

March 2, 2006

Mr. Mark B. Bezilla  
Vice President  
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company  
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station  
Mail Stop A-DB-3080  
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Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF  
AMENDMENT RE: REVISION OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM  
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (TAC NO. MC4173)

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 273 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 20, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated June 16 and December 6, 2005. The amendment revises TS 3/4.8.1.1, "A.C. Sources – Operating," by deleting Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.2.d.4, which requires verification that the emergency diesel generator auto-connected loads do not exceed the 2000-hour load limit. The amendment also revises TS 4/3.8.1.2, "A.C. Sources – Shutdown," to add exceptions to SR 4.8.1.2 when performed in Modes 5 and 6.

As a result of discussions held on October 20, 2005 with the NRC staff, you decided to withdraw the portion of the amendment request (LAR 01-0009) that requested clarification of SR 4.8.1.1.b.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen P. Sands, Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch III-2  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-346

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 273 to NPF-3
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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cc w/encls: See next page

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FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

AND

FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR GENERATION CORP.

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 273  
License No. NPF-3

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company et al. (the licensee), dated August 20, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated June 16 and December 6, 2005, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 273, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*/RA/*

Mindy S. Landau, Acting Chief  
Plant Licensing Branch III-2  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 2, 2006

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 273

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 8-4

3/4 8-5

Insert

3/4 8-4

3/4 8-5

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 273 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3  
FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY  
FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR GENERATION CORP.  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1  
DOCKET NO. 50-346

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, Commission) dated August 20, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated June 16 and December 6, 2005, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, et al. (the licensee), requested changes to the technical specifications (TSs) for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. The supplements dated June 16 and December 6, 2005, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as initially noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* on September 28, 2004 (69 FR 57989).

The proposed changes would revise TS 3/4.8.1.1, "A.C. Sources – Operating," and TS 3/4.8.1.2, "A.C. Sources – Shutdown," to revise electrical power system surveillance requirements (SRs). Specifically, the proposed changes would:

1. Relocate SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 from TS to Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). This SR presently requires verification that the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) auto-connected loads do not exceed the 2000-hour load limit.
2. Revise SR 4.8.1.2 in the TS 3/4.8.1.2, "A.C. Sources - Shutdown." The revision will add additional exceptions to SR 4.8.1.2 when performed in Modes 5 and 6. These additional exceptions are proposed to improve consistency among the various Davis-Besse TS requirements.

## 2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The regulatory requirements which the NRC staff applied in its review of the application include:

General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, "Electric power systems," of Title 10 to the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix A requires that nuclear power plants have onsite and offsite electric power systems to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components (SSC) that are important safety. The onsite system is required to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety function, assuming a single failure. The offsite power system must be supplied by two physically independent circuits that are designed and located so as to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. In addition, this



criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the remaining electric power supplies as a result of loss of power from the unit, the offsite transmission network, or the onsite power supplies.

GDC 18, "Inspection and testing of electric power systems," requires that electric power systems that are important to safety be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing.

Section 50.36, "Technical Specifications," to 10 CFR Part 50, sets forth the regulatory requirements for the content of the TSs. This regulation requires, in part, that the TSs contain limiting conditions for operation (LCOs). Section 50.36(c)(2)(ii) provides four criteria to be used in determining whether an LCO is required to be included in the TSs for a particular item. The four criteria are as follows:

1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
3. A SSC that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
4. A SSC which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Additionally, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) states:

Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.

The Final Commission policy statement issued on July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), presents the policy of the NRC with respect to the scope and purpose of TSs. Included in this policy statement is a discussion of the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). The policy statement further states that LCOs and SRs which do not meet any of these criteria may be proposed for removal from the TSs provided they are relocated to a licensee-controlled document, governed by the 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, tests, and experiments," change control process.

### 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

#### 3.1 Offsite/Onsite Power Systems at Davis-Besse

The Davis-Besse output, generated at 25 kV, is fed through an isolated phase bus to the 980 MVA main transformer where it is stepped up to 345 kV transmission voltage and delivered to the station switchyard. Three overhead 345 kV line connections are provided from the

switchyard to the onsite station distribution system, one line to each of the two startup transformers and a third line to the main transformer.

During power operation, the normal AC source is the 25 kV main generator output to feed the two 13.8 kV busses through the unit auxiliary transformer. During startup and shutdown, each 13.8 kV bus is fed from the secondary winding of either of two startup transformers, or, during operational modes 3, 4, 5, 6, or defueled, backfed through the main power transformer and unit auxiliary transformer with the generator links removed. During normal power operation, while the unit auxiliary transformer feeds both 13.8 kV busses, each startup transformer is selected as the reserve source for one of the 13.8 kV busses. Upon loss of power to either 13.8 kV bus, the bus automatically transfers to its reserve source as selected by the bus's reserve source selector switch.

Power supply to the 4.16 kV system is from two bus tie transformers which step down the voltage from 13.8 kV to 4.16 kV. Each bus tie transformer normally supplies one essential and one nonessential 4.16 kV bus and is available as a reserve source for the other two 4.16 kV buses. Each essential 4.16 kV bus is provided with a fast bus transfer scheme which will transfer the bus from its normal source to a reserve source of power.

Two redundant EDG units, one connected to each essential 4.16 kV bus, are provided as onsite standby power sources to supply their respective essential buses upon loss of the normal and the reserve power sources. The EDGs start on safety actuation signal or loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP) signal. Bus load shedding and isolation, bus transfer to the EDG, and pickup of critical loads is automatic.

### 3.2 Relocation of SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 to TRM

SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 requires verification that the auto-connected loads to each EDG do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 2838 kW. The licensee performs this SR by verifying the essential bus power level is below 2838 kW following a simulated loss of offsite power with a safety features actuation system (SFAS) signal present.

The licensee has proposed to relocate SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 to the TRM, which is incorporated by reference in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), and subject to the change control requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the update and reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e).

In its justification, the licensee stated that the performance of SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 is ineffective in demonstrating the EDG will not exceed its 2000-hour rating during actual accident conditions. This is due to the fact that the connected loading during testing is substantially lower than the maximum possible loading under actual accident conditions.

The USAR Section 8.1.5, "Design Bases," identifies NRC Safety Guide 9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," as being implemented in the electrical system design. Safety Guide 9, Regulatory Position 2, states, "At the operating license stage of review, the predicted loads should not exceed the smaller of the 2000-hour rating or 90 percent of 30-hour rating of the set." The predicted EDG loads for LOOP with the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and for LOOP without LOCA are tabulated in USAR Table 8.3-1.

The licensee verifies during SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.1 that the loads are shed from essential busses when simulating a LOOP in conjunction with a SFAS test signal. The SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.1, and the requirement that any changes to essential loads of EDG will be subjected to the 10 CFR 50.59

process to ensure EDG loads remain within analyzed limits, provide adequate assurance that the loading will remain within the EDG rated capacity. Other SRs under TS 3/4.8.1 will continue to ensure the readiness of EDGs to supply the essential loads. For example, SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 verifies that a EDG operates for \$ 60 minutes while loaded to \$ 2000 kW, at least once each REFUELING INTERVAL during shutdown.

Based on above, the NRC staff agrees that SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 is not required within the TS, and can be relocated to the TRM. The other SRs under TS 3/4.8.1 will continue to ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) are adequately met.

### 3.3 Additional Exceptions to SR 4.8.1.2

TS 3/4.8.1.2, "A.C. Sources - Shutdown," contains requirements for the A.C. electrical power sources in Modes 5 and 6. Presently, SR 4.8.1.2 states, "The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the Surveillance Requirements of 4.8.1.1.1 and 4.8.1.1.2 except for requirements..." The proposed change will add SR 4.8.1.1.1.b and SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 to the list of requirements that are not required to be performed for Modes 5 and 6 under SR 4.8.1.2.

#### SR 4.8.1.1.1.b Not to Be Performed Under SR 4.8.1.2

SR 4.8.1.1.1.b states, "Demonstrate OPERABLE at least once each REFUELING INTERVAL during shutdown by transferring (manually and automatically) unit power supply to each of the offsite circuits."

LCO 3.8.1.2. applicable for Modes 5 and 6 requires only one OPERABLE offsite circuit, and one EDG. However, SR 4.8.1.1.1.b by requiring transferring (unit power supply transfer from unit auxiliary transformer) to each of the offsite circuits, requires transferring capability to the two offsite circuits. Since, LCO 3.8.1.2 requires only one offsite circuit, the SR 4.8.1.1.1.b is inconsistent with LCO 3.8.1.2. The SR 4.8.1.1.b under Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 will continue to ensure transfer capability of unit power supply from the unit auxiliary transformer to each of the offsite circuits.

Based on above, the NRC staff considers the proposed change acceptable.

### 3.4 SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 Not to be Performed Under SR 4.8.1.2

SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 states as follows:

"Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety features actuation system (SFAS) test signal, and:

- (a) Verifying de-energization of the essential busses and load shedding from the essential busses.
- (b) Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the essential busses with permanently connected loads, energizes the auto-connected essential loads through the load sequencer and operates for \$ 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the essential loads.

- (c) Verifying that all diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the essential bus and/or an SFAS test signal.

SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 requires simulating a LOOP in conjunction with a SFAS test signal and verifying proper system response. In the license amendment request, the licensee stated that the TS requirements for the Sequence Logic Channels, which include part of logic circuitry that is necessary to successfully complete this test, are contained in TS 3/4.3.2.1, "Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation." TS Table 3.3-3 identifies the operability requirements for Functional Units ["Sequencer"; "Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (90%); and "Diesel Generator Start, Load Shed on Essential Bus (59%)"] as only being applicable in Modes 1 through 4. By requiring performance of SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 for Mode 5 and 6, the SR 4.8.1.2 is requiring performance of a SR that requires the use of logic circuitry that is not required by TS Table 3.3-3 to be operable for these modes.

In addition, the licensee stated, "Many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in Modes 1 through 4 have no specific analyses in Modes 5 and 6. Worst-case bounding events are deemed not credible in Modes 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. Accidents in Modes 5 and 6 are generally slow to develop and can be mitigated by manually loading and operating individual components. Adequate time is available to evaluate unit conditions and respond by manually loading and operating components, if required. The only USAR-described DBAs postulated to occur in Modes 5 and 6 are the Waste Gas Decay Tank Rupture (USAR Section 15.4.1) and the Fuel-Handling Accident (USAR Section 15.4.7). Both of these accidents rely on essential A.C. powered equipment for consequence mitigation. However, neither of these accident scenarios postulate a LOOP, and hence, automatic EDG actuation and loading are not credited in mitigating these accidents."

By adding SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 to the list of exceptions in SR 4.8.1.2, the modes in which the SR is applicable will be consistent with the modes for which the associated logic circuitry is required to be operable.

The NRC staff has reviewed the above proposed change, and agrees with the licensee that by adding SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 to the list of exceptions in SR 4.8.1.2, the modes in which SR is applicable will be consistent with the modes for which the associated logic circuitry is required to be operable. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable.

Based on justifications and commitments provided by the licensee, the NRC staff agrees with the following TS changes:

- (1) Relocation of SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.4 to TRM.
- (2) Additional exceptions to SR 4.8.1.2, i.e., SR 4.8.1.1.1.b and SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 are not required to be performed under SR 4.8.1.2.

As discussed above, the NRC staff has evaluated the proposed changes to the TS 3/4.8.1.1, "A.C. Sources – Operating," and TS 3/4.8.1.2, "A.C. Sources – Shutdown," to revise electrical power system SRs. The other SRs under TS 3/4.8.1 will continue to ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) are adequately met. Based on the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that it is safe to operate the plant using the proposed TSs and SRs.

Based on this conclusion, the NRC staff further concludes that the proposed amendment is acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (69 FR 57989; September 28, 2004). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: V. Goel

Date: March 2, 2006