

**From:** Harry Balian  
**To:** Richard J Brooks  
**Date:** 20-Oct-05 9:48:09 AM  
**Subject:** RO Questions 1 to 75

**!!!!!!!!!!!!!! THINK EXAM SECURITY PLEASE !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!**

This is our second submission for the December 2005 ILO exam. These are 75 questions of a 75 question RO exam and a 100 question SRO exam. The 75 questions submitted hereunder are all considered RO level examination questions.

Questions 1 through 50, except 25 and 47, were previously submitted to SSES. This submission incorporates your comments to those questions. Please note substantial changes to questions 2, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 34, 35, 38, 39, 43, 45, 47, and 48. Some comments to questions 9, 24, and 29 were not accepted.

Your technical assistance is specifically required to ensure questions 18, 21, 31, 64, 68, 69, 73, and 75 are appropriate. In addition, we don't consider questions 2 and 13 to be good K/A matches. Can you offer a suggested repair or replacement?

A hard-copy or paper version will NOT be sent unless you expressly request one. Please use the project password to access these protected files.

**!!!!!!!!!!!!!! THINK EXAM SECURITY PLEASE !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!**

Harry Balian  
Operational Safety Branch, Region 1  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415  
(610) 337 - 5224  
fax: (610) 337 - 5320  
hxb2@nrc.gov

**CC:** Cynthia Bixler; Todd Fish

Facility: <b>Susquehanna Steam Electric Station</b>				Date of Exam: <b>12 December 2005</b>		Exam Level: RO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SRO <input type="checkbox"/>	
Item Description				Initial			
				a	b*	c#	
1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility.				HB	N/A	TF	
2. a. NRC K/As are referenced for all questions. b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available.				HB	N/A	TF	
3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401				N/A	N/A	N/A	
4. The sampling process was random and systematic (if more than 4 RO and 2 SRO questions are repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult with NRR OL program office.)				2 RO repeats		TF	
5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or <input type="checkbox"/> the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the examinations were developed independently; or <input type="checkbox"/> the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or <input type="checkbox"/> other (explain)				HB	N/A	TF	
6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only question distribution(s) at right.				Bank	Modified	New	
				2 2	1 9	3 4	
7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.				Memory	C/A		
				3 0	4 5		
8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors.				HB	N/A	TF	
9. Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified.				HB	N/A	TF	
10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.				HB	N/A	TF	
11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet.				HB	N/A	TF	
Printed Name / Signature				Date			
a. Author <b>Harry Balian /</b>				<b>19 Oct 05</b>			
b. Facility Reviewer (*) <b>* not applicable</b>				<b>n/a</b>			
c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) <b>Todd H. Fish /</b>				<b>20 Oct 05</b>			
d. NRC Regional Supervisor <b>Richard J. Conte /</b>				<b>21 Oct 05</b>			
Note: * The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations. # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.				<b>10/20/05</b>			

This is our second submission for the December 2005 ILO exam. These are 75 questions of a 75 question RO exam and a 100 question SRO exam. The 75 questions submitted hereunder are all considered RO level examination questions.

Questions 1 through 50, except 25 and 47, were previously submitted to SSES. This submission incorporates your comments to those questions. Please note substantial changes to questions 2, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 34, 35, 38, 39, 43, 45, 47, and 48. Some comments to questions 9, 24, and 29 were not accepted. Your technical assistance is specifically required to ensure questions 18, 21, 31, 64, 68, 69, 73, and 75 are appropriate.

#### Previous Susquehanna Exam questions

August 2002: 1 Modified (34)

August 2003: None

December 2003: None

August 2004: 1 Modified (14) and 1 Bank (21)

Facility: Susquehanna Steam Electric StationDate of Exam: 12 to 22 December 2005

Tier	Group	RO K/A Category Points												SRO-ONLY Points				
		K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G*	TOTAL	K	A	A2	G*	TOTAL
1. Emergency & Abnormal Plant Evolutions	1	4	3	3				4	3			3	20					8
	2	1	2	1				1	1			1	7					4
	Tier Totals	5	5	4				5	4			4	27					12
2. Plant Systems	1	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	26					4
	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	12					2
	Tier Totals	4	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	38					6
3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories				1		2		3		4		10	1	2	3	4	7	
				2		3		2		3								

## Note:

1. Ensure that at least two topics from every K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO outline (i.e., the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two). Refer to Section D.1.c for additional guidance regarding SRO sampling.
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by  $\pm 1$  from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Select topics from many systems and evolutions; avoid selecting more than two K/A topics from a given system or evolution unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.
4. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline.
5. The shaded areas are not applicable to the category/tier.
6. \* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. The SRO K/As must also be linked to 10 CFR 55.43 or an SRO-level learning objective.
7. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; summarize all the SRO-only knowledge and non-A2 ability categories in the columns labeled "K" and "A." Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams. For Tier 3, enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, importance ratings, and point totals on Form ES-401-3.
8. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 (RO)						Form ES-401-1	
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K 1	K 2	K 3	A 1	A 2	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 1</u></b> 295001 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced Core Flow Circulation		X					<b>AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION and the following:</b> AK2.07 Core flow indication	3.4	1
<b><u>Question 2</u></b> 295003 Partial or Complete Loss of A.C. Power			X				<b>AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF A.C. POWER :</b> AK3.06 Containment isolation	3.7	1
<b><u>Question 3</u></b> 295004 Partial or Complete Loss of D.C. Power	X						<b>AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF D.C. POWER:</b> AK1.05 Loss of breaker protection	3.3	1
<b><u>Question 4</u></b> 295004 Partial or Complete Loss of D.C. Power						X	2.2.30 Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling such as alarms from fuel handling area / communication with fuel storage facility / systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations / and supporting instrumentation.	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 5</u></b> 295005 Main Turbine Trip		X					<b>AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP and the following:</b> AK2.04 Main generator protection	3.3	1
<b><u>Question 6</u></b> 295006 SCRAM					X		<b>AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM :</b> AA2.04 Reactor pressure	4.1	1
<b><u>Question 7</u></b> 295016 Control Room Abandonment			X				<b>AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT :</b> AK3.03 Disabling control room controls	3.5	1

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 (RO)						Form ES-401-1	
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K 1	K 2	K 3	A 1	A 2	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 8</u></b> 295018 Partial or Complete Loss of Component	X						<b>AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER :</b> AK1.01 Effects on component/system operations	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 9</u></b> 295019 Partial or Complete Loss of Instrument Air				X			<b>AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR :</b> AA1.03 Instrument air compressor power supplies	3.0	1
<b><u>Question 10</u></b> 295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling					X		<b>AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING:</b> AA2.07 Reactor recirculation flow	2.9	1
<b><u>Question 11</u></b> 295023 Refueling Accidents	X						<b>AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS :</b> AK1.01 Radiation exposure hazards	3.6	1
<b><u>Question 12</u></b> 295024 High Drywell Pressure						X	2.3.2 Knowledge of facility ALARA program.	2.5	1
<b><u>Question 13</u></b> 295025 High Reactor Pressure					X		<b>EA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE:</b> EA2.03 Suppression Pool Temperature	3.9	1
<b><u>Question 14</u></b> 295026 Suppression Pool High Water Temperature	X						<b>EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE:</b> EK1.02 Steam Condensation	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 15</u></b> 295028 High Drywell Temperature			X				<b>EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE:</b> EK3.02 RPV flooding	3.5	1

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 (RO)						Form ES-401-1	
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K 1	K 2	K 3	A 1	A 2	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 16</u></b> 295030 Low Suppression Pool Water Level				X			<b>EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL:</b> EA1.06 Condensate storage and transfer (make-up to the suppression pool): Plant-Specific	3.6	1
<b><u>Question 17</u></b> 295031 Reactor Low Water Level		X					<b>EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL and the following:</b> EK2.13 ARI/RPT/ATWS: Plant-Specific	4.1	1
<b><u>Question 18</u></b> 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown						X	2.2.2 Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.	4.0	1
<b><u>Question 19</u></b> 295038 High Off-Site Release Rate				X			<b>EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to HIGH OFF-SITE RELEASE RATE:</b> EA1.07 Control room ventilation: Plant-Specific	3.6	1
<b><u>Question 20</u></b> 600000 Plant Fire On Site				X			<b>AA1 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE:</b> AA1.06 Fire alarm	3.0	1
<b>K/A Category Totals:</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Group Point Total:</b>	<b>20</b>	



ES-401		BWR Examination Outline						Form ES-401-1	
Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 (RO)									
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function	K 1	K 2	K 3	A 1	A 2	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 21</u></b> 295008 High Reactor Water Level						X	2.1.20 Ability to execute procedure steps.	4.3	1
<b><u>Question 22</u></b> 295009 Low Reactor Water Level	X						<b>AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL :</b> AK1.02 Recirculation pump net positive suction head: Plant-Specific	3.0	1
<b><u>Question 23</u></b> 295013 High Suppression Pool Temperature		X					<b>AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE and the following:</b> AK2.01 Suppression pool cooling	3.6	1
<b><u>Question 24</u></b> 295015 Incomplete SCRAM		X					<b>AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between INCOMPLETE SCRAM and the following:</b> AK2.06 RSCS: Plant-Specific	2.6	1
<b><u>Question 25</u></b> 295034 Secondary Containment Ventilation High			X				<b>EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH RADIATION :</b> EK3.03 Personnel Evacuation	4.0*	1
<b><u>Question 26</u></b> 295036 Secondary Containment High Sump				X			<b>EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AREA WATER LEVEL :</b> EA1.01 Secondary containment equipment and floor drain systems	3.2	1
<b><u>Question 27</u></b> 500000 High Containment Hydrogen Concentration					X		<b>EA2 Ability to determine and / or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS:</b> EA2.04 Combustible limits for wetwell	3.3	1
K/A Category Point Totals:	1	2	1	1	1	1	Group Point Total:	7	

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1		
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 28</u></b> 203000 Residual Heat Removal /Low Pressure Coolant Injection: Injection Mode (Plant Specific)			X									<b>K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHR/LPCI: INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC) will have on following:</b> K3.03 Automatic depressurization logic.	4.2 *	1
<b><u>Question 29</u></b> 205000 Shutdown Cooling System (RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode)		X										<b>K2. Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:</b> K2.02 Motor operated valves.	2.5 *	1
<b><u>Question 30</u></b> 206000 High Pressure Coolant Injection System							X					<b>A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM controls including:</b> A1.01 Reactor water level: BWR-2,3,4	4.3 *	1
<b><u>Question 31</u></b> 206000 High Pressure Coolant Injection System											X	2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.	3.0	1
<b><u>Question 32</u></b> 209001 Low Pressure Core Spray System				X								<b>K4. Knowledge of LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following:</b> K4.08 Automatic system initiation	3.8	1
<b><u>Question 33</u></b> 211000 Standby Liquid Control System				X								<b>K4. Knowledge of STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following:</b> K4.04 Indication of fault in explosive valve firing circuits	3.8	1



ES-401		BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1		
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 34</u></b> 211000 Standby Liquid Control System											X	2.1.33 Ability to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.	3.4	1
<b><u>Question 35</u></b> 212000 Reactor Protection System				X								<b>K4. Knowledge of AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following:</b> K4.09 Control rod insertion following RPS system electrical failure.	3.8 *	1
<b><u>Question 36</u></b> 212000 Reactor Protection System									X			<b>A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM including:</b> A3.01 Reactor Power	4.4 *	1
<b><u>Question 37</u></b> 215003 Intermediate Range Monitor System		X										<b>K2. Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:</b> K2.01 IRM channels/detectors	2.5 *	1
<b><u>Question 38</u></b> 215004 Source Range Monitor (SRM) System					X							<b>K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM :</b> K5.03 Changing detector position	2.8	1

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1		
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 39</u></b> 215005 Average Power Range Monitor/Local Power Range Monitor							X					<b>A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM controls including:</b> A1.02 RPS status	3.9	1
<b><u>Question 40</u></b> 217000 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System	X											<b>K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) and the following:</b> K1.02 Nuclear boiler system	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 41</u></b> 218000 Automatic Depressurization System									X			<b>A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM including:</b> A3.01 ADS valve operation	4.2 *	1
<b><u>Question 42</u></b> 223002 Primary Containment Isolation System / Nuclear Steam Supply Shut-Off						X						<b>K6. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF :</b> K6.02 D.C. electrical distribution	3.0	1

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1		
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 43</u></b> 239002 Safety Relief Valves					X							<b>K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM :</b> K5.02 Safety function of SRV operation	3.7	1
<b><u>Question 44</u></b> 259002 Reactor Water Level Control System			X									<b>K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM will have on following:</b> K3.03 Rod worth minimizer: BWR-2,3,4	2.7	1
<b><u>Question 45</u></b> 259002 Reactor Water Level Control System										X		<b>A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:</b> A4.09TDRFP lockout reset: TDRFP. BWR-2,3,4	3.4	1
<b><u>Question 46</u></b> 261000 Standby Gas Treatment System	X											<b>K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM and the following:</b> K1.01 Reactor building ventilation system.	3.4	1
<b><u>Question 47</u></b> 262001 A.C. Electrical Distribution								X				<b>A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:</b> A2.05 Bus grounds.	3.8	1

## Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 (RO)

System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 48</u></b> 262002 Uninterruptable Power Supply						X						<b>K6. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) :</b> K6.01 A.C. electrical power	2.7	1
<b><u>Question 49</u></b> 263000 D.C. Electrical Distribution	X											<b>K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between D.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION and the following:</b> K1.02 Battery charger and battery	3.2	1
<b><u>Question 50</u></b> 264000 Emergency Generators (Diesel/Jet)							X					<b>A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) controls including:</b> A1.09 Maintaining minimum load on emergency generator (to prevent reverse power)	3.0	1
<b><u>Question 51</u></b> 300000 Instrument Air System								X				<b>A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:</b> A2.01 Air dryer and filter malfunctions	2.9	1
<b><u>Question 52</u></b> 300000 Instrument Air System										X		<b>A4. Ability to manually operate and / or monitor in the control room:</b> A4.01 Pressure gauges	2.6	1

ES-401			BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1	
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 53</u></b> 400000 Component Cooling Water System								X				<b>A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CCWS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:</b>  A2.02 High/low surge tank level	2.8	1
K/A Category Point Totals:	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	Group Point Total:	<b>26</b>	

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1		
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 54</u></b> 201001 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System									X			<b>A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM including:</b> A3.11 SDV level	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 55</u></b> 201002 Reactor Manual Control System	X											<b>K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM and the following:</b> K1.04 Rod block monitor: Plant-Specific	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 56</u></b> 201004 Rod Sequence Control System (Plant Specific)									X			<b>A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (PLANT SPECIFIC) including:</b> A3.05 †Verification of proper function/ operability: BWR-4,5	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 57</u></b> 201006 Rod Worth Minimizer System (RWM)											X	2.2.26 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.	2.5	1
<b><u>Question 58</u></b> 202001 Recirculation System										X		<b>A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:</b> A4.02 System valves	3.5	1
<b><u>Question 59</u></b> 202002 Recirculation flow Control System			X									<b>K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM will have on following:</b> K3.01 Core flow	3.5	1

Tier / Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection
	N/A	As per letter PLA005439 PLA14-13 from Jeff Helsel (PPL) to Alan Blamey (NRC) dated Feb. 4 <sup>th</sup> 2002 all K/As that are not applicable to SSES design were suppressed. A copy of this letter and the specific K/As involved is available upon request.
RO Tier 1 / Group 1	295004.2.2.1	Generic K/A to perform plant pre-startup or startup activities that could affect reactivity during a partial or full loss of DC power. This is not a reasonably foreseeable situation. Randomly selected 295004.2.2.5.
	295004.2.2.5	Generic K/A to demonstrate knowledge of making changes to the facility as described in the FSAR during a partial or full loss of DC power. These are unrelated such that writing an exam item that matches the K/A is probably not useful. Randomly selected 294004.2.2.6.
	295004.2.2.6	Generic K/A to demonstrate knowledge of making changes to the procedures as described in the FSAR during a partial or full loss of DC power. These are unrelated such that writing an exam item that matches the K/A is probably not useful. Randomly selected 294004.2.2.11.
	295004.2.2.11	Generic K/A to demonstrate knowledge of controlling temporary changes during a partial or full loss of DC power. These are unrelated such that writing an exam item that matches the K/A is probably not useful. Randomly selected 294004.2.2.30.
	295037.2.2.24	Generic K/A to demonstrate knowledge or ability during an ATWS while analyzing the affect of maintenance activities on LCO status. These are unrelated such that writing an exam item that matches the K/A is probably not useful. Randomly selected 295037.2.2.8.
	295037.2.2.8	Generic K/A to demonstrate knowledge or ability during an ATWS while determining if a proposed change, test, or experiment involves an un-reviewed safety question. These are unrelated such that writing an exam item that matches the K/A is probably not useful. Randomly selected 295037.2.2.2.
Question 21		Generic K/A to make accurate, clear and concise <u>verbal</u> reports. A written examination is not the optimum forum for testing this ability. Randomly selected 295008.2.2.20.
RO Tier 1 / Group 2		
295008.2.1.17		
Question 66		Generic K/A to operate the plant phone, paging system and two-way radio. A written examination is not the optimum forum for testing this ability. Randomly selected 2.1.21.
RO Tier 3		
2.1.16		



SRO Tier 1 / Group 1	Question 81	295030.2.2.32	EPE K/A concerning Low Suppression Pool Water Level and Generic K/A concerning effects of alteration on core configuration. These are unrelated topics such that writing an exam item that matches the K/A is probably not useful. Randomly selected 295030.2.2.33.
		295030.2.2.33	EPE K/A concerning Low Suppression Pool Water Level and Generic K/A concerning knowledge of control rod programming. These are unrelated topics such that writing an exam item that matches the K/A is probably not useful. Randomly selected 295030.2.2.4.
		295030.2.2.4	EPE K/A concerning Low Suppression Pool Water Level and Generic K/A concerning differences between units. According to Susquehanna Training Department, there are insignificant differences between the units. Therefore, it probably not possible to develop a meaningful exam item. Randomly selected 295030.2.2.25.
The K/As above were rejected during written exam outline development. New K/As were selected using a random number generator available at <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> . K/As were selected from the same tier, group and "E/APE #/Name/Safety Function" to maintain outline fidelity to the maximum extent possible.			
Per telephone conversation with Susquehanna Steam Electric Station staff on Tuesday, 2 August 2005, the following corrections were made to the exam outline:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RO Tier 1/Group 1, 295037.2.2.24 – as noted above, this K/A was replaced during sample selection. However, the original, deselected K/A was not replaced in the exam outline. Question 18.</li><li>• RO Tier 2/Group 1, 205000.K2.02 – deleted "3.4-42" because this was a page number carried over from the original cut-n- paste from the K/A catalog. Corrected the K/A to read "Motor operated valves". Question 29.</li><li>• RO Tier 2/Group 2, 201004.A3.05 – deleted "3.7-33" because this was a page number carried over from the original cut-n- paste from the K/A catalog. Question 56.</li><li>• SRO Tier 1/Group 1, 295037.2.4.11 - deleted "4.1-24" because this was a page number carried over from the original cut-n-paste from the K/A catalog. Question 82.</li><li>• SRO Tier 1/Group 2, 295035.EA2.02 – deleted "4.1-22" because this was a page number carried over from the original cut-n-paste from the K/A catalog. Question 85.</li><li>• This form, 295008.2.2.17 – corrected the table above to correctly indicate that this K/A was sampled and rejected under RO Tier 1/Group 2 vice RO Tier 1/Group 1 as originally shown. Question 21.</li></ul>			
Also found and corrected two K/As that were incorrectly copied from the original random sample generator to the examination outline:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RO Tier 2/Group 1, 203000.K3.03 – Corrected the K/A to refer to RHR/LPCI. Question 28.</li><li>• RO Tier 2/Group 1, 205000.K2.02 – Corrected the K/A to read "Motor operated valves". Question 29.</li></ul>			
Question 44		Changed "HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM" to "REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM". Changed "Suppression pool level control" to "Rod worth minimizer". This corrects typographical errors in the original outline that were incorrectly copied from the original random	
RO Tier 2 / Group 1			

259002.K3.03		sample generator to the examination outline. 15 September 2005
RO Tier 2 / Group 1	Question 45	Changed "Suppression pool level" to "TDRFP lockout reset: TDRFP". This corrects a typographical error in the original outline that was incorrectly copied from the original random sample generator to the examination outline. 16 September 2005
	259002.A4.09	
	Question 46	Changed "MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM" to "STANDY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM". Changed "Main steam system: BWR-4,5,6(P-Spec)" to "Reactor building ventilation system". This corrects typographical errors in the original outline that were incorrectly copied from the original random sample generator to the examination outline. 16 September 2005
	261000.K1.01	
	Question 47	Rejected K/A as too simplistic (GFE level knowledge). Unable to develop a discriminatory examination question. Used <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> to select another K/A from the 262001.A2 series. Selected 262001A2.03. 19 September 2005
	262001.A2.08	
RO Tier 2 / Group 2	Question 59	Changed "K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM will have on following: K3.01 Recirculation pumps: Plant-Specific" to "K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM will have on following: K3.01 Core flow". This corrects a typographical error in the original outline that was incorrectly copied from the original random sample generator to the examination outline. 21 September 2005
	202002.K3.01	
	Question 64	This K/A was rejected from the August 2004 ILO exam with the following statement: "This K/A is not directly applicable to Susquehanna and parallels system 241000 K/As. Susquehanna has no direct reheater controls, and reactor pressure is controlled <b>by EHC</b> (system 241 000)." Therefore, this K/A is rejected from this ILO exam as well. Used <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> to select another K/A from the 239001.A1 series. Selected 239001.A1.06. 22 September 2005
	239001.A1.01	
	Question 64	Rejected 239001.A1.06 because Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) does NOT have air ejector radiation monitors. Air Ejector effluent is directed to the Offgas processing system. Offgas effluent is monitored for radiation. However, this is too far removed from the Air Ejector system to justify a K/A

	239001.A1.06	<p>match.</p> <p>Used <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> to select another K/A from the 239001.A1 series. Selected 239001.A1.10.</p> <p>22 September 2005</p>
Question 34		Rejected 211000.2.1.2 during Chief Examiner review because unable to develop question with LOD greater than 1.0.
RO Tier 2 / Group 1		Used <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> to select another K/A from the 211000.2.1 series. Selected 211000.2.1.33.
211000.2.1.2		30 September 2005
Question 47		Rejected 262001.A2.03 during Branch Chief review because unable to develop RO level question that meets this K/A. The requirement to “. . . use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate . . .” is an SRO level task.
RO Tier 2 / Group 1		Used <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> to select another K/A from the 262001.A2 series. Selected 262001.A2.05.
262001.A2.03		3 October 2005
Question 88		Rejected 262002.A2.02 because Uninterruptible Power Supplies were sampled and tested at the RO level (Question 48).
SRO Tier 2 / Group 1		Substituted the question originally developed for 262001.A2.03 in place for 262002.A2.02. This substitutes one A2 K/A for another A2 K/A; thereby preserving the breadth and diversity of the original sample plan.
262002.A2.02		5 October 2005.
Question 92		Rejected 216000.2.4.27 because I was unable to develop a plausible and discriminatory question after over eight hours of effort.
SRO Tier 2 / Group 1		Used <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> to select another K/A from the 216000.2. series (two random draws: first for the 4, second for the 22). Selected 216000.2.2.22.
216000.2.4.27		12 October 2005
Question 13		Rejected 295025.EA2.02 because during review it was determined to be similar to 295006.AA2.04 and because development of a suitable question proved difficult.
RO Tier 1 / Group 1		Used <a href="http://www.random.org">http://www.random.org</a> to select another K/A from the 295025.EA2 series. Selected 295025.EA2.03
295025.EA2.02		17 October 2005
Question 14		Rejected 295026.EK1.01 because during review it was determined high Suppression Pool water temperature and Pump NPSH was not a limiting concern at SSES. Therefore, SSES advised that recommendations on this K/A would have little relevance.
RO Tier 1 / Group 1		Selected 295026.EK1.02 directly because there are only two K/As under the

295026.EK1.01	295026.EK1 series. 17 October 2005
Question 21	Rejected because this was incorrectly copied from original sample. See, 295008.2.1.17 above. This should have been 295008.2.1.20. 17 October 2005
RO Tier 1 / Group 1	
295008.2.2.20	
Question 51	Unable to adequately test both ability to predict and use procedures of this two part K/A. Per authority of NUREG 1021, ES401, Section D.2.a., second paragraph [ <i>When selecting or writing questions for K/As that test coupled knowledge or abilities (e.g., the A.2 K/A statements in Tiers 1 and 2 and a number of generic K/A statements, such as 2.4.1, in Tier 3), try to test both aspects of the K/A statement. If that is not possible without expending an inordinate amount of resources, limit the scope of the question to that aspect of the K/A statement requiring the highest cognitive level (e.g., the (b) portion of the A.2 K/A statements) or substitute another randomly selected K/A.</i> ], the test question tests the ability to predict the impact of an air dryer malfunction. 18 October 2005.
RO Tier 2 / Group 1	
300000.A2.01	
Question 53	Unable to adequately test both ability to predict and use procedures of this two part K/A. Per authority of NUREG 1021, ES401, Section D.2.a., second paragraph [ <i>When selecting or writing questions for K/As that test coupled knowledge or abilities (e.g., the A.2 K/A statements in Tiers 1 and 2 and a number of generic K/A statements, such as 2.4.1, in Tier 3), try to test both aspects of the K/A statement. If that is not possible without expending an inordinate amount of resources, limit the scope of the question to that aspect of the K/A statement requiring the highest cognitive level (e.g., the (b) portion of the A.2 K/A statements) or substitute another randomly selected K/A.</i> ], the test question tests the ability to predict the impact of an air dryer malfunction. 18 October 2005.
RO Tier 2 / Group 1	
400000.A2.02	
Question 57	This K/A requires a nexus between the RWM and refueling administrative requirements. The ROD TEST function is the only nexus I can find. Specifically, the RWM Bypass Keylock switch is ADMINISTRATIVELY prohibited under the conditions of the question. Therefore, this question is submitted as an adequate K/A match pursuant to the authority of of NUREG 1021, ES401, Section D.2.a., second paragraph [ <i>When selecting or writing questions for K/As that test coupled knowledge or abilities (e.g., the A.2 K/A statements in Tiers 1 and 2 and a number of generic K/A statements, such as 2.4.1, in Tier 3), try to test both aspects of the K/A statement. If that is not possible without expending an inordinate amount of resources, limit the scope of the question to that aspect of the K/A statement requiring the highest cognitive level (e.g., the (b) portion of the A.2 K/A statements) or substitute another randomly selected K/A.</i> ]. 18 October 2005
RO Tier 2 / Group 2	
201006.2.2.26	

Question 63	Unable to adequately test both ability to predict and use procedures of this two part K/A. Per authority of NUREG 1021, ES401, Section D.2.a., second paragraph [ <i>When selecting or writing questions for K/As that test coupled knowledge or abilities (e.g., the A.2 K/A statements in Tiers 1 and 2 and a number of generic K/A statements, such as 2.4.1, in Tier 3), try to test both aspects of the K/A statement. If that is not possible without expending an inordinate amount of resources, limit the scope of the question to that aspect of the K/A statement requiring the highest cognitive level (e.g., the (b) portion of the A.2 K/A statements) or substitute another randomly selected K/A.</i> ], the test question tests the ability to predict the impact of an air dryer malfunction. 18 October 2005.
RO Tier 2 / Group 2	
226001.A2.03	

ES-401		BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1		
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<b><u>Question 60</u></b> 204000 Reactor Water Cleanup System						X						<b>K6. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM :</b> K6.01 Component cooling water systems	3.1	1
<b><u>Question 61</u></b> 214000 Rod Position Information System				X								<b>K4. Knowledge of ROD POSITION INFORMATION SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following:</b> K4.02 Thermocouple	2.5 *	1
<b><u>Question 62</u></b> 219000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Suppression Pool Cooling Mode		X										<b>K2. Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:</b> K2.02 Pumps	3.1 *	1
<b><u>Question 63</u></b> 226001 RHR/LPCI: Containment Spray System								X				<b>A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHR/LPCI: CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM MODE ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:</b> A2.03 Valve closures	3.1	1
<b><u>Question 64</u></b> 239001 Main and Reheat Steam System							X					<b>A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM controls including:</b> A1.10 Reactor power.	3.6	1

ES-401			BWR Examination Outline										Form ES-401-1	
Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2 (RO)														
System #	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G	K/A Topic(s)	IR	#
<u>Question 65</u> 288000 Plant Ventilation Systems					X							<b>K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS:</b> K5.01 Airborne contamination control	3.1	1
K/A Category Point Totals:	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	Group Point Total:	<b>12</b>	



Facility: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station  
2005

Date of Exam: 12 to 22 December

Category	<u>Question</u>	K/A#	Topic	RO		SRO Only	
				IR	#	IR	#
1. Conduct of Operations	<u>66</u>	2.1.21	Ability to obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.	3.1	1		
	<u>67</u>	2.1.32	Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.	3.4	1		
	Subtotal				2		
2. Equipment Control	<u>68</u>	2.2.11	Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary changes.	2.5	1		
	<u>69</u>	2.2.25	Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.	2.5	1		
	<u>70</u>	2.2.27	Knowledge of the refueling process.	2.6	1		
	Subtotal				3		
3. Radiation Control	<u>71</u>	2.3.1	Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.	2.6	1		
	<u>72</u>	2.3.2	Knowledge of facility ALARA program.	2.5	1		
	Subtotal				2		
4. Emergency Procedures/ Plan	<u>73</u>	2.4.6	Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.	3.1	1		
	<u>74</u>	2.4.17	Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions.	3.1	1		
	<u>75</u>	2.4.22	Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.	3.0	1		
	Subtotal				3		
Tier 3 Point Total					10		7

# 1

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 28345 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

From 100% power and 100% flow, the "B" reactor recirculation pump (RRP) inadvertently trips.

How will indicated jet pump flow respond to this event?

Flow indications for the "A" loop jet pumps will . . .

- A** . . . initially increase, then return to their original values. Flow indication for the "B" jet pumps will decrease to zero as the pump coasts down, then increase to a positive value as flow reverses in the "B" loop jet pumps.
- B** . . . decrease, then increase to their original values as flow through the "B" loop jet pumps slows, then reverses. Flow indication for the "B" jet pumps will immediately read zero.
- C** . . . increase during the transient. Flow indication for the "B" loop jet pumps will decrease to zero as the "B" RRP coasts down, then remain at zero.
- D** . . . increase during the transient. Flow indications for the "B" loop jet pumps will decrease to zero as the "B" RRP coasts down, then increase to a positive value as flow reverses in the "B" loop jet pumps.

## Question Number: 1

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant does not understand that the operating loop system characteristic changes when in single RRP operation. The operating RRP will have a lower flow resistance because it can now discharge into the ten idle jet pumps in addition to the core inlet plenum.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant does not fully understand how the core flow signal is developed. The individual jet pump flow transmitters produce signals before they are summed to determine total core flow. FY-1K607 is substituted for FY-1K606 if a RRP generator exciter breaker is open or discharge valve is less than 90% open. FY-1K607 subtracts the idle loop jet pump flow from operating loop jet pump flow to determine actual core flow (operating loop flow less backflow through the idle loop).

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant does not understand that the idle loop jet pumps have no method of backflow prevention or if the Applicant misunderstands signal development.

CHOICE (D) - Yes

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) Mod from INPO Bank QuestionID 20448 (Quad Cities exam in August 2001)

2. (THF 09/08/05) - no comment

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - Should be HCL  
R: o.k. - classified Higher Cognitive Level.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

6. SSES 10/14/05 - MINOR FIX  
shortened stem and moved "Flow indications . . ." to stem.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced Core Flow Circ  
01

**Number** AK2.07 **RO** 3.4 **SRO** 3.4 **CFR Link** (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8)

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION and the following:  
AK2.07 Core flow indication

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 2**

# 2

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29693 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

Given the following conditions:

- SSES Unit 1 recently entered Mode 4 to start a refueling outage following a 500 day run.
- SSES Unit 2 is in mode 1 at full power and flow.
- The station experiences a loss of Startup Transformer T-20.

Which ONE of the following actions must be accomplished on Unit 2, in a short amount of time to prevent damage to major plant equipment?

- A** Restore Power to RPS Buss "A"
- B** Restore Power to RPS Buss "B"
- C** Restore the CRD System to service
- D** Start the ESW system

## Question Number: 2

Answers:

A ☐

B ☒

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO  
WRONG: does not de-energize

CHOICE (B) - YES  
T-20 causes loss of RPS "B".

CHOICE (C) - NO  
Will not cause major damage in short amount of time.

CHOICE (D) - NO  
WRONG: EDGs should NOT have started. ESW required to cool EDGs.

### References

SSES Bank

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) Modified from SSES Bank.

24 month 700 days or 18 month 500 days for SQ to answer

2. THF 09/08/05 - clarified stem.

3. Gil 09/09/05 - concerned about K/A match.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch. Relationship between containment isolation and EAL?  
R: on a loss of T-20, RPS buss "B" is deenergized. This causes Primary CTMT isolation including isolation of RHR in SDC mode. The successful Applicant must recognize the reason PCIS isolated is the loss of RPS buss "B" and that the isolation interrupted SDC which must be restored to prevent entry into an EAL. If SDC not restored, the threshold for an EAL will be crossed.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

6. Rich 10/03/05 - odd way to ask response question?  
R: change to "why did the SM declare the event". Saved original question as number 21.

7. SQ 10/14/05 - TOSS  
a - Not RO level  
b - K/A miss (reason for isolation under loss of AC)  
c - Technically not correct.

8. SQ 10/17/05 - rejected attempt to modify and used original BANK question. Changed T-10 to T-20 and RPS "A" to "B" to make it less recognizable. But essentially still the same question.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Partial or Complete Loss of A.C. Power  
03

**Number** AK3.06 **RO** 3.7 **SRO** **CFR Link**

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF A.C. POWER :  
AK3.06 Containment isolation

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number** **RO** **SRO** **CFR Link**

**Question Number: 3**

**# 3**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 28347 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

While operating at full power on Unit 2, control power to the operating control rod drive (CRD) pump is lost. What effect will this have on the CRD pump?

The operating CRD pump will . . .

- A** . . . continue to run. Automatic protective trips for the pump are functional.
- B** . . . trip. Automatic protective trips for the pump are disabled.
- C** . . . continue to run. Automatic protective trips for the pump are disabled.
- D** . . . trip. Automatic protective trips for the pump are functional.

## Question Number: 3

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☒

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: Automatic protective trips are disabled

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because the pump will continue to run.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: the operating pump will not trip

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because RRP's will automatically trip on loss of 125 VDC control power, not CRD's.

Auto trips are disabled.

CHOICE (C) - YES

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: Operating CRD Pump will not trip and auto trips are not functional.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if Applicant considers this a fail safe mechanism.

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) Modified from INPO Bank 23832 which was used on SSES August 2002 exam.
2. THF 09/08/05 - changed format to T-T / T-F / F-T / F-F with reasons.
3. Gil 09/09/05 - question ok but - in ATWS and directed to start both CRD pumps. Concurrent loss of DC power. Now what?
4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references.  
R: need SSES to validate answer and distracters. Low risk of error because this is a bank question. Gil thinks it's reasonable from memory.
5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.
6. SQ 10/14/05 - Move "The operating CRD pump will . . ." to the stem and delete from each answer choice. Stick to one pump  
R: done

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Partial or Complete Loss of D.C. Power  
04

**Number** AK1.05 **RO** 3.4 **SRO** 3.3 **CFR Link** (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF D.C. POWER : Loss of breaker protection

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number** **RO** **SRO** **CFR Link**



**Question Number: 4**

**# 4**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 28348 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 is refueling. Fuel shuffles are in progress and a bundle is ready to be lowered into the reactor vessel when the Control Room receives the following indications:

- IRM CHAN B/D/F/H UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP (AR-104-001/A06)
- SRM UPSCALE OR INOP (AR-104-001/B06)
- 24V DC PANEL 1L680 SYSTEM TROUBLE (AR-106-001/B13)
- REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL 1C201 INSTR PWR FAILURE (AR-106-001/H16)
- Source Range Monitors "B" and "D" fail DOWNSCALE.

Which of the following is the correct response for the Control Room operating crew?

- A** Stop all fuel movement after placing any suspended bundle in a safe location and enter ON-175-001, LOSS OF 24 VDC BUS.
- B** Continue fuel movement and enter ON-175-001, LOSS OF 24 VDC BUS.
- C** Stop all fuel movement after placing any suspended bundle in a safe location and enter ON-081-002, REFUELING PLATFORM OPERATION ANOMALY.
- D** Continue fuel movement and enter ON-081-002, REFUELING PLATFORM OPERATION ANOMALY.

## Question Number: 4

Answers:

**A** ☒

**B** ☐

**C** ☐

**D** ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

TS 3.3.1.2 refers to Table 3.3.1.2-1 for minimum SRM operability. Two SRMs are required when in mode 5. However, the loss of Division II 24 VDC power disables both SRM channels "B" and "C". Given that SRM channel "A" is already inoperable, the TS requirement can not be met because three out of four SRMs are now disabled. Note that this is NOT a spiral offload or reload because the stem specifies that a core "shuffle" is in progress and because SSES Training Dept indicates that spiral off/on-loads are not typical for SSES.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant fails to recognize that TS 3.3.1.2 can not be met following loss of one Division of 24 VDC power because the affected SRMs are in opposite quadrants.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the applicant believes that stopping fuel movement is an entry condition for the Off-Normal procedure.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the applicant believes that stopping fuel movement is an entry condition for the Off-Normal procedure and fails to recognize that TS 3.3.1.2 can not be met following loss of one Division of 24 VDC power because the affected SRMs are in opposite quadrants.

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



**GXJ**



**THF**



**RJC**



**SSES**

1. (HB 09/08/05) New question. Question for SSES: will SRM UPSCALE OR INOP (AR-104-001/B06) reflash? Can we delete that initial condition? Should others be added?

2. THF 09/08/05 - changes to stem and answers to simplify and clarify

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references. Shortest answer is correct. Should balance with other distracters.

R: Revised distracters "B" and "D" to address length of choices.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

6. SQ 10/14/05 - MAJOR

a - look at 0P020 for replacement

b - replace ON-175-001 in answer choices with "place in safe location"

c - move conditions in stem from Intro to bullets.

d - add conditions describing SRM and IRM response.

7. SQ 10/17/05 - added condition that deenergized SRMs failed DNSCL to stem and requmt to safely stow suspended fuel to choices "A" and "C".

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950  
04

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.2 Equipment Control

Number 2.2.30

RO 3.5

SRO 3.3

CFR Link (CFR: 45.12)

"Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling such as alarms from fuel handling area, communication with fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation."

**Question Number: 5**

**# 5**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29694 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is at full rated power when Stator Coolant begins leaking into the Main Generator. This causes a Generator Neutral Overvoltage (59GN) fault.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the expected sequence of plant events?

- A** 1. Concurrent trip of both Stator Cooling Water pumps and the Main Turbine,  
2. Generator Lockout Relays trip,  
3. Reactor Scram.
- B** 1. Concurrent trip of both Stator Cooling Water pumps and Generator Lockout Relays,  
2. Reactor Scram,  
3. Main Turbine trip.
- C** 1. Concurrent trip of both Stator Cooling Water pumps and the Main Turbine,  
2. Generator Lockout Relays trip,  
3. Reactor Scram.
- D** 1. Concurrent trip of both Stator Cooling Water pumps and Generator Lockout Relays,  
2. Main Turbine trip,  
3. Reactor Scram.

## Question Number: 5

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: Turbine does not trip with Stator Coolant Pumps.

VALID DISTRACTOR: combination of correct events ending in scram.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: The scram does NOT precede the Turbine Trip.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct start and reasonable to believe logic would force scram (Heat Source) before trip (Heat Sink).

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Pumps and Turbine are NOT the initiator (s/b Pumps and Generator).

VALID DISTRACTOR: tests knowledge of whether the trip causes a GENERATOR or TURBINE trip.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

AR-106-A04

AR-106-C04

ON-193-002

TM-OP-098

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) Question for SSES: how to describe Pp 1B status?

2. Gil 09/09/05 - no comments

3. Gil 09/26/05 - OK

4. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

5. Rich 10/03/05 - Backward logic at memory level. Can we increase cognitive level?

R: revised question and answer choice to be forward looking. Saved original question as number 51. Still considered on the high side of memory level.

6. SQ 10/14/05 - MAJOR

a - recommend giving condition that a Gen Neut OV occurred and asking for sequence of events.

7. SQ 10/17/05 - per phone conversation, question restated. Original saved as number 52.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Main Turbine Generator Trip  
05

**Number** AK2.04

**RO** 3.3

**SRO** 3.3

**CFR Link** (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8)

Knowledge of the interrelations between MAIN TURBINE  
GENERATOR TRIP and the following: Main generator protection

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 6**

# 6

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29587 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Ten minutes after a reactor scram late in core life the steady state Reactor Pressure has risen from about 955 psig to almost 960 psig.

Which of the following caused this?

- A** A Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) tripped.
- B** EHC Steam Pressure Regulator "A" (PT10101A) failed low.
- C** Both Reactor Feed Pumps (RFP) tripped.
- D** EHC Steam Pressure Regulator "A" (PT10101A) failed high.

## Question Number: 6

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a high failure will cause a plant depressurization because the HVG will pass the full OPEN signal to the TBVs.

CHOICE (B) - YES

This failure will cause EHC to maintain a new steady state pressure 3 psig GREATER THAN the pre-failure steady state pressure.

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant believes that reactor coolant throughput is reduced; thereby causing a slight pressure drop. Alternatively, the Applicant may conclude that the tripped RFP reduces steam flow such that pressure goes down. In fact, should a RFP trip, the EHC system will respond to maintain steady state pressure per program.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because this is redundant to PT10101A and an Applicant may incorrectly conclude that the signal will bias the output of the HVG somehow. However, this failure will cause a plant depressurization because the HVG will pass the full OPEN signal to the TBVs.

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) New.

Need reasonable pressure drop from SQ

2. THF 09/08/05 - changes to stem and answer.

3. Gil 09/08/05 - not realistic. Suggests scram condition but Rx Press stays at full power value - then ask what procedure to enter.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - Distracter "A" not plausible with electric feed pumps.

R: SSES has steam driven feed pumps. This is the result of comments to date. We need to reconsider "A" in light of making it mirror image of B-C-D.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

6. SQ 10/14/05 - MINOR

a - stem may describe actual plant response

b - delete STA reference in stem

c - need better description of the PTs

7. SQ 10/17/05 - per phone conversation with SSES, refer to PTs as EHC Regulators.

R - accepted. Also changed distracter "C" to both RFPs to better align the question to the K/A.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950 SCRAM  
06

Number AA2.04

RO 4.1

SRO 4.1

CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM : Reactor Pressure

### NRC K/A Generic

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

**# 7**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 28352 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

What is the DESIGN BASIS for disabling control room controls when control is transferred from the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel per ON-100-009, PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM?

- A** To prevent unauthorized component operation from the Control Room.
- B** To prevent spurious component operation caused by hot shorts.
- C** To simplify design and construction of the Remote Shutdown system.
- D** To minimize time to evacuate the Control Room once deciding to evacuate.



## Question Number: 7

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because it does fulfill the purpose proposed by this distracter. However, the design reason is to prevent spurious hot short operation.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because it may simplify design and construction of the RSD system. However, the design reason is to prevent hot short operation.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because it may minimize evacuation time. However, the design reason is to prevent hot short operation.

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☒

SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) Bank - minor revisions
2. THF 09/08/05 - editorial and deleted window dressing in stem.
3. PAP 9/9/05 - too easy, consider asking what the CR indication would be when the instrument were swapped to RSD.
4. Gil 09/26/05 - Revise first sentence of stem: "What is design basis for disabling control room controls . . ."  
R: done.
5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.
6. SQ 10/14/05 - distractor "C" may be implausible.  
R - SSES personnel disagreed on this. Left question unchanged.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Control Room Abandonment  
16

**Number** AK3.03 **RO** 3.5 **SRO** 3.7 **CFR Link** (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses  
as they apply to CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT : Disabling control room controls

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 8**

# 8

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29586 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

The plant is at 100% power when a loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) occurs.

With NO Operator action, which of ONE of the following will occur and why?

- A** Inboard MSIVs will close because Containment Instrument Gas is lost when RBCCW is lost.
- B** Outboard MSIVs will close because Instrument Air is lost when RBCCW is lost.
- C** Inboard MSIVs will close due to Main Steam Tunnel High Temperature when RBCCW is lost.
- D** Outboard MSIVs will close due to Main Steam Tunnel High Differential Temperature when RBCCW is lost.

## Question Number: 8

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

CTMT Inst Gas compressors cooled by RBCCW.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: IA compressors are cooled by TBCCW.

VALID DISTRACTOR:

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Tunnel coolers cooled by SW (Secondary CTMT). Moreover, Hi Tunn Temp closes ALL MSIVs.

VALID DISTRACTOR:

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: Tunnel coolers cooled by SW (Secondary CTMT). Moreover, Hi Tunn Diff Temp closes ALL MSIVs.

VALID DISTRACTOR:

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSS

1. (HB 09/06/05) Bank question.

2. THF 09/08/05 - editorial changes. changed choices to just INBD/OUTBD

3. Gil 09/09/05 - added stem conditions to improve operational orientation.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references.

R: Risk of error is low because this is a BANK question. Also noted that RBCCW cools the steam tunnel HVAC during exam development.

5. Rich 10/03/05 - Backward logic at memory level. Can we increase cognitive level?

R: revised wording to forward looking. Still lower level cause BANK and it is memory.

6. SQ 10/14/05 - OK.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Partial or Complete Loss of Component Cooling Wtr  
18

**Number** AK1.01

**RO** 3.5

**SRO** 3.6

**CFR Link** (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the  
following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OR

COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER : Effects on component/system operations

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 9**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 28355 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is at full power with the following conditions:

- "A" Containment Instrument Gas compressor (2K205A) is in LEAD
- "B" Containment Instrument Gas compressor (2K205B) is in STANDBY
- "A" Instrument Air compressor (2K107A) is in LEAD
- "B" Instrument Air compressor (2K107B) is in STANDBY
- "A" Service Air compressor (2K108A) is in LEAD
- "B" Service Air compressor (2K108B) is in STANDBY

The plant suffers a loss of Bus 2A201. Which of the following correctly describes the plant response:

- A** PCV-22560 will open, allowing the Service Air system to supply Instrument Air system loads.
- B** Service Air compressor 2K108B will start and cycle between 118 psig and 127 psig.
- C** Instrument Air compressor 2K107B will start and cycle between 87 psig and 102 psig.
- D** Containment Instrument Gas compressor 2K205B will start and cycle between 152 psig and 170 psig.

## Question Number: 9

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (D) - YES

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a unit 2 bus was lost and the STBY IA compressor does cycle between 87 and 102. Incorrect because the power supply to lead IA compressor 2K107A (2A204) remains energized.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a unit 2 bus was lost and the STBY SA compressor does cycle between 118 and 127. Incorrect because the power supply to lead SA compressor 2K108A (1B130) remains energized.

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because PCV-12560 will open as described on a loss of IA. However, no loss of IA occurred as described in Distracter 1.

### References

TM-OP-025

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) New. Check cycle pressures with SSES.

2. THF 09/08/05 - formatting

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references.

R: will re-verify if time permits. Did re-verify once during development of subsequent question and am confident in question.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

6. Rich 10/03/05 - are we sure it is Memory Level?

R: yes - really only need to know the power supplies for each of the compressors. Once loss of power to 2K205A is recognized, the question is straightforward memory.

7. SQ 10/14/05 - Power supply from memory is minutia. 2Y216 Trips Control Power. Stick with one unit or the other. Delete references to cycle pressures in the answer choices.

R - deleted all references to Unit 1. Agree that it is a simple power supply question. However, the K/A was randomly selected and has an importance rating of 3.0. Moreover, SSES has a Learning Objective to know the power supplies to these compressors. The cycle pressures are not necessary to determine the answer and correctly state what the associated compressor will do IF ITS POWER IS LOST. Therefore, this additional information does not complicate the question and is left in place.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Partial or Complete Loss of Instrument Air  
19

**Number** AA1.03

**RO** 3.0

**SRO** 3.0

**CFR Link** (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR : Instrument air compressor power supplies

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 10**

**# 10**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29689 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is in Mode 3 with Shutdown Cooling in service. Shutdown Cooling is lost due to low RPV water level isolation.

What is the minimum required RPV Water Level and the basis for this level?

- A** 45 inches to ensure natural circulation flow for core cooling and to prevent thermal stratification if Shutdown Cooling is lost.
- B** 80 inches to ensure natural circulation flow for core cooling and to provide adequate NPSH to the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) pumps.
- C** 45 inches to prevent thermal stratification and to provide adequate NPSH to the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) pumps.
- D** 80 inches to prevent thermal stratification and to provide adequate NPSH to the RHR pumps.

## Question Number: 10

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: NPSH to FPC pumps is NOT the reason.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because 90 inches is the administrative limit per OP-149-002 and because NC flow is partially correct. Static head is a common issue wrt NPSH.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: NPSH to FPC pumps is NOT the reason.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because 45 inches is correct and thermal stratification is part of the reason. Static head is a common issue wrt NPSH.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: NPSH to pumps is NOT the reason.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because 90 inches is the administrative limit per OP-149-002. Static head is a common issue wrt NPSH.

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



EXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) New.

2. Gil 09/09/05 - no changes.

3. PAP 9/9/05 comment - Applicant could argue that "C" is a second correct answer. Changed RFR to Fuel Pool Cleanup pumps.

!!! ASK SSES IF "C" IS POTENTIALLY CORRECT !!!!

4. Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch.

R: possibly but on a loss of SDC, unlikely to see any recirc flow changes.

5. Todd - unable to agree. SSES input seems to support my view but I asked for further clarification.

6. SQ 10/14/05 - As written, two correct answers. Rejected entirely for MAJOR rewrite. Original saved as 101.

09/28/05 Phone Conversation with SSES - they agree that the original question as written did not appear to match the K/A. However, they recommended changes to the entire question to better align it to the K/A. These changes were incorporated into the question.

Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

7. SQ 10/14/05 - as written, 90 inches is correct. Also, distractor "D" refers to NPSH for BOTH reasons.

R - significant rewrite to make only one correct answer and changed distractor "D".

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Loss of Shutdown Cooling  
21

**Number** AA2.07

**RO** 2.9

**SRO** 3.1

**CFR Link** (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as  
they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING : Reactor recirculation flow

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 11**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29585 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

Which one of the following is the Safety Related Basis for maintaining Fuel Pool level 22 feet above the top of fuel?

- A** To provide a floodable volume for RHR/FPC following a postulated seismic event.
- B** To limit Iodine release during a fuel handling accident to 25% or less of 10 CFR 100 limits.
- C** To minimize localized boiling within individual fuel assemblies following a loss of fuel pool cooling.
- D** To properly seat the Fuel Pool Gate Inflatable Seals with a static head of water in the fuel pool



## Question Number: 11

Answers:

A ☐

B ☒

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: SQ has committed to providing RHRFPC to maintain temperatures below 125 degrees Fahrenheit following a seismic event. However, this is not the safety related basis.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: This is the basis for maintaining fuel pool temperature below 125 degrees Fahrenheit. However, it is not the safety related basis for maintaining 22 feet of water above the fuel.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: This is not the stated reason.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Higher head of water could be expected to better seat the gates..

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) Bank - INPO 24493 (River Bend ILO in 2003)

Need to verify BASIS against SQ TS

2. THF 09/08/05

3. Gil 09/09/05: added operational orientation and raised LOD by adding conditions to the stem.

4. Gil 09/26/05: Distractor "D" not plausible if FPC pumps are non-safety related.

R: Replaced "To ensure net positive suction head to the Fuel Pool Cooling Cleanup Pumps during routine operation." with new distractor.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - deleted "Refueling operations are about to start. There are no known fuel failures in the core. The Shift Manager directs you to ensure the level in the Fuel Pool and Reactor Cavity are greater than 22 feet." from the stem.

6. SQ 10/14/05 - insert a "?" between RHR and FPC in distractor "A".

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950 Refueling Accidents  
23

Number AK1.01

RO 3.6

SRO 4.1

CFR Link (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS : Radiation exposure hazards

### NRC K/A Generic

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

**# 12**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29690 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 Operators are responding to a High Drywell Pressure condition by venting the drywell per OP-273-003, Primary Containment Nitrogen Makeup and Venting. There is no failed fuel and the Containment atmosphere is below minimum detectable activity (MDA). How does the method of Drywell venting per Section 2.3 of OP-273-003, Venting Drywell, prevent an UNMONITORED and UNCONTROLLED release to assure radiation exposures remain as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)?

The Drywell is vented . . .

- A** . . . to the Standby Gas Treatment Exhaust Vent via the Standby Gas Treatment system.
- B** . . . to the Zone 3 Filtered Exhaust via the Recirculation Plenum.
- C** . . . to the SSES Unit 2 Filtered Exhaust via the Recirculation Plenum.
- D** . . . to the SSES Unit 2 Turbine Building Filtered Exhaust via the Ambient Offgas Charcoal system.

## Question Number: 12

Answers:

A ☒

B ☐

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: This is not the vent path

VALID DISTRACTOR: From the Training diagram, this appears to be a possible flow path.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible to believe that the Nitrogen gas could be compressed and reused. However, it's not done this way.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible method of venting the Drywell. However, it's not done this way.

### References

TM-OP-70 (46) and 73 (10)

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. (HB 09/08/05) New by Gil. Check TRM 3.6.1.

2. THF 09/08/05 - no comment

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment

4. Gil 09/26/05 - Is the flow path in distracter "B" possible?

R: No. none of the distracter flow paths are possible. Replaced "The Drywell is vented to the Offgas Recombiner via the Main Condenser." with new distracter.

5. SQ 10/14/05 - editorial change to stem and complete rewrite of the distractors. Saved original version as 121.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950  
24

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.3 Radiation Control

Number 2.3.2

RO 2.5

SRO 2.9

CFR Link (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4. 45.9 / 45.10)

Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

**Question Number: 13**

**# 13**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29695 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

The following conditions exist on SSES Unit 1:

- A successful automatic reactor scram occurred on high reactor pressure.
- MSIVs are closed bu the Main Condenser is available.
- The PCO is attempting to stablize RPV pressure between 950 and 1,000 psig using SRVs.

Re-establishing the Main Condenser as a heat sink is . . .

- A** . . . PERMITTED if NO valid MSIV isolation signal exists.
- B** . . . NEVER permitted UNLESS primary containment integrity is in jeopardy.
- C** . . . REQUIRED immediately after bypassing and resetting any valid MSIV isolation signal.
- D** . . . PERMITTED if NO SRV is available.

## Question Number: 13

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: is permitted if signal determined and cleared.

VALID DISTRACTOR: CTMT Integrity issues come from ON-184-001 note.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: not required action - nonsensical to bypass valid signals

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may consider heat sink restoration more important than CTMT.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: would not be permitted if SRVs were unavailable.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may see extremis - reality is that HPCI and RCIC are available and total SRV loss is unlikely.

### References

Hope Creek August 1998 Exam  
ON-184-001

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Question generated after original K/A rejected IRT SQ comments and concerns about first question. Original saved as 131.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950 High Reactor Pressure  
25

Number EA2.03 RO 3.9 SRO 4.1 CFR Link (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13)

Ability to determine and/or interpret the Suppression pool temperature as it applies to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE

### NRC K/A Generic

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

**Question Number: 14**

**# 14**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29696 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

A Main Generator trip and an Auxiliary Buss load shed occurred while SSES Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. The following conditions exist:

- A failure to scram occurred.
- Initial Reactor power was 4%.
- SRVs are cycling to maintain Reactor Pressure.
- Drywell pressure is 18 psig.
- Drywell Temperature is 149 degrees Fahrenheit.
- Suppression Pool water level is 31 feet.
- Suppression Pool Temperature is 135 degrees Fahrenheit.

Which ONE of the following states the required Operator action and the basis of that action?

- A** Perform an emergency cooldown using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves to prevent the impulse load on the Supression Pool from exceeding design loads.
- B** Perform a rapid depressurization using the SRVs to ensure Primary Containment vent valve opening pressure will not be exceeded following RPV depressurization.
- C** Transfer HPCI suction from the Condensate Storage Tank to the Suppression Pool to prevent further Suppression Pool water level increase.
- D** Reduce Reactor pressure using SRVs and stop HPCI and RCIC to prevent operation with water in the turbine exhaust lines.

## Question Number: 14

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: TBVs unavailable due to load shed & loss of Circ Water.

VALID DISTRACTOR: may want to remove energy via normal means.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: HCTL NOT exceeded. This is a key mod to the original question.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may recognize past question or misread HCTL curves.

CHOICE (C) - YES per SP/L-12.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: SP/L-11 prefers running HPCI and RCIC to prevent auto start with water in Turbine Exhaust.

VALID DISTRACTOR: play on actual requirements.

### References

SSES ILO Exam of August 2004.

EO-000-103.

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

New question after SSES review determined that original had little or no plant relevance.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Suppression Pool High Water Temperature  
26

**Number** EK1.02 **RO** 3.5 **SRO** 3.8 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.8 to 41.10)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the Steam condensation as it applies to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 15**

**# 15**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID:

29576 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

SSS Unit 1 has a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the following plant conditions exist:

- RPV Pressure . . . . . 25 psig
- RPV Level . . . . . +40 inches and rising slowly
- Suppression Pool Level . . . . . 23.5 feet
- Suppression Pool Temperature . . . . . 102 degrees Fahrenheit
- Drywell Pressure . . . . . 21 psig
- Drywell Temperature . . . . . 296 degrees Fahrenheit
- Division I RHR . . . . . Injecting into the RPV
- Division II RHR . . . . . Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray mode
- Both Divisions of Core Spray . . . . . Injecting into the RPV
- Instrument Run Temperature (UR 25701A&B) . . 276 degrees Fahrenheit

Given the above conditions, which of the following actions is required by the operating crew per EO-200-103, PC CONTROL?

- A** Go To EO-100-112, Rapid Depressurization.
- B** Initiate Drywell Spray.
- C** Go To EO-100-114, RPV Flooding.
- D** Shutdown All Drywell Coolers and Fans.



## Question Number: 15

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☒

### Justification

Bank - Fermi 2 2 exam of March 2003 (Question ID = 23721)

Applicants may want the EOPs to refer to Figure 1 of EO-100-103, PC Control. However, they should be able to determine that RPV level instruments are unreliable due to reference leg flashing by using ordinary steam tables. The given RPV Pressure of 25 psig or 40 psia yields a saturation Temperature of 267.25 deg F. The given Instrument Run Temperature is almost 9 deg F above saturation.

DISTRACTOR (A):

Plausible because the Drywell Temperature Control procedure requires Rapid Depressurization if DW temps can not be restored/maintained below 340 deg F at step DW/T-6. However, in this question, the operator should have gone to RPV flooding earlier at step DW/T-3.

DISTRACTOR (B):

Plausible because Drywell Spray is required when Drywell Temps exceed 340 deg F.

DISTRACTOR (D):

Shutdown All Drywell Coolers and Fans per OP-273-001, Containment Atmosphere Control System.

### References

Standard Steam Tables.

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

**GXJ**

☒

**THF**

☒

**RJC**

☐

**SSES**

Gil 09/09/05 - editorial change to stem

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

SQ 10/14/05 - changed Torus to Suppression Pool and revised +1.5 inches to 23.5 feet.  
delete procedure references and changed to unit 1  
Applicants will have EOPs without entry conditions.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 High Drywell Temperature  
28

**Number** EK3.02 **RO** 3.5 **SRO** 3.8 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.5, 45.6)

Knowledge of the reasons for the RPV flooding as it applies to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 16**

**# 16**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29577 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

Which of the following describes the method that provides the highest flow rate of makeup to the Suppression Pool per OP-159-001, Suppression Pool Cleanup System?

- A** Pump the Condensate Storage Tank with the Core Spray Line Fill Pump to the CORE SPRAY CONDENSATE TRANSFER ISOLATION TO LOOP "B" MINIMUM FLOW LINE 152028.
- B** Gravity drain the Condensate Storage Tank through the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump Casing to the RCIC MIN FLOW TEST LINE 149F019.
- C** Pump the Condensate Storage Tank with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump to the HPCI MIN FLOW LINE 155F012.
- D** Gravity drain the Condensate Storage Tank through CORE SPRAY CST SUPPLY ISOLATION 152021 and CORE SPRAY PUMP B&D CST SUCTION SUPPLY 152F002B to the Core Spray suction strainers.

## Question Number: 16

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: lower flow rate than the correct response.

VALID DISTRACTOR: normal method of makeup.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: Not procedurally authorized.

VALID DISTRACTOR: would work.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Not procedurally authorized.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Would work

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

Section 3.4 of OP-159 and SP/L-1 specify use of the Suppression Pool Cleanup system.

### Comments and Question Modification History



6XJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Inspired by Peach Bottom 2 September 2002 exam (Question ID 24782)

Gil 09/09/05 - editorial change to stem

CONSIDER CHANGING ALL DISTRACTORS TO: Gravity drain CST through RHR, HPCI, RCIC suction strainers.  
?????????

Gil 09/26/05 - Correct answer is longest. Should balance with other distracters.

R: added full noun name descriptions to "B" and "C" for HPCI and RCIC. However, unable to perfect length of selections without degrading operational validity of the distracters or creating new psychometric clues.

Todd 09/30/05 - deleted "SSES Unit 1 is operating at full power. A failure of PSV152-F032B, the "B" Core Spray loop pump suction relief valve has lowered Suppression Pool water level. PSV152-F032B has been gagged shut. However, Suppression Pool water level has been below 22 feet for one hour. Per Emergency Operating Procedure EO-100-103, step SP/L-1, the Unit Supervisor has directed you to raise Suppression Pool water level to 23 feet." from stem.

SQ 10/14/05 - OK

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Low Suppression Pool Water Level  
30

**Number** EA1.06

**RO** 3.4

**SRO** 3.4

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7, 45.6)

Ability to operate and/or monitor the Condensate storage and transfer (make up to the suppression pool) (Plant-Specific)  
as it applies to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 17**

**# 17**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29578 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 was operating at full rated power when all Feedwater flow was lost. Reactor Pressure Vessel level quickly lowered to approximately -40 inches at which point all control rods inserted and both Reactor Recirculation Pumps (RRP) tripped. What FSAR described event initiated the transient and what caused the plant response?

- A** Feedwater Line Break - Outside Containment  
Backup Scram Valve (SV 147110 A & B) actuation
- B** Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand  
ARI and ATWS-RPT actuation
- C** Feedwater Line Break - Outside Containment  
ARI and ATWS-RPT actuation
- D** Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand  
Backup Scram Valve (SV 147110 A & B) actuation

## Question Number: 17

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

New

Note: The ATWS-ARI and ATWS-RPT use the same circuitry per TM-OP-058, page 46. RPS should have scrambled the plant at L3 (+13 inches). In this case, the rods inserted and RPT occurred just below L2 (-38 inches).

DISTRACTOR (A):

Plausible because FW Line Break is correct and the Backup Scram Valves are a redundant means of inserting control rods. However, per OP-TM-058, page 35, the Backup Scram Valves will not actuate unless both RPS A and B Trip Systems trip (de-energize) to energize the Backup Scram Valve Solenoid on each valve. In this case, the RPS system failed to operate at L3.

DISTRACTOR (B):

Plausible because the FW failure to max demand would eventually cause a loss of both FW-Ps on high RPV level. However, the question stem does not support this conclusion because there is no statement indicating a rise in RPV level and the RPV level decrease to below L2 requires the main turbine to be in operation.

DISTRACTOR (D):

Plausible because Backup Scram valves are a redundant means of inserting control rods. However, per OP-TM-058, page 35, the Backup Scram Valves will not actuate unless both RPS A and B Trip Systems trip (de-energize) to energize the Backup Scram Valve Solenoid on each valve. In this case, the RPS system failed to operate at L3.

### References

FSAR

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/09/05 - No comment

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - change insert and trip to inserted and tripped.

SQ 10/14/05 - editorial changes to stem and added "ARI and" to "B" and "C".

## NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Reactor Low Water Level  
31

**Number** EK2.13

**RO** 4.1

**SRO** 4.2

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7, 45.8)

Knowledge of the interrelations between REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL and ARI/RPT/ATWS (Plant-Specific)

## NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 18**

**# 18**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29660 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 has an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). The control room operating crew initiate Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) per LQ/Q-3. You observe the following:

- "A" SBLC Pump RED indicating light ILLUMINATES,
- "B" SBLC Pump RED indicating light does NOT illuminate,
- ONE SBLC SQUIB READY A-B White indicating light extinguishes,
- ONE SBLC SQUIB READY A-B White indicating light remains energized,
- SBLC SQUIB VALVES LOSS OF CKT CONTINUITY (A03) Energizes.

What actions, if any, are necessary to establish REQUIRED flow (86 gpm)?

- A** OPEN the second SBLC SQUIB Valve to establish sufficient flow path for full flow.
- B** START the "B" SBLC Pump to establish full pumping capacity.
- C** INJECT Boron with RCIC IAW ES-150-002 to establish full flow.
- D** No action is necessary because a single pump and valve will provide rated flow.

## Question Number: 18

Answers:

A ☐

B ☒

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

New - inspired by Browns Ferry 2 exam of September 2001 (Question ID 21039)

SSES requires both SBLC pumps to start to ensure reactor safety following an ATWS. The expected flow rate is approximately 86 gpm. In this case, the flow rate is one-half of expected (43 gpm) because one SBLC pump failed to start. The alarm will energize when 4742 less 4587 (155) gallons have been injected. This will occur in 155 divided by 43 or 3.6 minutes.

The failure of one SQUIB Valve to fire has no effect on the solution because the pumps discharge to a common header. The common header then flows through two parallel SQUIB valves.

A - Only one valve opened. Plausible if the Applicant believes that the failed SQUIB valve blocks SBLC flow to the RPV and that opening the valve will restore full flow.

C - LQ/Q-4 requires this if Boron can NOT be injected with SBLC. Here, SBLC is injecting, albeit at half the required rate.

D - SSES requires both SBLC pumps to start to ensure reactor safety following an ATWS

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒ **GXJ**

☒ **THF**

☒ **RJC**

☒ **SSES**

Gil 09/09/05 - editorial change to stem

Gil 09/26/05 - Distracter "A" not plausible with one pump running and one squibb fired; should have some flow.

R: revised "Never" to "16 minutes". Applicant may misapply pump laws.

Todd 09/30/05 - why give set point?

R: w/o set point, it may become LOD=5 because not expected to know this.

Rich 10/03/05 - K/A mismatch. CE view?

R: agreed. Changed stem and distracters to require Applicant to demonstrate ability to manipulate controls. Saved original question as 181.

\* \* \* Ask SSES to evaluate distracter "C" as a potentially second correct answer.

SQ 10/14/05 - editorial changes to stem and answer.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950  
37

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.2 Equipment Control

Number 2.2.2

RO 4.0

SRO 3.5

CFR Link (CFR: 45.2)

Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.

**Question Number: 19**

**# 19**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29580 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

A truck carrying Chlorine is involved in an accident on Route 11 outside the Main Access Road to the site. How will the Control Structure HVAC system protect control room operators from toxic gas?

- A** The system will automatically shift to the RECIRCULATION MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-159-001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation.
- B** The system can be manually started in the RECIRCULATION MODE per OP-030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Control Structure Manual Isolation switches HS-07802A1 and HS-07802B1 to "ISO" and then starting CREOASS Fan OV101A or OV101B.
- C** The system can be manually started in the PRESSURIZATION/FILTRATION MODE per OP-030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Emergency Outside Air Intake Radiation Monitor mode switches RISHH-D12-0K618A and RISHH-D12-0K618B to "TRIP TEST".
- D** The system will automatically shift to the PRESSURIZATION/FILTRATION MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-159-001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation.



## Question Number: 19

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

New

Per TM-OP-079E, the system originally built to automatically do this on high Chlorine.

DISTRACTOR (A):

Plausible because ON-1/2 59-002 does verify configuration and operation in response to a CTMT ISO. Automatic initiation of RECIRCULATION was part of the original design basis.

DISTRACTOR (C):

Plausible because this is one of three distinct operating modes for the system. However, per the TM-OP-079E, the correct response is RECIRC mode.

DISTRACTOR (D):

Plausible because this is one of three distinct operating modes for the system. However, the system will not automatically align itself to this mode and ON-1/2 59-002 does not address this mode.

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/09/05 - No comment

Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch. Suggests throwing the K/A out.

R: disagree. While the question does not directly ask what happens on a RADIOACTIVE release, the successful Applicant must understand operation of the Control Structure ventilation system to answer this question. The applicant must know the difference between the two suggested operating modes (Recirc and Press/Filt) and what situations cause automatic reconfigurations. Therefore, the question does discriminate between Applicants who understand the Control Structure HVAC from those who do not.

Gil: suggests new stem: "Following a significant release of Chlorine from the Chlorine building". Accepted.

SQ 10/14/05 - SSES no longer has Chlorine on site. Therefore, changed stem to read truck accident.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 High Off Site Release Rate  
38

**Number** EA1.07

**RO** 3.6

**SRO** 3.8

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7, 45.6)

Ability to operate and/or monitor the Control room ventilation (Plant-Specific) as it applies to HIGH OFF SITE RELEASE RATE

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 20**

**# 20**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID:

29697 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

The following Simplex Alarm is received.

FIRE SUP X222\_Z3 ALM  
TIME: 0300 DATE: 08/14/04  
02-656 WPS111 CNDNSR

Which of the following would be the plant response for the given Simplex Alarm?

- A** High flow from FSH12201A ( FSH FOR WPS-111 UNIT 1 TB CDSR AREA ) and WPS-111 OS&Y SUPPLY VALVE via ZS-12201A NOT Full open, and Input to Radwaste Collection Tanks will increase.
- B** AR-036-B01, "PUMP (Fire) IS OPERATING", alarm will be received, and AR-036-B05, "ENGINE RUNNING", alarm will be received, and Input to Radwaste Collection Tanks will increase.
- C** AR-036-B01, "PUMP (Fire) IS OPERATING", alarm will be received, and AR-036-B05, "ENGINE RUNNING", alarm will be received, and HV16150 Condenser Area Transfer Sump Isolation Valve closes.
- D** High flow from FSH12201A ( FSH FOR WPS-111 UNIT 1 TB CDSR AREA ) and WPS-111 OS&Y SUPPLY VALVE via ZS-12201A NOT Full open, and HV16150 Condenser Area Transfer Sump Isolation Valve closes.

## Question Number: 20

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

VALID DISTRACTOR: The candidate may believe that there will be an increase in flow to the radwaste, but the sump isolates as part of the fire response. Thus there will be no sudden inrush of fire protection water to radwaste.

CHOICE (B) - NO

VALID DISTRACTOR: The candidate may believe that there will be an increase in flow to the radwaste, but the sump isolates as part of the fire response. Thus there will be no sudden inrush of fire protection water to radwaste.

CHOICE (C): YES

CHOICE (D): NO

VALID DISTRACTOR: The high flow from the flow switch is expected on fire suppression initiation in the area. The supply valve is normally open. A trouble alarm will result if the valve is not full open. The valve is a manual valve and will be open. The candidate may believe the valve operates on an initiation signal.

### References

SSES Exam of August 2004  
Direct K/A match.  
AR-036-B01, B05  
OP-TM-013Z

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSS

Second stab at same K/A

```
*****
*
*  THIS IS THE FIRST BANK TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM PREVIOUS EXAM  *
*
*****
```

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 6000 Plant fire on site  
00

Number AA1.06

RO 3.0

SRO 3.0

CFR Link

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Fire alarm

### NRC K/A Generic

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

**Question Number: 21**

**# 21**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29698 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is at full rated power. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level is steady at 35 inches. You observe the following steady state conditions:

- Reactor Feed Pump "A"
  - running at 4,000 rpm and
  - pumping 3.7E6 lbm/hour (3,700,000 lbm per hour).
- Reactor Feed Pump "B"
  - running at 5,000 rpm and
  - pumping 4.6E6 lbm/hour (4,600,000 lbm per hour).
- Reactor Feed Pump "C"
  - running at 4,000 rpm and
  - pumping 3.7E6 lbm/hour (3,700,000 lbm per hour).

As PCO, you take RFP B SPD CTL/DEMAND SIGNAL SIC-C32-2R601B to MANUAL and attempt to reduce the speed of the "B" Reactor Feed Pump. There is no response.

What MUST your next action be per ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION?

- A** Lower RFPT B MTR SPD CHANGER using HS-22730B1 SLOW pushbutton until the Reactor Feed Pump slows down.
- B** Place FW LEVEL CTL/DEMAND SIGNAL LIC-C32-2R600 in MANUAL and attempt to reduce Reactor Feed Pump speed.
- C** Place FWLCS in Single Element Control by pressing the Green 1 ELEM pushbutton for 1 OR 3 ELEMENT LEVEL CONTROL HS-206102.
- D** Swap the controlling level channel by depressing available channel pushbutton for SELECT LVL A OR B HS-C32-2S01.

## Question Number: 21

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES, per 3.4.3

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: Master Controller will affect all three pumps. Need to match speeds/flows

VALID DISTRACTOR: this is directed for a Master Controller failure

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Would have no affect on speed control because level is steady at 35.

VALID DISTRACTOR: this is directed for level controller failure.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: Would have no affect on speed control because level is steady at 35.

VALID DISTRACTOR: this is directed for level controller failure.

### References

ON-145-001

### Comments and Question Modification History



**GXJ**



**THF**



**RJC**



**SSES**

Get good numbers from SSES.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950  
08

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.1 Conduct of Operations

Number 2.1.20

RO 4.3

SRO 4.2

CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Ability to execute procedure steps.

**Question Number: 22**

**# 22**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29592 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Which of the following conditions will actuate a Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) runback to prevent CAVITATION?

- A** RPV Water Level at +11 inches and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 26% and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 27%.
- B** RPV Water Level at +32 inches and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 18% and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 18%.
- C** RPV Water Level at +28 inches and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 20% and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 18%.
- D** RPV Water Level at +12 inches and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 16% and  
Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 17%.

## Question Number: 22

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

30% limiter if below L3 and TOTAL FW less than 20%

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: greater than 20% FW

VALID DISTRACTOR: below L3 is correct

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: above L3

VALID DISTRACTOR: Total FW < 20% is correct

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Below L4 but above L3

VALID DISTRACTOR: This combination will actuate the 45% limit (Speed Limiter #2)

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

TM-OP-064A, pp 8 to 11.

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - No K/A statement with question. Did validate correct answer.

R: added K/A to K/A table. Gil is OK.

Todd 09/30/05 - removed references to L3, L4 and Total v. RFP flows.

SQ 10/14/05 - changed stem from "Which of the following conditions will prevent CAVITATION?" to "Which of the following conditions will actuate a Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) runback to prevent CAVITATION?"

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Low Reactor Water Level  
09

**Number** AK1.02

**RO** 3.0

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL:  
Recirculation pump net positive suction head: Plant specific.

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 23**

**# 23**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29593 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 was at 10% reactor power when a steam line break occurred in the Primary Containment. The following conditions exist:

- Several control rods failed to insert.
- RPV Water Level is -80 inches and steady.
- RPV Pressure is 920 psig and steady.
- Drywell Pressure is 7.0 psig and steady.
- Drywell Temperature is 180 degrees Fahrenheit and steady.
- Suppression Chamber Pressure is 2.0 psig and rising slowly.
- Suppression Pool Temperature is 86 degrees Fahrenheit and rising.

According to EO-200-103, PC CONTROL, which ONE of the following Residual Heat Removal (RHR) configurations is REQUIRED?

- A** One loop of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling and one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray
- B** Both loops of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.
- C** One loop of RHR in Drywell Spray and one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Spray
- D** One loop of RHR in Drywell Spray and one loop of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling



## Question Number: 23

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

SP Cooling required per SP/T-1

SP Spray required per PC/P-4

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: SP/T-2 does NOT require maximum SP cooling until SC temp can NOT be maintained below 90 deg F.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Some SP cooling will be required to maintain SP below 90 deg F

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Drywell Spray is NOT required until DW pressure exceeds 13 psig in the SC per PC/P-5

VALID DISTRACTOR: SC Spray required per PC/P-4

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: Drywell Spray is NOT required until DW pressure exceeds 13 psig in the SC per PC/P-5

VALID DISTRACTOR: Some SP cooling will be required to maintain SP below 90 deg F

### References

NMP2 August 2002 Exam (Question ID 22265)

EOPs.

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references. Appears correct.

R: Self validated. Will ask Chief Examiner to validate.

2. SQ 10/14/05 - changed to Unit 1, added initial power of 10%, RPV level to -80 inches, changed Chamber to Pool.

3. SQ 10/18/05 - changed selections to state one loop in and the other loop in instead of specifying which loop.

Changed RPV Pressure to 920. Changed SPT to rising. Capitalized REQUIRED. All per original comments illuminated by phone conversation on this date.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 High Suppression Pool Temperature  
13

**Number** AK2.01 **RO** 3.6 **SRO** 3.7 **CFR Link** (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8)

Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH

SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE and the following: Suppression pool cooling

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 24**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29594 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 was operating at full power when the Main Turbine tripped. However, the Reactor did NOT scram. Control Rod 22-27 is selected and to be inserted per EO-100-113, Control Rod Insertion.

The following plant conditions exist:

- all Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) indicate approximately 24% Reactor Power.
- the RSCS ROD INS BLK BYPASS HS-55601 is in NORMAL (WHITE light illuminated)

On the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) Operator Display Unit (ODU), you observe the following:

- AMBER DISPLAY UNIT pushbutton lower light (FREE ROD) illuminated.
- Control Rod 22-27 AMBER light emitting diode (LED) is illuminated.
- RED DISPLAY UNIT pushbutton lower light (BYPASS) illuminated.
- Control Rod 22-27 RED light emitting diode (LED) is illuminated.

Which one of the following describes the status of control rod 22-27?

Control Rod 22-27 can . . .

- A** . . . be INSERTED because power is above the Low Power Set point (LPSP).
- B** . . . be INSERTED because it is BYPASSED.
- C** . . . NOT be INSERTED because the RSCS ROD INS BLK BYPASS HS-55601 is in NORMAL.
- D** . . . NOT be INSERTED because power is below the Low Power Set point (LPSP).

## Question Number: 24

Answers:

A ☐

B ☒

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: RPS does not bypass RSCS blocks.

VALID DISTRACTOR: LPSP is 22%. APRMs > 22% may be mistaken for the actual LPSP parameter (1st stage pressure).

CHOICE (B) - YES

Turbine 1st stage pressure is the parameter measured to determine whether the plant is above or below LPSP and LPAP. The stem establishes that the Main Turbine is tripped. Therefore, 1st stage pressure is below the LPSP set point and is probably at a vacuum. In addition, the ODU conditions in the stem establish that the rod is bypassed (RED LED) and free to move (AMBER LED).

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: The rod can be inserted because RSCS does not have a Rod Block on this rod

VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-100-113 directs the user to bypass RSCS. Applicant may believe the rod could be blocked if the switch is still in normal.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: The rod can be inserted because RSCS does not have a Rod Block on this rod.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may recognize that with no 1st stage pressure, RSCS receives a <LPSP signal and blocks rod motion.

### References

TM-OP-56Z

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒ GXJ

☒ THF

☒ RJC

☐ SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - replaced colon with question mark at end of stem.

SQ 10/14/05 - moved "Control Rod 22-27 can" from choices to stem. Conditions of RSCS panel may be trivial.

R - following Lesson Objectives support this question:

10183 Locate and describe the function of each Rod Sequence Control System control and indication.

- a. Amber Display Control Pushbutton
- b. Red Display Control Pushbutton

2438 Predict the Rod Sequence Control System response to manipulation of the following controls:

- a. Amber Display Control Pushbutton
- b. Red Display Control Pushbutton
- f. Bypass Switches

2441 Predict the effect that the following will have on the Rod Sequence Control System:

- d. Loss of Main Turbine First Stage Pressure Input

Verified with TM-OP-056Z that the indications do indicate that the rod is BYPASSED and Free to Move.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2950 Incomplete SCRAM  
15

Number AK2.06

RO 2.6

SRO 2.8

CFR Link (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8)

Knowledge of the interrelations between INCOMPLETE  
SCRAM and the following: RSCS: Plant-Specific

### NRC K/A Generic

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

**Question Number: 25**

**# 25**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29663 Origin: Mod

☒ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 is in MODE 5 for a planned refueling outage and fuel movement is in progress. SSES Unit 2 is in MODE 4 to support emergent maintenance. The Control Room receives the following alarms and Indications:

- REFUEL FLOOR WALL EXH MON HI RADIATION (AR-212-001, D01)
- RR-D12-2R605 reads 19.2 millirem per hour (mR/hr)
- REFUEL FLOOR HI EXH HI RADIATION (AR-212-001, F02)
- REFUEL FLOOR HI EXHAUST HI - HI RADIATION (AR-206-001, E03)
- RR-D12-2R607 reads 19.8 millirem per hour (mR/hr)

Which ONE of the following is the correct evacuation and reason?

- A** Evacuate both Refuel Floor areas because the Refuel Floor areas are common to both units.
- B** Only evacuate Unit 1 Refuel Floor areas because fuel movement is in progress only on Unit 1.
- C** Evacuate both Refuel Floor areas because radiation levels in 2 areas have exceeded MAX NORMAL.
- D** Evacuate both Refuel Floor areas because radiation levels in 2 areas have exceeded MAX SAFE.

## Question Number: 25

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

Radiation levels are high enough to cause a Secondary CTMT isolation. Zone III at SSES is common to both units. Therefore, evacuation of both areas is required.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: Zone III is common to both areas. Therefore, evacuation of both areas is required.

VALID DISTRACTOR: SSES Unit 1 is the unit undergoing refueling with fuel moves in progress.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Zone III is common to both SSES units. Therefore, evacuation of both areas is required.

VALID DISTRACTOR: The alarms given are Unit 2 alarms.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: SSES procedures support immediate evacuation.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Training Material discusses allowance for planned or expected alarms. The discussion indicates that alarms can be expected when handling irradiated materials in the vicinity of the radiation monitors.

### References

TM-OP-079E

AR-101-A04, AR-112-D01, AR-112-F02, AR-106-E03

ON-070-001

ON-081-001

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Modified from Grand Gulf 1, April 2000 (Question ID 16458)

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - added ", only" after distracters "B" and "C" for grammatical correctness.

Rich 10/03/05 - does not ask for REASONS. K/A mismatch.

R: saved original as 251. Rewrite to address reasons for evacuation.

Todd 10/17/05 - additional revisions. Concerned that "C" is implausible with common refuel floor.

R - possibly but accident could have occurred on Unit 2 side and not yet spread. Nevertheless, changed to mimic "D" with MAX NORMAL

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Secondary Containment Ventilation High Radiation  
34

**Number** EK3.03

**RO** 4.0

**SRO** 4.4

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.5, 45.6)

Knowledge of the reasons for the Personnel evacuation as it applies to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION  
HIGH RADIATION

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 26**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29596 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

Both units are at full power. SSES Unit 1 has isolated and is draining Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop "B" for planned maintenance. SSES Unit 1 RHR loop "B" is draining to the floor drain to the Reactor Building Sump via 161121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain Iso Vlv.).

SSES Unit 1 Receives the following alarms and indications:

- RHR LOOP B PUMP ROOM FLOODED (AR-113-001, H08).
- SUPPRESSION POOL DIV 1 LO LEVEL (AR-111-001, E02).
- SUPP POOL LEVEL LI-25755A indicates 22.4 feet and slowly lowering.
- SUPPRESSION POOL DIV 2 LO LEVEL (AR-112-001, E02).
- SUPP POOL LEVEL LI-15755B indicates 22.3 feet and slowly lowering.
- REACTOR BLDG SUMP LEVEL HI-HI (AR-125-001, B01)

(1) How will Suppression Pool level respond?

(2) What Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) entry conditions are CURRENTLY met?

- A** (1) The Suppression Pool will continue to drain until 161121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain Iso Vlv.) is closed.  
(2) EO-100-104, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.
- B** (1) The Suppression Pool will continue to drain until 161121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain Iso Vlv.) is closed.  
(2) EO-100-103, PC CONTROL.
- C** (1) Suppression Pool will continue to drain until draining of RHR loop "B" is stopped by closing the open vents & drains.  
(2) EO-100-104, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL.
- D** (1) Suppression Pool will continue to drain until draining of RHR loop "B" is stopped by closing the open vents & drains.  
(2) EO-100-103, PC CONTROL.

## Question Number: 26

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☒

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: SP will not continue to drain because the Unit 1 and 2 floor drains are not cross-connected.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct EOP and each unit's ECCS room floor drains are cross-connected to other ECCS room of the same unit.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: PC CONTROL requires SP level below 22 feet. However, the SP will not continue to drain because the Unit 1 and 2 floor drains are not cross-connected.

VALID DISTRACTOR: The stem conditions give sufficient information to correctly conclude that the Suppression Pool will stabilize at 17 feet (Table 18 of EO-100-103). Therefore, Applicant may reasonably select this.

CHOICE (C) - YES

Table 18 of EO-100-103 tells us that SP will stabilize at 17 feet.

EO-100-104 requires entry on RB Water Level above high alarm.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: PC CONTROL requires SP level below 22 feet.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct SP level. The stem conditions give sufficient information to correctly conclude that the Suppression Pool will stabilize at 17 feet (Table 18 of EO-100-103). Therefore, Applicant may reasonably select this.

### References

EO-100-103, 104

AR-111, 112, 113, 125

ON-169-002

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒ **GXJ**

☒ **THF**

☒ **RJC**

☐ **SSES**

NM2 August 2002 (Question ID 22279)

1. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate the 17 feet because EO-100-103 not included in work papers

R: it is 17 feet. Ask Chief Examiner to independently validate.

2. Todd 09/30/05 - changed "(1) What level will SSES Unit 2 Suppression Pool stabilize at?" to "(1) How will Suppression Pool level respond?"

changed part (1) of distracters "C" and "D" from "(1) 17 feet" to "(1) Suppression Pool level will lower to 17 feet and stabilize."

3. SQ 10/17/05 - system will continue draining until isolated. Stick to only one unit for plausibility.

R - only unit 1 and changed "C" and "D" to correct technical error.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2950 Secondary Containment High Sump/Area Water Level  
36

**Number** EA1.01

**RO** 3.2

**SRO** 3.3

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7, 45.6)

Ability to operate and/or monitor the Secondary containment equipment and floor drain systems as it applies to  
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AREA WATER LEVEL

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 27**

**# 27**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29597 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Following a loss of coolant accident, the Primary Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen (H<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub>) Analyzers are placed in service per OP-173-001, Section 2.8, H<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub> ANALYZER OPERATION DURING EMERGENCY. The following conditions exist:

- Analyzer "A" is aligned to the SUPPRESSION POOL.
- Analyzer "A" O<sub>2</sub> reads 2%.
- Analyzer "A" H<sub>2</sub> reads 9%
  
- Analyzer "B" is aligned to the DRYWELL.
- Analyzer "B" O<sub>2</sub> reads 6%
- Analyzer "B" H<sub>2</sub> reads less than 1%
  
- Sample flow to both analyzers was restored 35 minutes ago.
- Both analyzers are on the 10% range.

Which ONE of the following statements is correct?

All Hydrogen Recombiners, Drywell Fans and Drywell Coolers MUST . . .

- A** . . . be Operated to adequately mix the Primary Containment atmosphere.
- B** . . . be Operated to adequately recombine Hydrogen in the Primary Containment atmosphere.
- C** . . . be Shutdown because Hydrogen and Oxygen concentrations are above combustible limits
- D** . . . be Shutdown because Hydrogen and Oxygen concentrations can NOT be determined.



## Question Number: 27

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: EO-100-103 requires that Recombiners, Fans and Coolers be secured when H<sub>2</sub>>6% AND O<sub>2</sub>>5% whether the gases are in the same CTMT section or not because migration is possible.

VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-103-113 calls for mixing and recombining for the individual CTMT sections (SP or DW) given the individual conditions.

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: EO-100-103 requires that Recombiners, Fans and Coolers be secured when H<sub>2</sub>>6% AND O<sub>2</sub>>5% whether the gases are in the same CTMT section or not because migration is possible.

VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-103-113 calls for mixing and recombining for the individual CTMT sections (SP or DW) given the individual conditions.

CHOICE (C) - YES

Analyzers have been in-service for >30 minutes.

H<sub>2</sub> and O<sub>2</sub> conditions exceed combustible limits.

CHOICE (D) - NO

WRONG: The Analyzers require 30 minutes to stabilize. They've had 35 minutes.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may consider the Analyzers inoperable due to the disparate SP and DW readings or because Analyzers have been in service for a short time period. (Note: 1 hour at PB)

### References

EO-000-103

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - OK

SQ 10/14/05 - moved "All Hydrogen Recombiners, Drywell Fans and Drywell Coolers MUST" to the stem.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 5000 High Containment Hydrogen Concentration  
00

**Number** EA2.04 **RO** 3.3 **SRO** 3.3 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13)

Ability to determine and / or interpret Combustible limits for wetwell as it applies to HIGH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 28**

**# 28**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29598 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

Given that the following conditions occur in the specified sequence:

1. All required conditions for Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) actuation were met.
2. Automatic depressurization is in progress.
3. All low pressure ECCS pumps trip.
4. A single Core Spray (CS) pump is restarted.

Which ONE of the following describes how the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) is affected?

- A** Automatic depressurization STOPS when low pressure ECCS pumps trip; then AUTOMATICALLY reinitiate after the CS pump restarts.
- B** Automatic depressurization CONTINUES until the LOGIC TIMER RESET pushbutton is depressed.
- C** Automatic depressurization CONTINUES until both MANUAL INHIBIT (S34A & S34B) switches are rotated to INHIBIT.
- D** Automatic depressurization STOPS when low pressure ECCS pumps trip; then can be MANUALLY reinitiated after the CS pump restarts.

## Question Number: 28

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: K4A seals in the actuation signal.

VALID DISTRACTOR: ADS will not actuate without low pressure ECCS pumps running

CHOICE (B) - YES

Signal seals in until broken by the ADS LOGIC/TIMER RESET PB

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Manual Inhibit PBs are effective before ADS actuation only.

VALID DISTRACTOR: They are effective before actuation at stopping actuation.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: K4A seals in the actuation signal and Manual Initiation does NOT bypass the LP ECCS Pumps relay K9A and K10A

VALID DISTRACTOR: Reasonable belief that Manual Initiation would bypass all interlocks.

### References

OP-TM-83E

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Drawn from Clinton 1 June 2000 exam (Question ID 18937)

Gil 09/26/05 - Add to first sentence in stem ". . . conditions occur in sequence". Can you shorten distracter "D" a bit?

R: accepted both comments.

Todd 09/30/05 - Revised "A" and "D" to be past tense and added auto restart to "A".

SQ 10/14/05 - changed past/present tenses to read better and eliminate psychometric clues.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2030 RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode (Plant Specific)  
00

**Number** K3.03

**RO** 4.2

**SRO** 4.3

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.4)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHR/LPCI: INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC) will have on Automatic depressurization logic

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 29**

**# 29**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29599 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Both units are at full power. 480 VAC Bus 2B226 was deenergized in response to a report of smoke coming out of the bus.. All systems were in their normal configuration when Operations de-energized 2B226.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of SSES Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop "B" with NO Local/Manual component manipulation?

- A** Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available  
Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Available  
Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available  
RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - Available
- B** Drywell Spray Mode - Available  
Suppression Pool Spray - Available  
Suppression Pool Cooling - Available  
RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - NOT Available
- C** Drywell Spray Mode - Available  
Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Available  
Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available  
RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - NOT Available
- D** Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available  
Suppression Pool Spray - Available  
Suppression Pool Cooling - Available  
RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - Available

Answers:

☒ A

☐ B

☐ C

☐ D

References Provided to Applicant: ☒

#### Justification

De-energizing 2B226 removes power from the following:

- HV251F016B - Drywell Spray (Normally Shut)
- HV251F017B - Injection (Normally Open)
- HV251F028B - SP Spray & Cooling (Normally Shut)
- HV251F010B - Cross-connect to "A" loop (Normally Shut)
- HV251F004B - "B" Pump suction from SP (Normally Open)
- HV251F006B - "B" Pump suction from SDC dropline (Normally Open)
- HV251F003B - "B" HX Outlet (Normally Open)
- HV251F047B - "B" HX Inlet (Normally Open)

Therefore, the following applies"

- Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) - Operable because de-energized valves in the flow path are normally open (HV251F015B is on swing buss 2B229)
- Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available because normally closed valve F016B is de-energized
- Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Available because normally closed valve F028B is de-energized
- Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available because normally closed valve F028B is de-energized
- RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow - Available because normally closed valve F007B is energized from 2B229

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: DW Spray NOT avail because F016B deenergized. SP Spray NOT avail because F028B deenergized.

VALID DISTRACTOR: LPCI is Operable, Min Flow is available and SP Cooling NOT Avail.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: LPCI is Operable. Remainder of distracter mirrors Distracter B

VALID DISTRACTOR: Remainder of distracter mirrors Distracter B

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: LPCI is Operable. Remainder of distracter mirrors Distracter D

VALID DISTRACTOR: Remainder of distracter mirrors Distracter B

#### References

M-2151

ON-104-202

#### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - Suggest use "Available" (or not available) rather than "Operable". Not sure what impact the bus loss will have on Operability, however availability is assured in A.

R: accepted.

Todd 09/30/05 - deleted LPCI mode to limit variables to four. modified distracters accordingly.

SQ 10/17/05 - Memorized Load List is trivial. Operations would not de-energize 2B226.

R - change to loss due to fault and provide Applicant with Load List. Specifically, provide Applicants with copy of ON-204-202.

Note that SSES Lesson Objective supports this question: 10499 State the power supply to the following Residual Heat Removal System Components:

- a. Residual Heat Removal Pumps
- b. RHR motor-operated valves
- c. LPCI initiation logic
- d. RHR valve control logic

#### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2050 Shutdown Cooling System (RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode 00

**Number** K2.02 **RO** 2.5 **SRO** 2.7 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7)

Knowledge of electrical power supplies to Motor operated valves

#### NRC K/A Generic

**Question Number: 29**

---

**System  
Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 30**

**# 30**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29600 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 is at full power when the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inadvertently initiates and injects to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). Assuming no Operator action, which ONE of the following correctly describes the INITIAL change from steady state?

Thermal Power will RISE and . . .

- A** RPV Water Level will LOWER and  
Total Steam Flow will LOWER and  
Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER
- B** RPV Water Level will LOWER and  
Total Steam Flow will RISE and  
Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER
- C** RPV Water Level will RISE and  
Total Steam Flow will LOWER and  
Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will RISE
- D** RPV Water Level will RISE and  
Total Steam Flow will RISE and  
Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER

## Question Number: 30

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Wrong Level, ST & FW changes

VALID DISTRACTOR: correct power changes.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Wrong RPV Water Level Effect.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct Power, ST and FW changes

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Reverses the actual FW and ST changes - both affect Level Error.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct Power and Level change

CHOICE (D) - YES

Steam Flow RISES cause HPCI Turbine Operating. Therefore, RPV pressure drops cause ST rises and Power rises due to colder FW.

RPV Water Level will rise because FW now > ST. Stable when Level Error offsets Flow Error

Total Steam Flow will rise because now have additional steam flow path

Indicated FW Flow lowers to create the Flow Error that offsets Level Error.

### References

Adopted directly from SQ exam bank. Editorial and format changes only.

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references. Note for justification "A" Power increases due to lowering feedwater temperature with HPCI injection.

R: Low risk of error because it is drawn from SSES Exam Bank and is theoretical rather than plant specific.

2. Todd 09/30/05 - changed "INITIAL to FINAL" to "INITIAL change from SS"

3. SQ 10/14/05 - moved "Thermal Power will RISE" from choices to stem.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2060 High Pressure Coolant Injection System  
00

**Number** A1.01 **RO** 4.3 **SRO** 4.4 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.5)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM controls including Reactor water level (BWR-2,3,4)

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**



**Question Number: 31**

**# 31**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29601 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

During quarterly surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system per SO-152-002, the HPCI system is \_\_ (1) \_\_ and the liquid flow path is \_\_ (2) \_\_.

- A** (1) NOT OPERABLE because injection valve HV155F006 is deenergized in the closed position.  
(2) From the Suppression Pool to the Pumps and return to the Suppression Pool.
- B** (1) NOT OPERABLE because injection valve HV155F006 is deenergized in the closed position.  
(2) From the Condensate Storage Tank to the Pumps and return to the Condensate Storage Tank.
- C** (1) OPERABLE because HPCI will automatically realign to the injection mode upon receipt of an initiation signal.  
(2) From the Suppression Pool to the Pumps and return to the Suppression Pool.
- D** (1) OPERABLE because HPCI will automatically realign to the injection mode upon receipt of an initiation signal.  
(2) From the Condensate Storage Tank to the Pumps and return to the Condensate Storage Tank.

## Question Number: 31

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Path is CST to Pps to CST

VALID DISTRACTOR: system is Inoperable.

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Path is CST to Pps to CST. System is NOT operable (no auto realign)

VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror imaging distracters.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: System is NOT operable (no auto realign)

VALID DISTRACTOR: correct flow path

### References

SO-152-002

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☒

SSES

Get the correct surveillance (I've got the 24 month one)

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - ask SSES if initial power level changes the answer.

SQ 10/14/05 - inserted HPCI into stem before system.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2060  
00

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.2 Equipment Control

Number 2.2.12

RO 3.0

SRO 3.4

CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

**# 32**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID:

29602 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

Both SSES units were at full power and SSES Unit 1 was running Core Spray pumps 1P206A and 1P206C for surveillance testing when the site experienced a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP).

- Both units are now maintaining Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure and inventory with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system.
- All engineered safeguards (ES) buses are powered from their associated emergency diesel generators (EDG).

Subsequently, a transient affects SSES Unit 2 and results in the following conditions:

- SSES Unit 2 RPV Water Level is -60 inches.
- SSES Unit 2 RPV Pressure is 350 psig.
- SSES Unit 2 Drywell Pressure is 1.8 psig.

Which ONE of the following describes the AUTOMATIC actions of the SSES Unit 2 Core Spray Pumps?

- A** Core Spray pumps 2P206A, 2P206B, 2P206C and 2P206D start after a 15 second time delay.
- B** Core Spray pumps 2P206A, 2P206B, 2P206C and 2P206D start after a 10.5 second time delay.
- C** Core Spray pumps 2P206B and 2P206D start after a 10.5 second time delay. Core Spray pumps 2P206A and 2P206C do NOT start.
- D** Core Spray pumps 2P206B and 2P206D start after a 15 second time delay. Core Spray pumps 2P206A and 2P206C do NOT start.

## Question Number: 32

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: the 15 sec TD occurs if ES busses are energized from normal/off-site power.

VALID DISTRACTOR: all four pumps do start after a TD

CHOICE (B) - YES

the 15 sec does time out. However, its start signal comes AFTER the 10.5 sec TD sends its signal.

LOOP: K3A opens, EDGs start and energize ES busses, K3A closes and the EDG breaker 52 contacts swap (a closes & b opens)

LOCA: K10A closes on DW Hi pressure and RPV Low pressure, K116A energizes 10.5 sec TD concurrently with K16A's 15 sec TD. K116A closes before K16A closes, K12A energizes.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: CS pumps A & C will also start.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct TD and pumps B & D are "Preferred" unit 2 pumps for concurrent CS initiation signals (electrical load considerations).

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Wrong TD and CS pumps A& C will also start.

VALID DISTRACTOR: CS pumps B & D are "Preferred" unit 2 pumps for concurrent CS initiation signals (electrical load considerations).

### References

Modified from SSES submittal.

TM-OP-051

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - changed "plant" to "site" in the stem.

SQ 10/14/05 - editorial changes.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2090 Low Pressure Core Spray System  
01

**Number** K4.08 **RO** 3.8 **SRO** 4.0 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7)

Knowledge of LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the Automatic system initiation

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 33**

**# 33**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29691 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Both SSES units are at full power. During shift turnover, you notice that the:

- white indicating light for Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) squib valve 148F004A is EXTINGUISHED
- white indicating light for Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) squib valve 148F004B is ILLUMINATED

Before accepting the shift, you go to the Relay Room and determine that the Unit 1 SBLC squib valve CONTINUITY METERS read:

- 0.1 milliamps (ma) for squib valve 148F004A.
- 4.7 milliamps (ma) for squib valve 148F004B.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of the SBLC squib valves?

- A** 148F004A is Operable  
148F004B is Operable
- B** 148F004A is NOT Operable  
148F004B is Operable
- C** 148F004A is Operable  
148F004B is NOT Operable
- D** 148F004A is NOT Operable  
148F004B is NOT Operable

## Question Number: 33

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

The stem establishes conditions indicative of a burned out light bulb.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Neither valve is inoperable.

VALID DISTRACTOR: White light out is the first indication of an inoperable squib valve.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Neither valve is inoperable

VALID DISTRACTOR: Tests Applicants' understanding of the normal/expected condition.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Neither valve is inoperable

VALID DISTRACTOR: Mirror imaging and tests Applicants' understanding of normal/expected condition.

### References

AR-107-A03

TM-OP-053

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - suggest using 5 milliamps in stem if this is technically correct, albeit a little higher than normal. 4 milliamps is too easily recognizable.

R: accepted. Changed from 4 to 5 and deleted sentence saying "These are the NORMAL values". Recategorized to Higher Cognitive Level.

Todd 09/30/05 - added "Unit 1" before SBLC in the stem.

SQ 10/14/05 - changed stem to indicate INOPERABLE Squib valve because not realistic to not replace bulb before going to the Relay Room. Saved original question as 331.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2110 Standby Liquid Control System  
00

**Number** K4.04 **RO** 3.8 **SRO** 3.9 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7)

Knowledge of STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for Indication of fault in explosive valve firing circuits

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 34**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29692 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 is operating at full power. The following Standby Liquid Control System (SBLC) conditions exist following SBLC tank filling:

- SLC tank temperature is 70 F
- AR 107 B03, STANDBY LIQUID TANK HI/LO TEMP is in alarm
- SLC tank level is 5100 gallons
- AR 107 C03, STANDBY LIQUID TANK HI/LO LEVEL is in alarm
- Chemistry sample results after filling indicate that the concentration of the sodium pentaborate solution in the SLC tank is 15.4% by weight

Which ONE of the following actions, if any, are required to meet Technical Specifications?

- A** No action required. The LCO is satisfied.
- B** Raise SBLC Tank Temperature.
- C** Lower SBLC Tank Volume/Level.
- D** Raise Sodium pentaborate concentration.

## Question Number: 34

Answers:

A ☐

B ☒

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☒

### Justification

!! THIS QUESTION APPEARED ON THE AUGUST 2002 SUSQUEHANNA EXAM !!

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: The temperature-concentration combination is in the UNACCEPTABLE range.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant must determine this from Figure 3.1.7-2

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Volume falls in the acceptable region of Figure 3.1.7-2

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant determine this from Figure 3.1.7-2

CHOICE (D) -

WRONG: Concentration falls in the acceptable region of Figure 3.1.7-2

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant determine this from Figure 3.1.7-2

### References

!! THIS QUESTION APPEARED ON THE AUGUST 2002 SUSQUEHANNA EXAM !!

INPO Bank Question ID 23895

Provide TS figures 3.1.7-1, 2 without words indicating acceptable or unacceptable regions if possible.

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒ **GXJ**

☒ **THF**

☒ **RJC**

☐ **SSES**

!! THIS QUESTION APPEARED ON THE AUGUST 2002 SUSQUEHANNA EXAM !!

Gil 09/26/05 - Not sure it is plausible for an operator to NOT acknowledge any annunciator. How about "acknowledge but do not reset" for "A".

R: accepted. Changed distracters "A" and "B"

?? Does SSES have the RESET function ??

\*\*\* REJECTED K/A CAUSE LOD UNREACHABLE \*\*\*

Reselected 2.1.33 and found this in an SSES old exam.

SQ 10/14/05 - rejected because two potentially correct answers. Reworded the stem and modified the choices to ask for actions to fix rather than identify problem. Recategorized to Modified. Saved original as 341.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2110  
00

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.1 Conduct of Operations

Number 2.1.2

RO 3.0

SRO 4.0

CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.



**Question Number: 35**

**# 35**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29605 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 scrams from full power. All systems, structures and components operated as expected EXCEPT the Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves for all twenty (20) Group 2 Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) on Reactor Side 2 failed to vent their associated HCUs.

Which ONE of the following describes the Control Rod response?

- A** All control rods will insert at the same time and  
All control rods will insert at the same speed.
- B** Group 2 control rods will insert LATER than all other control rods and  
Group 2 control rods will insert at a SLOWER speed than all other control rods.
- C** Group 2 control rods will insert LATER than all other control rods and  
All control rods will insert at the same speed.
- D** All control rods will insert at the same time and  
Group 2 control rods will insert at a SLOWER speed than all other control rods.

## Question Number: 35

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☒

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: The rods will INSERT at a slower rate as ARI and Backup Scram valves act to depressurize the air header

VALID DISTRACTOR: The rod still inserts

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: The rods will insert without Operator action

VALID DISTRACTOR: valid method directed by EO-100-113, Control Rod Insertion

CHOICE (C) - YES

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: The rods will insert without Operator action

VALID DISTRACTOR: using RMC may be plausible once the Scram and ARI are reset.

### References

Taken directly from SSES Exam Bank.

TM-OP-055, 055B, 058.

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - Once a rod is scrammed (from any means) it will insert at the same rate (about 4 seconds).

Recommends:

A - All control rods will automatically insert in < 10 seconds.

C - All control rods will automatically insert in > 10 seconds.

R: no known basis for the 10 second threshold. Will request SSES input. Not sure I accept the proposition that all rods will insert at the same rate. Seems reasonable to believe that the rods for which the Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves did NOT open would move a bit slower because their air is vented through a smaller area.

09/27/05: Now understand the issue. All rods insert at the same rate once the scram valves open. However, for the affected 20 HCU's, the scram valves take longer to open. Must have SSES verify/evaluate the 10 second threshold.

Todd 09/30/05 - replaced "Both units are at full power when one unit scrams for unknown reasons." with "SSES Unit 2 scrams from full power."

SQ 10/14/05 - major changes to improve/clarify. Original not saved.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2120 Reactor Protection System  
00

**Number** K4.09 **RO** 3.8 **SRO** 3.9 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7)

Knowledge of REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the Control rod insertion following RPS system electrical failure

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number** **RO** **SRO** **CFR Link**

**Question Number: 36**

**# 36**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29606 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

A reactor STARTUP is in progress. All Intermediate Range Neutron Monitors (IRM) are on Range 4. Which ONE of the following IRM readings will ONLY cause a HALF SCRAM?

Note: INOP = Inoperable and NOT bypassed.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
<b>A</b>	INOP	109	108	106	110	INOP	107	107
<b>B</b>	124	124	108	106	110	103	107	108
<b>C</b>	110	107	INOP	123	112	118	109	111
<b>D</b>	INOP	105	108	110	124	112	116	109

## Question Number: 36

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

IRMs are assigned to RPS as follows:

RPS "A": IRM channels "A", "C", "E", "G"

RPS "A": IRM channels "B", "D", "F", "H"

To yield a half scram, one or more APRMs in a SINGLE and only a SINGLE RPS channel must either trip on high flux (>122 / 125 scale) or INOP

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: INOP IRM channels "A" and "F" yield a FULL scram.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Two inoperable channels.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: IRM channels "A" and "B" yield a FULL scram.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Two channels > high flux set point

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: IRM channels "D" and "E" yield a FULL scram

VALID DISTRACTOR: Two channels above high flux set point.

CHOICE (D) - YES

IRM channel "A" trips RPS "A"

IRM channel "E" trips RPS "A"

### References

Clinton 1 August 2002 exam

T.S. Table 3.3.1.1-1

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. Gil 09/26/05 - explanation talks about APRMs rather than IRMs.  
R: corrected explanation to IRMs.

2. SQ 10/18/05 - OK

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2120 Reactor Protection System  
00

Number A3.01

RO 4.4

SRO 4.4

CFR Link (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Ability to monitor automatic operations of the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM including Reactor Power

### NRC K/A Generic

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

**# 37**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29607 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 in Mode 2. Heavy grounds on the Division I 24-VDC system cause a loss of Load Center 1D672. For unknown reasons, the 1B216 ESS 480-VAC MCC also deenergizes.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM)?

- A** IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE  
IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" CAN be inserted or withdrawn  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" CAN be inserted or withdrawn
- B** IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE  
IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" CAN be inserted or withdrawn  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn
- C** IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed UPSCALE  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE  
IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" CAN be inserted or withdrawn
- D** IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE  
IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn  
IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn

## Question Number: 37

Answers:

**A** ☒

**B** ☐

**C** ☐

**D** ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are powered from 1D672. The stem establishes that the associated battery is not available to provide backup power to 1D672 and that both battery chargers are abnormally configured to be powered from the same buss (1Y216). 1Y216 is powered from 1B216 which, according to the stem, is lost. Therefore, 24-VDC to 1D672 is also lost.

The IRM Detector Drive motors for all 8 IRMs are powered from 1Y218. Although the normal power to 1Y218 is lost, the Non-class 1E Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 1D240 keeps 1Y218 powered from a 250-VDC battery and ES Buss 1B236. Therefore all 8 detectors can be moved.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: IRM Detectors "B", "D", "F", and "H" can be moved. IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and fail downscale

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may erroneously associate drive motors with associated detectors. Applicant may believe detectors fail upscale.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: All IRMs are movable.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may understand that 1Y218 is affected by the loss of 1B216 but forget that 1Y218 is protected by an UPS.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: IRMs fail down, not up

VALID DISTRACTOR: everything else is correct.

### References

Grand Gulf exam of August 2002 (Question ID 24195)

TM-OP-075

TM-OP-017

TM-OP-078B

### Comments and Question Modification History



**GXJ**



**THF**



**RJC**



**SSES**

Gil 09/26/05 - Please confirm that there is at least one indicator in the plant (not necessarily IRMs) that will fail upscale on loss of power; otherwise C and D are not plausible. I can't think of any at the plants I worked.

R: will ask. Easy fix by also varying the status of Div II IRMs or Div I IRMs.

Changed Distracter "D" to fail DOWNSCALE and IRMs B, D, F, H can NOT be withdrawn. Request sent to SSES to determine if any meters fail high. If so, may return to UPSCALE.

09/28/05 Phone conversation with SSES: they agree it is implausible for an IRM to fail UPSCALE and indicated that this could happen on plants with DC powered IRMs. They did not consider an UPSCALE failure credible. Therefore, changes indicated above should alleviate this concern because now only one distracter contains the UPSCALE failure. Adjusted the ability to withdraw IRMs to make distracter "C" more enticing.

Todd 09/30/05 - changed "fail" to "failed" in all four choices.

SQ 10/18/05 - deleted conditions leading to loss of 1D672 because LOD = 5 and because unrealistic scenario. Simply stated that the Load Center is lost due to heavy grounds. During phone conversation on 10/17/05, SSES indicated that this system is the only ungrounded DC system at the plant. Therefore, grounds would be a realistic concern. SSES initially indicated that asking whether the detectors could be inserted/withdrawn was trivial (LOD=5) - later reconsidered this and indicated it was fair to ask.

The following SSES Learning Objectives support this question:

2347 Describe the relationships between the Intermediate Range Monitor System and the following:

- a. 24 VDC Distribution System

10230 State the power supply to the Intermediate Range Monitor System channels and detectors.

2337 Predict the effect that the following conditions will have on the Intermediate Range Monitor System:

- a. Loss of 24 VDC
- b. Detector drive failure

## **Question Number: 37**

---

**System** 2150 Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) System  
03

**Number** K2.01 **RO** 2.5 **SRO** 2.7 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7)

Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the IRM channels/detectors

### **NRC K/A Generic**

**System**

**Number** **RO** **SRO** **CFR Link**

# 38

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29608 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is in Mode 2, conducting a normal reactor startup per GO-200-102, PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION. The following conditions exist:

- the reactor is CRITICAL.
- RPV Pressure is 0 psig.
- All Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) are on Range 3
- Source Range Monitor (SRM) detectors are being withdrawn intermittently, TWO AT A TIME.
- SRM level is being maintained between 5E3 (5,000) and 5E4 (50,000) counts per second (CPS).
- SRM Channel "A" reads 6.1E3 (6,100) CPS and slowly rising.
- SRM Channel "B" reads 7.2E4 (72,000) CPS and slowly rising.
- SRM Channel "C" reads 6.0E3 (6,000) CPS and slowly rising.
- SRM Channel "D" reads 6.1E3 (6,100) CPS and slowly rising.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes (1) the cause of these indications and (2) actions required to continue the startup?

(1) SRM Detector "B" is stuck & located . . .

(2) The reactor startup may . . .

- A** (1) . . . LOWER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D".  
(2) . . . continue. The SRM Upscale Block is AUTOMATICALLY bypassed when all IRMs are on Range 3 or above.
- B** (1) . . . LOWER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D".  
(2) . . . continue if Operators MANUALLY bypass SRM "B" to prevent a Rod Withdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20,000) CPS.
- C** (1) . . . HIGHER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D".  
(2) . . . continue if Operators MANUALLY bypass SRM "B" to prevent a Rod Withdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20,000) CPS.
- D** (1) . . . HIGHER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D".  
(2) . . . continue. The SRM Upscale Block is AUTOMATICALLY bypassed when all IRMs are on Range 3 or above.



## Question Number: 38

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: The detector is stuck HIGHER in the core and AUTO bypass occurs on Range 8 or higher.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Mirror imaging.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: The detector is stuck HIGHER.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Manual bypass is required.

CHOICE (C) - YES

Detector is stuck HIGHER.

MANUAL bypass is required to continue.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Auto bypass occurs on Range 8 or higher.

VALID DISTRACTOR: SRM is stuck HIGHER.

### References

NM1 October 2002 Exam (Question ID 22068)

TM-OP-056A

TM-OP-078A

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☒

SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - grammatical corrections to stem.

SQ 10/18/05 - SQ recommends moving "SRM Detector "B" is stuck & located" to the stem.

R - revised wording in attempt to accommodate.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2150 Source Range Monitor (SRM) System  
04

**Number** K5.03

**RO** 2.8

**SRO** 2.8

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.3)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as it applies to SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM)

SYSTEM : Changing detector position

## NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 39**

**# 39**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID:

29699 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is at 12% reactor power with the Reactor Mode Switch in STARTUP/HOT STANDBY. The present status of LPRM inputs and APRM power levels is:

	APRM A	APRM B	APRM C	APRM D	APRM E	APRM F
D Level inputs	4	3	2	4	3	4
C Level inputs	3	2	4	4	3	3
B Level inputs	4	3	3	4	4	2
A Level inputs	3	2	4	3	4	5
Power indicated	12%	11 %	14%	11 %	14%	10%

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the plant response to these conditions?

- A** No AUTOMATIC action. The "B" APRM is administratively INOPERABLE.
- B** A control rod block and ONLY a half reactor scram in channel "B" will occur.
- C** A control rod block and ONLY a half reactor scram in channel "A" will occur.
- D** A control rod block and a full reactor scram will occur.

## Question Number: 39

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - NO

WRONG: less than 14 LPRMs will cause an INOP trip.

VALID DISTRACTOR: less than 2 per level is an Admin INOP

CHOICE (B) - NO

WRONG: Gonna get the full scram

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may not recognize that B & C are < 14 or confuse RPS Division assignments.

CHOICE (C) - NO

WRONG: Gonna get the full scram

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may not recognize that B & C are < 14 or confuse RPS Division assignments.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

Hatch exam of March 1997

TM-OP-078D

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2150 Average Power Range Monitor/Local Power Range Moni  
05

**Number** A1.02 **RO** 3.9 **SRO** 4.0 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.5)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM controls including RPS status

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 40**

**# 40**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29610 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

How is the integrity of Primary Containment protected if one of the RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Instrument Sensing Lines break?

The Instrument Sensing Lines are . . .

- A** . . . Normally Open and are AUTOMATICALLY isolated in response to a line break.
- B** . . . equipped with a Flow Orifice, a MANUALLY Operated Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) and an Excess Flow Check Valve.
- C** . . . equipped with a Flow Orifice, an AUTOMATICALLY Operated Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) and an Excess Flow Check Valve.
- D** . . . Normally Isolated and are AUTOMATICALLY placed in service when RCIC actuates.

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

#### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: they do penetrate CTMT

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe that the sensors are EQ.

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: The PCIV is Manual.

VALID DISTRACTOR: everything else is correct.

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG:

VALID DISTRACTOR:

#### References

TM-OP-050

TM-OP-059B

#### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☒

SSES

\*\*\*\*\* N O T E: SSES rejected this K/A in 2002 because it was too difficult to write a LOD>1 question. \*\*\*\*\*

Gil 09/26/05 - . . . penetrate the RCIC Turbine . . . . . these RCIC INSTRUMENT . . . .

R: issue is unclear.

Clarified by phone - revisions made by inserting "RCIC"

Todd 09/30/05 - deleted long winded explanation of the line from stem and replaced "A" with distracter better balanced with "D" and more enticing.

SQ 10/14/05 - moved "The Instrument Sensing Lines are" from choices to stem.

#### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2170 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)  
00

**Number** K1.02 **RO** 3.5 **SRO** 3.5 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) and the Nuclear boiler system

#### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 41**

**# 41**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29611 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

With SSES Unit 2 at full power, a Safety Relieve Valve (SRV) inadvertently opened and is now indicating CLOSED. What is the expected tailpipe temperature 45 minutes later if the SRV is leaking?

Assume Suppression Pool Pressure is 0.2 psig.

Select the closest answer.

- A** 551 degrees Fahrenheit.
- B** 545 degrees Fahrenheit.
- C** 296 degrees Fahrenheit.
- D** 252 degrees Fahrenheit.

## Question Number: 41

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☒

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: this is Tsat for normal RPV pressure of 1040 psig.

VALID DISTRACTOR: TMI lesson learned.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: this is Tsat for normal MS Header pressure of 985 psig.

VALID DISTRACTOR: TMI lesson learned.

CHOICE (C): YES

At 1040 psig (1055 psia), the steam vapor enthalpy is 1190.8 BTU/lbm. Throttling is an isenthalpic process. From the Mollier diagram, we see that the expected tailpipe temperature is in the vicinity of 280 deg F. From the tables, we can interpolate to 296 deg F.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: this is 2 deg F above the alarm set point.

VALID DISTRACTOR: the alarm set point is 250 deg F

### References

Standard Steam Tables

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch.

R: will reconsider. Agree that this does not DIRECTLY test automatic ADS valve operation. But Applicant should understand whether tailpipe temperatures are trending to ambient or not following an open SRV.

Todd 09/30/05 - verify with SSES that 45 minutes eliminates "D" as potentially correct.

SQ 10/14/05 - changed 14.7 psig to 0.2 psig.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2180 Automatic Depressurization System  
00

**Number** A3.01

**RO** 4.2

**SRO** 4.3

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Ability to monitor automatic operations of the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM including: ADS valve operation

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 42**

**# 42**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29612 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

A loss of 250-VDC Load Center 1D662 would affect the \_\_ (1) \_\_ system by preventing the \_\_ (2) \_\_ Steam Supply Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV) from closing.

- A** (1) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)  
(2) Outboard
- B** (1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)  
(2) Outboard
- C** (1) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)  
(2) Inboard
- D** (1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)  
(2) Inboard



## Question Number: 42

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

From TM-OP-088, the 1D264 and 1D274 busses are powered from 1D662. 1D662 is powered from the 1D663 Battery Charger or the 1D660 Battery. The stem specifies a loss of 1D662. Therefore, the cause of this loss is irrelevant. However, the successful Applicant must recognize that loss of 1D662 will also cause a loss of 1D274 and 1D264. Alternatively, the successful Applicant may know that RCIC DC-powered MOVs are powered from Div I and HPCI DC-powered MOVs are powered from Div II of the 250-VDC system.

CHOICE (A) - YES

1D264 and 1D274 provide power to the HPCI outboard PCIVs.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: It's HPCI, not RCIC

VALID DISTRACTOR: correct valves.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Wrong Valves

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct system

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Wrong valves and system.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Mirror image.

### References

TM-OP-088.

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. Gil 09/26/05 - can't see connection between 1D662 and Outboard MOV.

R: INBD Vvs AC pwr'd to prevent sparking inside PC that could ignite H2 if present. OTBD Vvs are DC powered for reliability & diversity. Added text to justification section explaining 250-VDC distribution. Also added word "PUMP" to stem to preclude "B" from being a potentially correct second answer. HV-149F084, RCIC TURB EXH VAC BKR OB VLV, is powered from 1D264 and is an Outboard PCIV.

2. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

3. SQ 10/14/05 - deleted "system" and added "Suction and Discharge" to stem to eliminate second correct answer.

4. SQ 10/17/05 - preferred STEAM SUPPLY to pump suct and disch.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2230 Primary Containment Isolation System/Nuclear Steam  
02

**Number** K6.02

**RO** 3.0

**SRO** 3.2

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of D.C. electrical distribution will have on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 43**

**# 43**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29700 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

During a plant transient the Control Room is EVACUATED. You report to the SSES Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel (1C201). The following conditions now exist:

- Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) are CLOSED.
- Drywell Pressure is 1.9 psig.
- Safety Relief Valve (SRV) control has been transferred to the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes status of the Safety Relief Valves (SRV)?

- A** SRVs "A", "B", and "C" can ONLY operate MANUALLY in the Overpressure RELIEF Mode. AUTOMATIC Overpressure SAFETY operation is still functional for all SRVs.
- B** SRVs "A", "B", and "C" can operate AUTOMATICALLY or MANUALLY in the Overpressure RELIEF Mode. AUTOMATIC Overpressure SAFETY operation is still functional for all SRVs.
- C** SRVs "A", "B", and "C" can ONLY operate MANUALLY in the Overpressure RELIEF Mode. AUTOMATIC Overpressure SAFETY operation is functional ONLY for SRVs "D" through "S".
- D** SRVs "A", "B", and "C" can operate AUTOMATICALLY or MANUALLY in the Overpressure RELIEF Mode. AUTOMATIC Overpressure SAFETY operation is functional ONLY for SRVs "D" through "S".

## Question Number: 43

Answers:

**A** ☒

**B** ☐

**C** ☐

**D** ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

Complete rewrite of original question. Old question saved as Order 431.

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: "A", "B", "C" can NOT be AUTO transferred to the RSD.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Safety mode is correct

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Safety Mode of "A", "B", "C" is still available

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct RSD effect.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: mirror imaging.

VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror imaging.

### References

TM-OP-083

TM-OP-050

TM-OP-083E

TM-OP-025

### Comments and Question Modification History



**GXJ**



**THF**



**RJC**



**SSES**

NOTE: per ON-100-009, ADS valves can be operated from the Relay Rooms.

Revised correct answer to "A" after telephone discussion with SSES. Accumulators will provide some operation of SRVs A, B, C from the RSD in this condition. Operation in SAFETY mode will not deplete the accumulator.

????? QUESTION: would the accumulators have depleted in RELIEF mode by now? ???????

1. Gil 09/26/05 - believes SRVs always operate in Overpressure Relief mode before safety relief mode. This will deplete the air supply. Question may have NO correct answer if this is true.

R: The stem conditions state that pressure is cycling between 1180 and 1150. At these higher values, the SRVs have to be in the Safety mode because RPV pressures would be lower in the Relief mode. Applicant should be sufficiently familiar with the set points to recognize this.

May need to delete second half of question regarding which SRVs have controls at the RSD to make the entire question plausible. Distracters c/b RELIEF, ADS, RCIC/HPCI.

Agree to toss second half out and make corrections to remaining distracters. Essentially rewrote the question. Saved old one as 431.

NOTE: from ON-100-009, learned that Automatic RELIEF mode operation is NOT possible when control transferred to RSD panel. May be able to use this if further revision required.

Todd 09/30/05 - grammatical correction to accommodate distracter "D".

SQ 10/18/05 - original rejected as too confusing and relies on RSD panel during accident - not design based. Saved original as 431.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2390 Relief/Safety Valves  
02

**Number** K5.02

**RO** 3.7

**SRO** 3.8

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.3)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the Safety function of SRV operation as it applies to RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 44**

**# 44**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29614 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Reactor power is 27% and rising pursuant to a normal reactor startup. The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) is in the transition zone between LPSP and LPAP. Which ONE of the following would cause the RWM to enforce the programmed rod pattern?

- A** Intermediate Range Monitor Detector is FULLY INSERTED.
- B** Main Turbine FIRST-STAGE Pressure instrument fails LOW.
- C** WIDE RANGE RPV Water Level REFERENCE leg ruptures.
- D** One Main Steam Flow instrument fails DOWNSCALE.

## Question Number: 44

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: At 50% power, the MODE switch is in RUN - that bypasses the IRM UPSCALE Scram and Block.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Fully inserted would yield a Block if not bypassed because the IRM would read >108%

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: This would not cause a rod block

VALID DISTRACTOR: First Stage pressure is an input to RSCS which would cause a rod block if it failed low.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: RPV Water Level has no Rod Block function and this failure would cause a HIGH condition.

VALID DISTRACTOR: The Narrow Range instrument is an input to FWLCS but is not sent onto to RWM from there.

Moreover, the Ref leg rupture would cause a HIGH level indication that would NOT actuate any other protective features that could cause an RPS Scram which would block rods.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

TM-OP-031D

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch.

R: Disagree. MS flow does affect RWM. FWLCS uses Steam Flow as an input. FWLCS also sends TOTAL Steam Flow to the RWM to determine if the plant is above/below LPSP or LPAP. At 50%, each steam line is inputting 12.5%. If one goes to zero, the TOTAL steam flow goes to 37.5%. This is the ONLY relationship between the Reactor Water Level Control System and the Rod Worth Minimizer.

The following is copied from TM-OP-031D

Main Steam Line (MSL) flow is measured by the Feed Water Level Control (FWLC) System to determine when the plant is operating at 22 percent of Rated Thermal Power (RTP). This monitored parameter is inputted to the RDCS and PICSY to activate the LPSP. The set point can be adjusted by varying the trip value in the MSL flow sensor.

Noted computational and typographical errors:

Changed 50% power to 27% to ensure loss of one MS flow instrument puts total steam flow below LPSP of 22%.

Corrected reference to TM-OP-031D from TM-OP-078K.

Gil is now OK.

SQ 10/18/05 - per SSES, the original question had no correct answer and would not cause a block without Rod Program Errors. SSES also asserted a K/A mismatch.

R - changed stem and distractor "C". Stem now asks what will cause RWM enforcement. "C" now fails First Stage Pressure low - the actual RSCS failure that would cause RSCS to enforce rod pattern.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2590 Reactor Water Level Control System  
02

**Number** K3.03

**RO** 2.7

**SRO** 2.9

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.4)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM will have on Rod worth minimizer (Plant-Specific)

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 45**

**# 45**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29701 Origin: Mod

☒ Memory Level

Following a Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) trip, what AUTOMATIC INTERLOCKS must be satisfied BEFORE resetting the RFPT trip?

- A** RFP Min Flow (FV-10604) in MAN  
Min Flow (FIC-10604) set for 2,000 gpm  
RFP Disch (HV-10603) CLOSED  
EAP Control (SIC-C32-1R601) at 0
- B** RFPT Exhaust (HV-12731) 100% OPEN  
RFPT Stop Valves (SV) ARE Reset  
RFPT LP Isol (HV-12709) 100% CLOSED  
RFPT HP Isol (HV12710) 100% CLOSED
- C** RFPT Exhaust (HV-12731) 100% OPEN  
RFPT Stop Valves (SV) are NOT Reset.  
RFPT LP Isol (HV-12709) 100% OPEN  
RFPT HP Isol (HV12710) 100% OPEN
- D** RFPT Exhaust (HV-12731) 100% OPEN  
RFPT Control Valves 100% CLOSED  
RFPT LP Isol (HV-12709) 100% CLOSED  
RFPT HP Isol (HV12710) 100% CLOSED

## Question Number: 45

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: All MANUAL actions per procedure.

VALID DISTRACTOR: All correct manual actions.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: SVs s/b NOT RESET.

VALID DISTRACTOR: rest of conditions is correct.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: LP and HP Isolations s/b closed, not open

VALID DISTRACTOR: rest is correct.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

TM-OP-045

OP-124-001, Section 2.18

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CGJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☒

SSES

Modified from SSES Exam Bank essay question.

09/19/2005: Per SSES staff, MSC must be on LSS per simulator attempt to reset RFPT Trip during previous weekend.

Changed answer "D" to reflect MSC on LSS as an Automatic Interlock.

Gil 09/26/05 - Change justification for "D" (correct answer).

R: corrected justification.

Todd 09/30/05 - too busy. reduced to four Manual actions. original saved as 451.

SQ 10/17/05 - not fair to ask memorized procedural requirements.

R - will ask for automatic interlocks.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2590 Reactor Water Level Control System  
02

**Number** A4.09 **RO** 3.4 **SRO** 3.1 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor TDRFP lockout reset: TDRFP in the control room

## NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 46**

**# 46**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29616 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

The following conditions exist on SSES Unit1:

- Recently entered Mode 4 in preparation for a planned refueling outage.
- Primary Containment is PURGING.

SSES Unit 2 has a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and DRYWELL PRESSURE quickly rises above 1.72 psig.

Which ONE of the following describes the correct ventilation system response?

- A** All three Reactor Building Zones (1, 2 and 3) Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION.

Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Exhaust ventilation stack.

SSES Unit 1 PURGE automatically ISOLATES.

—

- B** Reactor Building Zones 2 and 3 Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION.

Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Exhaust ventilation stack.

SSES Unit 1 PURGE automatically ISOLATES.

—

- C** Reactor Building Zones 2 and 3 Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION.

Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Recirculation plenum.

SSES Unit 1 PURGE Continues.

—

- D** All three Reactor Building Zones (1, 2 and 3) Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION.

Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Recirculation plenum.

SSES Unit 1 PURGE Continues.



## Question Number: 46

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Only Zones 2 and 3 Isolate. SGTS does not take suction on the Exhaust Vent

VALID DISTRACTOR:

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: SGTS does NOT take suction on the Exhaust Vent

VALID DISTRACTOR: reasonable misconception to believe SGTS would draw suction on the normal exhaust path.

CHOICE (C) - YES

Zones 2 (Unit 2) and 3 (Common) Isolate and reconfigure to Recirc

SGTS automatically takes suction on RB Recirc plenum

Unaffected unit does not isolate. Therefore, purge continues.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Only Zones 2 and 3 isolate

VALID DISTRACTOR: Purge continues and SGTS suction is correct.

### References

TM-OP-070

TM-OP-073

TM-OP-034

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☒

SSES

Confirm with SSES that unaffected unit's purge will continue.

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - OK

SQ 10/14/05 - OK.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2610 Standby Gas Treatment System  
00

**Number** K1.01 **RO** 3.4 **SRO** 3.6 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM and the following: Reactor building ventilation system

## NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 47**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29702 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

Both SSES Units are at full power. The 13.8-kVAC, 4.16-kVAC and 480-VAC electrical power distribution systems are in their NORMAL configurations. A fault develops in ESS Transformer T-201 (0X203).

- (1) How does the Electric Plant respond to this event?
- (2) What action MUST the Operator take to mitigate this event?

- A** (1) ESS busses 1D (1A204) and 2D (2A204) are DEENERGIZED.  
(2) Energize ESS busses 1D (1A204) and 2D (2A204) by closing the feeder breakers from ESS Transformer T-101 (0X201).
- B** (1) ESS busses 1D (1A204) and 2D (2A204) are ENERGIZED from Emergency Diesel Generator "D".  
(2) ENSURE ESW in service to provide cooling to diesel generator.
- C** (1) ESS busses 1D (1A204) and 2D (2A204) are DEENERGIZED and Feeder Breakers can NOT be closed.  
(2) CROSSTIE Instrument Air to CIG 90# header.
- D** (1) ESS busses 1D (1A204) and 2D (2A204) are ENERGIZED from ESS Transformer T-101 (0X201).  
(2) Restore RBCW to Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) motor winding coolers.

## Question Number: 47

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Momentary loss, not sustained. Should AUTO transfer.

VALID DISTRACTOR: asks Applicant to manually energize.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: EDGs start but won't power the buss.

VALID DISTRACTOR: must have ESW if EDGs are running.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: This fault allows alternate power supply to feed the buss.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could confuse T-201 (0X203) with buss fault.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

ON-104-204

TM-OP-004

SSSES Exam of August 2002 (Question ID 23823)

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSSES

Question originally rejected as SRO level. Removed procedural references to remain at RO level. Returned classification to MOD instead of NEW.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2620 A.C. Electrical Distribution  
01

**Number** A2.05 **RO** 2.9 **SRO** 3.3 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.6)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Bus grounds on the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 48**

**# 48**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29657 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES has a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A" fails to start. Operators start EDG "E" and energize 1A201 and 2A201 one hour later.

Both VITAL AC UPS (1D666 & 2D666) are energized from their \_\_ (1) \_\_ source.

All four NON-CLASS 1E INSTRUMENT AC UPS (1D240, 1D130, 2D240, 2D130) are energized from their \_\_ (2) \_\_ source.

Note: UPS = UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES

- A** 250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1D662, 2D142).  
250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1D652, 1D662, 2D652, 2D662)
- B** 480-VAC ALTERNATE source (1B246, 2B246).  
250-VDC BATTERY source (1D243, 1D133, 2D243, 2D133)
- C** 480-VAC PREFERRED source (1B246, 2B246).  
480-VAC PREFERRED source (1B216, 1B226, 2B216, 2B226)
- D** 250-VDC PREFERRED source (1D662, 2D142).  
480-VAC ALTERNATE source (1B216, 1B226, 2B216, 2B226)

## Question Number: 48

Answers:

**A** ☐

**B** ☐

**C** ☒

**D** ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Vital: Pfd v. Alt.

Inst: wrong source of 250-VDC & would not be on 250-VDC

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Would not transfer to ALTERNATE

These batteries deplete after 20 minutes.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Vital: 480-VAC is not Pfd.

This is NOT Pfd source.

CHOICE (D) - YES

WRONG: Vital: no reason to shift to 480-VAC alt

Inst: would have shifted back to Pfd 480-VAC source

HOD because Applicant must distinguish LOOP from Blackout. Here, following a LOOP, the EDGs respond to power the ES busses.

### References

TM-OP-017

See also, 480 VAC, 250 VDC.

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒ **GXJ**

☐ **THF**

☒ **RJC**

☐ **SSES**

Gil 09/26/05 - "A" and "C" not plausible with "all ...components operate as designed". That is, everyone should know 1E equipment will be energized. Use a different term (RPS MG Set or Instrument AC Distribution Panel 1Y216, etc) rather than "CLASS 1E".

Answer B does not appear correct. The way I read the references the preferred will be lost for about 10 seconds and the UPS will run on DC. Then when the EDG energizes the bus the UPS will automatically shift back to preferred.

R: will revisit this question.

Added "one minute after" to expressly show question is asking for conditions after the transient.

Suggestion: don't say "Class 1E" and just identify the buss itself.

```
*****
*                                     *
*  COMPLETE REWRITE 27 SEPTEMBER 2005  *
*                                     *
*****
```

Todd 09/30/05 - same question with substantial revisions. Saved old one as 481.

SSES 10/16/05 - EDG "E" can NOT be started in under 45 minutes. Therefore, changed from 20 minutes to one hour and revised answer and distractors accordingly.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2620 Uninterruptable Power Supply (A.C./D.C.)  
02

**Number** K6.01

**RO** 2.7

**SRO** 2.9

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of A.C. electrical power will have on the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.)

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 49**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29618 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

250 VDC Battery Charger 2D663 has the following front panel indications:

- Battery Charger Float-Equalize switch is in FLOAT.
- Battery Charger Interval Timer set to FIVE HOURS.

Which ONE of the following is correct concerning charger operation?

- A** Output voltage will be between 279 and 287 VDC for five hours, then LOWER to between 265 and 271 VDC thereafter.
- B** Output voltage will be between 265 and 271 VDC for five hours, then RISE to between 279 and 287 VDC thereafter.
- C** Output voltage will be between 279 and 287 VDC for five hours and will remain between 279 and 287 VDC thereafter.
- D** Output voltage will be between 265 and 271 VDC for five hours and will remain between 265 and 287 VDC thereafter.

## Question Number: 49

Answers:

A ☒

B ☐

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

Per TM-OP-088 and OP-1(2)88-001, this provides Equalizing Charge for five hours, then automatically reconfigures to the FLOAT mode.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Reverse of correct answer

VALID DISTRACTOR: First FLOAT, then EQUALIZE

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Stay on EQUALIZE

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct if Float-Equalize switch in EQUALIZE

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Stay on Float

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe that the Float-Equalize switch must be in EQUALIZE to conduct charge.

### References

TM-OP-088

OP-1(2)88-001.

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - add to stem: ...switch has just been placed in FLOAT. This ensures the full five hours at 279-287 will occur; making "A" correct

R: added "up to" in each answer choice. Pfd concept of Operator on tour discovering these conditions.

deleted "up to" and added "is" to the stem.

Todd 09/30/05 - OK

SQ 10/14/05 - change lower to rise in "B".

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2630 D.C. Electrical Distribution  
00

**Number** K1.02 **RO** 3.2 **SRO** 3.3 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between D.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION and Battery charger and battery

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number** **RO** **SRO** **CFR Link**

**Question Number: 50**

**# 50**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29619 Origin: Mod

☒ Memory Level

How and why does the Operator reduce and stabilize Diesel Generator load at 300 - 500 KW before opening the EDG-to-Bus breaker?

- A** By adjusting the Diesel Generator Voltage Adjust (HS-00053),  
To prevent an ENGINE Trip on Reverse Power.
- B** By adjusting the Diesel Generator Voltage Adjust (HS-00053),  
To prevent a STARTUP TRANSFORMER TAP Change which can cause a Diesel Generator Trip.
- C** By adjusting the Diesel Generator Speed Governor (HS-00054),  
To prevent an ENGINE Trip on Reverse Power.
- D** By adjusting the Diesel Generator Speed Governor (HS-00054),  
To prevent a STARTUP TRANSFORMER TAP Change which can cause a Diesel Generator Trip.



## Question Number: 50

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: adjusting voltage changes reactive load (KVAR not KW).

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct Engine trip

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: adjusting voltage changes reactive load (KVAR not KW).

VALID DISTRACTOR: S/U XFMR TAP Changer adjustments can cause EDG trips but this is not why REAL load is reduced. Reactive load is minimized (kept close to zero) to prevent TAP changes.

CHOICE (C) - YES

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: S/U XFMR TAP Changer adjustments can cause EDG trips but this is not why REAL load is reduced.

Reactive load is minimized (kept close to zero) to prevent TAP changes.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct DG control scheme.

### References

OP-024-001, Section 2.3

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 09/30/05 - revised from (1) (2) format to simple sentence structure.

SQ 10/14/05 - reversed why and how to how and why.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2640 Emergency Generators (Diesel/Jet)  
00

**Number** A1.09 **RO** 3.0 **SRO** 3.1 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.5)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) controls including Maintaining minimum load on emergency generator (to prevent reverse power)

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 51**

**# 51**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29620 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

Unit 2 is at 100% power with "A" Instrument Air Dryer Skid in service and the "B" Instrument Air Dryer Skid out of service for planned maintenance. The Turbine Building NPO reports that the dryer transfer valves have failed and that Instrument Air is being vented to atmosphere. Which ONE of the following describes the impact of this failure on the Instrument Air system?

Instrument Air system pressure will . . .

- A** . . . remain constant at a lower than normal value because the "Unit 1-to-Unit 2 Crosstie" (025091) automatically opens to supply air.
- B** . . . remain constant at a lower than normal value because the "IA-to-SA Crosstie" (PCV-22560) automatically opens to supply air.
- C** . . . lower until Operators manually open Service Air cross-tie (PCV-22560) BYPASS (225143).
- D** . . . lower until Operators manual place Dryer Skid "C" in service.

## Question Number: 51

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: This is a MANUAL valve

VALID DISTRACTOR: This cross-tie does connect downstream of the malfunctioning dryer.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: This cross-tie connects upstream of the malfunctioning dryer such that the malfunction will prevent this from solving the problem

VALID DISTRACTOR: This is an AUTOMATIC action.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: This cross-tie connects upstream of the malfunctioning dryer such that the malfunction will prevent this from solving the problem

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe that the bypass will bypass the dryers.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

Bank Question

TM-OP-018

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - Don't believe "B" is correct as worded. The SA crosstie will "fix" an IA supply problem at the inlet to the dryers but will NOT resolve a dryer capacity problem.

R: Will question SSES on this because it is a BANK question.

Changed "D" to correct answer - typographical error.

Todd 10/05/06 - delete "and the required remedial actions" from the stem. Part (b) of the K/A is not RO related.

Applicable SSES Lesson Objectives:

R1772: Predict the effect the following will have on the Instrument Air System:

d. Air Dryer malfunction

Unable to adequately test both ability to predict and use procedures of this two part K/A. Per authority of NUREG 1021, ES401, Section D.2.a., second paragraph [When selecting or writing questions for K/As that test coupled knowledge or abilities (e.g., the A.2 K/A statements in Tiers 1 and 2 and a number of generic K/A statements, such as 2.4.1, in Tier 3), try to test both aspects of the K/A statement. If that is not possible without expending an inordinate amount of resources, limit the scope of the question to that aspect of the K/A statement requiring the highest cognitive level (e.g., the (b) portion of the A.2 K/A statements) or substitute another randomly selected K/A.], the test question tests the ability to predict the impact of an air dryer malfunction.

18 October 2005.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 3000 Instrument Air System (IAS)  
00

**Number** A2.01 **RO** 2.9 **SRO** 2.8 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.6)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Air dryer and filter malfunctions following on the INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 52**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29621 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Both SSES Units are at full power with NORMAL Instrument Air loads when the following conditions develop on SSES Unit 2:

- Instrument Air Compressor 2K107A is in LEAD-MANUAL-FULL mode.
- Instrument Air Compressor 2K107B is in STANDBY-AUTO-FULL mode.
- ESS 480V LC 2B210 TROUBLE (AR-016-001, A05) annunciates
- INSTRUMENT AIR PANEL 2C140A,B SYSTEM TROUBLE (AR-224-01, D01) annunciates.
- Instrument Air pressure (PI-22511A on 2C668) is 100 psig and steady.
- Instrument Air Header pressure (PI-22564 on 2C668) is 92 psig and steady.

Which ONE of the following CORRECTLY explains the cause of these indications?

- A** Instrument Air Compressor 2K107A is running 100% LOADED.  
Instrument Air Compressor 2K107B is cycling between 50% and 100% LOADED.  
Both Instrument Air Compressors are making up for a small Instrument Air LEAK.
- B** Instrument Air Compressor 2K107A tripped.  
Instrument Air Compressor 2K107B tripped.  
Service Air to Instrument Air cross-connect (PCV-22560) is carrying all Instrument Air loads.
- C** Instrument Air Compressor 2K107A tripped.  
Service Air to Instrument Air cross-connect (PCV-22560) is carrying all Instrument Air loads.
- D** Instrument Air Compressor 2K107A tripped.  
Instrument Air Compressor 2K107B assumed the LEAD compressor loading sequence.

## Question Number: 52

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: ESS 480 V Trouble alarm tells us that something tripped. Given these conditions, we would expect 2K107B to maintain pressure lower less than the normal value of 100 psig (cycle between 93 and 99 psig).

VALID DISTRACTOR: Accurate description for a leak.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: SA-to-IA begins opening at 95 psig and lowering, full open at 90 psig.

VALID DISTRACTOR: PCV-22560 is meant to carry IA loads.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Would expect 2K107B to start and assume LEAD role given these conditions.

VALID DISTRACTOR: If 2K107A did not trip, PCV-22560 would open BEFORE 2K107B started in STBY.

CHOICE (A) - YES

### References

TM-OP-018

AR-224-D01

AR-016-A05

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Revised stem IRT phone conversation with SSES staff. Still need to consider distracter "A" as potentially correct or too close to call.

1. Gil 09/26/05 - Is 2C668 in the control room?

R: yes. I verified that during the earlier conversation with SSES but will reconfirm during validation.

2. Gil 09/26/05 - Add to stem: "...full power with normal loads on the instrument air system..."

Why is Instrument Air Pressure steady? Should be cycling between 93 and 99 psig (or between 93 and 102 psig if lightly loaded). Similar comment for Instrument Air Header Pressure.

R: question originally drafted as Gil suggests. Per phone conversation with SSES Staff, learned that pressure cycling is not apparent on the 2C668 panel.

Will revisit with SSES - try to run on simulator.

Todd 10/05/05 - Backwards logic but acceptable because it is HCL

Rich 10/09/05 - why two IA questions?

R: question 9 asks for power supplies at the HCL. This asks for IA response to tripped lead compressor.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 3000 Instrument Air System (IAS)  
00

**Number** A4.01 **RO** 2.6 **SRO** 2.7 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Ability to manually operate and / or monitor Pressure gauges in the control room

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 53**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29622 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

Both units are at full power when the following conditions develop on SSES Unit 1:

- RBCCW HEAD TANK HI-LO LEVEL (AR-123-001, E06) annunciates.
- Auxiliary Operators check RBCCW DEMIN WTR SUPPLY ISO 113024 Closed.
- Auxiliary Operators drain the RBCCW Head tank to 5/8 full.

After several hours:

- RBCCW HEAD TANK HI-LO LEVEL (AR-123-001, E06) annunciates.
- All other conditions in the plant are NORMAL.
- The STA reports that RBCCW Head Tank level has been slowly rising since it was drained several hours ago and that all other RBCCW indications are normal.

Per established SSES procedures, the Operating Crew must:

- A** Swap CRD Pumps and Isolate the previously running CRD Pump.
- B** Remove the RWCU system from service and Isolate RBCCW to the NRHX.
- C** Swap RBCCW Heat Exchangers (1E201A/B) and Isolate the previously in-service Heat Exchanger.
- D** Check RBCCW DEMIN WTR SUPPLY ISO 113024 Closed and drain the RBCCW Head tank to 5/8 full.

## Question Number: 53

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☒

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: This is a TBCCW load

VALID DISTRACTOR: Might work for high TBCCW Surge Tank.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: This would be correct if higher radiation levels accompanied the high level. However, no radiation present.

VALID DISTRACTOR: correct if higher rad levels evident.

CHOICE (C) - YES

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: already did this once.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Per AR-123-001, E06 - time to suspect the RBCCW HX and isolate it.

### References

AR-123-E06

ON-114-001

### Comments and Question Modification History



CXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Rich 10/09/05 - If not immediate action, should we specify procedure?

R: the action required by answer "C" is part of the alarm response and not part of the ON. Given these indications and choices, the successful Applicant should be able to recognize "C" as the only answer that would address these conditions. "A" is obviously wrong because it is NOT a RBCCW load. "B" is wrong because all conditions are otherwise normal which implies no radiation or high temperatures to indicate NRHX leak. "D" has already been done and will not alleviate the continuing rise in level. I did add another bullet to drive the Applicant further away from "D".

Todd 10/17/05 - 2-part K/A at the RO level.

The following SSES Learning Objectives support this question:

10258 Given appropriate alarm response procedures, determine the following for any annunciator associated with the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System:

1. Probable cause of the alarm
2. Adverse consequences of continued operation in the alarm state
3. Appropriate course of action

Applicant should be able to reason the correct course of action without the Alarm Response Procedure.

1676 Predict the effect that the following conditions will have on the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System:

- h. High or low RBCCW Head Tank level

Unable to adequately test both ability to predict and use procedures of this two part K/A. Per authority of NUREG 1021, ES401, Section D.2.a., second paragraph [When selecting or writing questions for K/As that test coupled knowledge or abilities (e.g., the A.2 K/A statements in Tiers 1 and 2 and a number of generic K/A statements, such as 2.4.1, in Tier 3), try to test both aspects of the K/A statement. If that is not possible without expending an inordinate amount of resources, limit the scope of the question to that aspect of the K/A statement requiring the highest cognitive level (e.g., the (b) portion of the A.2 K/A statements) or substitute another randomly selected K/A.], the test question tests the ability to predict the impact of an air dryer malfunction.

18 October 2005.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 4000 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)  
00

**Number** A2.02 **RO** 2.8 **SRO** 3.0 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.6)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of High/low surge tank level on the CCWS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation

## NRC K/A Generic

**Question Number: 53**

---

**System  
Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**



**Question Number: 54**

**# 54**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29624 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 tripped following a Main Turbine trip. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) has been RESET. However, the following annunciator has not cleared:

- SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME NOT DRAINED (AR-103-001, G02)

Which ONE of the following is a cause for this alarm?

- A** BACKUP SCRAM VALVE (SV-147-110B) remained ENERGIZED when RPS was reset.
- B** ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION BLOCK VALVE (SV-147-101) remained DEENERGIZED when RPS was reset.
- C** ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION VENT VALVE (SV-147-099) remained DEENERGIZED when RPS was reset.
- D** One or more SCRAM PILOT SOLENOID VALVES remained ENERGIZED when RPS was reset.

## Question Number: 54

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

The B/U Scram Vvs energize to vent the I/A header and allow the scram valves to reposition.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: ARI Vvs ENERGIZE to cause a scram on ATWS-RPT (L2 or High Pressure) - independent of RPS and would not have actuated on the given scram condition.

VALID DISTRACTOR: These valves would hold the scram valves open if they were energized.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: ARI Vvs ENERGIZE to cause a scram on ATWS-RPT (L2 or High Pressure) - independent of RPS and would not have actuated on the given scram condition.

VALID DISTRACTOR: These valves would hold the scram valves open if they were energized.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: The Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves are normally energized and are DEENERGIZED to cause a scram.

VALID DISTRACTOR: These valves could hold the scram valves open they were deenergized.

NOTE: the SDV is filling from the CRD charging header through the scram valves. The scram valves are held open because SV-147-110B (B/U Scram Valve) is energized (held open by an energized solenoid).

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSS

Gil 09/26/05 - OK

Todd 10/05/05 - delete "The Main Turbine was inadvertently tripped during maintenance on the Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC)." from stem. Backward logic OK because HCL.

Rich 10/09/05 - replace "possible explanation" with "cause".

R: done.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2010 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System  
01

**Number** A3.11 **RO** 3.5 **SRO** 3.5 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM including SDV level

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 55**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29625 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

Complete the following statement concerning the ACTIVITY CONTROL CARDS in the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS).

The cards . . .

- A** . . . work in conjunction with various Control Rod Block initiating systems to determine when a Control Rod motion block is required.
- B** . . . control the directional control valves and returns information concerning the present state of the Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU).
- C** . . . sample all Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) for information concerning the status of all valves and controls.
- D** . . . compare REQUEST signals to ensure MATCH and supervises MODES of operation.

## Question Number: 55

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

Both references support this.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: The Rod Motion Timer Card does this.

VALID DISTRACTOR: This is part of the Rod Drive Control Cabinet

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: The Transponder does this.

VALID DISTRACTOR: This is part of the Rod Drive Control Cabinet

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: The Analyzer does this.

VALID DISTRACTOR: This is part of the Rod Drive Control Cabinet

### References

SSES Bank

TM-OP-078K

TM-OP-056A

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - No references were included to validate the answer as correct. Otherwise looks OK.

R: Low likelihood of error because this is a BANK question.

Todd 10/05/05 - change question to statement.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2010 Reactor Manual Control System  
02

**Number** K1.04 **RO** 3.5 **SRO** 3.6 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM and the Rod block monitor (Plant-Specific)

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 56**

**# 56**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29626 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

The Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) PREVENTS continuous Control Rod WITHDRAWAL between notches 00 and 12 in which of the following categories:

- I. 100% rod density to 75% rod density
- II. 75% rod density to 50% rod density
- III. 50% rod density to Low Power Set point (LPSP)
- IV. LPSP to 100% rated Core Thermal Power (CTP)

**A** I and II

**B** II and III

**C** III and IV

**D** I and IV

## Question Number: 56

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: No rod motion blocks imposed in Category I (100% to 75% rod density)

VALID DISTRACTOR: Rod motion blocks are imposed at N1, N2, N3, N4 in Category II (75% to 50% rod density)

CHOICE (B) - YES

Rod motion blocks are imposed at N1, N2, N3, N4 in Category II (75% to 50% rod density)

Rod motion blocks are imposed at N1 in Category III (50% rod density to LPSP)

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: No rod motion blocks imposed in Category IV (LPSP to 100% CTP)

VALID DISTRACTOR: Rod motion blocks are imposed at N1 in Category III (50% rod density to LPSP)

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: No rod motion blocks imposed in Category IV (LPSP to 100% CTP)

WRONG: No rod motion blocks imposed in Category I (100% to 75% rod density)

VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror image. Also the correct answer on the BANK question from which this was drawn.

### References

Bank question

TM-OP-056Z

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - Add to stem: "...WITHDRAWAL between notches 00 and 12..."

R: done.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2010 Rod Sequence Control System (Plant Specific)  
04

**Number** A3.05 **RO** 3.5 **SRO** 3.7 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Ability to monitor automatic operations of the ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM (PLANT SPECIFIC) including: †

Verification of proper function/ operability: BWR-4,5

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 57**

**# 57**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29627 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 is in Mode 5 with the Reactor Mode Switch locked in REFUEL. It is necessary to withdraw one Control Rod to support routine Technical Specification Surveillance requirements.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes operation of the Rod Worth Minimizer for this activity?

- A** The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) is AUTOMATICALLY BYPASSED when the Reactor Mode Switch is NOT in RUN.
- B** The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) is MANUALLY BYPASSED by rotating the RWM Keylock Bypass Switch to BYPASS.
- C** The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) permits withdrawal of a single rod if the Control Room Operator selects "Rod Test" at the RWM Main Display.
- D** The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) permits withdrawal of multiple rods if the Control Room Operator selects "Rod Test" at the RWM Main Display.

## Question Number: 57

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☒

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: This is NOT an automatic bypass

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could reasonably believe this to be true given that a "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out" interlock exists.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: RWM Keylock Bypass Switch can only be used in the following two instances:

The RWM Bypass Switch can be used by the operator to override active RWM rod blocks during any operating condition. There are administrative controls regarding the use of the RWM Bypass function in NDAP-QA-0338 (Reactivity Management and Control Program), Technical Specifications and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). NDAP-QA-0338 permits bypassing for Special Tests. This is not a Special Test.

During a failure to SCRAM (ATWS) condition, execution of EOPs EO-000-113, "Level/Power Control" in the section for Control Rod Insertion, there is a step requiring this switch to be placed in the bypass position. This is not an EOP directed activity

VALID DISTRACTOR: This would work but is ADMINISTRATIVELY impermissible.

CHOICE (C) - YES

The ROD TEST function allows single rod withdrawal.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Selecting a second rod with one already withdrawn causes a Select Error, an Insert Block and a Withdraw Block.

VALID DISTRACTOR: this works for one, and only one, control rod under these conditions.

### References

TM-OP-031D

TS 3.9.2

OP-131-001

NDAP-QA-0338

SO-156-003

GO-100-006

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒ **GXJ**

☒ **THF**

☒ **RJC**

☐ **SSES**

Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch. The question is about system interlocks, not administrative requirements. "A" and "D" look implausible to me. RWM has to work in RUN. Everyone should know only one rod can be withdrawn in REFUEL. R: need to beef up link to Administrative requirements. Disagree on plausibility of A and D. AUTO bypass is plausible if you understand that the RWM is not the primary means of enforcing the one rod out requirement. D is weaker but permits psychometric balance. Also somewhat plausible if you know that the RWM can be bypassed and that bypassing it allows multiple rods to be moved. Only error is method of bypassing.

Satisfied with "A". Gil is not satisfied that this addresses the "administrative requirements" associated with refueling. However, the K/A requires a nexus between the RWM and refueling administrative requirements. The ROD TEST function is the only nexus I am aware of. Therefore, added second part of question concerning ONE-ROD-OUT Interlock functional test.

09/28/05: SSES is considering how to better include administrative requirements.

Todd 10/05/05 - may not be RO unless L.O. exists to memorize test frequency.

R - deleted second part of question concerning TSS frequency.

Returning to original concept - nexus between RWM and Refueling Admin - this hits it by testing the Applicant's knowledge of the RWM Keylock Bypass Switch. Use of the keylock is ADMINISTRATIVELY prohibited.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2010  
06

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic



**Question Number: 57**

---

**System** 2.2 Equipment Control

**Number** 2.2.26 **RO** 2.5 **SRO** 3.7 **CFR Link**

Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

**# 58**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29672 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the operation of Reactor Recirculation System (RRS) valves when starting a Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP)?

- A** The RRS Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) breakers will close if:
- the ASSOCIATED RRP Suction Valve HV-F023A or B is 100% OPEN and
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Bypass Valve HVF-32A or B is 100% OPEN.
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Valve HV-F031A or B will OPEN when the RRP reaches rated speed.
- B** The RRS Motor-Generator Drive Motor breaker will close if:
- the ASSOCIATED RRP Suction Valve HV-F023A or B is 100% OPEN and
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Valve HV-F031A or B is 100% CLOSED.
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Valve HV-F031A or B will OPEN when the RRP reaches rated speed.
- C** The RRS Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) breakers will close if:
- the ASSOCIATED RRP Suction Valve HV-F023A or B is 100% OPEN and
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Valve HV-F031A or B is 100% CLOSED and
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Bypass Valve HVF-32A or B is 100% OPEN.
- D** The RRS Motor-Generator Drive Motor breaker will close if:
- the ASSOCIATED RRP Suction Valve HV-F023A or B is 100% OPEN and
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Valve HV-F031A or B is 100% CLOSED and
  - the ASSOCIATED RRP Discharge Bypass Valve HVF-32A or B is 100% OPEN.

## Question Number: 58

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: The RPT breakers are not affected. The discharge valve does not AUTO open.

VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror image

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: The discharge valve does not AUTO open.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may misunderstand the start circuit or system configuration. Some CW pumps operate in this manner.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: The RPT breakers are not affected.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may misunderstand purpose of the RPT breakers.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

TM-OP-064C

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/26/05 - OK.

Todd 10/05/05 - focus is on Pumps, not valves. Explained operating and accepted but need to fix distracters.

Difference is ONLY "and" v. "or". Therefore, amended "A" and "B" to both improve focus on valves and make sharper distinctions between the distracters. Saved original as 581.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System 2020 Recirculation System  
01

Number A4.02

RO 3.5

SRO 3.4

CFR Link (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor System valves in the control room

### NRC K/A Generic

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

**# 59**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29703 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is operating at 49% reactor power on a SINGLE Recirculation Loop with the following conditions:

- Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) "B" is secured.
- Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) speed is 80%.
- Rods are withdrawn to 80% (80% Rod Line).

The SCOOP TUBE of RRP "A" fails and repositions itself to the LOWER ELECTRICAL STOP.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes:

- (1) the expected change in core flow and
- (2) Operator actions required to mitigate this event?

- A** (1) Core Flow will INCREASE and  
(2) Lower RRP Speed to 80% or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours.
- B** (1) Core Flow will DECREASE and  
(2) Raise RRP Speed or Insert Control Rods to Exit Stability Region II
- C** (1) Core Flow will INCREASE and  
(2) Lower RRP Speed to 80% or enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 immediately.
- D** (1) Core Flow will DECREASE and  
(2) Reduce RRP Speed or Withdraw Control Rods to Exit Stability Region II

## Question Number: 59

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☒

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Flow will decrease.

VALID DISTRACTOR: If Applicant believes speed increases, there is a TS limit on how the speed.

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Flow decreases.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may go to 3.0.3 if speed can't be reduced.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: further speed reduction or rod withdrawal pushes plant into Region I - worsens the situation

VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror imaging.

### References

Dresden 2 exam of February 2001

NDAP-QA-0338

TM-OP-084A & C

TS 3.4.1

GO-200-009

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

**GXJ**

☒

**THF**

☒

**RJC**

☐

**SSES**

Applicant must have NDAP-QA-0338 or other source of Power-to-Flow map.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2020 Recirculation Flow Control System  
02

**Number** K3.01

**RO** 3.5

**SRO** 3.5

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.4)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM will have on Core flow

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 60**

**# 60**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29630 Origin: Mod

☒ Memory Level

Both SSES Units are operating at full power. SSES Unit 1 loses Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) when the in-service heat exchanger fouls. Without Operator action (e.g., the standby heat exchanger is NOT placed in service) which ONE of the following will occur next?

- A** INSTRUMENT AIR PANEL 1C140 A, B SYSTEM TROUBLE (AR-124-001, D01)
- B** CONTAINMENT DRWL CLG LOOP B HI TEMP (AR-112-001, E03) will annunciate.
- C** RWCU FILTER INLET HI TEMP ISO (AR-101-001, A01) will annunciate.
- D** CRD PUMP A TRIP (AR-107-001, D01).

## Question Number: 60

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☒

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: IA Compressors are TBCCW load

VALID DISTRACTOR: Potential alarm on loss of TBCCW

CHOICE (B) - No, set point is 150 deg F.

WRONG: RWCU NRHX is RBCCW's largest heat load, comprising 80% of the system load.

VALID DISTRACTOR: RBCCW is backup to RB Chilled Water system. RB Chilled Water cools the Drywell Coolers.

CHOICE (C) - YES. Set point is 145 deg F.

CHOICE (D) - No.

WRONG: CRD Pp Brg and Gear Oil cooler are TBCCW loads

VALID DISTRACTOR: could occur on loss of TBCCW.

### References

TM-OP-014

ON-114-001

Alarm Responses

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. Gil 09/26/05 - Is this a loss of RBCCW flow or a rise in RBCCW temperature due to loss of SW flow? If the RBCCW flow is normal albeit with elevated temperature it may be possible that "A" or "B" could occur first. Depends on the alarm/trip set points for each.

R: neither. It's a rise in RBCCW temperature caused by fouling in the heat exchanger. If inaccurate, will change to loss of RBCCW flow.

09/28/05 phone conversation with SSES => better use distracters that are NOT RBCCW loads to be certain that the distracters are absolutely wrong.

2. Todd 10/05/05 - editorial changes to stem.

3. Rich 10/09/05 - careful with need to check answer out on simulator.

R: no longer necessary because all wrong distracters were replaced with impossible answers. (2 TBCCW loads and 1 Chilled Water load).

Gil's concern no longer at issue because of changes above.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2040 Reactor Water Cleanup System  
00

**Number** K6.01

**RO** 3.1

**SRO** 3.3

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of Component cooling water systems will have on the REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 61**

**# 61**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29631 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

Both units are at full power when SSES Unit 2 receives the following alarm:

- CRD PANEL 2C007 HI TEMP (AR-103-001, H05).

On panel 1C601, you observe the following:

- COOLING WATER HEADER FLOW (FI-C12-2R605) reads 63 gpm.  
- RPV-CRD DRIVE WATER DIFF (PDI-C12-2R602) reads 250 psi.

Which ONE of the following caused the alarm?

- A** Cooling Orifices of the affected CRD are too large.
- B** The Scram Outlet Valve of the affected CRD has an internal leak.
- C** CRD pressure is too low.
- D** CRD Cooling Water Header Flow is too low.



## Question Number: 61

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: this would keep the CRD cooler, not hotter.

VALID DISTRACTOR: clogged orifices could cause this alarm

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: The Stem gives CRD pressure at the normal value.

VALID DISTRACTOR: low pressure could cause low flow rate and a hotter CRD

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: the stem gives CRD header flow rate at the normal value.

VALID DISTRACTOR: low flow rate could cause a hotter CRD.

### References

AR-103-H05

TM-OP-055B

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

1. Gil 09/26/05 - what is the K/A description? Need K/A statement otherwise looks OK.

R: added K/A (corrected system number)

2. Rich 10/06/05 - delete "could have". Backward logic at Memory Level.

R: deleted. Not really memory level - need to understand internal flow path of the CRD cooling water, that the indications given are normal and figure that larger orifices would pass more flow, causing cooler conditions.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2140 Rod Position Information System  
00

**Number** K4.02 **RO** 2.5 **SRO** 2.5 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7)

Knowledge of ROD POSITION INFORMATION SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following: Thermocouple

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 62**

**# 62**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29704 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 is at full rated power with all Systems, Structures and Components operable and in their normal configurations.

SSES Unit 2 is at full rated power with Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop "B" isolated and drained for planned maintenance.

It becomes necessary to shutdown and cooldown both units to Mode 4.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of RHR pumps?

- A** SSES Unit 1: All RHR Pumps are available.  
SSES Unit 2: Only RHR Pumps "A" and "C" are available.  
Only ONE RHR pump may be run on a buss to limit buss loading.
- B** SSES Unit 1: All RHR Pumps are available.  
SSES Unit 2: Only RHR Pumps "A" and "C" are available.  
All available RHR pumps may be run because off-site power is available.
- C** SSES Unit 1: RHR Pump "B" is available.  
SSES Unit 2: RHR Pump "C" is available.  
RHR Pump "A" may run on ONE unit ONLY to limit buss loading.  
RHR Pump "D" is NOT available on either unit.
- D** SSES Unit 1: Only RHR Pumps "A", "B" and "C" are available.  
SSES Unit 2: Only RHR Pumps "A" and "C" are available.  
RHR Pump "D" is NOT available on either unit.

## Question Number: 62

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Interlocked to prevent running more than one per buss at any time.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may confuse buss loading with EDG power limits.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: All unit 1 pumps are available.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Confuses preferred arrangement for simultaneous LOCA with the given conditions.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: All unit 1 pumps are available.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Confuses preferred arrangement for simultaneous LOCA with the given conditions.

### References

TM-OP-049

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2190 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Suppression Pool Cooling Mode  
00

**Number** K2.02 **RO** 3.1 **SRO** 3.3 **CFR Link** (CFR 41.7)

Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: Pumps

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 63**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29633 Origin: New

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 has recently completed a routine Technical Specification Surveillance of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop "B" is in the Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC) and Suppression Pool Spray (SPS) mode. A small steam leak develops on SSES Unit 1 and raises Drywell Pressure to 1.5 psig. At the Unit Supervisor's direction, the Operating Crew manually initiates Divisions I and II LOCA signals.

(1) What effect does this have on SSES Unit 1 RHR system?

Subsequently, the leak worsens and Reactor Pressure Vessel level lowers and stabilizes at -140 inches.

(2) What must the Operating Staff do to initiate Drywell Spray?

**A** (1) RHR Loop "A" starts in the LPCI mode. RHR Loop "B" automatically reconfigures to the SPS mode ONLY.

(2) Depress the RHR LOOP B INIT SIG RESET PUSHBUTTON (HS-151-1S56A/B) and manually reconfigure the selected RHR loop.

**B** (1) RHR Loop "A" starts in the LPCI mode. RHR Loop "B" automatically reconfigures to the LPCI mode.

(2) Place LOCA ISOLATION MANUAL OVERRIDE (HS-E11-1S17B) to OVERRIDE and manually reconfigure the selected RHR loop.

**C** (1) RHR Loop "A" starts in the LPCI mode. RHR Loop "B" automatically reconfigures to the SPS mode ONLY.

(2) Place LOCA ISOLATION MANUAL OVERRIDE (HS-E11-1S17B) to OVERRIDE and manually reconfigure the selected RHR loop.

**D** (1) RHR Loop "A" starts in the LPCI mode. RHR Loop "B" automatically reconfigures to the LPCI mode.

(2) Depress the RHR LOOP B INIT SIG RESET PUSHBUTTON (HS-151-1S56A/B) and manually reconfigure the selected RHR loop.

## Question Number: 63

Answers:

A ☐

B ☒

C ☐

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: This switch will NOT clear the LOCA signal because the low level is still present (below -129)

VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror imaging.

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: RHR Loop "B" auto reconfigs to LPCI.

VALID DISTRACTOR: correct switch.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: This switch will NOT clear the LOCA signal because the low level is still present (below -129)

VALID DISTRACTOR: correct effect on RHR.

### References

TM-OP-049

OP-149-004

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

1. Gil 09/26/05 - what is TAF (-XXX")? "C" not plausible at -140". There may, also be a cue from another question to help answer this.

R: 366.3 inches from bottom of RPV. Instrument zero is 527.5 inches. 527.5 minus 366.3 yields 161.2 inches.

Therefore, TAF is ~ -161. Don't know what other question is cuing the Applicant.

Unclear why "C" is implausible.

Changed A & C to auto reconfigure to SPS only to improve plausibility.

The following Lesson Objectives support this question:

181 Describe the following Residual Heat Removal System design features and interlocks, including initiating signals, setpoints, automatic actions, and control logic, as applicable:

- a. Automatic LPCI initiation/injection
- v. Suppression Pool cooling
- w. SDC actions on LPCI initiation

10495 Predict the Residual Heat Removal System response to manipulation of the following controls:

- d. LOCA isolation manual override switches

Unable to adequately test both ability to predict and use procedures of this two part K/A. Per authority of NUREG 1021, ES401, Section D.2.a., second paragraph [When selecting or writing questions for K/As that test coupled knowledge or abilities (e.g., the A.2 K/A statements in Tiers 1 and 2 and a number of generic K/A statements, such as 2.4.1, in Tier 3), try to test both aspects of the K/A statement. If that is not possible without expending an inordinate amount of resources, limit the scope of the question to that aspect of the K/A statement requiring the highest cognitive level (e.g., the (b) portion of the A.2 K/A statements) or substitute another randomly selected K/A.], the test question tests the ability to predict the impact of an air dryer malfunction.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2260 RHR/LPCI: Containment Spray System Mode  
01

**Number** A2.03

**RO** 3.1

**SRO** 3.1

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.6)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHR/LPCI: CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM MODE ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Valve closures

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 64**

**# 64**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29634 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 is at 70% power when ONE string of Feedwater Heating is taken out of service for emergent maintenance.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes effect on:

- (1) CORE POWER and
- (2) PLANT POWER LIMITS?

- A** (1) Core Power RISES because Feedwater temperature lowers.  
(2) Plant power is limited to 90% by FEEDWATER Flow capability.
- B** (1) Core Power LOWERS because Feedwater temperature rises.  
(2) Plant power is limited to 90% by FEEDWATER Flow capability.
- C** (1) Core Power LOWERS because Feedwater temperature rises.  
(2) Plant power is limited to 75% by Feedwater DRAIN Flow capability.
- D** (1) Core Power RISES because Feedwater temperature lowers.  
(2) Plant power is limited to 75% by Feedwater DRAIN Flow capability.

## Question Number: 64

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Limit is based on Drain capacity.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Core power is greater because subcooling increases. FW flow is limited to 91.4%.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Plant power limit is 75% and limited by FW Drains, not FW itself. Per TM-OP-047, FW flow rate with one Heater string isolated is 91.4% of "uprate design feedwater flow".

VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror imaging. FW flow is limited to 91.4%.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Core Power rises.

VALID DISTRACTOR: correct power limit.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

Clinton 1 exam of July 2001

ON-147-001, 002

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/28/05: Add to stem: "...effect on and reason for..."

Have SSES run this on the simulator to ensure no automatic actions occur (runback, etc.)

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2390 Main and Reheat Steam System  
01

**Number** A1.10

**RO** 3.8

**SRO** 3.8

**CFR Link** (CFR 41.5 / 45.5)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM controls including Reactor power

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**Question Number: 65**

**# 65**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29673 Origin: Mod

☒ Memory Level

In response to a HIGH RADIATION signal at the outside air intake, the Access Control and Laboratory area supply fans \_\_ (1) \_\_ and the Outside Air Inlet Dampers 02A and 02B \_\_ (2) \_\_.

- A** (1) Automatically START  
(2) Automatically CLOSE
- B** (1) Automatically START  
(2) Remain OPEN
- C** (1) Automatically TRIP  
(2) Automatically CLOSE
- D** (1) Automatically TRIP  
(2) Remain OPEN.



## Question Number: 65

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

SSES BANK QUESTION.

TM-OP-030

See justification from 651.

### References

### Comments and Question Modification History



**GXJ**



**THF**



**RJC**



**SSES**

Gil 09/28/05: The correct answer ("A") is implausible. There is NO connection with SGTS. Makes the question LOD=1. Recommend replacing "A" with "Access control and lab area supply fan auto starts". Per reference the fan will trip, not auto start.

R: done. other stem changes to support the new answer.

Todd 10/05/05 - complete revision to restate the question. Saved original as 651.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

**System** 2880 Plant Ventilation Systems  
00

**Number** K5.01

**RO 3.1**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts they apply to PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS:  
Airborne contamination control.

### NRC K/A Generic

**System**

**Number**

**RO**

**SRO**

**CFR Link**

**# 66**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29643 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

You are preparing to conduct a Technical Specification Surveillance and retrieve a Controlled Copy of the applicable Plant Procedure from the Document Control System (DCS). You notice that three PCAFs are attached to the Plant Procedure.

Per NDAP-QA-0002, PROCEDURE PROGRAM AND PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS, you must:

- A** Print and use the Plant Procedure. DCS automatically inserts the attached PCAFs.
- B** Print and use the Plant Procedure. It is NOT necessary to incorporate the PCAFs.
- C** Print both the PCAFs and the Plant Procedure. Page insert the PCAFs before procedure use. Unit Supervisor authorization is NOT required before using the procedure with PCAFs inserted.
- D** Print both the PCAFs and the Plant Procedure. Page insert the PCAFs before procedure use. Unit Supervisor authorization IS REQUIRED before using the procedure with PCAFs inserted.

## Question Number: 66

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: DCS does NOT insert PCAFs

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could believe that attached PCAFs are automatically inserted.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: PCAFs must be inserted

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could believe that PCAFs are not substantive changes requiring inclusion.

CHOICE (C) - YES

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: PCAFs must be included.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could believe that US can authorize use.

### References

NDAP-QA-002, Section 6.12.2.a.(5)

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

PCAF used to be the SSES acronym for "Procedure Change Authorization Form". The PCAF no longer exists at SSES procedure control process. However, the acronym lives on as part of institutional knowledge. Therefore, PCAF is not defined in the question.

Gil 09/28/05: Change distracter "D" "Obtain Unit Supervisor authorization before using the PCAF's". This will make the distracter more plausible and balance with other distracters.

R: done.

Todd 10/05/05 - changed distracter "D" to more closely mirror answer "C". Added statement concerning US authorization wrt PCAFs.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

### System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

## NRC K/A Generic

### System

2.1

Conduct of Operations

Number

2.1.21

RO 3.1

SRO 3.2

CFR Link (CFR: 45.10 / 45.13)

Ability to obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.

**Question Number: 67**

**# 67**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29636 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

ON-164-003, REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP DUAL SEAL FAILURE, directs closing of RRP suction valve HV-143-F023A/B BEFORE closing the RRP discharge valve HV-143-F031A/B because it ensures . . .

- A** Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) suction will limit the leak rate to containment to less than 420 gpm.
- B** RRP suction valve will close without exceeding its design limit of 50 psid.
- C** nominal 500 psid across the Lower #1 Seal will NOT be exceeded.
- D** RRP Discharge valve HV-143-F031A/B will close with additive force.

## Question Number: 67

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: No such limit

VALID DISTRACTOR: RWCU does take suction from the RRP suction line.

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: If at full power, d/p is 500 psi

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe that the suction is at lower pressure

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: discharge pressure of unaffected RRP does NOT affect closing force of affected discharge valve.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe that discharge of unaffected loop assists closure in this condition.

### References

ON-164-003

TM-OP-030

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/28/05: Confirm the RWCU suction is between the RRP suction valve and the pump. Otherwise this distracter is implausible.

R: per SSES Dwgs M-143 and 144, the suction is between the RRP and its associated suction valve.

Todd 10/05/05 - deleted "Following a Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) dual seal failure," from the stem.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

### System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.1 Conduct of Operations

Number 2.1.32

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12)

Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions

**Question Number: 68**

**# 68**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29637 Origin: New

☒ Memory Level

The Diesel Engine Driven Fire Pump (0P511) is starting intermittently when no automatic start is required. The malfunction has been identified. However, parts needed to complete the repair will NOT be available for several weeks. Maintenance has recommended placing 0P511 in Manual until the repair is complete. To support this recommendation, Operations is requested to issue a Temporary Procedure Change that directs Control Room Operators to MANUALLY start 0P511 if Fire Service header pressure drops to the AUTOMATIC starting set point of 85 psig.

How MUST this configuration be implemented?

- A** Per NDAP-QA-1901, SSES Station Work Management Process.
- B** Per NDAP-QA-0323, Standard Blocking Practices.
- C** Per NDAP-QA-1218, Temporary Modifications.
- D** Per NDAP-QA-0002, Nuclear Department Procedure Program.

## Question Number: 68

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☒

D ☐

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Work Management is not the issue

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe work management requires a Mod Eval

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Not a blocking issue

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may want to attach info tag

CHOICE (C) - YES

NDAP-QA-1218, Attachment B, page 7 of 10 specifically identifies substitution of MANUAL actions for AUTOMATIC actions as requiring a Mod Eval.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: NDAP-QA-1218, Attachment B, page 7 of 10 specifically precludes use of a Procedure Change.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe it is acceptable based on stem conditions.

### References

NDAP-QA-1218

TM-OP-013

### Comments and Question Modification History



GXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Need SSES to closely study distracters to ensure they are NOT potentially correct.

Need input on whether to provide copies of each of these NDAP procedures as references.

Gil 09/28/05: Confirm "Standard Blocking Practices" includes the use of yellow tags, otherwise pick a procedure that is closer to using temporary changes/modifications. Also consider that the use of yellow tags may be required for this situation and makes "B" another correct answer.

Availability of these procedures should NOT be necessary. It should be fair game that the applicant's know which procedure to go to. On second thought this may make the question SRO only.

R: will query SSES on this

Todd 10/05/05 - agree that this may be SRO level question. Check with SSES to determine if it is fair for an RO.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System

2.2

Equipment Control

Number

2.2.11

RO 2.5

SRO 3.4\*

CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary changes.

**Question Number: 69**

**# 69**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29638 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

To maintain fuel integrity and the capability to properly blow down and re-flood the reactor following a design basis loss of coolant accident (DB LOCA):

- A** All low pressure ECCS must be AVAILABLE.
- B** Operation within permissible areas of the Power-to-Flow map must be MAINTAINED.
- C** Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) speeds must be MATCHED.
- D** All Jet Pumps must be OPERABLE.



## Question Number: 69

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☐

D

☒

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Must have the refloodable volume intact

VALID DISTRACTOR: Do need LP ECCS systems to blowdown and reflood.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: has not effect on B/D or Reflood.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could mistakenly believe that N-F is based on LOCA

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: RRP has no impact (suction valves close anyway).

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could believe that loop d/p affects blowdown or reflood.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

SSES Bank

SSES TS Basis.

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/28/05: Looks like an SRO only question. Otherwise OK.

R: SSES recommended this from their BANK specifically for the RO exam.

Todd 10/05/05 - agree; too close to TS/FSAR basis Q. Not for RO exam. Check with SSES.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

## NRC K/A Generic

System

2.2

Equipment Control

Number

2.2.25

RO 2.5

SRO 3.7

CFR Link (CFR: 43.2)

Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

**Question Number: 70**

**# 70**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29705 Origin: Bank

☒ Memory Level

SSES Unit 1 refueling operations are in progress with the reactor vessel head removed and a partial load of fuel is in the vessel. Shutdown margin check has been performed.

Which ONE of the following is a CORE ALTERATION?

- A** Install a control rod blade into an empty cell.
- B** Perform a friction test on a control rod in a loaded cell.
- C** Drive a Source Range Monitor detector to full in.
- D** Insert the LPRM Instrument Handling Tool below the top guide.

## Question Number: 70

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: Control Rod movement with no fuel is a specified exception

VALID DISTRACTOR: control rods are a normal reactivity adjustment.

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: SRM motion is a specified exception.

VALID DISTRACTOR: SRM monitoring required in this mode.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: LPRM is a specified exception.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could misunderstand use of LPRMs.

### References

Cooper Exam of June 2003

TS 1.1 Definitions.

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Original rejected as K/A mismatch.

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System

2.2

Equipment Control

Number

2.2.27

RO 2.6

SRO 3.5

CFR Link (CFR: 43.6 / 45.13)

Knowledge of the refueling process.

**Question Number: 71**

**# 71**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29706 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

Under which ONE of the following circumstances may a VERIFICATION requirement be OMITTED?

- A** Application of Blocking Tags on the Backup Diesel Fire Pump.
- B** Independent Verification of a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system lineup that requires at least 14 mrem of exposure.
- C** Clearing a Blocking Tag from a Normally LOCKED CLOSED River Water Makeup System (RWMU) valve.
- D** Clearing a Blocking Tag from a Normally THROTTLED Control Rod Hydraulics (CRD) valve in the Reactor Building.

## Question Number: 71

Answers:

A

☐

B

☒

C

☐

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: OP-AD-002, Section 7.3.1.a - application of Blocking on any SSC requires CV

VALID DISTRACTOR: not a Safety Related system and no ALARA concern.

CHOICE (B) - YES

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: OP-AD-002, Section 7.3.1.c - IV required when clearing Blocking from locked component

VALID DISTRACTOR: not a Safety Related system and no ALARA concern.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: OP-AD-002, Section 7.3.5.a.(1) - CV required when IV would nullify first positioning.

VALID DISTRACTOR: safety related but CV required in lieu of IV.

### References

Modified from River Bend February 2003 Exam

OP-AD-002

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

CXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

original number 70 rejected as too simple. Saved as 711

### NRC K/A System/E/A

System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

### NRC K/A Generic

System 2.3 Radiation Control

Number 2.3.1

RO 2.6

SRO 3.0

CFR Link (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4. 45.9 / 45.10)

Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.

**Question Number: 72**

**# 72**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29641 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

A job must be completed in a room in the plant. The value for the general radiation levels if NO shielding is installed, and the value for the work area if shielding is installed is listed below:

- Unshielded general radiation field: 100 millirem per hour (0.1 R/hr)
- Shielded general radiation field: 10 millirem per hour (0.02 R/hr)

Which ONE of the following methods of performing the job will result in the radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)?

- A** One person does the job without shielding in 2.5 hours.
- B** Two people do the job without shielding in 1.5 hours.
- C** One person installs shielding in 1 hour. Then a second person does the job in 2.5 hours.
- D** Two people install shielding in 45 minutes. Then another two people do the job in 1.5 hours.

## Question Number: 72

Answers:

A

☐

B

☐

C

☒

D

☐

References Provided to Applicant:

☐

### Justification

Total exposure is calculated by multiplying the time by the number of people by the dose rate. For the correct answer, the total exposure is 100 mR/hr times 1 hour to install shielding plus 10 mR/hr times 2.5 hours to do the job for a total of 125 mR. The Applicant must select the answer that yields the lowest total cumulative dose for the job.

CHOICE (A) - No

VALID DISTRACTOR: Total dose is 250 mR.

CHOICE (B) - No

VALID DISTRACTOR: Total dose is 150 mR.

CHOICE (C) - YES, total dose is 125 mR.

CHOICE (D) - No

VALID DISTRACTOR: Total dose is 180 mR.

### References

SSES Bank  
NDAP-QA-0625

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒

GXJ

☒

THF

☒

RJC

☐

SSES

Gil 09/28/05: Question OK. Add to justification: "...that yields the lowest total ..."

Todd 10/05/05 - delete conversion of hours to hours, minutes.

Rich 10/19/05 - acceptable if 71 changed.

R - 71 changed.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

### System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

## NRC K/A Generic

System 2.3 Radiation Control

Number 2.3.2

RO 2.5

SRO 2.9

CFR Link (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4. 45.9 / 45.10)

Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

**Question Number: 73**

**# 73**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29642 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

A rapid loss of condenser vacuum from 100% power has resulted in the following plant conditions:

- Reactor power is 25%.
- Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) is injecting.
- Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) are closed.
- Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Pressure is being controlled between 800 to 1,000 psig with Safety Relief Valves (SRVs).
- High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) are NOT available.
- RPV level is -165 inches and can NOT be restored nor maintained above -161 inches.

Which ONE of the following actions are required?

- A** Stop injection from all sources EXCEPT Control Rod Drive (CRD) and SBLC and perform a rapid depressurization.
- B** Stop all injection and continue steam cooling until RPV water level reaches -205 inches.
- C** Open SRVs to lower pressure to 600 psig and maximize injection with Table 15 systems.
- D** Stop injection from all Table 15 systems and perform a rapid depressurization.



## Question Number: 73

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant: ☒

### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES, LQ/L-14

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Steam cooling is not called for by the EOPs

VALID DISTRACTOR: Stopping injection is called for.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: Maximizing injection is not called for by the EOPs

VALID DISTRACTOR: Opening SRVs to Depress is called for.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: Table 15 includes CRD and SBLC flow.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Stopping injection and Depress is called for.

### References

SSES Bank.

EO-100-112, 113

### Comments and Question Modification History



CXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/28/05: Looks like a direct lookup to the ATWS EOP with the current stem. Suggest modifying the stem to: "...condenser vacuum from 100% power has resulted..." In this case the applicants have to derive from stem conditions that an ATWS has occurred and go to the right procedure. Takes the DLO part out.

R: done

Todd 10/05/05 - what references? chance of direct look-up?

R: No, Applicant must determine from the given conditions that an ATWS occurred.

Todd 10/05/05 - why fair game for RO? check with SQ.

R: o.k.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

### System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

## NRC K/A Generic

System 2.4 Emergency Procedures /Plan

Number 2.4.6

RO 3.1

SRO 4.0

CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.

**Question Number: 74**

**# 74**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29644 Origin: Mod

☐ Memory Level

SSES Unit 2 has the following conditions:

- A Reactor Scram condition is present.
- 24 Control Rods are at Position 04.
- All other Control Rods are at Position 00.
- Reactor Pressure Vessel level is stable at +35 inches.
- IRMs are not yet fully inserted.

What is the status of the Reactor?

- A** The Reactor IS shutdown and WILL remain shutdown under ALL conditions without Boron.
- B** The Reactor IS shutdown but will NOT remain shutdown under ALL conditions without Boron.
- C** The Reactor IS shutdown but MAY NOT remain shutdown (indeterminate). Need input from Reactor Engineering.
- D** The Reactor is NOT shutdown and will NOT remain shutdown under ALL conditions without Boron.

## Question Number: 74

Answers:

A ☐

B ☐

C ☐

D ☒

References Provided to Applicant: ☐

### Justification

Per EO-000-113, LQ-2, the Reactor is shutdown and expected to remain shutdown under all conditions without Boron if no more than one rod position is greater than 00. Alternatively, with more than one rod above position 00, the Reactor is shutdown and expected to remain shutdown under all conditions without Boron if all Control Rods are inserted to the Maximum Subcritical Banked Withdrawal Position (MSBWP). For SSES Unit 2, the MSBWP is 02.

CHOICE (A) - No

WRONG: SSES Unit 2 MSBWP is 02. Here, 24 rods are at position 04.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could erroneously apply Unit 1 data to Unit 2. Good question on unit differences.

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: the Reactor can NOT be deemed shutdown under all conditions . . .

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could erroneously believe that the Reactor is S/D but not assured to remain shutdown under all conditions . . .

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: the reactor can NOT be deemed to be SHUTDOWN.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant could erroneously believe that the Reactor will remain S/D even though it's not currently declared S/D with more than rod above 00.

CHOICE (D) - YES

### References

Limerick Unit 1 exam of October 2002, (Question ID 24312)  
EO-000-113, LQ-2

### Comments and Question Modification History

☒ **GXJ**

☒ **THF**

☒ **RJC**

☐ **SSES**

Gil 09/28/05: Distracter "C" is implausible NO not shutdown and Yes it will remain shutdown. Change part (2) to "Indeterminate. Need input from Reactor Engineering"  
R: done.

Todd 10/05/05 - changed question call and choices from (1)-(2) selection to single bullet/sentence.

Harry 10/05/05 - changed distracter "C" from implausible "NOT S/D and INDETERMINANT" to more plausible "IS S/D but future status is INDETERMINANT".

## NRC K/A System/E/A

### System

Number	RO	SRO	CFR Link
--------	----	-----	----------

## NRC K/A Generic

System	2.4	Emergency Procedures /Plan
--------	-----	----------------------------

Number	2.4.17	RO 3.1	SRO 3.8	CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)
--------	--------	--------	---------	-------------------------------

Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions.

**Question Number: 75**

**# 75**

☒ RO

☒ SRO

Question ID: 29645 Origin: Bank

☐ Memory Level

Which ONE of the following correctly describes EO-000-103 requirements for HPCI and RCIC operation with Suppression Pool level below 17 feet and the basis for any differences?

- A** RCIC operation may continue to operate because the RCIC turbine exhaust is within the Primary Containment Vent capacity.
- B** RCIC operation must be isolated at the same time as HPCI to minimize Primary Containment pressure rise.
- C** RCIC operation may continue ONLY if it is the LAST available source of high pressure coolant injection to ensure adequate core cooling.
- D** RCIC operation may continue IF Suppression Pool Spray is on to condense RCIC turbine exhaust steam.

## Question Number: 75

Answers:

A



B



C



D



References Provided to Applicant:



### Justification

CHOICE (A) - YES

CHOICE (B) - No

WRONG: Not true.

VALID DISTRACTOR: RCIC and HPCI have similar designs.

CHOICE (C) - No

WRONG: The EOP does NOT say this. Rather, RCIC is expected to trip on high backpressure BEFORE HPCI does.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Reasonable to believe that EOPs would preserve last source of HP injection.

CHOICE (D) - No

WRONG: RCIC and HPCI have similar designs.

VALID DISTRACTOR: Reasonable to believe they could affect each other adversely.

### References

Fitzpatrick 1 exam of July 2003 (Question ID 25693)

EO-000-103, SP/L-6

### Comments and Question Modification History



CXJ



THF



RJC



SSES

Gil 09/28/05: Distracter "D" can be improved by changing to "RCIC operation may continue as long as suppression pool sprays are on to condense exhaust steam."

R: done.

Todd 10/05/05 - changed stem of question (editorial). Is this a RO level question?

R - will ask SSES.

## NRC K/A System/E/A

### System

Number

RO

SRO

CFR Link

## NRC K/A Generic

System 2.4 Emergency Procedures /Plan

Number 2.4.22

RO 3.0

SRO 4.0

CFR Link (CFR: 43.5 / 45.12)

Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.