ENCLOSURE 4 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA) BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 2 AND 3 EXTENDED POWER UPRATE CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE CREDIT RISK ASSESSMENT

BFN EPU Containment Overpressure (COP) Credit Risk Assessment

Performed for:

Tennessee Valley Authority

Performed by:

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BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear (BFN) **BFN EPU Containment Overpressure (COP) Credit Risk Assessment** Prepared by: Date: Feb. 27, 2006 **Andersen** Reviewed by: Date: Feb. 27, 2006

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The report documents the risk impact of utilizing containment accident pressure (containment overpressure) to satisfy the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for RHR and Core Spray pumps during DBA LOCAs.

The risk assessment evaluation uses the current BFN Unit 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) internal events model (including internal flooding). The BFN PRA provides the necessary and sufficient scope and level of detail to allow the calculation of Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) changes due to the crediting of containment overpressure in determining sufficient NPSH requirements for the RHR system and Core Spray system emergency core cooling pumps.

The steps taken to perform this risk assessment evaluation are as follows:

- 1) Evaluate sensitivities to the DBA LOCA accident calculations to determine under what conditions credit for COP is required to satisfy low pressure ECCS pump NPSH.
- 2) Revise all large LOCA accident sequence event trees to make low pressure ECCS pumps dependent upon containment isolation when other plant pre-conditions exist (i.e., SW high temperature, SP initial high temperature).
- 3) Modify the existing BFN PRA Containment Isolation System fault tree to include the probability of pre-existing containment leakage.
- 4) Quantify the modified PRA models and determine the following risk metrics:
 - Change in Core Damage Frequency (CDF)
 - Change in Large Early Release Frequency (LERF)
- 5) Perform modeling sensitivity studies and a parametric uncertainty analysis to assess the variability of the results.

The conclusion of the plant internal events risk associated with this assessment is as follows.

- Regulatory Guide 1.174 provides guidance for determining the risk impact of plant-specific changes to the licensing basis. Regulatory Guide 1.174 defines very small changes in risk as resulting in increases of core damage frequency (CDF) below 10⁻⁶/yr. Based on this criteria, the proposed change (i.e., use of COP to satisfy the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for RHR and Core Spray pumps) represents a very small change in CDF (1.53E-09/yr).
- 2) Regulatory Guide 1.174 provides guidance for determining the risk impact of plant-specific changes to the licensing basis. Regulatory Guide 1.174 defines very small changes in risk as resulting in increases of Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) below 10⁻⁷/yr. Based on this criteria, the proposed change (i.e., use of COP to satisfy the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for RHR and Core Spray pumps) represents a very small change in LERF (1.53E-09/yr).

Section 1 INTRODUCTION

The report documents the risk impact of utilizing containment accident pressure (containment overpressure) to satisfy the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for RHR and Core Spray pumps during DBA LOCAs.

1.1 BACKGROUND

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted the BFN extended power uprate (EPU) license amendment request (LAR) to the NRC in June 2004. In a October 3, 2005 letter to TVA, the NRC requested the following additional information on the EPU LAR:

"SPSB-A.11

As part of its EPU submittal, the licensee has proposed taking credit (Unit 1) or extending the existing credit (Units 2 and 3) for containment accident pressure to provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) to the ECCS pumps. Section 3.1 in Attachment 2 to Matrix 13 of Section 2.1 of RS-001, Revision 0 states that the licensee needs to address the risk impacts of the extended power uprate on functional and system-level success criteria. The staff observes that crediting containment accident pressure affects the PRA success criteria; therefore, the PRA should contain accident sequences involving ECCS pump cavitation due to inadequate containment pressure. Section 1.1 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174 states that licensee-initiated licensing basis change requests that go beyond current staff positions may be evaluated by the staff using traditional engineering analyses as well as a risk-informed approach, and that a licensee may be requested to submit supplemental risk information if such information is not submitted by the licensee. It is necessary to consider risk insights, in addition to the results of traditional engineering analyses, while determining the regulatory acceptability of crediting containment accident pressure.

Considering the above discussion, please provide an assessment of the credit for containment accident pressure against the five key principles of risk-informed decisionmaking stated in RG 1.174 and SRP Chapter 19. Specifically, demonstrate that the proposed containment accident pressure credit meets current regulations, is consistent with the defense-

in-depth philosophy, maintains sufficient safety margins, results in an increase in core-damage frequency and risk that is small and consistent with the intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement, and will be monitored using performance measurement strategies. With respect to the fourth key principle (small increase in risk), provide a quantitative risk assessment that demonstrates that the proposed containment accident pressure credit meets the numerical risk acceptance guidelines in Section 2.2.4 of RG 1.174. This quantitative risk assessment must include specific containment failure mechanisms (e.g., liner failures, penetration failures, primary containment isolation system failures) that cause a loss of containment pressure and subsequent loss of NPSH to the ECCS pumps."

Typical of other industry EPU LAR submittals, the BFN EPU LAR includes a request to credit containment accident pressure, also known as containment overpressure (COP), in the determination of net positive suction head (NPSH) for low pressure ECCS systems following design basis events. Also consistent with other industry EPU LAR submittals, the NRC is requesting risk information from licensees regarding the COP credit request.

BFN Units 2 and 3 already have existing approvals for containment overpressure credit. The BFN EPU LAR requests containment overpressure credit for BFN Unit 1 for DBA LLOCA accidents.

The need for COP credit requests is driven by the conservative nature of design basis accident calculations. Use of more realistic inputs in such calculations shows that no credit for COP is required. In any event, the request for containment accident pressure credit is a physical aspect that will exist during the postulated design basis accidents. The EPU LAR simply requests to include that existing containment accident pressure in the ECCS pump NPSH calculations. The NRC request is to investigate the impact on risk if the containment accident pressure is not present (e.g., postulated pre-existing primary containment failure) during the postulated scenarios.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has allowed credit for COP to satisfy NPSH requirements in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.82 (RG 1.82). Specifically, RG 1.82 Position 2.1.1.2 addresses containment overpressure as follows:

"For certain operating BWRs for which the design cannot be practicably altered conformance with Regulatory Position 2.1.1.1 may not be possible. In these cases, no additional containment pressure should be included in the determination of available NPSH than is necessary to preclude pump cavitation. Calculation of available containment pressure should underestimate the expected containment pressure when determining available NPSH for this situation. Calculation of suppression pool water temperature should overestimate the expected temperature when determining available NPSH."

The proposed change in the BFN license basis regarding credit for COP meets the approved positions of RG 1.82. However, developments between the NRC staff and members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in 2005 regarding proposed language to Revision 4 of RG 1.82 prompted the NRC to request performance of a 'risk-informed' assessment in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis".

1.2 SCOPE

This risk assessment addresses principle #4 of the RG 1.174 risk informed structure. Principle #4 of RG 1.174 involves the performance of a risk assessment to show that the impact on the plant core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) due to the proposed change is within acceptable ranges, as defined by RG 1.174. The other principles (#1-#3, and #5) are not addressed in this report.

This analysis assesses the CDF and LERF risk impact on the BFN Unit 1 at-power internal events PRA resulting from the COP credit requirement for low pressure ECCS pumps during large LOCA scenarios.

External event and shutdown accident risk is assessed on a qualitative basis.

In addition, a review of the BFN Unit 2 and Unit 3 models is performed to show that the results from the Unit 1 BFN PRA apply to Units 2 and 3, as well.

1.3 DEFINITIONS

Accident sequence - a representation in terms of an initiating event followed by a combination of system, function and operator failures or successes, of an accident that can lead to undesired consequences, with a specified end state (e.g., core damage or large early release). An accident sequence may contain many unique variations of events that are similar.

Core damage - uncovery and heatup of the reactor core to the point at which prolonged oxidation and severe fuel damage is anticipated and involving enough of the core to cause a significant release.

Core damage frequency - expected number of core damage events per unit of time.

End State - is the set of conditions at the end of an event sequence that characterizes the impact of the sequence on the plant or the environment. End states typically include: success states, core damage sequences, plant damage states for Level 1 sequences, and release categories for Level 2 sequences.

Event tree - a quantifiable, logical network that begins with an initiating event or condition and progresses through a series of branches that represent expected system or operator performance that either succeeds or fails and arrives at either a successful or failed end state.

Initiating Event - An initiating event is any event that perturbs the steady state operation of the plant, if operating, or the steady state operation of the decay heat removal systems during shutdown operations such that a transient is initiated in the plant. Initiating events trigger sequences of events that challenge the plant control and safety systems.

ISLOCA - a LOCA when a breach occurs in a system that interfaces with the RCS, where isolation between the breached system and the RCS fails. An ISLOCA is usually characterized by the over-pressurization of a low-pressure system when subjected to RCS pressure and can result in containment bypass.

Large early release - the rapid, unmitigated release of airborne fission products from the containment to the environment occurring before the effective implementation of offsite emergency response and protective actions.

Large early release frequency - expected number of large early releases per unit of time.

Level 1 - identification and quantification of the sequences of events leading to the onset of core damage.

Level **2** - evaluation of containment response to severe accident challenges and quantification of the mechanisms, amounts, and probabilities of subsequent radioactive material releases from the containment.

Plant damage state - Plant damage states are collections of accident sequence end states according to plant conditions at the onset of severe core damage. The plant conditions considered are those that determine the capability of the containment to cope with a severe core damage accident. The plant damage states represent the interface between the Level 1 and Level 2 analyses.

Probability - is a numerical measure of a state of knowledge, a degree of belief, or a state of confidence about the outcome of an event.

Probabilistic risk assessment - a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the risk associated with plant operation and maintenance that is measured in terms of frequency of occurrence of risk metrics, such as core damage or a radioactive material release and its effects on the health of the public (also referred to as a probabilistic risk assessment, PRA).

Release category - radiological source term for a given accident sequence that consists of the release fractions for various radionuclide groups (presented as fractions of initial core inventory), and the timing, elevation, and energy of release. The factors addressed in the definition of the release categories include the response of the containment structure, timing, and mode of containment failure; timing, magnitude, and mix of any releases of radioactive material; thermal energy of release; and key factors affecting deposition and filtration of radionuclides. Release categories can be considered the end states of the Level 2 portion of a PRA.

Risk - likelihood (probability) of occurrence of undesirable event, and its level of damage (consequences).

Risk metrics - the quantitative value, obtained from a risk assessment, used to evaluate the results of an application (e.g., CDF or LERF).

Severe accident - an accident that involves extensive core damage and fission product release into the reactor vessel and containment, with potential release to the environment.

Split Fraction - a unitless parameter (i.e., probability) used in quantifying an event tree. It represents the fraction of the time that each possible outcome, or branch, of a particular top event may be expected to occur. Split fractions are, in general, conditional on precursor events. At any branch point, the sum of all the split fractions representing possible outcomes should be unity. (Popular usage equates "split fraction" with the failure probability at any branch [a node] in the event tree.)

1.4 ACRONYMS

- ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
- ATWS Anticipated Transient without Scram
- BFN Browns Ferry Nuclear plant
- CCF Common Cause Failure
- CDF Core Damage Frequency
- CET Containment Event Tree
- COP Containment Overpressure
- CPPU Constant Pressure Power Uprate
- DBA Design Basis Accident
- DW Drywell
- ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems
- EPU Extended Power Uprate
- GE General Electric
- HEP Human Error Probability
- HPCI High Pressure Core Injection system
- HRA Human Reliability Analysis

IPE Individual Plant Examination Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPEEE ISLOCA Interface System Loss of Coolant Accident La Maximum Allowable Primary Containment Leakage Rate LERF Large Early Release Frequency LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LLOCA Large LOCA LOOP Loss of Offsite Power event LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection MAAP Modular Accident Analysis Program NPSH Net Positive Suction Head NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment RCIC **Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System** RG Regulatory Guide RHR **Residual Heat Removal System** RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel SMA Seismic Margins Assessment SP Suppression Pool SPC Suppression Pool Cooling SW Service Water

BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

- TS Technical Specifications
- TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
- WW Wetwell

Section 2 APPROACH

This section includes a brief discussion of the analysis approach and the types of inputs used in this risk assessment.

2.1 GENERAL APPROACH

This risk assessment is performed by modification and quantification of the BFN PRA models.

2.1.1 Use of BFN Unit 1 PRA

The current BFN Unit 1 PRA models (BFN model U1050517) are used as input to perform this risk assessment. The Browns Ferry PRA uses widely-accepted PRA techniques for event tree and fault tree analysis. Event trees are constructed to identify core damage and radionuclide release sequences. The event tree "top events" represent systems (and operator actions) that can prevent or mitigate core damage. Fault trees are constructed for each system in order to identify the failure modes. Analysis of component failure rates (including common cause failures) and human error rates is performed to develop the data needed to quantify the fault tree models.

For the purpose of analysis, the Browns Ferry PRA divides the plant systems into two categories:

- 1. Front-Line Systems, which directly satisfy critical safety functions (e.g., Core Spray and Torus Cooling), and
- 2. Support Systems, which are needed to support operation of front-line systems (e.g., AC power and service water).

Front-line event trees are linked to the end of the Support System event trees for sequence quantification. This allows definition of the status of all support systems for each sequence before the front-line systems are evaluated. Quantification of the event tree and fault tree models is performed using personal computer version of the RISKMAN code.

The Support System and Front-Line System event trees are "linked" together and solved for the core damage sequences and their frequencies. Each sequence represents an initiating event and combination of Top Event failures that results in core damage. The frequency of each sequence is determined by the event tree structure, the initiating event frequency and the Top Event split fraction probabilities specified by the RISKMAN master frequency file. RISKMAN allows the user to enter the split fraction names and the logic defining the split fractions (i.e., rules) to be selected for a given sequence based on the status of events occurring earlier in the sequence or on the type of initiating event.

2.1.2 PRA Quality

The BFN PRA used as input to this analysis (BFN model U1050517) is of sufficient quality and scope for this application. The BFN Unit 1 PRA is highly detailed, including a wide variety of initiating events (e.g., transients, internal floods, LOCAs inside and outside containment, support system failure initiators), modeled systems, extensive level of detail, operator actions, and common cause events.

The BFN Units 2 and 3 at-power internal events PRAs received a formal industry PRA Peer Review in 1997. All of the "A" and "B" priority comments have been addressed.

Refer to Appendix A for further details concerning the quality of the BFN PRA.

2.2 STEPS TO ANALYSIS

The performance of this risk assessment is best described by the following major analytical steps:

- Assessment of DBA calculations
- Estimation of pre-existing containment failure probability
- Analysis of relevant plant experience data
- Manipulation and quantification of BFN Unit 1 RISKMAN PRA models
- Comparison to \triangle CDF and \triangle LERF RG 1.174 acceptance guidelines
- Performance of uncertainty and sensitivity analyses
- Assessment of "Large Late" Release Impact
- Review of BFN Unit 2 and Unit 3 PRAs

Each of these steps is discussed briefly below.

2.2.1 Assessment of DBA Calculations

The purpose of this task is to develop an understanding of the BFN EPU design basis LLOCA calculations that result in the need to credit 3 psig containment overpressure credit.

The need for COP credit requests is driven by the conservative nature of design basis accident calculations. The DBA LOCA calculations are reviewed and sensitivity calculations performed to determine under what conditions of more realistic inputs is there no need for COP credit in the determination of low pressure ECCS pump NPSH.

2.2.2 Estimation of Pre-Existing Containment Failure Probability

This task involves defining the size of a pre-existing containment failure pathway to be used in the analysis to defeat the COP credit, and then quantifying the probability of occurrence of the un-isolable pre-existing containment failure. The approach to this input parameter calculation will follow EPRI guidelines regarding calculation of pre-existing containment leakage probabilities in support of integrated leak rate test (ILRT) frequency extension LARs (i.e., EPRI Report 1009325, <u>Risk Impact of Extended Integrated Leak Rate Testing Intervals</u>, 12/03).[2] This is the same approach used in the recent Vermont Yankee EPU COP analyses presented to the ACRS in December 2005.

The pre-existing unisolable containment leak probability is combined with the BFN PRA containment isolation failure on demand fault tree (CIL) to develop the likelihood of an unisolated primary containment at t=0 that can defeat the COP credit necessary for the determination of adequate low pressure ECCS pump NPSH.

2.2.3 Analysis of Relevant Plant Experience Data

An unisolated primary containment is not the only determining factor in defeating low pressure ECCS pump NPSH. The DBA calculations show that other extreme low likelihood plant conditions are required at t=0 to result in the need to credit COP in the determination of pump NPSH, such as high initial reactor power level and the following two key water temperature conditions:

- High river water temperature
- High initial torus water temperature

This step involves obtaining plant experience data for river water and torus water temperature and performing statistical analysis to determine the probabilities of exceedance as a function of water temperature.

2.2.4 Manipulation And Quantification of BFN Unit 1 RISKMAN PRA Models

This task is to make the necessary modifications to the BFN Unit 1 RISKMAN-based PRA models to simulate the loss of low pressure ECCS pumps during PRA Large LOCA scenarios due to inadequate NPSH caused by an unisolated containment and other extreme plant conditions (e.g., high service water temperature).

All large LOCA initiated sequences in the BFN PRA are modified as appropriate (except ISLOCAs and LOCAs outside containment, because these LOCAs result in deposition of decay heat directly outside the containment and not into the suppression pool). This approach to manipulating only LLOCA scenarios is to mirror the DBA accident calculations requiring COP credit. This is consistent with the ACRS observations during the December 2005 Vermont Yankee EPU COP hearings, in which the ACRS commented that they did not prefer the approach of assigning COP credit to all accident sequence types in the PRA simply for the sake of conservatism.

The modeling and quantification is performed consistent with common RISKMAN modeling techniques.

2.2.5 Comparison to ΔCDF and ΔLERF RG 1.174 Acceptance Guidelines

The revised BFN Unit 1 PRA models are quantified to determine CDF and LERF. The difference in CDF and LERF between the revised model of this assessment and the BFN Unit 1 PRA base results are then compared to the RG 1.174 risk acceptance guidelines. The RG 1.174 \triangle CDF and \triangle LERF risk acceptance guidelines are summarized in Figures 2-1 and 2-2, respectively. The boundaries between regions are

not necessarily interpreted by the NRC as definitive lines that determine the acceptance or non-acceptance of proposed license amendment requests; however, increasing delta risk is associated with increasing regulatory scrutiny and expectations of compensatory actions and other related risk mitigation strategies.

2.2.6 Performance of Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses

To provide context to the variability of the calculated deltaCDF and deltaLERF results, a parametric uncertainty analysis was performed using the RISKMAN software.

2.2.7 Assessment of "Large Late" Release Impact

This task is to perform an assessment of the EPU COP credit impact on BFN Unit 1 PRA "Large Late" radionuclide releases. This task is performed because the ACRS questioned Entergy on this issue during the recent Vermont Yankee EPU ACRS hearings in December 2005.

This aspect of the analysis is for additional information, and does not directly correspond to the RG 1.174 risk acceptance guidelines shown in Figures 2-1 and 2-2.

2.2.8 Review of BFN Unit 2 and Unit 3 PRAs

The base analysis uses the BFN Unit 1 PRA models. This task involves reviewing the BFN Unit 2 and BFN Unit 3 RISKMAN PRA models and associated documentation to determine whether the analysis performed for BFN Unit 1 is also applicable to Unit 2 and Unit 3.









Section 3

ANALYSIS

This section highlights the major qualitative and quantitative analytic steps to the analysis.

3.1 ASSESSMENT OF DBA CALCULATIONS

The purpose of this risk assessment is due to the fact that the conservative nature of design basis accident calculations result in the need to credit COP in determining adequate low pressure ECCS pump NPSH. Use of more realistic inputs in such calculations shows that no credit for COP is required.

The GE DBA LOCA calculation makes the following conservative assumptions, among others, regarding initial plant configuration and operation characteristics:

- Initial reactor power level at 102% EPU
- Decay heat defined by 2 sigma uncertainty
- 2 RHR pumps and 2 RHR heat exchangers in SPC
- All pumps operating at full flow
- River water temperature at 95°F
- Initial suppression pool temperature at 95°F
- No credit for containment heat sinks

The GE DBA LOCA calculations were reviewed and the following input parameters were identified as those with a potential to significantly impact the DBA analytic conclusions regarding the need for COP credit in NPSH determination:

- Initial reactor power level
- Decay heat

- Number of RHR pumps and heat exchangers in SPC
- River water temperature
- Initial suppression pool temperature
- RHR heat exchanger effectiveness
- Initial suppression pool water volume
- Credit for containment heat sinks

Based on knowledge of the calculations, other inputs such as initial containment air temperature and humidity, have non-significant impacts on the results.

It is recognized that there are numerous different combinations of more realistic calculation inputs that show that COP credit is not necessary for maintenance of low pressure ECCS pump NPSH. To simplify the risk assessment, the different combinations of realistic input sensitivities were maintained at a manageable number. Eleven sensitivity calculations were performed to identify key input parameters for use in this risk assessment. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 3-1 (the shaded cells show those parameters that changed from the base DBA LOCA calculation). [3]

From the results of the sensitivity cases summarized in Table 3-1, the following general conclusions can be made:

- Initial reactor power, decay heat level, and initial water temperatures are the key determining factors in the analytic conclusions
- COP credit is <u>not</u> required for NPSH, even with the conservative DBA calculation inputs, if 3 or 4 RHR pumps and associated heat exchangers are in operation (refer to Cases 1 and 1a in Table 3-1).
- If the plant is operating at an unexpected 102% EPU initial power level with an assumed 2 sigma decay heat, only 2 RHR pumps and heat exchangers are placed in SPC operation, and initial torus water temperature is at the high temperature of 95°F, then river water

temperature must be above 70°F to result in the need for COP credit (refer to Case 2b in Table 3-1).

 If the plant is operating at the expected nominal 100% EPU initial power level (2 sigma decay heat not assumed), only 2 RHR pumps and heat exchangers are placed in SPC operation, and initial torus water temperature is taken as 92°F, then river water temperature must be above 86°F to result in the need for COP credit (refer to Case 4c in Table 3-1).

The analytic conclusions are used in this risk assessment to define two plant states that will result in failure of low pressure ECCS pumps on inadequate NPSH during large LOCAs if the containment is unisolated:

- Plant State 1: 102% EPU initial power level, 2 sigma decay heat, 2 RHR pumps and heat exchangers in SPC, initial torus water temperature of 95°F, and river water temperature above 70°F
- Plant State 2: 100% EPU initial power level, nominal decay heat, 2 RHR pumps and heat exchangers in SPC, initial torus water temperature of 92°F, and river water temperature above 86°F

These two plant states are used in this risk assessment to model the LLOCA scenarios that can result in loss of low pressure ECCS pumps due to inadequate NPSH when the containment is unisolated. The probability of being in Plant State 1 or Plant State 2 is discussed below in Section 3.2.

3.2 PROBABILITY OF PLANT STATE 1 AND PLANT STATE 2

This section discusses the estimation of the probability of being in Plant State 1 or Plant State 2. This assessment is based on the statistical analysis of BFN experience data. Refer to Appendix C for the statistical analysis of variations in BFN river water and torus water temperatures.

3.2.1 Probability of Plant State 1

The probability of being in Plant State 1 is determined as follows:

- The probability of being at 102% EPU power at the time of the postulated DBA LOCA is modeled as a miscalibration error of an instrument
- If such a miscalibration error occurs, it is assumed that the plant will be operating at 102% and that the operator <u>does not</u> notice other differing plant indications that would cause the operator to re-evaluate the plant condition
- If the plant is operating at 102% power, the decay heat level defined by 2 sigma uncertainty is assumed to occur with a probability of 1.0 (this conservative assumption is to simplify the analysis).
- The probability of river water temperature greater than 70°F is determined from the BFN experience data statistical analysis summarized in Appendix C.
- If the above conditions are satisfied, it assumed that the torus water temperature is 95°F, with a probability of 1.0 (this conservative assumption is to simplify the analysis).

Based on review of the pre-initiator human error probability calculations in the BFN Unit 1 PRA Human Reliability Analysis, this risk assessment assumes a nominal human error probability of 5E-3 for miscalibration of an instrument. As such, the probability of being at 102% power at t=0 is taken in this analysis to be 5E-3.

As can be seen from Table C-1, the probability of river water temperature exceeding 70°F is 4.0E-1.

Therefore, the probability of being in Plant State 1 is $5E-3 \times 0.40 = 2E-3$.

3.2.2 Probability of Plant State 2

The probability of being in Plant State 2 is determined as follows:

- The probability of being at 100% EPU power at the time of the postulated DBA LOCA is reasonably assumed to be 1.0
- The probability of river water temperature greater than 86°F is determined from the BFN experience data statistical analysis summarized in Appendix C.
- If the above conditions are satisfied, it assumed that the torus water temperature is 92°F, with a probability of 1.0 (this conservative assumption is to simplify the analysis).

As can be seen from Table C-1, the probability of river water temperature exceeding 86°F is 1.4E-1.

Therefore, the probability of being in Plant State 2 is $1.4E-1 \times 1.0 = 1.4E-1$.

3.3 PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT FAILURE PROBABILITY

As discussed in Section 2, the approach to this input parameter calculation follows the EPRI guidelines regarding calculation of pre-existing containment leakage probabilities in support of integrated leak rate test (ILRT) frequency extension LARs (i.e., EPRI Report 1009325, <u>Risk Impact of Extended Integrated Leak Rate Testing Intervals</u>, 12/03). [2]

This assessment is provided in Appendix B of this report. As discussed in Appendix B, a pre-existing unisolable containment leakage path of 35La is assumed in the base case quantification of this risk assessment to result in defeating the necessary COP credit. As can be seen from Table B-1, the probability of the 35La pre-existing containment leakage used in this base case analysis is 9.86E-04.

This low likelihood of a significant pre-existing containment leakage path is consistent with BFN primary containment performance experience. Neither BFN nor the BWR industry has experienced a 35La pre-existing containment leakage event. The BFN primary containment performance experience shows BFN containment leakages much less than 35La. Per Reference [1], the BFN Unit 2 and Unit 3 primary containment ILRT results from the most recent tests are as follows:

Unit	Test Date	Containment Leakage (Fraction of La)
2	11/06/94	0.1750
2	03/17/91	0.1254
3	10/10/98	0.1482
3	11/06/95	0.4614

Although the above results are for Units 2 and Units 3, given the similarity in plant design and operation and maintenance practices, the results are reasonably judged to be reflective of BFN Unit 1, as well.

Sensitivity studies to the base case quantification (refer to Section 4) assess the sensitivity of the results to the pre-existing leakage size assumption.

3.4 MODIFICATIONS TO BFN UNIT 1 PRA MODELS

As discussed in Section 2, all large LOCA initiated sequences in the BFN PRA are modified as appropriate (except ISLOCAs and LOCAs outside containment, because these LOCAs result in deposition of decay heat directly outside the containment and not into the suppression pool). The following Large LOCA initiated sequences in the BFN Unit 1 PRA were modified:

- Large LOCA Loop I Core Spray Line Break (LLCA)
- Large LOCA Loop II Core Spray Line Break (LLCB)

- Large LOCA Loop A Recirc. Discharge Line Break (LLDA)
- Large LOCA Loop B Recirc. Discharge Line Break (LLDB)
- Large LOCA Loop A Recirc. Suction Line Break (LLSA)
- Large LOCA Loop B Recirc. Suction Line Break (LLSB)
- Other Large LOCA (LLO)

The accident sequence modeling for the above LLOCA initiators was modified as follows:

- A top event for loss of containment integrity (CIL) was added to the beginning of the Level 1 event tree structures
- A top event modeling the additional Plant State pre-conditions (NPSH) was added to the beginning of the Level 1 event tree structures, right after the CIL top event.
- If top events CIL and NPSH are satisfied (i.e., occur), then the RHR pumps and CS pumps are directly failed

Refer to Appendix E for print-outs of the revised large LOCA event trees.

The CIL top event is quantified using a fault tree. The fault tree is a modified version of the existing BFN Unit 1 Level 2 PRA containment isolation fault tree. The BFN Unit 1 Level 2 PRA containment isolation fault tree models failure of the containment isolation system on demand given an accident signal. Hardware, power and signal failures for all primary containment penetrations greater than 3" diameter are modeled in the fault tree. To this fault tree structure was added the probability of a pre-existing containment leak size of 35La. Refer to Appendix F for a print-out of the containment isolation fault tree used in this analysis for the CIL node in the large LOCA event trees.

The NPSH top event is also quantified using a fault tree. The NPSH incorporates the fault tree logic to model the probability of being in Plant State 1 or Plant State 2. Refer to Appendix F for a print-out of the fault tree used in this analysis for the NPSH node in the Large LOCA event trees.

The quantification of the revised model was performed to produce the new CDF. All the new CDF scenarios are those in which the containment is unisolated at t=0, all RPV injection is lost early, and core damage occurs at approximately one hour. As such, the additional CDF contributions created by this model manipulation are also all LERF release sequences (i.e., deltaCDF equals deltaLERF). This is a conservative assumption as it assumes that the pre-existing containment leakage of 35La used in the base quantification is representative of a LERF release. Reference [2] determines that a containment leak representative of LERF is >600La.

The quantification results and uncertainty and sensitivity analyses are discussed in Section 4.

The revised BFN Unit 1 PRA RISKMAN model for this base case analysis is archived in file **U1COP2-9** and saved on the BFN computers along with the other BFN PRA RISKMAN models.

3.5 ASSESSMENT OF LARGE-LATE RELEASES

As discussed above in Section 3.3, all the deltaCDF resulting from this risk assessment also results directly in LERF. As such, there is no increase in Large-Late releases due to scenarios modeling in this risk assessment. Refer to Appendix D for more discussion.

Table 3-1 SUMMARY OF COP DETERMINISTIC CALCULATIONS

Case	Case Description	Initial Power	Decay Heat	SW Temp (F)	SP Initial Temp (F)	Number of RHR pumps in Operation	RHR and CS Pump Flow Rate Per Pump	Number of RHR HX in Operation	Number of RHRSW pumps in Operation	RHRSW Pump Flow Rate Per Pump (gpm)	RHR Heat Exchanger K Value	Core Spray Pumps in Operation	Initial SP Water Volume	ECCS Strainer Debris Loading	Credit for Containment Heat Sinks	Peak SP Temp (F)	COP Credit Required
Base Case	EPU Licensing Calculation – DBA LOCA	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/2or	95	95	2	Full design	2	2	4000	223	2	Minimum	Yes	No	187.3	Yes
Case 1	No Single Failure	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/2 o	95	95	4	Full design	4	4	4000	223	4	Minimum	Yes	No	166.4	No
Case 1a	3 Pumps in SPC	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/2or	95	95	3	Full design	3	3	4000	223	4	Minimum	Yes	No	175.0	No
Case 2	DBA Calculation but SW Temperature = 85F	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/2 o	85	95	2	Full design	2	2	4000	223	2	Minimum	Yes	No	182.0	Yes
Case 2a	DBA Calculation but SW Temperature = 75F	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/2or	75	95	2	Full design	2	2	4000	223	2	Minimum	Yes	No	177.6	Yes
Case 2b	DBA Calculation but SW Temperature = 70F	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/2or	70	95	2	Full design	2	2	4000	223	2	Minimum	Yes	No	175.9	No
Case 2c	DBA Calculation but SW Temperature = 65F	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/2or	65	95	2	Full design	2	2	4000	223	2	Minimum	Yes	No	174.3	No
Case 3	DBA Calculation but SP Temperature = 85F	102% EPU	ANSI 5.1 w/20	95	85	2	Full design	2	2	4000	223	2	Minimum	Yes	No	183.8	Yes
Case 4	100% Initial Power, Minimum SP Level, and No Heat Sink Credit	100%	ARELET	92	92	2	Full design	2	2	4000	241	2	Minimum	Yes	No	177.0	Yes
Case 4a	100% Initial Power, Nominal SP Level, and Heat Sink Credit	100% EPU	ANESI 5.1 97020	92	92	2	Full design	2	2	4000	241	2	Nominal	Yes	Yes	174.7	No

Table 3-1 SUMMARY OF COP DETERMINISTIC CALCULATIONS

Case	Case Description	Initial Power	Decay Heat	SW Temp (F)	SP Initial Temp (F)	Number of RHR pumps in Operation	RHR and CS Pump Flow Rate Per Pump	Number of RHR HX in Operation	Number of RHRSW pumps in Operation	RHRSW Pump Flow Rate Per Pump (gpm)	RHR Heat Exchanger K Value	Core Spray Pumps in Operation	Initial SP Water Volume	ECCS Strainer Debris Loading	Credit for Containment Heat Sinks	Peak SP Temp (F)	COP Credit Required
Case 4b	100% Initial Power, Minimum SP Level, and Heat Sink Credit	100% EPU	445151 ₩6227	92	92	2	Full design	2	2	4000	225	2	Minimum	Yes	Yes	178.9	Yes
Case 4c	100% Initial Power, Minimum SP Level, Heat Sink Credit, and SW Temp. that results in Peak SP Temp. equal to/less than 176F	10074 EPU	ANDIA 517 W/- 247	85	92	2	Full design	2	2	4000	225	2	Minimum	Yes	YES	175.8	No

Section 4

RESULTS

4.1 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

The results of the base quantification of this risk assessment for the 35 L_a case are as follows:

- deltaCDF: 1.42E-9/yr
- deltaLERF: 1.42E-9/yr

As discussed in Section 3, the additional CDF contributions created by this model manipulation are also all LERF release sequences (i.e., deltaCDF equals deltaLERF).

These very low results are expected and are well within the RG 1.174 guidelines (refer to Figures 2-1 and 2-2) for "very small" risk impact. If greater detail was included to address some of the conservative assumptive assumptions in this risk assessment (e.g., 2 sigma decay heat assumed with a probability of 1.0 given 102% EPU power exists; refer to Section 3.2), the deltaCDF and deltaLERF would be even lower.

4.2 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS

To provide additional information for the decision making process, the risk assessment provided here is supplemented by parametric uncertainty analysis and quantitative and qualitative sensitivity studies to assess the sensitivity of the calculated risk results.

Uncertainty is categorized here into the following three types, consistent with PRA industry literature:

- Parametric
- Modeling

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Completeness

Parametric uncertainties are those related to the values of the fundamental parameters of the PRA model, such as equipment failure rates, initiating event frequencies, and human error probabilities. Typical of standard industry practices, the parametric uncertainty aspect is assessed here by performing a Monte Carlo parametric uncertainty propagation analysis. Probability distributions are assigned to each parameter value, and a Monte Carlo sampling code is used to sample each parameter and propagate the parametric distributions through to the final results. The parametric uncertainty analysis and associated results are discussed further below.

Modeling uncertainty is focused on the structure and assumptions inherent in the risk model. The structure of mathematical models used to represent scenarios and phenomena of interest is a source of uncertainty, due to the fact that models are a simplified representation of a real-world system. Model uncertainty is addressed here by the identification and quantification of focused sensitivity studies. The model uncertainty analysis and associated results are discussed further below.

Completeness uncertainty is primarily concerned with scope limitations. Scope limitations are addressed here by the qualitative assessment of the impact on the conclusions if external events and shutclown risk contributors are also considered. The completeness uncertainty analysis is discussed further below.

4.2.1 Parametric Uncertainty Analysis

The parametric uncertainty analysis for this risk assessment was performed using the RISKMAN computer program to calculate probability distributions and determine the uncertainty in the accident frequency estimate.

RISKMAN has three analysis modules: Data Analysis Module, System Analysis Module, and Event Tree Analysis Module. Appropriate probability distributions for each uncertain parameter in the analysis is determined and included in the Data Module. The System Module combines the individual failure rates, maintenance, and common cause parameters into the split fraction frequencies that will be used by the Event Tree Module. A Monte Carlo routine is used with the complete distributions to calculate the split fraction frequencies. Event trees are quantified and linked together in the Event Module. The important sequences from the results of the Event Tree Module are used in another Monte Carlo sampling step to propagate the split fraction uncertainties and obtain the uncertainties in the overall results.

The descriptive statistics calculated by RISKMAN for the total core damage frequency of the plant caused by internal events include:

- Mean of the sample
- Variance of the sample
- 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of the sample

The parametric uncertainty associated with delta core damage frequency calculated in this assessment is presented as a comparison of the RISKMAN calculated CDF uncertainty statistics for the two cases (i.e., the Unit 1 base EPU PRA and the EPU COP Credit base case quantification). The results are shown in Table 4-1. Table 4-1 summarizes the CDF uncertainty distribution statistics for the Unit 1 PRA and for the COP credit base quantification.

As can be seen from the parametric uncertainty results summarized in Table 4-1, even when considering the parametric uncertainty the risk impact is small. The statistics show that CDF has not changed while the distribution of CDF for the COP study has narrowed slightly: the 5% ile increased slightly while the 95% ile decreased slightly.

It should be cautioned that this distribution is developed via Monte Carlo (random) sampling, and as such it is dependent upon the number of samples and the initial numerical seed values of the sampling routine. Neither the initial seeds nor the number of samples used for the model of record are known. Consequently, some variation from the base model statistics is expected. Taking these cautions into consideration, a comparison of the distributions by percentiles shows little if any change.

4.2.2 Modeling Uncertainty Analysis

As stated previously, modeling uncertainty is concerned with the sensitivity of the results due to uncertainties in the structure and assumptions in the logic model. Modeling uncertainty has not been explicitly treated in many PRAs, and is still an evolving area of analysis. The PRA industry is currently investigating methods for performing modeling uncertainty analysis. EPRI has developed a guideline for modeling uncertainty that is still in draft form and undergoing pilot testing. The EPRI approach that is currently being tested takes the rational approach of identifying key sources of modeling uncertainty and then performing appropriate sensitivity calculations. This approach is taken here.

The modeling issues selected here for assessment are those related to the risk assessment of the containment overpressure credit. This assessment does not involve investigating modeling uncertainty with regard to the overall BFN PRA. The modeling issues identified for sensitivity analysis are:

- Pre-existing containment leakage size and associated probability
- Calculation of containment isolation system failure
- Assessment of power and water temperature pre-conditions
- Number of RHR pumps and heat exchangers in SPC
Pre-Existing Containment Leakage Size/Probability

The base case analysis assumes a pre-existing containment leakage pathway leakage size of 35La that would result in defeat of the necessary containment overpressure credit during a DBA LOCA. The following two modeling sensitivity cases are identified to assess the variability of the risk results to the assumed pre-existing containment leakage size:

- A smaller, even more conservative, pre-existing leak size of 20La is assumed in this sensitivity to result in defeat of the necessary COP credit. From EPRI 1009325, the probability of a pre-existing 20La containment leakage pathway is 1.88E-03.
- A larger pre-existing leak size of 100La, consistent with the EPRI 1009325 recommended assumption for a "large" leak, is used in this sensitivity to defeat the necessary COP credit. From EPRI 1009325, the probability of a pre-existing 100La containment leakage pathway is 2.47E-04.

Calculation of Containment Isolation System Failure

The base case quantification uses the containment isolation system failure fault tree logic to represent failure of the containment isolation system. The fault tree specifically analyzes primary containment penetrations greater than 3" diameter. This modeling sensitivity case expands the scope of the containment isolation fault tree to include smaller lines as potential defeats of COP credit. This sensitivity is performed by increasing by a factor of 10 the failure probability associated with all the split fraction solutions for the containment isolation system fault tree.

Assessment of Power and Water Temperature Pre-conditions

This is a conservative sensitivity that assumes that all that is necessary for failure of the low pressure ECCS pumps due to inadequate NPSH during a large LOCA is an unisolated containment. This sensitivity is performed by assuming the other preconditions represented by the top event NSPH (e.g., river water temperature greater than 86°F) exist with a probability of 1.0.

Number of RHR pumps and heat exchangers in SPC

The base case COP credit quantification addresses the situation in which 2 or less RHR pumps and heat exchangers are operating in SPC mode. The likelihood of failing any two RHR pumps is approximately 8.2E-3. The likelihood of an unisolated containment is approximately 1.4E-3 and the likelihood of other necessary extreme plant conditions (e.g., high river temperature, high reactor power) existing at the time of the LLOCA is approximately 0.14. As such, the base quantification results in an approximate 1.6E-6 conditional probability, given a LLOCA, of loss of low pressure ECCS pumps due to insufficient NPSH due to inadequate COP.

This sensitivity discusses the risk impact of also explicitly quantifying scenarios with only 1 or no RHR pumps failed. Such scenarios are not explicitly included in the base quantification because their risk contribution is negligible, as shown by the sensitivities discussed here. As shown in Table 3-1, even with design basis conservative assumptions, if 3 or more RHR pumps and heat exchangers are operating in SPC, there is no need for containment overpressure. To result in a need for COP credit in such cases would require even more conservative input assumptions than the 2 RHR pump scenario. As such, the additional risk from such scenarios is negligible compared to the 2 RHR pump case explicitly modeled in this analysis.

An estimate of the deltaCDF risk contribution for the scenario with 3 RHR pumps in SPC operation can be approximated as follows:

- Sum of BFN PRA Large LOCA initiator frequencies: 3.10E-5/yr
- Likelihood of failure of 1 RHR pump or 1 RHR heat exchanger: 1.00E-2 (nominal estimate)
- Probability of 102% EPU initial power level: 5E-3 (same as base analysis)
- Probability of containment isolation failure: 7E-3 (nominal from base analysis)
- Probability of river water temperature >~96°F: 9E-3 (nominal value based on Table C-1. Although the river temperature has not exceeded 90°F based on the collected plant data, statistically there is a non-zero likelihood of such a temperature). 96°F is assumed here as the temperature at which COP credit is required (refer to Case 1a of Table 3-1).
- deltaCDF contribution for 3 RHR pump case: 3.1E-5 x 1E-2 x 5E-3 x 9E-3 = ~1E-13/yr

This additional contribution to the calculated deltaCDF from a 3 RHR pump case is negligible in comparison to the 2 RHR pump case.

An estimate of the deltaCDF risk contribution for the scenario with 4 RHR pumps in operation can be approximated as follows:

- Sum of BFN PRA Large LOCA initiator frequencies: 3.10E-5/yr
- Likelihood of 4 RHR pumps and 4 heat exchangers in SPC during Large LOCA: 1.0 (nominal estimate)
- Probability of 102% EPU initial power level: 5E-3 (same as base analysis)
- Probability of containment isolation failure: 7E-3 (nominal from base analysis)
- Probability of river water temperature >~100°F: 1E-3 (estimate based on Table C-1. Although the river temperature has not exceeded 90°F based

on the collected plant data, statistically there is a non-zero likelihood of such a temperature). 100°F is assumed here as the temperature at which COP credit is required (refer to Case 1 of Table 3-1).

 deltaCDF contribution for 3 RHR pump case: 3.1E-5 x 1.0 x 5E-3 x 7E-3 x 1E-3 = ~1E-12/yr

Similar to the 3 pump case discussed previously, this additional contribution to the calculated deltaCDF from a 4 RHR pump case is negligible in comparison to the 2 RHR pump case.

Summary of Modeling Uncertainty Results

The modeling uncertainty sensitivity cases are summarized in Table 4-2.

4.2.3 <u>Completeness Uncertainty Analysis</u>

As stated previously, completeness uncertainty is addressed here by the qualitative assessment of the impact on the conclusions if external events and shutdown risk contributors are also considered.

Statistic	BFN Unit 1 Base CDF	COP Risk Assessment CDF
5%	4.71E-7	4.73E-7
50%	1.23E-6	1.21E-6
MEAN	1.77E-6	1.77E-6
95%	4.72E-6	4.69E-6

Table 4-1 PARAMETRIC UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS RESULTS

Table 4-2

Case	Description	CDF	LERF	∆CDF	∆LERF
Base ⁽¹⁾	Base Case Quantification	1.77E-06	4.41E-07	1.42E-09	1.42E-09
1 ⁽¹⁾	Pre-Existing Containment Leakage Sufficient to Fail COP Credit Defined by 100La (probability = 2.47E-4)	1.77E-06	4.41E-07	1.33E-09	1.33E-09
2 ^{(1), (2)}	Pre-Existing Containment Leakage Sufficient to Fail COP Credit Defined by 20La (probability = 1.88E-3)	1.77E-06	4.41E-07	1.53E-09	1.53E-09
3 ⁽¹⁾	Expansion of Containment Isolation fault tree to Encompass Smaller Lines (approximate by multiplying Cont. Isol. failure probability by 10x)	1.77E-06	4.42E-07	2.05E-09	2.05E-09
4 ⁽¹⁾	Assume Initial Power Level and Water Temperature Pre-Conditions Exist 100% of the Time	1.77E-06	4.42E-07	2.66E-09	2.66E-09
5 ⁽¹⁾	Combination of Cases #2, #3 and #4	1.77E-06	4.48E-07	8.33E-09	8.33E-09
6	Incorporation of "3-RHR pumps in SPC" and "4-RHR pumps in SPC" loss of NPSH scenarios	1.77E-06	4.41E-07	1.42E-09	1.42E-09

SUMMARY OF SENSITIVITY QUANTIFICATIONS

<u>Notes:</u>

⁽¹⁾ Scenarios with failure of 2 or more RHR pumps and associated heat exchangers in SPC are explicitly analyzed in these cases. As shown in Case 6, explicit incorporation of scenarios with 0 or 1 RHR pumps in SPC failed has a negligible impact on the results.

⁽²⁾ Case 2, 20L_a containment leakage size, is the case used as the basis for the Conclusions of this study (refer to Section 5).

<u>Seismic</u>

The BFN seismic risk analysis was performed as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). BFN performed a seismic margins assessment (SMA) following the guidance of NUREG-1407 and EPRI NP-6041. The SMA is a deterministic evaluation process that does not calculate risk on a probabilistic basis. No core damage frequency sequences were quantified as part of the seismic risk evaluation.

The conclusions of the SMA are judged to be unaffected by the EPU or the containment overpressure credit issue. The EPU has little or no impact on the seismic qualifications of the systems, structures and components (SSCs). Specifically, the power uprate results in additional thermal energy stored in the RPV, but the additional blowdown loads on the RPV and containment given a coincident seismic event, are judged not to alter the results of the SMA.

The decrease in time available for operator actions, and the associated increases in calculated HEPs, is judged to have a non-significant impact on seismic-induced risk. Industry BWR seismic PSAs have typically shown (e.g., Peach Bottom NUREG-1150 study; Limerick Generating Station Severe Accident Risk Assessment; NUREG/CR-4448) that seismic risk is overwhelmingly dominated by seismic induced equipment and structural failures. Seismic induced failures of containment are low likelihood scenarios, and such postulated scenarios are moot for the COP question because they would be analyzed in a seismic PRA as core damage scenarios directly.

Based on the above discussion, it is judged that seismic issues do not significantly impact the decision making for the BFN EPU and containment overpressure credit.

Internal Fires

The BFN fire risk analysis was performed as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). BFN performed a screening methodology using the EPRI FIVE (Fire Induced Vulnerability Evaluation) methodology.

Like most plants, BFN currently does not maintain a fire PRA. However, given the very low risk impact of the COP credit, even if fire risk was explicitly quantified the conclusions of this risk assessment are not expected to change, i.e., the risk impact is very small.

Other External Hazards

In addition to seismic events and internal fires, the BFN IPEEE Submittal analyzed a variety of other external hazards:

- High Winds/Tornadoes
- External Floods
- Transportation and Nearby Facility Accidents
- Other External Hazards

The BFN IPEEE analysis of high winds, tornadoes, external floods, transportation accidents, nearby facility accidents, and other external hazards was accomplished by reviewing the plant environs against regulatory requirements regarding these hazards. Based upon this review, it was concluded that BFN meets the applicable NFC Standard Review Plan requirements and therefore has an acceptably low risk with respect to these hazards. As such, these other external hazards are judged not to significantly impact the decision making for the BFN EPU and containment overpressure credit.

Shutdown Risk

As discussed in the BFN EPU submittal, shutdown risk is a non-significant contributor to the risk profile of the proposed EPU. The credit for containment overpressure is not required for accident sequences occurring during shutdown. As such, shutdown risk does not influence the decision making for the BFN EPU containment overpressure credit.

4.3 APPLICABILITY TO BFN UNIT 2 AND UNIT 3

This risk assessment was performed using the BFN Unit 1 PRA. To assess the applicability of the Unit 1 results to BFN Units 2 and 3, the BFN Unit 3 PRA was reviewed. The Unit 3 PRA was explicitly reviewed because it has a higher base CDF than the Unit 2 PRA due to fewer inter-unit crosstie capabilities than Unit 2.

Review of the Unit 3 PRA models did not identify any differences that would make the Unit 1 PRA results and conclusions not applicable to Units 2 and 3. As further evidence, the Unit 3 PRA was modified in a similar manner as the Unit 1 sensitivity Case #2 and quantified to determine the Δ CDF impact. The result for Unit 3 was a deltaCDF of 1.9E-9/yr. The revised BFN Unit 3 PRA RISKMAN model supporting this review is archived in file **U3COP2-9** and saved on the BFN computers along with the other BFN PRA RISKMAN models.

Given the above, the results for the Unit 1 PRA risk assessment are comparable to the Units 2 and 3 PRAs.

Section 5

CONCLUSIONS

The report documents the risk impact of utilizing containment accident pressure (containment overpressure) to satisfy the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for RHR and Core Spray pumps during DBA LOCAs.

The need for COP credit requests is driven by the conservative nature of design basis accident calculations. Use of more realistic inputs in such calculations shows that no credit for COP is required.

The conclusions of this risk assessment are based on the conservative $20l_{-a}$ assumed containment leakage size (refer to Case 2 of Table 4-2). The conclusions of the plant internal events risk associated with this assessment are as follows.

- Regulatory Guide 1.174 provides guidance for determining the risk impact of plant-specific changes to the licensing basis. Regulatory Guide 1.174 defines very small changes in risk as resulting in increases of core damage frequency (CDF) below 10⁻⁶/yr. Based on this criteria, the proposed change (i.e., use of COP to satisfy the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for RHR and Core Spray pumps) represents a very small change in CDF (1.53E-09/yr).
- 2) Regulatory Guide 1.174 provides guidance for determining the risk impact of plant-specific changes to the licensing basis. Regulatory Guide 1.174 defines very small changes in risk as resulting in increases of Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) below 10⁻⁷/yr. Based on this criteria, the proposed change (i.e., use of COP to satisfy the net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for RHR and Core Spray pumps) represents a very small change in LERF (1.53E-09/yr).

These results are well within the guideline of RG 1.174 for a "very small" risk increase. Even when modeling uncertainty and parametric uncertainty, and external event scenarios are considered, the risk increase is small. As such, the credit for COP in determining adequate NPSH for low pressure ECCS pumps during DBA LOCAs is acceptable from a risk perspective.

The general conclusions that the risk impact from the COP credit for DBA LOCAs is very small, applies to BFN Unit 1 as well as BFN Units 2 and 3.

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REFERENCES

- [1] "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Units 2 and 3 Technical Specifications (TS) Change 448 – One-Time Frequency Extension For Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test (ILRT) Interval", TVA-BFN-TS-448, July 8, 2004.
- [2] <u>Risk Impact Assessment of Extended Integrated Leak Rate Testing Intervals</u>, EPRI Report 1009325, Final Report, December 2003.
- [3] "Project Task Report Browns Ferry Units 1, 2 & 3 EPU, RAI Response NPSH Sensitivity Studies", GE Nuclear Energy, GE-NE-0000-0050-00443-R0-Draft, February 2006.
- [4] Letter from G.B. Wallis (Chairman, ACRS) to N.J. Diaz (Chairman, NRC), "Vermont Yankee Extended Power Uprate", ACRSR-2174, January 4, 2006.

Appendix A PRA QUALITY

The BFN Unit 1 EPU PRA was used in this analysis for the base case quantification as it was recently updated consistent with the ASME PRA Standard and it is representative of each of the three BFN unit PRAs. The following discusses the quality of the BFN Unit 1 PRA models used in performing the risk assessment crediting containment overpressure for RHR and Core Spray pump NPSH requirements:

- Level of detail in PRA
- Maintenance of the PRA
- Comprehensive Critical Reviews

A.1 LEVEL OF DETAIL

The BFN Unit 1 PRA modeling is highly detailed, including a wide variety of initiating events, modeled systems, operator actions, and common cause events.

The PRA model (Level 1 and Level 2) used for the containment overpressure risk assessment was the most recent internal events risk model for the BFN Unit 1 plant at EPU conditions (BFN model U1050517). The BFN PRA models adopts the large event tree / small fault tree approach and use the support state methodology, contained in the RISKMAN code, for quantifying core damage frequency.

The PRA model contains the following modeling attributes.

A.1.1 Initiating Events

The BFN at-power PRA explicitly models a large number of internal initiating events:

- General transients
- LOCAs
- Support system failures
- Internal Flooding events

The initiating events explicitly modeled in the BFN at-power PRA are summarized in Table A-1. The number of internal initiating events modeled in the BFN at-power PRA is similar to or greater than the majority of U.S. BWR PRAs currently in use.

A.1.2 System Models

The BFN at-power PRA explicitly models a large number of frontline and support systems that are credited in the accident sequence analyses. The BFN systems explicitly modeled in the BFN at-power PRA are summarized in Table A-2. The number and level of detail of plant systems modeled in the BFN at-power PRA is equal to or greater than the majority of U.S. BWR PRAs currently in use.

A.1.3 Operator Actions

The BFN at-power PRA explicitly models a large number of operator actions:

- Pre-Initiator actions
- Post-Initiator actions
- Recovery Actions
- Dependent Human Actions

Approximately fifty operator actions are explicitly modeled in the BFN PRA. A summary table of the individual actions modeled is not provided here.

The human error probabilities for the actions are modeled with accepted industry HRA techniques.

The BFN PRA includes an explicit assessment of the dependence of post-initiator operator actions. The approach used to assess the level of dependence between operator actions is based on the method presented in the NUREG/CR-1278 and EPRI TR-100259.

The number of operator actions modeled in the BFN at-power PRA, and the level of detail of the HRA, is consistent with that of other U.S. BWR PRAs currently in use.

A.1.4 Common Cause Events

The BFN at-power PRA explicitly models a large number of common cause component failures. Approximately two thousand common cause terms are included in the BFN Unit 1 PRA. Given the large number of CCF terms modeled in the BFN at-power internal events PRA, a summary table of them is not provided here. The number and level of detail of common cause component failures modeled in the BFN at-power PRA is equal to or greater than the majority of U.S. BWR PRAs currently in use.

A.1.5 <u>Level 2 PRA</u>

The BFN Unit 1 Level 2 PRA is designed to calculate the LERF frequency consistent with NRC Regulatory Guidance (e.g. Reg. Guides 1.174 and 1.177) and the PRA Application Guide.

The Level 2 PRA model is a containment event tree (CET) that takes as input the core damage accident sequences and then questions the following issues applicable to LERF:

- Primary containment isolation
- RPV depressurization post-core clamage
- Recovery of damaged core in-vessel
- Energetic containment failure phenomena at or about time of RPV breach
- Injection established to drywell for ex-vessel core debris cooling/scrubbing
- Containment flooding
- Drywell failure location
- Wetwell failure location
- Effectiveness of secondary containment in release scrubbing

The following aspects of the Level 2 model reflect the more than adequate level of detail and scope:

- 1. Dependencies from Level 1 accidents are carried forward directly into the Level 2 by transfer of sequences to ensure that their effects on Level 2 response are accurately treated.
- 2. Key phenomena identified by the NRC and industry for inclusion in BWR Level 2 LERF analyses are treated explicitly within the model.
- 3. The model quantification truncation is sufficiently low to ensure adequate convergence of the LERF frequency.

A.2 MAINTENANCE OF PRA

The BFN PRA models and documentation are maintained living and are routinely updated to reflect the current plant configuration following refueling outages and to reflect the accumulation of additional plant operating history and component failure data.

The PRA Update Report is evaluated for updating every other refueling outage. The administrative guidance for this activity is contained in a TVA Procedure.

In addition, the PRA models are routinely implemented and studied by plant PRA personnel in the performance of their duties. Potential model modifications or enhancements are itemized and maintained for further investigation and subsequent implementation, if warranted. Potential modifications identified as significant to the results or applications may be implemented in the model at the time the change occurs if their impact is significant enough to warrant.

A.2.1 History of BFN PRA Models

The current BFN Unit 1 PRA is the model used for this analysis. The BFN Unit 1 PRA was initially developed in June 2004 using the guidance in the ASME PRA Standard, and to incorporate the latest plant configuration (including EPU) and operating experience data. The Unit 1 PRA was then subsequently updated in August 2005. The Unit 1 PRA was developed using the BFN Unit 2 and Unit 3 PRAs as a starting point. The BFN Unit 2 and Unit 3 PRAs have been updated numerous times since the original IPE Submittal. The BFN Unit 2 PRA revisions are summarized below:

Original BFN IPE Submittal	9/92
Revision to address plant changes and incorporate BFN IE and EDG experience data	8/94
Revision to ensure consistency with the BFN Multi-Unit PRA	4/95
Revision to address PER BFPER 970754	10/97
2002 PRA Update	3/02
2004 PRA Update (includes conditions to reflect EPU)	6/04
2005 Update	8/05

A.3 COMPREHENSIVE CRITICAL REVIEWS

As described above, the BFN Unit 1 PRA used in this analysis was built on more than 10 years of analysis effort and experience associated with the Unit 2 and 3 PRAs.

During November 1997, TVA participated in a PRA Peer Review Certification of the Browns Ferry Unit 2 and 3 PRAs administered under the auspices of the BVVROG Peer Certification Committee. The purpose of the peer review process is to establish a method of assessing the technical quality of the PRA for its potential applications. The elements of the PRA reviewed are summarized in Tables A-3 through A-4.

The Peer Review evaluation process utilized a tiered approach using standardized checklists allowing a detailed review of the elements and the sub-elements of the Browns Ferry PSAs to identify strengths and areas that need improvement. The review system used allowed the Peer Review team to focus on technical issues and to issue their assessment results in the form of a "grade" of 1 through 4 on a PRA sub-element level. To reasonably span the spectrum of potential PRA applications, the four grades of certification as defined by the BWROG document "Report to the Industry on PRA Peer Review Certification Process - Pilot Plant Results" were employed.

During the Unit 2 and 3 PSAs updates in 2003, the significant findings (i.e., designated as Level A or B) from the Peer Certification were resolved, resulting in the PRA elements now having a minimum certification grade of 3. The Unit 1 PRA used in this analysis has incorporated the findings of the Units 2 and 3 PSA Peer Review. The previously conducted Peer Review was effectively an administrative and technical Peer Review of the Unit 1 PRA. Similar models, processes, policies, approaches, reviews, and management oversight were utilized to develop the Unit 1 PRA.

A.4 PRA QUALITY SUMMARY

The quality of modeling and documentation of the BFN PRA models has been demonstrated by the foregoing discussions on the following aspects:

- Level of detail in PRA
- Maintenance of the PRA
- Comprehensive Critical Reviews

The BFN Unit 1 Level 1 and Level 2 PRAs provide the necessary and sufficient scope and level of detail to allow the calculation of CDF and LERF changes due to the risk assessment requiring containment overpressure for sufficient NPSH for the low pressure ECCS pumps.

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INITIATING EVENTS FOR BFN PRA

Initiator Category	Mean Frequency (events per year)	
Transient Initiator Categories		
Inadvertent Opening of One SRV	1.36E-2	
Spurious Scram at Power	8.76E-2	
Loss of 500kV Switchyard to Plant	1.02E-2	
Loss of 500kV Switchyard to Unit	2.37E-2	
Loss of Instrumentation and Control Bus 1A	4.27E-3	
Loss of Instrumentation and Control Bus 1B	4.27E-3	
Total Loss of Condensate Flow	9.45E-3	
Partial Loss of Condensate Flow	1.93E-2	
MSIV Closure	5.52E-2	
Turbine Bypass Unavailable	1.95E-3	
Loss of Condenser Vacuum	9.70E-2	
Total Loss of Feedwater	2.58E-2	
Partial Loss of Feedwater	2.47E-1	
Loss of Plant Control Air	1.20E-2	
Loss of Offsite Power	7.87E-3	
Loss of Raw Cooling Water	7.95E-3	
Momentary Loss of Offsite Power	7.57E-3	
Turbine Trip	5.50E-1	
High Pressure Trip	4.29E-2	
Excessive Feedwater Flow	2.78E-2	
Other Transients	8.60E-2	
ATWS Categories		
Turbine Trip ATWS	5.50E-1	
LOSP ATWS	7.87E-3	
Loss of Condenser Heat Sink ATWS	1.52E-1	
Inadvertent Opening of SRV ATWS	1.36E-2	
Loss of Feedwater ATWS	3.02E-1	
LOCA Initiator Categories		
Breaks Outside Containment	6.67E-4	
Excessive LOCA (reactor vessel failure)	9.39E-9	
Interfacing Systems LOCA	3.15E-5	

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INITIATING EVENTS FOR BFN PRA

Initiator Category	Mean Frequency (events per year)	
Large LOCA – Core Spray Line Break		
Loop I	1.68E-6	
Loop II	1.68E-6	
Large LOCA – Recirculation Discharge Line Break		
Loop A	1.18E-5	
Loop В	1.18E-5	
Large LOCA – Recirculation Suction Line Break		
Loop A	8.39E-7	
Loop B	8.39E-7	
Other Large LOCA	8.39E-7	
Medium LOCA Inside Containment	3.80E-5	
Small LOCA Inside Containment	4.75E-4	
Very Small LOCA Inside Containment	5.76E-3	
Internal Flooding Initiator Categories		
EECW Flood in Reactor Building – shutdown units	1.20E-3	
EECW Flood in Reactor Building – operating unit	1.85E-6	
Flood from the Condensate Storage Tank	1.22E-4	
Flood from the Torus	1.22E-4	
Large Turbine Building Flood	3.65E-3	
Small Turbine Building Flood	1.65E-2	

Table A-2 BFN PRA MODELED SYSTEMS

- 120V and 250V DC Electric Power
- AC Electric Power
- ARI and RPT
- Condensate Storage Tank
- Condensate System
- Containment Atmospheric Dilution
- **Control Rod Drive Hydraulic**
- Core Spray System
- **Drywell Control Air**
- **Emergency Diesel Generators**
- Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
- Feedwater System
- Fire Protection System (for alternative RPV injection)
- Hardened Wetwell Vent
- **High Pressure Coolant Injection**
- Main Steam System
- Plant Air Systems
- Primary Containment Isolation
- Raw Cooling Water
- Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
- **Reactor Core Isolation Cooling**
- **Reactor Protection System**
- **Recirculation System**
- Residual Heat Removal System
- **RHR Service Water**
- Secondary Containment Isolation
- Shared Actuation Instrumentation System
- SRVs / ADS
- Standby Gas Treatment System
- Standby Liquid Control System

Table A-2 BFN PRA MODELED SYSTEMS

Suppression Pool / Vapor Suppression Turbine Bypass and Main Condenser

PRA PEER REVIEW TECHNICAL ELEMENTS FOR LEVEL 1

PRA ELEMENT	CERTIFICATION SUB-ELEMENTS	
Initiating Events	Guidance Documents for Initiating Event Analysis	
	Groupings	
	- Transient	
	- LOCA	
	- Support System/Special	
	- ISLOCA	
	- Break Outside Containment	
	- Internal Floods	
	Subsumed Events	
	• Data	
	Documentation	
Accident Sequence Evaluation	Guidance on Development of Event Trees	
(Event Trees)	Event Trees (Accident Scenario Evaluation)	
	- Transients	
	- SBO	
	- LOCA	
	- ATWS	
	- Special	
	- ISLOCA/BOC	
	- Internal Floods	
	Success Criteria and Bases	
	Interface with EOPs/AOPs	
	Accident Sequence Plant Damage States	
	Documentation	

PRA PEER REVIEW TECHNICAL ELEMENTS FOR LEVEL 1

PRA ELEMENT	CERTIFICATION SUB-ELEMENTS
Thermal Hydraulic Analysis	Guidance Document
	Best Estimate Calculations (e.g., MAAP)
	Generic Assessments
	FSAR - Chapter 15
	Room Heat Up Calculations
	Documentation
System Analysis	System Analysis Guidance Document(s)
(Fault Trees)	System Models
	- Structure of models
	- Level of Detail
	- Success Criteria
	- Nomenclature
	- Data (see Data Input)
	- Dependencies (see Dependency Element)
	- Assumptions
	Documentation of System Notebooks

PRA PEER REVIEW TECHNICAL ELEMENTS FOR LEVEL 1

PRA ELEMENT	CERTIFICATION SUB-ELEMENTS	
Data Analysis	Guidance	
	Component Failure Probabilities	
	System/Train Maintenance Unavailabilities	
	Common Cause Failure Probabilities	
	Unique Unavailabilities or Modeling Items	
	- AC Recovery	
	- Scram System	
	- EDG Mission Time	
	- Repair and Recovery Model	
	- SORV	
	- LOOP Given Transient	
	- BOP Unavailability	
	- Pipe Rupture Failure Probability	
	Documentation	
Human Reliability Analysis	Guidance	
	Pre-Initiator Human Actions	
	- Identification	
	- Analysis	
	- Quantification	
	Post-Initiator Human Actions and Recovery	
	- Identification	
	- Analysis	
	- Quantification	
	Dependence among Actions	
	Documentation	

PRA PEER REVIEW TECHNICAL ELEMENTS FOR LEVEL 1

PRA ELEMENT	CERTIFICATION SUB-ELEMENTS
Dependencies	Guidance Document on Dependency Treatment
	Intersystem Dependencies
	Treatment of Human Interactions (see also HRA)
	Treatment of Common Cause
	Treatment of Spatial Dependencies
	Walkdown Results
κ.	Documentation
Structural Capability	Guidance
	RPV Capability (pressure and temperature)
	- ATWS
	- Transient
	Containment (pressure and temperature)
	Reactor Building
	Pipe Overpressurization for ISLOCA
	Documentation
Quantification/Results	Guidance
Interpretation	Computer Code
	Simplified Model (e.g., cutset model usage)
	Dominant Sequences/Cutsets
	Non-Dominant Sequences/Cutsets
	Recovery Analysis
	Truncation
	Uncertainty
	Results Summary

PRA CERTIFICATION TECHNICAL ELEMENTS FOR LEVEL 2

PRA ELEMENT	CERTIFICATION SUB-ELEMENTS
Containment Performance Analysis	Guidance Document
	Success Criteria
	L1/L2 Interface
	Phenomena Considered
	Important HEPs
	Containment Capability Assessment
	End state Definition
	LERF Definition
	• CETs
	Documentation

PRA CERTIFICATION TECHNICAL ELEMENTS FOR MAINTENANCE AND UPDATE PROCESS

PRA ELEMENT	CERTIFICATION SUB-ELEMENTS
Maintenance and Update Process	Guidance Document
	 Input - Monitoring and Collecting New Information
	Moclel Control
	PRA Maintenance and Update Process
	• Evaluation of Results
	Re-evaluation of Past PRA Applications
	Documentation

Appendix B PROBABILITY OF PRE-EXISTING CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

Containment failures that may be postulated to defeat the containment overpressure credit include containment isolation system failures (refer to Appendix D) and preexisting unisolable containment leakage pathways. The pre-existing containment leakage probability used in this analysis is obtained from EPRI 1009325, <u>Risk Impact of Assessment of Extended Integrated Leak Rate Testing Intervals.</u>[2] This is the same approach as used in the recent 2005 Vermont Yankee EPU COP analyses, and accepted by the NRC and ACRS. [4]

EPRI 1009325 provides a framework for assessing the risk impact for extending integrated leak rate test (ILRT) surveillance intervals. EPRI 1009325 includes a compilation of industry containment leakage events, from which an assessment was performed of the likelihood of a pre-existing unisolable containment leakage pathway.

A total of seventy-one (71) containment leakage or degraded liner events were compiled. Approximately half (32 of the 71 events) had identified leakage rates of less than or equal to 1La (i.e., the Technical Specification containment allowed leakage rate). None of the 71 events had identified leakage rates greater than 21La. EPRI 1009325 employed industry experts to review and categorize the industry events, and then various statistical methods were used to assess the data. The resulting probabilities as a function of pre-existing leakage size are summarized here in Table B-1.

The EPRI 1009325 study used 100La as a conservative estimate of the leakage size that would represent a large early release pathway consistent with the LERF risk measure, but estimated that leakages greater than 600La are a more realistic representation of a large early release.

B-1

This analysis is not concerned per se about the size of a leakage pathway that would represent a LERF release, but rather a leakage size that would defeat the containment overpressure credit. Given the low likelihood of such a leakage, the exact size is not key to this risk assessment, and no detailed calculation of the exact hole size is performed here. The recent COP risk assessment for the Vermont Yankee Mark I BWR plant, presented to the ACRS in November and December 2005, determined a leakage size of 27La using the conservative 10CFR50, Appendix K containment analysis approach. Earlier ILRT industry guidance (NEI Interim Guidance – see Ref. 10 of EPRI 1009325) conservatively recommended use of 10La to represent "small" containment leakages and 35La to represent "large" containment leakages.

Given the above, the base analysis here assumes 35La as the size of a pre-existing containment leakage pathway sufficient to defeat the containment overpressure credit. Such a hole size does not realistically represent a LERF release (based on EPRI 1009325) and is also believed (based on the VY hole size estimate) to be on the low end of a hole size that would preclude containment overpressure credit. As can be seen from Table B-1, the probability of the 35La pre-existing containment leakage used in this base case analysis is 9.86E-04.

Sensitivity studies to the base case quantification (refer to Section 4) assess the sensitivity of the results to the pre-existing leakage size assumption.

Table B-1

PROBABILITY OF PRE-EXISTING UNISOLABLE CONTAINMENT LEAK [2] (as a Function of Leakage Size)⁽¹⁾

Leakage Size (La)	Mean Probability of Occurrence
1	2.65E-02
2	1.59E-02
5	7.42E-03
10	3.88E-03
20	1.88E-03
35	9.86E-04
50	6.33E-04
100	2.47E-04
200	8.57E-05
500	1.75E-05
600	1.24E-05

Notes:

⁽¹⁾ Reference [2] recommends these values for use for both BWRs and PWRs. Reference [2] makes no specific allowance for the fact that inerted BWRs, such as BFN, could be argued to have lower probabilities of significant pre-existing containment leakages.

Appendix C

ASSESSMENT OF RIVER WATER AND SP WATER TEMPERATURE VARIATION

The BFN river and torus water temperatures were analyzed to statistically model variability in temperature. The purpose of this data assessment is to estimate for use in the risk assessment the realistic probability that these temperatures will exceed a given value, i.e. the probability of exceedance.

C.1 BFN EXPERIENCE DATA

The following sets of river water inlet and torus water daily temperature data were obtained and reviewed:

Unit	Data Period	Years
2	01/01/00 - 01/31/06	6.1
3	02/01/03 - 01/31/06	3.0

Data for suppression pool water level for the above time periods were also obtained. However, statistical assessment of the variation in pool level was not pursued as the small variation in pool level has a non-significant impact on the COP / NPSH calculations.

The river water temperature data from the above units is not pooled because river temperature is dependent upon the seasonal cycle in weather and is not independent between the units. Use of data for SW inlet temperatures from multiple units would incorrectly assume the sets of data are independent when in fact they are directly dependent upon weather and the common river source. As such, the statistical assessment of the river water temperature variation uses the largest set of data (i.e., the 6.1 years of data from the Unit 2 river water inlet).

As the torus water temperature has a high dependence on river water temperature for most of the year, the assessment of the torus temperature variability also is based on the 6.1 year data set from Unit 2.

C.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF TEMPERATURE DATA

The chronological variation in river water temperature and torus water temperature is plotted together on the graph shown in Figure C-1. As can be seen from Figure C-1, the torus water temperature is always equal to or higher than the river water temperature. Also, the river water temperatures and torus temperatures are closely correlated in the warmer months when river water temperature is above approximately 70°F.

The 6.1 years of temperature data was categorized into 5-degree temperature bins ranging from 50°F to 99°F degrees. The resulting histograms are shown in Figures C-2 and C-3. Figure C-2 presents histogram for the river water temperature and Figure C-3 presents the histogram for the torus water temperature.

The histogram information was then used in a statistical analysis software package (Crystal Ball, a MS Excel add-in, developed by Decisioneering, Inc. of Denver, CO) to approximate a distribution of the expected range in temperature.

The Crystal Ball software automatically tests a number of curve fits. The best fit for the temperature data is a normal distribution that is truncated at user-defined upper and lower bounds. If upper and lower bounds are not defined, the tails of the curve fit distribution extend to unrealistic values (e.g., river water and torus water temperatures below 0°F degrees). To constrain the distributions, the following user-defined upper and lower bounds were used:

- River water temperature lower bound of 32°F (no data points in the 6.1 years of data reached 32°F, only a single data point reached 35°F)
- River water temperature upper bound of 95°F (no data points in the 6.1 years of data exceeded 90°F)
- Torus water temperature lower bound of 55°F (no data points in the 6.1 years of data reached lower than 57°F)
- Torus water temperature upper bound of 95°F (only a single data point in the 6.1 years of data reached 93°F)

The Crystal Ball software statistical results for the river water temperature and torus water temperature variations are provided in Figures C-4 and C-5, respectively.

The statistical results are also summarized in the form of exceedance probability as a function of temperature in Figures C-6 and C-7. The information is also presented in tabular form, Tables C-1 and C-2. As discussed previously, the river water and the torus water temperature variations are not independent; as such, the exceedance frequencies are not independent (i.e., they should not be multiplied together directly to determine the probability of exceeding a particular temperature in the river AND at the same time exceeding particular temperature in the torus).

Figure C-1

CHRONOLOGICAL VARIABILITY IN RIVER WATER AND TORUS WATER TEMPERATURES


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Figure C-2

RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE HISTOGRAM



Figure C-3





Figure C-4

STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE VARIATION

Crystal Ball Report Simulation started on 2/6/06 at 7:09:56 Simulation stopped on 2/6/06 at 7:11:44

Forecast: Pool Temperature

Cell: C15

Summary:

Display Range is from 55.00 to 95.00 F Entire Range is from 55.00 to 95.00 F After 50,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0.05

Statistics:	<u>Value</u>
Trials	50000
Mean	75.75
Median	76.06
Mode	
Standard Deviation	11.30
Variance	127.65
Skewness	-0.08
Kurtosis	1.85
Coeff. of Variability	0.15
Range Minimum	55.00
Range Maximum	95.00
Range Width	40.00
Mean Std. Error	0.05



Figure C-5

STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR TORUS WATER TEMPERATURE VARIATION

Crystal Ball Report Simulation started on 2/6/06 at 7:09:56 Simulation stopped on 2/6/06 at 7:11:44

Forecast: River Temperature

Cell: G18

Su	mr	nar	У:

Display Range is from 30.00 to 100.00 F Entire Range is from 32.00 to 95.00 F After 50,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0.08

Sta	tisti	cs

istics:	Value
Trials	50000
Mean	63.50
Median	63.41
Mode	
Standard Deviation	18.07
Variance	326.51
Skewness	0.00
Kurtosis	1.81
Coeff. of Variability	0.28
Range Minimum	32.00
Range Maximum	95.00
Range Width	63.00
Mean Std. Error	0.08







Table C-1

RIVER WATER TEMPERATURE EXCEEDANCE PROBABILITIES

Temperature (°F)	Exceedance Probability
30	1.00E+00
35	9.55E-01
40	8.80E-01
45	8.02E-01
50	7.24E-01
55	6.45E-01
60	5.64E-01
65	4.74E-01
70	3.97E-01
75	3.17E-01
80	2.41E-01
85	1.64E-01
86	1.40E-01
90	8.46E-02
95	9.15E-03
100	0.00E+00

Table C-2

TORUS WATER TEMPERATURE EXCEEDANCE PROBABILITIES

Temperature (°F)	Exceedance Probability
30	1.00E+00
35	1.00E+00
40	1.00E+00
45	1.00E+00
50	1.00E+00
55	1.00E+00
60	8.90E-01
65	7.79E-01
70	6.63E-01
75	5.28E-01
80	4.01E-01
85	2.62E-01
90	1.35E-01
92	8.25E-02
95	1.01E-02
100	0.00E+00

Appendix D LARGE-LATE RELEASE IMPACT

In the November-December 2005 ACRS meetings concerning the Vermont Yankee EPU and COP credit risk assessments, the ACRS questioned the impact on Large-Late releases from EPU and COP credit. The following discussion is provided to address this question for the BFN COP credit risk assessment.

D.1 OVERVIEW OF BFN PRA RELEASE CATEGORIZATION

The spectrum of possible radionuclide release scenarios in the BFN Level 2 PRA is represented by a discrete set of release categories or bins. Typical of industry PRAs, the BFN release categories are defined by the following two key attributes:

- Timing of the release
- Magnitude of the release

D.1.1 <u>Timing Categorization</u>

Three timing categories are used, as follows:

- 1) Early (E) Less than 6 hours from accident initiation
- 2) Intermediate (I) Greater than or equal to 6 hours, but less than 24 hours
- 3) Late (L) Greater than or equal to 24 hours.

The definition of the timing categories is relative to the timing of the declaration of a General Emergency and based upon past experience concerning offsite accident response:

- 0-6 hours is conservatively assumed to include cases in which minimal offsite protective measures have been observed to be performed in nonnuclear accidents.
- 6-24 hours is a time frame in which much of the offsite nuclear plant protective measures can be assured to be accomplished.
- >24 hours are times at which the offsite measures can be assumed to be fully effective.

Magnitude Categorization

The BFN Level 2 PRA defines the following radionuclide release magnitude classifications:

- 1) <u>High</u> (H) A radionuclide release of sufficient magnitude to have the potential to cause prompt fatalities.
- 2) <u>Medium or Moderate</u> (M) A radionuclide release of sufficient magnitude to cause near-term health effects.
- 3) Low (L) A radionuclide release with the potential for latent health effects.
- 4) <u>Low-Low</u> (LL) A radionuclide release with undetectable or minor health effects.
- 5) <u>Negligible</u> (OK) A radionuclide release that is less than or equal to the containment design base leakage.

The definition of the source terms levels distinguishing each of these release severity categories is based on the review of existing consequence analyses performed in previous industry studies, PRAs and NRC studies containing detailed consequence modeling. The BFN Level 2 PRA uses cesium as the measure of the source term magnitude because it delivers a substantial fraction of the total whole body population dose. This approach is typical of most industry PRAs.

In terms of fraction of core inventory CsI released, the BFN release magnitude classification is as follows:

Release Magnitude	Fraction of Release Csl Fission Products
High	greater than 10%
Medium/Moderate	1 to 10%
Low	0.1 to 1.0%
Low-Low	less than 0.1%
Negligible	much less than 0.1%

D.2 LLOCA COP CREDIT IMPACT ON LARGE-LATE

Based on the preceding discussions, it can be seen that "Large-Late" scenarios are termed High-Late releases in BFN Level 2 PRA terminology and are defined as releases occurring after 24hrs and with a magnitude of >10% Csl.

For this risk assessment it is not necessary to perform any explicit quantification of the Level 2 PRA to determine the effect on large-late releases, i.e., the scenarios of interest in this analysis are never late releases, in fact they are all always Early releases.

The scenarios of interest in this risk assessment are very low frequency postulated scenarios that were not explicitly incorporated into the BFN base PRA. These scenarios are defined by containment isolation failure at t=0, leading to assumed loss of NPSH to the ECCS pumps in the short term and leading to core damage in approximately one hour.

In summary, there is no change in the frequency of Large-Late releases due to the credit of COP in DBA LOCA scenarios.

Appendix E REVISED EVENT TREES

This appendix provides print-outs of the BFN Unit 1 PRA modified event trees used in this analysis. In addition, the RISKMAN software event tree "rules" and "macros" for these revised event trees are also provided in this appendix.

E.1 MODEL CHANGES

The following are details of the changes made to the BFN Unit 1 PRA RISKMAN models for this risk assessment.

The BFN Unit 1 PRA model of record was modified for this risk assessment to question the status of containment integrity first in the Level 1 large LOCA event trees. In addition, a second node was added to the large LOCA event trees to question the probability of extreme plant conditions (e.g., high river water temperature). These nodes are then used to fail the RHR and CS pumps for scenarios with 2 or less RHR pumps in SPC.

The scope of the analysis is limited to large LOCA accidents. In order to ensure that only the large LOCA initiators are affected by the event tree changes, several of the existing event trees were renamed. In addition, because the containment isolation top event CIL is located in the containment event tree CET1, it too was renamed. The event tree names were revised as follows:

Original Event Tree	New Event Tree	Description
CET1	CETN1	Containment event tree 1
LLCS	LLCSN	Core spray LLOCA event tree
LLRD	LLDSN	Recirc discharge LLOCA event tree
LLO	LLON	Other large LOCA event tree
LLRS	LLSN	Recirc suction LLOCA event tree

In the containment event tree, top event CIL was replaced with a dummy top event, CILDUM, which is a switch whose branches depends on CIL, now moved into the large LOCA event trees. Two split fractions were developed for CILDUM, one for success (CILDS) and one for failure (CILDF). The branches of CILDUM depend on CIL, which is traced via macro CILFAIL. Macro CILFAIL is a logical TRUE if top event CIL=F, otherwise it is FALSE. If CILFAIL is TRUE, that is if CIL fails, then the failed branch of CILDUM is assigned via split fraction CILDF (1.00E+00). Otherwise, the success branch is assigned via split fraction CILDS (0.00E+00).

The purpose of installing dummy top event CILDUM is to preserve the containment event tree structure (i.e., the RISKMAN software allows use of a specific top event name only once in an accident sequence structure). All top events that are asked in the base model if CIL fails are still asked; those that are not normally asked are not asked in this sensitivity case.

In each of the large LOCA event trees, top event CIL was added as the left most top event. Top event NPSH was added as the next top event to the right. In this way, the original event tree structure is preserved because CIL transfers to NPSH which transfers to the original first top of each event tree.

CIL models containment isolation penetrations greater than 3 inches, and top event NPSH models the probability of reactor power at 102% as well as river water temperature greater than 86F. Top event NPSH has two split fractions NPSH1 and NPSHS (success, equal to 0.00E+00). The latter is applied for all initiators other than those modeling large LOCAs. The existing CIL fault tree was modified to add the probability of a pre-existing containment leak; a basic event was inserted just under the top 'OR' gate of the CIL fault tree. The basic event is set to different values depending on the size of the leak rate assumed. See Table 4-2 for the sensitivity cases and associated pre-existing leak size. The values used and the resultant CIL split fraction values are listed below:

Sensitivity Case	Leak Size	Leak Probability	CIL Split Fractions ⁽¹⁾
Base	35 La	9.86E-04	1.36E-03
1	100 La	2.47E-04	6.22E-04
2	20 La	1.88E-03	2.25E-03
3	Base CIL split fractions X 10, plus pre-existing leak 35 La	9.86E-04	6.37E-03
4	35 La	9.86E-04	1.36E-03
5	Base CIL split fractions X 10, plus pre-existing leak 20 La	1.88E-03	7.37E-03

Note:

⁽¹⁾All support split fraction. Degraded state split fraction is also affected but not shown.

Top event NPSH models the probability that the plant is at 102% reactor power with 86F river water, 'OR' the reactor is at the nominal 100% reactor power level with river water greater than 70F. The probability that the plant is at 102% power is modeled using a miscalibration human error probability taken from a similar action documented in the existing BFN Unit 1 PRA Human Reliability Analysis (see event ZHECCL, instrument calibration error, Control Room). The probability that the river water is either greater than 70F or greater than 86F is developed in the data analysis (refer to Appendix C).

Top event NPSH has two split fractions, NPSH1 and NPSHS. The latter is used to filter out sequences where greater than 3 RHR pumps are running. This latter pass-through split fraction is used to exclude the cases where sufficient RHR pumps are cooling the torus such that containment overpressure is not necessary (per DBA calculations) for the success of the RHR and CS pumps. The status of the RHR pumps and heat exchangers is tracked via an existing macro in the event tree RHRET. Split fraction NPSH1 is the default split fraction. Refer to Section 4.2.2 where scenarios with more than 2 RHR pumps in SPC are analyzed as a sensitivity case.

When both top events CIL and NPSH fail, conditions are present such that the model assumes there is insufficient NPSH for the low pressure pumps to operate during a large LOCA. RISKMAN rules were added to assign guaranteed failure split fractions for

top events: CS, LPCI, LPCII, SPI and SPII. A macro was created (NPSHLOST, defined as CIL=F*NPSH=F) and defined in each large LOCA event tree. The macro was then added to the split fraction rule for each guaranteed failed split fraction for the desired top event. Note that drywell spray failure is captured by the event tree structure (i.e., if LPCI loops I and II are failed, then drywell spray is never asked in the event trees).

挋 CIL NPSH RPSM RPSE TOR TTP NC lpci LPCH cs SI XS ******** **********

MODEL Name: U1ERIN Event Tree: LLCSN.ETI

BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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Page No. 1 of 2 12:22:35 February 14, 2006

Page No. 2 of 2 12:22:35 February 14, 2006

MODEL Name: UTERIN Event Tree: LLCSN.ETI

SPC	SPI	SPI	SPC	ODWS	DWS	X#	8#	St	
x2			X1				1	t	
l l	1	1	Ĺ	······			2	2	
					L		3	3	
				L			4	4	
[1	L	*****	******	(***>==================================	Xi	5	5-8	
	L			~~~	******	XI	5	9-12	
		L		***	**********	XI	7	13-16	
L	*****						8	17	
					L		9	18	
			****		·····		10	19	
					L		11	20	
	******			******	.4.#>++**************	X2·	12	21-38	
							13	39	
~~~	*****	*****	)	********	******	X2	14	40-57	
							15	58	
					I		16	59	
-4	*********	*********		*************	*****	X2	17	60-77	
							18	· 78	
~~~~		******	**********	********	******	X2	19	79-96	
							20	97	
					L		21	88	
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~		*****		,,	,	X2	22	99-116	-
				•			23	117	•
	,						24	118	
****	*****************	*****				X3	25	119-236	
*****				·····			26	237	
					L		27	238	
• ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~							28	239	
					L		29	240	
	~			~~~~~			<b>\$</b>	544 67	
······	******						31	242	
	*****	*****		+\$4419\$\$\$440\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	X5	32	243-484	
*******		****	********			X6	33	485-968	

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BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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#### Model Name: U1COP2-5 Top Events for Event Tree: LLCSN

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#### 5:06 FM 2/9/2006 Rage 1

Top Boest Name	Description
CIL	Prinast (invaluent isolation pail/RE - large (~>3 inches)
NFSA	conditions preventing NPSH for LLOCA
rfsm	NECERNICAL PORTION OF RPS SUCCESSFUL
RPSE	ELECTRICAL PORTION OF RES (NUREG-\$500 BASIS)
30a -	Pressure suppression pool
tt2	TURBING TAL?
IVC	CLOSURE OF MEIVE
LPCT	LYCE LOOP E
LPCII	LPC LOOP II
CS	core stray system
st .	LOGIC SNITCH FOR SUFFICIENT INJECTION
0880	OPERATOR ALIGNS SUPPRESSION FOOL COOLING
se1	Suppression fool cooling fariware - Loop I
sfii	SUPPRESSION FOOL COOLING FARMARE - LOOP II.
88C	Logic switch for suppression pool cooling with ui rhr
oems	operator aligns drywell spray
DN3	Drywell spray hardware

E-7

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#### Model Name: U1COP2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLCSN

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5:16 PM 2/9/2006 Page 1

5F	Split Fraction Assignment Rule	~~~~
CILL	PCA=8* (DXF=8 + LVF=8)	
CIB2	PCA=F+ (DXF=S + LV9=5)	
CIPL	D%D=L+TA6=8.	
¥7333	BUR1*RER2*RUR3 + BUR1*RUR2*RER4 + SHR1*RHR3*RER4 + SHR2*RHR3*RER4 + RHR1*RHR2*RHR3*RHR4 Comments IF 3 OR MCRE PIMPS ARE AVAILABLE WE DOX'T MEED COP FOR SCU NFSH	5
NPSR1	INIT=LLCA + INIT=LLCB + INIT=LLDA + INIT=LLDE + INIT=LLCA + INIT=LLSA + INIT=LLSB	
KPSH3	3	
apsms	1	
APSEC ·	1	
Porl	1	
etpl	225-5*51*5	
5973	285~5*5IT=F	
5933	095=2*0I=S	
6.56£	1	
1901	1	
lpcip	-lpcisup + Epselost	
LPCI2	LPCISUP Comments MANUAL LPCI START NOT CREDITED LLOCAS; ODD SPLIT FRACTION SNOULD APPLY	
LPCITF	-LPCIISOF + MPEHLOST	
LPCI12	1.903-8	
SPCII4	-lpcisup	
lpciig	PGCI-L. Paciens	
26¥	IXII-LLCR+ (RE~F+RC~F+D&~F+RD~F+BD~F+NYII=F + CASSIG +D%~F*LY~F+RA~F+ + IXII-LLCB*(RE~F+RR~F+DR~F+AB~F+DC=F+XPI=F+D%~F*LY~F+RD=F+ZSCK) + NYS&LOST	ECV
052	IBIT=IICB+-{RE>F+AA=F+DA=F+AB>F+AB>F+OC>F+XFI>F+DN=F*IV=F+RC>F+BSC#}	
2528	Initelica*-{Rf>F+AC=F+DS=F+AD=F+DD=F+RSII=F+ CASSIC+D%=F*LV=F+RE=F+ -::	C%)
C5P -	1	

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#### Model Name: UlCOP2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLCSN

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#### 5:06 PM 2/9/2006 Faga 2

87	Split Fraction Assignment Sule
515	LPCI=S*RFA=S*RFC=S + LHCII=S*RFB=S*RFD=S + LFCI=S*LFCII=S*( (RFA=S+RFC=S) + (RFB=S+RFD=S) + CS=S ) Comments Any TWO SHR FUNDS CR CS FROMTHE UNBROKEN LOOP
SIF	1
OSPC1	8.25%=6*898 <b>5=</b> 5
CSPCF	1
8PIT	Q82C=F + R5=F + R25310:57
8P12	RZ=S*RC=S*(RZA=S=HXA=S + RFC=S*RXC=S)
SPIF	1
SPLIF	OSPC=F + RF=F + NFSHLONT
Spii4	(RP8=5*!IXB=5 + R2D=5*!!(D=5)*5P2=5
erii5	(RP3-5*HX5-5 + R2D=5*H1D=5)*SP2=F*RE>6
spii6	(RPS=S^HXR=S + RRD=S*HXD=S)*SFI=8*82=7
spiif	1
SPCZ	~{\$PI#\$} *~ (\$PII#\$}
SPCS	Spies* (RPA=6*HXA=6 + RBC=6*HXC=6) + Spie=6*(RPR=9*HXB=6+RPD=6*XXD=6)
SPCT	
odws1	2
DWSF .	priaf*\$x2=f + {R\$&=f*RPC=f +RH=f+&GGE} * {RPB=f*R\$D=f+Ri=f + xOGD}
DWS1	pri=s*pri=s* (rfa=s+rfc=s) *=rogs* (rfs=s+rfd=s) *=nogd
ows2	(RPR=F*RPC=F +RH=F+SOJ3+PX1=F) * (RPB=F*RPD=F+RI=F + RDDD+PX2=F)
DWSF	1

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Model Name: U1COP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLCSN

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## 5:06 pm 2/2/2006 Fage 1

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Kaczo	Miero Rris / Comments
Altinjrhsw	rpsx=8 This macro is needed in the cets
altinju2x	RF314-2 This macro is needed in the cets
BUCKET	875)~5
CILFAIL	CIL=P
CLASSIA	RFSIM-8
Class1b	RFSM=3
Classibe	RESN-8
CLASSIBL	RPSN#8
CLASSIC	rfem-3
CLASSI 0	RF628≖3
CLABSIS	₹₽8%≈9
CLASS2	R.200-9
CLASS2R	R\$5%=8
CLASS2L	spare + ospare
CLASS2T	rPS1=8
CLASS2V	R¥SI≪5
CLASS3A	apsii≈B
	8.2535-43

Model Name: V1COP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLCSN

5:08 9% 2/9/2006 Page 2

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Magro	Kaare Rule / Comments	
CLASS3C	-{SINS}+ -{TTP+S+IVC=S}	
CLASS3D	-{TCR#\$}	
•	•	
CLASS4	R7554-F	
CLASS5	-{*T?#\$}*-{IVC=\$}	
£		-
ens pray	DNS+8 This NACRO is needed in the cets	
EMDE PHOMR	8180WB	
	This hadro is needed in the cets	
HICH .	R <b>?61<del>1</del>-B</b>	
Hei	<b>₹</b> ₹5₩~3	
1.0M	INIT-LLCB + INIT-LLCB	
LECIISUP	RE-S+{ (NPII-S+0K-S) + 1.V=S }	•
LPCLSUF	re-8* ( (NFI-5*DX-5) + LV-5 ) Loof I lfci suffort	
lfi	\$I=8	
NOACREC	RPSM=3 This macro is nueded in the cete	
NOCE	R26m=s * Tor=s+(TTB=s+(VC=s)*s1=s*sfC=s	
NODC	RJSH-9 This macro is needed in the crts	
NORV	Resk-9 This macro is needed in the cets	•
NCSRY	RPSM-B This macro is needed in the cets	
NPSHLOST	Ciloftaren	
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# Model Name: UICOP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLCSN 3:05 FM 2/5/2005 Fage 3

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Macro	Macro Rule / Comments
opdefli	RPSN-B This macro is needed in the cets
RINSPCOOL	SPC+8
sorv	RPRAS Large Locas are alwrys depressurizeed
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MODEL Neme: UTERIN Event Tree: LLON.ETT Page No. 1 of 2 13:37:12 February 16, 2008

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BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

MODEL Nat Event Tree:	BE: UTERN LLON.ETI	
-46		
X¥	E#	St
	1	1
	2	2
	3	3
X1	5	5-8
XI	6	9-12
XI	7	13-16
	8	17
	9 40	18 19
	11	29
X2	12	21-38
	13	39
X2	54 	49-57
	13 16	50 ·
X2	ñ	fR)-77
	18	78
X2	19	79-96
	20 71	37 98
X2	2	99-118
	23	117
	24	118
<b>X</b> 3	25 198	113-236
	23	238
	28	239
	29	240
	30	241
	33	7.47.
74 V6	32 12	293-904 486.062
XS	33	

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#### BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

#### Model Name: U1COP2-9 Top Events for Event Tree: LLON

#### 5:07 TH 2/9/2006 Page 1 Top Event Name Description CIL PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FAILURE - LARGE (->3 INCRES) NPSH CONDITIONS PREVENTING MPSH FOR LLOCA RFSM MECHANICAL FORTION OF RES SUCCESSFUL RPSE ELECTRICAL PORTION OF RPS (NUREG-5500 BASIS) PRESSURE SUPPRESSION POOL TOR T79 TURBINE TRIP IVC CLOSURE OF MEIVE LECX. LPCI LOOP I LPCII The toos ii CS CORE SPRAY SYSTEM LOGIC SWITCH FOR SUFFICIENT INJECTION si OSTC OPERATOR ALIGNS SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING \$PI SUPPRESSION FOOL COOLING HARDWARE - LOOP I SPIL SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING HARDWARE - LOOP II LOGIC SWITCH FOR SUPPRESSION FOOL COOLING WITH UI RER spc ODWS OPERATOR ALIGNS DRYWELL SPRAY DRYWELL SPRAY HARDWARE DWS

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#### Model Name: U1COP2-9

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#### Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Trea: LLON

5:07 PM 2/9/2005 -Page 1

ST	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
CILL	PCA=S* (DXP=S + LVP=S)
CIL2	PCANE* (IMPAS + LVPAS)
CILF	THEME, TARME
resu2 .	RHR1*RER2*RHR3 + RNR1*RER2*RER4 + RER1*RHR3*RNR4 + EHE2*RNR3*RER4 + RHR1*RER2*RHR3*RER4 CONTENTS IF 3 OR MORE PUNPS ARE AVAILABLE WE DON'T NEED COP FOR ECCS WF6H
<b>RPSR1</b>	INIT-LLCA + INIT-LLCB + INIT-LLDA + INIT-LLOB + INIT-LLO + INIT-LLSA + INIT-LLSE
vPSHS	1
RPSMS .	<b>1</b> · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
RFSED	1
tori	1
rtel .	B85#5*DI#\$
rtp2	283-5*DI#F
TTT3	385-s [*] 01"=5
r77F	1
IVCL	1
LPCIF	-lpcisup + mpshlost
LPCI2	LPCISUP. Comments MANUAL LPCI START NOT CREDITED LLOCAS; ODD SPLIT FRACTION SWOOLD APPLY
lpciif	-lèciisup + nesulost
LPCIT2	Tecies
LPCII4	~l?CI\$U?
LPCII6	lpci=x+lpcisup
st	{RE=F+AC=F+DB=F+AD=F+DD=F+XFII=F+ CASSIG+DK=F*LV=F+RD=F+ -EECK} * {RE=F+AA=F+DA=F+AD=F+DC=F+XFI=F+JN=F*LV=F+RC=F+ -EECK} + XPSHLO37
:82	- (RE#F+RA=F+D2#F+RE=F+D0=F+NFI=F+DN=F*LV=F+RO=F+ `-KECW}
328	-{Kf=f+rc=}+db=f+rd=f+kp11=f+ crssig+dx=f+lv=f+rb=f+ ~recx}
C3F	i
575	LPCIMS*(RPAMS+RPCMS) + LPCIImS*(RPCmS+RPDmS) + CSMS

SF	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
	COMPUENTS ANY TWO RAR FUMPS OR CS FROMTHE SNEROKEN LOOP
slf	1
OSPC1	RPSM~5*RP3Z~S
osper	1
spit	RE-F + OSPC-F + NPSHLOS?
SPI2	1
Spilf	ospc=t + RF=F + NPSH101:
SPII4	{RPB=5*HXB=5 + RPD=5*HXI=5}*5PI=5
Spiis	{RP5=5*HXB=5 + R70=5+HX ==3}*521=F*R2=5
SPI16 .	{R99-5*#XB#3 + R90#5*#X1#5}*371#7*R5#F
SFIIF	1
sect	- (\$P1==3) *- (\$P11==5)
SPCS	spi=2* (RFA=5*HXA=5 + RP(==5*HKC=6) + Spii=5*(RDB=5*HXB=6+RPD=5*HXD=5)
SPCF	1
00#51	1
oksr /	px1=F*PK2=F + (R2A=F*RPJ=F +RH=F+BOGB) * (R28=F*RPD=P+RI=F + NOGD)
DWS1	?x1=\$*fx2=\$* (R3A=\$+RPC=3) *~n0g8* (B23=\$+RPD=\$) *~n0gd
DWS2	(RPA=F*RPC=? +3H=F+NOGB+FX1=F) * (RPB=F*RFD=F+RI=F + KOGD+PX2=F)
DWST	1

• Model Name: U1COF2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLON

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### BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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	Macro	Macro Rula / Connests
	ALTINURHSW	restore This macro is needed in the cets
•	ALTINJU2X	RP3M-B This macro is needed in the cets
	SUCKET	R¥31∞a
	CILFAIL	CIL¤\$
	CLASSIA	RF5RB
	CLASSIB	₽₽\$\$ <b>*</b> ₽
	CLASSIRE	RPSH=8
	Classisl	RP31-8
•	CLASSIC	resn=e
	CLASSID	8737~3
·	CLASSIE	RP3M∞B
	CLASS2	RPSN=8
	Class2a	rpsn=3
	Class2l	ospo=F4 spc=?
	CLASS2T	₹£SK≈₽
	CLASS2V	rean-B
	Classia	R25%~8

#### Model Name: U1COF2-9 Nacro for Event Tree: LLON

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#### BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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#### Model Name: U1COP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLON

#### 5:87 FN 2/9/2005 Fage 2

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Magro	Macro Rule / Comments	·
CLASS3C	-{SINS }+ -{TTPNS+IVCNS}	
glass3d	-{TCR=S}	
CLASS4	rpst	
CLASS5	-{TTP=5}*-{IVC=3}	
Dwspray	ins-s This macro is meeded in the cets	
EMDEPHD#R	rpsk=3 This hacro is needed in the cete	· · ·
rioh	RPSM+3	
npi	RPan~B.	
TOM.	INI7=LLO	
PCIISUP	RE~S*{ {NFII-8*D0:-9} + LV~9 }	
PbcI205	re=s*( {ngi=s*dr=s} + lv=s } loop I lpci support	
LPI	SI⇔∜ . ·	
NOACRÉG	rpsk=3 This macro is needed in the cets	
NOCD	rpsk-3 * Tor-s+(TTP-s+IVO-s}*SI-s*s	7C=6
NODC	RPSM#B This macro is needed in the cets	
VXCM	RPSN~6 This macro is needed in the cets	
NOSRY	rpsm-8 This macro is needed in the cets	
NPSHLOST	CTL#F*NPSH#F	

Model Name: UlCOP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLON

> 5:07 FM 2/9/2006 Page 3

Macro	Macro Rule / Consents
OPDEPL1	RESM®R This macro is needed in the cets
RHRSPCCOL	\$?C~\$
SORV	RPSM=S Lange Locas are always impressurizeed

E-20



BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

# Page No. 2 of 2 13:37:46 February 16, 2006

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MODEL Name: U1ERIN Event Tree: LLRDN.ETI

OSPC	SPI	SPII	SPC	ODWS	DWS	Х#	8#	S#		•	•	
	*****								• •			
······		·····	X1				· <b>1</b>	1			. •	
			L				2	2				
			•		L		3	3				
				L	******		4	4				
	]	L	*****			X1	5	5-8				
	L			****	**********	X1	6	9-12				
		L		*****	*******	X1	7	13-16				
L	~~~~~					•••	8	17				
							9	18				
{\$\$}}\$ {{{}}}	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,			******	<b>~~~~</b> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~	X2	10	19-36				
	*****	********	*******		<b>47</b> ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	X2	11	37-54				
\+ <i>++</i> 46 <b>\</b> <i>+</i> #6 <b>\</b> +#6 <b>\</b> #	************	*******	************		*****	X2	12	55-72				
\		*******	, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		*********	X2	13	73-90				
*****	*****	******	*****		********	X2	14	91-108				
***********				*****	*****************	X2	15	109-126				
********	*****	******	*****	********	*****	X2	18	127-144				
****	4005 LL0 FF 440FF +40	******				X4	17	145-288				
	*****	*******				X4	18	289-432				
41.64 <i>5</i> -1.2 <b>8</b> <i>5</i> -7 <b>.69</b> 4.		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	********	v##== 44 6	*********	X3	19	433-468				
*************	*****	******	*****	******	****************	X5	20	469-936				
							21	937				
		•					22	938				
·····	~~~~~				~~~~		23	939				
						100	24	940				
*************	***************		••••••••••••••••••••••••	******	*****	X6 X7	25 26	841-1880 1881-3760				
						~	4.V	300 1-03 00				

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BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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#### Model Name: U1COP2-9 Top Events for Event Tree: LLRDN

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5:09 PM 2/9/2006 Page 1

Top Event Name	Bescripticz
CIL	PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FAILURE - LARGE (=>3 INCHES)
NPSN	conditions preventing NP3H for Lloca
rpsk	MECHANICAL PORTION OF RDS SUCCESSFUL
RPSE	Electrical Portion of RPS (NUREG-5500 Basis)
Tor	PRESSURE SUPPRESSION POOL
1. The second se	TURBINE TRIP
IVC	CLOSURE OF MEIVS
DV1	LOOF I RECIRCULATION DISCHARGE VALVE CLOSURE
DV2	LOOP II RECIRCULATION DISCHARGE VALVE CLOBURE
1.PCI	LPCI LOOP I
PCII	LPC LOOF II
CS	Core Spray System
SI	LOGIC SNITCH FOR SUFFICIENT INJECTION
0890	OPERATOR ALIGNS SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING
871	SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING KARDWARE - LOOF I
SPII	SUPPRESSION FOOL COOLING HARDNARE - LOOP II
82C 7	LOGIC SWITCH FOR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING WITH UI RHR
ODWS	OPERATOR ALIGNS DRYWELL SPRAY
DNS	DRYNSLL SFRAY KARDRARS

E-23

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#### Model Name: U1COP2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLRDN

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#### 5:09 PK 2/9/2005

	Pagg 1		
	SP	Split Fraction Assignment Auls	
	CILL	PCR=S*(INR=S + LV2=S)	
	CILZ	PCA=F* (JNP=S + Lyp=S)	
	CILF	D%5~%.*?	
	NP5H3	RHR1*RHR2*RER3 + RER1*RHR2*RER4 + RER1*RHR3*RER4 + RER2*RER3*RER4 * RNR1*RHR2*RER3*RER4 Comments 1f 3 or more pumps are available we don't weed cop for edge NESE	
	NPSH1	init-lice + init-lice + init-lice + init+lice + init+lic + init-lise + init-lise	
	NPSHS	1	
	rysms	1	
	RPSED	1	
	TORL	1	
	7721	825~S*DI~S	
	<b>TTP2</b>	885=5*DI~F	
•	TIPJ	835*F*DI*S	
ć .	TISE.	1	
•	IVCL	1	
	DATE	RE=F+RB=f*RC=F+NXL=F*KH2=F+DX=F*LV=F	
	DV11	dx=8*lv=5*nH1=5*nH2=5*RB=5*RC=5	
	DV12	Dx=S*LV=S*xH1=S*xH2=S* (RB=T+RC=F)	
	DV13	Dx=5*LV=F*xx1=5*Xx2=5*RB=5*RC=5	
	DV14	0x=F*LV=S*X41=S*X12=\$*RB=5*XC=S	
	DVIS	Dxx=5*1.V=5* (xx1=f+xx12=f)*R8=5*NC=5	
	DVIF	1	
	DA31.	rf=f+re=f*rc=f+rh1=f*rH2=f+dH=f*t/V=f	
	DV25	RF=F*DV1=F*DH=S*LV=S*HE1=S*NH2=S*RB=S*RC=S	
	0721	DV1+S*DM+S*LV+S*NR1=S*NR2=S*R3=S*RC=S	
	DVZ2	dv1=f*dx=3*lv=3*xr1=5*xH2=S*rr=5*rc=B	
	DV24	Ra=2*DV1=2*DG=5*1.V=5*N21=5*N21=5*(RD=2+RC=5)	

E-24

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# BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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	Model Name: U1COP2-9	
	Bplit Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLRDN	
	5:09 PM 2/\$/2006 Page 2	
88 ·	Split Fraction Assignment Bule	
DV23		
D¥24	nvl=r*dx=g*lv=s*nrl=s*(ri2=s*(ri3=s+ri=f)	
DV27	₹5~£*D¥1≈₹*J%~3*L¥≈₹*K%12≈\$*K%2≈\$*X8≈\$*X0≈\$	
DV28	uvi=s*dx=s*lv=f*xx1~s*xH2=s*R3=s*R3=s	
DV29	dri*Exdxx2x7x5x7142x81142x8x22x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x2x	
DV2A	rr-r+dv1wr+dv+r+lvws+r11ws+rr2=3+rrc=s+rc=s	
DV2B	.dv1#s+d%=f*lV#s+%%1=s*%#2=s*x8=s*%C=s	
DV2C	dv1=f*dk=f*lv=s*xH1=5*xH2=S*x2=5*xC=5	
0720	Rz=F*Dy1=F*DH=S*1V=S*(3H1=F+N32=F)*RB=S*RC=S	
DV2E	cv1+s*dx+s*lv+s* (nn1=f+xH2=f) *rs=s*rc=s	
DV2G	uvi=f*ux=s*uv=s* (nxu=f*nx2=f) *xb=s*rc=s	
DV2F	2	
LPCIF	-lecisup+ dv1-p*dv2-f + xpshlost	
LFCI2	LPCISOF	
lpciif	-lpcligup +dw1-f*dvz-f + xxxxlost	
LPCI12	LPCI-S	
LPCII4	-lpcisup	
LPCIIS	12C1=\$*19C1502	
LPCIIF	1	
CSF	(82=F+11=F+01=F+13=F+10=F+18=F+18=F+18=F+18=F+18=F+E3=F+E3=F+E3=F+E3=F+E3=F+E3=F+11=F+11=F+11=F+11=F+11=F+11=F+11=F+1	
	Nyskrost Evelsensesdels + Evelskurgelsenseddeltene + Kreiskuelsens + Evelsensesdelsens + Evelskurgelgertydeltene + Kreiskueltens + Evelsensesdelse + Evelsensensensensensensense + Kreisensensensensensensensensensensensensens	
<b>CS</b> 1	= {bs=bs=bowb} = {bs=bs=bowb} EB=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=bs=	
C82 .	-{RS~F+RA~f+DA~F+RB~F+DO=F+RFI~F+DX~F+LV~F+RC=F+FR=F+SB=F+SC=F + RB=F+SC=F+ED=F + {R=F+RC=F+DS=F+DX=F+DD=F+RD=F+ER=F+SD=F+SD=F + CASSIG+DX=F+LV=F+RB=f+ER=F+RD=F+DD=F+DD=F+RE=F+SD=F + ER=F+SC=F+SD=F + ER=F+EC=F+ED=F}	

E-25

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# Model Name: UlCOP2-9 Model Name: UlCOP2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLRDN

· . 5:(19 2% 2/9/2006 Page 3

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C528	EB~L+SC=L+SC=L) CY32[C+DK=L+TA=L+TY=L+SC=L+TY=L+SC=L+SC=L+SC=L+SC=L+SC=L+SC=L+SC=L+SC
CST	1 Comments Core Spray Loop II Pipe Break Large LOCA
SIS	CS=8 + LPCI=S*(RPA=S + RPB=8) + LPCII=S*(RPS=S + RPD=S)
sif	1
OSPC1	RPSK-S*RPSE=S
OSPCF	1
SPIF	RS×F + OS€C=F + NFSELOST
spiif	ocec-f + rf-f + nericuit
8fii4	(RPB=5*HNR=9 + RPD=5*X(D=8)*6PI=5
\$P115	{RPB~5*{}}**********************************
SPII6	{R2B~\$*#X3~y + R59~5*H:(D=5}*85I=\$*#X8~F
SPILF	1
SPCY	-{\$PI=8}*-{\$PII=8}
8765	SPI=S*(RPA=S*HXA=S + R}C=S*HXC=S) + SPXI=S*(RPB=S*HXB=S+RYD=S*HXD=S)
SPC2.	
dwsf	- PX1-F*PX2-F + (RPA=F*RFC=F +RH=F*ROGE) * (RPB=F*RPD=F+RI=F + ROGD)
0%51	7x1=5*7x2=5* (Rr1=5+850=6) *=x005* (RF3=6+RPD=5) *=x0050
D#\$2	{RFA=F*RFC=F +RX=F+RCG3+FX1=F} * {RFD=F*R7D=F+R1=F + KOGD+FX2=F}
owsf	2
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E-26

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Model Name: UICOP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLRDN

5:08 PM 2/8/2006 Fage 1

ALTINJUSHSM RPS0+-B THIS MACRO IS NIEDED IN THE CEYS ALTINJUZX RPS0+-B SUCKST RPS0+-B CTLPAIL CIL+F CLASSIA RYS0+-B CLASSIB RP20+-B CLASSIB RP20+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B CLASSIC RP50+-B	Krcio	Neoro Rule / Comments
NUTIVOUX RPSN-B   THIS MACRO IS NEXCED IN THE CETS   BUCKET RPSN-B   CLASSIA CIN-F   CLASSIA RPSN-B   CLASSIB RPSN-B   CLASSIB RPSN-B   CLASSIB RPSN-B   CLASSIB RPSN-B   CLASSIB RPSN-B   CLASSIC </th <th>altinjahsw</th> <th>RPSMAB This macro is needed in the cets</th>	altinjahsw	RPSMAB This macro is needed in the cets
BUCKIY     RFSN-B       CLASSIA     RFSN-B       CLASSIB     RFSN-B       CLASSIB     RFSN-B       CLASSIS     RFSN-S       CLASSIS     RFSN-S       CLASSIS     RFSN-S       CLASSIS     RFSN-S	ALTINJUZX	RFSN=B This macro is nexued in the cets
CTL.FXXL     CTL.FF       CLASSIA     RFSM-B       CLASSIB     RPSM-B       CLASSIB     RPSM-B       CLASSIC     RPSM-B       CLASSIC     RPSM-B       CLASSIE     RPSM-B       CLASSIC     RPSM-S       CLASSIC     RPSM-S	BUCKET	r7sm~e
CLASSIA RFSM-B   CLASSIB RPSM-B   CLASSIBA RPSM-B   CLASSIC RPSM-S   CLASSIC RPSM-S   CLASSIC RPSM-S	CTLFAXL	CITOF
CLASSIE RPSN-B   CLASSIE RPSN-B   CLASSIE RPSN-B   CLASSIC RPSN-B   CLASSIE RPSN-B	314681 <b>A</b>	8 <b>~%</b> 893
CLASSIB2 RESINS CLASSIC RESINS	DLASSIB	R₽£\$%×B
CLASSIEL RPSM-B CLASSIE RPSM-B CLASSIE RPSM-B CLASSIE RPSM-B CLASSIE RPSM-B CLASSIE RPSM-B CLASSIE COSPC+F SPC+F CLASSIE COSPC+F SPC+F CLASSIE RPSM-S CLASSIE RPSM-S	Elassibe	<b>K260/~</b> 8
CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC QSPO=F   CLASSIC QSPO=F   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC QSPO=F   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC QSPO=F   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC QSPO=F   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC RPSN=B   CLASSIC RPSN=B	JLA58181	RP51-3
ILASSIE RESM-B ILASSIE RESM-B ILASSIE RESM-B ILASSIE COPOLT + SPC-F ILASSIE RESM-B ILASSIE RESM-B ILASSIE RESM-B	nassic	RPSM=0
LLASSIE RFSM-B CLASSZ RPSM-B LLASSZA RPSM-B LLASSZE GSPC-F + SPC-F LLASSZF RPSM-G LLASSZE RPSM-B	1143310	RPSM-1
CLASS2 RPSN=8   CLASS2A RPSN=8   CLASS2L OSPO=T + SPC=F   CLASS2T RPSN=9   CLASS2A RPSN=8   CLASS3A RPSN=8	massie	Resime
LLASS2A RESN=B CLASS2L OSPO+T + SFC+F CLASS2T RESN+G CLASS2V RPSN=B CLASS3A RESN=B	;las62	R?sn∞9
LASS2L DEPONT + SPC=F RESM=S LASS2V RPSM=B LASS3A RPSM=S	lass2a	resm=b
LASS27 RFSH+g LASS2V RFSH=B LASS3A RFSH=3 LASS3B RFSH=2	LASSE	0820~2 + SFC~2
LASS2V RPS%=B LASS3A RPS%=3 LASS3B RPSM=8	/LAB827	resu-s
IASS3A RPSMor	lass2v	rpsn=b
IASS38 RP8Mag	11A5\$3A	Resizes
······································	iass38	RPSN=3

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Mode	1 Name :	U1COP:	2-9
Macro f	or Event	Tree:	LLRDN

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Macro	Macro Rule / Conments	
CLASS3C	~{SI*\$} }+ -{TT'\$*\$+IVO*\$}	
GLASS3D	-{TOR=5}	
CLASSI	r75K=7	
CLASSS	- (779=5) *- { IV(>\$}	
Inspray	ows-5 This makeo is needed in the cets	
emdephdwr	HYEN-B This macro is needed in the cets	
High	\$\$55%∞B	
KDI -	RP\$\$**3	
LON	INIT-LLCA + INIT-LLOB	
LFCIISUR	R7=5*( (N8II-5*0N-5) + LV-5 )	
lecisue	Re-S*( (NPI-S*DR-S) + LV-S ) Loop I lpci Support	
LPI	3X*\$	
NOACREC	rpsn-b This nacro is needed in the Cets	
NOCD	rfsk-s * Tor-3* (Tfr-S+IVC=E)*5I=5*5PC=5	
NODC	RBSM-3 This macro is needed in the cets	
NORV	KF2N≈3 This macro is needed in the Cets	
NOSRV	RPSN-8 This maind is needed in the cets	
NPSHLOST	CIL=P*NPSH=F	

Model Name: UlCOP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLRDN

#### 5:09 2M 2/9/2006 2ago 3

Madro	Nanro Rule / Consents	• .
OPDEFL1	RPSN-S This macro is needed in the cets	
RHRSPCOOL	OSPONE + BRONE	
SCRV	RFSI-5	

large locas are always repressurfeed

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MODEL Name: U1ERIN

Page No. 1 of 4

MODEL Name: UTERIN

Event Tree: LLRSN.ETI

SP}}	993	odws	DWS	X#	B#	5#
	X9	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~			t	1
	L	······			2	2
			L		3	3
		<b></b>			4	4
L		**************	*****	X9	5	5-8
		** \$\$\$*******	*******	X9	8	9-12
L		*************		X9	7	13-16
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,					8	17
······		·····			9	18
**********		*****		X10	10	19-36
<b></b>	***********	*****		X10	11	37-54
**********	****	************	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	X10	12	55-72
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		********	*****	X10	13	73-90
*******		********		X11	14	91-107
	**3***********	*****		XH	15	108-124
************	*****	********	·····	X11	16	125-141
**********		************		Xt	17	142-282
*********		******		X1	18	283-423
******	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			X2	19	424-458
**************	************		*********	X3	20	459-916
******		·····			21	917
					22	918

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BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Event Tree: LLRSN.ETI 13:38:20 February 16, 2005 Æ CIL NPSH RPSM RPSE TOR. TIP IVC OV1 DV2 LPCI LPCI ĊS 9 OSPC SPI ********************************** ****** ************************* ... .

MODEL Name: UTERIN

Page No. 3 of 4

MODEL Name: U1ERIN

Event Tree: LLRSN.ETI

SPII	SPC	ODWS	DWS	Xŧ	8#	S#
•					23	919
	·····				24	<b>\$20</b>
	******	******	<b></b>	X12	25	921-1840
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		*******	X13	26	1841-3680

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## Page No. 4 of 4

13:38:20 February 16, 2006

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#### Model Name: U1COP2-9 Top Events for Event Tree: LLRSN

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# 5:03 2% 2/8/2005 Page 1

	Fage 1
Fop Event Name	Description
CIL	PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FAILURE - LARGE (=>3 INCHES)
NPSH	CONDITIONS PREVENTING NEED FOR LLOCA
rpan	MECHANICAL PORTION OF RPS SUCCESSFUL
rpse	ELECTRICAL FORTION OF RFS (NUREG-5500 BASIS)
for	Pressure suppression pool
rty .	TURBINE TRIP
EVC .	CLOSURE OF MSIVS
DV1 ·	LOOP I RECIRCULATION DISCHARGE VALVE CLOSURE
DV.2	LOOP II RECIRCULATION DISCHARGE VALVE CLOSURE
LPCI	FbCI FOOS I
UPCII	LPC LOOP II
28	Core syray system
5I ·	Locic switch for sufficient injection
NS PC	OPERATOR ALIGNS SUPPRESSION FOOL COOLING
3PT -	SUPPRESSION FOOL COOLING HARDWARE - LOOP I
SPII	SUPERESSION FOOL COULING HARDNARE - LOOP II
SPC	LOGIC Switch for suppression fool cooling with ui rer
DDNS .	OPERATOR ALIGNE DRYWELL SPRAY
SWS .	Drywell Spray Hardwark

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### Model Name: V1COP2-9

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#### Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLRSN

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SF	Split Fraction Assignment Rula
CIPI	PCA=5*(DRP=3 + L47=5)
CILZ	PCA-F* (DRP-S + LVP-S)
CILF	DR9~6*LV9~F
NPSH3	RHR1+RHR2*RHR3 + RKR1+RKR2*RHR4 + RKR1*RHR3+RKR4 + RHR2*RHR3*RER4 + RHR1*RHR2*RER3*RER4 COMMENTS 17 3 OR NOFE FURFS ARE AVAILABLE WE DON'T WEED COP FOR ECUS BP32
npshl	INIT-LLCA + INIT-LLCB + INIT-LLDA + INIT-LLD8 + INIT-LLO + INIT-LLSA + INIT-LLSB
NPSHŚ	1
rpsms	1
RPSEČ .	1
Tori	1
TTP1	₿₿ጛ≈ઙ≁⊅፻≈\$
TTP2	B33=s*DI=¥
TTP3	B25-F*IX=3
TTPF	1
IVCl	1
DATA	RexF+RD=7*FC=F+RH1=F*NH2=F+DX=F*LV=7
9V11	Dx=5*LV=5*xX1=5*x42=5*x8=5*R5=5.
DV12	D##5*LV=\$*XX1=5*XH2=5*(RB=F+RD=F)
DV13	D%-3*LV=F*NAl=6*X::2=5*N3=6*NC+5
<b>BV14</b>	dx=f+lv=2+xx1=5+xx2=3+x2=5+xC=x
DV15	dx=s*lv=s* (xx1=f+xx2=f) *rs=s*rc=s
DYLE	1
DV28	B⊁≤\$+\$\$₽\$\$\$K≈}+\$B\$\$≈₽*\$\$\$~\$*₽₩≈₽*\$₽
DV25 ·	3x~F*DV1=F*D¥=5*1V~\$*Xx1~5*#H2=5*XB~\$*8C>5
DV21	dv1~s*dx~s*lv~s*kH=s*nH2~e*R3~s*Xc~s
5455	dv1+F*dx=S*lv=S*XH1=5*XH2=5*RB=6*RC=8
0V24	RE#?*DV1#F*DX#S*1V#S*NH1#S*NH2#S*(RB#F+RC#F)

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# Model Name: U1COP2-S

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#### Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: LLRSN

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#### 5:09 9% 2/9/2005 Page 2

\$F	Solit Fraction Assignment Rule
DV23	dvi=u*dx=s*lv=s*nHi=s*nH2=s*(RH=F+RC=F)
DVZA	dv1=F*Dx=S*Lv=S*XH1=S*XH2=S* (RS=F+RC=F)
DV27	rd=f*dv1=f*l%=s*lv=f*nH1=s*kR2=s*H3=s*kC=s
DV28	dv1=s*c%=s=lv=f*xx1=s*nH2=s*xB=s*RC=5
DV29	DV1=F^DX=S+LV=F+XX1=S+XH2=S+XB=S+RC=S
DV2A	re~f*dy}~f*dx~f*lv~s*x:1~s*x:2~s*r8~s*rC~s
ov2b	dv1=s^dx=7*1;v=s*xx1=s*xx2=5*R==s=rc=s
DVŽC	dvi=f*dx=f*lv=s*xHi=s*xH2=s*RB=s*RC=s
DV20	RE#F*DV1#F*D%#S*1V#S*(%H1#F+NE2#F)*RB#S*RC#&
DV25	dv1~8*dx~8*lv~8*{nH1~f+nH2=f}*r3=5*rC=5
DV2G	DV1=7+0%=\$+14=5+1831=\$+842=\$1+83=\$+8C=5
DV2F	i
lpcif	RE=F + DV1=F + NFSHLOST
19012	1
LPCIIF	RE-F + DV2-F + RESELCET
LPCITZ	LPCI-S
LPCII4	₹2 <b>~</b> 7
FACILE	LFCI=F*RE=S
lpciif	1
CSF	(RE=F+AA=F+DA=F+AB=F+DC=F+N9I=F+DH=F*LV=F+RC=F4=EECH)*(RE=F+AC=F+DB=F+AD=F+D D=F+HPII=F+ CASSIG+DH=F+LV=F+RB=F+ =EECH) * HPSHLOSI
C51	~{R%#F+AA#F+DA#F+AB#F+CC#F+N3I#F+DN#F+LV#F+RD#F+ ~ZECX}*~{Rf#F+AC#F+DB#F+AD=F+DD#F+XFII=F+_CASSIG+DN#F*LV#F+88#F+_~EECH}
C52	-{RE=F+AA=F+DA=F+AB=F+EC=F+NFI=F+DX=F+DX=F+RC=F+. =BSCN}={RS=F+AC=F+DB=F+AD=F+DD=F+NFII=F+ CASSIG+DX=F*LV=F+R8=F+ =EUCN}
C528	_{HE#F+AA#F+EA#F+AB#F+DC#F+HFI#F+D%#F*L%#F+RC#F+-EEC#}*-{HF#F+AC#F+DB#?+AD#F+ DD#F+#FII#F+_CASSIG+H##F#LV#F+RB#F+-ERC#}
CSF ·	1 Comments Core Spray Loop II Fipe Break Large LOCA
\$15	LPCI=S*RFA=S*RFA=S + LfCII=S*RFB=S*RFD=S + LPCI=S*LFCII=S* /RFA=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S=S

		Model Name	a: U1	COP	2-9		
Split	Fraction	Assignment	Rule	for	Event	Tres:	LLRSN

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	Fac	193	3	۰.	•

sf	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
sif	£
OSPC1	RPSM=S*RF55=5
osper	1
\$PIT	re-f + Osec-f + resulost
\$712	1
SPILF	OSPC+F + RF+F > NF5RLOST
SPII4	{RPB=5*XXB=S + RPD=S*XXD=S}*SPI=5
SPIIS	(RPB=S*KXE=S + RPD=S*EXD=S)*SPI=T*RE=S
SPII6	{RPB=S*ExB=S + RPD=S*ExD=S}*SPI=F*RE=F
Spiip	1
SPCF	-(SPI=3) *-(SPII=3)
SPCS	rpi=s*(Rpr=s*(IXA=s + Rec=s*(IXC=s) + Spii=s*(Rpb=s*EXB=s+Apd=s*EXD=s)
52C7	1
oons1	1
DxSF	PX1=F*PX2=F + {&F&=F*RIC=F +RI=F+RGG3} * (RPB=S*HUD=P+RI=F + NOGO)
0%81	2x1=s*2x2=s* (RPA=s+RFC=s) *==NOGR* (RPB=s+R2D=s) *==NOGD
DN\$2	(RPR=F*RFC=F +RE=F+BOGH+FX1=F) * (RFB=F*RPD=F+RI=F + ROGD+PX2=F)
DWSF	2

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# Model Name: UICOF2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLRSN .

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5:03 FM 2/9/2006 Fage 1

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ALTINJRHEMRPSM=8 THIS MACRO IS NEEDED IN THE CETSALTINJU2XRPSM=9 THIS MACRO IS MEEDED IN THE CETSRUCKUTRPSM=8CILFAILCIL=FCLASSIARPSM=9 RPSM=8CLASSIBRPSM=8	
ALTINJU2X RPSM=3 THIS KACRO IS NEEDED IN THE CETS   RUCKRY RPSM=B   CILFAIL CIL=F   CLASSIA RPSM=B   CLASSIB RPSM=B   CLASSIBS RPSM=B	
RUCKUY RUSH-B CILFAIL CIL-F CLASSIA RUSH-B CLASSIB RUSH-B	
CILFAIL CIL=F CLASSIA FPSN=5 CLASSIBS RFSN=5	•
CLASSIA P251-5 CLASSIB R251-5 CLASSIBS R251-5	
CLASSIB RFSM=5 CLASSIBS RFSM=5	
CLASS182 RPSM=3	•
Classiel Rysn#3	
CLASSIC RPSN=B	
CLASSID RPSN-B	
lassie resn=B	
ilass2 rpsm=b	
Class2r Prsx>8	
CLASESI. OFFC-F + SPC-S	•
lass2t rest=b	
2LA332V R25X+3	
llassia rpsn-b	
LASS38 RPEX-B	·

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Model Name: U1COP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLRSN

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Nacro	Macro Rule / Comments
CLASSIC	-{BINS }+ -{TTPNS+IVCNS}
CLASSID	~{TOR~S}
CLASSA	RF:SM=F
Classs	~{TTF=S}*~{IVC=5}
Dwspray :	INS-S This macro is needed in the cets
eecn	EA=S*(22=S + EC=S + ED=S) + EE=S3*(2C=S + ED=S) + EC=S*3D=S
ends fhowr	rfsmæb Thig macro is needed in the cets
HIGH	RPS%=3
rfi	R₽\$\$\$\$≠B
FOM	Init-lisa + Init-lisb
LPCIISUP	RF=3*( (NFII=5*120=5) 4 LV=6 )
For and	RE=S*( (NPI=S*DN=S) + LV=S ) Loop I lpcI support
ldī	SING
NOACREC	RFSM-E This Macro is needed in the cets
NOCD	RPSN=s * Tor=s*(TTF=s+1VC=s)*sI=s*sPC=s
KODG .	rpem=b This macro is needed in the cets
NORV	RPSN=3 This macro is needed in the cets
NOERV	RPSM-B This macro is needed in the cets

Model Name: UlCOF2-9 Macro for Event Tree: LLRSN

#### 5:05 9H 2/9/2006 Page 3

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Kacro	Macro Rule / Comments			
NPSHLOST	CILWF*NPSH#F	۰.		
122020	8 800-3			
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~	THIS MACRO IS NEEDED IN THE CETS		· .	
RHRS2COOL	SPC=S			
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
Borv	rpsn=s			
	large locas are always depressurizeed			

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E-40



MODEL Name: U1ERIN

Page No. 1 of 4 1-38-50 Eebnary 16, 2006

# Page No. 2 of 4 MODEL Name: UTERIN 13:36:50 February 16, 2006 Event Tree: CETN1.ETI . . S# 1 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 14 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 .

BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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Page No. 4 of 4 13:36:50 February 16, 2006

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MODEL Name: UIERIN Event Tree: CETN1.ETI

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E-44

BFN EPU COP Probabilistic Risk Assessment

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Model Name: V1COP2-9 Top Events for Event Tree: CETN1

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#### 5:09 PM 2/9/2005 Page 1

Top Event Name	Bescriptica
1.2	Level 2 /Lerf results
AI.	CETI LOGIC NODE FOR CLASS 2 AND CLASSIBL
CILOUX	CIL DURKY YOP
or	OPERATORS DEPRESSURIZE APV (L2)
IR	IN-VESSEL RECEVERY
CE	CONTAINENT ISOLATED AND INTACT
TD	Injection Established
FD	Containment flooding
DWI	NO DIRECT DRYWELL RELEASE PATH
WR.	NET AIR SPCE FAILURE
RNE	Containment Building. Effective

### Model Name: U1COP2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CETN1

# 5:09 PM 2/9/2006 Page 1

89	Split Fraction Assignment: Bule
L20	1 Comments 120-0 IMPLINS LEVEL 1; 120-1 IMPLIES LEVEL2; USE MAR TO CHANGE
ALF	CLASSIR + CLASSIBE + CLASSIC + CLASSID + CLASSIE + CLASSIB + CLASSIG
RL0	NOCH + CLASSIBL + CLASS2A + CLASS2L + CLASS2T + CLASS2V + (CLASS3D + CLASS4 + CLASS5) + BUCKET Comments CLASS 3D AND CLASS 4 ARE EVALUATED FOR LERF
CILDF	CILFAIL
CILDS	1
OIS	CLABS3A + CLASS3B + CLASS3C + LOW
OII	CLASSIA + CLASSIT + NORV*(CLASSIA + CLASSIBE + CLASSIBL+ CLASSIC) + CLASSIB*(NOACREC + NODC)
OI4	CLASS1B
013	-OPDEPL1*(CLASSIA + CLASSIC + CLASSID) Convents change: hIGH PRESSURE LERF
012	OPDEPL1* (CLASSIA + CLASSIC + CLASSID) Comments change: hIGH PRESSURE LERP
IR1	OI-F* (CLASSIA + CLASSIC)
IRJ	CLASSIBS
IR4	CLASS13L
IR5	OI-F*CLASBID
IRS	OI-S*CLASSID Comments the irginal 01 12 model
IR7	OI*F*CLASSIE
IN3	ol=s*classie
IR2	OI=S Comments LOW PRESSURE INJECTION IMPLICIT
IRF	1
C22	IR#F ¹ OI#S
C24	IR-F*0I=F
CZ1	IR-S*GI-S
C23	1R=5*0I=f

 Model Name: ULCOF2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event	Tree:	Cetni

#### 5:05 9% 2/9/2006 Page 2

ŚF	Split Fraction Assignment Sule
C88	1
TDI	Classie
T02	oi=≤*j#spray
T03	- (01=9) *CLASS185
TD4	- (01-8) +CLASS18L
TDB	oz=s*class12
TOF	1
\$01 ·	Altingrisk + Oxseray
5D2	TD-3*{CLASS1A + CLA3S1BE + CLASS1BL + CLASS1D + CLASS3A + CLASS3B + CLASS3C}
FD3	TD-7+{Class1a + class1c + class1b + class3a + class3b + class3c}
FD4	7D=F* (CLASSIBE + CLASSIBL)
DNIF	1
WR1	2K~S
8228	CLASSIBL Comments TD-S*D#SFRAI*RERSFCOOL This was an assumption that zecuited in 100 RBE
RME7	QX=F
RME6	oirs=tins=tins=dru=s
RMES	01=2+70-3+F0=3+0x3=F
RNE4	Q3#\$*7D#5*TD#P
R%E3	oi=s*20=f*fd=f
resp	1
120	1 Comments 620-0 IMPLIES LEVEL 1; 126-1 IMPLIES LEVEL2; USE MIT TO CHANGE
ALT	Classia + Classiae + Classic + Classid + Classie + Classia + Classia + Classic
ALJ .	ROCD + CLRSSIBL + CLRSSIR + CLRSSIL + CLRSSIT + CLRSSIV + (GLRSSID + CLRSS4 + CLRSS5) + RUCKET Commonts CLRSS ID AND CLRSS 4 ARE EVALUATED FOR LERF
CILDF	CILFRIL
CTLDC	

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#### Model Name: U1COF2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CEIN1

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#### 5:09 FM 2/9/2006 Fage 3

<b>5</b> 8'	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
OIS	CLASS3A + CLASS3B + CLA353C + LOW
011	CLASS2A + CLASS2T + NORV*(CLASS1A + CLASS1BE + CLASS1BL+ CLASS1C) + CLASS1B*(NOACREC + NODC)
014	CIASSIB
513	-OPDEPL1*(CLASSIA + CLASSIC + CLASSID) Comments change: MICH FRESSURE LERF
012	OPDEPL1*(CLASSIR + CLASSIC + CLASSID) Comments change; bitH PRESSURE LERF
IR]	OI#F*(CLASSIR + CLASSIC)
<b>ER3</b>	CLASSIBE
[84	CLASSIBL
185	OI∞F*CLASSID
RE	OI*S*DLASS10 Comments the inginal VI L2 model
<b>R</b> 7	OI⇒F*CLASS1E
RS	od=5*Classie
	01~S Comments LON PRESSURE INJECTION IMPLICIT
RF	1
22	IR≈I*ΩI≪S
24	IR=F*GI=F
81	IR=S*OI=S
:23	1R~5*0I=5
:RF	i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
. 10	CLASSIE
02	CI~S*DWSPRRY
53	~ {OI=b} *Classibe
04 .	~{DI=B}*Classibl
DB	OI=F*CLASSIA
>8.	1

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#### Model Name: U1COPZ-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CETN1

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#### 5:09 PM 2/9/2006 Page 4

e.tr	
95°	aplie fragile Assignzent Bule
FD1	ALTINJRHSW + DWBPRAY
£02	TD=S+ (CLASS1A + CLASS1AE + CLASS1BL + CLASS1D + CLASS3A + CLASS3B + (LASS3C)
883	TD*F* (CLASSIA + CLASSIC + CLASSIG + CLASSIA + CLASSIE + CLASSIC)
FD4	· TD=F*(CLASSI25 + CLASSIBL)
DNIF	1
¥R1	DN#S
rme <b>9</b>	CLASSIBL Comments TD*S*DWSPRNY*RHRSPCOOL This was an essumption that resulted in 100 RBX
rme7	QI#F
rmes	01=3*?D=3*?D=3*D%5=5
rnes	OI=S*TD=3*TD=S*TD=S~f
RKE4	GI#S*TD>S*XD=F
RME3	OI*83*IB*F*FD~L
Rmef	1
1.20	l Commente 120-0 IMPLIES LEVEL 1; 120-1 IMPLIES LEVEL2; DSZ MEF TO CHANGE
ALF	CLASSIA + CLASSIRE + CLASSIC + CLASSID + CLASSIE - + CLASSIA + CLASSISE + CLASSIC
ALC	NOCD + CLASSIBL + CLASSIZA + CLASSIZL + CLASSIZT + CLASSIZY + (CLASSID + CLASSI + CLASSIS) + BUCKET Comments CLASSID AND CLASS 4 ARE EVALUATED FOR LERF
CILDF	CILFAIL
CILDS	4
OIS	CLASE3A + CLASE3B + CLASE3C + LOW
or1	CLASSIB + CLASSIF + NORV*(CLASSIA + CLASSIBE + CLASSIBL+ CLASSIC) + CLASSIB*(NOACREC + NOBC)
014	CLASSIB
013	-CPDEPL1*(CLASS1A + CLASS1C + CLASS1D) Comments change! DIGH PRESSURE LERF
012	OPDEFL1* (CLASSIA + CLASSIC + CLASSID) Comments change! bIGH PRESSURE LERF

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## Model Name: U1COP2-9 Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CETN1

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SF	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
IR1	OI-F*(CLASSIA + CLASSIC)
IR3	CLASS1BE
IR4	CLASS1BL
IR5	OI=F*CLASS1D
IRG	OI-S*CLASS1D Comments the irginal U1 L2 model
IR7	OI-F*CLASS1E
IRÐ	OI=S*CLASS1E
IR2	OI-S Comments LOW PRESSURE INJECTION IMPLICIT
IRF	1
C22	IR=F*OI=S
CZ4	IR=F*OI=F
CZ1	IR=S*OI=S
CZ3	IR=S*OI=F
CZF	1
TD1	CLASSIE
TD2	OI-S*DWSPRAY
TD3	- (OI-B) *CLASSIBE
TD4	- (OI=B) *CLASS1BL
BGT	OI=F*CLASS1A
TDF	1
FD1	ALTINJRHSW + DWSPRAY
FD2	TD=S*(CLASSIA + CLASSIBE + CLASSIBL + CLASSID + CLASS3A + CLASS3B + CLASS3C)
FD3	TD=F*(CLASSIA + CLASSIC + CLASSID + CLASSIA + CLASSIB + CLASSIC)
FD4	TD=F*(CLASS1BE + CLASS1BL)
DWIF	1
WR1	DW=S
RMEB	CLASSIBL

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Model Name: U1COP2-9

Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CETN1

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SF	Split Fraction Assignment: Rule						
<u></u>	Comments TD=S*DWSPRAU*RHRSPCOOL This was an assumption that resulted in 100 RBE						
RME7	oi-t						
RME6	OI=S*TD=S*FD=S*DWS=S						
RME5	OI=S*TD=S*FD=S*DWS=F						
RME4	OI=S*TD=S*FD=F						
RME3	OI=S*TD=F*FD=F						
RMEF	1						
<b>L20</b>	1 Comments L20=0 IMPLIES LEVEL 1; L20=1 IMPLIES LEVEL2; USE MFF TO CHANGE						
ALF	CLASSIA + CLASSIBE + CLASSIC + CLASSID + CLASSIE + CLASSIA + CLASSIE + CLASSIC						
ALO	NOCD + CLASSIBL + CLASS2A + CLASS2L + CLASS2T + CLASS2V + (CLASS3D + CLASS4 + CLASS5) + BUCKET Comments CLASS 3D AND CLASS 4 ARE EVALUATED FOR LERF						
CILDF	CILFAIL						
CILDS	1						
OIS	CLASS3A + CLASS3B + CLASS3C + LOW						
011	CLASS2A + CLASS2T + NORV*(CLASS1A + CLASS1BE + CLASS1BL+ CLASS1C) + CLASS1B*(NOACREC + NODC)						
014	CLASSIB						
013	-OPDEPL1*(CLASS1A + CLASS1C + CLASS1D) Comments changel hIGH PRESSURE LERF						
012	OPDEPL1*(CLASS1A + CLASS1C + CLASS1D) Comments change! hIG: PRESSURE LERF						
IR1	OI=F* (CLASS1A + CLASS1C)						
IRJ	CLASS1BE						
IR4	CLASSIBL						
IR5	OI-J*CLASS1D						
IR6	OI=S*CLASS1D Comments the irginal U1 L2 model						
IR7	OI=F*CLASS1E						
IRØ	OI=S*CLASS1E						

#### Model Name: U1COP2-9 ۰. Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CEIN1

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57 ⁻	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
IR2	OI=S Comments LOW PRESSURE INJECTION IMPLICIT
IRF	1
282	IR=F*OI=S
284	IR-F*0I-F
221	IR-S*OI-S
223	IR=S*OI=F
ZF	1
101	CLASSIE
202	OI-S'DWSPRAY
203	- (OI=B) *CLASS1BE
°D4	- (OI=B) *CLASS1BL
80	OI=F*CLASS1A
DF	1
'D1	ALTINJRHSW + DWSPRAY
D2	TD=S* (CLASSIA + CLASSIBE + CLASSIBL + CLASSID + CLASSIA + CLASSIB + CLASSIC
D3 ·	TD=F* (CLASS1A + CLASS1C + CLASS1D + CLASS3A + CLASS3B + CLASS3C)
°D4	TD=F*(CLASS1BE + CLASS1BL)
WIF	1
IR1	DN=S
RME B	CLASSIBL Comments TD=S*DWSPFAY*RHRSPCOOL This was an assumption that resulted in 100 RBE
ME7	OI=F
ME6	oi=s*TD=s*FD=s*DWS=s
ME5	OI=S*TD=S*FD=S*DWS=F
ME4	OI=S*TD=S*FD=F
ME3	OI=S*TD=F*FD=F
Mef	1
20	1

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# Model Name: U1COP2-9

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Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CETN1

# 5:09 PM 2/9/2006 Page 8

SF	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
•	Comments L20=0 IMPLIES LEVEL 1; L20=1 IMPLIES LEVEL2; USE MFF TO CHANGE
ALF	CLASSIA + CLASSIBE + CLASSIC + CLASSID + CLASSIE + CLASSIA + CLASSIB + CLASSIC
ALO	NOCD + CLASSIBL + CLASS2A + CLASS2L + CLASS2T + CLASS2V + (CLASS3D + CLASS4 + CLASS5) + BUCKET Comments CLASS 3D AND CLASS 4 ARE EVALUATED FOR LERF
CILDF	CILFAIL
CILDS	1
ois	CLASS3A + CLASS3B + CLASS3C + LOW
011	CLASS2A + CLASS2T + NORV*(CLASS1A + CLASS1BE + CLASS1BL+ CLASS1C) + CLASS1B*(NOACREC + NODC)
014	CLASS1B
013	-OPDEPL1*(CLASS1A + CLASS1C + CLASS1D) Comments change! hIGH PRESSURE LERF
012	OPDEPL1*(CLASS1A + CLASS1C + CLASS1D) Comments change: hIGH PRESSURE LERF
IR1	OI⇒F* (CLASS1A + CLASS1C)
ER3	CLASSIBE
ER4	CLASSIBL
IR5	0I=F*CLASS1D
IR6	OI=S*CLASS1D Comments the irginal U1 L2 model
[R7	OI-F*CLASS1E
IR8	OI-S*CLASS1E
IR2	OI-S Comments LOW PRESSURE INJECTION IMPLICIT
IRF	1
22	IR=F*OI-S
24	IR=F*OI=F
21	IR=S*OI=S
223	IR-S*OI-F
1 <b>7</b> F	1

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### Model Name: U1COP2-9

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#### Split Fraction Assignment Rule for Event Tree: CETN1

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#### 5:09 FM 2/9/2006 Page 9

SF <u>.</u>	Split Fraction Assignment Rule
TD1 .	CLASSIE
rd2	OI=S*DWSPRAY
D3	- (OI=B) *CLASS1BE
'D4	- (OI=B) *CLASS1BL
9 <b>D</b> 8	OI=F*CLASS1A
DF	1
<b>'D</b> 1	ALTINJRHSW + DWSPRAY
D2	TD-S*(CLASSIA + CLASSIBE + CLASSIBL + CLASSID + CLASS3A + CLASS3B + CLASS3C)
. נסי	TD=F*(CLASSIA + CLASSIC + CLASSID + CLASSIA + CLASSIB + CLASSIC)
'D4	TD=F*(CLASS1BE + CLASS1BL)
WIF	1
R1	DW=S
ME8	CLASSIBL Comments TD-S*DWSPRAY*RHRSPCOOL This was an assumption that resulted in 100 RBE
ME7	OI=F
ME6	OI=S*TD=S*FD=S*DWS=S
ME5	OI=S*TD=S*FD=S*DWS=F
ME4	oi=s*TD=s*FD=F
me3	OT=2*TD=E*ED=E

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# Model Name: U1COP2-9 Macro for Event Tree: CETN1

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Macro	Macro Rule / Comments
CIC3LERF	CZ=F + RME=F*(CILFAIL+DWI=F+IR=F*TD=S*FD=S)
	CZ=F + RME=F*(GILFAIL+DWI=F+IR=F*TD=S*FD⇒S)
•	CZ=F + RME=F*(CILFAIL+DWI=F+IR=F*TD=S*FD=S)
	CZ=F + RME-F*(CILFAIL+DWI-F+IR=F*TD=S*FD=S)
	CZ=F + RME=F*(CILFAIL+DWI=F+IR=F*TD=S*FD=S)
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# Appendix F FAULT TREES

This appendix provides print-outs of the BFN Unit 1 PRA modified containment isolation fault tree and the NPSH fault tree used in this analysis.

Top Event Cit.: Containment Isolation Failure Unit 1					Page 1 of 9	
Analyst: Lincoln Djang			Last Modification: 02/09/06		Dete: 02/09/08	· .
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Contrainment isolation Failure =>> Niches (Cil.)



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Too Event Cit.; Containment Isolation Failura Unit 1		•••

Top Event Cit.: Containment Isolation Failura Unit 1				 Page 2 of 9	· .
Analys:: Lincoln Djang		Last Modification: 02/09/06	· · · · ·	Date: 02/09/06	•
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· r	PENETRATION X250X231				•		· · ·	•
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				-	EXHAUST FAILURE			•
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ſ	VALVE FCV-64-29 FAILURE	. YAI	VE FCV-14-31 FAILURE	•	VALVE FCV-84-32 FAILURE	•	VALVE FCV-64-33 FAILURE	
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	GO2MAB		Geziecc		GOZMOC	}	GOZMES	
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(	VALVE FCV-64-29 FAIL TO	VALVE FCV-64-29 TRANSFER	E FCV-84-38 TRANSFER	VALVE FCV-64-30 FAIL TO	VALVE FEV-84-32 FAR TO	VALVE FCV-64-32 TRANSFE	R VALVE FCY-64-33 TRANSFER	VALVE FCV-64-33 FAIL TO
	CLOSE ON DEMAND	OPEN	OPEN	CLOSE ON DEMAND	CLOSE ON DEMAND	OPEN	OPEN	CLOSE ON DEMAND
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FAILURE PATH FRO PENETRATION X25/X3	W	•• •		•		•			•
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INBOARD VALVE (FCV- OR FCV-64-11) FALLU	14-18 RE				VALVE FCV-84-17 OR FCV-76-24 FAILURE	· .			
Geaming	<u> </u>	· ·	· · · · ·				· ·: ·		
		ISFER   VALVE FCV-84-19 TRANSFER	VALVE PCV-64-19 FAIL TO	1 1	VALVE FCV-84-17 FAIL TO	VALVE FCV-54-17 TRANSFER     V	IVE FCV-76-24 FAIL TO	VALVE FCV.78-24 TRANSFER	ח
CLOSE ON DEMAN	OPEN	CPEN	CLOSE ON DEMAND		CLOBE ON DEIKAND	OPEN	CLOSE ON DEMAND	OPEN	
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Top Event Cil.; Containment isolation	Fakure Unit 1		•	Page 5 of 9
Analyst: Lincoln Djang		Last Modification: 02/09/08		Date: 02/09/06
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	GDEMIDA To Page(s) 2	To Page(s) 2		2 . 1
•	CHECK VALVE 64-800 FAILURI	CHECK VALVE 84.001 FAILINE		
		Cetarois	• •	



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CHECK VALVE 64-801 FAILS CHECK TO RESEAT

CHECK VALVE 44 501 GROSS REVERSE LEAKAGE COVLK1_8440801

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Top Event Cit.: Containment isolation Failure Unit 1	•	· .	۰.	Page 6 of 9
Analyst: Lincoln Diang	······································	Last Modification: 02/09/06		Dela: 02/09/08
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		· .	•	· ·
	PENETRATION X19 DRYWELL EQUIPMENT DRAIN		• • • •	
	CE_X19 To Page(a)			:
	PENETRATION X19 DRYWELL EQUIPMENT DRAIN			
• •	CR_X19			
· · · ·	VALVE FCV-77-15A FAILURE	VALVE FCV-77-188 FAILURE	• • •	•
· · · ·	CIL_FCY7715A	CIL_FCV7745B		250 - A

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VALVE FCV-77-158 FAIL YO CLOSE ON DEMAND OPEN CLOSE ON DEMAND AOVXOIFCV0770158 ADVX01FCV077015A AOVECIECV0770158 .

Top Event Cit.: Containment isolation Failure Unit 1	· · ·			Page 7 of 9
Analyst: Lincoln Djang		Last Modification: 02/09/06		Dete: 02/08/06
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		· •		•
			·	
· · · · ·	SUPPRESSION CHAMBER DRAIN			• •
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•	CIL_SUP_CH_DR			· .
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:	VALVE FCV-75-67 FAILURE	VALVE FCV-76-58 FAILURE	· · · · ·	
•	Cil_FCV7537	Cil_FCV7591	•	
	<u> </u>	-		· .
	VALVE FCV75-ST FAIL TO CLOSE ON DEMAND	V7547 TRANSFER VALVE FCV75-58 TRANSFER CHEN	FCV-75-58 FAIL TO SE ON DEMAND	
•	ACVFC1FCV0750057 ACV/0	01FCV8759957 A0VX01FCV0750058 A0V	FC1FCV8750058	
• •	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$ $\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	

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n Event Cill - Containment Inclutions Failure Unit 1	•				Page 6 of 9	
nelvet Lincoln Diano		Last Modification: 02/09/06		·	Dale: 02/09/08	
· · · · · ·		•	,	• •		
	•					
	PENETRATION X18 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN		•	•.	· · · · ·	
	CIL_X18 To Page(s) 1			•		
	PENETRATION X18 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN	· ,				
•	CIL_X18		•	• ·	· · ·	-
	. <b>(</b> )	• •		, · ·		
	VALVE FCV-77-2A FAILURE	VALVE FCV-77-29 FAILURE	• •	•		. · ·
· · · ·	CIL_FCV772A	CIL_FCV7728			•	•
	μ <u>μ</u>	Ϋ́				
	VALVE FCV-77-2A FAIL TO CLOSE ON DEMAND	A TRANSFER VALVE FCV-77-28 TRANSFER IN OPEN	VALVE FCV-77-28 FAIL TO CLOSE ON DEMAND			
	ACVECIECVIT7812A ACVX01FC	V077002A AOVX01FCV077002B	AOVEC1FCV077002B		•	
•			$\square \bigcirc \square$		•	

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Myder      List Workshin 1000      Date 10000        MARCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSERVED      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSTRUM      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSTRUM      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSTRUM      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)      SINCE LUNCAL (PM)        MARCE CONSTRUM      SI									<b>`</b> `			
NUCL.NUE      N      NUCL.NUE      N      NUCL.NUE      N        AMPCIPONMENT      2      NAR_INFT      CXA	knalyst: Lincoln Djang	<u> </u>			Last Modification: 02/39/08	•	· ·				Date: 02/09/06	
AMICHICHMAND      2      BASE_NET      COCKIMEREN      3      BASE_NET        AMICHICHMAND      2      BASE_NET      COCKIMEREN      4      AMICHICHMAND        AMICHICHMAND      2      BASE_NET      COURT      COURT      COURT        AMICHICHMAND		SYMBOL NAME	PB	SYMBOL TYPE					SYMBOL NAME	PIF	SYMBOL TYPE	
Control      Control      Control      Control      Control        ADVECTORMENT I      INACLINET      Control      INACLINET        ADVECTORMENT I      INACLINET <tdi< td=""><td></td><td>A CMECHERSING 40817</td><td></td><td>DARK THENT</td><td>• • •</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tdi<>		A CMECHERSING 40817		DARK THENT	• • •							
ADDELSCORENTQUAL_DAMNQUAL_DAMNQUAL_DAMNADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENTQUALQUALQUALADDELSCORENT </td <td></td> <td>ACHIC1FC40040017</td> <td>-</td> <td>BASIL_EVENT</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>CUVLK1_0840800</td> <td>3</td> <td>BASRG_EVENT</td> <td>•</td>		ACHIC1FC40040017	-	BASIL_EVENT					CUVLK1_0840800	3	BASRG_EVENT	•
ADVICUMENT      2      ADVICUMENT      OPP      1      ADVICUMENT        ADVICUMENT      2      ADVICUMENT      ADVICUMENT      ADVICUMENT        ADVICUMENT      2      MARLYNT      OMMENT      ADVICUMENT        ADVICUMENT      3      MARLYNT      OMMENT      ADVICUMENT        ADVICUMENT      3      MARLYNT      OMMENT      ADVICUMENT	- /	ACVI-CTI-CYUCHUMI	2	BASIC EVENT					CDVLK10540801	3	HASIC_EVENT	
ADVICENTIONNERS      2      MARENEMT      Comments      1      ADVICENTIONNERS      2      MARENEMT        ADVICENTIONNERS      3      MARENEMT      COMMENTS      4      MARE		ACVFC1FCV0640019	2	BASIC_EVENT		•	•	•	OWP	1	HOUSE_EVENT	
AVF:SIGNMENT      2      MARL, NAT      GMED      C. G. (A.T.        AVF:SIGNMENT      3      MARL, NAT      GMED      C. G. (A.T.        AVF:SIGNMENT      4      MARL, NAT      GMED      C. (A.T.	•	ACVPC1FCV0640020	. 2	BASIC_EVENT					GOONEE	1	AND_GATE	
AMPCIPUMENT      BMS_PAT      GMMCD      GMARD        AMPCIPUMENT      BMS_PAT      GMARD      GMARD		ACVFC1FCV0640021	2	BASIC_EVENT	λ.				•	*	Ze s M [™] ,	
AMPCENDMENT      MAC.PART      OWNER      I      DULLATE        AMPCENDMENT      I      MAC.PART      OWNER      I      OULATE        AMPCENDMENT      I      MAC.PART      OWNER      I      OULATE  <		ACVFC1FCV0640029	3	BASIC_EVENT	· .	•			GOONDB	1	OR_GATE	•
ADD/C01/C01/00/00/00/1      IMULENTIT      OMMEE      IMULENTIT        ADD/C01/C01/00/00/1      IMULENTIT      OPINEC      2      ORENTIT        ADD/C01/C01/C01/00/0      IMULENTIT      OPINEC      2      ORENTIT        ADD/C01/C01/C01/00/0      IMULENTIT      OPINEC      2      ORENTIT        ADD/C01/C01/C01/C01/00/0      IMULENTIT      OPINEC      2      ORENTIT        ADD/C01/C01/C01/C01/C01/C01/C01/C01/C01/C01	•	ACVFC1FCV0640030	3	BASIC_EVENT					GOONDC	. 1	OR_GATE	
ADD/CHICH/0003  2  MADENEXT  OHINE  2  ADL_ALT    ADD/CHICH/0003  1  MADENEXT  OHINE  2  CLAIT    ADD/CHICH/0003  1  MADENEXT  OHINE  2  TALAIT    ADMICL/CHICH/0004  4  MADENEXT  OHINE  2  TALAIT    ADMICL/CHICH/0004  5  MADENEXT  OHINE  2  MADENEXT    ADMICL/CHICH/0004  5  MADENEXT  OHINE  2  MADENEXT    ADMICL/CHICH/0004  5  MADENEXT  OHINE  3  MADENEXT    ADMICL/CHICH/0004  5  MADENEXT  OHINE		AUVFC1FCV9640032	3	BASIC_EVENT					GOINEC	1	OR_GATE	
ADPCR/ENTRYME  3  MACL_PART  OPINE  2  OLATE    ADPCR/ENTRYME  4  MACL_PART  OPINE  2  TAMERELAT    ADPCR/ENTRYME  4  MACL_PART  OPINE  2  OLATE    ADPCR/ENTRYME  5  MACL_PART  OPINE  2  OLATE    ADPCR/ENTRYME  5 </td <td></td> <td>A0VFC1FCV0640033</td> <td>3</td> <td>BASIC_EVENT</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>GO1MBB</td> <td>2</td> <td>AND_GATE</td> <td>•</td>		A0VFC1FCV0640033	3	BASIC_EVENT					GO1MBB	2	AND_GATE	•
ADD/FEI/CV701788    1    MAE_POPT,    OPINED    2    OPLATE      ADD/FEI/CV701780    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    1    TEMMERE_UT      ADD/FEI/CV701780    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    2    ALE_POPT,      ADD/FEI/CV701780    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    2    ALE_POPT,      ADD/FEI/CV701781A    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    2    ALE_POPT,      ADD/FEI/CV701781A    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    2    OLEATE      ADD/FEI/CV701781A    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    2    OLEATE      ADD/FEI/CV701781A    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    3    ALE_POPT,      ADD/FEI/CV701781A    4    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    3    ALE_POPT,      ADD/FEI/CV701781A    1    MAE_POPT,    OPINED,    3    ALE_P		AOVFC1FCV0750057	3	BASIC, EVENT		•			GOINEC	2	OR_GATE	
AVCTUCIONNERS    1    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    1    TAMBERE_AUT      AVCTUCIONNERS    4    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    2    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    4    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    2    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    4    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    2    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    2    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    2    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    2    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    2    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    2    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    3    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    3    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    3    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    3    MARE_MERT    OPMERA    3    OQUAT      AVCTUCIONNERS    3    MARE_MERT <td></td> <td>ACVFC1FCV0750058</td> <td></td> <td>BASIC_EVENT</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>GO1MCC</td> <td>2</td> <td>OR_GATE</td> <td></td>		ACVFC1FCV0750058		BASIC_EVENT					GO1MCC	2	OR_GATE	
AMCCUCYTONIAN4BASE_NENTGENERA1TAURENCLATAMCCUCYTONIAN4BASE_NENTGENERA2OL_AORTAMCCUCYTONIAN5BASE_NENTGENERA2OL_AORTAMCCUCYTONIAN2BASE_NENTGENERA2OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER2BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER2BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER2BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER2BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER2BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER3BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER3BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER3BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER3BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER4BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER4BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER5BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER4BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER5BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER6BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER6BASE_NENTGENERA3OL_AORTAMCUCYCUNTER6BASE_NENT <td></td> <td>ACVFC1FCV0780024</td> <td>2</td> <td>BASIC_EVENT</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>GO1MDA</td> <td>2</td> <td>TRANSFER_OUT</td> <td></td>		ACVFC1FCV0780024	2	BASIC_EVENT					GO1MDA	2	TRANSFER_OUT	
AVACCICONTINUE      4      BASE_PRIMIT      ONING      2      0 (A)XIT        AVACUSCINUTURIE      4      BASE_PRIMIT      ONING      2      0 (A)XIT        AVACUSCINUTURIE      2      BASE_PRIMIT      ONING      2      0 (A)XIT        AVACUSCI		ACVFC1FCV077002A	4	BASIC_EVENT					GOIMDA	1	TRANSFER IN	
AMMCTRUTHIA      4      BASC_PRET      OMERC      2      AUC_DATE        AMMCTRUMMENT      2      BASC_PRET      OMERC      2      OUTES        AMMCTRUMMENT      2      BASC_PRET      OMERC      2      OUTES        AMMCTRUMMENT      2      BASC_PRET      OMERC      1      DUATES        AMMCTRUMMENT      2      BASC_PRET      OMERC      1      DUATES_COT        AMMONTRUMMENT      2      BASC_PRET      OWERC      1      DUATES_COT        AMMONTRUMMENT      2      BASC_PRET      OWERC      1      DUATES_COT        AMMONTRUMMENT      2      BAS		ACVFC1FCV0779028	4	BASIC EVENT		•			GOIMEA	2	OR GATE	· · · .
AMPCTEVENTURE      4      BASE_PIPAT      DEMEC      2      QLAXE        AMPCTEVENTURE      2      BASE_PIPAT      DEMEC      2      QLAXE        AMPCTEVENTURE      2      BASE_PIPAT      DEMEC      2      QLAXE        AMPCTEVENTURE      2      BASE_PIPAT      DEMEC      1      DAVESTER        AMPCTEVENTURE      2      BASE_PIPAT      DEMEC      0      QLATE        AMPCTEVENTURE      3      BASE_PIPAT      DEMEC      0      QLATE        AMPCTEVENTURE      3      BASE_PIPAT	•	ACVECIECVET7015A	. 4	BASIC EVENT					GOIMEB	2	AND GATE	
AVX001CV944091      2      BASE_PORT      004000      2      DC_DATE        AVX001CV944091      2      BASE_PORT      004000      1      TOLEATE        AVX001CV944091      2      BASE_PORT      004000      1      AVX001000000000      2      TOLEATE        AVX001CV944091      2      BASE_PORT      0040000      2      TOLEATE        AVX001CV944091      2      BASE_PORT      0040000      2      TOLEATE        AVX001CV944091      2      BASE_PORT      0040000      2      TOLEATE		ACVEC1ECVIT70188	Å.	BASIC EVENT					BOIMEC	.,	OR GATE	
ACVICUITIONNERSI      2      BARE_PRIT      COULT        ACVICUITIONNE      2      BARE_PRIT      COULT        ACVICUITIONNE      2      BARE_PRIT      COUNT	· ·	ACM/20190/0640017	,	BASIC EVENT			•		animer:	;	OR GATE	
AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      2      DURL (F) WIND (F)      0      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      2      DURL (F) WIND (F)      0      DURL (F)      TURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      2      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      TURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      2      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      TURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      2      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      3      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      3      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      3      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      3      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      3      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      3      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)      DURL (F)        AND DIT (F) WIND (F)      4      DURL (F)		ACMX019CM640618	-	BASIC EVENT					COMMAR .	:	OR CATE	• •
APPONDICIPATION      2      Description      Construction      Construction        APPONDICIPATION      2      Description      Construction      Construction        APPONDICIPATION      3      BARC_SMET      CONSTRUCTION      APPONDICIPATION      APPONDICIPATION        APPONDICIPATION      3      BARC_SMET      CONSTRUCTION      CONSTRUCTION        APPONDICIPATION      4      BARC_SMET      CONSTRUCTION      CONSTRUCTION        APPONDICIPATION      4      BARC_SMET      CONSTRUCTION      CONSTRUCTION        APPONDICIPATION      4      BARC_SMET      CONSTRUN		ACMONISCIMMANHE	÷	DAGIC SVENT					COURSES .	:	TRANSCER MIT	
ADVXD19      2      BURL      BURL      BURL      BURL        ADVXD19      2      BURL      BURL      BURL      ARQUATE        ADVXD19      BURL_PHAT      GRATE      GRATE      GRATE        ADVXD19      BURL_PHAT      GRATE      GRATE        ADVXD19      GRATE      GRATE <td>, .</td> <td>ACM/0010/00/00/00/00</td> <td>•</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>• •</td> <td>•</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	, .	ACM/0010/00/00/00/00	•			• •	•					
ADXX011000000000000000000000000000000000	· .	AUTAU ITC VOOLOGA	-							1	IKANDTER_IN	
AUXDURVEWEND      3      BASE_PRET      BASE_C      3      DUC, NATE        AUXDURVEWEND      2      MARE_PRET      GEZENC      3      GEZENC      3      MARE_PRET        AUXDURVEWENDS      3      BASE_PRET      GEZENC      3      OR_ANTE        AUXDURVEWENDS      3      BASE_PRET      GEZENC      3      OR_ANTE        AUXDURVEWENDS      3      BASE_PRET      GEZENC      3      OR_ANTE        AUXDURVEWENDS      3      BASE_PRET      GEZENC      2      RUSPER_CT        AUXDURVEWENDS      4      BASE_PRET      GEZENC      2      RUSPER_CT        AUXDURVEWENDS      4      BASE_PRET      GEZENC      2      GUATE        AUXDURVEWENDS <td></td> <td>ADVAD TO MODULE</td> <td>-</td> <td>BADIC_EVENT</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>3</td> <td>ANU_GAIL</td> <td></td>		ADVAD TO MODULE	-	BADIC_EVENT						3	ANU_GAIL	
ADMUNITY      ADMEL, PART      CREAR      3      DREG, APRIT        ADMUNITY      ADMEL, PART      CREAR      A AND, ANTE        ADMONITY      S BARE, PART      CREAR      CREAR      CLEART        ADMONITY      S BARE, PART      CREAR      CREAR      CREAR        ADMONITY      S BARE, PART      CREAR      S TRARFER, CUT        CREAR      CREAR      CREAR      CREAR      S TRARFER, CUT        CREAR      S TRARFERE		ADVX01FCV0540828	3	BASIC_EVENT				•	GIZICC	1	OR_GATE	
AXX01EVM44082    3    AME_EMMT    GENED    3    AME_EMMT      AXX01EVM44083    3    BARE_EMMT    GENED    3    GENED      AXX01EVM44083    3    BARE_EMMT    GENED    2    GENED      AXX01EVM44083    3    BARE_EMMT    GENED    2    TRAMESEQ_UT      AXX01EVM44084    2    BARE_EMMT    GENED    2    OC_ATE      AXX01EVM44084    4    BARE_EMMT    GENED    2    OC_ATE      AXX01EVM47082    4    BARE_EMMT    GENED    2    RUME_EMMT      AXX01EVM47084    4    BARE_EMMT    GENED    2    RUME_EMMT      AXX01EVM4707184    4    BARE_EMMT    GENED    2    TRAMESEQ_UT      GL_EV77184    4    OC_BATE    GMMED    3    OC_BATE      GL_EV771785    4    OC_BATE<	•	AOVX01FGV0540630		BASIC EVENT					GIZINIA	3	OR_GATE	
ADVX01FCVMMR07      S      BARE_PHMT      GERREC      S      OR_GATE        ADVX01FCVMTM087      S      BARE_PHMT      GERMEA      2      TRAMSEL_QAT        ADVX01FCVMTM084      2      BARE_PHMT      GERMEA      2      TRAMSEL_QAT        ADVX01FCVMTM084      2      BARE_PHMT      GERMEA      2      MOLATE        ADVX01FCVMTM084      4      BARE_PHMT      GERMEA      2      TRAMSEL_QUT        ADVX01FCVMTM084      4      BARE_PHMT      GERMEA      2      TRAMSEL_QUT        CL_FCVTM1      1      OL_GATE      GERMEA      3      TRAMSEL_QUT        CL_FCVTM1      4      GL_BATE      GERMEA      3      TRAMSEL_QUT        CL_FCVTM1      4      GL_BATE      GERMEA      3      TRAMSEL_QUT        CL_FCVTM1      4 <td>• • •</td> <td>ACVX01FCV8640032</td> <td>3</td> <td>BASIC_EVENT</td> <td>•</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>GEZNDE</td> <td>· •</td> <td>AND_GATE</td> <td></td>	• • •	ACVX01FCV8640032	3	BASIC_EVENT	•				GEZNDE	· •	AND_GATE	
ADVACHICANTRADES      BASIEENNET      GR2/PE      1      OL_AATE        ADVACHICANTRADES      BASIEENNET      GR3/DA      2      TRAINSTEL_OLT        ADVACHICANTRADES      E      BASIEENNET      GR3/DA      2      TRAINSTEL_OLT        ADVACHICANTRADES      I      BASIE_ENNET      GR3/DA      2      TRAINSTEL_OLT        CUL_FORTRAT      I      GR3/DA      ITANATREL_OLT      GR3/DA      2      TRAINSTEL_OLT        CUL_FORTRAD      I      GR3/DA      ITANATREL_OLT      ITANATREL_OLT      ITANATREL_OLT        CUL_FORTRAD      ITANATREL_OLT      GR3/DA      ITANATREL_OLT		AOVX01FCV0540033	3	BASIC_EVENT			:		GE2MDC	. 3	OR_GATE	
AVX001FCVWWWWW    3    BASE_PMBT    GRWAA    2    TRANSFEL_OUT      AVX001FCVWTWWWW    4    BASE_PMBT    GRWAA    2    TRANSFEL_OUT      AVX001FCVWTWWW    4    BASE_PMBT    GRWAA    2    TRANSFEL_OUT      AVX001FCVWTWB2A    4    BASE_PMBT    GRWAA    2    GRWAA    2    TRANSFEL_OUT      AVX001FCVWTWB2A    4    BASE_PMBT    GRWAA    2    GRWAA    2    TRANSFEL_OUT      AVX001FCVWTWB3A    4    BASE_PMBT    GRWAA    3    TRANSFEL_OUT      GL_FCVTFST    3    OR_GATE    GRWAA    3    TRANSFEL_OUT      GL_FCVTFST    3    OR_GATE    GWWAA    3    TRANSFEL_OUT      GL_FCVTFST    3    OR_GATE    GWWAA    3    TRANSFEL_OUT      GL_FCVTFST    4    OR_GATE    1    HOUS		AOVXOSFCV#750057	3	BASIC_EVENT	· · · ·				GEZMTB	3	OR_GATE	
AVXCD1EVUTF002A    2    BABIC_PENT    GBMDA    2    TRAMSER_UK      AVXCD1EVUTF002B    4    BABIC_PENT    GBMDA    2    GR_GATE      GL_ECVT705T    3    GR_GATE    GBMBA    2    TRAMSER_UNT      GL_ECVT705T    3    GR_GATE    GBMDA    3    TRAMSER_UNT      GL_ECVT705T    4    OR_GATE    GBMDA    3    TRAMSER_UNT      GL_ECVT77A    4    OR_GATE    GBMDA    2    TRAMSER_UNT      GL_ECVT7A    4    OR_GATE    VP    1    HOUBE_PENT      GL_EVT7A    4    OR_GATE    VP    1    HOUBE_PENT      GL_EVT8    1    TR		ACVXC1FCV9750058	3	BASIC_EVENT	•				GUINDA	2	TRANSFER_OUT	•
AVXX01FOVIT70024      4      BASE_PRENT      0930PB      2      0 (CATE        AVXX01FOVIT70124      4      BASE_PRENT      0910PD      2      0 (CBATE        AVXX01FOVIT70124      4      BASE_PRENT      0910PD      2      0 (CBATE        AVXX01FOVIT70154      4      BASE_PRENT      0910PD      2      0 (CBATE        AVXX01FOVIT70154      4      BASE_PRENT      0940PBA      2      TRANSFER_UT        CL_FOVT755      3      0 (CATE      0940PBA      3      TRANSFER_UT        CL_FOVT755      4      0 (CATE      0940PA      3      0 (CATE        CL_FOVT755      4      0 (CATE      0940PA      3      0 (CATE        CL_FOVT756      3      TRANSFER_UT      PCA      2      HOUBE_PRENT        CL_SUP_CLPR      3		ACVX01FCV0709024	2	BASIC_EVENT					Gesnida	2	TRANSFER	•
A0XX01FCVMTVB28    4    BASIC_EVENT    061MED    2    0R_GATE      A0XX01FCVMTVB28    4    BASIC_EVENT    061MED    2    0R_GATE      A0XX01FCVMTVB28    4    BASIC_EVENT    061MED    2    0R_GATE      A0XX01FCVMTVB28    4    BASIC_EVENT    061MED    2    TRAMSFER_OUT      CL_FCVTS87    3    0R_GATE    064MEA    2    TRAMSFER_OUT      CL_FCVTS87    4    0R_GATE    064MEA    2    TRAMSFER_OUT      CL_FCVT584    4    0R_GATE    064MEA    2    NUSE_EVENT      CL_FCVT584    4    0R_GATE    044MEA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CL_FCVT584    4    0R_GATE    1    HOUSE_EVENT    1    HOUSE_EVENT      CL_FCVT584    3    TRAMSFER_OUT    2    HOUSE_EVENT    1    HOUSE_EVENT	•	AOVX01FCV077002A	- 4	BABIC_EVENT	•				Gesende	2	OR_GATE	
A0X/X01FCVTTP154    4    BASIC_EVENT    0014FE0    2    OR_GATE      A0XX01FCVTTP159    4    BASIC_EVENT    0446BA    3    TRANSFER_OUT      CL_ECVT7591    3    0R_GATE    0446BA    3    0R_GATE      CL_ECVT7591    4    0R_GATE    0446BA    3    0R_GATE      CL_ECVT7591    4    0R_GATE    0446BA    3    0R_GATE      CL_ECVT7591    4    0R_GATE    0446BA    3    0R_GATE      CL_ECVT73A    4    0R_GATE    0646BA    3    0R_GATE      CL_ECVT73A    4    0R_GATE    0646BA    3    0R_GATE      CL_ECVT73A    4    0R_GATE    0646BA    3    0R_GATE      CL_ECVT73A    4    0R_GATE    1    10045E_EVENT      CL_ECVT73A    4    0R_GATE    1    10045E_EVENT      CL_ECVT73A    4    0R_GATE    1    10045E_EVENT      CL_EUP_CULDR    1    TANASFEL_OUT    1    10045E_EVENT      CL_EUP_CULDR    4    ND_GATE    1    10045E_EVENT      CL_E	•	AOVXO1FCV077002B	- 4	BASIC_EVENT					GUIMEA	2	AND_GATE	
ADVXXXVFCVVTTP1FBG4BASIC_EVENT5BASIC_EVENT5DEFAULTCUTGL_FXVTTSV30.F_GATECHANSEEL_CUT0.HMBA2TRANSFEL_CUTGL_FXVTTSV40.F_GATE0.HMBA30.F_GATEGL_FXVTTSV40.F_GATE0.HMBA2TRANSFEL_UTGL_FXVTTSV40.F_GATE0.HMBA30.F_GATEGL_FXVTTSV40.F_GATE0.HMBA30.F_GATEGL_FXVTTSV40.F_GATE1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_SUP_CHILDR3TRANSFELOUT1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_SUP_CHILDR3TRANSFELOUTPCA2.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUBSEE_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEE_FXVT1.HUFSEER_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEER_FXVT1.HUFSEER_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEER_FXVT1.HUFSEER_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEER_FXVT1.HUFSEER_FXVTGL_XIS4ND_GATE1.HUBSEER_FXVT1.HUFSEER_FXVTGL_XIS59.HUTSEER_FXVT1.HUFSEER_FXVT1.HUFSEER_FXVTGL_YIS69.HUTSE	• .	AOVXO1FCV077015A	4	BASIC_EVENT	• •		-		GOIMFD	2	OR_GATE -	
CL_CVT05710R_GATEORHOBA2TRAMSTER_UNCL_CVT05840R_GATEORHOBA3TRAMSTER_UNTCL_CVT05840R_GATEORHOBA3TRAMSTER_UNTCL_CVT05840R_GATEORHOBA3OR_GATECL_CVT05840R_GATEORHOBA3OR_GATECL_CVT05840R_GATEUVP1HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSTER_UNTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSTER_UNTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSTER_UNTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR4TRAMSTER_UNTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR4TRAMSTER_UNTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR4TRAMSTER_UNTFRAMSTER_UNTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUP_CH_DR4RAMSTER_UNTFRAMSTER_UNTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUP_CH_DR4RAMSTER_UNTFRAMSTER_UNTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUP_CH_DR4RAM_GATEFRAMSTER_UNTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUP_CH_CH_CH_SUPENT5RAMC_EVENTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUP_CH_CH_GN3RAMC_EVENTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUP_CH_CH_CH_SUPENT5RAMC_EVENTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUPENT5RAMC_EVENTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUPENT5RAMC_EVENTFRAMSTER_UNTCL_SUPENT5RAMC_EVENTCL_SUPENT5RAMC_EVENTC	•	AOVXOIFCV077015B	4	BASIC_EVENT					GRAMBA .	3	TRANSFER_OUT	· · ·
CL_FCVT0SI3OR_GATEGMABB3OR_GATECL_FCVT71544OR_GATEGMAIDA3TRAMSFER_UTCL_FCVT715940R_GATEGMAIDA2TRAMSFER_UTCL_FCVT72840R_GATEGMAIDA3OR_GATECL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UTLVP1HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UNPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UNPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UNPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UNPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UNPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR3TRAMSFER_UNPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CH_DR4TRAMSFER_UNFEFEFECL_SUP_CH_DR4TRAMSFER_UNFEFEFECL_SUP_CH_DR4RAMSFER_UNFEFEFECL_SUP_CH_DR4TRAMSFER_UNFEFEFECL_SUP_CH_DR4RAMSFER_UNFEFEFECL_SUP_CH_DR4RAMSFER_UNFEFEFECL_SUP_CH_DR4RAMSFER_UNFEFEFECL_SUP_CH_DR4RAMSFER_UNFEFEFE </td <td></td> <td>CIL_FCV7657</td> <td>3.</td> <td>OR_GATE</td> <td>· ·</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>Genera</td> <td>2 '</td> <td>TRANSFER_IN</td> <td></td>		CIL_FCV7657	3.	OR_GATE	· ·				Genera	2 '	TRANSFER_IN	
GL_FCV7715A4OR_GATEORMADA2TRANSFER_OUTCL_FCV7715B4OR_GATEGRUMCA2TRANSFER_OUTCL_FCV772A4OR_GATEORIGATEORIGATECL_FCV772B4OR_GATEUVP1NOUSE_EVENTCL_FCV72B4OR_GATEPCA2HOUSE_EVENTCL_SUP_COLDR1TRANSFER_OUTPCA2HOUSE_EVENTCL_SUP_COLDR1TRANSFER_OUTPCA2HOUSE_EVENTCL_SUP_COLDR1TRANSFER_OUTPCA2HOUSE_EVENTCL_X184TRANSFER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X184TRANSFER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X184TRANSFER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X194AND_GATEFCAFCAFCACL_X194BARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACNUTPE6BARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACNUTIGMURR11BARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACNUTIGMURR11BARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCA		CIL_FCV7558	<b>.</b> 3	OR_GATE		•			GOUMBE	<b>3</b>	OR_GATE	
CL_PCV771894DC_BATEGR MMDA2TINARGELINCL_PCV772A4GR_BATEGR MATEGR MMDB3OR_GATECL_PCV772B4OR_GATEIVP1HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CLDR1TRANSFEQ.UTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_CLDR3AND_GATEPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_X154TRANSFEQ.UTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_X154TRANSFEQ.UTFCA5FCAFCACL_X194TRANSFEQ.UTFCAFCAFCAFCACL_X194TRANSFEQ.UTFCAFCAFCAFCACL_X194TRANSFEQ.UTFCAFCAFCAFCACL_X194TRANSFER.INFCAFCAFCAFCACL_X194SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCAFCACONFIFE5SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCAFCACONFITGM0RR13SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACONFITMMRR215SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACONFIT_MMURR215SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACONFIT_MMURR215SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACONFIT_MMURR215SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCACONFITFMA5SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCAFCA5SARG_EVENTFCAFCAFCAFCAFCA5SARG_EVENT		CIL_FCV7715A	4	OR_GATE					GOMMOA	3	TRANSFER_OUT	
CL_FCV772A4OR_GATEGOMMOS3OR_GATECL_FCV772B4OR_GATELVP1HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_COLOR3TRANSPER_OUTPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_SUP_COLOR4AND_GATEPCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_X154TRANSPER_OUTFCA2HOUBE_EVENTCL_X194TRANSPER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X194TRANSPER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X194TRANSPER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X194TRANSPER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X194TRANSPER_OUTFCAFCAFCACL_X194AND_GATEFCAFCAFCACDVFTL_G440805FCAFCAFCAFCACOVFTL_G440805BASC_EVENTFCAFCAFCA		CL_PCV77158	4	OR_GATE	-				GO4NDA	2	TRANSFER_M	•
CL_FCV/728    4    OR_GATE    LVP    1    HOUBE_EVENT      CL_SUP_COLDR    3    TRANSPEL_OUT    PCA    2    HOUBE_EVENT      CL_SUP_COLDR    1    TRANSPEL_IN    PCA    2    HOUBE_EVENT      CL_SUP_COLDR    4    TRANSPEL_IN    PCA    2    HOUBE_EVENT      CL_X18    4    TRANSPEL_IN    PCA    2    HOUBE_EVENT      CL_X18    4    TRANSPEL_OUT    F    F    F      CL_X18    4    TRANSPEL_OUT    F    F    F      CL_X18    4    TRANSPEL_OUT    F    F    F    F      CL_X18    4    TRANSPER_OUT    F    F    F    F    F      CL_X19    4    AND_GATE    F    F    F    F    F    F    F      CL_X19    4    AND_GATE    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F    F<		CIL_FCV772A	4	OR_GATE .					GO4MOB	3	OR GATE	
CL_SUP_CH_DR    1    TRANSPER_CUT    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CL_SUP_CH_DR    1    TRANSPER_LIN    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CL_SUP_CH_DR    3    AND_GATE    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CL_X18    4    TRANSPER_LOUT    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CL_X18    4    TRANSPER_CUT    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CL_X19    4    AND_GATE    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CONSPRE    1    TRANSPER_UN    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT      CONFTIGH40001    3    BASC_EVENT    PCA    2    HOUSE_EVENT		CIL_FCV/728	4	OR GATE					LVP	1	HOUSE EVENT	
CIL_SUP_CH_DR  1  TRANSPER_IN  PCA  2  HOUSE_EVENT    CIL_SUP_CH_DR  3  AND_GATE  CIL_X15  4  TRANSPER_UNT    CIL_X15  4  TRANSPER_UNT  CIL_X15  4  TRANSPER_UNT    CIL_X15  4  TRANSPER_UNT  CIL_X15  4  TRANSPER_UNT    CIL_X15  4  TRANSPER_UNT  CIL_X15  4  TRANSPER_UNT    CIL_X15  4  AND_GATE		CIL SUP CH DR	3	TRANSFER OUT					PCA	,	HOUSE EVENT	
CIL_SUP_CCLPR    3    AND_GATE      CIL_SUP_CCLPR    4    TRANSPEL_OUT      CIL_X18    4    TRANSPEL_OUT      CIL_X18    4    AND_GATE      CIL_X18    4    TRANSPEL_OUT      CIL_X19    4    TRANSPER_UN      CIL_X19    4    TRANSPER_UT      CIL_X19    1    TRANSPER_UN      CIL_X19    1    TRANSPER_UN      COL_X19    1    TRANSPER_UN      COL_X19    1    TRANSPER_UN      COL_X19    1    TRANSPER_UN      CONTYTLG440800    1    BASIC_EVENT      CONTYTLG440801    3    BASIC_EVENT	•	CIL SUP CH DR		TRANSFER IN	•				PCA	,	HOUSE EVENT	
CIL_X18 4 TRANSFEL_DUT CIL_X18 4 TRANSFEL_DUT CIL_X18 4 AND_GATE CIL_X19 4 TRANSFER_UN CIL_X19 4 AND_GATE CIL_X19 1 TRANSFER_UN CONDPRE 1 BARC_EVENT COVFT1G40301 3 BARC_EVENT				AND BATE						-	HOVOLLEN.	
CIL_X18    1    TRANSFEL_IN      CIL_X18    4    AND_GATE      CIL_X19    4    TRANSFER OUT      CIL_X19    4    AND_GATE      CIL_X19    4    AND_GATE      CIL_X19    1    TRANSFER IN      CONFORE    1    BARC_EVENT      CONFT1G440901    3    BASIC_EVENT		CH YIS			•							
CH_X10    4    House Huge      CH_X19    4    TRANSFER CUT      CH_X19    4    AND_GATE      CH_X19    1    TRANSFER IN      CONDPRE    1    BASIC_EVENT      COVFT1S440901    3    BASIC_EVENT		CH 118	-	TRANSFER IN							•	
CL_X19  4  TRAINFER OUT    CL_X19  4  AND_GATE    CL_X19  1  TRAINFER INI    CONDPRE  1  BARC_EVENT    COVFT1SH0000  3  BASC_EVENT    COVFT1_SH0001  3  BASC_EVENT		CH 118	ż	AND GATE		•	•					
CL_X19 4 AND_GATE CL_X19 4 AND_GATE CL_X19 1 TRANSFER IN CONDRE 1 BARC_EVENT CONFI1G40000 3 BASIC_EVENT CONFI1G40001 3 BARC_EVENT	·	CH 149	-7			i		•				
CONDEPRE 1 BARG_EVENT CONFT16440000 3 BASG_EVENT CONFT16440001 3 BARG_EVENT		CHE 140	2		•				•			
CONDIPRE 1 INTERCENT CONTIGH0000 3 BASC_EVENT CONTIGH0001 3 BASC_EVENT			2	TRANSFR IN	- ·				•			
CONFIL_GLOBOR 3 BASIC_EVENT CONFIL_GLOBOR 3 BASIC_EVENT CONFIL_MANORI 3 BASIC_EVENT		0000000	2	INANOTEN IN								
CONFIL_GRADDE 3 BASE_EVENT CONFIL_GRADDE1 3 BASE_EVENT		CUNDERE	1	BARC_EVENT				•	•			
CONFI1040001 3 BABC_EVENT		COVFT16640906	8	BASIC EVENT								
	-	COVFT10640801	3	BASIC_EVENT	•							•





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•	SYMBOL NAME	P#	SYMBOL TYPE	•		
:		1,	AND_GATE			
· · ·	NPSH	1	OR_GATE			
	RIVER70	1	BASIC_EVENT			
	RIVER89	1	BASIC_EVENT	•		
	ZHECCL	1	BASIC_EVENT			•
·				•		
			. •		•	•
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