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Subject: Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
Technical Specification Bases Changes

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.4, please find attached changes to the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Specification Bases. These Bases changes were made according to the provisions of 10CFR 50.59.

Any questions regarding this information should be directed to L. J. Rudy, Regulatory Compliance, at (803) 831-3084.

I certify that I am a duly authorized officer of Duke Energy Corporation and that the information contained herein accurately represents changes made to the Technical Specification Bases since the previous submittal.

D. M. Jamil

Attachment

A001



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

October 24, 2005

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B 3.1.6-5	Revision 0	9/30/98
B 3.1.6-6	Revision 0	9/30/98
B 3.1.7-1	Revision 0	9/30/98
B 3.1.7-2	Revision 2	1/08/04
B 3.1.7-3	Revision 2	1/08/04
B 3.1.7-4	Revision 2	1/08/04
B 3.1.7-5	Revision 2	1/08/04
B 3.1.7-6	Revision 2	1/08/04
B 3.1.8-1	Revision 0	9/30/98
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B 3.1.8-4	Revision 1	10/06/05
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B 3.2.1-4	Revision 1	10/06/05
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BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

specified for each fuel cycle in the COLR. PHYSICS TESTS meet the criteria for inclusion in the Technical Specifications, since the components and process variable LCOs suspended during PHYSICS TESTS meet Criteria 1, 2, and 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref.6).

Reference 7 allows special test exceptions (STEs) to be included as part of the LCO that they affect. It was decided, however, to retain this STE as a separate LCO because it was less cumbersome and provided additional clarity.

LCO

This LCO allows the reactor parameters of MTC and minimum temperature for criticality to be outside their specified limits. In addition, it allows selected control and shutdown rods to be positioned outside of their specified alignment and insertion limits. Operation beyond specified limits is permitted for the purpose of performing PHYSICS TESTS and poses no threat to fuel integrity, provided the SRs are met.

The requirements of LCO 3.1.3, LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, LCO 3.1.6, and LCO 3.4.2 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

- a. RCS lowest loop average temperature is $\geq 541^{\circ}\text{F}$; and
 - b. SDM is within limit specified in the COLR.
-

APPLICABILITY

This LCO is applicable in MODE 2 when performing low power PHYSICS TESTS. The applicable PHYSICS TESTS are performed in MODE 2 at HZP.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

If the SDM requirement is not met, boration must be initiated promptly. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components. The operator should begin boration with the best source available for the plant conditions. Boration will be continued until SDM is within limit.

Suspension of PHYSICS TESTS exceptions requires restoration of each of the applicable LCOs to within specification.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

When THERMAL POWER is > 5% RTP, the only acceptable action is to open the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) to prevent operation of the reactor beyond its design limits. Immediately opening the RTBs will shut down the reactor and prevent operation of the reactor outside of its design limits.

C.1

When the RCS lowest T_{avg} is < 541°F, the appropriate action is to restore T_{avg} to within its specified limit. The allowed Completion Time of 15 minutes provides time for restoring T_{avg} to within limits without allowing the plant to remain in an unacceptable condition for an extended period of time. Operation with the reactor critical and with temperature below 541°F could violate the assumptions for accidents analyzed in the safety analyses.

D.1

If the Required Actions cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within an additional 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 additional minutes is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching MODE 3 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.1.8.1

The power range and intermediate range neutron detectors must be verified to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 by LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation." A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is performed on each power range and intermediate range channel prior to initiation of the PHYSICS TESTS. This will ensure that the RTS is properly aligned to provide the required degree of core protection during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS.

During zero power PHYSICS TESTS, one power range channel is placed in the trip condition and the output of the detector is connected to the reactivity computer.

BASES

LCO (continued)

where: F_q^{RTP} is the $F_q(X,Y,Z)$ limit at RTP provided in the COLR, and is reduced by measurement uncertainty, $K(BU)$, and manufacturing tolerances provided in the COLR,

$K(Z)$ is the normalized $F_q(X,Y,Z)$ as a function of core height provided in the COLR, and

$$P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RTP}}$$

The actual values of F_q^{RTP} , $K(BU)$, and $K(Z)$ are given in the COLR.

For relaxed AFD limit operation, $F_q^M(X,Y,Z)$ (measured $F_q(X,Y,Z)$) is compared against three limits:

- Steady state limit, $(F_q^{RTP}/P) * K(Z)$,
- Transient operational limit, $F_q^L(X,Y,Z)^{OP}$, and
- Transient RPS limit, $F_q^L(X,Y,Z)^{RPS}$.

A steady state evaluation requires obtaining an incore flux map in MODE 1. From the incore flux map results we obtain the measured value $F_q^M(X,Y,Z)$ of $F_q(X,Y,Z)$. Then, $F_q^M(X,Y,Z)$ is adjusted by a radial local peaking factor and compared to F_q^{RTP} which has been reduced by manufacturing tolerances, $K(BU)$, and flux map measurement uncertainty.

$K(BU)$ is the normalized $F_q^L(X,Y,Z)$ as a function of burnup and is provided in the COLR.

$F_q^L(X,Y,Z)^{OP}$ and $F_q^L(X,Y,Z)^{RPS}$ are cycle dependent design limits to ensure the $F_q(X,Y,Z)$ is met during transients. The expression for $F_q^L(X,Y,Z)^{OP}$ is:

$$F_q^L(X,Y,Z)^{OP} = F_q^D(X,Y,Z) * M_q(X,Y,Z) / (UMT * MT * TILT)$$

BASES

LCO (continued)

where: $F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{OP}$ is the cycle dependent maximum allowable design peaking factor which ensures that the $F_{Q}(X,Y,Z)$ limit will be preserved for operation within the LCO limits. $F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{OP}$ includes allowances for calculational and measurement uncertainties.

$F_{Q}^{D}(X,Y,Z)$ is the design power distribution for F_{Q} provided in the COLR.

$M_{Q}(X,Y,Z)$ is the margin remaining in core location X,Y,Z to the LOCA limit in the transient power distribution and is provided in the COLR for normal operating conditions and power escalation testing during startup operations. UMT and MT are only included in the calculation of $F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{OP}$ if these factors were not included in the LOCA limit.

UMT is the measurement uncertainty specified in the COLR.

MT is the engineering hot channel factor specified in the COLR.

TILT is the peaking penalty that accounts for allowable quadrant power tilt ratio of 1.02 and is specified in the COLR.

The expression for $F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{RPS}$ is:

$$F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{RPS} = F_{Q}^{D}(X,Y,Z) * M_{C}(X,Y,Z) / (UMT * MT * TILT)$$

where: $F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{RPS}$ is the cycle dependent maximum allowable design peaking factor which ensures that the center line fuel melt limit will be preserved for operation within the LCO limits. $F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{RPS}$ includes allowances for calculational and measurement uncertainties.

$M_{C}(X,Y,Z)$ is the margin remaining to the center line fuel melt limit in core location X,Y,Z from the transient power distribution and is provided in the COLR for normal operating conditions and power escalation testing during startup operations. UMT and MT are only included in the calculation of $F_{Q}^{L}(X,Y,Z)^{RPS}$ if these factors were not included in the fuel melt limit.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The worst case small break LOCA analyses also assume a time delay before pumped flow reaches the core. For the larger range of small breaks, the rate of blowdown is such that the increase in fuel clad temperature is terminated solely by the accumulators, with pumped flow then providing continued cooling. As break size decreases, the accumulators, safety injection pumps, and centrifugal charging pumps all play a part in terminating the rise in clad temperature. As break size continues to decrease, the role of the accumulators continues to decrease until they are not required and the centrifugal charging pumps become solely responsible for terminating the temperature increase.

This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria established for the ECCS by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 3) will be met following a small break LOCA and there is a high level of probability that the criteria are met following a large break LOCA:

- a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is $\leq 2200^{\circ}\text{F}$;
- b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation;
- c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; and
- d. Core is maintained in a coolable geometry.

Since the accumulators discharge during the blowdown phase of a LOCA, they do not contribute directly to the long term cooling requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. However, the boron content of the accumulator water helps to maintain the reactor core subcritical after reflood, thereby eliminating fission heat as an energy source for which cooling must be provided.

For both the large and small break LOCA analyses, a nominal contained accumulator water volume is used. The contained water volume is the same as the deliverable volume for the accumulators, since the accumulators are emptied, once discharged. The large and small break LOCA analyses are performed with accumulator volumes that are consistent with the LOCA evaluation models. To allow for operating margin, values of $\pm 30 \text{ ft}^3$ are specified.

The minimum boron concentration setpoint is used in the post LOCA subcriticality verification during the injection phase. For each reload

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

cycle, the all rods out (ARO) critical boron concentration is verified to be less than the minimum allowed cold leg accumulator boron concentration.

The minimum boron concentration setpoint is also used in the post LOCA sump boron concentration calculation. The calculation is performed to assure reactor subcriticality in a post LOCA environment with all rods in, minus the highest worth rod out (ARI N-1). Of particular interest is the large cold leg break LOCA, since boron accumulation in the core will be maximized during the cold leg recirculation phase due to core boiling. The accumulation of boron in the core prevents the boron from returning to the sump, which leads to a boron diluted sump condition which may cause the core to become re-critical when switching over to hot leg recirculation. A reduction in the accumulator minimum boron concentration would produce a subsequent reduction in the available containment sump concentration for post LOCA shutdown and an increase in the maximum sump pH. The maximum boron concentration is used in determining the cold leg to hot leg recirculation injection switchover time and minimum sump pH. In particular, the equilibrium sump pH should be at least 7.5 following the design basis LOCA.

The large and small break LOCA analyses are performed with accumulator pressures that are consistent with the LOCA evaluation models. To allow for operating margin and accumulator design limits, a range from 585 psig to 678 psig is specified. The maximum nitrogen cover pressure limit prevents accumulator relief valve actuation, and ultimately preserves accumulator integrity.

The effects on containment mass and energy releases from the accumulators are accounted for in the appropriate analyses (Ref. 4).

The accumulators satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 5).

LCO

The LCO establishes the minimum conditions required to ensure that the accumulators are available to accomplish their core cooling safety function following a LOCA. Four accumulators are required to ensure that 100% of the contents of three of the accumulators will reach the core during a LOCA. This is consistent with the assumption that the contents of one accumulator spill through the break. If less than three accumulators are injected during the blowdown phase of a LOCA, the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 3) could be violated.

For an accumulator to be considered OPERABLE, the isolation valve must be fully open, power removed above 1000 psig, and the limits established in the SRs for contained volume, boron concentration, and

BASES

LCO (continued)

nitrogen cover pressure must be met. Additionally, the nitrogen and liquid volumes between accumulators must be physically separate.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS pressure > 1000 psig, the accumulator OPERABILITY requirements are based on full power operation. Although cooling requirements decrease as power decreases, the accumulators are still required to provide core cooling as long as elevated RCS pressures and temperatures exist.

This LCO is only applicable at pressures > 1000 psig. At pressures \leq 1000 psig, the rate of RCS blowdown is such that the ECCS pumps can provide adequate injection to ensure that peak clad temperature remains below the 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 3) limit of 2200°F for small break LOCAs and there is a high level of probability that the peak cladding temperature does not exceed 2200°F for large break LOCAs.

In MODE 3, with RCS pressure \leq 1000 psig, and in MODES 4, 5, and 6, the accumulator motor operated isolation valves are closed to isolate the accumulators from the RCS. This allows RCS cooldown and depressurization without discharging the accumulators into the RCS or requiring depressurization of the accumulators.

ACTIONS

A.1

If the boron concentration of one accumulator is not within limits, it must be returned to within the limits within 72 hours. In this Condition, ability to maintain subcriticality or minimum boron precipitation time may be reduced. The boron in the accumulators contributes to the assumption that the combined ECCS water in the partially recovered core during the early reflooding phase of a large break LOCA is sufficient to keep that portion of the core subcritical. One accumulator below the minimum boron concentration limit, however, will have no effect on available ECCS water and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality during reflood. Boiling of ECCS water in the core during reflood concentrates boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core. In addition, current analysis techniques demonstrate that the accumulators do not discharge following a large main steam line break for the plant. Even if they do discharge, their impact is minor and not a design limiting event. Thus, 72 hours is allowed to return the boron concentration to within limits.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

If one accumulator is inoperable for a reason other than boron concentration, the accumulator must be returned to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. In this Condition, the required contents of three accumulators cannot be assumed to reach the core during a LOCA. Due to the severity of the consequences should a LOCA occur in these conditions, the 24 hour Completion Time to open the valve, remove power to the valve, or restore the proper water volume or nitrogen cover pressure ensures that prompt action will be taken to return the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time minimizes the potential for exposure of the plant to a LOCA under these conditions.

The 24 hours allowed to restore an inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status is justified in WCAP-15049-A, Rev. 1 (Ref. 6).

C.1 and C.2

If the accumulator cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and RCS pressure reduced to \leq 1000 psig within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1

If more than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.5.1.1

Each accumulator valve should be verified to be fully open every 12 hours. This verification ensures that the accumulators are available for injection and ensures timely discovery if a valve should be less than fully open. If an isolation valve is not fully open, the rate of injection to the RCS would be reduced. Although a motor operated valve position should not change with power removed, a closed valve could result in not meeting accident analyses assumptions. This Frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that ensure a mispositioned isolation valve is unlikely.

SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3

Every 12 hours, borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure are verified for each accumulator. This is typically performed using the installed control room indication. This Frequency is sufficient to ensure adequate injection during a LOCA. Because of the static design of the accumulator, a 12 hour Frequency usually allows the operator to identify changes before limits are reached. Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.

SR 3.5.1.4

The boron concentration should be verified to be within required limits for each accumulator every 31 days since the static design of the accumulators limits the ways in which the concentration can be changed. The 31 day Frequency is adequate to identify changes that could occur from mechanisms such as stratification or inleakage. Sampling the affected accumulator within 6 hours after a 75 gallon increase will identify whether inleakage has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the required limit. It is not necessary to verify boron concentration if the added water inventory is from the refueling water storage tank (RWST), because the water contained in the RWST is within the accumulator boron concentration requirements. This is consistent with the recommendation of NUREG-1366 (Ref. 7).

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.1.5

Verification every 31 days that power is removed from each accumulator isolation valve operators for NI54A, NI65B, NI76A, and NI88B when the RCS pressure is > 1000 psig ensures that an active failure could not result in the undetected closure of an accumulator motor operated isolation valve. If this were to occur, only two accumulators would be available for injection given a single failure coincident with a LOCA. Since power is removed and circuit breakers padlocked under administrative control, the 31 day Frequency will provide adequate assurance that power is removed.

This SR allows power to be supplied to the motor operated isolation valves when RCS pressure is \leq 1000 psig, thus allowing operational flexibility by avoiding unnecessary delays to manipulate the breakers during plant startups or shutdowns. Even with power supplied to the valves, inadvertent closure is prevented by the RCS pressure interlock associated with the valves.

Should closure of a valve occur in spite of the interlock, the SI signal provided to the valves would open a closed valve in the event of a LOCA.

REFERENCES

1. IEEE Standard 279-1971.
2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
3. 10 CFR 50.46.
4. DPC-NE-3004.
5. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specification, (c)(2)(ii).
6. WCAP-15049-A, Rev. 1, April 1999.
7. NUREG-1366, February 1990.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LOCA sump boron concentration necessary to assure subcriticality with all rods in, minus the highest worth rod out (ARI N-1). The large cold leg break LOCA is the limiting case since boron accumulation in the core will be maximized during the cold leg recirculation phase due to core boiling. The accumulation of boron in the core prevents the boron from returning to the sump, which leads to a boron diluted sump condition that may cause the core to become re-critical when switching over to hot leg recirculation. For the post LOCA injection phase, each reload cycle is verified to have all rods out (ARO) critical boron concentrations less than the minimum allowed RWST boron concentration.

The upper limit on boron concentration as listed in the COLR is used to determine the maximum allowable time to switch to hot leg recirculation following a LOCA. The purpose of switching from cold leg to hot leg injection is to avoid boron precipitation in the core following the accident. In addition, this upper limit ensures that the equilibrium pH of the solution in the containment sump following the design basis LOCA is at least 7.5.

In the ECCS analysis, the containment spray temperature is assumed to be equal to the RWST lower temperature limit of 70°F. If the lower temperature limit is violated, the containment spray further reduces containment pressure, which decreases the saturated steam specific volume. This means that each pound of steam generated during core reflood tends to occupy a larger volume, which decreases the rate at which steam can be vented out the break and increases peak clad temperature. The upper temperature limit of 100°F, plus an allowance for temperature measurement uncertainty, is used in the containment OPERABILITY analysis. Exceeding this temperature will result in higher containment pressures due to reduced containment spray cooling capacity. For the containment response following an MSLB, the lower limit on boron concentration and the upper limit on RWST water temperature are used to maximize the total energy release to containment.

The RWST satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2).

LCO

The RWST ensures that an adequate supply of borated water is available to cool and depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), to cool and cover the core in the event of a LOCA, to maintain the reactor subcritical following a DBA, and to ensure adequate level in the containment sump to support ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation in the recirculation mode.

BASES

LCO (continued)

To be considered OPERABLE, the RWST must meet the water volume, boron concentration, and temperature limits established in the SRs.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, RWST OPERABILITY requirements are dictated by ECCS and Containment Spray System OPERABILITY requirements. Since both the ECCS and the Containment Spray System must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the RWST must also be OPERABLE to support their operation. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops—MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops—MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.4, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation—High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation—Low Water Level."

ACTIONSA.1

With RWST boron concentration or borated water temperature not within limits, they must be returned to within limits within 8 hours. Under these conditions neither the ECCS nor the Containment Spray System can perform its design function. Therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE condition. The 8 hour limit to restore the RWST temperature or boron concentration to within limits was developed considering the time required to change either the boron concentration or temperature and the fact that the contents of the tank are still available for injection.

B.1

With the RWST inoperable for reasons other than Condition A (e.g., water volume), it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

In this Condition, neither the ECCS nor the Containment Spray System can perform its design function. Therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE status or to place the plant in a MODE in which the RWST is not required. The short time limit of 1 hour to restore the RWST to OPERABLE status is based on this condition simultaneously affecting redundant trains.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)C.1 and C.2

If the RWST cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**SR 3.5.4.1

The RWST borated water temperature should be verified every 24 hours to be within the limits assumed in the accident analyses band. This Frequency is sufficient to identify a temperature change that would approach either limit and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.4.2

The RWST water volume should be verified every 7 days to be above the required minimum level in order to ensure that a sufficient initial supply is available for injection and to support continued ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation on recirculation. Since the RWST volume is normally stable and is protected by an alarm, a 7 day Frequency is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.4.3

The boron concentration of the RWST should be verified every 7 days to be within the required limits. This SR ensures that the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA and that the boron content assumed for the injection water in the MSLB analysis is available. Further, it assures that the resulting sump pH will be maintained in an acceptable range so that boron precipitation in the core will not occur and the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7 day sampling Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.
2. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.4.5 and SR 3.8.4.6

Visual inspection and resistance measurements of intercell, interrack, intertier, and terminal connections provide an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anticorrosion material, as recommended by the manufacturer for the batteries, is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection. The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of SR 3.8.4.5.

For the DG batteries utilizing nickel cadmium cells, the cell-to-cell terminal pole screws should be set from 14 to 15 foot-pounds of torque. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.4.7

This SR requires that each battery charger for the DC channel be capable of supplying at least 200 amps and at least 75 amps for the DG chargers. All chargers shall be tested at a voltage of at least 125 V for ≥ 8 hours. These requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10), the battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 18 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.4.8

A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The vital battery's actual duty cycle is identified in calculation CNC-1381.05-00-0011, 125 VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System Battery and Battery Charger Sizing Calculation. The test duty cycle is the actual duty cycle adjusted for the temperature correction factor for 60°F operation, and a design margin of typically 10 to 15% for load addition. The DC channel batteries are tested to supply a current ≥ 534.11 amps for the first minute, then ≥ 279.23 amps for the next 9 minutes, ≥ 387.66 amps for the next 10 minutes, and ≥ 293.49 amps for the next 100 minutes. Terminal voltage is required to remain ≥ 110.4 volts during this test. The DG battery's actual duty cycle is identified in calculation CNC-1381.05-00-0050, 125 VDC Diesel Generator Battery and Battery Charger Sizing Calculation. The test duty cycle is the actual duty cycle adjusted for the temperature correction factor for 60°F operation, and a design margin of typically 10 to 15% for load addition. The DG batteries utilizing nickel cadmium cells are tested to supply a current ≥ 218.5 amps for the first minute, then ≥ 42.5 amps for the next 10 minutes, then ≥ 121.8 amps for the next minute, then ≥ 42.5 amps for the remaining 108 minutes. Terminal voltage is required to remain ≥ 105 volts during this test. The DG batteries utilizing lead acid cells are tested to supply a current ≥ 228.0 amps for the first minute, then ≥ 37.75 amps for the next 10 minutes, then ≥ 127.1 amps for the next minute, then ≥ 37.75 amps for the remaining 108 minutes. Terminal voltage is required to remain ≥ 105 volts during this test. (Note: The duty cycle in the UFSAR is used for battery sizing and includes the temperature factor of 11%, a design margin of 15%, and an aging factor of 25%.)

Except for performing SR 3.8.4.8 for the DC channel batteries with the unit on line, the Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10), which states that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations or at some other outage, with intervals between tests, not to exceed 18 months.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The modified performance discharge test is a performance discharge test that is augmented to include the high-rate, short duration discharge loads (during the first minute and 11-to-12 minute discharge periods) of the service test. The duty cycle of the modified performance test must fully envelope the duty cycle of the service test if the modified performance discharge test is to be used in lieu of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by the high-rate, short duration discharge periods of the service test represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the modified performance discharge test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

A modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rates of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical periods of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would perturb the electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.4.9

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.8. Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.9; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.9 while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.8 at the same time.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 9). This reference recommends that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The Surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is < 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 18 months. However (for DC vital batteries only), if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity \geq 100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450 (Ref. 9), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its average capacity on the previous performance tests or when it is \geq 10% below the manufacturer's rating. These Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 9). This SR is modified by a Note which is applicable to the DG batteries only. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would perturb the associated electrical distribution system and challenge safety systems.

- REFERENCES**
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
 2. Regulatory Guide 1.6, March 10, 1971.
 3. IEEE-308-1971 and 1974.
 4. UFSAR, Chapter 8.
 5. IEEE-485-1983, June 1983.
 6. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 7. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 8. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
 9. IEEE-450-1975 and/or 1980.
 10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.