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SDP/EA REQUEST & STRATEGY FORM

Case Data Disputed: Related Cases: EA-2004-065
SDP/EA No.: 2004-064 Number: 2 Docket No.: 40-3392
Request Date: 4/28/04 Region: II. Case Type: UF Small Entity: X No Yes
Licensee: Honeywell International, Inc. Facility / City: Metropolis, IL:
License No.: SUB-526 Last Day of Insp.: 2/19/04
Insp. Rpt No.: 2004-003 Keywords: 040000, 080000 ES: gkm
Facts (EATS): On 12/203, the licensee had declared an SAE in response to a potential offsite release of what was later determined to be U.F. Based on the results of an AT and a subsequent follow-up inspection, the AT concluded that the licensee failed to develop procedures to simultaneously operate two fluorinators. The inadvertent offsite release resulted from an inappropriate valve line-up which compromised the systems' capability to contain U.F. in an over pressurization condition. Section 2. 6. Chapter 2 of the License Application states that plant operations are to be conducted in accordance with written Standard Operating Procedure Manuals. The failure to develop or have procedures for the evolution that resulted in the offsite release was determined to be in violation of the License Application.
Discussion (if required):
S.D.P. X.No Yes Assessment Green White Yellow NOV Nov No
Wrongdoing X No Yes
OI Ref. OI Rpt. OI Rpt. OI Rpt. DOJ Referral? No Yes Ref. Date Action Date OI Rot OI Rpt. Decline Accept Additional OI OI Investigating OI needs to be notified OI/OE dispute memo needed Additional coordination needed Awaiting DOJ Needs coordination with DOJ
Escalated Action Consequence: X Actual X Potential X Reg. Impact
Discretion or Order? X No Yes Explain:
Future Action Conference?
Participants: Region S.Sparks, C.Evans, D.Collins, J.Henson, D.H artland
OE F.Congel, G.Morell, C.Nolan OGC/OI
Program Office R.Nelson,G.Janosko, M.Burgess Other emarks/Comments/Lessons Learned:

On 4/23/04, an enforcement re panel was convened to determine the appropriate enforcement action in reference to the offisite release and procedural related issues described above. The first panel (conducted on 3/24/04) concluded that two SL III violations and a Choice call to the licensee was appropriate. This decision was based on the Policy (no previous escalated enforcement) and the corrective actions the licensee had taken to prevent recurrence.

Approved, Dir. OE: /RA/ C. Nolan

Date: 5/26/04

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Based on HQ's review of the Choice Letter it was determined that this case merited further discussion in regards to the severity level and possible reconsideration to exercise discretion and/or propose a CP. A request was made to members of the RII staff involved in the AIT to provide more information in regards to the potential injuries that did/could have resulted to members of the public from exposure to UF₆ as well as HF. Predicated on the information provided by RII AIT members, the panel determined that there were no injuries/significant uptake and that the potential for significant injuries from this event was not probable. Additionally, the panel concluded that the licensee's response in regards to corrective actions went well beyond the regulatory requirements and that this information would need to be articulated in the Choice letter to the licensee as a basis for our rationale in not proposing a CP due to the offsite release of radioactive material. In accordance with the Policy and the aforementioned, the licensee will be given credit for corrective action which will result in a SLIII violation with no CP (Supplement VI C.11 a).