1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3	+ + + .+ +
4	OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
5	INTERVIEW
6	x
7	IN THE MATTER OF: :Docket No.
8	INTERVIEW OF : (not provided)
9	BILL WHITE :
10	(CLOSED) :
11	х
12	Friday, August 27, 2004
13	
14	1 <sup>st</sup> Floor Conference Room
15	TB-2 Building
16	Salem Hope Creek
17	Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
18	
19	The above-entitled interview was conducted
20	at 10:08 a.m.
21	
22	BEFORE:
23	Senior Special Agent JEFFREY TEATOR
24	nation in this record was deleted
715 <b>a</b> q	ordance with the Freedom of Information
FOLA	O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
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#### P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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2	10:08 a.m.
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Today's date is
4	August 27, the year is 2004. My name is Jeffrey
5	Teator, I'm a Senior Special Agent with the United
6	States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of
7	Investigations.
8	This morning I'm interviewing Mr. Bill
9	White. It's approximately 10:08 on Friday morning and
10	the interview is taking place in the 1 <sup>st</sup> floor
11	conference room in the TB-2 Building at Salem Hope
12	Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Hancocks Bridge, New
13	Jersey.
14	Mr. White, prior to going on the record,
15	did I present you with my credentials?
16	MR. WHITE: Yes you did.
17	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And this is a
18	voluntary interview today. Knowing it's voluntary, do
19	you wish to go forward?
20	MR. WHITE: I understand it's voluntary
21	and I have no problem with going forward.
22	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Thank
23	you. Do you have any objection this morning to
24	providing sworn testimony?
J	

MR. WHITE: No I do not.

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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would you 1 raise your right hand for me, please? Bill White, do 2 you swear that the information that you are about to 3 provide to me is the truth, the whole truth and 4 5 nothing but the truth? 6 MR. WHITE: I do. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 7 Thanks. White, you are being interviewed this morning as a 8 witness in an investigation I'm conducting into the 9 closing of the 22MS42 valve at Salem, and the event 10 occurred on September 21, 2002. You were the control 11 room supervisor on duty that night, is that correct? 12 That is correct, yes. 13 MR. WHITE: 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And as the CRS, 15 what were your responsibilities? MR. WHITE: Well, my responsibilities was 16 17 for direct command and control of the Salem Unit 2, in this case the valve was in Salem Unit 2, and so that 18 was my responsibility that night and I was in charge. 19 As a matter of fact, I had just briefed the shutdown 20 21 I think when the valve got closed. 22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. We're going to come back to that, again I just wanted 23 to get what your job title was and your responsibility 24

on the record.

So I think he might have been one of the, to

NOSF.

1	terr you the truth I don't remember who. I guess I
2	could have gone back and looked, I don't remember who
3	the RO and PO were that night.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. PO
5	would be plant operator?
6	MR. WHITE: Plant operator, right. Right,
7	reactor operator and plant operator is the separate
8	watch stations. I don't remember who was who. I'm
9	pretty sure Rick was one of the guys, he's one of the
10	Bravo shift guys that usually he worked directly for
11	me.
12	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Your normal
13	shift manager was Van Ford then?
14	MR. WHITE: Right.
15	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And Rick was
16	one of the normal ROs working under you at that time?
17	MR. WHITE: Right. Well he kind of
18	reported, you know, our chain of command he reported
19	to me directly, he just happened to be working in our
20	unit that night, I know him very well since I've
21	well he's RO over the last several years.
22	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The control
23	rooms are shared, Salem 1 and 2, is that correct?
24	MR. WHITE: That's correct.
25	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is there a CRS
	1

1	also on the Unit 2 side?
2	MR. WHITE: Well I was on Unit 2.
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean Unit 1
4	side.
5	MR. WHITE: The Unit 1 side, yes, and who
6	that was I don't remember either.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And they'd have
8	a full complement on that side also?
9	MR. WHITE: Yes, it would have been like
10	Mike Walker or one of the other guys that, let me
11	think who the other guys were. That shift's all
12	broken up now, we're all on different, all over the
13	place.
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about a
15	shift manager, would there be a shift manager in Unit
16	1 also?
17	MR. WHITE: No.
18	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So Van had both
19	units?
20	MR. WHITE: Van is the shift manager for
21	both shifts.
22	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All
23	right. Get some biographical information, can you give
24	me your date and place of birth please?
25	MR. WHITE: Yes. I was born in let's see,

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1	this job here, but I still have my house up there.
2	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. It's
3	pretty up there. I like it.
4	MR. WHITE: It certainly is. I just came
5	back two days ago as a matter of fact, I was up there
6	staining my, doing my deck, biannual work.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah, being a
8	homeowner there's always a lot going on maintenance.
9	MR. WHITE: Oh yes, especially if you live
10	250 miles away from it.
11	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Is your
12	house near the shore, near the water?
13	MR. WHITE: No, it's about ten miles in.
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. that
15	makes it a little bit
16	MR. WHITE: Yeah, I live on the cheap side
17	of the town. Close to the shore is more expensive.
18	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So then you
19	were in the is that correct?
20	MR. WHITE: Correct.
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And what years
22	did you serve in the
23	MR. WHITE:
24	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Rank and rating
25	upon discharge?

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1	me to go for an interview at the NRC.
2	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did they?
3	Okay. Well we almost got you.
4	MR. WHITE: Too late.
5	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
6	Have you attended college?
7	MR. WHITE: Yes. Penn State
8	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Penn State
9	what type of degree?
10	MR. WHITE: Electrical engineering
11	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What year?
12	MR. WHITE:
13	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: BS?
14	MR. WHITE: Yes.
15	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Further
16	degrees?
17	MR. WHITE: No.
18	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Hired at
19	PSE & G?
20	MR. WHITE: 1995. October 30 or 31
21	somewhere in there. I think it was the 30th, it's
22	right at the end of the month.
23	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At some point
24	did you become licensed down here on the Salem units?
25	MR. WHITE: Yes.
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1	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When was that?
2	MR. WHITE: That's a good question. Let's
3	see
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: On or about?
5	MR. WHITE: It would be September and this
6	is six years ago so whatever that is, 1998 I guess.
7	I think that sounds right. They just sent in my
8.	renewal for my license so I'm pretty sure it was six
9	years ago.
10	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And did you
11	obtain an instant SRO license?
12	MR. WHITE: Yes. It wasn't that instant
13	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's what
14	they call them.
15	MR. WHITE: Yeah I know. It was a bit
16	different for me.
17	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And your
18	current job title?
19	MR. WHITE: I'm an SRO on Alpha shift,
20	CRS, SRO.
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And whom do you
22	report to today?
23	MR. WHITE: Mike actually physically
24	today Mike's not in, he's the normal shift manager so
25	Mike Strawmuller (PHONETIC) is the guy I normally

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1	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Wow, that's
2	amazing. Now they're dying to find teachers seems
3	like.
4	MR. WHITE: Yes, specifically the high
5	school, the local high school at North Stonington the
6	physics teacher retired two years ago.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The physics
8	teacher? They had one?
9	MR. WHITE: They had one, right, because
10	I used to fill in for him. I was the only guy they
11	had to fill in for him and I knew he was going to
12	retire in five years and I said well I can't wait five
13	years to find a job.
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, that's a
15	long wait.
16	MR. WHITE: So I was doing substitute
17	teaching and stuff and I wasn't willing to move to be
18	a teacher. I figured I could get a job right there and
19	I couldn't.
20	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Amazing.
21	MR. WHITE: And after trying that for
22	about a year I said well that's enough, I'm going to
23	try in some other field.
24	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you do
25	training in the were you ever
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saw the leak. I believe there might have been a small leak on there at one time and then it got larger.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay

MR. WHITE: And it was reported to the control room. Who specifically reported it the first time I don't know. However, we became aware that there was a leak on that valve and we started looking into it and found out that it was a fairly healthy sized leak. Not that we saw any change in, I don't remember that we saw any change in temperature or anything like that. It was not that significant that we saw anything that affected, directly affected -- activity of the magnitude that would do that, but it was of such a magnitude it was causing switch gears and other things to become wedded.

And we had various indications in the control room that some of the group buses, which are part of the reactor cooling pumps and stuff, I believe we got a, I don't remember the specific title of it but it was like a failure to transfer warning or something on one of the overheads, I don't remember what number it was or anything but I remember specifically thinking about it.

And we shut down, chances are we're going to lose RCPs, it was becoming, it rapidly became a

2 || 3 ||

complicated, you know, we're seeing indications in the control room that we have a fairly significant leak and we had indications and stuff the switch gear was getting wedded, and we were thinking, okay, can we get somebody down there to redirect the steam so it doesn't go on the switch boards and stuff like that.

And it was over a course of a period of time, I don't know whether it was half hour or an hour, but it was long enough that we looked at stuff, we knew where the valve was, we knew that if we shut the valve, somehow, I don't remember who contacted and got hold of design engineering or somebody that knew that if you shut that valve that that would stop the leak coming from where the top of the valve, which is where we thought it was coming from.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

options and I don't know when, but some time during the course of it, as a matter of fact and I because Van took command and control in the control room so I could go down and look at it to get a feel for what we had out in the field. You know, we made sure the plant was stable and all that stuff, and I had Van in the control room and I went out with so that we could see where the leak was, how big it

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was, you know, what we might be able to do about 1 redirecting it and stuff. 2 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did you 4 discover from that review? 5 MR. WHITE: Well, I specifically remember and I standing down because the valve is up on a 6 7 platform of probably eight feet up in the air. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've seen it, 8 I know where the valve is. 9 10 You probably know exactly MR. WHITE: where it is. We were standing off to the side because 11 12 you could see the steam blowing out of it, and I remember specifically commenting to them that, you 13 14 know, that it wasn't safe to get up there to shut the 15 valve because, you know, first off there was enough 16 lagging and stuff still attached to the valve so you 17 really couldn't tell where the steam was coming from. 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's lagging? 19 What is lagging? Lagging is, you know, the 20 MR. WHITE: 21 thermal covering that --SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The wrap like? 22 23 MR. WHITE: Yes, the stuff that you wrap on the outside so that it doesn't get too hot and 24 25 people don't get burned and you don't lose heat

through.

Anyhow, the thermal lagging material that was over the top of the thing was directing the steam such that you really couldn't tell where it was coming from. You could tell it was coming from that valve but you couldn't see what on that valve, and it was a fairly good magnitude and it was blowing right on the platform and across that platform where you could get up to the valve.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Was the steam hot enough that it would cause injury to people temperature wise?

MR. WHITE: I would say oh yes, certainly, steam temperature 300, 400 degrees.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right that answers my question.

MR. WHITE: And it's blowing out of the pipe, it was blowing out from underneath the lagging and we couldn't tell where it was coming from because and I are standing there and it's noisy, but you know we had a brief conversation saying that, boy, if we could just somehow get it redirected such that we could get safely get up there to shut that valve, and you knew that the valve was intact, which we didn't know at the time.

And we decided, he and I talking, said, well we can't get up there. I'm not going to safely, I don't know that it's safe to send somebody up there with the steam blowing off in the direction and stuff that it was, because it was blowing right across the platform over onto the switch gear right on the other side of it.

And I said to you know we had a discussion and we both agreed that you couldn't safely get up there to shut that valve.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. So you come to that conclusion after looking at the steam?

MR. WHITE: Right.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you then come back to the control room with

MR. WHITE: That's correct.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What happened next?

MR. WHITE: I don't remember if came back to the control room with me at that time or not. But I do specifically remember having a discussion with him that it was not safe with that and that, you know, somehow we could tell where the steam was coming from and we could safely get up there and we knew that

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1	the valve was intact and wasn't going to fall apart
2	when we tried to manipulate the valve that we could
3	shut it.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
5	MR. WHITE: And that's where we left.
6	There was a lot of ifs and we didn't think we could
7	get up there at the time and I proceeded back to the
8	control room and then I don't know where he
9	went, whether he stayed out in the field or came back.
10	I went back and we talked it over with Van
11	and the decision was made that, you know, we didn't
12	think we could get up there safely so we weren't going
13	to attempt to shut the valve because we didn't know if
14	the thing was going to fall apart in your hand and
15	kill somebody.
16	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
17	MR. WHITE: And we made the decision we
18	were going to shut down.
19	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Shut down the
20	plant? MR. WHITE: Shut down the plant
21	right.
22	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that
23	decision made during a conference call with management
24	who was on site? Do you recall what happened?
25	MR. WHITE: No, I don't remember. I was
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in the control room, if there was a conference call Van made it independent of me. I was not involved in any conference call with anybody other than who was in the control room.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

MR. WHITE: And I'm sure that because and I agreed, you know, in our first look at it when I was out in the field that we couldn't get up there to get that valve shut.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay

MR. WHITE: And you know, that's the way the conversation was left. And then I went back to the control room and we looked at our options. We made a decision, okay, we're going to start shutting down the unit. As a matter of fact, it's a fairly complicated shutdown because of all the what-ifs with the alarms that were in where the group buses may not transfer when we get to the point we're going to take the turbine off line and stuff like that. And we were discussing a lot of contingencies.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: So it was a fairly lengthy brief which probably, I don't know, may have taken 15 or 20 minutes because like I said it was a fairly complicated shutdown and there were a lot of things

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that we were concerned about in the shutdown itself, besides the fact that we had steam blowing out there.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall being present for any discussion between Van and at the time period you're talking about now, where is telling Van, maybe it can be shut. I'm not talking later in the shift now but talking right about the time period where you're going into your shift briefing. Do you recall them being present for any discussion between the two of them regarding whether it could or not be shut down? That maybe something changed?

MR. WHITE: Well, the only thing that I knew was that my discussion with and that was when we were out in the field, I don't remember specifically talking, we may have talked, I don't specifically remember that when we came back to the control room.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. My question was --

MR. WHITE: We bounced it back and forth, you know, because obviously if I thought that we were going to be able to shut it, I wouldn't be briefing the shut, well I might have been briefing some stuff but not shutting the plant down.

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Well

Okav.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And was that the first you had heard of someone even going out

24

there and looking at it or attempting to shut it?

MR. WHITE: Well I knew that we had people down there looking at it, and who was there at what specific time, we were looking at it for a chance, you know, with conditions changed. And my understanding and talking, because I discussed it with afterwards, you know, I said what happened? How did the valve get shut? Because we discussed it. We wanted to shut the valve, I remember specifically talking to him during our discussion when we were out in the field looking at it that we wanted to do that if we thought it was safe to do so.

And I was told that what had happened, and this was I'm pretty sure it was that was telling me, that the lagging that was on the valve had blown off, and he could clearly see where the leak was coming from.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: And based on the change in conditions, and I think what he described is it changed the direction that the steam was blowing also.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: So he could tell that the valve was intact and it was blowing such that he was able, or somebody was able, and I didn't realize it

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himself. I understand it was himself that shut the valve, saw that the conditions had changed and then he proceeded to do what we had talked about that we'd like to do if we could get up there.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: Now, as I said, I was in the brief for the shutdown, I did not specifically give a direction, or no one came in and says, hey, the condition's changed, we think we can get to the valve, we'd like to shut the valve. I did not say go shut the valve to anybody.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: The first indication that the valve was actually being shut was when somebody came in, as soon as I finished the brief and said, "Hey, the valve's shut."

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The valve is shut?

MR. WHITE: Right. And you know it was a sigh of relief on my part because I'm thinking, man, this is going to be complicated. There's a lot of parallel in this thing and all of a sudden somebody walked in and said it was, you know, the valve had been shut and it was isolated.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You mentioned

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or Van?

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the

MR. WHITE: You know, I don't remember him 1 saying yes or no. He may have, I don't remember that, 2 because my recollection was during the whole time, I 3 thought Van was in the control room the whole time but 4 you know, like I said, I was engrossed in the briefing 5 in the shutdown, I thought he was standing off to the 6 side where we were briefing it. 7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 8 MR. WHITE: Van. 9 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I don't believe was in 11 MR. WHITE: 12 the control room most of the time, or at all, until right at the end of the brief. 13 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: discussion which you just described with 15 16 at any point during that discussion did it come up on had informed Van Ford of what he 17 whether or not was going to do before he did it? 18 MR. WHITE: I don't remember that. He may 19 have said it, I don't remember that specifically. 20 mean like I said, it was two years ago, I don't 21 remember if he specifically said he told Van. He may 22 I can't say that for a fact because I don't 23 remember him specifically saying that he told Van that 24

he was going to go shut the valve. I thought Van was

in the control room to tell you the truth. 1 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well I believe 3 Van was in the control room for the majority of this time that this whole sequence was going on. 4 5 any point did you have a discussion with Van Ford about how that occurred, how the closing had occurred 6 and what he knew and what he didn't know about it? 7 8 MR. WHITE: I'm trying to think if I 9 talked to Van about it or if it was 10 have been both at the same time, I don't remember. 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, let me ask you this point blank question. 12 At any point 13 did you have a discussion with either of those two people where they each said, where Van would have 14 said, I didn't know was going to do that before 15 he did it, or where said I told Van what I was 16 17 going to do before I did what I did? MR. WHITE: I don't remember specifically 18 19 discussing that with me who told anybody, because I 20 thought, to tell you the truth I thought Van was in the control room the whole time when the valve was --21 22 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You keep saying Why are you saying I thought Van was in the 24

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control room? Why is that?

1	MR. WHITE: Well I thought he was there
2	when we were briefing the shutdown the whole time.
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All
4	right.
5	MR. WHITE: That's why I believed he was
6	in the control room. I didn't think he was out in the
7	field when the valve got shut, I don't know if he was
8	or not.
9	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10	MR. WHITE: You know, he wouldn't
11	necessarily have to be there but I thought he was
12	standing off to the side in the control room when I
13	was doing the brief.
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well why do you
15	keep bringing up the fact that you think Van was in
16	the control room? Why do you think that's relevant?
17	MR. WHITE: Well that's where I thought he
18	was.
19	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Right.
20	MR. WHITE: I don't know, I mean is there
21	an issue that
22	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The question is
23	Van Ford the shift manager, he's responsible for the
24	shift, did he know what was going to do
25	before did it?



1	MR. WHITE: I don't know, you'll have to
2	ask Van that. I mean he would be the best
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you have any
4	knowledge of whether or not he knew or not?
5	MR. WHITE: I don't specifically have any
6	knowledge of that.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Right.
8	I mean just think about it this way, the control
9	room's going one way, is there a rogue employee out in
10	the plant doing something that the control room in the
11	form of Van Ford doesn't know about, that's the issue.
12	MR. WHITE: See I don't know. I don't
13	know if talked to Van or Van talked to
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
15	Let's move on then, I think we've beaten that one up
16	pretty good.
17	MR. WHITE: That's the best I can do
18	because I don't remember where everybody specifically
19	was located the whole time.
20	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall
21	being present for any conversation where Van Ford is
22	questioning the safety of closing the valve, whether
23	it was safe or not, from a personal standpoint?
24	MR. WHITE: Well yes, we did discuss that
25	early on after when we came back and we made the
•	

1	decision, you know, when I was briefing, before I
2	briefed the shutdown that, hey, we don't think we can
3	safely get up there.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
5	MR. WHITE: We did discuss that
6	specifically, that's why we made the decision which
7	way we were going to go with the plan.
8	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which was to
9	shut it down?
LO	MR. WHITE: Which was to shut it down and
ւո	obviously conditions must have changed, as I said,
L2	from my understanding.
ιз	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At some point
L4	did the control room swap over the feed pumps? Do you
L5	remember if that occurred or not?
16	MR. WHITE: Swapped over the feed pumps?
L7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
L8	MR. WHITE: Hmmm. What do you mean by
L9	swapped over? Both feed pumps were still running at
20	the time.
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Let me
22	take a short break and I'll pull out some testimony
23	that might help you understand what the issue is here.
24	MR. WHITE: Okay. Yes, okay. I mean I'm
25	not sure I understand what the issue is on that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 10:36, let 1 2 me go off the record for a minute. (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 3 the record at 10:36 a.m. and went back on 4 the record at 10:50 a.m.) 5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 6 Okay. 7 almost 10:50 in the morning and we had a somewhat lengthy discussion about the steam valves and the 8 swapping of the valves. Do you recall there being 9 10 discussion that night on shift about having to swap 11 these valves? If you do, tell me what you remember 12 about that. Well, the only thing I 13 MR. WHITE: remember specifically about feed pumps is there's two 14 15 steam sources that come to the feed pump, one is bleed steam and one is main steam. And we did discuss, I 16 believe we discussed during the course of the 17 briefings the fact that if that valve did get shut, 18 that that would take away one of the two steam 19 20 sources, the main steam source. The main steam source is not what's normally powering those feed pumps when 21 we were at the power level we were at. 22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 23 24 MR. WHITE: So bleed steam was powering it you could shut that valve it should not have 25

affected anything, I believe. I'd have to go back and 1 2 look at all the procedures just to make sure because 3 I don't have any of that stuff in front of me right 4 But that was the only thing that I remember now. specifically discussing about the fact that one of the 5 steam sources would have been isolated if we could get 6 7 the valve shut. 8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Do you 9 recall if was proving any direction to any of the ROs about what you just described? 10 11 MR. WHITE: No. didn't 12 provide any in the control room, provided no direction 13 to anybody. I mean he didn't have command and control, he wouldn't have done that and I certainly 14 would have remembered that if he had. 15 I'm pretty sensitive about that stuff. 16 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. MR. WHITE: You know, when I have command 18 and control and, somebody else comes in and wants to 19 take the watch, they'd better, you know, follow the 20 appropriate procedures to take the watch when they 21 22 start giving direction, the guys that work for me. 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that occur 24 at all that night? 25 It did not. MR. WHITE:

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25

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:



MR. WHITE: No one came in the control room and no one gave direction to anybody in the control room that didn't go through me, including Van.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Did

come through you to give direction to any
of the ROs to do what we just talked about?

MR. WHITE: Swapping the feed pump steam over?

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: If he did, I certainly was not aware of it. Now was in and out of the control room several times in the course of events that night, you know, if he did, I was not aware of him telling an RO to do anything. And if he had, I'm sure I would have said something to him and said, okay, you know, what are we trying to do? And make sure that I was the guy that was giving the direction to the operators not him, he knows he's not supposed to do that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know who Bob Cordury (PHONETIC) is?

MR. WHITE: Yes.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall him being on duty that night?

MR. WHITE: Yes. Bob was on Bravo shift

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1	at the time.
2	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
3	MR. WHITE: I don't remember what capacity
4	he was that night, whether he was at work control or
5	where he was.
6	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
7	MR. WHITE: I believe in the course of
8	various things going in, I believe he was out in the
9	field at some time and looked at the steam leak.
10	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Did you
11	have any discussions with Bob Cordury regarding the
12	closing of this valve after you learned it was closed?
13	That night do you recall
14	MR. WHITE: I'm trying to remember if I
15	talked to Bob about it. I can't remember talking to
16	Bob that night. I have talked to Bob subsequently, I
17	can't say for sure if it was that night.
18	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well tell me
19	MR. WHITE: Bob was down there or in the
20	vicinity, I think, when the valve was closed. That
21	was my understanding.
22	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Tell me
23	what you and Bob talked about and what he said he saw
24	and heard? Can you remember?
25	MR. WHITE: Well, I think he pretty much

described the same thing that did, you know, something happened, it was obvious where the steam was coming from and that, you know, it may even have been him that I was talking to when I actually knew that was the guy who puts hands on valve, because I believe he was down there whenever that happened. I mean he was not -- Bob was not in a command and control position at the time, so I mean he wouldn't have been giving him permission or anything to do anything with that valve.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Did Bob speak to whether or not had told Van Ford about what he was going to do? Did he discuss that at all with you? His knowledge of --

MR. WHITE: I don't remember that. He may have at some point and, quite frankly, I don't remember to this day whether specifically talked to Van. I was under the impression he had not, but he may have.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Why?

MR. WHITE: Because as I said because I thought Van was in the control room when I was briefing the shutdown. As the shift manager he would normally be there, and I just thought he was. I can't swear that he was but I thought he was in the control

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1	room during at least most of the briefing for the
2	shutdown.
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: My
4	understanding is the control room was operating under
5	the AB steam procedure, okay?
6	MR. WHITE: That is probably true.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
8	MR. WHITE: I'm sure we were in some kind
9	of an AB knowing what the magnitude of the steam leak
10	was.
11	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Had you begun
12	to enter the shutdown procedures yet
13	MR. WHITE: Had not.
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: when you
15	learned that the valve was shut?
16	MR. WHITE: No. We had not
17	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Just
18	finished the briefing right?
19	MR. WHITE: My recollection is I had just
20	finished the brief and somebody, it was either Van
21	Ford or that came in and said that valve
22	was closed. And I think it was Van, but how he found
23	that out I don't know, or when he found it out.
24	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
25	MR. WHITE: I think it was Van but once
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again I can't swear, there were so many, there were people walking in and out of the control room and I'm pretty sure that Van was the one that told me. That's when I found out that the valve was shut. Now whether came up and told him in the control room or not I don't know.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're in the AB steam procedure?

MR. WHITE: Correct.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is it allowed in that procedure to isolate the valve manually like did? Is it allowed by that procedure or do you have to go to another procedure to do that, to actually do it?

MR. WHITE: I'd have to look at the exact wording in there, but I'm fairly certain that somewhere it tells you that if you can find the source and isolate it, you do that.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: Now exactly what step that would have been in the AB, I mean I'd have to go look at the AB, but somewhere in the AB there is something that tells you if you can isolate the steam to isolate it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that a

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1	lengthy procedure?
2	MR. WHITE: AB steam?
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.
4	MR. WHITE: Not real long. I mean AB wise
5	most ABs you know, it's not that too involved I don't
6	think.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would it be a
8	violation of anything if you provided a copy of that
9	procedure to me or the residents and they can send it
10	up to me?
11	MR. WHITE: I don't see why it would be.
12	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I don't think
13	so either.
14	MR. WHITE: I can't think of any reason,
15	as a matter of fact I'm surprised that you don't have
16	it.
17	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well it's
18	coming back up in my head now that maybe that's
19	something that needs to be looked at.
20	MR. WHITE: Yes. You know, I would have
21	to look. I would think that in the continuous action
22	summary or some place it's going to tell you, if you
23	know where the leak is, isolate it.
24	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.
25	MR. WHITE: I mean I'm fairly certain

1	that's in there, exactly how it's worded and stuff
2	anymore I don't remember.
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well let me get
4	back to you because I'm going to ask you to do that,
5	I'll get back to you okay?
6	MR. WHITE: Yes that would be as far as
7	I can see I don't see that that's a problem. I can
8	fax it to you or however you want to get it.
9	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10	MR. WHITE: Now the other thing to
11	remember, that was two years ago and I'm not really
12	certain that procedure has been revised.
13	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
14	Probably.
L5	MR. WHITE: I think we can go back in the
۱6	archives and find it in the NCR
L7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Get the regs.
18	MR. WHITE: And find out what reg was in
۱9	effect that day and pull the actual procedure. You
20	know, probably the actual procedure is somewhere
21	archived but that would be probably not too easy to
22	pull back out.
23	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. How
24	about we take a short break and we should finish up in
25	about 15 minutes or so? Okay?

1 MR. WHITE: That's fine, sure. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I want to look 2 something quick and I just need a couple of 3 It's almost 11 o'clock and we're going to minutes. 4 5 take a break off the record. 6 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 11:00 a.m. and went back on 7 the record at 11:45 a.m.) 8 Okay. 9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We're back on the record, it's almost quarter of twelve. 10 The break was somewhat lengthy because they had a 11 second fire alarm here at TB2, we had to evacuate the 12 The Fire Department had to come and check 13 building. the whole building out so we just got back in the 14 building, I don't know, five minutes or so and we were 15 just discussing things off the record. 16 17 But now we're back on the record and during the fire drill, Bill, did you have a chance to 18 review the AB procedure? 19 20 MR. WHITE: Yes I reviewed the AB Steam 1. As a matter of fact, the copy that I'm looking at is 21 22 the actual copy because it's got my initials and times 23 that I'd noted on there the night that we did it. And I also looked at the control room log for that night, 24 as well as reviewed some of, not every one of the 25

1 things in the NAP 5 procedure which talks about 2 conduct of operations. 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATORR: Based on your review of the documents which you just described, does 4 5 that refresh your memory or change anything you told 6 me? 7 MR. WHITE: Yes. 8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If so, or if 9 you want to add something now please go ahead. 10 MR. WHITE: The only real thing it changes is that to tell you the truth until I looked at the 11 12 log I forgot that we had already reduced power to 47 percent, and we only needed one feed pump at the time 13 to be able to operate the plant. And that the 22 feed 14 pump we knew that was where the leak was coming from. 15 16 However, as I said, we were in the process of 17 briefing, we were at 47 percent power while we were 18 doing the brief to get ready to take the unit off line 19 and reduce power the rest of the way down, take the 20 turbine off line and shut the main steam isolation 21 valves, which would have been the only way to isolate 22 that valve without shutting the valve itself, as 23 occurred. 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. 25 MR. WHITE: And then, you know, I mean

1 essentially the rest of the stuff I don't see any change in what I saw. During the course of the brief, 2 3 indicated before, we generally don't do manipulations and I don't believe we were doing 4 anything with the feed pump to get ready to take it 5 6 off line. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 7 That goes to 8 the swap question I brought up earlier? 9 MR. WHITE: To the swap question that you 10 brought up earlier. You know, I can't say for sure 11 that we hadn't discussed anything in the course of the many things that we discussed during the shutdown, but 12 confident 13 I'm fairly we weren't doing any 14 manipulations because it's not our practice during 15 briefings of that nature that the reactor operator or the plant operator would do any manipulations on the 16 control board to shut any, you know, to swap anything 17 around. 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Ιf that 19 manipulation did occur at some point during the shift, 20 would it be required to put that in the control room 21 log? 22 It would not necessarily be 23 MR. WHITE: logged and, as a matter of fact, I looked through the 24 log and I didn't see that we annotated that we had 25

done anything with respect to SOCN2, which would have 1 been the procedure, to shift any steam around. 2 And we did take, eventually we did trip 3 4 the feed pump but that was some 40 minutes or so, 5 actually 50 minutes after we'd already isolated the 6 steam leak. So that feed pump was operating off of 7 the bleed steam side of it and that, you know, we were at reduced capacity anyhow so we were certainly able 8 9 to handle it at that power level. SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. The AB 10 11 steam procedure, and we had the one section out where 12 it talks about right before you're notified that the valve was isolated, where does that step say 3.39? 13 14 Can you read that for me, please? MR. WHITE: Yes, 3.39 says, "Is the steam 15 leak isolable or repairable in the present plant 16 17 conditions?" Now that question was answered twice in 18 the course of this. At 0016 I initially annotated 19 that that was a no to that step and it tells me to go 20 to the step 3.42, which is the reduced power in accordance with -- and that was the procedures that we 21 were briefing, that's the shutdown briefing. 22 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. MR. WHITE: Minimal load to hot standby, 24 25 and it tells you ultimately we were going to shut the

2 shutdown. 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And section 3.40, how does that read? 4 MR. WHITE: 3.40 said, "Isolate or repair 5 the steam leak." And that section was signed off, you 6 know, the question is 3.39 is the steam leak isolable 7 and repairable in present plan conditions? And then 8 9 at 0050 and I go back and look at the log, I've annotated in the AB itself at 0050 I'd said yes. 10 is isolable. Conditions changed, I went back to that 11 step and said that has changed and we should follow 12 the other path through the procedure at that time. 13 14 And that's customary, the way 15 procedure flows if something had changed then I would go back and annotate it at that time, and that's when 16 I knew that something was different, that we now knew 17 it was isolable. And looking at the control room log 18 19 for that night, at 0050 that's the team that I was notified that the 22MS42 is closed and the steam leak 20 is stopped and the plan is to hold power there. 21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So at that step 22 in the procedure is closing that valve still allowed 23 by that procedure based on your review of it? 24 25 MR. WHITE: Yes, if the answer to this was

main steam isolation valves in the course of the

1	yes at that time.
2	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
3	MR. WHITE: The thing that's I guess
4	specific about this I didn't know that we could go
5	back and answer that yes until 0050 when the valve was
6	already closed.
7	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But
8	could a plant condition have changed in-between 0016
9	and 0050?
10	MR. WHITE: Oh yes, and my understanding
11	that the plant condition had changed was that the
12	source of the leak and the condition of the valve
13	became recognizable to the person that was out in the
14	field.
15	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there a
16	discussion earlier in the shift between yourself and
17	regarding whether the valve could be shut
18	or not and, if it could be, whether that was desirable
19	or not?
20	MR. WHITE: Yes.
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you just
22	reiterate what that was?
23	MR. WHITE: Yes I'll go over that again.
24	and I earlier in the shift prior to the 0016 when
25	we made the decision and then I started the brief, he

and I jointly went out in the field and looked at the valve. I had Van Ford go up, he was in the control room so I could go out in the field during that time frame.

And and I looked at the valve and looked at, you know, and we did say, I did tell him that it would be advantageous that we'd want to shut that valve if we could safely get to it.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: That was our discussion.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: And my understanding was at the later time, at the time that I found out it was now isolable, when I found out it was it was already isolated.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: But apparently in his evaluation, because he was the guy out in the field, looked at it and now said, oh I can get up there safely now. Now I can see what's going on with the valve, the lagging, he could see the lagging. He thought specifically that he could see that the leak was coming from a flanged area, there was a piece of the gasket material looked like it had been blown out in that one section, and it probably wasn't very big,

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and it was directing the steam in a different direction from when he and I had been out in the field earlier and looked at it, and that he felt it could safely be approached.

And, as we said, my understanding is that he actually did it, he actually shut the valve himself when he saw that he could get up there.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

MR. WHITE: And to me personally in the control room he did not communicate to me that he was going to do that at that time, although we had discussed earlier that that was what we would like to do if we could access to the valve.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.

Are you aware of any information that leads you to believe that deliberately violated any station procedure that night in what he did? And again the word is deliberately violated?

MR. WHITE: I don't believe that

deliberately violated it. I believe that he was out

in the field and he saw that the conditions had

changed, as we ha discussed earlier, had hoped that

they would change, or if we were standing there and it

had changed to that condition it would have probably

gone down differently. I personally would not have

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1	operated the valve, I'm the CRS on duty, I don't do
2	that kind of stuff when I'm the guy that's in the
3	chain of command for sure.
4	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
5	MR. WHITE: I would have proceeded back to
6	the control room to make sure the control room, that's
7	me. He may have gotten the impression from our
8	discussion that that was, you know, what I would have
9	liked to have had done because that's what I said we'd
LO	like to do.
11	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Like to do
12	meaning close the valve?
13	MR. WHITE: To get the valve closed.
14	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If the
15	conditions
16	MR. WHITE: If we could get up there.
17	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Safely?
18	MR. WHITE: Right, and that's specifically
19	what we said. If we could get up there safely and
{	
20	that we knew the valve wasn't going to fall apart in
	that we knew the valve wasn't going to fall apart in our hands, then we would shut the valve.
21	
21	our hands, then we would shut the valve.
20 21 22 23	our hands, then we would shut the valve.  SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.
21 22 23	our hands, then we would shut the valve.  SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.  MR. WHITE: But as I said, that was

that we had talked about, that he and I had talked about, so he may have felt that he had, you know, obtained my permission, and in a kind of a way he did earlier because we said, hey, that's what we want to do.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

MR. WHITE: And I could see his -- saying, jeez, you know I discussed it with the CRS that we would like to shut the valve. But that was you know time early, and some time later, what, 40 minutes? Thirty minutes later.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You think it was only 30 minutes from the time you were out there with

MR. WHITE: Well I'm thinking that because the time I wrote down here in 0016 when we made, when I said, hey, we're going to go to the reduced power step and started some time after that we started the brief, so it would have been a little bit before that and I see at 0050, which is about a little over 30 minutes from the time that I went back to the control room and started briefing the shutdown, that's when the valve actually got shut.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

MR. WHITE: So we discussed approximately

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30 to 40 minutes before the valve got shut that that's 1 2 what we would like to do if we could get access to that valve. 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okav. 4 5 MR. WHITE: Now at the time I did not specifically say, I want you to shut the valve 6 7 or any specific words to that effect, but I could see 8 certainly that he'd get the impression that I wanted 9 that valve shut. 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is there 11 anything else you'd like to add today? I don't think 12 I have any other questions at this time. I might have some follow up ones; if I do, can I call you? 13 Yes certainly. 14 MR. WHITE: SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. 15 16 WHITE: As I said, I never have MR. anything to hide and command and control was where I 17 lived for the last 30 years, you know. 18 I didn't feel 19 too uncomfortable with what transpired until later on some of the discussions said, well maybe he should 20 have called me before he'd shut the valve. 21 22 And in hindsight, if it was me out in the 23 field and I was doing it today, I would call the control room before I did that and I probably wouldn't 24

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But that's just me.

do it myself.

25

I was never an

1	operator at this plant. I don't operate equipment;
2	I'm not supposed to operate equipment.
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you feel
4	that, I mean that night after you learned that
5	had closed the valve, did you feel that he had
6	violated your command and/or control of the plant and
7	the operators in the plant?
8	MR. WHITE: Well, I felt that he didn't do
9	anything that I didn't want to have done.
10	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
11	MR. WHITE: And there are didn't and
12	don'ts in there. I did not, as I said earlier, I did
13	not specifically give him direction to shut the valve
14	at any time. But in our discussion I can certainly
15	see where he got the impression that if that valve
16	would get shut, because we talked about it, if we shut
17	it, what the consequences were, you know, what the
18	steam source is for the steam pump or for the feed
19	pump.
20	And I was fairly confident in our
21	discussion that shutting that valve would have no
22	effect on anything in the plant.
23	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
24	MR. WHITE: The plant would continue to
25	operate just the way it did. The only difference is

I wouldn't have that, you know, in our case I mean even though there's a lot of steam coming out, we never really saw anything that would indicate that it was affecting, you know, reactivity or reactor power or anything.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

MR. WHITE: And there was a lot of steam but it would be directed at a switch board which was the biggest concern probably. I didn't know what the heck was going to happen with the switch boards, you know, and that's why I was anxious, I was anxious to get the valve isolated. I mean from a plant control standpoint, I think there's good reason to think that we wanted that valve shut, and it needed to be shut because that steam was blowing towards the switch boards.

And I don't know what direction it changed, if it changed direction, which apparently it did whenever the lagging blew off and stuff, it may have been directed more towards the switch boards. I don't know. Like I said, I wasn't there whenever he made the decision he could gain access.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Bill, is there anything more you want to add?

MF. WHITE: No, I can't think of anything

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1	else. Like I said, if you have any other questions or	
2	anything, you know, I've said a lot of stuff today.	
3	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, we've	
4	talked quite a bit.	
5	MR. WHITE: And we went back and forth as	
6	to, you know, and it certainly changed my recollection	
7	after I got a chance to look at the logs and stuff	
8	after two years. But yes, please call me or send me	
9	an e-mail or call the resident or whatever you need.	
10	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, I'll do	
11	that.	
12	MR. WHITE: I certainly will answer	
1.3	whatever you want to know. But to the best of my	
14	knowledge that's exactly what occurred in the command	
15	and control aspects. I mean I guess that's really the	
16	question. Whether or not he had to at the time and	
17	what his impression was, I don't know. Only can	179
18	answer what his impressions were about what our	
19	discussion meant to him because I wasn't there when he	
20	shut the valve.	
21	SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is it your	hc
22	opinion that had to inform the control room	
23	before he closed it, or he should have?	
24	MR. WHITE: From a pure standpoint, he had	
25	to tell us. I think that he thought that he did, and	

opinion.

the fact that we'd discussed it earlier, that's what I think.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

MR. WHITE: But you know I don't know what went on in head.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm asking your

MR. WHITE: It's my opinion that he thought he had the go ahead to shut the valve at the time he was shutting the valve because we had discussed all the ramifications. I was the CRS on duty he had told me, maybe he felt that I'd already told the control room I was going to shut the valve, you know, you'll have to ask specifically what was in his mind at the time. But certainly I could see where he might have gotten the impression that I had given the go ahead, even though that was 30 or 40 minutes before that that I wanted that valve shut.

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I guess the procedure reads, "if plant conditions change." Isn't that part of the wording in the AB procedure?

MR. WHITE: Let's see. Well it doesn't specifically say that, but plant conditions did change, that's why I went back to this step again and said --

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