VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Richmond, Virginia 23261

10CFR50.73

October 6, 2005

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Serial No.: 5-668 SPS: PAK Docket No.: 50-280 50-281 License No.:DPR-32 DPR-37

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

Report No. 50-280, 50-281/2005-003-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Verv truly vours.

Donald E. Jernigan, Site Vice President Surry Power Station

Enclosure

Commitments contained in this letter:

None



cc: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931

Mr. N. P. Garrett NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION				ION AP	APPROVED BY IMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2007									
(6-2004) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)				Es rec est Nu e-r an Bu	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information									
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NRC FORM 366A

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE			
	05000 000	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		OF		
Surry Power Station	05000-280	2005 -	- 003	- 00	2		4	

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On August 11, 2005, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100% reactor power, the results of the monthly engine oil sample for Emergency Service Water Pump (ESWP) 1B [EIIS–BI, ENG] indicated fuel contamination of the engine oil in the marginal range. Evaluation of previous monthly oil analyses revealed that although the results remained within the acceptable range, an increasing trend of fuel contamination began with the June 11, 2005 sample. The rate of fuel intrusion was such that the ESWP could not sustain long-term operation. Engine oil viscosity also exhibited a concurrent, declining trend but remained within the acceptable range as well. Based on this evaluation, ESWP 1B was declared inoperable on August 11, 2005 at 1900 hours.

Subsequent inspection and pressure test of the fuel system found a leak at the connection between the fuel supply jumper and the #1L fuel injector. The fuel injector and jumper were replaced, the fuel system was pressure tested satisfactorily, and the engine oil was changed. ESWP 1B was declared operable on August 17, 2005 following a successful return to service operational test.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.14.A.4 requires that the reactor coolant system not exceed 350° F or 450 psig or that the reactor shall not be critical unless three ESWPs are operable. This requirement may be modified to have two ESWPs operable for a period not to exceed 7 days. ESWP 1B was assumed to be inoperable beginning June 11, 2005 and remained inoperable until completion of testing on August 17, 2005, exceeding the allowed outage time of 7 days. Therefore, this report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition that was prohibited by the plant's TS. In addition, during the period when the 1B pump was assumed to be inoperable, a second ESWP was taken out of service to perform maintenance or modifications. The long-term service water requirement for a design basis accident on one unit and the service water requirement to bring the other unit to Hot Shutdown are greater than the design capacity of one ESWP. Therefore, this report is also being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

Each ESWP has a design capacity of 15,000 gallon per minute (GPM). The long-term service water requirements for a design basis accident in one unit with a simultaneous loss-of-station power and the second unit being brought to Hot Shutdown is greater than 15,000 gpm. Additional service water is required to bring the non-accident unit to Cold Shutdown. Considering a single active failure of one pump, TS require three ESWPs to be operable to ensure sufficient cooling water is available in the event of an accident. One ESWP is permitted to be inoperable for up to a 7-day period to provide operational flexibility for testing or maintenance without requiring unit outages.

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Although the ESWP 1B was considered to be inoperable since June 11, 2005, it continued to operate during the monthly surveillance test. If needed, the pump would have been capable of satisfactory performance however, due to engine oil contamination would operate for a duration less than required by design basis.

A Safety Monitor analysis for one ESWP inoperable for the period June 11 to August 17, 2005, found the impact to be negligible at less than 5E-9/year. During this period, a second ESWP was removed from service for brief periods to perform maintenance or modifications. Assuming a second ESWP out of service for the entire period, the integrated risk remained low and would be classified as an issue of very low safety significance.

3.0 <u>CAUSE</u>

The cause for the fuel entering the engine oil system of ESWP 1B and for the lower oil viscosity was a leak at the connection between the fuel inlet line and the 1L injector. The root cause for the leak was a failure to identify and correct a defect at the seating area on the inlet of the 1L injector where the flared end of the fuel line seats. This defect was a flat spot that extends through the entire flared fitting seating surface. When initially installed, the connection did not leak, as indicated by the fuel system pressure test and the engine oil analysis. However, over time due to vibration, heat-up and cool-down this fitting began to leak.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

An inspection and pressure test of the fuel system for ESWP 1B was conducted. During this inspection a leak was identified at the flared connection between the jumper and the inlet side of the #1L fuel injector. The fuel injector and jumper were replaced, all other fuel system mechanical joints were tightened, the engine oil was changed, and a satisfactory fuel system pressure test as well as a successful return to service test run was performed.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

An engine oil sample was obtained after the return to service test. The results of the analysis for fuel contamination of the engine oil and for oil viscosity were acceptable. The oil analysis results for the September sample were also acceptable.

The engine oil analysis results from the two other ESWP diesels, the three Station Emergency diesels, the Station Blackout diesel, and the Security diesel were reviewed for fuel contamination of the engine oil and for oil viscosity. The review concluded that the results were consistent and within acceptable ranges.

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

Maintenance procedures have been revised to identify defects by inspecting the seating surface of the connection of the fuel lines to the injectors.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS

Fuel contamination of Surry's Emergency Diesel Generator #3 engine oil was detected in 1984 and 1990. In both cases, the cause was determined to be a loose connection at the fuel injector. Engine oil testing for fuel contamination was initiated. Also, a visual inspection for fuel leaks during engine operation following maintenance was initiated. No additional issues for fuel contamination of engine oil were identified.

8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER

Detroit Diesel Model 8V71

9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

None