



January 19, 2006

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Palisades Nuclear Plant
Docket 50-255
License No. DPR-20

Licensee Event Report 05-007, Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator For A Time Longer Than Permitted By Technical Specifications

Licensee Event Report (LER) 05-007 is attached. The LER describes the discovery of a component failure during surveillance testing of emergency diesel generator 1-2. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Paul A. Harden
Site Vice President, Palisades Nuclear Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Enclosure (1)

CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC

ENCLOSURE 1

**LER 05-007, Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator
For A Time Longer Than Permitted By Technical Specifications**

3 Pages Follow

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0066), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Palisades Nuclear Plant

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000-255

PAGE (3)

1 of 3

TITLE (4)

Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator For A Time Longer Than Permitted By Technical Specifications

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
11	20	2005	2005	-- 007 --	00	01	19	2006	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR *: (Check all that apply) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		100	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
			20.2201(d)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(1)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.46(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Daniel G. Malone

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(269) 764-2463

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
B	EK	SNB	F010	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
				03	31	2006

ABSTRACT

On November 20, 2005, during a monthly surveillance test of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1-2, a fuel leak was observed from the fuel oil injection system at the discharge of the cylinder 5R fuel pump. Since the spraying fuel oil created a potential fire hazard, the EDG was shutdown and declared inoperable. Subsequent inspection determined that the leak occurred at the cylinder 5R snubber valve, which had cracked.

Review of the cause of failure indicates that the snubber valve was unable to operate satisfactorily for the EDG's required mission time. Therefore, EDG 1-2 should be considered to have been inoperable since installation of this snubber valve. Consequently, EDG 1-2 was inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by Palisades Technical Specifications. Additionally, during the period EDG 1-2 was inoperable, EDG 1-1 was made inoperable for performance of its monthly surveillance. Therefore, both EDGs were simultaneously inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by Technical Specifications.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Palisades	05000-255	2005	-- 007	-- 00	2 of 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On November 20, 2005, during a monthly surveillance test of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1-2 [DG;EK], a fuel leak was observed from the fuel oil injection system at the discharge of the cylinder 5R fuel pump. Since the spraying fuel oil created a potential fire hazard, the EDG was shutdown and declared inoperable.

Subsequent inspection determined that the leak occurred at the cylinder 5R snubber valve, which had cracked. The snubber valve is located at the interface of the fuel injection pump and fuel injection tube. The snubber valve functions to dampen pulsations created by the fuel injection system and also serves as the fuel oil pressure boundary.

This snubber valve had been recently installed during EDG maintenance and had performed satisfactorily during post maintenance test runs on October 27 and 28, 2005, for a total of approximately 11 hours of EDG run time. Subsequently, on November 20, 2005, EDG 1-2 operated for approximately 1.5 hours during the monthly surveillance test before the leak was identified.

Review of the cause of failure indicates that the snubber valve was unable to operate satisfactorily for the EDG's required mission time. Therefore, EDG 1-2 should be considered to have been inoperable since installation of this snubber valve. Consequently, EDG 1-2 was inoperable for a period of time longer than the 7 days allowed by Palisades Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.B.4. Additionally, during the period EDG 1-2 was inoperable, EDG 1-1 was made inoperable for approximately 8 hours for the performance of its monthly surveillance. Therefore, both EDGs were simultaneously inoperable for a period of time longer than the 2 hours allowed by TS 3.8.1.E.1.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

This event involves a safety system functional failure.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

Examination of the snubber valve revealed that it had cracked axially in 3 separate locations. An additional crack was visible, but the fracture was not yet complete. The apparent cause of the cracking was due to improper heat treatment.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Palisades	05000-255	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 of 3
		2005	-- 007	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The EDG vendor is continuing their investigation of the issue and evaluation of potential 10 CFR 21 reporting.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The safety significance of the event is considered minimal. For any postulated design basis scenario, the safety function of the EDGs is met with one operating EDG.

EDG 1-2 demonstrated that it would run for approximately 1.5 hours before the actual failure of the snubber valve. EDG 1-1 was operable during the subject period except for approximately 8 hours due to surveillance testing. EDG 1-1 is considered capable of being recovered to a fully operable condition from surveillance testing in a matter of minutes (much less than 1.5 hours).

Therefore, even if a postulated scenario requiring the EDG safety function occurred during EDG 1-1 surveillance testing, EDG 1-2 would have initially been in operation, with recovery of EDG 1-1 to operable status occurring before EDG 1-2 exhibited its failure.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cylinder 5R snubber valve was replaced. The EDG was satisfactorily test operated for approximately 25 hours. The issue with snubber valve cracking is considered an early life failure and would be expected to self reveal within a 24-hour run of the EDG.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None