

December 2, 2005

MEMORANDUM TO: Biweekly Notice Coordinator

FROM: Drew G. Holland, Project Manager, Section 1 /RA/
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION IN BIWEEKLY FR NOTICE -
NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE, PROPOSED NO
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION,
AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING (TAC NO. MC8540)

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, Pope
County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: September 19, 2005

Description of amendment request: Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby requests an Operating License amendment for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, to replace the existing steam generator (SG) tube surveillance program with that being proposed by the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) in TSTF 449, Revision 4. Specifically, Technical Specification (TS) 1.1, Definitions; TS 3/4.4.5, Steam Generators; TS 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System Leakage; TS 6.5.9, Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program; and TS 6.6.7, Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Reports are being revised to incorporate the new Steam Generator Program of TSTF 449, Revision 4. The proposed changes are consistent with the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process provided in the May 6, 2005, *Federal Register* Notice (70 FR 24126).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed change requires a Steam Generator Program that includes performance criteria that will provide reasonable assurance that the steam generator (SG) tubing will retain integrity over the full range of operating conditions (including startup, operation in the power range, hot standby, cooldown and all anticipated transients included in the design specification). The SG performance criteria are based on tube structural integrity, accident induced leakage, and operational leakage.

The structural integrity performance criterion is:

Structural integrity performance criterion: All in-service steam generator tubes shall retain structural integrity over the full range of normal operating conditions (including startup, operation in the power range, hot standby, and cool down and all anticipated transients included in the design specification) and design basis accidents. This includes retaining a safety factor of 3.0 against burst under normal steady state full power operation primary to secondary pressure differential and a safety factor of 1.4 against burst applied to the design basis accident primary to secondary pressure differentials. Apart from the above requirements, additional loading conditions associated with the design basis accidents, or combination of accidents in accordance with the design and licensing basis, shall also be evaluated to determine if the associated loads contribute significantly to burst or collapse. In the assessment of tube integrity, those loads that do significantly affect burst or collapse shall be determined and assessed in combination with the loads due to pressure with a safety factor of 1.2 on the combined primary loads and 1.0 on axial secondary loads.

The accident induced leakage performance criterion is:

The primary to secondary accident induced leakage rate for any design basis accidents, other than a SG tube rupture, shall not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the accident analysis in terms of total leakage rate for all SGs and leakage rate for an individual SG. Leakage is not to exceed 1 gpm through any one SG.

The operational leakage performance criterion is:

The RCS operational primary to secondary leakage through any one SG shall be limited to #150 gallons per day per SG.

A steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event is one of the design basis accidents that are analyzed as part of a plant's licensing basis. In the analysis of a SGTR event, a bounding primary to secondary leakage rate equal to the leakage rate associated with a double-ended rupture of a single tube is assumed.

For other design basis accidents such as main steam line break (MSLB) and control element assembly (CEA) ejection, the tubes are assumed to retain their structural integrity (i.e., they are assumed not to rupture). The accident induced leakage criterion introduced by the proposed changes accounts for tubes that may leak during design basis accidents. The accident induced leakage criterion limits this leakage to no more than the value assumed in the accident analysis.

The SG performance criteria proposed change identify the standards against which tube integrity is to be measured. Meeting the performance criteria provides reasonable assurance that the SG tubing will remain capable of fulfilling its specific safety function of maintaining reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity throughout each operating cycle and in the unlikely event of a design basis accident. The performance criteria are only a part of the Steam Generator Program required by the proposed change. The program, defined by NEI 97-06, *Steam Generator Program Guidelines*, includes a framework that incorporates a balance of prevention, inspection, evaluation, repair, and leakage monitoring.

The consequences of design basis accidents are, in part, functions of the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 in the primary coolant and the primary to secondary LEAKAGE rates resulting from an accident. Therefore, limits are included in the plant technical specifications for operational leakage and for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 in primary coolant to ensure the plant is operated within its analyzed condition. The typical analysis of the limiting design basis accident assumes that primary to secondary leak rate after the accident is 1 gallon per minute with no more than 720 gallons per day in any one SG, and that the reactor coolant activity levels of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 are at the technical specification values before the accident.

The proposed change does not affect the design of the SGs, their method of operation, or primary coolant chemistry controls. The proposed approach updates the current technical specifications and enhances the requirements for SG inspections. The proposed change does not adversely impact any other previously evaluated design basis accident and is an improvement over the current technical specifications.

Therefore, the proposed change does not affect the consequences of a SGTR accident and the probability of such an accident is reduced. In addition, the proposed changes do not affect the consequences of other design basis events.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed performance based requirements are an improvement over the requirements imposed by the current technical specifications.

Implementation of the proposed Steam Generator Program will not introduce any adverse changes to the plant design basis or postulated accidents resulting from potential tube degradation. The result of the implementation of the Steam Generator Program will be an enhancement of SG tube performance. Primary to secondary leakage that may be experienced during all plant conditions will be monitored to ensure it remains within current accident analysis assumptions.

The proposed change does not affect the design of the SGs, their method of operation, or primary or secondary coolant chemistry controls. In addition, the proposed change does not impact any other plant system or component. The change enhances SG inspection requirements.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The SG tubes in pressurized water reactors are an integral part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and, as such, are relied upon to maintain the primary system's pressure and inventory. As part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the SG tubes are unique in that they are also relied upon as a heat transfer surface between the primary and secondary systems such that residual heat can be removed from the primary system. In addition, the SG tubes also isolate the radioactive fission products in the primary coolant from the secondary system. In summary, the safety function of a SG is maintained by ensuring the integrity of its tubes.

Steam generator tube integrity is a function of the design, environment, and the physical condition of the tube. The proposed change does not affect

tube design or operating environment. The proposed change is expected to result in an improvement in the tube integrity by implementing the Steam Generator Program to manage SG tube inspection, assessment, and plugging. The requirements established by the Steam Generator Program are consistent with those in the applicable design codes and standards and are an improvement over the requirements in the current technical specifications.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1700 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006-3817

NRC Branch Chief: David Terao

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1700 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006-3817

NRC Branch Chief: David Terao

DISTRIBUTION:

Non-Public
PDIV-1 Reading
RidsNrrDlpmLpdiv1 (DTerao)
RidsNrrPMDHolland
RidsNrrLA

ADAMS Accession No.: **ML053120435**

OFFICE	NRR/LPL4/PM	NRR/LPL4/LA	NRR/LPL4/BC
NAME	DHolland	DJohnson	DTerao
DATE	12/1/05	11/28/05	1/2/05

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY