/cm ²)	0.0267 (MPC-24) 0.0372 (MPC-24E/EF) 0.0372 (MPC-32)	0.0372 (MPC-68) 0.01 (MPC-68F)
Pre-disposal service life (years)	40	40
Design temperature, max./min. (°F)	725 ^{o†} /-40 ^{o††}	725 ^{o†} /-40 ^{o††}
Design Internal pressure (psig)		
Normal Conditions	100	100
Off-normal Conditions	100	100
Accident Conditions	200	200
Total heat load, max. (kW)	20.0	18.5
Maximum permissible peak fuel cladding temperature (°F)	752 ^o (normal conditions) 1058 ^o (accident conditions)	752 ^o (normal conditions) 1058 ^o (accident conditions)
MPC internal environment Helium filled (psig)	≥ 0 and ≤ 44.8 psig ^{†††} at a reference temperature of 70°F	≥ 0 and ≤ 44.8 psig ^{†††} at a reference temperature of 70°F
MPC external environment/overpack internal environment Helium filled initial pressure (psig, at STP)	≥ 10 and ≤ 14	≥ 10 and ≤ 14
Maximum permissible reactivity including all uncertainty and biases	<0.95	<0.95
End closure(s)	Welded	Welded
Fuel handling	Opening compatible with standard grapples	Opening compatible with standard grapples
Heat dissipation	Passive	Passive

† Maximum normal condition design temperature for the MPC fuel basket. A complete listing of design temperatures for all components is provided in Table 2.1.2

†† Temperature based on minimum ambient temperature (10CFR71.71(c)(2)) and no fuel decay heat load.

††† This value represents the nominal backfill value used in the thermal analysis, plus 2 psig operating tolerance. Based on the MPC pressure results in Table 3.4.15 and the pressure limits specified in Table 2.1.1, there is sufficient analysis margin to accommodate this operating tolerance.

Tables 1.2.4 through 1.2.6
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Table 1.2.7

HI-STAR 100 LOADING OPERATIONS DESCRIPTION

Site-specific handling and operating procedures will be prepared, reviewed, and approved by each owner/user.	
1	Overpack and MPC lowered into the fuel pool without closure plate and MPC lid
2	Fuel assemblies transferred to the MPC fuel basket
3	MPC lid lowered onto the MPC
4	Overpack/MPC assembly moved to the decon pit and MPC lid welded in place, examined, pressure tested, and leak tested
5	MPC dewatered, dried, backfilled with helium, and the vent/drain port cover plates and closure ring welded
6	Overpack drained and external surfaces decontaminated
7	Overpack seals and closure plate installed and bolts pre-tensioned
8	Overpack cavity dried, backfilled with helium, and helium leak tested
9	HI-STAR 100 System transferred to transport bay
10	HI-STAR 100 placed onto transport saddles, tied down, impact limiters and personnel barrier installed, and package surveyed for release for transport.

Table 1.2.8

PWR FUEL ASSEMBLIES EVALUATED TO DETERMINE DESIGN BASIS SNF

Assembly Class	Array Type
B&W 15x15	All
B&W 17x17	All
CE 14x14	All
CE 16x16	All except System 80™
WE 14x14	All
WE 15x15	All
WE 17x17	All
St. Lucie	All
Ft. Calhoun	All
Haddam Neck (Stainless Steel Clad)	All
San Onofre 1 (Stainless Steel Clad, except MOX)	All
Indian Point 1	All

Table 1.2.9

BWR FUEL ASSEMBLIES EVALUATED TO DETERMINE DESIGN BASIS SNF

Assembly Class	Array Type			
GE BWR/2-3	All 7x7	All 8x8	All 9x9	All 10x10
GE BWR/4-6	All 7x7	All 8x8	All 9x9	All 10x10
Humboldt Bay	All 6x6	All 7x7 (Zircaloy Clad)		
Dresden-1	All 6x6	All 8x8		
LaCrosse (Stainless Steel Clad)	All			

Table 1.2.10
PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array/Class	14x14A	14x14B	14x14C	14x14D	14x14E
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	SS	SS
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	≤ 407	≤ 407	≤ 425	≤ 400	≤ 206
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, and 24EF) (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 4.6 (24) ≤ 5.0 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.6 (24) ≤ 5.0 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.6 (24) ≤ 5.0 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.0 (24) ≤ 5.0 (24E/24EF)	≤ 5.0
Initial Enrichment (MPC-32) (wt % ²³⁵ U) (Note 5)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	179	179	176	180	173
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.400	≥ 0.417	≥ 0.440	≥ 0.422	≥ 0.3415
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.3514	≤ 0.3734	≤ 0.3880	≤ 0.3890	≤ 0.3175
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.3444	≤ 0.3659	≤ 0.3805	≤ 0.3835	≤ 0.3130
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.556	≤ 0.556	≤ 0.580	≤ 0.556	Note 6
Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 144	≤ 102
No. of Guide and/or Instrument Tubes	17	17	5 (Note 4)	16	0
Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.017	≥ 0.017	≥ 0.038	≥ 0.0145	N/A

Table 1.2.10 (continued)
PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array/Class	15x15A	15x15B	15x15C	15x15D	15x15E	15x15F
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	≤ 464	≤ 464	≤ 464	≤ 475	≤ 475	≤ 475
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, and 24EF (wt % ²³⁵ U))	≤ 4.1 (24) ≤ 4.5 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.1 (24) ≤ 4.5 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.1 (24) ≤ 4.5 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.1 (24) ≤ 4.5 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.1 (24) ≤ 4.5 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.1 (24) ≤ 4.5 (24E/24EF)
Initial Enrichment (MPC-32) (wt % ²³⁵ U) (Note 5)	N/A	N/A	N/A	(Note 5) ≤ 5.0	(Note 5) ≤ 5.0	(Note 5) ≤ 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	204	204	204	208	208	208
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.418	≥ 0.420	≥ 0.417	≥ 0.430	≥ 0.428	≥ 0.428
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.3660	≤ 0.3736	≤ 0.3640	≤ 0.3800	≤ 0.3790	≤ 0.3820
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.3580	≤ 0.3671	≤ 0.3570	≤ 0.3735	≤ 0.3707	≤ 0.3742
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.550	≤ 0.563	≤ 0.563	≤ 0.568	≤ 0.568	≤ 0.568
Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150
No. of Guide and/or Instrument Tubes	21	21	21	17	17	17
Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.0165	≥ 0.015	≥ 0.0165	≥ 0.0150	≥ 0.0140	≥ 0.0140

Table 1.2.10 (continued)
PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array/Class	15x15G	15x15H	16x16A	17x17A	17x17B	17x17C
Clad Material (Note 2)	SS	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	≤ 420	≤ 475	≤ 443	≤ 467	≤ 467	≤ 474
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, and 24EF) (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 4.0 (24) ≤ 4.5 (24E/24EF)	≤ 3.8 (24) ≤ 4.2 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.6 (24) ≤ 5.0 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.0 (24) ≤ 4.4 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.0 (24) ≤ 4.4 (24E/24EF) (Note 7)	≤ 4.0 (24) ≤ 4.4 (24E/24EF)
Initial Enrichment (MPC-32) (wt % ²³⁵ U) (Note 5)	N/A	(Note 5) ≤ 5.0	N/A	(Note 5) ≤ 5.0	(Note 5) ≤ 5.0	(Note 5) ≤ 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	204	208	236	264	264	264
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.422	≥ 0.414	≥ 0.382	≥ 0.360	≥ 0.372	≥ 0.377
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.3890	≤ 0.3700	≤ 0.3320	≤ 0.3150	≤ 0.3310	≤ 0.3330
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.3825	≤ 0.3622	≤ 0.3255	≤ 0.3088	≤ 0.3232	≤ 0.3252
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≥ 0.563	≥ 0.568	≥ 0.506	≥ 0.496	≥ 0.496	≥ 0.502
Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 144	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150
No. of Guide and/or Instrument Tubes	21	17	5 (Note 4)	25	25	25
Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.0145	≥ 0.0140	≥ 0.0400	≥ 0.016	≥ 0.014	≥ 0.020

Table 1.2.10 (continued)
PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS

Notes:

1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Maximum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.
2. ZR designates any zirconium-based fuel cladding material authorized for use in a commercial power reactor.
3. Design initial uranium weight is the nominal uranium weight specified for each assembly by the fuel manufacturer or reactor user. For each PWR fuel assembly, the total uranium weight limit specified in this table may be increased up to 2.0 percent for comparison with users' fuel records to account for manufacturer's tolerances.
4. Each guide tube replaces four fuel rods.
5. "N/A" means that this array/class is not authorized for transportation in the MPC-32. For authorized array/classes, minimum assembly average burnup and maximum enrichment is required specified in per Table 1.2.34.
6. This fuel assembly array/class includes only the Indian Point Unit 1 fuel assembly. This fuel assembly has two pitches in different sectors of the assembly. These pitches are 0.441 inches and 0.453 inches.
7. Trojan plant-specific fuel is governed by the limits specified for array/class 17x17B and will be transported in the custom-designed Trojan MPC-24E/EF canisters. The Trojan MPC-24E/EF design is authorized to transport only Trojan plant fuel with a maximum initial enrichment of 3.7 wt.% ²³⁵U.

Table 1.2.11
BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array/Class	6x6A	6x6B	6x6C	7x7A	7x7B	8x8A
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	≤ 110	≤ 110	≤ 110	≤ 100	≤ 195	≤ 120
Maximum Planar-Average Initial Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 2.7	≤ 2.7 for the UO ₂ rods. See Note 4 for MOX rods.	≤ 2.7	≤ 2.7	≤ 4.2	≤ 2.7
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 4.0	≤ 4.0	≤ 4.0	≤ 5.5	≤ 5.0	≤ 4.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	35 or 36	35 or 36 (up to 9 MOX rods)	36	49	49	63 or 64
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.5550	≥ 0.5625	≥ 0.5630	≥ 0.4860	≥ 0.5630	≥ 0.4120
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.5105	≤ 0.4945	≤ 0.4990	≤ 0.4204	≤ 0.4990	≤ 0.3620
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.4980	≤ 0.4820	≤ 0.4880	≤ 0.4110	≤ 0.4910	≤ 0.3580
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.710	≤ 0.710	≤ 0.740	≤ 0.631	≤ 0.738	≤ 0.523
Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 120	≤ 120	≤ 77.5	≤ 80	≤ 150	≤ 120
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	1 or 0	1 or 0	0	0	0	1 or 0
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	> 0	> 0	N/A	N/A	N/A	≥ 0
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤ 0.060	≤ 0.060	≤ 0.060	≤ 0.060	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.100

Table 1.2.11 (continued)
BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array/Class	8x8B	8x8C	8x8D	8x8E	8x8F	9x9A
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy) (Note 3)	≤ 185	≤ 185	≤ 185	≤ 185	≤ 185	≤ 177
Maximum Planar-Average Initial Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.0	≤ 4.2
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	63 or 64	62	60 or 61	59	64	74/66 (Note 5)
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.4840	≥ 0.4830	≥ 0.4830	≥ 0.4930	≥ 0.4576	≥ 0.4400
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.4295	≤ 0.4250	≤ 0.4230	≤ 0.4250	≤ 0.3996	≤ 0.3840
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.4195	≤ 0.4160	≤ 0.4140	≤ 0.4160	≤ 0.3913	≤ 0.3760
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.642	≤ 0.641	≤ 0.640	≤ 0.640	≤ 0.609	≤ 0.566
Design Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	1 or 0	2	1 - 4 (Note 7)	5	N/A (Note 12)	2
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.034	> 0.00	> 0.00	≥ 0.034	≥ 0.0315	> 0.00
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.100	≤ 0.055	≤ 0.120

Table 1.2.11 (continued)
BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array/Class	9x9 B	9x9 C	9x9 D	9x9 E (Note 13)	9x9 F (Note 13)	9x9 G
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	≤ 177	≤ 177	≤ 177	≤ 177	≤ 177	≤ 177
Maximum Planar-Average Initial Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.0	≤ 4.0	≤ 4.2
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	72	80	79	76	76	72
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.4330	≥ 0.4230	≥ 0.4240	≥ 0.4170	≥ 0.4430	≥ 0.4240
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.3810	≤ 0.3640	≤ 0.3640	≤ 0.3640	≤ 0.3860	≤ 0.3640
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.3740	≤ 0.3565	≤ 0.3565	≤ 0.3530	≤ 0.3745	≤ 0.3565
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.572	≤ 0.572	≤ 0.572	≤ 0.572	≤ 0.572	≤ 0.572
Design Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	1 (Note 6)	1	2	5	5	1 (Note 6)
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	> 0.00	≥ 0.020	≥ 0.0300	≥ 0.0120	≥ 0.0120	≥ 0.0320
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.100	≤ 0.100	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120

Table 1.2.11 (continued)
BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array/Class	10x10 A	10x10 B	10x10 C	10x10 D	10x10 E
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	SS	SS
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	≤ 186	≤ 186	≤ 186	≤ 125	≤ 125
Maximum Planar-Average Initial Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.2	≤ 4.0	≤ 4.0
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt % ²³⁵ U)	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	92/78 (Note 8)	91/83 (Note 9)	96	100	96
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.4040	≥ 0.3957	≥ 0.3780	≥ 0.3960	≥ 0.3940
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.3520	≤ 0.3480	≤ 0.3294	≤ 0.3560	≤ 0.3500
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.3455	≤ 0.3420	≤ 0.3224	≤ 0.3500	≤ 0.3430
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.510	≤ 0.510	≤ 0.488	≤ 0.565	≤ 0.557
Design Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	≤ 83	≤ 83
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	2	1 (Note 6)	5 (Note 10)	0	4
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.030	> 0.00	≥ 0.031	N/A	≥ 0.022
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.055	≤ 0.080	≤ 0.080

Table 1.2.11 (continued)
BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS

NOTES:

1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Maximum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.
2. ZR designates any zirconium-based fuel cladding material authorized for use in a commercial power reactor.
3. Design initial uranium weight is the nominal uranium weight specified for each assembly by the fuel manufacturer or reactor user. For each BWR fuel assembly, the total uranium weight limit specified in this table may be increased up to 1.5 percent for comparison with users' fuel records to account for manufacturer tolerances.
4. ≤ 0.635 wt. % ^{235}U and ≤ 1.578 wt. % total fissile plutonium (^{239}Pu and ^{241}Pu), (wt. % of total fuel weight, i.e., UO_2 plus PuO_2).
5. This assembly class contains 74 total rods; 66 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.
6. Square, replacing nine fuel rods.
7. Variable.
8. This assembly contains 92 total fuel rods; 78 full length rods and 14 partial length rods.
9. This assembly class contains 91 total fuel rods; 83 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.
10. One diamond-shaped water rod replacing the four center fuel rods and four rectangular water rods dividing the assembly into four quadrants.
11. These rods may also be sealed at both ends and contain ZR material in lieu of water.
12. This assembly is known as "QUAD+." It has four rectangular water cross segments dividing the assembly into four quadrants.
13. For the SPC 9x9-5 fuel assembly, each fuel rod must meet either the 9x9E or the 9x9F set of limits or clad O.D., clad I.D., and pellet diameter.

Table 1.2.12

DESIGN BASIS FUEL ASSEMBLY FOR EACH DESIGN CRITERION

Criterion	MPC-68/68F	MPC-24/24E/24EF/32
Reactivity	SPC 9x9-5 (Array/Class 9x9E/F)	B&W 15x15 (Array/Class 15x15F)
Shielding (Source Term)	GE 7x7	B&W 15x15
Fuel Assembly Effective Planar Thermal Conductivity	GE 11 9x9	<u>W</u> 17x17 OFA
Fuel Basket Effective Axial Thermal Conductivity	GE 7x7	<u>W</u> 14x14 OFA
MPC Density and heat Capacity	GE 7x7	<u>W</u> 14x14 OFA

Tables 1.2.13 and 1.2.14

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Table 1.2.15

NORMALIZED DISTRIBUTION BASED ON BURNUP PROFILE

GENERIC FUEL DISTRIBUTION[†]			
Interval	Axial Distance From Bottom of Active Fuel (% of Active Fuel Length)	PWR Fuel Normalized Distribution	BWR Fuel Normalized Distribution
1	0% to 4-1/6%	0.5485	0.2200
2	4-1/6% to 8-1/3%	0.8477	0.7600
3	8-1/3% to 16-2/3%	1.0770	1.0350
4	16-2/3% to 33-1/3%	1.1050	1.1675
5	33-1/3% to 50%	1.0980	1.1950
6	50% to 66-2/3%	1.0790	1.1625
7	66-2/3% to 83-1/3%	1.0501	1.0725
8	83-1/3% to 91-2/3%	0.9604	0.8650
9	91-2/3% to 95-5/6%	0.7338	0.6200
10	95-5/6% to 100%	0.4670	0.2200
TROJAN PLANT FUEL DISTRIBUTION^{††}			
Interval	Axial Distance From Bottom of Active Fuel (% of Active Fuel Length)	Normalized Distribution	
1	0% to 5%	0.59	
2	5% to 10%	0.89	
3	10% to 15%	1.03	
4	15% to 20%	1.07	
5	20% to 25%	1.09	
6	25% to 45%	1.10	
7	45% to 70%	1.09	
8	70% to 75%	1.07	
9	75% to 80%	1.05	
10	80% to 85%	1.02	
11	85% to 90%	0.96	
12	90% to 95 %	0.82	
13	95% to 100%	0.56	

[†] References [1.2.8] and [1.2.9]

^{††} Reference [1.2.12]

Table 1.2.16

SUGGESTED PWR UPPER AND LOWER FUEL SPACER LENGTHS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Type	Assembly Length w/o NFH[†] (in.)	Location of Active Fuel from Bottom (in.)	Max. Active Fuel Length (in.)	Upper Fuel Spacer Length (in.)	Lower Fuel Spacer Length (in.)
CE 14x14	157	4.1	137	9.5	10
CE 16x16	176.8	4.7	150	0	0
BW 15x15	165.7	8.4	141.8	6.7	4.1
W 17x17 OFA	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
W 17x17S	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
W 17x17V5H	160.1	3.7	144	7.9	8.5
W 15x15	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
W 14x14S	159.8	3.7	145.2	9.2	7.5
W 14x14 OFA	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
Ft. Calhoun	146	6.6	128	10.25	20.25
St. Lucie 2	158.2	5.2	136.7	10.25	8.05
B&W 15x15 SS	137.1	3.873	120.5	19.25	19.25
W 15x15 SS	137.1	3.7	122	19.25	19.25
W 14x14 SS	137.1	3.7	120	19.25	19.25
Indian Point 1	137.2	17.705	101.5	18.75	20.0

Notes: 1. These fuel spacer lengths are not applicable to Trojan plant fuel. Trojan plant fuel spacer lengths are determined uniquely for the custom-designed Trojan MPC-24E/EF, as necessary, based on the presence of non-fuel hardware. They are sized to maintain the active fuel within the envelope of the neutron absorber affixed to the cell walls and allow for an approximate 2-inch gap between the fuel and the MPC lid. See Chapter 6 for discussion of potential misalignments between the active fuel and the neutron absorber.

[†] NFH is an abbreviation for non-fuel hardware, including control components. Fuel assemblies with control components may require shorter fuel spacers.

Table 1.2.17

SUGGESTED BWR UPPER AND LOWER FUEL SPACER LENGTHS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Type	Assembly Length (in.)	Location of Active Fuel from Bottom (in.)	Max. Active Fuel Length (in.)	Upper Fuel Spacer Length (in.)	Lower Fuel Spacer Length (in.)
GE/2-3	171.2	7.3	150	4.8	0
GE/4-6	176.2	7.3	150	0	0
Dresden 1	134.4	11.2	110	18	28.0
Humboldt Bay	95	8	79	40.5	40.5
Dresden 1 Damaged Fuel or Fuel Debris	142.1 [†]	11.2	110	17	16.9
Humboldt Bay Damaged Fuel or Fuel Debris	105.5 [†]	8	79	35.25	35.25
LaCrosse	102.5	10.5	83	37	37.5

Notes: 1. Each user shall specify the fuel spacer lengths based on their fuel length and allowing an approximate 2-inch gap between the fuel and the MPC lid. See Chapter 6 for discussion of potential misalignments between the active fuel and the neutron absorber.

[†] Fuel length includes the damaged fuel container.

Aspect of Post-Accident Performance	Results with Demonstrated Integrity of MPC Enclosure Vessel	Results with Postulated Gross Failure of MPC Enclosure Vessel
Containment Boundary Integrity	The MPC enclosure vessel is leak tested to 5.0×10^{-6} atm cm ³ /s (helium). The overpack containment boundary is standard air leak tested to 4.3×10^{-6} atm cm ³ /s (helium). Both boundaries are shown to withstand all hypothetical accident conditions. Therefore, there will be no detectable release of radioactive materials.	The overpack containment boundary is leak tested to 4.3×10^{-6} atm cm ³ /s (helium). The overpack containment boundary is shown to withstand all hypothetical accident conditions. Therefore, the overpack containment boundary meets the accident condition leakage rates.
Maintenance of Subcritical Margins (Maximum k_{eff})	The MPC enclosure vessel is seal welded and there is no breach of the MPC. The bolted closure overpack containment boundary has been shown to prevent water immersion. Therefore, the maximum reactivity of the fuel in a dry MPC is less than 0.5.	The bolted closure overpack containment boundary has been shown to prevent water immersion. Therefore, the maximum reactivity of the fuel in a dry MPC is less than 0.5. Assuming the MPC is fully flooded with water, the reactivity is shown to be below the regulatory requirement of 0.95 including uncertainties and bias.
Adequate Shielding	The MPC enclosure vessel boundary has no effect on the dose rates of the HI-STAR 100 System.	Failure of the MPC enclosure vessel to maintain a release boundary has no effect on the dose rates of the HI-STAR 100 System.
Adequate Heat Rejection (Peak Fuel Cladding Temperature)	The MPC enclosure vessel maintains the helium and the peak fuel cladding temperature is demonstrated to remain below 800°F in the post-fire hypothetical accident condition.	<p>Assuming the MPC internal helium fill pressure is released into the overpack containment, the pressure within the small annulus would rise to equalize with the MPC internal pressure. There would be a corresponding slight pressure decrease in the MPC enclosure vessel. The comparatively small volume of the annulus and pressure differential results in the slight pressure change. This will have a negligibly small effect on the peak fuel cladding temperature.</p> <p>The overpack containment boundary is demonstrated to withstand all hypothetical accident conditions. Therefore, there is no credible mechanism for the release of the helium.</p>

Tables 1.2.19 and 1.2.20
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Table 1.2.21

DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS FOR THORIA RODS IN D-1 THORIA ROD CANISTERS

PARAMETER	MPC-68 or MPC-68F
Cladding Type	ZR
Composition	98.2 wt.% ThO ₂ , 1.8 wt.% UO ₂ with an enrichment of 93.5 wt. % ²³⁵ U
Number of Rods Per Thoria Canister	≤ 18
Decay Heat Per Thoria Canister	≤ 115 watts
Post-Irradiation Fuel Cooling Time and Average Burnup Per Thoria Canister	Cooling time ≥ 18 years and average burnup ≤ 16,000 MWD/MTIHM
Initial Heavy Metal Weight	≤ 27 kg/canister
Fuel Cladding O.D.	≥ 0.412 inches
Fuel Cladding I.D.	≤ 0.362 inches
Fuel Pellet O.D.	≤ 0.358 inches
Active Fuel Length	≤ 111 inches
Canister Weight	≤ 550 lbs., including Thoria Rods
Canister Material	Type 304 SS

Table 1.2.22

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-24

PARAMETER	VALUE
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide, PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class
Maximum Initial Enrichment	As specified in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Table 1.2.28 or Table 1.2.29, as applicable SS clad: As specified in Table 1.2.30
Decay Heat Per Assembly	ZR clad: ≤ 833 Watts SS clad: ≤ 488 Watts
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 176.8 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 8.54 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	$\leq 1,680$ lbs
Other Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity is limited to up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies. ▪ Non-fuel hardware and neutron sources not permitted. ▪ Damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris not permitted. ▪ Trojan plant fuel not permitted.

Table 1.2.23

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-68

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)			
Fuel Type(s)	Uranium oxide, BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for the applicable array/class, with or without Zircaloy channels	Uranium oxide, BWR damaged fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, or 8x8A, with or without Zircaloy channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers(DFCs)	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B, with or without Zircaloy channels	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR damaged fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B, with or without Zircaloy channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFCs)
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 1.2.11 for the applicable array/class	ZR	ZR	ZR
Maximum Initial Planar-Average and Rod Enrichment	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Table 1.2.31 except as provided in Notes 2 and 3 SS clad: Note 4	Cooling time ≥ 18 years, average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTU, and minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .	Cooling time ≥ 18 years, average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTIH M, and minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .	Cooling time ≥ 18 years, average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTIHM, and minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .
Decay Heat Per Assembly	ZR clad: ≤ 272 Watts (Note 5) SS clad: ≤ 83 Watts	≤ 115 Watts	≤ 115 Watts	≤ 115 Watts

Table 1.2.23 (cont'd)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-68

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)			
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 176.2 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 5.85 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 700 lbs (including channels)	≤ 550 lbs, (including channels and DFC)	≤ 400 lbs, (including channels)	≤ 550 lbs, (including channels and DFC)
Quantity per MPC	Up to 68 BWR intact fuel assemblies	Up to 68 BWR damaged and/or intact fuel assemblies	Up to 68 BWR intact fuel assemblies	Up to 68 BWR damaged and/or intact fuel assemblies
Other Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity is limited to up to one (1) Dresden Unit 1 thoria rod canister meeting the specifications listed in Table 1.2.21 plus any combination of Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs and intact fuel assemblies up to a total of 68. ▪ Stainless steel channels are not permitted. ▪ Fuel debris is not permitted. ▪ Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one antimony-beryllium neutron source are permitted. The antimony-beryllium neutron source material shall be in a water rod location. 			

Notes:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for transportation.
2. Array/class 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time ≥ 18 years, an average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTU, and a minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .
3. Array/class 8x8F fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time ≥ 10 years, an average burnup $\leq 27,500$ MWD/MTU, and a minimum initial enrichment ≥ 2.4 wt. % ^{235}U .
4. SS-clad fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time ≥ 16 years, an average burnup $\leq 22,500$ MWD/MTU, and a minimum initial enrichment ≥ 3.5 wt. % ^{235}U .
5. Array/class 8x8F fuel assemblies shall have a decay heat ≤ 183.5 Watts.

Table 1.2.24

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-68F

PARAMETER	VALUE (Notes 1 and 2)			
Fuel Type(s)	Uranium oxide, BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, or 8x8A, with or without Zircaloy channels	Uranium oxide, BWR damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, or 8x8A, with or without Zircaloy channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers(DFCs)	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B, with or without Zircaloy channels	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris meeting the limits in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B, with or without Zircaloy channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFCs))
Cladding Type	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Maximum Initial Planar-Average and Rod Enrichment	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B	As specified in Table 1.2.11 for array/class 6x6B
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	Cooling time ≥ 18 years, average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTU, and minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .	Cooling time ≥ 18 years, average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTU, and minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .	Cooling time ≥ 18 years, average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTIH M, and minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .	Cooling time ≥ 18 years, average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTIHM, and minimum initial enrichment ≥ 1.8 wt. % ^{235}U .
Decay Heat Per Assembly	≤ 115 Watts	≤ 115 Watts	≤ 115 Watts	≤ 115 Watts

Table 1.2.24 (cont'd)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-68F

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)			
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 400 lbs (including channels)	≤ 550 lbs (including channels and DFC)	≤ 400 lbs (including channels)	≤ 550 lbs (including channels and DFC)
Other Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity is limited to up to four (4) DFCs containing Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay uranium oxide or MOX fuel debris. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with array/class 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A fuel assemblies of the following type, as applicable: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - uranium oxide BWR intact fuel assemblies - MOX BWR intact fuel assemblies - uranium oxide BWR damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs - MOX BWR damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs - up to one (1) Dresden Unit 1 thoria rod canister meeting the specifications listed in Table 1.2.21 ▪ Stainless steel channels are not permitted. ▪ Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one antimony-beryllium neutron source are permitted. The antimony-beryllium neutron source material shall be in a water rod location. 			

Notes:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for transportation.
2. Only fuel from Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay plant are permitted for transportation in the MPC-68F.

Table 1.2.25

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-24E

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)	
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class	Trojan plant damaged fuel meeting the limits in Table 1.2.10 for array/class 17x17B, placed in a Holtec Damaged Fuel Container (DFC) designed for Trojan plant fuel or a Trojan Failed Fuel Can (FFC)
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class	ZR
Maximum Initial Enrichment	As specified in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class	3.7 wt. % ²³⁵ U
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly (except Trojan plant fuel and non-fuel hardware)	ZR clad: As specified in Table 1.2.28 or 1.2.29, as applicable SS clad: As specified in Table 1.2.30	Not applicable
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly for Trojan plant fuel	As specified in Table 1.2.35	As specified in Table 1.2.35
Post-irradiation Cooling Time and Burnup for Trojan plant Non-fuel Hardware and Neutron Sources	As specified in Table 1.2.36	Not applicable
Decay Heat Per Assembly (except for Trojan plant fuel)	ZR clad: ≤ 833 Watts SS clad: ≤ 488 Watts	Not applicable
Decay heat per Assembly for Trojan plant fuel	≤ 725 Watts	≤ 725 Watts

Table 1.2.25 (cont'd)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-24E

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)	
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 176.8 in. (nominal design)	≤ 169.3 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 8.54 in. (nominal design)	≤ 8.43 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 1680 lbs (including non-fuel hardware)	≤ 1680 lbs (including DFC or Failed Fuel Can)
Other Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity per MPC: up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies. For Trojan plant fuel only, up to four (4) damaged fuel assemblies may be stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19, and/or 22. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with Trojan plant intact fuel assemblies. ▪ Trojan plant fuel must be transported in the custom-designed Trojan MPCs with the MPC spacer installed (see Figure 1.1.5). Fuel from other plants is not permitted to be transported in the Trojan MPCs. ▪ Except for Trojan plant fuel, the fuel assemblies shall not contain non-fuel hardware. Trojan intact fuel assemblies containing non-fuel hardware may be transported in any fuel storage location. ▪ Trojan plant damaged fuel assemblies must be transported in a Holtec DFC for Trojan plant fuel or a Trojan plant FFC. ▪ One (1) Trojan plant Sb-Be and/or two (2) Cf neutron sources, each in a Trojan plant intact fuel assembly may be transported in any one MPC. Each neutron source may be transported in any fuel storage location. ▪ Fuel debris is not authorized for transportation in the MPC-24E. ▪ Trojan plant non-fuel hardware and neutron sources may not be transported in the same fuel storage location with damaged fuel assemblies. 	

Notes:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for transportation.

Table 1.2.26

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-24EF

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)		
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class	Trojan plant damaged fuel meeting the limits in Table 1.2.10 for array/class 17x17B, placed in a Holtec Damaged Fuel Container (DFC) designed for Trojan plant fuel or a Trojan Failed Fuel Can (FFC)	Trojan plant Fuel Debris Process Can Capsules and/or Trojan plant fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris, for which the original fuel assemblies meet the applicable criteria in Table 1.2.10 for array/class 17x17B, placed in a Holtec Damaged Fuel Container (DFC) designed for Trojan plant fuel or a Trojan Failed Fuel Can (FFC)
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class	ZR	ZR
Maximum Initial Enrichment	As specified in Table 1.2.10 for the applicable array/class	≤ 3.7 wt. % ^{235}U	≤ 3.7 wt. % ^{235}U
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly (except Trojan plant fuel and non-fuel hardware)	ZR clad: As specified in Table 1.2.28 or 1.2.29, as applicable SS clad: As specified in Table 1.2.30	Not applicable	Not applicable
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly for Trojan plant fuel	As specified in Table 1.2.35	As specified in Table 1.2.35	As specified in Table 1.2.35

Table 1.2.26 (cont'd)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-24EF

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)		
Post-irradiation Cooling Time and Burnup for Trojan plant Non-fuel Hardware and Neutron Sources	As specified in Table 1.2.36	As specified in Table 1.2.36	As specified in Table 1.2.36
Decay Heat Per Assembly (except for Trojan plant fuel)	ZR clad: ≤ 833 Watts SS clad: ≤ 488 Watts	Not applicable	Not applicable
Decay heat per Assembly for Trojan plant fuel	≤ 725 Watts	≤ 725 Watts	≤ 725 Watts
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 176.8 in. (nominal design)	≤ 169.3 in. (nominal design)	≤ 169.3 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 8.54 in. (nominal design)	≤ 8.43 in. (nominal design)	≤ 8.43 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 1680 lbs (including non-fuel hardware)	≤ 1680 lbs (including DFC or Failed Fuel Can)	≤ 1680 lbs (including DFC or Failed Fuel Can)

Table 1.2.26 (cont'd)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-24EF

<p>Other Limitations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quantity per MPC: Up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies. For Trojan plant fuel only, up to four (4) damaged fuel assemblies, fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris, and/or Trojan Fuel Debris Process Can Capsules may be stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19, and/or 22. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with Trojan plant intact fuel assemblies. ▪ Trojan plant fuel must be transported in the custom-designed Trojan MPCs with the MPC spacer installed (see Figure 1.1.5). Fuel from other plants is not permitted to be transported in the Trojan MPCs. ▪ Except for Trojan plant fuel, the fuel assemblies shall not contain non-fuel hardware or neutron sources. Trojan intact fuel assemblies containing non-fuel hardware may be transported in any fuel storage location. ▪ Trojan plant damaged fuel assemblies, fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris, and Fuel Debris Process Can Capsules must be transported in a Trojan Failed Fuel Can or a Holtec DFC for Trojan plant fuel. ▪ One (1) Trojan plant Sb-Be and/or two (2) Cf neutron sources, each in a Trojan plant intact fuel assembly may be transported in any one MPC. Each neutron source may be transported in any fuel storage location.
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Notes:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for transportation.

Table 1.2.27

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-32 (Note 1)

PARAMETER	VALUE
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide, PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 1.2.10 for array/classes 15x15D, E, F, and H and 17x17A, B, and C
Cladding Type	ZR
Maximum Initial Enrichment	As specified in Table 1.2.10
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	As specified in Table 1.2.32 or Table 1.2.33, as applicable
Decay Heat Per Assembly	≤ 625 Watts
Minimum Burnup per Assembly	As specified in Table 1.2.34 for the applicable array/class
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 176.8 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 8.54 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	$\leq 1,680$ lbs
Operating Parameters During Irradiation of the Assembly (See Subsection 1.2.3.7.1)	
Average in-core soluble boron concentration	≤ 1000 ppmb
Average Core outlet water temperature	≤ 601 K for array/classes 15x15D, E, F and H ≤ 610 K for array/classes 17x17A, B and C
Average Specific Power	≤ 47.36 kW/kg-U for array/classes 15x15D, E, F and H ≤ 61.61 kW/kg-U for array/classes 17x17A, B and C

Table 1.2.27 (continued)

LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE TRANSPORTED IN MPC-32

Other Limitations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Quantity is limited to up to 32 PWR intact fuel assemblies in the above-specified array/classes only.▪ Non-fuel hardware and neutron sources not permitted.▪ Damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris not permitted.▪ Trojan plant fuel not permitted.
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NOTES:

~~1. The MPC-32 is not authorized for transportation in the HI-STAR-100 System at this time.~~

Table 1.2.28

FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING, AVERAGE BURNUP, AND MINIMUM ENRICHMENT LIMITS FOR TRANSPORTATION IN MPC-24/24E/24EF; PWR FUEL WITH ZR CLADDING AND WITH NON-ZIRCALOY IN-CORE GRID SPACERS

ASSEMBLY POST-IRRADIATION COOLING TIME (years)	ASSEMBLY BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	ASSEMBLY ENRICHMENT (wt. % ²³⁵U)
≥ 9	≤ 24,500	≥ 2.3
≥ 11	≤ 29,500	≥ 2.6
≥ 13	≤ 34,500	≥ 2.9
≥ 15	≤ 39,500	≥ 3.2
≥ 18	≤ 44,500	≥ 3.4

Table 1.2.29

FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING, AVERAGE BURNUP, AND MINIMUM ENRICHMENT LIMITS FOR TRANSPORTATION IN MPC-24/24E/24EF;PWR FUEL WITH ZR CLADDING AND WITH ZIRCALOY IN-CORE GRID SPACERS

ASSEMBLY POST-IRRADIATION COOLING TIME (years)	ASSEMBLY BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	ASSEMBLY ENRICHMENT (wt. % ²³⁵U)
≥ 6	≤ 24,500	≥ 2.3
≥ 7	≤ 29,500	≥ 2.6
≥ 9	≤ 34,500	≥ 2.9
≥ 11	≤ 39,500	≥ 3.2
≥ 14	≤ 44,500	≥ 3.4

Table 1.2.30

FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING, AVERAGE BURNUP, AND MINIMUM ENRICHMENT
LIMITS FOR TRANSPORTATION IN MPC-24/24E/24EF; PWR FUEL WITH
STAINLESS STEEL CLADDING

ASSEMBLY POST-IRRADIATION COOLING TIME (years)	ASSEMBLY BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	ASSEMBLY ENRICHMENT (wt. % ²³⁵ U)
≥ 19	≤ 30,000	≥ 3.1
≥ 24	≤ 40,000	≥ 3.1

Table 1.2.31

FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING, AVERAGE BURNUP, AND MINIMUM ENRICHMENT
LIMITS FOR TRANSPORTATION IN MPC-68

ASSEMBLY POST-IRRADIATION COOLING TIME (years)	ASSEMBLY BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	ASSEMBLY ENRICHMENT (wt. % ²³⁵U)
≥ 8	≤ 24,500	≥ 2.1
≥ 9	≤ 29,500	≥ 2.4
≥ 11	≤ 34,500	≥ 2.6
≥ 14	≤ 39,500	≥ 2.9
≥ 19	≤ 44,500	≥ 3.0

Table 1.2.32

FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING, AVERAGE BURNUP, AND MINIMUM ENRICHMENT LIMITS FOR TRANSPORTATION IN MPC-32; PWR FUEL WITH ZR CLADDING AND WITH NON-ZIRCALOY IN-CORE GRID SPACERS (Note 1)

ASSEMBLY POST-IRRADIATION COOLING TIME (years)	ASSEMBLY BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	ASSEMBLY ENRICHMENT (wt. % ²³⁵ U)
≥ 12	≤ 24,500	≥ 2.3
≥ 14	≤ 29,500	≥ 2.6
≥ 16	≤ 34,500	≥ 2.9
≥ 19	≤ 39,500	≥ 3.2
≥ 20	≤ 42,500	≥ 3.4

NOTES:

- ~~MPC-32 is not authorized for transportation at this time.~~

Table 1.2.33

FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING, AVERAGE BURNUP, AND MINIMUM ENRICHMENT LIMITS FOR TRANSPORTATION IN MPC-32; PWR FUEL WITH ZR CLADDING AND WITH ZIRCALOY IN-CORE GRID SPACERS (Note 1)

ASSEMBLY POST-IRRADIATION COOLING TIME (years)	ASSEMBLY BURNUP (MWD/MTU)	ASSEMBLY ENRICHMENT (wt. % ²³⁵ U)
≥ 8	≤ 24,500	≥ 2.3
≥ 9	≤ 29,500	≥ 2.6
≥ 12	≤ 34,500	≥ 2.9
≥ 14	≤ 39,500	≥ 3.2
≥ 19	≤ 44,500	≥ 3.4

NOTES:

- ~~MPC-32 is not authorized for transportation at this time.~~

Table 1.2.34

FUEL ASSEMBLY **MAXIMUM ENRICHMENT AND MINIMUM BURNUP**
REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSPORTATION IN MPC-32

(Note 1)

FUEL ASSEMBLY ARRAY/CLASS	Con-figuration (Note 2)	Maximum Enrichment (wt% ²³⁵U)	MINIMUM BURNUP (B) AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL ENRICHMENT (E) (Note 1) (GWD/MTU)
15x15D, E, F, H	A	4.79	$B = +(1.6733) * E^3 -(18.72) * E^2 +(80.5967) * E -88.3$
	B	4.54	$B = +(2.175) * E^3 -(23.355) * E^2 +(94.77) * E -99.95$
	C	4.64	$B = +(1.9517) * E^3 -(21.45) * E^2 +(89.1783) * E -94.6$
	D	4.59	$B = +(1.93) * E^3 -(21.095) * E^2 +(87.785) * E -93.06$
17x17A, B, C	A	4.70	$B = +(1.08) * E^3 -(12.25) * E^2 +(60.13) * E -70.86$
	B	4.31	$B = +(1.1) * E^3 -(11.56) * E^2 +(56.6) * E -62.59$
	C	4.45	$B = +(1.36) * E^3 -(14.83) * E^2 +(67.27) * E -72.93$
	D	4.38	$B = +(1.4917) * E^3 -(16.26) * E^2 +(72.9883) * E -79.7$

Notes:

~~1. MPC 32 is not authorized for transportation at this time.~~

21. E = Initial enrichment ~~from the fuel vendor's data sheet~~, i.e., for 4.05wt. %, E = 4.05.

2. See Table 1.2.37

Table 1.2.35

TROJAN PLANT FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING, AVERAGE BURNUP, AND MINIMUM ENRICHMENT LIMITS (Note 1)

Post-irradiation Cooling Time (years)	Assembly Burnup (MWD/MTU)	Assembly Minimum Enrichment (wt. % ²³⁵U)
≥ 16	≤ 42,000	≥ 3.09
≥ 16	≤ 37,500	≥ 2.6
≥ 16	≤ 30,000	≥ 2.1

Notes:

1. Each fuel assembly must only meet one set of limits (i.e., one row).

Table 1.2.36

TROJAN PLANT NON-FUEL HARDWARE AND NEUTRON SOURCE COOLING AND BURNUP LIMITS

Type Of Hardware or Neutron Source	Burnup (MWD/MTU)	Post-irradiation Cooling Time (years)
BPRAs	$\leq 15,998$	≥ 24
TPDs	$\leq 118,674$	≥ 11
RCCAs	$\leq 125,515$	≥ 9
Cf neutron source	$\leq 15,998$	≥ 24
Sb-Be neutron source with 4 source rods, 16 burnable poison rods, and 4 thimble plug rods	$\leq 45,361$	≥ 19
Sb-Be neutron source with 4 source rods and 20 thimble plug rods	$\leq 88,547$	≥ 9

Table 1.2.37

~~SOLUBLE BORON REQUIREMENTS FOR MPC-32
WET LOADING AND UNLOADING OPERATIONS~~ **LOADING CONFIGURATIONS FOR
THE MPC-32**

Configuration FUEL ASSEMBLY INITIAL ENRICHMENT (wt. % ²³⁵U)	Assembly Specifications REQUIRED SOLUBLE BORON IN MPC WATER (ppmb)
A All fuel assemblies ≤ 4.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Assemblies that have not been located in any cycle under a control rod bank that was permitted to be inserted during full power operation (per plant operating procedures); or ○ Assemblies that have been located under a control rod bank that was permitted to be inserted during full power operation (per plant operating procedures), but where it can be demonstrated, based on operating records, that the insertion never exceeded 8 inches from the top of the active length during full power operation. ≥ 1900
B One or more fuel assemblies > 4.1 and ≤ 5.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Of the 32 assemblies in a basket, up to 8 assemblies can be from core locations where they were located under a control rod bank, that was permitted to be inserted more than 8 inches during full power operation. There is no limit on the duration (in terms of burnup) under this bank. ○ The remaining assemblies in the basket must satisfy the same conditions as specified for configuration A. ≥ 2600
C	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Of the 32 assemblies in a basket, up to 8 assemblies can be from core locations where they were located under a control rod bank, that was permitted to be inserted more than 8 inches during full power operation. Location under such a control rod bank is limited to 20 GWd/mtU of the assembly. ○ The remaining assemblies in the basket must satisfy the same conditions as specified for configuration A.
D	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Of the 32 assemblies in a basket, up to 8 assemblies can be from core locations where they were located under a control rod bank, that was permitted to be inserted more than 8 inches during full power operation. Location under such a control rod bank is limited to 30 GWd/mtU of the assembly. ○ The remaining assemblies in the basket must satisfy the same conditions as specified for configuration A.

Combined Curves B&W 15x15 Assemblies




Figure 1.2.18; Combined Burnup and Enrichment Requirements for B&W 15x15 Fuel in the MPC-32