# Holtec International Final Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System\*

by

Holtec International Holtec Center 555 Lincoln Drive West Marlton, NJ 08053 (holtecinternational.com)

USNRC Docket No.: Holtec Report No.: HI-2002444 Quality Designation: Safety Significant

72-1014

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# CHAPTER 1<sup>†</sup>: GENERAL DESCRIPTION

## 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION

This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Holtec International's HI-STORM 100 System is a compilation of information and analyses to support a United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing review as a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage cask under requirements specified in 10CFR72 [1.0.1]. This FSAR describes the basis for NRC approval and issuance of a Certificate of Compliance (C of C) for storage under provisions of 10CFR72, Subpart L, for the HI-STORM 100 System to safely store spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). This report has been prepared in the format and content suggested in NRC Regulatory Guide 3.61 [1.0.2] and NUREG-1536 Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems [1.0.3] to facilitate the NRC review process.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general description of the design features and storage capabilities of the HI-STORM 100 System, drawings of the structures, systems, and components important to safety, and the qualifications of the certificate holder. This report is also suitable for incorporation into a site-specific Safety Analysis Report which may be submitted by an applicant for a site-specific 10 CFR 72 license to store SNF at an ISFSI or a facility similar in objective and scope. Table 1.0.1 contains a listing of the terminology and notation used in this FSAR.

To aid NRC review, additional tables and references have been added to facilitate the location of information requested by NUREG-1536. Table 1.0.2 provides a matrix of the topics in NUREG-1536 and Regulatory Guide 3.61, the corresponding 10CFR72 requirements, and a reference to the applicable FSAR section that addresses each topic.

The HI-STORM 100 FSAR is in full compliance with the intent of all regulatory requirements listed in Section III of each chapter of NUREG-1536. However, an exhaustive review of the provisions in NUREG-1536, particularly Section IV (Acceptance Criteria) and Section V (Review Procedures) has identified certain deviations from a verbatim compliance to all guidance. A list of all such items, along with a discussion of their intent and Holtec International's approach for compliance with the underlying intent is presented in Table 1.0.3 herein. Table 1.0.3 also contains the justification for the alternative method for compliance adopted in this FSAR. The justification may be in the form of a supporting analysis, established industry practice, or other NRC guidance documents. Each chapter in this FSAR provides a clear statement with respect to the extent of compliance to the NUREG-1536 provisions. Chapter 1 is in full compliance with NUREG-1536; no exceptions are taken.

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This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulatory Guide 3.61. However, the material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements of NUREG-1536. Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in Chapter 1, Section 1.0, herein. Finally, all terms-of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the terminology of the glossary (Table 1.0.1) and component nomenclature of the Bill-of-Materials (Section 1.5).

The generic design basis and the corresponding safety analysis of the HI-STORM 100 System contained in this FSAR are intended to bound the SNF characteristics, design, conditions, and interfaces that exist in the vast majority of domestic power reactor sites and potential away-from-reactor storage sites in the contiguous United States. This FSAR also provides the basis for component fabrication and acceptance, and the requirements for safe operation and maintenance of the components, consistent with the design basis and safety analysis documented herein. In accordance with 10CFR72, Subpart K, site-specific implementation of the generically certified HI-STORM 100 System requires that the licensee perform a site-specific evaluation, as defined in 10CFR72.212. The HI-STORM 100 System FSAR identifies a limited number of conditions that are necessarily site-specific and are to be addressed in the licensee's 10CFR72.212 evaluation. These include:

- Siting of the ISFSI and design of the storage pad (including the embedment for anchored cask users) and security system. Site-specific demonstration of compliance with regulatory dose limits. Implementation of a site-specific ALARA program.
- An evaluation of site-specific hazards and design conditions that may exist at the ISFSI site or the transfer route between the plant's cask receiving bay and the ISFSI. These include, but are not limited to, explosion and fire hazards, flooding conditions, land slides, and lightning protection.
- Determination that the physical and nucleonic characteristics and the condition of the SNF assemblies to be dry stored meet the fuel acceptance requirements of the Certificate of Compliance.
- An evaluation of interface and design conditions that exist within the plant's fuel building in which canister fuel loading, canister closure, and canister transfer operations are to be conducted in accordance with the applicable 10CFR50 requirements and technical specifications for the plant.
- Detailed site-specific operating, maintenance, and inspection procedures prepared in accordance with the generic procedures and requirements provided in Chapters 8 and 9, and the technical specifications provided in the Certificate of Compliance.
- Performance of pre-operational testing.
- Implementation of a safeguards and accountability program in accordance with 10CFR73. Preparation of a physical security plan in accordance with 10CFR73.55.
- Review of the reactor emergency plan, quality assurance (QA) program, training program, and radiation protection program.

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The generic safety analyses contained in the HI-STORM 100 FSAR may be used as input and for guidance by the licensee in performing a 10CFR72.212 evaluation.

Within this report, all figures, tables and references cited are identified by the double decimal system m.n.i, where m is the chapter number, n is the section number, and i is the sequential number. Thus, for example, Figure 1.2.3 is the third figure in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1.

Revisions to this document are made on a section level basis. Complete sections have been replaced if any material in the section changed. The specific changes are noted with revision bars in the right margin. Figures are revised individually. Drawings are controlled separately within the Holtec QA program and have individual revision numbers. Bills-of-Material (BOMs) are considered separate drawings and are not necessarily at the same revision level as the drawing(s) to which they apply. If a drawing or BOM was revised in support of the current FSAR revision, that drawing/BOM is included in Section 1.5 at its latest revision level. Drawings and BOMs appearing in this FSAR may be revised between formal updates to the FSAR. Therefore, the revisions of drawings/BOMs in Section 1.5 may not be current.

#### 1.0.1 Engineering Change Orders

#### 1.0.1.1 FSAR Revision 3

The changes authorized by the Holtec ECOs (with corresponding 10CFR72.48 evaluations, if applicable) listed in the following table are reflected in Revision 3 of this FSAR.

Affected Item	FCO Number	72 48 Evaluation or Screening
Anceled tem		Number
MPC-68/68F/68FF	ECO 1021-61	717
Basket	ECO 1021-62	NA
	ECO 1021-64	732
MPC-24/24E/24EF	ECO 1022-57	717
Basket	ECO 1022-58	NA .
MPC-32	ECO 1023-31	NA
Basket	ECO 1023-33	735
MPC Enclosure Vessel	ECO 1021-61	717
	ECO 1022-57	717
	ECO 1023-30	717
	ECO 5014-99	700
	ECO 5014-101	706
	ECO 5014-117	739
	700 100 1 55	
HI-STORM Overpack	ECO 1024-77	683
	ECO 1024-85	698
	ECO 1024-88	NA
	ECO 1024-89	707
	ECO 1024-90	708
	ECO 1024-91	709
125-Ton HL-TRAC	FCO 1025-51	723
Transfer Cask	ECO 1025-54	NA
		- · · · ·
General FSAR Changes	ECO 5014-98	NA
	ECO 5014-101	706
	ECO 5014-103	712
	ECO 5014-104	NA
	ECO 5014-106	716
	ECO 5014-108	720
	ECO 5014-109	724
	ECO 5014-110	NA
	ECO 5014-118	741
	ECO 5014-119	743

#### LIST OF ECO'S AND APPLICABLE 10CFR72.48 EVALUATIONS

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#### Table 1.0.1

#### TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION

ALARA is an acronym for As Low As Reasonably Achievable.

**Boral** is a generic term to denote an aluminum-boron carbide cermet manufactured in accordance with U.S. Patent No. 4027377. The individual material supplier may use another trade name to refer to the same product.

**Boral<sup>TM</sup>** means Boral manufactured by AAR Advanced Structures.

BWR is an acronym for boiling water reactor.

C.G. is an acronym for center of gravity.

Commercial Spent Fuel or CSF refers to nuclear fuel used to produce energy in a commercial nuclear power plant.

**Confinement Boundary** means the outline formed by the sealed, cylindrical enclosure of the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) shell welded to a solid baseplate, a lid welded around the top circumference of the shell wall, the port cover plates welded to the lid, and the closure ring welded to the lid and MPC shell providing the redundant sealing.

**Confinement System** means the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) which encloses and confines the spent nuclear fuel during storage.

**Controlled Area** means that area immediately surrounding an ISFSI for which the owner/user exercises authority over its use and within which operations are performed.

**Cooling Time (or post-irradiation cooling time)** for a spent fuel assembly is the time between reactor shutdown and the time the spent fuel assembly is loaded into the MPC.

**DBE** means Design Basis Earthquake.

DCSS is an acronym for Dry Cask Storage System.

**Damaged Fuel Assembly** is a fuel assembly with known or suspected cladding defects, as determined by review of records, greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks, empty fuel rod locations that are not replaced with dummy fuel rods, or those that cannot be handled by normal means. Fuel assemblies that cannot be handled by normal means due to fuel cladding damage are considered fuel debris.

**Damaged Fuel Container (or Canister)** means a specially designed enclosure for damaged fuel or fuel debris which permits gaseous and liquid media to escape while minimizing dispersal of gross particulates. The Damaged Fuel Container/Canister (DFC) features a lifting location which is suitable for remote handling of a loaded or unloaded DFC.

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#### TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION

**Design Heat Load** is the computed heat rejection capacity of the HI-STORM system with a certified MPC loaded with CSF stored in *uniform storage* with the ambient at the normal temperature and the peak cladding temperature (PCT) at 400°C. The Design Heat Load is less than the thermal capacity of the system by a suitable margin that reflects the conservatism in the system thermal analysis.

**Design Life** is the minimum duration for which the component is engineered to perform its intended function set forth in this FSAR, if operated and maintained in accordance with this FSAR.

**Design Report** is a document prepared, reviewed and QA validated in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR72 Subpart G. The Design Report shall demonstrate compliance with the requirements set forth in the Design Specification. A Design Report is mandatory for systems, structures, and components designated as Important to Safety. The FSAR serves as the Design Report for the HI-STORM 100 System.

**Design Specification** is a document prepared in accordance with the quality assurance requirements of 10CFR72 Subpart G to provide a complete set of design criteria and functional requirements for a system, structure, or component, designated as Important to Safety, intended to be used in the operation, implementation, or decommissioning of the HI-STORM 100 System. The FSAR serves as the Design Specification for the HI-STORM 100 System.

**Enclosure Vessel (or MPC Enclosure Vessel)** means the pressure vessel defined by the cylindrical shell, baseplate, port cover plates, lid, closure ring, and associated welds that provides confinement for the helium gas contained within the MPC. The Enclosure Vessel (EV) and the fuel basket together constitute the multi-purpose canister.

**Fracture Toughness** is a property which is a measure of the ability of a material to limit crack propagation under a suddenly applied load.

FSAR is an acronym for Final Safety Analysis Report (10CFR72).

Fuel Basket means a honeycombed structural weldment with square openings which can accept a fuel assembly of the type for which it is designed.

Fuel Debris refers to ruptured fuel rods, severed rods, loose fuel pellets, or fuel assemblies with known or suspected defects which cannot be handled by normal means due to fuel cladding damage.

High Burnup Fuel, or HBF is a commercial spent fuel assembly with an average burnup greater than 45,000 MWD/MTU.

HI-TRAC transfer cask or HI-TRAC means the transfer cask used to house the MPC during MPC fuel loading, unloading, drying, sealing, and on-site transfer operations to a HI-STORM storage overpack or HI-STAR storage/transportation overpack. The HI-TRAC shields the loaded MPC

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allowing loading operations to be performed while limiting radiation exposure to personnel. HI-TRAC is an acronym for Holtec International Transfer Cask. In this FSAR there are three HI-TRAC transfer casks, the 125 ton standard design HI-TRAC (HI-TRAC-125), the 125-ton dualpurpose lid design (HI-TRAC 125D), and the 100 ton HI-TRAC (HI-TRAC-100). The 100 ton HI-TRAC is provided for use at sites with a maximum crane capacity of less than 125 tons. The term HI-TRAC is used as a generic term to refer to all three HI-TRAC transfer cask design, unless the discussion requires distinguishing among the three. The HI-TRAC is equipped with a pair of lifting trunnions and the HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 designs also include pocket trunnions. The trunnions are used to lift and downend/upend the HI-TRAC with a loaded MPC.

HI-STORM overpack or storage overpack means the cask that receives and contains the sealed multi-purpose canisters containing spent nuclear fuel. It provides the gamma and neutron shielding, ventilation passages, missile protection, and protection against natural phenomena and accidents for the MPC. The term "overpack" as used in this FSAR refers to all overpack designs, including the standard design (HI-STORM 100) and two alternate designs (HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S Version B). The term "overpack" also applies to those overpacks designed for high seismic deployment (HI-STORM 100A or HI-STORM 100SA), unless otherwise clarified.

HI-STORM 100 System consists of any loaded MPC model placed within any design variant of the HI-STORM overpack.

Holtite<sup>TM</sup> is the trade name for all present and future neutron shielding materials formulated under Holtec International's R&D program dedicated to developing shielding materials for application in dry storage and transport systems. The Holtite development program is an ongoing experimentation effort to identify neutron shielding materials with enhanced shielding and temperature tolerance characteristics. Holtite-A<sup>TM</sup> is the first and only shielding material qualified under the Holtite R&D program. As such, the terms Holtite and Holtite-A may be used interchangeably throughout this FSAR.

Holtite<sup>™</sup>-A is a trademarked Holtec International neutron shield material.

**Important to Safety** (ITS) means a function or condition required to store spent nuclear fuel safely; to prevent damage to spent nuclear fuel during handling and storage, and to provide reasonable assurance that spent nuclear fuel can be received, handled, packaged, stored, and retrieved without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

**Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)** means a facility designed, constructed, and licensed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage in accordance with 10CFR72.

Intact Fuel Assembly is defined as a fuel assembly without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks and hairline cracks, and which can be handled by normal means. Fuel assemblies without fuel rods in fuel rod locations shall not be classified as Intact Fuel Assemblies

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#### TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION

unless dummy fuel rods are used to displace an amount of water greater than or equal to that displaced by the fuel rod(s).

License Life means the duration for which the system is authorized by virtue of its certification by the U.S. NRC.

Long-term Storage means the time beginning after on-site handling is complete and the loaded overpack is at rest in its designated storage location on the ISFSI pad and lasting up to the end of the licensed life of the HI-STORM 100 System (20 years).

Lowest Service Temperature (LST) is the minimum metal temperature of a part for the specified service condition.

Maximum Reactivity means the highest possible k-effective including bias, uncertainties, and calculational statistics evaluated for the worst-case combination of fuel basket manufacturing tolerances.

**METAMIC<sup>®</sup>** is a trade name for an aluminum/boron carbide composite neutron absorber material qualified for use in the MPCs.

METCON<sup>™</sup> is a trade name for the HI-STORM overpack. The trademark is derived from the metal-concrete composition of the HI-STORM overpack.

MGDS is an acronym for Mined Geological Disposal System.

Minimum Enrichment is the minimum assembly average enrichment. Natural uranium blankets are not considered in determining minimum enrichment.

Moderate Burnup Fuel, or MBF is a commercial spent fuel assembly with an average burnup less than or equal to 45,000 MWD/MTU.

Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) means the sealed canister consisting of a honeycombed fuel basket for spent nuclear fuel storage, contained in a cylindrical canister shell (the MPC Enclosure Vessel). There are different MPCs with different fuel basket geometries for storing PWR or BWR fuel, but all MPCs have identical exterior dimensions. The MPC is the confinement boundary for storage conditions.

NDT is an acronym for Nil Ductility Transition Temperature, which is defined as the temperature at which the fracture stress in a material with a small flaw is equal to the yield stress in the same material if it had no flaws.

Neutron Absorber Material is a generic term used in this FSAR to indicate any neutron absorber material qualified for use in the HI-STORM 100 System MPCs.

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Neutron Shielding means a material used to thermalize and capture neutrons emanating from the radioactive spent nuclear fuel.

**Non-Fuel Hardware** is defined as Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs), Thimble Plug Devices (TPDs), Control Rod Assemblies (CRAs), Axial Power Shaping Rods (APSRs), Wet Annular Burnable Absorbers (WABAs), Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs), water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and vibration suppressor inserts.

**Planar-Average Initial Enrichment** is the average of the distributed fuel rod initial enrichments within a given axial plane of the assembly lattice.

Plain Concrete is concrete that is unreinforced and is of density specified in this FSAR.

Post-Core Decay Time (PCDT) is synonymous with cooling time.

PWR is an acronym for pressurized water reactor.

Reactivity is used synonymously with effective neutron multiplication factor or k-effective.

**Regionalized Fuel Loading** is a term used to describe an optional fuel loading strategy used in lieu of uniform fuel loading. Regionalized fuel loading allows high heat emitting fuel assemblies to be stored in fuel storage locations in the center of the fuel basket provided lower heat emitting fuel assemblies are stored in the peripheral fuel storage locations. Users choosing regionalized fuel loading must also consider other restrictions in the CoC such as those for non-fuel hardware and damaged fuel containers. Regionalized fuel loading does not apply to the MPC-68F model.

SAR is an acronym for Safety Analysis Report (10CFR71).

Service Life means the duration for which the component is reasonably expected to perform its intended function, if operated and maintained in accordance with the provisions of this FSAR. Service Life may be much longer than the Design Life because of the conservatism inherent in the codes, standards, and procedures used to design, fabricate, operate, and maintain the component.

Short-term Operations means those normal operational evolutions necessary to support fuel loading or fuel unloading operations. These include, but are not limited to MPC cavity drying, helium backfill, MPC transfer, and onsite handling of a loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask.

Single Failure Proof means that the handling system is designed so that all directly loaded tension and compression members are engineered to satisfy the enhanced safety criteria of Paragraphs 5.1.6(1)(a) and (b) of NUREG-0612.

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## TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION

SNF is an acronym for spent nuclear fuel.

SSC is an acronym for Structures, Systems and Components.

STP is Standard Temperature and Pressure conditions.

**Thermal Capacity** of the HI-STORM system is defined as the amount of heat the storage system, containing an MPC loaded with CSF stored in *uniform storage*, will actually reject with the ambient environment at the normal temperature and the peak fuel cladding temperature (PCT) at 400°C.

**Thermosiphon** is the term used to describe the buoyancy-driven natural convection circulation of helium within the MPC fuel basket maximum heat load during short-term operating conditions up to which no time limit or other restriction is imposed on the operating condition.

**Uniform Fuel Loading** is a fuel loading strategy where any authorized fuel assembly may be stored in any fuel storage location, subject to other restrictions in the CoC, such as those applicable to non- | fuel hardware, and damaged fuel containers.

ZPA is an acronym for zero period acceleration.

**ZR** means any zirconium-based fuel cladding material authorized for use in a commercial nuclear power plant reactor. Any reference to Zircaloy fuel cladding in this FSAR applies to any zirconium-based fuel cladding material.

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#### Table 1.0.2

#### HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM FSAR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE CROSS REFERENCE MATRIX

Regulatory Guide 3.61 Section and Content		Associated NUREG- 1536 Review Criteria	Applicable 10CFR72 or 10CFR20 Requirement	HI-STORM FSAR
		1. General Descripti	ion	с
1.1	Introduction	1.III.1 General Description & Operational Features	10CFR72.24(b)	1.1
1.2	General Description	1.III.1 General Description & Operational Features	10CFR72.24(b)	1.2
	1.2.1 Cask Character- istics	1.III.1 General Description & Operational Features	10CFR72.24(b)	1.2.1
	1.2.2 Operational Features	1.III.1 General Description & Operational Features	10CFR72.24(b)	1.2.2
	1.2.3 Cask Contents	1.III.3 DCSS Contents	10CFR72.2(a)(1) 10CFR72.236(a)	1.2.3
1.3	Identification of Agents & Contractors	1.III.4 Qualification of the Applicant	10CFR72.24(j) 10CFR72.28(a)	1.3
1.4	Generic Cask Arrays	1.III.1 General Description & Operational Features	10CFR72.24(c)(3)	1.4
1.5	Supplemental Data	1.III.2 Drawings	10CFR72.24(c)(3)	1.5
	NA	1.III.6 Consideration of Transport Requirements	10CFR72.230(b) 10CFR72.236(m)	1.1
	NA	1.III.5 Quality Assurance	10CFR72.24(n)	1.3
		2. Principal Design Criter	ria	
2.1	Spent Fuel To Be Stored	2.III.2.a Spent Fuel Specifications	10CFR72.2(a)(1) 10CFR72.236(a)	2.1
2.2 Des Env	Design Criteria for Environmental	2.III.2.b External Conditions, 2.III.3.b Structural, 2.III.3.c Thermal	10CFR72.122(b)	2.2
	Conditions and Natural Phenomena		10CFR72.122(c)	2.2.3.3, 2.2.3.10
			(1)	2.2
			(2)	2.2.3.11
L	·····		10CFR72.122(h) (1)	2.0
	2.2.1 Tornado and Wind Loading	2.III.2.b External Conditions	10CFR72.122(b) (2)	2.2.3.5

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### HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM FSAR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE CROSS REFERENCE MATRIX

Regulatory Guide 3.61 Section and Content	Associated NUREG- 1536 Review Criteria	Applicable 10CFR72 or 10CFR20 Requirement	HI-STORM FSAR
2.2.2 Water Level (Flood)	2.III.2.b External Conditions 2.III.3.b Structural	10CFR72.122(b) (2)	2.2.3.6
2.2.3 Seismic	2.III.3.b Structural	10CFR72.102(f) 10CFR72.122(b) (2)	2.2.3.7
2.2.4 Snow and Ice	2.III.2.b External Conditions 2.III.3.b Structural	10CFR72.122(b)	2.2.1.6
2.2.5 Combined Load	2.III.3.b Structural	10CFR72.24(d) 10CFR72.122(b) (2)(ii)	2.2.7
NA	2.III.1 Structures, Systems, and Components Important to Safety	10CFR72.122(a) 10CFR72.24(c)(3)	2.2.4
NA	2.III.2 Design Criteria for Safety Protection Systems	10CFR72.236(g) 10CFR72.24(c)(1) 10CFR72.24(c)(2) 10CFR72.24(c)(4) 10CFR72.120(a) 10CFR72.236(b)	2.0, 2.2
NA	2.III.3.c Thermal	10CFR72.128(a) (4)	2.3.2.2, 4.0
NA	2.III.3f Operating Procedures	10CFR72.24(f) 10CFR72.128(a) (5)	10.0, 8.0
		10CFR72.236(h)	8.0
		10CFR72.24(1)(2)	1.2.1, 1.2.2
		10CFR72.236(1)	2.3.2.1
		10CFR72.24(e) 10CFR72.104(b)	10.0, 8.0
	2.III.3.g Acceptance Tests & Maintenance	10CFR72.122(1) 10CFR72.236(g) 10CFR72.122(f) 10CFR72.128(a) (1)	9.0
2.3 Safety Protection Systems			2.3

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Regulat Sectior	ory Guide 3.61 and Content	Associated NUREG- 1536 Review Criteria	Applicable 10CFR72 or 10CFR20 Requirement	HI-STORM FSAR
2.3	1 General			2.3
2.3	2 Protection by	2.III.3.b Structural	10CFR72.236(1)	2.3.2.1
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This FSAR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.

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		9.III.1.hRecords of Maintenance	10CFR72.212(b) (8)	9.2
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		9.III.1.d Submit Pre-Op Test Results to NRC	10CFR72.82(e)	(4)
		9.III.1.i Casks Conspicuously and Durably Marked 9.III.3 Cask Identification	10CFR72.236(k)	9.1.7, 9.1.1.(12)
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NA	12.III.2 Decontamination	10CFR72.236(i)	8.0, 10.1
NA	12.III.2 Wet or Dry Loading	10CFR72.236(h)	8.0
NA	12.III.2 Confinement Effectiveness	10CFR72.236(j)	9.0
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Notes:

- <sup>(1)</sup> The stated requirement is the responsibility of the licensee (i.e., utility) as part of the ISFSI pad and is therefore not addressed in this application.
- <sup>(2)</sup> It is assumed that approval of the FSAR by the NRC is the basis for the Commission's acceptance of the tests defined in Chapter 9.
- <sup>(3)</sup> Not applicable to HI-STORM 100 System. The functional adequacy of all important to safety components is demonstrated by analyses.
- <sup>(4)</sup> The stated requirement is the responsibility of licensee (i.e., utility) as part of the ISFSI and is therefore not addressed in this application.
- <sup>(5)</sup> The stated requirement is not applicable to the HI-STORM 100 System. No monitoring is required for accident conditions.
- "--" There is no corresponding NUREG-1536 criteria, no applicable 10CFR72 or 10CFR20 regulatory requirement, or the item is not addressed in the FSAR.
- "NA" There is no Regulatory Guide 3.61 section that corresponds to the NUREG-1536, 10CFR72, or 10CFR20 requirement being addressed.

### Table 1.0.3

## HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM FSAR CLARIFICATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO NUREG-1536

NUREG-1536 Requirement	Alternate Method to Meet NUREG-1536 Intent	Justification
2.V.2.(b)(1) "The NRC accepts as the maximum and minimum "normal" temperatures the highest and lowest ambient temperatures recorded in each year, averaged over the years of record."	Exception: Section 2.2.1.4 for environmental temperatures utilizes an upper bounding value of 80°F on the annual average ambient temperatures for the United States.	The 80°F temperature set forth in Table 2.2.2 is greater than the annual average ambient temperature at any location in the continental United States. Inasmuch as the primary effect of the environmental temperature is on the computed fuel cladding temperature to establish long-term fuel cladding integrity, the annual average ambient temperature for each ISFSI site should be below 80°F. The large thermal inertia of the HI-STORM 100 System ensures that the daily fluctuations in temperatures do not affect the temperatures of the system. Additionally, the 80°F ambient temperature is combined with insolation in accordance with 10CFR71.71 averaged over 24 hours.
2.V.2.(b)(3)(f) "10CFR Part 72 identifies several other natural phenomena events (including seiche, tsunami, and hurricane) that should be addressed for spent fuel storage."	<u>Clarification</u> : A site-specific safety analysis of the effects of seiche, tsunami, and hurricane on the HI- STORM 100 System must be performed prior to use if these events are applicable to the site.	In accordance with NUREG-1536, 2.V.(b)(3)(f), if seiche, tsunami, and hurricane are not addressed in the SAR and they prove to be applicable to the site, a safety analysis is required prior to approval for use of the DCSS under either a site specific, or general license.

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## HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM FSAR CLARIFICATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO NUREG-1536

NUREG-1536 Requirement	Alternate Method to Meet NUREG-1536 Intent	Justification
3.V.1.d.i.(2)(a), page 3-11, "Drops with the axis generally vertical should be analyzed for both the conditions of a flush impact and an initial impact at a corner of the cask"	<u>Clarification</u> : As stated in NUREG- 1536, 3.V.(d), page 3-11, "Generally, applicants establish the design basis in terms of the maximum height to which the cask is lifted outside the spent fuel building, or the maximum deceleration that the cask could experience in a drop." The maximum deceleration for a corner drop is specified as 45g's for the HI- STORM overpack. No carry height limit is specified for the corner drop.	In Chapter 3, the MPC and HI-STORM overpack are evaluated under a 45g radial loading. A 45g axial loading on the MPC is bounded by the analysis presented in the HI-STAR FSAR, Docket 72-1008, under a 60g loading, and is not repeated in this FSAR. In Chapter 3, the HI-STORM overpack is evaluated under a 45g axial loading. Therefore, the HI-STORM overpack and MPC are qualified for a 45g loading as a result of a corner drop. Depending on the design of the lifting device, the type of rigging used, the administrative vertical carry height limit, and the stiffness of the impacted surface, site-specific analyses may be required to demonstrate that the deceleration limit of 45g's is not exceeded.
<ul> <li>3.V.2.b.i.(1), Page 3-19, Para. 1, "All concrete used in storage cask system ISFSIs, and subject to NRC review, should be reinforced"</li> <li>3.V.2.b.i.(2)(b), Page 3-20, Para. 1, "The NRC accepts the use of ACI 349 for the design, material selection and specification, and construction of all reinforced concrete structures that are not addressed within the scope of ACI 359".</li> <li>3.V.2.c.i, Page 3-22, Para. 3, "Materials and material properties used for the design and construction of reinforced concrete structures</li> </ul>	Exception: The HI-STORM overpack concrete is not reinforced. However, ACI 349 [1.0.4] is used as guidance for the material selection and specification, and placement of the plain concrete. Appendix 1.D provides the relevant sections of ACI 349 applicable to the plain concrete in the overpack, including clarifications on implementation of this code. ACI 318-95 [1.0.5] is used for the calculation of the compressive strength of the plain concrete.	Concrete is provided in the HI-STORM overpack primarily for the purpose of radiation shielding during normal operations. During lifting and handling operations and under certain accident conditions, the compressive strength of the concrete (which is not impaired by the absence of reinforcement) is utilized. However, since the structural reliance under loadings which produce section flexure and tension is entirely on the steel structure of the overpack, reinforcement in the concrete will serve no useful purpose. To ensure the quality of the shielding concrete, all relevant provisions of ACI 349 are imposed as clarified in Appendix 1.D. The temperature limits for normal conditions are per Paragraph A.4.3 of

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NUREG-1536 Requirement	Alternate Method to Meet NUREG-1536 Intent	Justification
of ACI 359 should comply with the requirements of ACI 349".		off-normal and accident conditions are per Paragraph A.4.2 of Appendix A to ACI 349.
		Finally, the Fort St. Vrain ISFSI (Docket No. 72-9) also utilized plain concrete for shielding purposes, which is important to safety.
3.V.3.b.i.(2), Page 3-29, Para. 1, "The NRC accepts the use of ANSI/ANS-57.9 (together with the codes and standards cited therein) as the basic reference for ISFSI structures important to safety that are not designed in accordance with Section III of the ASME B&PV Code."	<u>Clarification:</u> The HI-STORM overpack steel structure is designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3. Any exceptions to the Code are listed in Table 2.2.15.	The overpack structure is a steel weldment consisting of "plate and shell type" members. As such, it is appropriate to design the structure to Section III, Class 3 of Subsection NF. The very same approach has been used in the structural evaluation of the "intermediate shells" in the HI-STAR 100 overpack (Docket Number 72-1008) previously reviewed and approved by the USNRC.
<ul> <li>4.IV.5, Page 4-2 "for each fuel type proposed for storage, the DCSS should ensure a very low probability (e.g., 0.5 percent per fuel rod) of cladding breach during long-term storage."</li> <li>4.IV.1, Page 4-3, Para. 1 "the staff should verify that cladding temperatures for each fuel type proposed for storage will be below the expected damage thresholds for normal conditions of storage."</li> <li>4.IV.1, Page 4-3, Para. 2 "fuel cladding limits for each fuel type should be defined in the SAR with the proposed for storage thresholds for normal conditions of storage."</li> </ul>	<u>Clarification</u> : As described in Section 4.3, all fuel array types authorized for storage are assigned a single peak fuel cladding temperature limit.	As described in Section 4.3, all fuel array types authorized for storage have been evaluated for the peak normal fuel cladding temperature limit of 400°C.
specifications." 4.V.1, Page 4-3, Para. 4 "the applicant should		

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NUREG-1536 Requirement	Alternate Method to Meet NUREG-1536 Intent	Justification
verify that these cladding temperature limits are appropriate for all fuel types proposed for storage, and that the fuel cladding temperatures will remain below the limit for facility operations (e.g., fuel transfer) and the worst-case credible accident."		
4.V.4.a, Page 4-6, Para. 6 "the basket wall temperature of the hottest assembly can then be used to determine the peak rod temperature of the hottest assembly using the Wooten-Epstein correlation."	<u>Clarification:</u> As discussed in Subsection 4.4.2, conservative maximum fuel temperatures are obtained directly from the cask thermal analysis. The peak fuel cladding temperatures are then used to determine the corresponding peak basket wall temperatures using a finite-element based update of Wooten-Epstein (described in Subsection 4.4.1.1.2)	The finite-element based thermal conductivity is greater than a Wooten-Epstein based value. This larger thermal conductivity minimizes the fuel-to- basket temperature difference. Since the basket temperature is less than the fuel temperature, minimizing the temperature difference conservatively maximizes the basket wall temperature.
4.V.4.b, Page 4-7, Para. 2 "high burnup effects should also be considered in determining the fuel region effective thermal conductivity."	Exception: All calculations of fuel assembly effective thermal conductivities, described in Subsection 4.4.1.1.2, use nominal fuel design dimensions, neglecting wall thinning associated with high burnup.	Within Subsection 4.4.1.1.2, the calculated effective thermal conductivities based on nominal design fuel dimensions are compared with available literature values and are demonstrated to be conservative by a substantial margin.
4.V.4.c, Page 4-7, Para. 5 "a heat balance on the surface of the cask should be given and the results presented."	<u>Clarification:</u> No additional heat balance is performed or provided.	The FLUENT computational fluid dynamics program used to perform evaluations of the HI-STORM Overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask, which uses a discretized numerical solution algorithm, enforces an

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NUREG-1536 Requirement	Alternate Method to Meet NUREG-1536 Intent	Justification
		energy balance on all discretized volumes throughout the computational domain. This solution method, therefore, ensures a heat balance at the surface of the cask.
4.V.5.a, Page 4-8, Para. 2 "the SAR should include input and output file listings for the thermal evaluations."	<u>Exception:</u> No input or output file listings are provided in Chapter 4.	A complete set of computer program input and output files would be in excess of three hundred pages. All computer files are considered proprietary because they provide details of the design and analysis methods. In order to minimize the amount of proprietary information in the FSAR, computer files are provided in the proprietary calculation packages.
4.V.5.c, Page 4-10, Para. 3 "free volume calculations should account for thermal expansion of the cask internal components and the fuel when subjected to accident temperatures.	Exception: All free volume calculations use nominal confinement boundary dimensions, but the volume occupied by the fuel assemblies is calculated using maximum weights and minimum densities.	Calculating the volume occupied by the fuel assemblies using maximum weights and minimum densities conservatively overpredicts the volume occupied by the fuel and correspondingly underpredicts the remaining free volume.

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## HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM FSAR CLARIFICATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO NUREG-1536

NUREG-1536 Requirement	Alternate Method to Meet NUREG-1536 Intent	Justification
7.V.4 "Confinement Analysis. Review the applicant's confinement analysis and the resulting annual dose at the controlled area boundary."	<u>Exception</u> : No confinement analysis is performed and no effluent dose at the controlled area boundary is calculated.	The MPC uses redundant closures to assure that there is no release of radioactive materials under all credible conditions. Analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 11 demonstrate that the confinement boundary does not degrade under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. Multiple inspection methods are used to verify the integrity of the confinement boundary (e.g.,non- destructive examination, pressure testing, and fabrication shop leakage testing).
		Pursuant to ISG-18, the Holtec MPC is constructed in a manner that supports leakage from the confinement boundary being non-credible. Therefore, no confinement analysis is required.
9.V.1.a, Page 9-4, Para. 4 "Acceptance criteria should be defined in accordance with NB/NC-5330, "Ultrasonic Acceptance Standards"."	<u>Clarification:</u> Section 9.1.1.1 and the Design Drawings specify that the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB, Article NB-5332 will be used for the acceptance criteria for the volumetric examination of the MPC lid-to-shell weld.	In accordance with the first line on page 9-4, the NRC endorses the use of "appropriate acceptance criteria as defined by either the ASME code, or an alternative approach" The ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB, Paragraph NB-5332 is appropriate acceptance criteria for pre-service examination.

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NUREG-1536 Requirement	Alternate Method to Meet NUREG-1536 Intent	Justification
9.V.1.d, Para. 1 "Tests of the effectiveness of both the gamma and neutron shielding may be required if, for example, the cask contains a poured lead shield or a special neutron absorbing material."	Exception: Subsection 9.1.5 describes the control of special processes, such as neutron shield material installation, to be performed in lieu of scanning or probing with neutron sources.	The dimensional compliance of all shielding cavities is verified by inspection to design drawing requirements prior to shield installation. The Holtite-A shield material is installed in accordance with written, approved, and qualified special process procedures. The composition of the Holtite-A is confirmed by inspection and tests prior to first use. Following the first loading for the HI-TRAC transfer cask and each HI-STORM overpack, a shield effectiveness test is performed in accordance with written approved
13.III, " the application must include, at a minimum, a description that satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G, 'Quality Assurance'"	Exception: Section 13.0 incorporates the NRC-approved Holtec International Quality Assurance Program Manual by reference rather than describing the Holtec QA program in detail.	procedures, as specified in Section 9.1. The NRC has approved Revision 13 of the Holtec Quality Assurance Program Manual under 10 CFR 71 (NRC QA Program Approval for Radioactive Material Packages No. 0784, Rev. 3). Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.140(d), Holtec will apply this QA program to all important-to-safety dry storage cask activities. Incorporating the Holtec QA Program Manual by reference eliminates duplicate documentation.

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#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

HI-STORM 100 (acronym for <u>Holtec International Storage and Transfer Operation Reinforced</u> <u>Module</u>) is a spent nuclear fuel storage system designed to be in full compliance with the requirements of 10CFR72. The annex "100" is a model number designation which denotes a system weighing over 100 tons. The HI-STORM 100 System consists of a sealed metallic canister, herein abbreviated as the "MPC", contained within an overpack. Its design features are intended to simplify and reduce on-site SNF loading, handling, and monitoring operations, and to provide for radiological protection and maintenance of structural and thermal safety margins.

The HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack designs are variants of the HI-STORM 100 overpack design and have their own drawings in Section 1.5. The "S" suffix indicates an enhanced overpack design, as described later in this section. "Version B" indicates an enhanced HI-STORM 100S overpack design. The HI-STORM 100S and 100S Version B accept the same MPCs and fuel types as the HI-STORM 100 overpack and the basic structural, shielding, and thermal-hydraulic characteristics remain unchanged. Hereafter in this FSAR reference to HI-STORM 100 System or the HI-STORM overpack is construed to apply to the HI-STORM 100, the HI-STORM 100S, and the HI-STORM 100S Version B. Where necessary, the text distinguishes among the three overpack designs. See Figures 1.1.1A and 1.1.3A for pictorial views of the HI-STORM 100S overpack design. See Figures 1.1.1B and 1.1.3B for pictorial views of the HI-STORM 100S Version B design.

The HI-STORM 100A overpack is a variant of two of the three HI-STORM 100 System overpack designs and is specially outfitted with an extended baseplate and gussets to enable the overpack to be anchored to the ISFSI pad in high seismic applications. In the following, the modified structure of the HI-STORM 100A, in each of four quadrants, is denoted as a "sector lug." The HI-STORM 100A anchor design is applicable to the HI-STORM 100S overpack design, in which case the assembly would be named HI-STORM 100SA. The HI-STORM 100A anchor design is not applicable to the HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack design. Therefore, the HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack cannot be deployed in the anchored configuration at this time. Hereafter in the text, discussion of HI-STORM 100A applies to both the standard (HI-STORM 100A) and HI-STORM 100SA overpacks, unless otherwise clarified.

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to accommodate a wide variety of spent nuclear fuel assemblies in a single basic overpack design by utilizing different MPCs. The external dimensions of all MPCs are identical to allow the use of a single overpack. Each of the MPCs has different internals (baskets) to accommodate distinct fuel characteristics. Each MPC is identified by the maximum quantity of fuel assemblies it is capable of receiving. The MPC-24, MPC-24E, and MPC-24EF contain a maximum of 24 PWR fuel assemblies; the MPC-32 and MPC-32F contain a maximum of 32 PWR fuel assemblies; and the MPC-68F, and MPC-68FF contain a maximum of 68 BWR fuel assemblies.

The HI-STORM overpack is constructed from a combination of steel and concrete, both of which are materials with long, proven histories of usage in nuclear applications. The HI-STORM overpack incorporates and combines many desirable features of previously-approved concrete and metal

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module designs. In essence, the HI-STORM overpack is a hybrid of metal and concrete systems, with the design objective of emulating the best features and dispensing with the drawbacks of both. The HI-STORM overpack is best referred to as a METCON<sup>™</sup> (metal/concrete composite) system.

Figures 1.1.1, 1.1.1A, and 1.1.1B show the HI-STORM 100 System with two of its major constituents, the MPC and the storage overpack, in a cut-away view. The MPC, shown partially withdrawn from the storage overpack, is an integrally welded pressure vessel designed to meet the stress limits of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NB [1.1.1]. The MPC defines the confinement boundary for the stored spent nuclear fuel assemblies with respect to 10CFR72 requirements and attendant review considerations. The HI-STORM storage overpack provides mechanical protection, cooling, and radiological shielding for the contained MPC.

In essence, the HI-STORM 100 System is the storage-only counterpart of the HI-STAR 100 System (Docket Numbers 72-1008 (Ref. [1.1.2]) and 71-9261 (Ref. [1.1.3])). Both HI-STORM and HI-STAR are engineered to house identical MPCs. Since the MPC is designed to meet the requirements of both 10CFR71 and 10CFR72 for transportation and storage, respectively, the HI-STORM 100 System allows rapid decommissioning of the ISFSI by simply transferring the loaded MPC's directly into HI-STAR 100 overpacks for off-site transport. This alleviates the additional fuel handling steps required by storage-only casks to unload the cask and repackage the fuel into a suitable transportation cask.

In contrast to the HI-STAR 100 overpack, which provides a containment boundary for the SNF during transport, the HI-STORM storage overpack does not constitute a containment or confinement enclosure. The HI-STORM overpack is equipped with large penetrations near its lower and upper extremities to permit natural circulation of air to provide for the passive cooling of the MPC and the contained radioactive material. The HI-STORM overpack is engineered to be an effective barrier against the radiation emitted by the stored materials, and an efficiently configured metal/concrete composite to attenuate the loads transmitted to the MPC during a natural phenomena or hypothetical accident event. Other auxiliary functions of the HI-STORM 100 overpack include isolation of the SNF from abnormal environmental or man-made events, such as impact of a tornado borne missile. As the subsequent chapters of this FSAR demonstrate, the HI-STORM overpack is engineered with large margins of safety with respect to cooling, shielding, and mechanical/structural functions.

The HI-STORM 100 System is autonomous inasmuch as it provides SNF and radioactive material confinement, radiation shielding, criticality control and passive heat removal independent of any other facility, structures, or components. The surveillance and maintenance required by the plant's staff is minimized by the HI-STORM 100 System since it is completely passive and is composed of materials with long proven histories in the nuclear industry. The HI-STORM 100 System can be used either singly or as the basic storage module in an ISFSI. The site for an ISFSI can be located either at a reactor or away from a reactor.

The information presented in this report is intended to demonstrate the acceptability of the HI-STORM 100 System for use under the general license provisions of Subpart K by meeting the criteria set forth in 10CFR72.236.

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The modularity of the HI-STORM 100 System accrues several advantages. Different MPCs, identical in exterior dimensions, manufacturing requirements, and handling features, but different in their SNF arrangement details, are designed to fit a common overpack. Even though the different MPCs have fundamentally identical design and manufacturing attributes, qualification of HI-STORM 100 requires consideration of the variations in the characteristics of the MPCs. In most cases, however, it is possible to identify the most limiting MPC geometry and the specific loading condition for the safety evaluation, and the detailed analyses are then carried out for that bounding condition. In those cases where this is not possible, multiple parallel analyses are performed.

The HI-STORM overpack is not engineered for transport and, therefore, will not be submitted for 10CFR Part 71 certification. HI-STORM 100, however, is designed to possess certain key elements of flexibility.

For example:

- The HI-STORM overpack is stored at the ISFSI pad in a vertical orientation, which helps minimize the size of the ISFSI and leads to an effective natural convection cooling flow around the MPC.
- The HI-STORM overpack can be loaded with a loaded MPC using the HI-TRAC transfer cask inside the 10CFR50 [1.1.4] facility, prepared for storage, transferred to the ISFSI, and stored in a vertical configuration, or directly loaded using the HI-TRAC transfer cask at or nearby the ISFSI storage pad.

The version of the HI-STORM overpack equipped with sector lugs to anchor it to the ISFSI pad is labeled HI-STORM 100A, shown in Figure 1.1.4. Figure 1.1.5 shows the sector lugs and anchors used to fasten the overpack to the pad in closer view. Details on HI-STORM 100A are presented in the drawing and BOM contained in Section 1.5. Users may employ a double nut arrangement as an option. The HI-STORM 100A overpack will be deployed at those ISFSI sites where the postulated seismic event (defined by the three orthogonal ZPAs) exceeds the maximum limit permitted for free-standing installation. The design of the ISFSI pad and the embedment are necessarily site-specific and the responsibility of the ISFSI owner. These designs shall be in accordance with the requirements specified in Appendix 2.A. The jurisdictional boundary between the anchored cask design and the embedment design is defined in Table 2.0.5. Additional description of the HI-STORM 100A configuration is provided in Subsection 1.2.1.2.1. The anchored design is applicable to the HI-STORM 100 and the HI-STORM 100S overpack designs only.

The MPC is a multi-purpose SNF storage device both with respect to the type of fuel assemblies and its versatility of use. The MPC is engineered as a cylindrical prismatic structure with square cross section storage cavities. The number of storage locations depends on the type of fuel. Regardless of the storage cell count, the construction of the MPC is fundamentally the same; it is built as a honeycomb of cellular elements positioned within a circumscribing cylindrical canister shell. The manner of cell-to-cell weld-up and cell-to-canister shell interface employed in the MPC imparts extremely high structural stiffness to the assemblage, which is an important attribute for mechanical accident events. Figure 1.1.2 shows an elevation cross section of an MPC.

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The MPC enclosure vessel is identical to those presented in References [1.1.2] and [1.1.3]. However, certain fuel basket models may not be certified for storage or transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System. The Part 71 and 72 CoCs for HI-STAR 100 should be consulted for the MPC models that are certified for that system. Referencing these documents, as applicable, avoids repetition of information on the MPCs which is comprehensively set forth in the above-mentioned Holtec International documents docketed with the NRC. However, sufficient information and drawings are presented in this report to maintain clarity of exposition of technical data.

The HI-STORM storage overpack is designed to provide the necessary neutron and gamma shielding to comply with the provisions of 10CFR72 for dry storage of SNF at an ISFSI. Cross sectional views of the HI-STORM storage overpacks are presented in Figures 1.1.3,1.1.3A, and 1.1.3B. A HI-TRAC transfer cask is required for loading of the MPC and movement of the loaded MPC from the cask loading area of a nuclear plant spent fuel pool to the storage overpack. The HI-TRAC is engineered to be emplaced with an empty MPC into the cask loading area of nuclear plant spent fuel pools for fuel loading (or unloading). The HI-TRAC/MPC assembly is designed to preclude intrusion of pool water into the narrow annular space between the HI-TRAC and the MPC while the assembly is submerged in the pool water. The HI-TRAC transfer cask also allows dry loading (or unloading) of SNF into the MPC.

To summarize, the HI-STORM 100 System has been engineered to:

• minimize handling of the SNF;

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- provide shielding and physical protection for the MPC;
- permit rapid and unencumbered decommissioning of the ISFSI;
- require minimal ongoing surveillance and maintenance by plant staff;
- minimize dose to operators during loading and handling;
- allow transfer of the loaded MPC to a HI-STAR overpack for transportation.

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MPE CLOSURE RING ORAIN PORT VENT PORT MPC LID LIFT LUG PER FLEL SHADER **ORAIN PIPE** FUEL BASKET-SHELL BASEPLATE LOWER FUEL SPACER FIGURE 1.1.2; CROSS SECTION ELEVATION VIEW OF MPC REPORT HI-2002444 REVISION O

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# FIGURE 1.1.4; A PICTORAL VIEW OF THE HI-STORM 100A OVERPACK (100SA MODEL SHOWN)

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## FIGURE 1.1.5; ANCHORING DETAIL FOR THE HI-STORM 100A AND 100SA OVERPACKS



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### 1.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HI-STORM 100 System

### 1.2.1 System Characteristics

The basic HI-STORM 100 System consists of interchangeable MPCs providing a confinement boundary for BWR or PWR spent nuclear fuel, a storage overpack providing a structural and radiological boundary for long-term storage of the MPC placed inside it, and a transfer cask providing a structural and radiological boundary for transfer of a loaded MPC from a nuclear plant spent fuel storage pool to the storage overpack. Figures 1.2.1 and 1.2.1A provide example cross sectional views of the HI-STORM 100 System with an MPC inserted into HI-STORM 100 and HI-STORM 100S storage overpacks, respectively. Figure 1.1.1B provides similar information for the HI-STORM 100 System using a HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack. Each of these components is described b elow, including information with r espect to c omponent fabrication techniques a nd designed safety features. All structures, systems, and components of the HI-STORM 100 System, which are identified as Important to Safety are specified in Table 2.2.6. This discussion is supplemented with a full set of drawings in Section 1.5.

The HI-STORM 100 System is comprised of three discrete components:

- i. multi-purpose canister (MPC)
- ii. storage overpack (HI-STORM)
- iii. transfer cask (HI-TRAC)

Necessary auxiliaries required to deploy the HI-STORM 100 System for storage are:

- i. vacuum drying (or other moisture removal) system
- ii. helium (He) backfill system (or other system capable of the same backfill condition)
- iii. lifting and handling systems
- iv welding equipment
- v. transfer vehicles/trailer

All MPCs have identical exterior dimensions that render them interchangeable. The outer diameter of the MPC is 68-3/8 inches<sup>†</sup> and the overall length is 190-1/2 inches. See Section 1.5 for the MPC | drawings. Due to the differing storage contents of each MPC, the maximum loaded weight differs among MPCs. See Table 3.2.1 for each MPC weight. However, the maximum weight of a loaded MPC is approximately 44-1/2 tons. Tables 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 contain the key system data and | parameters for the MPCs.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Dimensions discussed in this section are considered nominal values.

A single, base HI-STORM overpack design is provided which is capable of storing each type of MPC. The overpack inner cavity is sized to accommodate the MPCs. The inner diameter of the overpack inner shell is 73-1/2 inches and the height of the cavity is 191-1/2 inches. The overpack inner shell is provided with channels distributed around the inner cavity to present an inside diameter of 69-1/2 inches. The channels are intended to offer a flexible medium to absorb some of the impact during a non-mechanistic tip-over, while still allowing the cooling air flow through the ventilated overpack. The outer diameter of the overpack is 132-1/2 inches. The overall height of the HI-STORM 100 overpack is 239-1/2 inches.

There are two variants of the HI-STORM 100S overpack, differing from each other only in height and weight. The HI-STORM 100S(232) is 232 inches high, and the HI-STORM 100S(243) is 243 inches high. The HI-STORM 100S(243) is approximately 10,100 lbs heavier assuming standard density concrete. Hereafter in the text, these two versions of the HI-STORM 100S overpack will only be referred to as HI-STORM 100S and will be discussed separately only if the design feature being discussed is different between the two overpacks. See Section 1.5 for drawings.

There are also two variants of the HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack, differing from each other only in height and weight. The HI-STORM 100S-218 is 218 inches high, and the HI-STORM 100S-229 is 229 inches high. The HI-STORM 100S-229 is approximately 8,700 lbs heavier, including standard density concrete. Hereafter in the text, these two versions of the HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack will only be referred to as HI-STORM 100S Version B and will be discussed separately only if the design feature being discussed is different between the two overpacks. See Section 1.5 for drawings.

The weight of the overpack without an MPC varies from approximately 135 tons to 160 tons. See Table 3.2.1 for the detailed weights.

Before proceeding to present detailed physical data on the HI-STORM 100 System, it is of contextual importance to summarize the design attributes which enhance the performance and safety of the system. Some of the principal features of the HI-STORM 100 System which enhance its effectiveness as an SNF storage device and a safe SNF confinement structure are:

- the honeycomb design of the MPC fuel basket;
- the effective distribution of neutron and gamma shielding materials within the system;
- the high heat dissipation capability;
- engineered features to promote convective heat transfer;
- the structural robustness of the steel-concrete-steel overpack construction.

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The honeycomb design of the MPC fuel baskets renders the basket into a multi-flange plate weldment where all structural elements (i.e., box walls) are arrayed in two orthogonal sets of plates. Consequently, the walls of the cells are either completely co-planar (i.e., no offset) or orthogonal with each other. There is complete edge-to-edge continuity between the contiguous cells.

Among the many benefits of the honeycomb construction is the uniform distribution of the metal mass of the basket over the entire length of the basket. Physical reasoning suggests that a uniformly distributed mass provides a more effective shielding barrier than can be obtained from a nonuniform basket. In other words, the honeycomb basket is a most effective radiation attenuation device. The complete cell-to-cell connectivity inherent in the honeycomb basket structure provides an uninterrupted heat transmission path, making the MPC an effective heat rejection device.

The composite shell construction in the overpack, steel-concrete-steel, allows ease of fabrication and eliminates the need for the sole reliance on the strength of concrete.

A description of each of the components is provided in the following sections, along with information with respect to its fabrication and safety features. This discussion is supplemented with the full set of drawings in Section 1.5.

### 1.2.1.1 <u>Multi-Purpose Canisters</u>

The MPCs are welded cylindrical structures as shown in cross sectional views of Figures 1.2.2 through 1.2.4. The outer diameter and cylindrical height of each MPC are fixed. Each spent fuel MPC is an assembly consisting of a honeycombed fuel basket, a baseplate, canister shell, a lid, and a closure ring, as depicted in the MPC cross section elevation view, Figure 1.2.5. The number of spent nuclear fuel storage locations in each of the MPCs depends on the fuel assembly characteristics.

There are eight MPC models, distinguished by the type and number of fuel assemblies authorized for loading. Section 1.2.3 and Table 1.2.1 summarize the allowable contents for each MPC model. Section 2.1.9 provides the detailed specifications for the contents authorized for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System. Drawings for the MPCs are provided in Section 1.5.

The MPC provides the confinement boundary for the stored fuel. Figure 1.2.6 provides an elevation view of the MPC confinement boundary. The confinement boundary is defined by the MPC baseplate, shell, lid, port covers, and closure ring. The confinement boundary is a strength-welded enclosure of all stainless steel construction.

The PWR MPC-24, MPC-24E and MPC-24EF differ in construction from the MPC-32 (including the MPC-32F) and the MPC-68 (including the MPC-68F and MPC-68FF) in one important aspect: the fuel storage cells in the MPC-24 series are physically separated from one another by a "flux trap", for criticality control. The PWR MPC-32 and -32F are designed similar to the MPC-68 (without flux traps) and its design includes credit for soluble boron in the MPC water during wet fuel loading and unloading operations for criticality control.

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The MPC fuel baskets of non-flux trap construction (namely, MPC-68, MPC-68F, MPC-68FF, MPC-32, and MPC-32F) are formed from an array of plates welded to each other at their | intersections. In the flux-trap type fuel baskets (MPC-24, MPC-24E, and MPC-24EF), formed angles are interposed onto the orthogonally configured plate assemblage to create the required flux-trap channels (see MPC-24 and MPC-24E fuel basket drawings in Section 1.5). In both | configurations, two key attributes of the basket are preserved:

- i. The cross section of the fuel basket simulates a multi-flanged closed section beam, resulting in extremely high bending rigidity.
- ii. The principal structural frame of the basket consists of co-planar plate-type members (i.e., no offset).

This structural feature eliminates the source of severe bending stresses in the basket structure by eliminating the offset between the cell walls that must transfer the inertia load of the stored SNF to the basket/MPC interface during the various postulated accident events (e.g., non-mechanistic tipover, uncontrolled lowering of a cask during on-site transfer, or off-site transport events, etc.).

The MPC fuel basket is positioned and supported within the MPC shell by a set of basket supports welded to the inside of the MPC shell. Between the periphery of the basket, the MPC shell, and the basket supports, optional aluminum heat conduction elements (AHCEs) may have been installed in the early vintage MPCs fabricated, certified, and loaded under the original version or Amendment 1 of the HI-STORM 100 System CoC. The presence of these a luminum heat conduction elements is acceptable for MPCs loaded under the original CoC or Amendment 1, since the governing thermal analysis for Amendment 1 conservatively modeled the AHCEs as restrictions to convective flow in the basket, but took no credit for heat transfer through them. The heat loads authorized under Amendment 1 bound those for the original CoC, with the same MPC design. For MPCs loaded under Amendment 2 or a later version of the HI-STORM 100 CoC, the aluminum heat conduction elements shall not be installed. MPCs both with and without aluminum heat conduction elements installed are compatible with all HI-STORM overpacks. If used, these heat conduction elements are fabricated from thin aluminum alloy 1100 in shapes and a design that allows a snug fit in the confined spaces and ease of installation. If used, the heat conduction elements are installed along the full length of the MPC basket except at the drain pipe location to create a nonstructural thermal connection that facilitates heat transfer from the basket to shell. In their operating condition, the heat conduction elements contact the MPC shell and basket walls.

Lifting lugs attached to the inside surface of the MPC canister shell serve to permit placement of the empty MPC into the HI-TRAC transfer cask. The lifting lugs also serve to axially locate the MPC lid prior to welding. These internal lifting lugs are not used to handle a loaded MPC. Since the MPC lid is installed prior to any handling of a loaded MPC, there is no access to the lifting lugs once the MPC is loaded.

The top end of the MPC incorporates a redundant closure system. Figure 1.2.6 shows the MPC closure details. The MPC lid is a circular plate (fabricated from one piece, or two pieces - split top

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and bottom) edge-welded to the MPC outer shell. If the two-piece lid design is employed, only the top piece is analyzed as part of the enclosure vessel pressure boundary. The bottom piece acts as a radiation shield and is attached to the top piece with a non-structural, non-pressure retaining weld. The lid is equipped with vent and drain ports that are utilized to remove moisture and air from the MPC, and backfill the MPC with a specified amount of inert gas (helium). The vent and drain ports are covered and seal welded before the closure ring is installed. The closure ring is a circular ring edge-welded to the MPC shell and lid. The MPC lid provides sufficient rigidity to allow the entire MPC loaded with SNF to be lifted by threaded holes in the MPC lid.

For fuel assemblies that are shorter than the design basis length, upper and lower fuel spacers (as appropriate) maintain the axial position of the fuel assembly within the MPC basket. The upper fuel spacers are threaded into the underside of the MPC lid as shown in Figure 1.2.5. The lower fuel spacers are placed in the bottom of each fuel basket cell. The upper and lower fuel spacers are designed to withstand normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage. An axial clearance of approximately 2 to 2-1/2 inches is provided to account for the irradiation and thermal growth of the fuel assemblies. The suggested values for the upper and lower fuel spacer lengths are listed in Tables 2.1.9 and 2.1.10 for each fuel assembly type. The actual length of fuel spacers will be determined on a site-specific or fuel assembly-specific basis.

The MPC is constructed entirely from stainless steel alloy materials (except for the neutron absorber and optional aluminum heat conduction elements). No carbon steel parts are permitted in the MPC. Concerns regarding interaction of coated carbon steel materials and various MPC operating environments [1.2.1] are not applicable to the MPC. All structural components in a MPC shall be made of Alloy X, a designation which warrants further explanation.

Alloy X is a material that is expected to be acceptable as a Mined Geological Disposal System (MGDS) waste package and which meets the thermophysical properties set forth in this document.

At this time, there is considerable uncertainty with respect to the material of construction for an MPC that would be acceptable as a waste package for the MGDS. Candidate materials being considered for acceptability by the DOE include:

- Type 316
- Type 316LN
- Type 304

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• Type 304LN

The DOE material selection process is primarily driven by corrosion resistance in the potential environment of the MGDS. As the decision regarding a suitable material to meet disposal requirements is not imminent, the MPC design allows the use of any one of the four Alloy X materials.

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For the MPC design and analysis, Alloy X (as defined in this FSAR) may be one of the following materials. Any steel part in an MPC may be fabricated from any of the acceptable Alloy X materials listed below, except that the steel pieces comprising the MPC shell (i.e., the 1/2" thick cylinder) must be fabricated from the same Alloy X stainless steel type.

- · Type 316
- Type 316LN
- Type 304
- Type 304LN

The Alloy X approach is accomplished by qualifying the MPC for all mechanical, structural, neutronic, radiological, and thermal conditions using material thermophysical properties that are the least favorable for the entire group for the analysis in question. For example, when calculating the rate of heat rejection to the outside environment, the value of thermal conductivity used is the lowest for the candidate material group. Similarly, the stress analysis calculations use the lowest value of the ASME Code allowable stress intensity for the entire group. Stated differently, we have defined a material, which is referred to as Alloy X, whose thermophysical properties, from the MPC design perspective, are the least favorable of the candidate materials.

The evaluation of the Alloy X constituents to determine the least favorable properties is provided in Appendix 1.A.

The Alloy X approach is conservative because no matter which material is ultimately utilized in the MPC construction, the Alloy X approach guarantees that the performance of the MPC will exceed the analytical predictions contained in this document.

### 1.2.1.2 <u>Overpacks</u>

### 1.2.1.2.1 <u>HI-STORM Overpack</u>

The HI-STORM overpacks are rugged, heavy-walled cylindrical vessels. Figures 1.1.3B, 1.2.7, 1.2.8, and 1.2.8A provide cross sectional views of the HI-STORM 100 System, showing all of the overpack designs. The HI-STORM 100A overpack design is an anchored variant of the HI-STORM 100 and -100S designs and hereinafter is identified by name only when the discussion specifically applies to the anchored overpack. The HI-STORM 100A differs only in the diameter of the overpack baseplate and the presence of bolt holes and associated anchorage hardware (see Figures 1.1.4 and 1.1.5). The main structural function of the storage overpack is provided by carbon steel, and the main shielding function is provided by plain concrete. The overpack plain concrete is enclosed by cylindrical steel shells, a thick steel baseplate, and a top plate. The overpack lid has appropriate concrete shielding to provide neutron and gamma attenuation in the vertical direction.

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The storage overpack provides an internal cylindrical cavity of sufficient height and diameter for housing an MPC. The inner shell of the overpack has channels attached to its inner diameter. The channels provide guidance for MPC insertion and removal and a flexible medium to absorb impact loads during the non-mechanistic tip-over, while still allowing the cooling air flow to circulate through the overpack. Shims may be attached to channels to allow the proper inner diameter dimension to be obtained.

The storage system has air ducts to allow for passive natural convection cooling of the contained MPC. A minimum of four air inlets and four air outlets are located at the lower and upper | extremities of the storage system, respectively. The location of the air outlets in the HI-STORM 100 and the HI-STORM 100S (including Version B) design differ in that the outlet ducts for the HI-STORM 100 overpack are located in the overpack body and are aligned vertically with the inlet ducts at the bottom of the overpack body. The air outlet ducts in the HI-STORM 100S and – 100S Version B are integral to the lid assembly and are not in vertical alignment with the inlet ducts. See the drawings in Section 1.5 for details of the overpack air inlet and outlet duct designs. The air inlets and outlets are covered by a screen to reduce the potential for blockage. | Routine inspection of the screens (or, alternatively, temperature monitoring) ensures that blockage of the screens themselves will be detected and removed in a timely manner. Analysis, described in Chapter 11 of this FSAR, evaluates the effects of partial and complete blockage of the air ducts.

The air inlets and air outlets are penetrations through the thick concrete shielding provided by the HI-STORM 100 overpack. The outlet air ducts for the HI-STORM 100S and -100S Version B overpack designs, integral to the lid, present a similar break in radial shielding. Within the air inlets and outlets, an array of gamma shield cross plates are installed (see Figure 5.3.19 for a pictorial representation of the gamma shield cross plate designs). These gamma shield cross plates are designed to scatter any radiation traveling through the ducts. The result of scattering the radiation in the ducts is a significant decrease in the local dose rates around the air inlets and air outlets. The configuration of the gamma shield cross plates is such that the increase in the resistance to flow in the air inlets and outlets is minimized. For the HI-STORM 100 and -100S overpack designs, the shielding analysis conservatively credits only the mandatory version of the gamma shield cross plate design because they provide less shielding than the optional design. Conversely, the thermal analysis conservatively evaluates the optional gamma shield cross plate design because it conservatively provides greater resistance to flow than the mandatory design. There is only one gamma shield cross plate design employed with the HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack design, which has been appropriately considered in the shielding and thermal analyses.

Four threaded anchor blocks at the top of the overpack are provided for lifting. The anchor blocks are integrally welded to the radial plates which in turn are full-length welded to the overpack inner shell, outer shell, and baseplate (HI-STORM 100) or the inlet air duct horizontal plates (HI-STORM 100S) (see Figure 1.2.7). The HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack design incorporates partial-length radial plates at the top of the overpack to secure the anchor blocks and

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uses both gussets and partial-length radial plates at the bottom of the overpack for structural stability. Details of this arrangement are shown in the drawings in Section 1.5.

The four anchor blocks are located on 90° arcs around the circumference of the top of the overpack lid. The overpack may also be lifted from the bottom using specially-designed lifting transport devices, including hydraulic jacks, air pads, Hillman rollers, or other design based on site-specific needs and capabilities. Slings or other suitable devices mate with lifting lugs that are inserted into threaded holes in the top surface of the overpack lid to allow lifting of the overpack lid. After the lid is bolted to the storage overpack main body, these lifting bolts shall be removed and replaced with flush plugs.

The plain concrete between the overpack inner and outer steel shells is specified to provide the necessary shielding properties (dry density) and compressive strength. The concrete shall be in accordance with the requirements specified in Appendix 1.D.

The principal function of the concrete is to provide shielding a gainst g amma and n eutron radiation. However, in an implicit manner it helps enhance the performance of the HI-STORM overpack in other respects as well. For example, the massive bulk of concrete imparts a large thermal inertia to the HI-STORM overpack, allowing it to moderate the rise in temperature of the system under hypothetical conditions when all ventilation passages are assumed to be blocked. The case of a postulated fire accident at the ISFSI is another example where the high thermal inertia characteristics of the HI-STORM concrete control the temperature of the MPC. Although the annular concrete mass in the overpack shell is not a structural member, it does act as an elastic/plastic filler of the inter-shell space, such that, while its cracking and crushing under a tip-over accident is not of significant consequence, its deformation characteristics are germane to the analysis of the structural members.

Density and compressive strength are the key parameters that delineate the performance of concrete in the HI-STORM System. The density of concrete used in the inter-shell annulus, pedestal (HI-STORM 100 and -100S overpacks only), and overpack lid has been set as defined in Appendix 1.D. For evaluating the physical properties of concrete for completing the analytical models, conservative formulations of Reference [1.0.5] are used.

To ensure the stability of the concrete at temperature, the concrete composition has been specified in accordance with NUREG-1536, "Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems" [1.0.3]. Thermal analyses, presented in Chapter 4, show that the temperatures during normal storage conditions do not threaten the physical integrity of the HI-STORM overpack concrete.

There are three base HI-STORM overpack designs - HI-STORM 100, HI-STORM 100S, and HI-STORM 100S Version B. The significant differences among the three are overpack height, MPC pedestal height, location of the air outlet ducts, and the vertical alignment of the inlet and outlet air ducts. The HI-STORM 100 overpack is approximately 240 inches high from the bottom of the

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baseplate to the top of the lid bolts and 227 inches high without the lid installed. There are two variants of the HI-STORM 100S overpack design, differing only in height and weight. The HI-STORM 100S(232) is approximately 232 inches high from the bottom of the baseplate to the top of the lid in its final storage configuration and approximately 211 inches high without the lid installed. The HI-STORM 100S(243) is approximately 243 inches high from the bottom of the baseplate to the top of the lid in its final storage configuration and approximately 222 inches high without the lid installed. The HI-STORM 100S(243) is approximately 243 inches high from the bottom of the baseplate to the top of the lid in its final storage configuration and approximately 222 inches high without the lid installed. There are also two variants of the HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack design, differing only in height and weight. The HI-STORM 100S-218 is approximately 218 inches high from the bottom of the baseplate to the top of the lid in its final storage configuration and approximately 219 inches high without the lid installed. The HI-STORM 100S-229 is approximately 229 inches high from the bottom of the baseplate to the top of the lid in its final storage configuration and 210 inches high without the lid installed.

The HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack design does not include a concrete-filled pedestal to support the MPC. Instead, the MPC rests upon a steel plate that maintains the MPC sufficiently above the inlet air ducts to prevent direct radiation shine through the ducts. To facilitate this change, the inlet air ducts for the HI-STORM 100S Version B are shorter in height but larger in width. See the drawings in Section 1.5 for details.

The anchored embodiment of the HI-STORM overpack is referred to as HI-STORM 100A or HI-STORM 100SA. The HI-STORM 100S version B overpack design may not be deployed in the anchored configuration at this time. As explained in the foregoing, the HI-STORM overpack is a steel weldment, which makes it a relatively simple matter to extend the overpack baseplate, form lugs, and then anchor the cask to the reinforced concrete structure of the ISFSI. In HI-STORM terminology, these lugs are referred to as "sector lugs." The sector lugs, as shown in Figure 1.1.5 and the drawing in Section 1.5, are formed by extending the HI-STORM overpack baseplate, welding vertical gussets to the baseplate extension and to the overpack outer shell and, finally, welding a horizontal lug support ring in the form of an annular sector to the vertical gussets and to the outer shell. The baseplate is equipped with regularly spaced clearance holes (round or slotted) through which the anchor studs can pass. The sector lugs are bolted to the ISFSI pad using anchor studs that are made of a creep-resistant, high-ductility, environmentally compatible material. The bolts are preloaded to a precise axial stress using a "stud tensioner" rather than a torque wrench. Pre-tensioning the anchors using a stud tensioner eliminates any shear stress in the bolt, which is unavoidable if a torquing device is employed (Chapter 3 of the text "Mechanical Design of Heat Exchangers and Pressure Vessel Components", by Arcturus Publishers, 1984, K.P. Singh and A.I. Soler, provides additional information on stud tensioners). The axial stress in the anchors induced by pre-tensioning is kept below 75% of the material yield stress, such that during the seismic event the maximum bolt axial stress remains below the limit prescribed for bolts in the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF (for Level D conditions). Figures 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 provide visual depictions of the anchored HI-STORM 100A configuration. This configuration also applies to the HI-STORM 100SA.

The anchor studs pass through liberal clearance holes (circular or slotted) in the sector lugs (0.75" minimum clearance) such that the fastening of the studs to the ISFSI pad can be carried out without mechanical interference from the body of the sector lug. The two clearance hole configurations give the ISFSI pad designer flexibility in the design of the anchor embedment in the ISFSI concrete. The

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axial force in the anchors produces a compressive load at the overpack/pad interface. This compressive force, F, imputes a lateral load bearing capacity to the cask/pad interface that is equal to  $\mu F$  ( $\mu \le 0.53$  per Table 2.2.8). As is shown in Chapter 3 of this FSAR, the lateral load-bearing capacity of the HI-STORM/pad interface ( $\mu F$ ) is many times greater than the horizontal (sliding) force exerted on the cask under the postulated DBE seismic event. Thus, the potential for lateral sliding of the HI-STORM 100A System during a seismic event is precluded, as is the potential for any bending action on the anchor studs.

The seismic loads, however, will produce an overturning moment on the overpack that would cause a redistribution of the compressive contact pressure between the pad and the overpack. To determine the pulsation in the tensile load in the anchor studs and in the interface contact pressure, bounding static analysis of the preloaded configuration has been performed. The results of the static analysis demonstrate that the initial preloading minimizes pulsations in the stud load. A confirmatory nonlinear dynamic analysis has also been performed using the time-history methodology described in Chapter 3, wherein the principal nonlinearities in the cask system are incorporated and addressed. The calculated results from the dynamic analysis confirm the static analysis results and that the presence of pre-stress helps minimize the pulsation in the anchor stud stress levels during the seismic event, thus eliminating any concern with regard to fatigue failure under extended and repetitive seismic excitations.

The sector lugs in HI-STORM 100A are made of the same steel material as the baseplate and the shell (SA516- Gr. 70) which helps ensure high quality fillet welds used to join the lugs to the body of the overpack. The material for the anchor studs can be selected from a family of allowable stud materials listed in the ASME Code (Section II). A representative sampling of permitted materials is listed in Table 1.2.7. The menu of materials will enable the ISFSI owner to select a fastener material that is resistant to corrosion in the local ISFSI environment. For example, for ISFSIs located in marine environments (e.g., coastal reactor sites), carbon steel studs would not be recommended without concomitant periodic inspection and coating maintenance programs. Table 1.2.7 provides the chemical composition of several acceptable fastener materials to help the ISFSI owner select the most appropriate material for his site. The two mechanical properties, ultimate strength  $\sigma_u$  and yield strength  $\sigma_y$  are also listed. For purposes of structural evaluations, the lower bound values of  $\sigma_u$  and  $\sigma_y$  from the menu of materials listed in Table 1.2.7 are used (see Table 3.4.10).

As shown in the drawing, the anchor studs are spaced sufficiently far apart such that a practical reinforced concrete pad with embedded receptacles can be designed to carry the axial pull from the anchor studs without overstressing the enveloping concrete monolith. The design specification and supporting analyses in this FSAR are focused on qualifying the overpack structures, including the sector lugs and the anchor studs. The design of the ISFSI pad, and its anchor receptacle will vary from site to site, depending on the geology and seismological characteristics of the sub-terrain underlying the ISFSI pad region. The data provided in this FSAR, however, provide the complete set of factored loads to which the ISFSI pad, its sub-grade, and the anchor receptacles must be designed within the purview of ACI-349-97 [1.0.4]. Detailed requirements on the ISFSI pads for anchored casks are provided in Section 2.0.4.

#### 1.2.1.2.2 <u>HI-TRAC (Transfer Cask) - Standard Design</u>

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Like the storage overpack, the HI-TRAC transfer cask is a rugged, heavy-walled cylindrical vessel. The main structural function of the transfer cask is provided by carbon steel, and the main neutron and gamma shielding functions are provided by water and lead, respectively. The transfer cask is a steel, lead, steel layered cylinder with a water jacket attached to the exterior. Figure 1.2.9 provides a typical cross section of the standard design HI-TRAC-125 with the pool lid installed. See Section 1.2.1.2.3 for discussion of the optional HI-TRAC 125D design.

The transfer cask provides an internal cylindrical cavity of sufficient size for housing an MPC. The top lid of the HI-TRAC 125 has additional neutron shielding to provide neutron attenuation in the vertical direction (from SNF in the MPC below). The MPC access hole through the HI-TRAC top lid is provided to allow the lowering/raising of the MPC between the HI-TRAC transfer cask, and the HI-STORM or HI-STAR overpacks. The standard design HI-TRAC (comprised of HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125) is provided with two bottom lids, each used separately. The pool lid is bolted to the bottom flange of the HI-TRAC and is utilized during MPC fuel loading and sealing operations. In addition to providing shielding in the axial direction, the pool lid incorporates a seal that is designed to hold clean demineralized water in the HI-TRAC inner cavity, thereby preventing contamination of the exterior of the MPC by the contaminated fuel pool water. After the MPC has been drained, dried, and sealed, the pool lid is removed and the HI-TRAC transfer lid is attached (standard design only). The transfer lid incorporates two sliding doors that allow the opening of the HI-TRAC bottom for the MPC to be raised/lowered. Figure 1.2.10 provides a cross section of the HI-TRAC with the transfer lid installed.

In the standard design, trunnions are provided for lifting and rotating the transfer cask body between vertical and horizontal positions. The lifting trunnions are located just below the top flange and the pocket trunnions are located above the bottom flange. The two lifting trunnions are provided to lift and vertically handle the HI-TRAC, and the pocket trunnions provide a pivot point for the rotation of the HI-TRAC for downending or upending.

Two standard design HI-TRAC transfer casks of different weights are provided to house the MPCs. The 125 ton HI-TRAC weight does not exceed 125 tons during any loading or transfer operation. The 100 ton HI-TRAC weight does not exceed 100 tons during any loading or transfer operation. The internal cylindrical cavities of the two standard design HI-TRACs are identical. However, the external dimensions are different. The 100ton HI-TRAC has a reduced thickness of lead and water shielding and consequently, the external dimensions are different. The structural steel thickness is identical in the two HI-TRACs. This allows most structural analyses of the 125 ton HI-TRAC to bound the 100 ton HI-TRAC design. Additionally, as the two HI-TRACs are identical except for a reduced thickness of lead and water, the 125 ton HI-TRAC has a larger thermal resistance than the smaller and lighter 100 ton HI-TRAC. Therefore, for normal conditions the 125 ton HI-TRAC thermal analysis bounds that of the 100 ton HI-TRAC. Separate shielding analyses are performed for each HI-TRAC since the shielding thicknesses are different between the two.

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## 1.2.1.2.3 HI-TRAC 125D Transfer Cask

As an option to using either of the standard HI-TRAC transfer cask design, users may choose to use the optional HI-TRAC 125D design. Figure 1.2.9A provides a typical cross section of the standard design HI-TRAC-125 with the pool lid installed. Like the standard design, the HI-TRAC 125D is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME III, Subsection NF, with certain NRC-approved alternatives, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. Functionally equivalent, the major differences between the HI-TRAC 125D design and the standard design are as follows:

- No pocket trunnions are provided for downending/upending
- The transfer lid is not required
- A new ancillary, the HI-STORM mating device (Figure 1.2.18) is required during MPC transfer operations
- A wider baseplate with attachment points for the mating device is provided
- The baseplate incorporates gussets for added structural strength
- The number of pool lid bolts is reduce

The interface between the MPC and the transfer cask is the same between the standard design and the HI-TRAC 125D design. The optional design is capable of withstanding all loads defined in the design basis for the transfer cask during normal, off-normal, and accident modes of operation with adequate safety margins. In lieu of swapping the pool lid for the transfer lid to facilitate MPC transfer, the pool lid remains on the HI-TRAC 125D until MPC transfer is required. The HI-STORM mating device is located between, and secured with bolting to, the top of the HI-STORM overpack and the HI-TRAC 125D transfer cask. The mating device is used to remove the pool lid to provide a pathway for MPC transfer between the overpack and the transfer cask. Section 1.2.2.2 provides additional detail on the differences between the standard transfer cask design and the HI-TRAC 125D design during operations.

### 1.2.1.3 Shielding Materials

The HI-STORM 100 System is provided with shielding to ensure the radiation and exposure requirements in 10CFR72.104 and 10CFR72.106 are met. This shielding is an important factor in minimizing the personnel doses from the gamma and neutron sources in the SNF in the MPC for ALARA considerations during loading, handling, transfer, and storage. The fuel basket structure of edge-welded composite boxes and neutron absorber panels attached to the fuel storage cell vertical surfaces provide the initial attenuation of gamma and neutron radiation emitted by the radioactive spent fuel. The MPC shell, baseplate, lid and closure ring provide additional thicknesses of steel to further reduce the gamma flux at the outer canister surfaces.

In the HI-STORM storage overpack, the primary shielding in the radial direction is provided by concrete and steel. In addition, the storage overpack has a thick circular concrete slab attached to the lid, and the HI-STORM 100 and -100S have a thick circular concrete pedestal upon which

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the MPC rests. This concrete pedestal is not necessary in the HI-STORM 100S Version B overpack design. These slabs provide gamma and neutron attenuation in the axial direction. The thick overpack lid and concrete shielding integral to the lid provide additional gamma attenuation in the upward direction, reducing both direct radiation and skyshine. Several steel plate and shell elements provide additional gamma shielding as needed in specific areas, as well as incremental improvements in the overall shielding effectiveness. Gamma shield cross plates, as depicted in Figure 5.3.19, provide attenuation of scattered gamma radiation as it exits the inlet and outlet air ducts.

In the HI-TRAC transfer cask radial direction, gamma and neutron shielding consists of steellead-steel and water, respectively. In the axial direction, shielding is provided by the top lid, and the pool or transfer lid, as applicable. In the HI-TRAC pool lid, layers of steel-lead-steel provide an additional measure of gamma shielding to supplement the gamma shielding at the bottom of the MPC. In the transfer lid, layers of steel-lead-steel provide gamma attenuation. For the HI-TRAC 125 transfer lid, the neutron shield material, Holtite-A, is also provided. The HI-TRAC 125 and HI-TRAC 125D top lids are composed of steel-neutron shield-steel, with the neutron shield material being Holtite-A. The HI-TRAC 100 top lid is composed of steel only providing gamma attenuation.

### 1.2.1.3.1 Fixed Neutron Absorbers

### 1.2.1.3.1.1 <u>Boral</u><sup>TM</sup>

Boral is a thermal neutron poison material composed of boron carbide and aluminum (aluminum powder and plate). Boron carbide is a compound having a high boron content in a physically stable and chemically inert form. The boron carbide contained in Boral is a fine granulated powder that conforms to ASTM C-750-80 nuclear grade Type III. The Boral cladding is made of alloy aluminum, a lightweight metal with high tensile strength which is protected from corrosion by a highly resistant oxide film. The two materials, boron carbide and aluminum, are chemically compatible and ideally suited for long-term use in the radiation, thermal, and chemical environment of a nuclear reactor, spent fuel pool, or dry cask.

The documented historical applications of Boral, in environments comparable to those in spent fuel pools and fuel storage casks, dates to the early 1950s (the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's AE-6 Water-Boiler Reactor [1.2.2]). Technical data on the material was first printed in 1949, when the report "Boral: A New Thermal Neutron Shield" was published [1.2.3]. In 1956, the first edition of the Reactor Shielding Design Manual [1.2.4] was published and it contained a section on Boral and its properties.

In the research and test reactors built during the 1950s and 1960s, Boral was frequently the material of choice for control blades, thermal-column shutters, and other items requiring very good thermal-neutron absorption properties. It is in these reactors that Boral has seen its longest service in environments comparable to today's applications.

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Boral found other uses in the 1960s, one of which was a neutron poison material in baskets used in the shipment of irradiated, enriched fuel rods from Canada's Chalk River laboratories to Savannah River. Use of Boral in shipping containers continues, with Boral serving as the poison in current British Nuclear Fuels Limited casks and the Storable Transport Cask by Nuclear Assurance Corporation [1.2.5].

Boral has been licensed by the NRC for use in numerous BWR and PWR spent fuel storage racks and has been extensively used in international nuclear installations.

Boral has been exclusively used in fuel storage applications in recent years. Its use in spent fuel pools as the neutron absorbing material can be attributed to its proven performance and several unique characteristics, such as:

- The content and placement of boron carbide provides a very high removal cross section for thermal neutrons.
- Boron carbide, in the form of fine particles, is homogeneously dispersed throughout the central layer of the Boral panels.
- The boron carbide and aluminum materials in Boral do not degrade as a result of long-term exposure to radiation.
- The neutron absorbing central layer of Boral is clad with permanently bonded surfaces of aluminum.
- Boral is stable, strong, durable, and corrosion resistant.

Boral absorbs thermal neutrons without physical change or degradation of any sort from the anticipated exposure to gamma radiation and heat. The material does not suffer loss of neutron attenuation capability when exposed to high levels of radiation dose.

Holtec International's QA Program ensures that Boral is manufactured under the control and surveillance of a Quality Assurance/Quality Control Program that conforms to the requirements of 10CFR72, Subpart G. Holtec International has procured over 200,000 panels of Boral from AAR Advanced Structures in over 30 projects. Boral has always been purchased with a minimum <sup>10</sup>B loading requirement. Coupons extracted from production runs were tested using the wet chemistry procedure. The actual <sup>10</sup>B loading, out of thousands of coupons tested, has never been found to fall below the design specification. The size of this coupon database is sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that all future Boral procurements will continue to yield Boral with full compliance with the stipulated minimum loading. Furthermore, the surveillance, coupon testing, and material tracking processes which have so effectively controlled the quality of Boral are expected to continue to yield Boral of similar quality in the

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future. Nevertheless, to add another layer of insurance, only 75% <sup>10</sup>B credit of the fixed neutron absorber is assumed in the criticality analysis consistent with Chapter 6.0, IV, 4.c of NUREG-1536, Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems.

Operating experience in nuclear plants with fuel loading of Boral equipped MPCs as well as laboratory test data indicate that the aluminium used in the manufacture of the Boral may react with water, resulting in the generation of hydrogen. The numerous variables (i.e., aluminium particle size, pool temperature, pool chemistry, etc.) that influence the extent of the hydrogen produced make it impossible to predict the amount of hydrogen that may be generated during MPC loading or unloading at a particular plant. Therefore, due to the variability in hydrogen generation from the Boral-water reaction, the operating procedures in Chapter 8 require monitoring for combustible gases and either exhausting or purging the space beneath the MPC lid during loading and unloading operations when an ignition event could occur (i.e., when the space beneath the MPC lid is open to the welding or cutting operation).

### 1.2.1.3.1.2 <u>METAMIC<sup>®</sup></u>

METAMIC<sup>®</sup> is a neutron absorber material developed by the Reynolds Aluminum Company in the mid-1990s for spent fuel reactivity control in dry and wet storage applications. Metallurgically, METAMIC<sup>®</sup> is a metal matrix composite (MMC) consisting of a matrix of 6061 aluminum alloy reinforced with Type 1 ASTM C-750 boron carbide. METAMIC<sup>®</sup> is characterized by extremely fine aluminum (325 mesh or better) and boron carbide powder. Typically, the average B<sub>4</sub>C particle size is between 10 and 15 microns. As described in the U.S. patents held by METAMIC, Inc.<sup>\*†</sup>, the high performance and reliability of METAMIC<sup>®</sup> derives from the particle size distribution of its constituents, rendered into a metal matrix composite by the powder metallurgy process. This yields excellent and uniform homogeneity.

The powders are carefully blended without binders or other additives that could potentially adversely influence performance. The maximum percentage of  $B_4C$  that can be dispersed in the aluminum alloy 6061 matrix is approximately 40 wt.%, although extensive manufacturing and testing experience is limited to approximately 31 wt.%. The blend of powders is isostatically compacted into a green billet under high pressure and vacuum sintered to near theoretical density.

According to the manufacturer, billets of any size can be produced using this technology. The billet is subsequently extruded into one of a number of product forms, ranging from sheet and plate to angle, channel, round and square tube, and other profiles. For the METAMIC<sup>®</sup> sheets used in the MPCs, the extruded form is rolled down into the required thickness.

METAMIC<sup>®</sup> has been subjected to an extensive array of tests sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) that evaluated the functional performance of the material at elevated temperatures (up to 900°F) and radiation levels (1E+11 rads gamma). The results of the tests

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> U.S. Patent No. 6,042,779, "Extrusion Fabrication Process for Discontinuous Carbide Particulate Metal Matrix Composites and Super, Hypereutectic Al/Si."

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>•</sup> U.S. Patent No. 5,965,829, "Radiation Absorbing Refractory Composition".

documented in an EPRI report (Ref. [1.2.11]) indicate that METAMIC<sup>®</sup> maintains its physical and neutron absorption properties with little variation in its properties from the unirradiated state. The main conclusions provided in the above-referenced EPRI report are summarized below:

- The metal matrix configuration produced by the powder metallurgy process with a complete absence of open porosity in METAMIC<sup>®</sup> ensures that its density is essentially equal to the theoretical density.
- The physical and neutronic properties of METAMIC<sup>®</sup> are essentially unaltered under exposure to elevated temperatures (750° F 900° F).
- No detectable change in the neutron attenuation characteristics under accelerated corrosion test conditions has been observed.

In addition, independent measurements of boron carbide particle distribution show extremely small particle-to-particle distance<sup>†</sup> and near-perfect homogeneity.

An evaluation of the manufacturing technology underlying METAMIC<sup>®</sup> as disclosed in the abovereferenced patents and of the extensive third-party tests carried out under the auspices of EPRI makes METAMIC<sup>®</sup> an acceptable neutron absorber material for use in the MPCs. Holtec's technical position on METAMIC<sup>®</sup> is also supported by the evaluation carried out by other organizations (see, for example, USNRC's SER on NUHOMS-61BT, Docket No. 72-1004).

Consistent with its role in reactivity control, all METAMIC<sup>®</sup> material procured for use in the Holtec MPCs will be qualified as important-to-safety (ITS) Category A item. ITS category A manufactured items, as required by Holtec's NRC-approved Quality Assurance program, must be produced to essentially preclude the potential of an error in the procurement of constituent materials and the manufacturing processes. Accordingly, material and manufacturing control processes must be established to eliminate the incidence of errors, and inspection steps must be implemented to serve as an independent set of barriers to ensure that all critical characteristics defined for the material by the cask designer are met in the manufactured product.

All manufacturing and in-process steps in the production of METAMIC<sup>®</sup> shall be carried out using written procedures. As required by the company's quality program, the material manufacturer's QA program and its implementation shall be subject to review and ongoing assessment, including audits and surveillances as set forth in the applicable Holtec QA procedures to ensure that all METAMIC<sup>®</sup> panels procured meet with the requirements appropriate for the quality genre of the MPCs. Additional details pertaining to the qualification and production tests for METAMIC<sup>®</sup> are summarized in Subsection 9.1.5.3.

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Medium measured neighbor-to-neighbor distance is 10.08 microns according to the article, "METAMIC Neutron Shielding", by K. Anderson, T. Haynes, and R. Kazmier, EPRI Boraflex Conference, November 19-20, 1998.

Because of the absence of interconnected porosities, the time required to dehydrate a METAMIC<sup>®</sup>-equipped MPC is expected to be less compared to an MPC containing Boral.

NUREG/CR-5661 (Ref. [1.2.14]) recommends limiting poison material credit to 75% of the minimum <sup>10</sup>B loading because of concerns for potential "streaming" of neutrons, and allows for greater percentage credit in criticality analysis "if comprehensive acceptance tests, capable of verifying the presence and uniformity of the neutron absorber, are implemented". The value of 75% is characterized in NUREG/CR-5661 as a very conservative value, based on experiments with neutron poison containing relatively large B<sub>4</sub>C particles, such as BORAL with an average particle size in excess of 100 microns. METAMIC<sup>®</sup>, however, has a much smaller particle size of typically between 10 and 15 microns on average. Any streaming concerns would therefore be drastically reduced.

Analyses performed by Holtec International show that the streaming due to particle size is practically non-existent in METAMIC<sup>®</sup>. Further, EPRI's neutron attenuation measurements on 31 and 15 B<sub>4</sub>C weight percent METAMIC<sup>®</sup> showed that METAMIC<sup>®</sup> exhibits very uniform <sup>10</sup>B areal density. This makes it easy to reliably establish and verify the presence and microscopic and macroscopic uniformity of the <sup>10</sup>B in the material. Therefore, 90% credit is applied to the minimum <sup>10</sup>B areal density in the criticality calculations, i.e. a 10% penalty is applied. This 10% penalty is considered conservative since there are no significant remaining uncertainties in the <sup>10</sup>B areal density. In Chapter 9 the qualification and on production tests for METAMIC<sup>®</sup> to support 90% <sup>10</sup>B credit are specified. With 90% credit, the target weight percent of boron carbide in METAMIC<sup>®</sup> is 31 for all MPCs, as summarized in Table 1.2.8, consistent with the test coupons used in the EPRI evaluations [1.2.11]. The maximum permitted value is 33.0 wt% to allow for necessary fabrication flexibility.

Because METAMIC<sup>®</sup> is a solid material, there is no capillary path through which spent fuel pool water can penetrate METAMIC<sup>®</sup> panels and chemically react with aluminum in the interior of the material to generate hydrogen. Any chemical reaction of the outer surfaces of the METAMIC<sup>®</sup> neutron absorber panels with water to produce hydrogen occurs rapidly and reduces to an insignificant amount in a short period of time. Nevertheless, combustible gas monitoring for METAMIC<sup>®</sup> -equipped MPCs and purging or exhausting the space under the MPC lid during welding and cutting operations, is required until sufficient field experience is gained that confirms that little or no hydrogen is released by METAMIC<sup>®</sup> during these operations.

Mechanical properties of 31 wt.% METAMIC<sup>®</sup> based on coupon tests of the material in the asfabricated condition and after 48 hours of an elevated temperature state at 900°F are summarized below from the EPRI report [1.2.11].

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Mechanical Properties of 31wt.% B <sub>4</sub> C METAMIC				
Property	As-Fabricated	After 48 hours of 900°F Temperature Soak		
Yield Strength (psi)	32937 ± 3132	28744 ± 3246		
Ultimate Strength (psi)	40141 ± 1860	34608 ± 1513		
Elongation (%)	$1.8 \pm 0.8$	5.7 ± 3.1		

The required flexural strain of the neutron absorber to ensure that it will not fracture when the supporting basket wall flexes due to the worst case lateral inertial loading, has been set at 0.2% for the MPCs. The 1% minimum elongation of  $31 \text{wt.\% B}_4\text{C}$  METAMIC<sup>®</sup> indicated by the above table means that METAMIC<sup>®</sup> will have a minimum factor of safety of five against cracking under the most severe postulated mechanical accident conditions for the MPCs.

EPRI's extensive characterization effort [1.2.11], which was focused on 15 and 31 wt.% B<sub>4</sub>C METAMIC<sup>®</sup> served as the principal basis for a recent USNRC SER for 31wt.% B<sub>4</sub>C METAMIC for used in wet storage [1.2.12]. Additional studies on METAMIC<sup>®</sup> [1.2.13], EPRI's and others work provide the confidence that 31wt.% B<sub>4</sub>C METAMIC<sup>®</sup> will perform its intended function in the MPCs.

# 1.2.1.3.1.3 Locational Fixity of Neutron Absorbers

Both Boral and METAMIC<sup>®</sup> neutron absorber panels are completely enclosed in Alloy X (stainless steel) sheathing that is stitch welded to the MPC basket cell walls along their entire periphery. The edges of the sheathing are bent toward the cell wall to make the edge weld. Thus, the neutron absorber is contained in a tight, welded pocket enclosure. The shear strength of the pocket weld joint, which is an order of magnitude greater than the weight of a fuel assembly, guarantees that the neutron absorber and its enveloping sheathing pocket will maintain their as-installed position under all loading, storage, and transient evolutions. Finally, the pocket joint detail ensures that fuel assembly insertion or withdrawal into or out of the MPC basket will not lead to a disconnection of the sheathing from the cell wall.

## 1.2.1.3.2 Neutron Shielding

The specification of the HI-STORM overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask neutron shield material is predicated on functional performance criteria. These criteria are:

- Attenuation of neutron radiation to appropriate levels;
- Durability of the shielding material under normal conditions, in terms of thermal, chemical, mechanical, and radiation environments;
- Stability of the homogeneous nature of the shielding material matrix;

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- Stability of the shielding material in mechanical or thermal accident conditions to the desired performance levels; and
- Predictability of the manufacturing process under adequate procedural control to yield an in-place neutron shield of desired function and uniformity.

Other aspects of a shielding material, such as ease of handling and prior nuclear industry use, are also considered, within the limitations of the main criteria. Final specification of a shield material is a result of optimizing the material properties with respect to the main criteria, along with the design of the shield system, to achieve the desired shielding results.

Neutron attenuation in the HI-STORM overpack is provided by the thick walls of concrete contained in the steel vessel, lid, and pedestal (only for the HI-STORM 100 and -100S overpack designs). Concrete is a shielding material with a long proven history in the nuclear industry. The concrete c omposition h as been specified to ensure its continued integrity at the long term temperatures required for SNF storage.

The HI-TRAC transfer cask is equipped with a water jacket providing radial neutron shielding. Demineralized water will be utilized in the water jacket. To ensure operability for low temperature conditions, ethylene glycol (25% in solution) will be added to reduce the freezing point for low temperature operations (e.g., below 32°F) [1.2.7].

Neutron shielding in the H I-TRAC 125 and 125D transfer casks in the axial direction is provided by Holtite-A within the top lid. HI-TRAC 125 also contains Holtite-A in the transfer lid. Holtite-A is a poured-in-place solid borated synthetic neutron-absorbing polymer. Holtite-A is specified with a nominal  $B_4C$  loading of 1 weight percent for the HI-STORM 100 System. Appendix 1.B provides the Holtite-A material properties germane to its function as a neutron shield. Holtec has performed confirmatory qualification tests on Holtite-A under the company's QA program.

In the following, a brief summary of the performance characteristics and properties of Holtite-A is provided.

### Density

The specific gravity of Holtite-A is  $1.68 \text{ g/cm}^3$  as specified in Appendix 1.B. To conservatively bound any potential weight loss at the design temperature and any inability to reach the theoretical density, the density is reduced by 4% to 1.61 g/cm<sup>3</sup>. The density used for the shielding analysis is conservatively assumed to be 1.61 g/cm<sup>3</sup> to underestimate the shielding capabilities of the neutron shield.

#### <u>Hydrogen</u>

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The weight concentration of hydrogen is 6.0%. However, all shielding analyses conservatively assume 5.9% hydrogen by weight in the calculations.

### Boron Carbide

Boron carbide dispersed within Holtite-A in finely dispersed powder form is present in 1% (nominal) weight concentration. Holtite-A may be specified with a  $B_4C$  content of up to 6.5 weight percent. For the HI-STORM 100 System, Holtite-A is specified with a nominal  $B_4C$  weight percent of 1%.

### Design Temperature

The design temperatures of Holtite-A are provided in Table 1.B.1.. The maximum spatial temperatures of Holtite-A under all normal operating conditions must be demonstrated to be below these design temperatures, as applicable.

### Thermal Conductivity

The Holtite-A neutron shielding material is stable below the design temperature for the long term and provides excellent shielding properties for neutrons. A conservative, lower bound conductivity is stipulated for use in the thermal analyses of Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) based on information in the technical literature.

### 1.2.1.3.3 Gamma Shielding Material

For gamma shielding, the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack primarily relies on massive concrete sections contained in a robust steel vessel. A carbon steel plate, the shield shell, is located adjacent to the overpack inner shell to provide additional gamma shielding (Figure 1.2.7)<sup>†</sup>. Carbon steel supplements the concrete gamma shielding in most portions of the storage overpack, most notably the pedestal (HI-STORM 100 and -100S overpack designs only) and the lid. To reduce the radiation streaming through the overpack air inlets and outlets, gamma shield cross plates are installed in the ducts (Figures 1.2.8 and 1.2.8A) to scatter the radiation. This scattering acts to significantly reduce the local dose rates adjacent to the overpack air inlets and outlets. See Figure 5.3.19 and the drawings in Section 1.5 for more details of the gamma shield cross plate designs for each overpack design.

In the HI-TRAC transfer cask, the primary gamma shielding is provided by lead. As in the storage overpack, carbon steel supplements the lead gamma shielding of the HI-TRAC transfer cask.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The shield shell design feature was deleted in June, 2001 after overpack serial number 7 was fabricated. Those overpacks without the shield shell are required to have a higher concrete density in the overpack body to provide compensatory shielding. See Table 1.D.1.

## 1.2.1.4 Lifting Devices

Lifting of the HI-STORM 100 System may be accomplished either by attachment at the top of the storage overpack ("top lift"), as would typically be done with a crane, or by attachment at the bottom ("bottom lift"), as would be effected by a number of lifting/handling devices.

For a top lift, the storage overpack is equipped with four threaded anchor blocks arranged circumferentially around the overpack. These anchor blocks are used for overpack lifting as well as securing the overpack lid to the overpack body. The storage overpack may be lifted with a lifting device that engages the anchor blocks with threaded studs and connects to a crane or similar equipment.

A bottom lift of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is effected by the insertion of four hydraulic jacks underneath the inlet vent horizontal plates (Figure 1.2.1). A slot in the overpack baseplate allows the hydraulic jacks to be placed underneath the inlet vent horizontal plate. The hydraulic jacks lift the loaded overpack to provide clearance for inserting or removing a device for transportation.

The standard design HI-TRAC transfer cask is equipped with two lifting trunnions and two pocket trunnions. The HI-TRAC 125D is equipped with only lifting trunnions. The lifting trunnions are positioned just below the top forging. The two pocket trunnions are located above the bottom forging and attached to the outer shell. The pocket trunnions are designed to allow rotation of the HI-TRAC. All trunnions are built from a high strength alloy with proven corrosion and non-galling characteristics. The lifting trunnions are designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6. The lifting trunnions are installed by threading into tapped holes just below the top forging.

The top of the MPC lid is equipped with four threaded holes that allow lifting of the loaded MPC. These holes allow the loaded MPC to be raised/lowered through the HI-TRAC transfer cask using lifting cleats. The threaded holes in the MPC lid are designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6.

### 1.2.1.5 Design Life

The design life of the HI-STORM 100 System is 40 years. This is accomplished by using material of construction with a long proven history in the nuclear industry and specifying materials known to withstand their operating environments with little to no degradation. A maintenance program, as specified in Chapter 9, is also implemented to ensure the HI-STORM 100 System will exceed its design life of 40 years. The design considerations that assure the HI-STORM 100 System performs as designed throughout the service life include the following:

### HI-STORM Overpack and HI-TRAC Transfer Cask

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- Exposure to Environmental Effects
- Material Degradation
- Maintenance and Inspection Provisions

## <u>MPC</u>

- Corrosion
- Structural Fatigue Effects
- Maintenance of Helium Atmosphere
- Allowable Fuel Cladding Temperatures
- Neutron Absorber Boron Depletion

The adequacy of the HI-STORM 100 System for its design life is discussed in Sections 3.4.11 and 3.4.12.

## 1.2.2 Operational Characteristics

### 1.2.2.1 Design Features

The HI-STORM 100 System incorporates some unique design improvements. These design innovations have been developed to facilitate the safe long term storage of SNF. Some of the design originality is discussed in Subsection 1.2.1 and below.

The free volume of the MPCs is inerted with 99.995% pure helium gas during the spent nuclear fuel loading operations. Table 1.2.2 specifies the helium fill requirements for the MPC internal cavity.

The HI-STORM overpack has been designed to synergistically combine the benefits of steel and concrete. The steel-concrete-steel construction of the HI-STORM overpack provides ease of fabrication, increased strength, and an optimal radiation shielding arrangement. The concrete is primarily provided for radiation shielding and the steel is primarily provided for structural functions.

The strength of concrete in tension and shear is conservatively neglected. Only the compressive strength of the concrete is accounted for in the analyses.

The criticality control features of the HI-STORM 100 are designed to maintain the neutron multiplication factor k-effective (including uncertainties and calculational bias) at less than 0.95 under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage as analyzed in Chapter 6. This level of conservatism and safety margins is maintained, while providing the highest storage capacity.

1.2.2.2 Sequence of Operations

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Table 1.2.6 provides the basic sequence of operations necessary to defuel a spent fuel pool using the HI-STORM 100 System. The detailed sequence of steps for storage-related loading and handling operations is provided in Chapter 8 and is supported by the drawings in Section 1.5. A summary of the general actions needed for the loading and unloading operations is provided below. Figures 1.2.16 and 1.2.17 provide a pictorial view of typical loading and unloading operations, respectively.

### Loading Operations

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At the start of loading operations, the HI-TRAC transfer cask is configured with the pool lid installed. The HI-TRAC water jacket is filled with demineralized water or a 25% ethylene glycol solution depending on the ambient temperature conditions. The lift yoke is used to position HI-TRAC in the designated preparation area or setdown area for HI-TRAC inspection and MPC insertion. The annulus is filled with plant demineralized water, and an inflatable annulus seal is installed. The inflatable seal prevents contact between spent fuel pool water and the MPC shell reducing the possibility of contaminating the outer surfaces of the MPC. The MPC is then filled with water (borated if necessary). Based on the MPC model and fuel enrichment, this may be borated water or plant demineralized water (see Section 2.1). HI-TRAC and the MPC are lowered into the spent fuel pool for fuel loading using the lift yoke. Pre-selected assemblies are loaded into the MPC and a visual verification of the assembly identification is performed.

While still underwater, a thick shielding lid (the MPC lid) is installed. The lift yoke is remotely engaged to the HI-TRAC lifting trunnions and is used to lift the HI-TRAC close to the spent fuel pool surface. As an ALARA measure, dose rates are measured on the top of the HI-TRAC and MPC prior to removal from the pool to check for activated debris on the top surface. The MPC lift bolts (securing the MPC lid to the lift yoke) are removed. As HI-TRAC is removed from the spent fuel pool, the lift yoke and HI-TRAC are sprayed with demineralized water to help remove contamination.

HI-TRAC is removed from the pool and placed in the designated preparation area. The top surfaces of the MPC lid and the upper flange of HI-TRAC are decontaminated. The inflatable annulus seal is removed, and an annulus shield is installed. The annulus shield provides additional personnel shielding at the top of the annulus and also prevents small items from being dropped into the annulus. The Automated Welding System baseplate shield (if used) is installed to reduce dose rates around the top of the cask. The MPC water level is lowered slightly and the MPC lid is seal-welded using the Automated Welding System (AWS) or other approved welding process. Liquid penetrant examinations are performed on the root and final passes. A multi-layer liquid penetrant or volumetric examination is also performed on the MPC lid-to-shell weld. The MPC water is displaced from the MPC by blowing pressurized helium or nitrogen gas into the vent port of the MPC, thus displacing the water through the drain line. At the appropriate time in the sequence of activities, based on the type of test performed (hydrostatic or pneumatic), a pressure test of the MPC enclosure vessel is performed.

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For MPCs containing all moderate burnup fuel, a Vacuum Drying System (VDS) may be used to remove moisture from the MPC cavity. The VDS is connected to the MPC and is used to remove liquid water from the MPC in a stepped evacuation process. The stepped evacuation process is used to preclude the formation of ice in the MPC and Vacuum Drying System lines. The internal pressure is reduced and held for a duration to ensure that all liquid water has evaporated. This process is continued until the pressure in the MPC meets the technical specification limit and can be held there for the required amount of time.

For storage of high burnup fuel and as an option for storage of moderate burnup fuel, the reduction of residual moisture in the MPC to trace amounts is accomplished using a Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) system, as described in Appendix 2.B. Relatively warm and dry helium is recirculated through the MPC cavity, which helps maintain the SNF in a cooled condition while moisture is being removed. The warm, dry gas is supplied to the MPC drain port and circulated through the MPC cavity where it absorbs moisture. The humidified gas travels out of the MPC and through appropriate equipment to cool and remove the absorbed water from the gas. The dry gas may be heated prior to its return to the MPC in a closed loop system to accelerate the rate of moisture removal in the MPC. This process is continued until the temperature of the gas exiting the demoisturizing module described in Appendix 2.B meets the specified limit.

Following moisture removal, the MPC is backfilled with a predetermined amount of helium gas. The helium backfill ensures adequate heat transfer during storage and provides an inert atmosphere for long-term fuel integrity. Cover plates are installed and seal-welded over the MPC vent and drain ports with liquid penetrant examinations performed on the root and final passes.

The MPC closure ring is then placed on the MPC, aligned, tacked in place, and seal welded, providing redundant closure of the MPC lid and cover plates confinement closure welds. Tack welds are visually examined, and the root and final welds are inspected using the liquid penetrant examination technique to ensure weld integrity. The annulus shield is removed and the remaining water in the annulus is drained. The AWS Baseplate shield is removed. The MPC lid and accessible areas of the top of the MPC shell are smeared for removable contamination and HI-TRAC dose rates are measured. The HI-TRAC top lid is installed and the bolts are torqued. The MPC lift cleats are installed on the MPC lid. The MPC lift cleats are the primary lifting point of the MPC.

Rigging is installed between the MPC lift cleats and the lift yoke. The rigging supports the MPC within HI-TRAC while the pool lid is replaced with the transfer lid. For the standard design transfer cask, the HI-TRAC is manipulated to replace the pool lid with the transfer lid. The MPC lift cleats and rigging support the MPC during the transfer operations.

MPC transfer from the HI-TRAC transfer cask into the overpack may be performed inside or outside the fuel building. Similarly, HI-TRAC and HI-STORM may be transferred to the ISFSI

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in several different ways. The loaded HI-TRAC may be handled in the vertical or horizontal orientation. The loaded HI-STORM can only be handled vertically.

For MPC transfers inside the fuel building, the empty HI-STORM overpack is inspected and staged with the lid removed, the alignment device positioned, and, for the HI-STORM 100 overpack, the vent duct shield inserts installed. If using HI-TRAC 125D, the HI-STORM mating device is secured to the top of the empty overpack (Figure 1.2.18). The loaded HI-TRAC is placed using the fuel building crane on top of HI-STORM, or the mating device, as applicable. After the HI-TRAC is positioned atop the HI-STORM or secured to the mating device, as applicable, the MPC is raised slightly. With the standard HI-TRAC design, the transfer lid door locking pins are removed and the doors are opened. With the HI-TRAC 125D, the pool lid is removed using the mating device. The MPC is lowered into HI-STORM. Following verification that the MPC is fully lowered, slings are disconnected and lowered onto the MPC lid. For the HI-STORM 100, the doors are closed and the HI-TRAC is prepared for removal from on top of HI-STORM (with HI-TRAC 125D, the transfer cask must first be disconnected from the mating device). For the HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S Version B, the standard design HI-TRAC may need to be lifted above the overpack to a height sufficient to allow closure of the transfer lid doors without interfering with the MPC lift cleats. The HI-TRAC is then removed and placed in its designated storage location. The MPC lift cleats and slings are removed from atop the MPC. The alignment device, vent duct shield inserts, and/or mating device is/are removed, as applicable. The pool lid is removed from the mating device and re-attached to the HI-TRAC 125D prior to its next use. The HI-STORM lid is installed, and the upper vent screens and gamma shield cross plates are installed. The HI-STORM lid studs are installed and torqued.

For MPC transfers outside of the fuel building, the empty HI-STORM overpack is inspected and staged with the lid removed, the alignment device positioned, and, for the HI-STORM 100, the vent duct shield inserts installed. For HI-TRAC 125D, the mating device is secured to the top of the overpack. The loaded HI-TRAC is transported to the cask transfer facility in the vertical or horizontal orientation. A number of methods may be utilized as long as the handling limitations prescribed in the technical specifications are not exceeded.

To place the loaded HI-TRAC in a horizontal orientation, a transport frame or "cradle" is utilized. If the cradle is equipped with rotation trunnions they are used to engage the HI-TRAC 100 or 125 pocket trunnions. While the loaded HI-TRAC is lifted by the lifting trunnions, the HI-TRAC is lowered onto the cradle rotation trunnions. Then, the crane lowers and the HI-TRAC pivots around the pocket trunnions and is placed in the horizontal position in the cradle.

The HI-TRAC 125D does not include pocket trunnions in its design. Therefore, the user must downend the transfer cask onto the transport frame using appropriately designed rigging in accordance with the site's heavy load control program.

If the loaded HI-TRAC is transferred to the cask transfer facility in the horizontal orientation, the HI-TRAC transport frame and/or cradle are placed on a transport vehicle. The transport vehicle

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may be an air pad, railcar, heavy-haul trailer, dolly, etc. If the loaded HI-TRAC is transferred to the cask transfer facility in the vertical orientation, the HI-TRAC may be lifted by the lifting trunnions or seated on the transport vehicle. During the transport of the loaded HI-TRAC, standard plant heavy load handling practices shall be applied including administrative controls for the travel path and tie-down mechanisms.

For MPCs containing any HBF, the Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) is required to be operational during the time the loaded and backfilled MPC is in HI-TRAC to ensure fuel cladding temperatures remain within limits. The SCS is discussed in detail in Section 4.5 and the design criteria for the system are provided in Appendix 2.C. The SCS is not required when the MPC is inside the overpack, regardless of decay heat load.

After the loaded HI-TRAC arrives at the cask transfer facility, the HI-TRAC is upended by a crane if the HI-TRAC is in a horizontal orientation. The loaded HI-TRAC is then placed, using the crane located in the transfer area, on top of HI-STORM, which has been inspected and staged with the lid removed, vent duct shield inserts installed, the alignment device positioned, and the mating device installed, as applicable.

After the HI-TRAC is positioned atop the HI-STORM or the mating device, the MPC is raised slightly. In the standard design, the transfer lid door locking pins are removed and the doors are opened. With the HI-TRAC 125D, the pool lid is removed using the mating device. The MPC is lowered into HI-STORM. Following verification that the MPC is fully lowered, slings are disconnected and lowered onto the MPC lid. For the HI-STORM 100, the doors are closed and HI-TRAC is removed from on top of HI-STORM or disconnected from the mating device, as applicable. For the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S Version B, the standard design HI-TRAC may need to be lifted above the overpack to a height sufficient to allow closure of the transfer lid doors without interfering with the MPC lift cleats. The HI-TRAC is then removed and placed in its designated storage location. The MPC lift cleats and slings are removed, as applicable. The pool lid is removed from the mating device is/are removed, as applicable. The pool lid is removed from the mating device and re-attached to the HI-TRAC 125D prior to its next use. The HI-STORM lid is installed, and the upper vent screens and gamma shield cross plates are installed. The HI-STORM lid studs and nuts are installed.

After the HI-STORM has been loaded either within the fuel building or at a dedicated cask transfer facility, the HI-STORM is then moved to its designated position on the ISFSI pad. The HI-STORM overpack may be moved using a number of methods as long as the handling limitations listed in the technical specifications are not exceeded. The loaded HI-STORM must be handled in the vertical orientation, and may be lifted from the top by the anchor blocks or from the bottom by the inlet vents. After the loaded HI-STORM is lifted, it may be placed on a transport mechanism or continue to be lifted by the lid studs and transported to the storage location. The transport mechanism may be an air pad, crawler, railcar, heavy-haul trailer, dolly, etc. During the transport of the loaded HI-STORM, standard plant heavy load handling practices shall be applied including administrative controls for the travel path and tie-down mechanisms.

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Once in position at the storage pad, vent operability testing is performed to ensure that the system is functioning within its design parameters.

In the case of HI-STORM 100A, the anchor studs are installed and fastened into the anchor receptacles in the ISFSI pad in accordance with the design requirements.

#### **Unloading Operations**

The HI-STORM 100 System unloading procedures describe the general actions necessary to prepare the MPC for unloading, cool the stored fuel assemblies in the MPC, flood the MPC cavity, remove the lid welds, unload the spent fuel assemblies, and recover HI-TRAC and empty the MPC. Special precautions are outlined to ensure personnel safety during the unloading operations, and to prevent the risk of MPC overpressurization and thermal shock to the stored spent fuel assemblies.

The MPC is recovered from HI-STORM either at the cask transfer facility or the fuel building using any of the methodologies described in Section 8.1. The HI-STORM lid is removed, the alignment device positioned, and, for the HI-STORM 100, the vent duct shield inserts are installed, and the MPC lift cleats are attached to the MPC. For HI-TRAC 125D, the mating device is installed. Rigging is attached to the MPC lift cleats. For the HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S Version B with the standard HI-TRAC design, the transfer doors may need to be opened to avoid interfering with the MPC lift cleats. For HI-TRAC 125D, the mating device (possibly containing the pool lid) is secured to the top of the overpack. HI-TRAC is raised and positioned on top of HI-STORM or secured to the mating device, as applicable. For HI-TRAC 125D, the pool lid is ensured to be out of the transfer path for the MPC. The MPC is raised into HI-TRAC. Once the MPC is raised into HI-TRAC, the standard design HI-TRAC transfer lid doors are closed and the locking pins are installed. For HI-TRAC is removed from on top of HI-STORM. As required based on the presence of high burnup fuel, the Supplemental Cooling System is installed and placed into operation.

The HI-TRAC is brought into the fuel building and, for the standard design, manipulated for bottom lid replacement. The transfer lid is replaced with the pool lid. The MPC lift cleats and rigging support the MPC during lid transfer operations.

HI-TRAC and its enclosed MPC are returned to the designated preparation area and the rigging, MPC lift cleats, and HI-TRAC top lid are removed. The annulus is filled with plant demineralized water (borated, if necessary). The annulus and HI-TRAC top surfaces are protected from debris that will be produced when removing the MPC lid.

The MPC closure ring and vent and drain port cover plates are core drilled. Local ventilation is established around the MPC ports. The RVOAs are attached to the vent and drain port. The RVOAs allow access to the inner cavity of the MPC, while providing a hermetic seal. The MPC

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is cooled using appropriate means, if necessary, to reduce the MPC internal temperature to allow water flooding. Following the fuel cool-down, the MPC is flooded with borated or unborated water, as required.. The MPC lid-to-MPC shell weld is removed. Then, all weld removal equipment is removed with the MPC lid left in place.

The MPC lid is rigged to the lift yoke and the lift yoke is engaged to HI-TRAC lifting trunnions. If weight limitations require, the neutron shield jacket is drained. HI-TRAC is placed in the spent fuel pool and the MPC lid is removed. All fuel assemblies are returned to the spent fuel storage racks and the MPC fuel cells are vacuumed to remove any assembly debris. HI-TRAC and MPC are returned to the designated preparation area where the MPC water is removed. The annulus water is drained and the MPC and HI-TRAC are decontaminated in preparation for re-utilization.

## 1.2.2.3 Identification of Subjects for Safety and Reliability Analysis

# 1.2.2.3.1 <u>Criticality Prevention</u>

Criticality is controlled by geometry and neutron absorbing materials in the fuel basket. The MPC-24/24E/24EF (all with lower enriched fuel) and the MPC-68/68F/68FF do not rely on soluble boron credit during loading or the assurance that water cannot enter the MPC during storage to meet the stipulated criticality limits.

Each MPC model is equipped with neutron absorber plates affixed to the fuel cell walls as shown on the drawings in Section 1.5. The minimum <sup>10</sup>B areal density specified for the neutron absorber in each MPC model is shown in Table 1.2.2. These values are chosen to be consistent with the assumptions made in the criticality analyses.

The MPC-24, MPC-24E and 24EF(all with higher enriched fuel) and the MPC-32 and MPC-32F | take credit for soluble boron in the MPC water for criticality prevention during wet loading and unloading operations. Boron credit is only necessary for these PWR MPCs during loading and unloading operations that take place under water. During storage, with the MPC cavity dry and sealed from the environment, criticality control measures beyond the fixed neutron poisons affixed to the storage cell walls are not necessary because of the low reactivity of the fuel in the dry, helium filled canister and the design features that prevent water from intruding into the canister during storage.

## 1.2.2.3.2 Chemical Safety

There are no chemical safety hazards associated with operations of the HI-STORM 100 dry storage system. A detailed evaluation is provided in Section 3.4.

## 1.2.2.3.3 Operation Shutdown Modes

The HI-STORM 100 System is totally passive and consequently, operation shutdown modes are

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unnecessary. Guidance is provided in Chapter 8, which outlines the HI-STORM 100 unloading procedures, and Chapter 11, which outlines the corrective course of action in the wake of postulated accidents.

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### 1.2.2.3.4 Instrumentation

As stated earlier, the HI-STORM 100 confinement boundary is the MPC, which is seal welded, non-destructively examined and pressure tested. The HI-STORM 100 is a completely passive system with appropriate margins of safety; therefore, it is not necessary to deploy any instrumentation to monitor the cask in the storage mode. At the option of the user, temperature elements may be utilized to monitor the air temperature of the HI-STORM overpack exit vents in lieu of routinely inspecting the ducts for blockage. See Subsection 2.3.3.2 for additional details.

## 1.2.2.3.5 <u>Maintenance Technique</u>

Because of their passive nature, the HI-STORM 100 System requires minimal maintenance over its lifetime. No special maintenance program is required. Chapter 9 describes the acceptance criteria and maintenance program set forth for the HI-STORM 100.

## 1.2.3 Cask Contents

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to house different types of MPCs. The MPCs are designed to store both BWR and PWR spent nuclear fuel assemblies. Tables 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 provide key system data and parameters for the MPCs. A description of acceptable fuel assemblies for storage in the MPCs is provided in Section 2.1. This includes fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris in accordance with the definitions of these terms in Table 1.0.1. A summary of the types of fuel authorized for storage in each MPC model is provided below. All fuel assemblies, non-fuel hardware, and neutron sources must meet the fuel specifications provided in Section 2.1. All fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel or fuel debris must be stored in damaged fuel containers.

### <u>MPC-24</u>

The MPC-24 is designed to accommodate up to twenty-four (24) PWR fuel assemblies classified as intact fuel assemblies, with or without non-fuel hardware.

### MPC-24E

The MPC-24E is designed to accommodate up to twenty-four (24) PWR fuel assemblies, with or without non-fuel hardware. Up to four (4) fuel assemblies may be classified as damaged fuel assemblies, with the balance being classified as intact fuel assemblies. Damaged fuel assemblies must be stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19, and/or 22 (see Figure 1.2.4).

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### MPC-24EF

The MPC-24EF is designed to accommodate up to twenty-four (24) PWR fuel assemblies, with or without non-fuel hardware. Up to four (4) fuel assemblies may be classified as damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris, with the balance being classified as intact fuel assemblies. Damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris must be stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19, and/or 22 (see Figure 1.2.4).

### MPC-32

The MPC-32 is designed to accommodate up to thirty-two (32) PWR fuel assemblies with or without non-fuel hardware. Up to eight (8) of these assemblies may be classified as damaged fuel assemblies, with the balance being classified as intact fuel assemblies. Damaged fuel assemblies must be stored in fuel storage locations 1, 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 29, and/or 32 (see Figure 1.2.3).

#### MPC-32F

The MPC-32F is designed to store up to thirty two (32) PWR fuel assemblies with or without nonfuel hardware. Up to eight (8) of these assemblies may be classified as damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris, with the balance being classified as intact fuel assemblies. Damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris must be stored in fuel storage locations 1, 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 29, and/or 32 (see Figure 1.2.3).

### MPC-68

The MPC-68 is designed to accommodate up to sixty-eight (68) BWR intact and/or damaged fuel assemblies, with or without channels. For the Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay plants, the number of damaged fuel assemblies may be up to a total of 68. For damaged fuel assemblies from plants other than Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay, the number of damaged fuel assemblies is limited to sixteen (16) and must be stored in fuel storage locations 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 16, 25, 34, 35, 44, 53, 60, 61, 66, 67, and/or 68 (see Figure 1.2.2).

#### MPC-68F

The MPC-68F is designed to accommodate up to sixty-eight (68) Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay BWR fuel assemblies (with or without channels) made up of any combination of fuel assemblies classified as intact fuel assemblies, damaged fuel assemblies, and up to four (4) fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris.

#### MPC-68FF

The MPC-68FF is designed to accommodate up to sixty-eight (68) BWR fuel assemblies with or without channels. Any number of these fuel assemblies may be Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt

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Bay BWR fuel assemblies classified as intact fuel or damaged fuel. Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay fuel debris is limited to eight (8) DFCs. DFCs containing Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay fuel debris may be stored in any fuel storage location. For BWR fuel assemblies | from plants other than Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay, the total number of fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris is limited to sixteen (16), with up to eight (8) of the 16 fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris. These fuel assemblies must be stored in fuel storage locations 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 16, 25, 34, 35, 44, 53, 60, 61, 66, 67, and/or 68 (see Figure 1.2.2). The balance of the fuel storage locations may be filled with intact BWR fuel assemblies, up to a total of 68.

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ITEM	QUANTITY	NOTES	
Types of MPCs included in this revision of the submittal	8	5 for PWR 3 for BWR	
	MPC-24	Up to 24 intact ZR or stainless	
MPC storage capacity <sup>†</sup> :	MPC-24E	steel c lad P WR f uel a ssemblies with or without non-fuel hardware Up to four damaged	
	MPC-24EF	fuel assemblies may be stored in the MPC-24E and up to four (4)damaged fuel assemblies and/or fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris may be stored in the MPC-24EF	
		OR	
	MPC-32	Up to 32 intact ZR or stainless steel clad PWR fuel a ssemblies	
	MPC-32F	with or without non-fuel hardware. Up to 8 damaged fuel assemblies may be stored in the MPC-32 and up to 8 damaged	
		fuel assemblies and/or fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris may be stored in the MPC- 32F.	
	MPC-68	Any combination of Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay damaged fuel assemblies in damaged fuel containers and intact fuel assemblies, up to a total of 68. For damaged fuel other than Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay, the number of fuel assemblies is limited to 16, with the balance being intact fuel assemblies.	
		OR	

### KEY SYSTEM DATA FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

<sup>†</sup> See Section 2.1 for a complete description of authorized cask contents and fuel specifications.

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# Table 1.2.1 (continued) KEY SYSTEM DATA FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

ITEM	QUANTITY	NOTES
MPC storage capacity:	MPC-68F	Up to 4 damaged fuel containers with ZR clad Dresden Unit 1 (D- 1) or Humboldt Bay (HB) BWR fuel debris and the complement damaged ZR clad Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay BWR fuel assemblies in damaged fuel containers or intact Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay BWR intact fuel assemblies. OR
	MPC-68FF	Up to 68 Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay intact fuel or damaged fuel and up to 8 damaged fuel containers containing D-1 or HB fuel debris. For other BWR plants, up to 16 damaged fuel containers containing BWR damaged fuel and/or fuel debris with the complement intact fuel assemblies, up to a total of 68. The number of damaged fuel containers containing BWR fuel debris is limited to eight (8) for all BWR plants.

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Table	1.2.2

#### KEY PARAMETERS FOR HI-STORM 100 MULTI-PURPOSE CANISTERS

	PWR	BWR
Pre-disposal service life (years)	40	40
Design temperature, max./min. (°F)	725°†/-40°††	725° <sup>†</sup> /-40 <sup>°††</sup>
Design internal pressure (psig) Normal conditions Off-normal conditions Accident Conditions	100 110 200	100 110 200
Total heat load, max. (kW)	28.74	28.19
Maximum permissible peak fuel cladding temperature:		
Long Term Normal (°F) Short Term Operations (°F) Off-normal and Accident (°F)	752 752 or 1058 <sup>†††</sup> 1058	752 752 or 1058 <sup>†††</sup> 1058

t	Maximum normal condition design temperatures for the MPC fuel basket. A complete listing of design temperatures for all components is provided in Table 2.2.3.
tt	Temperature based on off-normal minimum environmental temperatures specified in Section 2.2.2.2 and no fuel decay heat load.
<b>†</b> ††	See Section 4.5 for discussion of the applicability of the 1058°F temperature limit during MPC drying.
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#### Table 1.2.2 (cont'd)

	PWR	BWR
MPC internal environment Helium fill (99.995% fill helium purity)	(all pressure ranges are at a reference temperature of 70°F)	(all pressure ranges are at a reference temperature of 70°F)
MPC-24 (heat load ≤ 27.77 kW)	≥ 29.3 psig and ≤ 33.3 psig OR 0.1212 +/-10% g-moles/liter	
MPC-24E/24EF (heat load ≤ 28.17 kW)	≥ 29.3 psig and ≤ 33.3 psig OR 0.1212 +/-10% g-moles/liter	
MPC-68/68F/68FF (heat load ≤ 28.19 kW)		≥ 29.3 psig and ≤ 33.3 psig OR 0.1218 +/-10% g-moles/liter
MPC-32/32F (heat load ≤ 28.74 kW)	≥ 29.3 psig and ≤ 33.3 psig OR 0.1212 +/-10% g-moles/liter	
Maximum permissible multiplication factor (k <sub>eff</sub> ) including all uncertainties and biases	< 0.95	< 0.95
Fixed Neutron Absorber <sup>10</sup> B Areal Density (g/cm <sup>2</sup> )	0.0267/0.0223 (MPC-24)	0.0372/0.0310 (MPC-68 & MPC-68FF)
Boral/Metamic	MPC-24EF MPC-32 & MPC-32F)	0.01/NA (MPC-68F) (See Note 1)
End closure(s)	Welded	Welded
Fuel handling	Opening compatible with standard grapples	Opening compatible with standard grapples
Heat dissipation	Passive	Passive

#### KEY PARAMETERS FOR HI-STORM 100 MULTI-PURPOSE CANISTERS

#### NOTES:

1. All MPC-68F canisters are equipped with Boral neutron absorber.

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### **HI-STORM 100 OPERATIONS SEQUENCE**

Site-sp owner	pecific handling and operations procedures will be prepared, reviewed, and approved by each /user.
1	HI-TRAC and MPC lowered into the fuel pool without lids
2	Fuel assemblies transferred into the MPC fuel basket
3	MPC lid lowered onto the MPC
4	HI-TRAC/MPC assembly moved to the decon pit and MPC lid welded in place, volumetrically or multi-layer PT examined, and pressure tested
5	MPC dewatered, moisture removed, backfilled with helium, and the closure ring welded
6	HI-TRAC annulus drained and external surfaces decontaminated
7	MPC lifting cleats installed and MPC weight supported by rigging
8	HI-TRAC pool lid removed and transfer lid attached (not applicable to HI-TRAC 125D)
9	MPC lowered and seated on HI-TRAC transfer lid (not applicable to HI-TRAC 125D)
9a	HI-STORM mating device secured to top of empty HI-STORM overpack (HI-TRAC 125D only)
10	HI-TRAC/MPC assembly transferred to atop HI-STORM overpack or mating device, as applicable
11	MPC weight supported by rigging and transfer lid doors opened (standard design HI- TRAC) or pool lid removed (HI-TRAC 125D)
12	MPC lowered into HI-STORM overpack, and HI-TRAC removed from atop HI- STORM overpack/mating device
12a	HI-STORM mating device removed (HI-TRAC 125D only)
13	HI-STORM overpack lid installed and bolted in place
14	HI-STORM overpack placed in storage at the ISFSI pad
15	For HI-STORM 100A (or 100SA) users, the overpack is anchored to the ISFSI pad by installation of nuts onto studs and torquing to the minimum required torque.

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#### Table 1.2.7

#### REPRESENTATIVE ASME BOLTING AND THREADED ROD MATERIALS ACCEPTABLE FOR THE HI-STORM 100A ANCHORAGE SYSTEM

Composition	I.D.	Type Grade or UNC No.	Ultimate Strength (ksi)	Yield Strength (ksi)	Code Permitted Size Range <sup>†</sup>
C	SA-354	BC K04100	125	109	t ≤ 2.5"
<sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub> Cr	SA-574	51B37M	170	135	t ≥ 5/8"
1 Cr – 1/5 Mo	SA-574	4142	170	135	t ≥ 5/8"
1 Cr-1/2 Mo-V	SA-540	B21 (K 14073)	165	150	t ≤ 4"
5 Cr – ½ Mo	SA-193	B7	125	105	t ≤ 2.5"
$2N_i - \frac{3}{4}Cr - \frac{1}{4}Mo$	SA-540	B23 (H-43400)	135	120	
2N <sub>i</sub> – ¾ Cr – 1/3 Mo	SA-540	B-24 (K-24064)	135	120	
17Cr-4Ni-4Cu	SA-564	630 (H-1100)	140	115	
17Cr-4Ni-4Cu	SA-564	630 (H-1075)	145	125	
25Ni-15Cr-2Ti	SA-638	660	130	85	
22CR-13Ni-5Mn	SA-479	XM-19 (S20910)	135	105	

#### ASME MATERIALS FOR BOLTING

Note: The materials listed in this table are representative of acceptable materials and have been abstracted from the ASME Code, Section II, Part D, Table 3. Other materials listed in the Code are also acceptable as long as they meet the size requirements, the minimum requirements on yield and ultimate strength (see Table 2.0.4), and are suitable for the environment.

\* Nominal diameter of the bolt (or rod) as listed in the Code tables. Two-inch diameter studs/rods are specified for the HI-STORM 100A.

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#### Table 1.2.8

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## METAMIC<sup>®</sup> DATA FOR HOLTEC MPCs

МРС Туре	Min. B-10 areal density required by criticality	Nominal Weight Percent of B <sub>4</sub> C and Reference <i>METAMIC</i> <sup>®</sup> Panel Thickness			
	analysis (g/cm <sup>2</sup> )	100% Credit	90% Credit	75% Credit	Ref. Thickness (inch)
MPC-24	0.020	27.6	31	37.2	0.075
MPC-68, - 68FF, -32, -32F, -24E, and -24EF	0.0279	27.8	31	37.4	0.104

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# Figure 1.2.16a; Major HI-STORM 100 Loading Operations (Sheet 1 of 6)

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Figure 1.2.16d; Major HI-STORM 100 Loading Operations (Sheet 4 of 6)

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Figure 1.2.16e; Example of HI-STORM 100 Handling Options (Sheet 5 of 6)

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Figure 1.2.16f; Example of HI-TRAC Handling Options (Sheet 6 of 6)

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## Figure 1.2.17b; Major HI-STORM 100 Unloading Operations (Sheet 2 of 4)

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Figure 1.2.17c; Major HI-STORM 100 Unloading Operations (Sheet 3 of 4)

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Figure 1.2.17d; Major HI-STORM 100 Unloading Operations (Sheet 4 of 4)

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#### 1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS

Holtec International is a specialty engineering company with a principal focus on spent fuel storage technologies. Holtec has carried out turnkey wet storage capacity expansions (engineering, licensing, fabrication, removal of existing racks, performance of underwater modifications, volume reduction of the old racks and hardware, installation of new racks, and commissioning of the pool for increased storage capacity) in numerous plants around the world. Over 45 plants in the U.S., Britain, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan have utilized Holtec's wet storage technology to extend their in-pool storage capacity.

Holtec's corporate engineering consists of experts with advanced degrees (Ph.D.'s) in every discipline germane to the fuel storage technologies, namely structural mechanics, heat transfer, computational fluid dynamics, and nuclear physics. All engineering analyses for Holtec's fuel storage projects (including HI-STORM 100) are carried out in-house.

Holtec International's quality assurance program was originally developed to meet NRC requirements delineated in 10CFR50, Appendix B, and was expanded to include provisions of 10CFR71, Subpart H, and 10CFR72, Subpart G, for structures, systems, and components designated as important to safety. The Holtec quality assurance program, which satisfies all 18 criteria in 10CFR72, Subpart G, that apply to the design, fabrication, construction, testing, operation, modification, and decommissioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety is incorporated by reference into this FSAR as described in Chapter 13.

It is currently planned that the HI-STORM 100 System will be fabricated by U.S. Tool & Die, Inc. (UST&D) of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. UST&D is an N-Stamp holder and a highly respected fabricator of nuclear components. UST&D is on Holtec's Approved Vendors List (AVL) and has a quality assurance program meeting 10CFR50 Appendix B criteria. Extensive prototypical fabrication of the MPCs has been carried out at the UST&D shop to resolve fixturing and tolerance issues. If another fabricator is to be used for the fabrication of any part of the HI-STORM 100 System, the proposed fabricator will be evaluated and audited in accordance with Holtec International's quality assurance program.

Construction, assembly, and operations on-site may be performed by Holtec or a licensee as the prime contractor. A licensee shall be suitably qualified and experienced to perform selected activities. Typical licensees are technically qualified and experienced in commercial nuclear power plant construction and operation activities under a quality assurance program meeting 10CFR50 Appendix B criteria.

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#### 1.4 GENERIC CASK ARRAYS

The HI-STORM 100 System is stored in a vertical configuration. The required center-to-center spacing between the modules (layout pitch) is guided by operational considerations. Tables 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 provide the nominal layout pitch information. Site-specific pitches are determined by practical operation with supporting heat transfer calculations in Chapter 4. The pitch values in Tables 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 are nominal and may be varied to suit the user's specific needs.

Table 1.4.1 provides recommended cask spacing data for array(s) of two by N casks. The pitch between adjacent rows of casks and between each adjacent column of casks are denoted by  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  In Table 1.4.1. There may be an unlimited number of rows. The distance between adjacent arrays of two by N casks (P3) shall be as specified in Table 1.4.1. See Figure 1.4.1 for further clarification. The pattern of required pitches and distances may be repeated for an unlimited number of columns.

For a square array of casks the pitch between adjacent casks may be in accordance with Table 1.4.2. See Figure 1.4.2 for further clarification. The data in Table 1.4.2 provide nominal values for large ISFSIs (i.e., those with hundreds of casks in a uniform layout), where access of feed air to the centrally located casks may become a matter of thermal consideration. From a thermal standpoint, regardless of the size of the ISFSI, the casks should be arrayed in such a manner that the tributary area for each cask (open ISFSI area attributable to a cask) is a minimum of 225 ft<sup>2</sup>. Subsection 4.4.1.1.7 provides the detailed thermal evaluation of the required tributary area. For specific sites, a smaller tributary area can be utilized after appropriate thermal evaluations for the site-specific conditions are performed.

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### Table 1.4.1

### CASK LAYOUT PITCH DATA FOR 2 BY N ARRAYS

Orientation	Nominal Cask Pitch (ft.)
Between adjacent rows, P1, and adjacent columns, P2	13.5
Between adjacent sets of two columns, P3	38

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## Table 1.4.2

## CASK LAYOUT PITCH DATA FOR SQUARE ARRAYS

Orientation	Nominal Cask Pitch (ft.)	
Between adjacent casks	18' - 8"	

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#### 1.5 <u>DRAWINGS</u>

The following HI-STORM 100 System drawings and bills of materials are provided on subsequent pages in this subsection:

Drawing Number/Sheet	Description	Rev.
3923	MPC Enclosure Vessel	13
3925	MPC-24E/EF Fuel Basket Assembly	5
3926	MPC-24 Fuel Basket Assembly	6
3927	MPC-32 Fuel Basket Assembly	8
3928	MPC-68/68F/68FF Basket Assembly	7
1495 Sht 1/6	HI-STORM 100 Assembly	13
1495 Sht 2/6	Cross Section "Z" - "Z" View of HI-STORM	18
1495 Sht 3/6	Section "Y" - "Y" of HI-STORM	12
1495 Sht 4/6	Section "X" -"X" of HI-STORM	13
1495 Sht 5/6	Section "W" - "W" of HI-STORM	15
1561 Sht 1/6	View "A" -"A" of HI-STORM	. 11
1561 Sht 2/6	Detail "B" of HI-STORM	15
1561 Sht 3/6	Detail of Air Inlet of HI-STORM	11
1561 Sht 4/6	Detail of Air Outlet of HI-STORM	12
3669	HI-STORM 100S Assembly	9
1880 Sht 1/10	125 Ton HI-TRAC Outline with Pool Lid	9
1880 Sht 2/10	125 Ton HI-TRAC Body Sectioned Elevation	10
1880 Sht 3/10	125 Ton HI-TRAC Body Sectioned Elevation "B" - "B"	9
1880 Sht 4/10	125 Ton Transfer Cask Detail of Bottom Flange	10
1880 Sht 5/10	125 Ton Transfer Cask Detail of Pool Lid	10
1880 Sht 6/10	125 Ton Transfer Cask Detail of Top Flange	10
1880 Sht 7/10	125 Ton Transfer Cask Detail of Top Lid	9
1880 Sht 8/10	125 Ton Transfer Cask View "Y" - "Y"	9
1880 Sht 9/10	125 Ton Transfer Cask Lifting Trunnion and Locking Pad	7
1880 Sht 10/10	125 Ton Transfer Cask View "Z" - "Z"	9
1928 Sht 1/2	125 Ton HI-TRAC Transfer Lid Housing Detail	11
1928 Sht 2/2	125 Ton HI-TRAC Transfer Lid Door Detail	10
2145 Sht 1/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Outline with Pool Lid	8
2145 Sht 2/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Body Sectioned Elevation	8
2145 Sht 3/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Body Sectioned Elevation 'B-B'	8
2145 Sht 4/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Detail of Bottom Flange	7
2145 Sht 5/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Detail of Pool Lid	6
2145 Sht 6/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Detail of Top Flange	8
2145 Sht 7/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Detail of Top Lid	8
2145 Sht 8/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC View Y-Y	8
2145 Sht 9/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC Lifting Trunnions and Locking Pad	5
2145 Sht 10/10	100 Ton HI-TRAC View Z-Z	7

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Drawing Number/Sheet	Description	Rev.
2152 Sht 1/2	100 Ton HI-TRAC Transfer Lid Housing Detail	10
2152 Sht 2/2	100 Ton HI-TRAC Transfer Lid Door Detail	8
3187	Lug and Anchoring Detail for HI-STORM 100A	2
BM-1575, Sht 1/2	Bill-of-Materials HI-STORM 100 Storage Overpack	19
BM-1575, Sht 2/2	Bill-of-Materials HI-STORM 100 Storage Overpack	19
BM-1880, Sht 1/2	Bill-of-Material for 125 Ton HI-TRAC	9
BM-1880, Sht 2/2	Bill-of-Material for 125 Ton HI-TRAC	7
BM-1928, Sht 1/1	Bill-of-Material for 125 Ton HI-TRAC Transfer Lid	10
BM-2145 Sht 1/2	Bill-of-Material for 100 Ton HI-TRAC	6
BM-2145 Sht 2/2	Bill-of-Material for 100 Ton HI-TRAC	5
BM-2152 Sht 1/1	Bill-of-Material for 100 Ton HI-TRAC Transfer Lid	8
3768	125 Ton HI-TRAC 125D Assembly	7
4116	HI-STORM 100S Version B	10

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BM-1880 (E.J.D. 3002) BILL OF MATERIAL FOR 125 TON HI-TRAC (DWG. 1880) SHT. 1 OF 2

BM-1880 (E.I.D 3003) BILL OF MATERIAL FOR 125 TON HI-TRAC (DWG. 1880) SHT. 2 OF 2

BM-1928 (E	E.I.D. 3001	) BILL D	F MATERIAL	FOR 125	TON HI-TRAC	TRANSFER	LID (DW	G. 1928)	
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#### 1.6 **REFERENCES**

- [1.0.1] 10CFR Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for the Storage of Spent Fuel in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation", Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 1998 Edition, Office of the Federal Register, Washington, D.C.
- [1.0.2] Regulatory Guide 3.61 (Task CE306-4) "Standard Format for a Topical Safety Analysis Report for a Spent Fuel Storage Cask", USNRC, February 1989.
- [1.0.3] NUREG-1536, "Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1997.
- [1.0.4] American Concrete Institute, "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures", ACI 349-85, ACI, Detroit, Michigan<sup>†</sup>
- [1.0.5] American Concrete Institute, "Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete", ACI 318-95, ACI, Detroit, Michigan.
- [1.1.1] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NB, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995 with Addenda through 1997.
- [1.1.2] USNRC Docket No. 72-1008, Final Safety Analysis Report for the (<u>Holtec</u> <u>International Storage, Transport, and Repository</u>) HI-STAR System, latest revision.
- [1.1.3] USNRC Docket No. 71-9261, Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the (<u>Holtec International Storage, Transport, and Repository</u>) HI-STAR System, latest revision.
- [1.1.4] 10CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities", Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 1998 Edition, Office of the Federal Register, Washington, D.C.
- [1.1.5] Deleted.
- [1.2.1] U.S. NRC Information Notice 96-34, "Hydrogen Gas Ignition During Closure Welding of a VSC-24 Multi-Assembly Sealed Basket".
- [1.2.2] Directory of Nuclear Reactors, Vol. II, Research, Test & Experimental Reactors, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1959.
- [1.2.3] V.L. McKinney and T. Rockwell III, "Boral: A New Thermal-Neutron Shield", USAEC Report AECD-3625, August 29, 1949.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The 1997 edition of ACI-349 is specified for ISFSI pad and embedment design for deployment of the anchored HI-STORM 100A and HI-STORM 100SA.

- [1.2.4] Reactor Shielding Design Manual, USAEC Report TID-7004, March 1956.
- [1.2.5] "Safety Analysis Report for the NAC Storable Transport Cask", Revision 8, September 1994, Nuclear Assurance Corporation (USNRC Docket No. 71-9235).
- [1.2.6] Deleted.
- [1.2.7] Materials Handbook, 13<sup>th</sup> Edition, Brady, G.S. and H.R. Clauser, McGraw-Hill, 1991, Page 310.
- [1.2.8] Deleted.
- [1.2.9] ANSI N14.6-1993, "American National Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials," American National Standards Institute, June, 1993.
- [1.2.10] Deleted.
- [1.2.11] "Qualification of METAMIC<sup>®</sup> for Spent Fuel Storage Application," EPRI, 1003137, Final Report, October 2001.
- [1.2.12] "Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Holtec International Report HI-2022871 Regarding Use of Metamic in Fuel Pool Applications," Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6, Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313 and 50-368, USNRC, June 2003.
- [1.2.13] "Metamic 6061+40% Boron Carbide Metal Matrix Composite Test", California Consolidated Tech. Inc. Report dated August 21, 2001 to NAC International.
- [1.2.14] "Recommendations for Preparing the Criticality Safety Evaluation for Transportation Packages," NUREG/CR-5661, USNRC, Dyer and Parks, ORNL.

**HI-STORM FSAR**
#### **APPENDIX 1.A: ALLOY X DESCRIPTION**

# 1.A <u>ALLOY X DESCRIPTION</u>

#### 1.A.1 <u>Alloy X Introduction</u>

Alloy X is used within this licensing application to designate a group of stainless steel alloys. Alloy X can be any one of the following alloys:

- Type 316
- Type 316LN
- Type 304
- Type 304LN

Qualification of structures made of Alloy X is accomplished by using the least favorable mechanical and thermal properties of the entire group for all MPC mechanical, structural, neutronic, radiological, and thermal conditions. The Alloy X approach is conservative because no matter which material is ultimately utilized, the Alloy X approach guarantees that the performance of the MPC will meet or exceed the analytical predictions.

This appendix defines the least favorable material properties of Alloy X.

#### 1.A.2 Alloy X Common Material Properties

Several material properties do not vary significantly from one Alloy X constituent to the next. These common material properties are as follows:

- density
- specific heat
- Young's Modulus (Modulus of Elasticity)
- Poisson's Ratio

The values utilized for this licensing application are provided in their appropriate chapters.

#### 1.A.3 Alloy X Least Favorable Material Properties

The following material properties vary between the Alloy X constituents:

- Design Stress Intensity (S<sub>m</sub>)
- Tensile (Ultimate) Strength (S<sub>u</sub>)
- Yield Strength (S<sub>y</sub>)
- Coefficient of Thermal Expansion (α)
- Coefficient of Thermal Conductivity (k)

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Each of these material properties are provided in the ASME Code Section II [1.A.1]. Tables 1.A.1 through 1.A.5 provide the ASME Code values for each constituent of Alloy X along with the least favorable value utilized in this licensing application. The ASME Code only provides values to -  $20^{\circ}$ F. The design temperature of the MPC is - $40^{\circ}$ F to 725°F as stated in Table 1.2.3. Most of the above-mentioned properties become increasingly favorable as the temperature drops. Conservatively, the values at the lowest design temperature for the HI-STAR 100 System have been assumed to be equal to the lowest value stated in the ASME Code. The lone exception is the thermal conductivity. The thermal conductivity decreases with the decreasing temperature. The thermal conductivity value for - $40^{\circ}$ F is linearly extrapolated from the 70°F value using the difference from 70°F to 100°F.

The Alloy X material properties are the minimum values of the group for the design stress intensity, tensile strength, yield strength, and coefficient of thermal conductivity. Using minimum values of design stress intensity is conservative because lower design stress intensities lead to lower allowables that are based on design stress intensity. Similarly, using minimum values of tensile strength and yield strength is conservative because lower values of tensile strength and yield strength is conservative because lower values of tensile strength and yield strength lead to lower allowables that are based on tensile strength and yield strength. When compared to calculated values, these lower allowables result in factors of safety that are conservative for any of the constituent materials of Alloy X. Further discussion of the justification for using the minimum values are used for the coefficient of thermal expansion of Alloy X. The maximum and minimum coefficients of thermal expansion are used as appropriate in this submittal. Figures 1.A.1-1.A.5 provide a graphical representation of the varying material properties with temperature for the Alloy X materials.

# 1.A.4 References

[1.A.1] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section II, 1995 ed. with Addenda through 1997.

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#### Table 1.A.1

# ALLOY X AND CONSTITUENT DESIGN STRESS INTENSITY (Sm) vs. TEMPERATURE

Temp. (°F)	Туре 304	Type 304LN	Туре 316	Type 316LN	Alloy X (minimum of constituent values)
-40	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
100	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
200	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
300	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
400	18.7	18.7	19.3	18.9	18.7
500	17.5	17.5	18.0	17.5	17.5
600	16.4	16.4	17.0	16.5	16.4
650	16.2	16.2	16.7	16.0	16.0
700	16.0	16.0	16.3	15.6	15.6
750	15.6	15.6	16.1	15.2	15.2
800	15.2	15.2	15.9	14.9	14.9

Notes:

- 1. Source: Table 2A on pages 314, 318, 326, and 330 of [1.A.1].
- 2. Units of design stress intensity values are ksi.

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#### Table 1.A.2

Temp. (°F)	Туре 304	Type 304LN	Туре 316	Type 316LN	Alloy X (minimum of constituent values)
-40	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)
100	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)
200	71.0 (66.2)	71.0 (66.2)	75.0 (70.0)	75.0 (70.0)	71.0 (66.2)
300	66.0 (61.5)	66.0 (61.5)	73.4 (68.5)	70.9 (66.0)	66.0 (61.5)
400	64.4 (60.0)	64.4 (60.0)	71.8 (67.0)	67.1 (62.6)	64.4 (60.0)
500	63.5 (59.3)	63.5 (59.3)	71.8 (67.0)	64.6 (60.3)	63.5 (59.3)
600	63.5 (59.3)	63.5 (59.3)	71.8 (67.0)	63.1 (58.9)	63.1 (58.9)
650	63.5 (59.3)	63.5 (59.3)	71.8 (67.0)	62.8 (58.6)	62.8 (58.6)
700	63.5 (59.3)	63.5 (59.3)	71.8 (67.0)	62.5 (58.4)	62.5 (58.4)
750	63.1 (58.9)	63.1 (58.9)	71.4 (66.5)	62.2 (58.1)	62.2 (58.1)
800	62.7 (58.5)	62.7 (58.5)	70.9 (66.2)	61.7 (57.6)	61.7 (57.6)

#### ALLOY X AND CONSTITUENT TENSILE STRENGTH (Su) vs. TEMPERATURE

Notes:

- 1. Source: Table U on pages 437, 439, 441, and 443 of [1.A.1].
- 2. Units of tensile strength are ksi.
- 3. The ultimate stress of Alloy X is dependent on the product form of the material (i.e., forging vs. plate). Values in parentheses are based on SA-336 forged materials (type F304, F304LN, F316, and F316LN), which are used solely for the one-piece construction MPC lids. All other values correspond to SA-240 plate material.

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# ALLOY X AND CONSTITUENT YIELD STRESSES (Sy) vs. TEMPERATURE

Temp. (°F)	Туре 304	Type 304LN	Туре 316	Type 316LN	Alloy X (minimum of constituent values)
-40	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
100	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
200	25.0	25.0	25.8	25.5	25.0
300	22.5	22.5	23.3	22.9	22.5
400	20.7	20.7	21.4	21.0	20.7
500	19.4	19.4	19.9	19.4	19.4
600	18.2	18.2	18.8	18.3	18.2
650	17.9	17.9	18.5	17.8	17.8
700	17.7	17.7	18.1	17.3	17.3
750	17.3	17.3	17.8	16.9	16.9
800	16.8	16.8	17.6	16.6	16.6

Notes:

1. Source: Table Y-1 on pages 518, 519, 522, 523, 530, 531, 534, and 535 of [1.A.1].

2. Units of yield stress are ksi.

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# Table 1.A.4

Temp. (°F)	Type 304 and Type 304LN	Type 316 and Type 316LN	Alloy X Maximum	Alloy X Minimum
-40	8.55	8.54	8.55	8.54
100	8.55	8.54	8.55	8.54
150	8.67	8.64	8.67	8.64
200	8.79	8.76	8.79	8.76
250	8.90	8.88	8.90	8.88
300	9.00	8.97	9.00	8.97
350	9.10	9.11	9.11	9.10
400	9.19	9.21	9.21	9.19
450	9.28	9.32	9.32	9.28
500	9.37	9.42	9.42	9.37
550	9.45	9.50	9.50	9.45
600	9.53	9.60	9.60	9.53
650	9.61	9.69	9.69	9.61
700	9.69	9.76	9.76	9.69
750	9.76	9.81	9.81	9.76
800	9.82	9.90	9.90	9.82

# ALLOY X AND CONSTITUENT COEFFICIENT OF THERMAL EXPANSION vs. TEMPERATURE

Notes:

- 1. Source: Table TE-1 on pages 590 and 591 of [1.A.1].
- 2. Units of coefficient of thermal expansion are in./in.- $^{\circ}$ F x 10<sup>-6</sup>.

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#### Table 1.A.5

Temp. (⁰F)	Type 304 and Type 304LN	Type 316 and Type 316LN	Alloy X (minimum of constituent values)
-40	8.23	6.96	6.96
70	8.6	7.7	7.7
100	8.7	7.9	7.9
150	9.0	8.2	8.2
200	9.3	8.4	8.4
250	9.6	8.7	8.7
300	9.8	9.0	9.0
350	10.1	9.2	9.2
400	10.4	9.5	9.5
450	10.6	9.8	9.8
500	10.9	10.0	10.0
550	11.1	10.3	10.3
600	11.3	10.5	10.5
650	11.6	10.7	10.7
700	11.8	11.0	11.0
750	12.0	11.2	11.2
800	12.2	11.5	11.5

ALLOY X AND CONSTITUENT THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY vs. TEMPERATURE

Notes:

- 1. Source: Table TCD on page 606 of [1.A.1].
- 2. Units of thermal conductivity are Btu/hr-ft-°F.

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Туре 304 Type 304LN Туре 316







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# THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY VS. TEMPERATURE

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# APPENDIX 1.B: HOLTITE <sup>TM</sup> MATERIAL DATA

The information provided in this appendix describes the neutron absorber material, Holtite-A for the purpose of confirming its suitability for use as a neutron shield material in spent fuel storage casks. Holtite-A is one of the family of Holtite neutron shield materials denoted by the generic name Holtite<sup>TM</sup>. It is currently the only solid neutron shield material approved for installation in the HI-TRAC transfer cask. It is chemically identical to NS-4-FR which was originally developed by Bisco Inc. and used for many years as a shield material with B<sub>4</sub>C or Pb added.

Holtite-A contains aluminum hydroxide (Al(OH)<sub>3</sub>) in an epoxy resin binder. Aluminum hydroxide is also known by the industrial trade name of aluminum tri-hydrate or ATH. ATH is often used commercially as a fire-retardant. Holtite-A contains approximately 62% ATH supported in a typical 2-part epoxy resin as a binder. Holtite-A contains 1% (nominal) by weight B<sub>4</sub>C, a chemically inert material added to enhance the neutron absorption property. Pertinent properties of Holtite-A are listed in Table 1.B.1.

The essential properties of Holtite-A are:

- 1. the hydrogen density (needed to thermalize neutrons),
- 2. thermal stability of the hydrogen density, and
- 3. the uniformity in distribution of  $B_4C$  needed to absorb the thermalized neutrons.

ATH and the resin binder contain nearly the same hydrogen density so that the hydrogen density of the mixture is not sensitive to the proportion of ATH and resin in the Holtite-A mixture.  $B_4C$  is added as a finely divided powder and does not settle out during the resin curing process. Once the resin is cured (polymerized), the ATH and  $B_4C$  are physically retained in the hardened resin. Qualification testing for  $B_4C$  throughout a column of Holtite-A has confirmed that the  $B_4C$  is uniformly distributed with no evidence of settling or non-uniformity. Furthermore, an excess of  $B_4C$  is specified in the Holtite-A mixing and pouring procedure as a precaution to assure that the  $B_4C$  concentration is always adequate throughout the mixture.

The specific gravity specified in Table 1.B.1 does not include an allowance for weight loss. The specific gravity assumed in the shielding analysis includes a 4% reduction to conservatively account for potential weight loss at the design temperatures listed in Table 1.B.1. or an inability to reach theoretical density. Tests on the stability of Holtite-A were performed by Holtec International. The results of the tests are summarized in Holtec Reports HI-2002396, "Holtite-A Development History and Thermal Performance Data" and HI-2002420, "Results of Pre- and Post-Irradiation Test Measurements." The information provided in these reports demonstrates that Holtite-A<sup>TM</sup> possesses

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the necessary thermal and radiation stability characteristics to function as a reliable shielding material in the HI-TRAC transfer cask.

The Holtite-A is encapsulated in the HI-TRAC transfer cask lid and, therefore, should experience a very small weight reduction during the design life of the cask. The data and test results confirm that Holtite-A remains stable under design thermal and radiation conditions, the material properties meet or exceed that assumed in the shielding analysis, and the  $B_4C$  remains uniformly distributed with no evidence of settling or non-uniformity.

Based on the information described above, Holtite-A meets all of the requirements for an acceptable neutron shield material.

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# Table 1.B.1

# REFERENCE PROPERTIES OF HOLTITE-A NEUTRON SHIELD MATERIAL

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES			
% ATH	62 nominal		
Specific Gravity	1.68 g/cc nominal		
Max. Continuous Operating Temperature	300°F		
Max. Short-Term Operating Temperature	350°F (Note 1)		
Hydrogen Density	0.096 g/cc minimum		
Radiation Resistance	Excellent		
CHEMICAL PROPERTIES (Nominal)			
wt% Aluminum	21.5		
wt% Hydrogen	6.0		
wt% Carbon	27.7		
wt% Oxygen	42.8		
wt% Nitrogen	2.0		
wt% B4C	1.0		

NOTES:

1. As defined in Section 2.2, all operations involving the HI-TRAC transfer cask are short-term operating conditions. The short-term operating temperature limit is, therefore, the appropriate maximum design temperature for the Holtite-A in the HI-TRAC transfer cask.

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# APPENDIX 1.C: MISCELLANEOUS MATERIAL DATA (Total of 2 Pages Including This Page)

The information provided in this appendix specifies the paint properties and demonstrates their suitability for use in spent nuclear fuel storage casks.

Thermaline 450 or equivalent is specified to coat the overpack to the maximum extent practical and the inner cavity of the HI-TRAC transfer cask. Carboline 890 or equivalent is specified to coat external surfaces of the HI-TRAC transfer cask. The paints are suitable for the design temperatures (see Table 2.2.3) and the environment.

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# **APPENDIX 1.D: Requirements on HI-STORM 100 Shielding Concrete**

#### 1.D.1 Introduction

The HI-STORM 100 overpack utilizes plain concrete for neutron and gamma shielding. Thus, the primary function of the concrete placed in the overpack is to provide neutron and gamma attenuation. Plain concrete used in the HI-STORM overpack provides only a compressive strength structural function due to the fact that both the primary and secondary load bearing members of the overpack are made of carbon steel. While most of the shielding concrete used in the HI-STORM 100 overpack is installed in the annulus between the concentric structural shells, smaller quantities of concrete are also present in the pedestal shield and the overpack lid. Because plain concrete has little ability to withstand tensile stresses, but is competent in withstanding compressive and bearing loads, the design of the HI-STORM 100 overpack places no reliance on the tension-competence of the shielding concrete.

During normal operations of the HI-STORM, the stresses in the concrete continuum are negligible, arising solely from its self-weight. ACI 318-95 provides formulas for permissible compressive and bearing stresses in plain concrete, which incorporate a penalty over the corresponding permissible values in reinforced concrete. The formulas for permissible compressive and bearing stresses set forth in ACI 318-95 are used in calculations supporting this FSAR in load cases involving compression or bearing loads on the overpack concrete. However, since ACI 318-95 is intended for commercial applications and the overpack concrete is designated as an ITS Category B material, it is appropriate to invoke applicable provisions of ACI 349-85 (which is sanctioned by NUREG-1536) for all requirements except for the allowable stress formulas (which do not exist in ACI 349) and load combinations to ensure that all "critical characteristics" of the concrete, as defined herein, are fully satisfied. During normal storage operations, the overpack concrete is completely enclosed by the overpack steel structure, protecting it from the deleterious effects of direct exposure to the environment, typical of most concrete structures governed by these ACI codes.

The "critical characteristics" of the plain concrete in the HI-STORM overpack are: (i) its density and (ii) its compressive strength (at 28 days of curing). This appendix provides the complete set of criteria applicable to the plain concrete in the HI-STORM 100 overpack.

#### 1.D.2 Design Requirements

The primary function of the plain concrete is to provide neutron and gamma shielding. As plain concrete is a competent structural member in compression, the plain concrete's effect on the performance of the HI-STORM overpack under compression loadings is considered and modeled in the structural analyses, as necessary. The formulas for permissible compressive and bearing stresses set forth in ACI 318-95 are used. However, as plain concrete has very limited capabilities in tension, no tensile strength is allotted to the concrete.

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The steel structure of the HI-STORM overpack provides the strength to meet all load combinations specified in Chapters 2 and 3, due to the fact that both the primary and secondary load bearing members (as defined in NF-1215 of the ASME Code, Section III) of the HI-STORM overpack are made from carbon steel. Credit for the structural strength of the plain concrete is only taken to enhance the compressive load carrying capability of the concrete in calculations appropriate to handling and transfer operations, and to demonstrate that the HI-STORM 100 System continues to provide functional performance in a post-accident environment. Therefore, the load combinations provided in ACI 349 and NUREG-1536, Table 3-1 are not applicable to the plain concrete in the HI-STORM overpack.

The shielding performance of the plain concrete is maintained by ensuring that the minimum concrete density is met during construction and the allowable concrete temperature limits are not exceeded. The thermal analyses for normal and off-normal conditions demonstrate that the plain concrete does not exceed the allowable long term temperature limit provided in Table 1.D.1. Under accident conditions, the bulk of the plain concrete in the HI-STORM overpack does not exceed the allowable short term temperature limit provided in Table 1.D.1. Any portion of the plain concrete, which exceeds the short-term temperature limit under accident conditions is neglected in the post-accident shielding analysis and in any post-accident structural analysis.

#### 1.D.2.1 Test Results to Support Normal Condition Temperature Limit

Note 3 to Table 1.D.1 references Paragraph A.4.3 of ACI-349, which requires that normal condition temperatures in excess of 150°F bulk and 200°F local must be supported by test data to demonstrate that strength reductions are acceptable and that concrete deterioration does not occur. Such data are described and discussed in this subsection.

With respect to concrete compressive strength at bulk temperatures up to 300°F, test studies for elevated temperatures were performed by Carette and Malhorta [1.D.1] that examined conditions very similar to those of the HI-STORM concrete. Their tests were performed on 4" diameter by 8" long test cylinders. The test condition most closely matching the HI-STORM concrete was: 0.6 water-to-cement ratio, limestone aggregate and 300°F for four months. While the HI-STORM storage period is much greater than 4 months, the investigators state "any major strength loss is found to occur within the first month of exposure." The four-month compressive strength for these conditions was actually determined to be greater than the nominal concrete strengths despite the elevated temperatures. This is attributable to the increase in compressive strength that accompanies concrete aging, which more than offsets the temperature effects.

With respect to concrete shielding performance at local temperatures above 300°F, a report by Schneider and Horvath [1.D.2] examined weight loss of concrete at elevated temperatures. Tests were performed on 12mm diameter by 40 mm long test cylinders in an apparatus called a thermobalance. A variety of aggregates (i.e., quartz, limestone and basalt) were tested. The test results indicate a worst-case weight loss of 0.424% from 300°F to 365°F for quartz aggregates. This maximum level of weight loss would reduce the concrete density from 2.35 gm/cc to 2.34 gm/cc. If the entire weight loss is attributed to water loss, the corresponding limiting reduction in hydrogen content is from 0.6% to 0.555%. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, such reductions are negligible with

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respect to shielding performance.

#### 1.D.3 Material Requirements

Table 1.D.1 provides the material limitations and requirements applicable to the overpack plain concrete. These requirements, drawn from ACI 349-85 and supplemented by the provisions of NUREG 1536 (page 3-21), are intended to ensure that the "critical characteristics" of the concrete placed in the HI-STORM overpack comply with the requirements of this Appendix and standard good practice. Two different minimum concrete densities are specified for the overpack concrete, based on the presence or absence of the steel shield shell. The steel shield shell was deleted from the overpack design after the construction of overpack serial number 1024-7.

ACI 349 was developed to govern the design and construction of steel reinforced concrete structures for the entire array of nuclear power plant applications, except for concrete reactor vessels and containment structures. Therefore, ACI 349 contains many requirements not germane to the plain concrete installed in and completely enclosed by the steel HI-STORM overpack structure. For example, the overpack concrete is not exposed to the environment, so provisions in the standard for protecting concrete from the environment would not be applicable to the concrete contained in the overpack.

In accordance with the requirement in Section 3.3 of Appendix B of the HI-STORM 100 CoC, Section 1.D.4, Table 1.D.1 and Table 1.D.2 were developed using the guidance of ACI 349-85, to the extent it needs to be applied to the unique application of placing unreinforced concrete inside the steel enclosure of the HI-STORM overpack. Other concrete standards were used, as appropriate, to provide the controls necessary to assure that the critical characteristics of the overpack concrete will be achieved and that the concrete will perform its design function.

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#### 1.D.4 Construction Requirements

The HI-STORM 100 overpack is composed of a steel structure that houses plain concrete. The steel structure acts as the framework for the pouring of the concrete. The steel structure defines the dimensions of the concrete, which ensures that the required thickness of concrete is provided. The fabrication sequence for the HI-STORM 100 overpack as it pertains to the concrete is provided below.

The steel structure of the HI-STORM 100 overpack body is assembled at a qualified steel fabrication facility. The design of the steel weldment incorporates access to the annulus formed by the overpack inner and outer shells as well as the MPC pedestal to allow placement of concrete. The steel structure of the overpack body is transported to the reactor site or a nearby concrete placement facility.

Once the steel structure of the body is received, the body will be inspected to ensure the steel structure meets the requirements of Sections 5.1 and 6.1 of ACI 349. The concrete shall be mixed, conveyed, and deposited in accordance with the guidance in Table 1.D.1. Sufficient rigidity in the steel structure overpack body is provided such that all the concrete may be placed in a single pour into each of the four segments formed by the inner shell, outer shell, and radial plates. If more than one pour is performed, the requirements of Section 6.4 of ACI 349 must be met for construction joints.

Mixing and placing of the concrete shall follow the guidance of ACI 349-85, Sections 5.6 and 5.7 for cold and hot weather conditions, respectively. Consolidation of the plain concrete shall be performed in accordance with portions of ACI 309-87, as delineated in Table 1.D.1. As no reinforcement is placed in the concrete, the possibility of voids is greatly diminished. Curing of the concrete shall be in accordance with Section 5.5 of ACI 349. Water curing or accelerated curing using sealing materials methods may be used as described in ACI 308-92, Standard Practice for Curing Concrete. This would include the use of either a plastic film or a curing compound.

Non-shrink grout shall be applied as necessary to account for any major deviations in concrete elevation. To fabricate the overpack lid an identical process is followed.

Table 1.D.1 provides the construction limitations and requirements applicable to the overpack plain concrete. These requirements are drawn from ACI 349-85.

# 1.D.5 <u>Testing Requirements</u>

Table 1.D.2 provides the testing requirements applicable to the overpack plain concrete. These requirements are derived from ACI 349-85 and are implemented as appropriate, to ensure that the critical characteristics of the plain concrete placed in the HI-STORM overpack are consistent with the safety analyses documented in the FSAR.

# 1.D.6 References

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- [1.D.1] Carette and Malhorta, "Performance of Dolostone and Limestone Concretes at Sustained High Temperatures," Temperature Effects on Concrete, ASTM STP 858.
- [1.D.2] Schneider and Horvath, "Behaviour of Ordinary Concrete at High Temperature," Vienna Technical University – Institute for Building Materials and Fire Protection, Research Report Volume 9.

ITEM	APPLICABLE LIMIT OR REFERENCE
Density in overpack body (Minimum)	146 lb/ft <sup>3</sup> (HI-STORM 100 up to Serial Number
(see Table 3.2.1 for information on maximum	(S/N) 7), 155 lb/ft <sup>3</sup> (S/N 8 and higher)
concrete density)	
Density in lid and pedestal (Minimum)	146 lb/ft <sup>3</sup> (HI-STORM 100S Version B does not
(See Table 3.2.1 for information on maximum	have a concrete-filled pedestal)
concrete density)	
Specified Compressive Strength	3,300 psi (min.)
Compressive and Bearing Stress Limit	Per ACI 318-95
Cement Type and Mill Test Report	Type II; Section 3.2 (ASTM C 150 or ASTM C595)
Aggregate Type	Section 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3 (including ASTM C33 (Note 2)
Nominal Maximum Aggregate Size	1-1/2 (inch)
Water Quality	Per Section 3.4
Material Testing	Per Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 (Note 4)
Admixtures	Per Section 3.6.1, 3.6.2, 3.6.5, and 3.6.6
Maximum Water to Cement Ratio	0.5 (Table 4.5.2)
Maximum Water Soluble Chloride Ion Cl in	1.00 percent by weight of cement (Table 4.5.4) (See
Concrete	Table 1.D.2, Note 1)
Concrete Quality	Per Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.6 of ACI 349 (Note 5)
Mixing and Placing	Per Chapter 5 of ACI 349 (Note 6)
Consolidation	Per Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 7.1 of ACI 309-87
Quality Assurance	Per Holtec Quality Assurance Manual, 10 CFR Part
	72, Appendix G commitments
Through-Thickness Section Average <sup>†</sup> Temperature	300°F (See Note 3)
Limit Under Long Term Conditions	
Through-Thickness Section Average <sup>†</sup> Temperature	350°F (Appendix A, Paragraph A.4.2)
Limit Under Short Term Conditions	
Aggregate Maximum Value <sup>††</sup> of Coefficient of	6E-06 inch/inch/°F
Thermal Expansion (tangent in the range of 70°F to 100°F)	(NUREG-1536, 3.V.2.b.i.(2)(c)2.b)

Table 1.D.1Requirements for Plain Concrete

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The through-thickness section average is the same quantity as that defined in Paragraph A.4.3 of Appendix A to ACI 349 as the mean temperature distribution. A formula for determining this value, consistent with the inner and outer surface averaging used in this FSAR, is presented in Figure A-1 of the commentary on ACI 349. Use of this quantity as an acceptance criterion is, therefore, in accordance with the governing ACI code.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> The following aggregate types are a priori acceptable: limestone, marble, basalt, granite, gabbro, or rhyolite. The limestone expansion coefficient limit does not apply when these aggregates are used. Careful consideration shall be given to the potential of long-term degradation of concrete due to chemical reactions between the aggregate and cement selected for HI-STORM overpack concrete.

# Table 1.D.1 (continued) Requirements for Plain Concrete

#### Notes:

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- 1. All section and table references are to ACI 349-85.
- 2. The coarse aggregate shall meet the requirements of ASTM C33 for class designation 1S from Table 3. However, if the requirements of ASTM C33 cannot be met, concrete aggregates that have been shown by special tests or actual service to produce concrete of adequate strength, unit weight, and durability meeting the requirements of Tables 1.D.1 and 1.D.2 are acceptable in accordance with ACI 349 Section 3.3.2. The high-density coarse aggregate percentage of Material Finer Than No. 200 Sieve may be increased to 10 % if the material is essentially free of clay or shale.
- 3. The 300°F long term temperature limit is specified in accordance with Paragraph A.4.3 of Appendix A to ACI 349 for normal conditions considering the very low maximum stresses calculated and discussed in Section 3.4 of this FSAR for normal conditions. In accordance with this paragraph of the governing code, the specified concrete compressive strength is supported by test data and the concrete is shown not to deteriorate, as evidenced by a lack of reduction in concrete density or durability.
- 4. Tests of materials and concrete shall be made in accordance with standards of the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) as specified here, to ensure that the critical characteristics for the HI-STORM concrete are achieved. ASTM Standards to be used include: C 31-96, C 33-82, C 39-96, C 88-76, C 131-81, C 138-92, C 143-98, C 150-97, C 172-90, C 192-95, C 494-92, C 637-73. More recent approved editions of the referenced standards may be used.
- 5. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of ACI 349 may be used for guidance in proportioning concrete trial mixes. Deviations from these sections may be taken provided an acceptable concrete mix design meeting the critical characteristics as specified in this appendix are achieved. Samples taken for strength tests from a concrete pump truck may be obtained from a single representative sample taken from the approximate middle of the concrete truck during discharge.
- 6. Water and admixtures may be added at the job site to bring both the slump and wet unit weight of the concrete within the mix design limits. Water or admixtures shall not be added to the concrete after placement activities have started. The tolerance for individual and combined aggregate weights in the concrete batch may be outside of tolerances specified in ASTM C94, provided that the wet unit weight of the concrete is tested prior to placement and confirmed to be within the approved range.

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TEST	SPECIFICATION
Compression Test	ASTM C31, ASTM C39, ASTM C192
Unit Weight (Density)	ASTM C138
Maximum Water Soluble Chloride Ion Concentration	Federal Highway Administration Report FHWA-RD-77-85, "Sampling and Testing for Chloride Ion in Concrete" (Note 1)

#### Table 1.D.2: Testing Requirements for Plain Concrete

Notes:

 If the concrete or concrete aggregates are suspected of containing excessive amounts of chlorides, they will be tested to ensure that their contribution will not cause the watersoluble chloride concentration to exceed the required maximum. Factors to be considered will consist of the source of the aggregates (proximity to a salt water source, brackish area, etc.) and service history of the concrete made from aggregates originating from the same source. No specific tests are required unless the aggregates or water source are suspected of containing an excessive concentration of chloride ions.

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# CHAPTER 2<sup>†</sup>: PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA

This chapter contains a compilation of design criteria applicable to the HI-STORM 100 System. The loadings and conditions prescribed herein for the MPC, particularly those pertaining to mechanical accidents, are far more severe in most cases than those required for 10CFR72 compliance. The MPC is designed to be in compliance with both 10CFR72 and 10CFR71 and therefore certain design criteria are overly conservative for storage. This chapter sets forth the loading conditions and relevant acceptance criteria; it does not provide results of any analyses. The analyses and results carried out to demonstrate compliance with the design criteria are presented in the subsequent chapters of this report.

This chapter is in full compliance with NUREG-1536, except for the exceptions and clarifications provided in Table 1.0.3. Table 1.0.3 provides the NUREG-1536 review guidance, the justification for the exception or clarification, and the Holtec approach to meet the intent of the NUREG-1536 guidance.

#### 2.0 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA

The design criteria for the MPC, HI-STORM overpack, and HI-TRAC transfer cask are summarized in Tables 2.0.1, 2.0.2, and 2.0.3, respectively, and described in the sections that follow.

#### 2.0.1 MPC Design Criteria

#### **General**

The MPC is designed for 40 years of service, while satisfying the requirements of 10CFR72. The adequacy of the MPC design for the design life is discussed in Section 3.4.12.

#### **Structural**

The MPC is classified as important to safety. The MPC structural components include the internal fuel basket and the enclosure vessel. The fuel basket is designed and fabricated as a core support structure, in accordance with the applicable requirements of Section III, Subsection NG of the ASME Code, with certain NRC-approved alternatives, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. The enclosure vessel is designed and fabricated as a Class 1 component pressure vessel in accordance with Section III, Subsection NB of the ASME Code, with certain NRC-approved alternatives, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. The principal exception is the MPC lid, vent and drain port cover plates, and closure ring welds to the MPC lid and shell, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. In addition, the threaded holes in

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<sup>†</sup> This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulatory Guide 3.61. However, the material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements of NUREG-1536. Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in Chapter 1, Section 1.0, herein. Finally, all terms-of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the terminology of the glossary (Table 1.0.1) and component nomenclature of the Bill-of-Materials (Section 1.5).

the MPC lid are designed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6 for critical lifts to facilitate vertical MPC transfer.

The MPC closure welds are partial penetration welds that are structurally qualified by analysis, as presented in Chapter 3. The MPC lid and closure ring welds are inspected by performing a liquid penetrant examination of the root pass and/or final weld surface (if more than one weld pass was required), in accordance with the drawings contained in Section 1.5. The integrity of the MPC lid weld is further verified by performing a volumetric (or multi-layer liquid penetrant) examination, and a Code pressure test.

The structural analysis of the MPC, in conjunction with the redundant closures and nondestructive examination, pressure testing, and helium leak testing (performed during MPC fabrication), provides assurance of canister closure integrity in lieu of the specific weld joint requirements of Section III, Subsection NB.

Compliance with the ASME Code as it is applied to the design and fabrication of the MPC and the associated justification are discussed in Section 2.2.4. The MPC is designed for all design basis normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions, as defined in Section 2.2. These design loadings include postulated drop accidents while in the cavity of the HI-STORM overpack or the HI-TRAC transfer cask. The load combinations for which the MPC is designed are defined in Section 2.2.7. The maximum allowable weight and dimensions of a fuel assembly to be stored in the MPC are limited in accordance with Section 2.1.5.

The structural analysis to evaluate the margin against fuel rod damage from buckling under the drop accident scenario remains unchanged considering ISG-11, Revision 3 because no credit for the tensile stresses in the fuel rods due to internal pressure is taken. Because recognition of the state of tensile axial stress in the fuel cladding permitted by ISG-11 Revision 3 increases the resistance under axial buckling, neglecting the internal pressure buckling analysis is conservative. Therefore, compliance with ISG-11 Revision 3 does not have material effect on the structural analyses summarized in Chapter 3 of this FSAR.

#### **Thermal**

The design and operation of the HI-STORM 100 System meets the intent of the review guidance contained in ISG-11, Revision 3 [2.0.8]. Specifically, the ISG-11 provisions that are explicitly invoked and satisfied are:

- i. The thermal acceptance criteria for all commercial spent fuel (CSF) authorized by the USNRC for operation in a commercial reactor are unified into one set of requirements.
- The maximum value of the *calculated* temperature for all CSF (including ZR and stainless steel fuel cladding materials) under long-term normal conditions of storage must remain below 400°C (752°F). For short-term operations, including canister drying, helium backfill, and on-site cask transport operations, the fuel cladding temperature must not exceed 400°C (752°F) for high burnup fuel and 570°C (1058°F) for moderate burnup fuel.

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- iii. The maximum fuel cladding temperature as a result of an off-normal or accident event must not exceed 570°C (1058°F).
- iv. For High Burnup Fuel (HBF), operating restrictions are imposed to limit the maximum temperature excursion during short-term operations to 65°C (117°F).

To achieve compliance with the above criteria, certain design and operational changes are necessary, as summarized below.

- i. The peak fuel cladding temperature limit (PCT) for long term storage operations and short term operations is generally set at 400°C (752°F). However, for MPCs containing all moderate burnup fuel, the fuel cladding temperature limit for short-term operations is set at 570°C (1058°F) because fuel cladding stress is shown to be less than approximately 90 MPa per Reference [2.0.9]. Appropriate analyses have been performed as discussed in Chapter 4 and operating restrictions added to ensure these limits are met (see Section 4.5).
- ii. For MPCs containing at least one high burnup fuel (HBF) assembly, the forced helium dehydration (FHD) method of MPC cavity drying must be used to meet the normal operations PCT limit and satisfy the 65°C temperature excursion criterion for HBF.
- iii. The off-normal and accident condition PCT limit remains unchanged (1058°F).
- iv. For high burnup fuel, the Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) is required to ensure fuel cladding temperatures remain below the applicable temperature limit (see Section 4.5). The design criteria for the SCS are provided in Appendix 2.C.

The MPC cavity is dried using either a vacuum drying system, or a forced helium dehydration system (see Appendix 2.B). The MPC is backfilled with 99.995% pure helium in accordance with the limits in Table 1.2.2 during canister sealing operations to promote heat transfer and prevent cladding degradation.

The design temperatures for the structural steel components of the MPC are based on the temperature limits provided in ASME Section II, Part D, tables referenced in ASME Section III, Subsection NB and NG, for those load conditions under which material properties are relied on for a structural load combination. The specific design temperatures for the components of the MPC are provided in Table 2.2.3.

The MPCs are designed for a bounding thermal source term, as described in Section 2.1.6. The maximum allowable fuel assembly heat load for each MPC is limited as specified in Section 2.1.9.

Each MPC model, except MPC-68F, allows for two fuel loading strategies. The first is uniform | fuel loading, wherein any authorized fuel assembly may be stored in any fuel storage location, subject to other restrictions, such as location requirements for damaged fuel containers (DFCs) | and fuel with integral non-fuel hardware (e.g., control rod assemblies). The second is

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regionalized fuel loading, wherein the basket is segregated into two regions. Region 1 is the inner region where fuel assemblies with higher heat emission rates may be stored and Region 2 is the outer region where fuel assemblies with lower heat emission rates are stored. Regionalized loading allows for storage of fuel assemblies with higher heat emission rates (in Region 1) than would otherwise be authorized for loading under a uniform loading strategy. Regionalized loading strategies must also comply with other requirements, such as those for DFCs and nonfuel hardware. Specific fuel assembly cooling time, burnup, and decay heat limits for regionalized loading are presented in Section 2.1.9. The two fuel loading regions are defined by fuel storage location number in Table 2.1.13 (refer to Figures 1.2.2 through 1.2.4). For MPC-68F, only uniform loading is permitted.

# Shielding

The allowable doses for an ISFSI using the HI-STORM 100 System are delineated in 10CFR72.104 and 72.106. Compliance with these regulations for any particular array of casks at an ISFSI is necessarily site-specific and is to be demonstrated by the licensee, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 12. Compliance with these regulations for a single cask and several representative cask arrays is demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 10.

The MPC provides axial shielding at the top and bottom ends to maintain occupational exposures ALARA during canister closure and handling operations. The occupational doses are controlled in accordance with plant-specific procedures and ALARA requirements (discussed in Chapter 10).

The MPCs are designed for design basis fuel as described in Sections 2.1.7 and 5.2. The radiological source term for the MPCs is limited based on the burnup and cooling times specified in Section 2.1.9. Calculated dose rates for each MPC are provided in Section 5.1. These dose rates are used to perform an occupational exposure evaluation, as discussed in Chapter 10.

#### **Criticality**

The MPCs provide criticality control for all design basis normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions, as discussed in Section 6.1. The effective neutron multiplication factor is limited to  $k_{eff} < 0.95$  for fresh unirradiated fuel with optimum water moderation and close reflection, including all biases, uncertainties, and MPC manufacturing tolerances.

Criticality control is maintained by the geometric spacing of the fuel assemblies, fixed borated neutron absorbing materials incorporated into the fuel basket assembly, and, for certain MPC models, soluble boron in the MPC water. The minimum specified boron concentration verified during neutron absorber manufacture is further reduced by 25% for criticality analysis for Boral-equipped MPCs and by 10% for METAMIC<sup>®</sup>-equipped MPCs. No credit is taken for burnup. The maximum allowable initial enrichment for fuel assemblies to be stored in each MPC is limited. Enrichment limits and soluble boron concentration requirements are delineated in Section 2.1.9 consistent with the criticality analysis described in Chapter 6.

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# **Confinement**

The MPC provides for confinement of all radioactive materials for all design basis normal, offnormal, and postulated accident conditions. As discussed in Section 7.1, the Holtec MPC design meets the guidance in Interim Staff Guidance 18 to classify confinement boundary leakage as noncredible. Therefore, no confinement dose analysis is performed. The confinement function of the MPC is verified through pressure testing, fabrication shop helium leak testing and weld examinations performed in accordance with the acceptance test program in Chapter 9.

#### **Operations**

There are no radioactive effluents that result from storage or transfer operations. Effluents generated during MPC loading are handled by the plant's radwaste system and procedures.

Generic operating procedures for the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 8. Detailed operating procedures will be developed by the licensee based on Chapter 8, site-specific requirements that comply with the 10CFR50 Technical Specifications for the plant, and the HI-STORM 100 System CoC.

#### Acceptance Tests and Maintenance

The fabrication acceptance basis and maintenance program to be applied to the MPCs are described in Chapter 9. The operational controls and limits to be applied to the MPCs are discussed in Chapter 12. Application of these requirements will assure that the MPC is fabricated, operated, and maintained in a manner that satisfies the design criteria defined in this chapter.

#### Decommissioning

The MPCs are designed to be transportable in the HI-STAR overpack and are not required to be unloaded prior to shipment off-site. Decommissioning of the HI-STORM 100 System is addressed in Section 2.4.

# 2.0.2 HI-STORM Overpack Design Criteria

#### General

The HI-STORM overpack is designed for 40 years of service, while satisfying the requirements of 10CFR72. The adequacy of the overpack design for the design life is discussed in Section 3.4.11.

#### **Structural**

The HI-STORM overpack includes both concrete and structural steel components that are classified as important to safety.

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The concrete material is defined as important to safety because of its importance to the shielding analysis. The primary function of the HI-STORM overpack concrete is shielding of the gamma and neutron radiation emitted by the spent nuclear fuel.

Unlike other concrete storage casks, the HI-STORM overpack concrete is enclosed in steel inner and outer shells connected to each other by four radial ribs, and top and bottom plates. Where typical concrete storage casks are reinforced by rebar, the HI-STORM overpack is supported by the inner and outer shells connected by four ribs. As the HI-STORM overpack concrete is not reinforced, the structural analysis of the overpack only credits the compressive strength of the concrete. Providing further conservatism, the structural analyses for normal conditions demonstrate that the allowable stress limits of the structural steel are met even with no credit for the strength of the concrete. During accident conditions (e.g., tornado missile, tip-over, end drop, and earthquake), only the compressive strength of the concrete is accounted for in the analysis to provide an appropriate simulation of the accident condition. Where applicable, the compressive strength of the concrete is calculated in accordance with ACI-318-95 [2.0.1].

In recognition of the conservative assessment of the HI-STORM overpack concrete strength and the primary function of the concrete being shielding, the applicable requirements of ACI-349 [2.0.2] are invoked in the design and construction of the HI-STORM overpack concrete as clarified in Appendix 1.D.

Steel components of the storage overpack are designed and fabricated in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF for Class 3 plate and shell components with certain NRC-approved alternatives.

The overpack is designed for all normal, off-normal, and design basis accident condition loadings, as defined in Section 2.2. At a minimum, the overpack must protect the MPC from deformation, provide continued adequate performance, and allow the retrieval of the MPC under all conditions. These design loadings include a postulated drop accident from the maximum allowable handling height, consistent with the analysis described in Section 3.4.9. The load combinations for which the overpack is designed are defined in Section 2.2.7. The physical characteristics of the MPCs for which the overpack is designed are defined in Chapter 1.

#### <u>Thermal</u>

The allowable long-term through-thickness section average temperature limit for the overpack concrete is established in accordance with Paragraph A.4.3 of Appendix A to ACI 349, which allows the use of elevated temperature limits if test data supporting the compressive strength is available and an evaluation to show no concrete deterioration provided. Appendix 1.D specifies the cement and aggregate requirements to allow the utilization of the 300°F temperature limit. For short term conditions the through-thickness section average concrete temperature limit of 350°F is specified in accordance with Paragraph A.4.2 of Appendix A to ACI 349. The allowable temperatures for the structural steel components are based on the maximum temperature for which material properties and a llowable stresses are provided in Section II of the ASME Code. The specific allowable

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temperatures for the structural steel components of the overpack are provided in Table 2.2.3.

The overpack is designed for extreme cold conditions, as discussed in Section 2.2.2.2. The structural steel materials used for the storage cask that are susceptible to brittle fracture are discussed in Section 3.1.2.3.

The overpack is designed for the maximum allowable heat load for steady-state normal conditions, in accordance with Section 2.1.6. The thermal characteristics of the MPCs for which the overpack is designed are defined in Chapter 4.

#### Shielding

The off-site dose for normal operating conditions at the controlled area boundary is limited by 10CFR72.104(a) to a maximum of 25 m rem/year whole body, 75 m rem/year thyroid, and 25 mrem/year for other critical organs, including contributions from all nuclear fuel cycle operations. Since these limits are dependent on plant operations as well as site-specific conditions (e.g., the ISFSI design and proximity to the controlled area boundary, and the number and arrangement of loaded storage casks on the ISFSI pad), the determination and comparison of ISFSI doses to this limit are necessarily site-specific. Dose rates for a single cask and a range of typical ISFSIs using the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 5. The determination of site-specific ISFSI dose | rates at the site boundary and demonstration of compliance with regulatory limits is to be performed by the licensee in accordance with 10CFR72.212.

The overpack is designed to limit the calculated surface dose rates on the cask for all MPCs as defined in Section 2.3.5. The overpack is also designed to maintain occupational exposures ALARA during MPC transfer operations, in accordance with 10CFR20. The calculated overpack dose rates are determined in Section 5.1. These dose rates are used to perform a generic occupational exposure estimate for MPC transfer operations and a dose assessment for a typical ISFSI, as described in Chapter 10.

#### **Confinement**

The overpack does not perform any confinement function. Confinement during storage is provided by the MPC and is addressed in Chapter 7. The overpack provides physical protection and biological shielding for the MPC confinement boundary during MPC dry storage operations.

#### **Operations**

There are no radioactive effluents that result from MPC transfer or storage operations using the overpack. Effluents generated during MPC loading and closure operations are handled by the plant's radwaste system and procedures under the licensee's 10CFR50 license.

Generic operating procedures for the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 8. The licensee is required to develop detailed operating procedures based on Chapter 8, site-specific conditions and requirements that also comply with the applicable 10CFR50 technical specification

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requirements for the site, and the HI-STORM 100 System CoC.

#### Acceptance Tests and Maintenance

The fabrication a cceptance basis and maintenance program to be applied to the overpack are described in Chapter 9. The operational controls and limits to be applied to the overpack are contained in Chapter 12. Application of these requirements will assure that the overpack is fabricated, operated, and maintained in a manner that satisfies the design criteria defined in this chapter.

#### Decommissioning

Decommissioning considerations for the HI-STORM 100 System, including the overpack, are addressed in Section 2.4.

# 2.0.3 HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Design Criteria

#### <u>General</u>

The HI-TRAC transfer cask is designed for 40 years of service, while satisfying the requirements of 10CFR72. The adequacy of the HI-TRAC design for the design life is discussed in Section 3.4.11.

#### Structural

The HI-TRAC transfer cask includes both structural and non-structural biological shielding components that are classified as important to safety. The structural steel components of the HI-TRAC, with the exception of the lifting trunnions, are designed and fabricated in accordance with the applicable requirements of Section III, Subsection NF, of the ASME Code with certain NRC-approved alternatives, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. The lifting trunnions and associated attachments are designed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6 for non-redundant lifting devices.

The HI-TRAC transfer cask is designed for all normal, off-normal, and design basis accident condition loadings, as defined in Section 2.2. At a minimum, the HI-TRAC transfer cask must protect the MPC from deformation, provide continued adequate performance, and allow the retrieval of the MPC under all conditions. These design loadings include a side drop from the maximum allowable handling height, consistent with the technical specifications. The load combinations for which the HI-TRAC is designed are defined in Section 2.2.7. The physical characteristics of each MPC for which the HI-TRAC is designed are defined in Chapter 1.

# <u>Thermal</u>

The allowable temperatures for the HI-TRAC transfer cask structural steel components are based on the maximum temperature for material properties and allowable stress values provided in Section II of the ASME Code. The top lid of the HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 incorporate Holtite-A

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shielding material. This material has a maximum allowable temperature in accordance with the manufacturer's test data. The specific allowable temperatures for the structural steel and shielding components of the HI-TRAC are provided in Table 2.2.3. The HI-TRAC is designed for off-normal environmental cold conditions, as discussed in Section 2.2.2.2. The structural steel materials susceptible to brittle fracture are discussed in Section 3.1.2.3.

The HI-TRAC is designed for the maximum heat load analyzed for storage operations. When the MPC contains any high burnup fuel assemblies, the Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) will be required for certain time periods while the MPC is inside the HI-TRAC transfer cask (see Section 4.5). The design criteria for the SCS are provided in Appendix 2.C. The HI-TRAC water jacket maximum allowable temperature is a function of the internal pressure. To preclude over pressurization of the water jacket due to boiling of the neutron shield liquid (water), the maximum temperature of the water is limited to less than the saturation temperature at the shell design pressure. In addition, the water is precluded from freezing during off-normal cold conditions by limiting the minimum allowable temperature and adding ethylene glycol. The thermal characteristics of the fuel for each MPC for which the transfer cask is designed are defined in Section 2.1.6. The working area ambient temperature limit for loading operations is limited in accordance with the design criteria established for the transfer cask.

#### Shielding

The HI-TRAC transfer cask provides shielding to maintain occupational exposures ALARA in accordance with 10CFR20, while also maintaining the maximum load on the plant's crane hook to below either 125 tons or 100 tons, or less, depending on whether the 125-ton or 100-ton HI-TRAC transfer cask is utilized. The HI-TRAC calculated dose rates are reported in Section 5.1. These dose rates are used to perform a generic occupational exposure estimate for MPC loading, closure, and transfer operations, as described in Chapter 10. A postulated HI-TRAC accident condition, which includes the loss of the liquid neutron shield (water), is also evaluated in Section 5.1.2. In addition,

HI-TRAC dose rates are controlled in accordance with plant-specific procedures and ALARA requirements (discussed in Chapter 10).

The HI-TRAC 125 and 125D provide better shielding than the 100 ton HI-TRAC. Provided the licensee is capable of utilizing the 125 ton HI-TRAC, ALARA considerations would normally dictate that the 125 ton HI-TRAC should be used. However, sites may not be capable of utilizing the 125 ton HI-TRAC due to crane capacity limitations, floor loading limits, or other site-specific considerations. As with other dose reduction-based plant activities , individual users who cannot accommodate the 125 ton HI-TRAC should perform a cost-benefit analysis of the actions (e.g., modifications) which would be necessary to use the 125 ton HI-TRAC. The cost of the action(s) would be weighed against the value of the projected reduction in radiation exposure and a decision made based on each plant's particular ALARA implementation philosophy.

The HI-TRAC provides a means to isolate the annular area between the MPC outer surface and the HI-TRAC inner surface to minimize the potential for surface contamination of the MPC by spent fuel pool water during wet loading operations. The HI-TRAC surfaces expected to require

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decontamination are coated. The maximum permissible surface contamination for the HI-TRAC is in accordance with plant-specific procedures and ALARA requirements (discussed in Chapter 10).

#### Confinement

The HI-TRAC transfer cask does not perform any confinement function. Confinement during MPC transfer operations is provided by the MPC, and is addressed in Chapter 7. The HI-TRAC provides physical protection and biological shielding for the MPC confinement boundary during MPC closure and transfer operations.

#### **Operations**

There are no radioactive effluents that result from MPC transfer operations using HI-TRAC. Effluents generated during MPC loading and closure operations are handled by the plant's radwaste system and procedures.

Generic operating procedures for the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 8. The licensee will develop detailed operating procedures based on Chapter 8, plant-specific requirements including the Part 50 Technical Specifications, and the HI-STORM 100 System CoC.

#### Acceptance Tests and Maintenance

The fabrication acceptance basis and maintenance program to be applied to the HI-TRAC Transfer Cask are described in Chapter 9. The operational controls and limits to be applied to the HI-TRAC are contained in Chapter 12. Application of these requirements will assure that the HI-TRAC is fabricated, operated, and maintained in a manner that satisfies the design criteria defined in this chapter.

#### Decommissioning

Decommissioning considerations for the HI-STORM 100 Systems, including the HI-TRAC Transfer Cask, are addressed in Section 2.4.

#### 2.0.4 Principal Design Criteria for the ISFSI Pad

#### 2.0.4.1 Design and Construction Criteria

In compliance with 10CFR72, Subpart F, "General Design Criteria", the HI-STORM 100 cask system is classified as "important-to-safety" (ITS). This final safety analysis report (FSAR) explicitly recognizes the HI-STORM 100 System as an assemblage of equipment containing numerous ITS components. The reinforced concrete pad on which the cask is situated, however, is designated as a non-ITS structure. This is principally because, in most cases, cask systems for storing spent nuclear fuel on reinforced concrete pads are installed as free-standing structures. The lack of a physical connection between the cask and the pad permits the latter to be designated as not important-to-safety.

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However, if the ZPAs at the surface of an ISFSI pad exceed the threshold limit for free-standing HI-STORM installation set forth in this FSAR, then the cask must be installed in an anchored configuration (HI-STORM 100A).

In contrast to an ISFSI containing free-standing casks, a constrained-cask installation relies on the structural capacity of the pad to ensure structural safety. The Part 72 regulations require consideration of natural phenomenon in the design. Since an ISFSI pad in an anchored cask installation participates in maintaining the stability of the cask during "natural phenomena" on the cask and pad, it is an ITS structure. The procedure suggested in Regulatory Guide 7.10 [2.0.4] and the associated NUREG [2.0.5] indicates that an ISFSI pad used to secure anchored casks should be classified as a Category C ITS structure.

Because tipover of a cask installed in an anchored configuration is not feasible, the pad does not need to be engineered to accommodate this non-mechanistic event. However, the permissible carry height for a loaded HI-STORM 100A overpack must be established for the specific ISFSI pad using the methodology described in this FSAR, if the load handling device is not designed in accordance with ANSI N 14.6 and does not have redundant drop protection design features. These requirements are specified in the CoC. However, to serve as an effective and reliable anchor, the pad must be made appropriately stiff and suitably secured to preclude pad uplift during a seismic event.

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Because the geological conditions vary widely across the United States, it is not possible to, a'priori, define the detailed design of the pad. Accordingly, in this FSAR, the limiting requirements on the design and installation of the pad are provided. The user of the HI-STORM 100A System bears the responsibility to ensure that all requirements on the pad set forth in this FSAR are fulfilled by the pad design. Specifically, the ISFSI owner must ensure that:

- The pad design complies with the structural provisions of this report. In particular, the requirements of ACI-349-97 [2.0.2] with respect to embedments must be assured.
- The material of construction of the pad (viz., the additives used in the pad concrete), and the attachment system are compatible with the ambient environment at the ISFSI site.
- The pad is designed and constructed in accordance with a Part 72, Subpart G-compliant QA program.
- The design and manufacturing of the cask attachment system are consistent with the provisions of this report.
- Evaluations are performed (e.g., per 72.212) to demonstrate that the seismic and other inertial loadings at the site are enveloped by the respective bounding loadings defined in this report.

A complete listing of design and construction requirements for an ISFSI pad on which an anchored HI-STORM 100A will be deployed is provided in Appendix 2.A. A sample embedment design is depicted in Figure 2.A.1.

### 2.0.4.2 <u>Applicable Codes</u>

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Factored load combinations for ISFSI pad design are provided in NUREG-1536 [2.1.5], which is consistent with ACI-349-85. The factored loads applicable to the pad design consist of dead weight of the cask, thermal gradient loads, impact loads arising from handling and accident events, external missiles, and bounding environmental phenomena (such as earthquakes, wind, tornado, and flood). Codes ACI 360R-92, "Design of Slabs on Grade"; ACI 302.1R, "Guide for Concrete Floor and Slab Construction"; and ACI 224R-90, "Control of Cracking in Concrete Structures" should be used in the design and construction of the concrete pad, as applicable. The embedment design for the HI-STORM 100A (and 100SA) are the responsibility of the ISFSI owner and shall comply with Appendix B to ACI-349-97 as described in Appendix 2.A. A later Code edition may be used provided a written reconciliation is performed.

The factored load combinations presented in Table 3-1 of NUREG 1536 are reduced in the following to a bounding set of load combinations that are applied to demonstrate adherence to its acceptance criteria.

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#### a. Definitions

- D = dead load including the loading due to pre-stress in the anchor studs
- L = live load
- W = wind load
- $W_t = tornado load$
- T = thermal load
- F = hydrological load
- E = DBE seismic load
- A = accident load
- H = lateral soil pressure
- $T_a =$  accident thermal load
- U<sub>c</sub>= reinforced concrete available strength

Note that in the context of a complete ISFSI design, the DBE seismic load includes both the inertia load on the pad due to its self mass plus the interface loads transmitted to the pad to resist the inertia loads on the cask due to the loaded cask self mass. It is only these interface loads that are provided herein for possible use in the ISFSI structural analyses. The inertia load associated with the seismic excitation of the self mass of the slab needs to be considered in the ISFSI owner's assessment of overall ISFSI system stability in the presence of large uplift, overturning, and sliding forces at the base of the ISFSI pad. Such considerations are site specific and thus beyond the purview of this document.

## b. Load Combinations for the Concrete Pad

The notation and acceptance criteria of NUREG-1536 apply.

#### Normal Events

 $U_c > 1.4D + 1.7L$  $U_c > 1.4D + 1.7$  (L+H)

#### Off-Normal Events

U<sub>c</sub> > 1.05D + 1.275 (L+H+T) U<sub>c</sub> > 1.05D + 1.275 (L+H+T+W)

#### Accident-Level Events

$U_{c} > D+L+H+T+F$	$U_c > D+L+H+T+W_t$
$U_c > D+L+H+T_a$	$U_c > D+L+H+T+A$
$U_c > D + L + H + T + E$	

In all of the above load combinations, the loaded cask weight is considered as a live load L on the pad. The structural analyses presented in Chapter 3 provide the interface loads contributing to "E", "F" and " $W_t$ ", which, for high-seismic sites, are the most significant loadings. The above set of load

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combinations can be reduced to a more limited set by recognizing that the thermal loads acting on the ISFSI slab are small because of the low decay heat loads from the cask. In addition, standard construction practices for slabs serve to ensure that extreme fluctuations in environmental temperatures are accommodated without extraordinary design measures. Therefore, all thermal loads are eliminated in the above combinations. Likewise, lateral soil pressure load "H" will also be bounded by "F" (hydrological) and "E" (earthquake) loads. Accident loads "A", resulting from a tipover, have no significance for an anchored cask. The following three load combinations are therefore deemed sufficient for structural qualification of the ISFSI slab supporting an anchored cask system.

Normal Events

 $U_c > 1.4D + 1.7 (L)$ 

Off-Normal Events

 $U_{c} > 1.05D + 1.275 (L+F)$ 

Accident-Level Events

 $U_c > D + L + E$  (or  $W_t$ )

c. Load Combination for the Anchor Studs

The attachment bolts are considered to be governed by the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF and Appendix F [2.0.7]. Therefore, applicable load combinations and allowable stress limits for the attachment bolts are as follows:

Event Class and Load Combination	Governing ASME Code Section III Article for Stress Limits
Normal Events	
D	NF-3322.1, 3324.6
Off-Normal Events	
D+F	NF-3322.1, 3324.6 with all stress limits increased by 1.33
Accident-Level Events	
$D+E$ and $D+W_t$	Appendix F, Section F-1334, 1335

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#### 2.0.4.3 Limiting Design Parameters

Since the loaded HI-STORM overpack will be carried over the pad, the permissible lift height for the cask must be determined site-specifically to ensure the integrity of the storage system in the event of a handling accident (uncontrolled lowering of the load). To determine the acceptable lift height, it is necessary to set down the limiting ISFSI design parameters. The limiting design parameters for an anchored cask ISFSI pad and the anchor studs, as applicable, are tabulated in Table 2.0.4. The design of steel embedments in reinforced concrete structures is governed by Appendix B of ACI-349-97. Section B.5 in that appendix states that "anchorage design shall be controlled by the strength of embedment steel...". Therefore, limits on the strength of embedment steel and on the anchor studs must be set down not only for the purposes of quantifying structural margins for the design basis load combinations, but also for the use of the ISFSI pad designer to establish the appropriate embedment anchorage in the ISFSI pad. The anchored cask pad design parameters presented in Table 2.0.4 allow for a much stiffer pad than the pad for free-standing HI-STORMs (Table 2.2.9). This increased stiffness has the effect of reducing the allowable lift height. However, a lift height for a loaded HI-STORM 100 cask (free-standing or anchored) is not required to be established if the cask is being lifted with a lift device designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 having redundant drop protection design features.

In summary, the requirements for the ISFSI pad for free-standing and anchored HI-STORM deployment are similar with a few differences. Table 2.0.5 summarizes their commonality and differences in a succinct manner with the basis for the difference fully explained.

#### 2.0.4.4 <u>Anchored Cask/ISFSI Interface</u>

The contact surface between the baseplate of overpack and the top surface of the ISFSI pad defines the structural interface between the HI-STORM overpack and the ISFSI pad. When HI-STORM is deployed in an anchored configuration, the structural interface also includes the surface where the nuts on the anchor studs bear upon the sector lugs on the overpack baseplate. The anchor studs and their fastening arrangements into the ISFSI pad are outside of the structural boundary of the storage cask. While the details of the ISFSI pad design for the anchored configuration, like that for the freestanding geometry, must be custom engineered for each site, certain design and acceptance criteria are specified herein (Appendix 2.A) to ensure that the design and construction of the pad fully comports with the structural requirements of the HI-STORM System.

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#### Table 2.0.1 MPC DESIGN CRITERIA SUMMARY

Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Design Life:			
Design	40 yrs.	-	Table 1.2.2
License	20 yrs.	10CFR72.42(a) and 10CFR72.236(g)	-
Structural:			
Design Codes:			
Enclosure Vessel	ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.1
Fuel Basket	ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NG for core supports (NG-1121)	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.1
MPC Fuel Basket Supports (Angled Plates)	ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NG for internal structures (NG-1122)	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.1
MPC Lifting Points	ANSI N14.6/NUREG-0612	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 1.2.1.4
Dead Weights <sup>†</sup> :			
Max. Loaded Canister (dry)	90,000 lb.	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.1
Empty Canister (dry)	42,000 lb. (MPC-24) 45,000 lb. (MPC-24E/EF) 39,000 lb. (MPC-68/68F/68FF) 36,000 lb. (MPC-32)	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.1
Design Cavity Pressures:			
Normal:	100 psig	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.1.3
Off-Normal:	110 psig	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.2.1
Accident (Internal)	200 psig	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.3.8
Accident (External)	60 psig	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Sections 2.2.3.6 and 2.2.3.10

<sup>†</sup> Weights listed in this table are bounding weights. Actual weights will be less, and will vary based on as-built dimensions of the components, fuel type, and the presence of fuel spacers and non-fuel hardware.

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Response and Degradation Limits	SNF assemblies confined in dry, inert environment	10CFR72.122(h)(l)	Section 2.0.1
Thermal:			
Maximum Design Temperatures:			
Structural Materials:			
Stainless Steel (Normal)	725° F	ASME Code Section II, Part D	Table 2.2.3
Stainless Steel (Accident)	950° F	ASME Code Section II, Part D	Table 2.2.3
Neutron Poison:			
Neutron Absorber (normal)	800° F	See Table 4.3.1 and Section 1.2.1.3.1	Table 2.2.3
Neutron Absorber (accident)	950° F	See Table 4.3.1 and Section 1.2.1.3.1	Table 2.2.3
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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Canister Drying	$\leq$ 3 torr for $\geq$ 30 minutes (VDS) $\leq$ 21°F exiting the		
	demoisturizer for $\geq 30$ minutes or a dew point of the MPC exit gas $\leq 22.9^{\circ}$ F for $\geq 30$ minutes(FHD)	NUREG-1536, ISG-11, Rev. 3	Section 4.5, Appendix 2.B
Canister Backfill Gas	Helium	-	Section 4.4
Canister Backfill	Varies (see Table 1.2.2)	Thermal Analysis	Section 4.4
Fuel cladding temperature limit for long term storage conditions	752 °F (400 °C)	ISG-11, Rev. 3	Section 4.3
Fuel cladding temperature limit for normal short-term operating conditions (e.g., MPC drying and onsite transport)	752 °F (400 °C), except certain MPCs containing all moderate burnup fuel (MBF) may use 1058°F (570°C) for normal short-term operating conditions	ISG-11, Rev. 3	Sections 4.3 and 4.5
Fuel cladding temperature limit for Off-Normal and Accident Events	1058° F (570 °C)	ISG-11, Rev. 3	Sections 2.0.1 and 4.3
Insolation	Protected by overpack or HI-TRAC	-	Section 4.3
Confinement:		10CFR72.128(a)(3) and 10CFR72.236(d) and (e)	
Closure Welds:			
Shell Seams and Shell-to- Baseplate	Full Penetration	-	Section 1.5 and Table 9.1.4
MPC Lid	Multi-pass Partial Penetration	10CFR72.236(e)	Section 1.5 and Table 9.1.4
MPC Closure Ring	Partial Penetration		
Port Covers	Partial Penetration		

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
NDE:			
Shell Seams and Shell-to- Baseplate	100% RT or UT	-	Table 9.1.4
MPC Lid	Root Pass and Final Surface 100% PT; Volumetric Inspection or 100% Surface PT each 3/8" of weld depth	-	Chapter 8 and Table 9.1.4
Closure Ring	Root Pass (if more than one pass is required) and Final Surface 100% PT	-	Chapter 8 and Table 9.1.4
Port Covers	Root Pass (if more than one pass is required) and Final Surface 100% PT	-	Chapter 8 and Table 9.1.4
Leak Testing:			
Welds Tested	Shell seams, shell-to- baseplate,	-	Section 9.1
Medium	Helium		Section 9.1
Max. Leak Rate	5x10 <sup>-6</sup> atm-cm <sup>3</sup> /sec (helium)		Section 9.1
Monitoring System	None	10CFR72.128(a)(1)	Section 2.3.2.1
Pressure Testing:			
Minimum Test Pressure	125 psig (hydrostatic) 120 psig (pneumatic)	-	Sections 8.1 and 9.1
Welds Tested	MPC Lid-to-Shell, MPC Shell seams, MPC Shell-to-Baseplate	-	Sections 8.1 and 9.1
Medium	Water or helium	-	Section 8.1 and Chapter 9

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Retrievability:			
Normal and Off-normal: Post (design basis) Accident	No Encroachment on Fuel Assemblies or Exceeding	10CFR72.122(f),(h)(1), & (l)	Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.1.2
	Fuel Assembly Deceleration Limits		
Criticality:		10CFR72.124 & 10CFR72.236(c)	
Method of Control	Fixed Borated Neutron Absorber, Geometry, and Soluble Boron	-	Section 2.3.4
Min. <sup>10</sup> B Loading (Boral/METAMIC <sup>®</sup> )	0.0267/0.0223 g/cm <sup>2</sup> (MPC-24) 0.0372/0.0310 g/cm <sup>2</sup> (MPC-68, MPC-68FF, MPC-24E,MPC- 24EF, MPC-32 and MPC-32F) 0.01 g/cm <sup>2</sup> (MPC-68F)	-	Sections 2.1.8 and 6.1
Minimum Soluble Boron	Varies (see Tables 2.1.14 and 2.1.16)	Criticality Analysis	Sections 2.1.9 and 6.1
Max. k <sub>eff</sub>	0.95	-	Sections 6.1 and 2.3.4
Min. Burnup	0.0 GWd/MTU (fresh fuel)	-	Section 6.1
Radiation Protection/Shielding:		10CFR72.126, & 10CFR72.128(a)(2)	
MPC:			
(normal/off-normal/accident)			
MPC Closure	ALARA	10CFR20	Sections 10.1, 10.2, & 10.3
MPC Transfer	ALARA	10CFR20	Sections 10.1, 10.2, & 10.3
Exterior of Shielding: (normal/off-normal/accident)			
Transfer Mode Position	See Table 2.0.3	10CFR20	Section 5.1.1

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
ISFSI Controlled Area Boundary	See Table 2.0.2	10CFR72.104 & 10CFR72.106	Section 5.1.1 and Chapter 10
Design Bases:		10CFR72.236(a)	
Spent Fuel Specification:		^	
Assemblies/Canister	Up to 24 (MPC-24, MPC-24E & MPC-24EF) Up to 32 (MPC-32 and MPC-32F) Up to 68 (MPC-68, MPC-68F, & MPC-68FF)	-	Table 1.2.1 and Section 2.1.9
Type of Cladding	ZR and Stainless Steel	-	Section 2.1.9
Fuel Condition	Intact, Damaged, and Debris	-	Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.9
PWR Fuel Assemblies:		<u> </u>	
Type/Configuration	Various		Section 2.1.9
Max. Burnup	68,200 MWD/MTU		Sections 2.1.9 and 6.2
Max. Enrichment	Varies by fuel design		Table 2.1.3 and Section 2.1.9
Max. Decay Heat/ MPC <sup>†</sup> :	28.74 kW		Section 4.4

† Section 2.1.9.1 describes the decay heat limits per assembly

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Minimum Cooling Time:	3 years (Intact ZR Clad Fuel) 8 years (Intact SS Clad Fuel)	-	Section 2.19
Max. Fuel Assembly Weight: (including non-fuel hardware and DFC, as applicable)	1,680 lb.	_	Section 2.1.9
Max. Fuel Assembly Length: (Unirradiated Nominal)	176.8 in.	-	Section 2.1.9
Max. Fuel Assembly Width (Unirradiated Nominal)	8.54 in.	- 	Section 2.1.9
BWR Fuel Assemblies:			
- Type	Various	•	Sections 2.1.9 and 6.2
Max. Burnup	65,000 MWD/MTU	•	Section 2.1.9
Max. Enrichment	Varies by fuel design	-	Section 2.1.9, Table 2.1.4
Max. Decay Heat/ MPC <sup>†</sup> .	28.19 kW	-	Section 4.4
Minimum Cooling Time:	3 years (Intact ZR Clad Fuel) 8 years (Intact SS Clad Fuel)		Section 2.1.9
Max. Fuel Assembly Weight:			
w/channels and DFC, as applicable	700 lb.	•	Section 2.1.9

<sup>†</sup> Section 2.1.9.1 describes the decay heat limits per assembly.

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Max. Fuel Assembly Length (Unirradiated Nominal)	176.5in.	-	Section 2.1.9
Max. Fuel Assembly Width (Unirradiated Nominal)	5.85 in.	-	Section 2.1.9
Normal Design Event Conditions:	······································	10CFR72.122(b)(1)	
Ambient Temperatures	See Tables 2.0.2 and 2.0.3	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.1.4
Handling:			Section 2.2.1.2
Handling Loads	115% of Dead Weight	CMAA #70	Section 2.2.1.2
Lifting Attachment Acceptance Criteria	1/10 Ultimate 1/6 Yield	NUREG-0612 ANSI N14.6	Section 3.4.3
Attachment/Component Interface Acceptance Criteria	1/3 Yield	Regulatory Guide 3.61	Section 3.4.3
Away from Attachment Acceptance Criteria	ASME Code Level A	ASME Code	Section 3.4.3
Wet/Dry Loading	Wet or Dry	-	Section 1.2.2.2
Transfer Orientation	Vertical	-	Section 1.2.2.2
Storage Orientation	Vertical	-	Section 1.2.2.2
Fuel Rod Rupture Releases:			
Source Term Release Fraction	1%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.1.3
Fill Gases	100%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.1.3
Fission Gases	30%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.1.3
Snow and Ice	Protected by Overpack	ASCE 7-88	Section 2.2.1.6
Off-Normal Design Event Conditions:		10CFR72.122(b)(1)	
Ambient Temperature	See Tables 2.0.2 and 2.0.3	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.2.2
Leakage of One Seal	N/A	ISG-18	Sections 2.2.2.4 and 7.1
Partial Blockage of Overpack Air Inlets	Two Air Inlets Blocked	-	Section 2.2.2.5
Source Term Release Fraction:			

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Fuel Rod Failures	10%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.2.1
Fill Gases	100%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.2.1
Fission Gases	30%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.2.1
Design-Basis (Postulated) Accident Desi	gn Events and Conditions:	10CFR72.24(d)(2) & 10CFR72.94	
Tip Over	See Table 2.0.2	-	Section 2.2.3.2
End Drop	See Table 2.0.2	-	Section 2.2.3.1
Side Drop	See Table 2.0.3	-	Section 2.2.3.1
Fire	See Tables 2.0.2 and 2.0.3	10CFR72.122(c)	Section 2.2.3.3
Fuel Rod Rupture Releases:			
Fuel Rod Failures (including non-fuel hardware)	100%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.3.8
Fill Gases	100%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.3.8
Fission Gases	30%	NUREG-1536	Sections 2.2.3.8
Particulates & Volatiles	See Table 7.3.1	-	Sections 2.2.3.9
Confinement Boundary Leakage	None	ISG-18	Sections 2.2.3.9 and 7.1
Explosive Overpressure	60 psig (external)	10CFR72.122(c)	Section 2.2.3.10
Airflow Blockage:			
Vent Blockage	100% of Overpack Air Inlets Blocked	10CFR72.128(a)(4)	Section 2.2.3.13
Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes	Crud Depth (Table 2.2.8)	ESEERCO Project EP91-29	Section 2.2.3.4
Design Basis Natural Phenomenon Desig	gn Events and Conditions:	10CFR72.92 & 10CFR72.122(b)(2)	
Flood Water Depth	125 ft.	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.3.6
Seismic	See Table 2.0.2	10CFR72.102(f)	Section 2.2.3.7
Wind	Protected by Overpack	ASCE-7-88	Section 2.2.3.5
Tornado & Missiles	Protected by Overpack	RG 1.76 & NUREG-0800	Section 2.2.3.5
Burial Under Debris	Maximum Decay Heat Load	-	Section 2.2.3.12
Lightning	See Table 2.0.2	NFPA 78	Section 2.2.3.11

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Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Extreme Environmental	See Table 2.0.2	-	Section 2.2.3.14
Temperature			

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## Table 2.0.2HI-STORM OVERPACK DESIGN CRITERIA SUMMARY

Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Design Life:			
Design	40 yrs.	-	Section 2.0.2
License	20 yrs.	10CFR72.42(a) & 10CFR72.236(g)	
Structural:			
Design & Fabrication Codes:			
Concrete			
Design	ACI 349 as clarified in Appendix 1.D	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.2 and Appendix 1.D
Fabrication	ACI 349 as clarified in Appendix 1.D	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.2 and Appendix 1.D
Compressive Strength	ACI 318-95 as clarified in Appendix 1.D	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.2 and Appendix 1.D
Structural Steel			
Design	ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.2
Fabrication	ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.2
Dead Weights <sup>†</sup> :			
Max. Loaded MPC (Dry)	90,000 lb. (MPC- 32)	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.1
Max. Empty Overpack Assembled with Top Lid (150 pcf concrete/200pcf concrete)	270,000/320,000 lb.	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.1
Max. MPC/Overpack (150 pcf concrete/200pcf concrete)	360,000/410,000 lb.	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.1
Design Cavity Pressures	N/A	-	Section 2.2.1.3
Response and Degradation Limits	Protect MPC from deformation	10CFR72.122(b) 10CFR72.122(c)	Sections 2.0.2 and 3.1

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Weights listed in this table are bounding weights. Actual weights will be less, and will vary based on as-built dimensions of the components, fuel type, and the presence of fuel spacers and non-fuel hardware, as applicable.

Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
	Continued adequate performance of overpack	10CFR72.122(b) 10CFR72.122(c)	
	Retrieval of MPC	10CFR72.122(1)	
Thermal:			
Maximum Design Temperatures:			
Concrete			
Through-Thickness Section Average (Normal)	300° F	ACI 349, Appendix A (Paragraph A.4.3)	Section 2.0.2, and Tables 1.D.1 and 2.2.3
Through-Thickness Section Average (Off-normal and Accident)	350° F	ACI 349 Appendix A (Paragraph A.4.2)	Section 2.0.2, and Tables 1.D.1 and 2.2.3
Steel Structure (other than lid bottom and top plates) Lid Bottom and Top Plates	450° F 450° F	ASME Code Section II, Part D	Table 2.2.3
Insolation:	Averaged Over 24 Hours	10CFR71.71	Section 4.4.1.1.8
Confinement: ·	None	10CFR72.128(a)(3) & 10CFR72.236(d) & (e)	N/A
Retrievability:			
Normal and Off-normal	No damage that precludes	10CFR72.122(f),(h)(1), & (l)	Sections 3.5 and 3.4
Accident	Retrieval of MPC or Exceeding Fuel Assembly Deceleration Limits		Sections 3.5 and 3.4
Criticality:	Protection of MPC and Fuel Assemblies	10CFR72.124 & 10CFR72.236(c)	Section 6.1
Radiation Protection/Shielding:		10CFR72.126 & 10CFR72.128(a)(2)	
Overpack (Normal/Off-normal/Accident)			
Surface	ALARA	10CFR20	Chapters 5 and 10
Position	ALARA	10CFR20	Chapters 5 and 10

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Type Criteria		Basis	FSAR Reference
Beyond Controlled Area During	Beyond Controlled Area During 25 mrem/yr. to whole body		Sections 5.1.1, 7.2, and 10.1
Normal Operation and Anticipated	75 mrem/yr. to thyroid		
Occurrences	25 mrem/yr. to any critical organ		
At Controlled Area Boundary from	5 rem TEDE or sum of DDE	10CFR72.106	Sections 5.1.2, 7.3, and 10.1
Design Basis Accident	and CDE to any individual organ		
	or tissue (other than lens of eye)		
	$\leq$ 50 rem. 15 rem lens dose. 50		
	rem shallow dose to skin or		
	extremity.		
		······	
Design Bases:			
Spent Fuel Specification	See Table 2.0.1	10CFR72.236(a)	Section 2.1.9
Normal Design Event Conditions:		10CFR72.122(b)(1)	
Ambient Outside Temperatures:			
Max. Yearly Average	80° F	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.1.4
Live Load <sup>†</sup> :		ANSI/ANS 57.9	-
Loaded Transfer Cask (max.)	250,000 lb.	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.4
	(HI-TRAC 125		Section 2.2.1.2
	w/transfer lid)		
Dry Loaded MPC (max.)	90,000 lb.	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.1 and
			Section 2.2.1.2
Handling:			Section 2.2.1.2
Handling Loads	115% of Dead Weight	CMAA #70	Section 2.2.1.2
Lifting Attachment Acceptance	1/10 Ultimate	NUREG-0612	Section 3.4.3
Criteria	1/6 Yield	ANSI N14.6	
Attachment/Component	1/3 Yield	Regulatory Guide 3.61	Section 3.4.3
Interface Acceptance Criteria		3 <b>7 7</b>	
Away from Attachment	ASME Code	ASME Code	Section 3.4.3

<sup>†</sup> Weights listed in this table are bounding weights. Actual weights will be less, and will vary based on as-built dimensions of the components, fuel type, and the presence of fuel spacers and non-fuel hardware, as applicable.

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Type Criteria		Basis	FSAR Reference
Acceptance Criteria Level A			
Minimum Temperature During Handling Operations	0° F	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.1.2
Snow and Ice Load	100 lb./ft <sup>2</sup>	ASCE 7-88	Section 2.2.1.6
Wet/Dry Loading	Dry	-	Section 1.2.2.2
Storage Orientation	Vertical	-	Section 1.2.2.2
Off-Normal Design Event Conditions:		10CFR72.122(b)(1)	
Ambient Temperature			
Minimum	-40° F	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.2.2
Maximum	100° F	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.2.2
Partial Blockage of Air Inlets	Two Air Inlet Ducts Blocked	-	Section 2.2.2.5
Design-Basis (Postulated) Accident Designed	gn Events and Conditions:	10CFR72.94	
Drop Cases:			
End	11 in.	-	Section 2.2.3.1
Tip-Over (Not applicable for HI-STORM 100A)	Assumed (Non-mechanistic)	•	Section 2.2.3.2
_Fire:			
Duration	217 seconds	10CFR72.122(c)	Section 2.2.3.3
Temperature	1,475° F	10CFR72.122(c)	Section 2.2.3.3
Fuel Rod Rupture	See Table 2.0.1	-	Section 2.2.3.8
Air Flow Blockage:			
Vent Blockage	100% of Air Inlets Blocked	10CFR72.128(a)(4)	Section 2.2.3.13
Ambient Temperature	80° F	10CFR72.128(a)(4)	Section 2.2.3.13
Explosive Overpressure External Differential Pressure	10 psid instantaneous, 5 psid steady state	10 CFR 72.128(a)(4)	Table 2.2.1
Design-Basis Natural Phenomenon Design Events and Conditions:		10CFR72.92 & 10CFR72.122(b)(2)	
Flood			
Height 125 ft.		RG 1.59	Section 2.2.3.6
Velocity	15 ft/sec.	RG 1.59	Section 2.2.3.6

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Type Criteria		Basis	FSAR Reference
Seismic			
Max. acceleration at top of ISFSI pad	Free Standing: $G_{H} + 0.53G_{V} \le 0.53$ Anchored: $G_{H} \le 2.12, G_{V} \le 1.5$	10CFR72.102(f)	Section 3.4.7.1 Section 3.4.7.3
Tornado			
Wind			
Max. Wind Speed	360 mph	RG 1.76	Section 2.2.3.5
Pressure Drop	3.0 psi	RG 1.76	Section 2.2.3.5
Missiles			Section 2.2.3.5
Automobile			
Weight	1,800 kg	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Velocity 126 mph		NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Rigid Solid Steel Cylinder			
Weight	125 kg	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Velocity	Velocity 126 mph		Table 2.2.5
Diameter	8 in.	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Steel Sphere			
Weight	0.22 kg	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Velocity	126 mph	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Diameter	1 in.	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Burial Under Debris	Maximum Decay Heat Load	-	Section 2.2.3.12
Lightning	Resistance Heat-Up	NFPA 70 & 78	Section 2.2.3.11
Extreme Environmental Temperature	125° F	-	Section 2.2.3.14
Load Combinations:	See Table 2.2.14 and Table 3.1.5	ANSI/ANS 57.9 and NUREG-1536	Section 2.2.7

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## TABLE 2.0.3 HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK DESIGN CRITERIA SUMMARY

Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Design Life:			
Design	40 yrs.	-	Section 2.0.3
License	20 yrs.	10CFR72.42(a) & 10CFR72.236(g)	
Structural:			
Design Codes:			
Structural Steel	ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 2.0.3
Lifting Trunnions	NUREG-0612 & ANSI N14.6	10CFR72.24(c)(4)	Section 1.2.1.4
Dead Weights <sup>†</sup> :			
Max. Empty Cask:			
w/top lid and pool lid installed and water jacket filled	143,500 lb. (HI-TRAC 125) 102,000 lb. (HI-TRAC 100) 146,000 lb. (HI-TRAC 125D)	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.2
w/top lid and transfer lid installed and water jacket filled (N/A for HI-TRAC 125D)	155,000 lb. (HI-TRAC 125) 111,000 lb. (HI-TRAC 100)	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.2
Max. MPC/HI-TRAC with Yoke (in-pool lift):			
Water Jacket Empty	250,000 lb. (HI-TRAC 125 and 125D) 202,000 lb. (HI-TRAC 100)	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.4
Design Cavity Pressures:			
HI-TRAC Cavity	Hydrostatic	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.1.3
Water Jacket Cavity	60 psig (internal)	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2,1.3
Response and Degradation Limits	Protect MPC from deformation	10CFR72.122(b) 10CFR72.122(c)	Section 2.0.3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Weights listed in this table are bounding weights. Actual weights will be less, and will vary based on as-built dimensions of the components, fuel type, and the presence of fuel spacers and non-fuel hardware, as applicable.

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## TABLE 2.0.3 (continued) HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK DESIGN CRITERIA SUMMARY

Type Criteria		Basis	FSAR Reference
	Continued adequate performance	10CFR72.122(b)	
	of HI-TRAC transfer cask	10CFR72.122(c)	
	Retrieval of MPC	10CFR72 122(1)	-
Thermal:			
Maximum Design Temperature			
Structural Materials	400° F	ASME Code Section II, Part D	Table 2.2.3
Shielding Materials			
Lead	350° F (max.)		Table 2.2.3
Liquid Neutron Shield	307° F (max.)		Table 2.2.3
Solid Neutron Shield	300° F (max.) (long term) 350°F (max.) (short term)	Test Data	Appendix 1.B and Table 2.2.3
Insolation:	Averaged Over 24 Hours	10CFR71.71	Section 4.5.1.1.3
Confinement:	None	10CFR72.128(a)(3) & 10CFR72.236(d) & (e)	N/A
Retrievability:			
Normal and Off-normal	No encroachment on MPC or	10CFR72.122(f),(h)(1), & (l)	Sections 3.5 & 3.4
After Design-basis (Postulated)	Exceeding Fuel Assembly		
Accident	Deceleration Limits		Section 3.5 & 3.4
Criticality:	Protection of MPC and Fuel Assemblies	10CFR72.124 & 10CFR72.236(c)	Section 6.1
Radiation Protection/Shielding:		10CFR72.126 & 10CFR72.128(a)(2)	
Transfer Cask (Normal/Off-normal/Accident)			
Surface	ALARA	10CFR20	Chapters 5 and 10
Position ALARA		10CFR20	Chapters 5 and 10
Design Bases:			
Spent Fuel Specification	See Table 2.0.1	10CFR72.236(a)	Section 2.1
Normal Design Event Conditions:		10CFR72.122(b)(1)	
Ambient Temperatures:			

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## TABLE 2.0.3 (continued) HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK DESIGN CRITERIA SUMMARY

Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Lifetime Average 100° F		ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.1.4
Live Load <sup>†</sup>			
Max. Loaded Canister			
Dry	90,000 lb.	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.1
Wet (including water in HI- TRAC annulus)	106,570 lb.	R.G. 3.61	Table 3.2.4
Handling:			Section 2.2.1.2
Handling Loads	115% of Dead Weight	CMAA #70	Section 2.2.1.2
Lifting Attachment Acceptance Criteria	1/10 Ultimate 1/6 Yield	NUREG-0612 ANSI N14.6	Section 3.4.3
Attachment/Component Interface Acceptance Criteria	1/3 Yield	Regulatory Guide 3.61	Section 3.4.3
Away from Attachment Acceptance Criteria	ASME Code Level A	· ASME Code	Section 3.4.3
Minimum Temperature for Handling Operations	0° F	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.1.2
Wet/Dry Loading	Wet or Dry	-	Section 1.2.2.2
Transfer Orientation	Vertical	-	Section 1.2.2.2
Test Loads:			
Trunnions	300% of vertical design load	NUREG-0612 & ANSI N14.6	Section 9.1.2.1
Off-Normal Design Event Conditions:		10CFR72.122(b)(1)	
Ambient Temperature			
Minimum	0° F	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.2.2
Maximum	100° F	ANSI/ANS 57.9	Section 2.2.2.2
Design-Basis (Postulated) Accident Desig	gn Events and Conditions:	10CFR72.24(d)(2) & 10CFR72.94	
Side Drop	42 in.	-	Section 2.2.3.1
Fire			

<sup>†</sup> Weights listed in this table are bounding weights. Actual weights will be less, and will vary based on as-built dimensions of the components, fuel type, and the presence of fuel spacers and non-fuel hardware, as applicable.

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#### TABLE 2.0.3 (continued) HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK DESIGN CRITERIA SUMMARY

Туре	Criteria	Basis	FSAR Reference
Duration	4.8 minutes	10CFR72.122(c)	Section 2.2.3.3
Temperature	1,475° F	10CFR72.122(c)	Section 2.2.3.3
Fuel Rod Rupture	See Table 2.0.1		Section 2.2.3.8
Design-Basis Natural Phenomenon Des	ign Events and Conditions:	10CFR72.92 & 10CFR72.122(b)(2)	
Missiles			Section 2.2.3.5
Automobile			-
Weight	1800 kg	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Velocity	126 mph	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Rigid Solid Steel Cylinder			
Weight	125 kg	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Velocity	126 mph	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Diameter 8 in.		NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Steel Sphere			
Weight	0.22 kg	NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Velocity 126 mph		NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Diameter 1 in.		NUREG-0800	Table 2.2.5
Load Combinations:	See Table 2.2.14 and Table 3.1.5	ANSI/ANS-57.9 & NUREG-1536	Section 2.2.7

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## TABLE 2.0.4 LIMITING DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR ISFSI PADS AND ANCHOR STUDS FOR HI-STORM 100A

Item	Maximum Permitted Value†	Minimum Permitted Value				
	ISFSI PAD					
Pad Thickness		48 inches				
Subgrade Young's Modulus from Static Tests (needed if pad is not founded on rock)		10,000 psi				
Concrete compressive strength at 28 days	4,000 psi					
	ANCHOR STUDS					
Yield Strength at Ambient Temperature	None	80,000 psi				
Ultimate Strength at Ambient Temperature	None	125,000 psi				
Initial Stud Tension	65 ksi	55 ksi				

<sup>†</sup> Pad and anchor stud parameters to be determined site-specifically, except where noted.

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## TABLE 2.0.5 ISFSI PAD REQUIREMENTS FOR FREE-STANDING AND ANCHORED HI-STORM INSTALLATION

	Item	Free-Standing	Anchored	Comments
1.	Interface between cask and ISFSI	Contact surface between cask and top surface of ISFSI pad	Same as free-standing with the addition of the bearing surface between the anchor stud nut and the overpack baseplate. (The interface between the anchor stud and the anchor receptacle is at the applicable threaded or bearing surface).	All components below the top surface of the ISFSI pad and in contact with the pad concrete are part of the pad design. A non- integral component such as the anchor stud is not part of the embedment even though it may be put in place when the ISFSI pad is formed. The embedment for the load transfer from the anchor studs to the concrete ISFSI pad shall be exclusively cast-in-place.
2.	Applicable ACI Code	At the discretion of the ISFSI owner. ACI-318 and ACI-349 are available candidate codes.	ACI-349-97. A later edition of this Code may be used if a written reconciliation is performed.	ACI-349-97 recognizes increased structural role of the ISFSI pad in an anchored cask storage configuration and imposes requirements on embedment design.
3.	Limitations on the pad design parameters	Per Table 2.2.9	Per Table 2.0.4	In free-standing cask storage, the non- mechanistic tipover requirement limits the stiffness of the pad. In the anchored storage configuration, increased pad stiffness is permitted; however, the permissible HI- STORM carry height is reduced.
4.	HI-STORM Carry Height	11 inches (for ISFSI pad parameter Set A or Set B) or, otherwise, site-specific. Not applicable if the cask is lifted with a device designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and having redundant drop protection features.	Determined site-specifically. Not applicable if the cask is lifted with a device designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and having redundant drop protection features.	Appendix 3.A provides the technical basis for free-standing installation. Depending on the final ISFSI pad configuration (thickness, concrete strength, subgrade,etc.), and the method of transport, an allowable carry height may need to be established.

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Item		Free-Standing	Anchored	Comments
5.	Maximum seismic input on the pad/cask contact surface. $G_H$ is the vectorial sum of the two horizontal ZPAs and $G_V$ is the vertical ZPA	G <sub>H</sub> + μG <sub>V</sub> ≤ μ	$G_{\rm H} \le 2.12$ AND $G_{\rm V} \le 1.5$	
6.	Required minimum value of cask to pad static coefficient of friction (µ, must be confirmed by testing).	Greater than or equal to 0.53 (per Table 2.2.9).	Same as that for free-standing condition	
7.	Applicable Wind and Large Missile Loads	Per Table 2.2.4, missile and wind loading different from the tabulated values, require 10CFR 72.48 evaluation	The maximum overturning moment at the base of the cask due to lateral missile and/or wind action must be less than $1 \times 10^7$ ft- lb.	The bases are provided in Section 3.4.8 for free-standing casks; the limit for anchored casks ensures that the anchorage system will have the same structural margins established for seismic loading.
8.	Small and medium missiles (penetrant missile)	Per Table 2.2.5, missiles and wind loading different from the tabulated value, require 10CFR 72.48 evaluation.	Same as for free-standing cask construction.	
9.	Design Loadings for the ISFSI Pad	Per load combinations in Section 2.0.4 using site-specific load.	Same as for free-standing cask.	

## TABLE 2.0.5 (continued) ISFSI PAD REQUIREMENTS FOR FREE-STANDING AND ANCHORED HI-STORM INSTALLATION

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#### 2.1 SPENT FUEL TO BE STORED

#### 2.1.1 Determination of The Design Basis Fuel

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to store most types of fuel assemblies generated in the commercial U.S. nuclear industry. Boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies have been supplied by The General Electric Company (GE), Siemens, Exxon Nuclear, ANF, UNC, ABB Combustion Engineering, and Gulf Atomic. Pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies are generally supplied by Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, ANF, and ABB Combustion Engineering. ANF, Exxon, and Siemens are historically the same manufacturing company under different ownership. Within this report, SPC is u sed to designate fuel manufactured by A NF, Exxon, or Siemens. Publications such as Refs. [2.1.1] and [2.1.2] provide a comprehensive description of fuel discharged from U.S. reactors. A central object in the design of the HI-STORM 100 System is to ensure that a majority of SNF discharged from the U.S. reactors can be stored in one of the MPCs.

The cell openings and lengths in the fuel basket have been sized to accommodate the BWR and PWR assemblies listed in Refs. [2.1.1] and [2.1.2] except as noted below. Similarly, the cavity length of the multi-purpose canisters has been set at a dimension which permits storing most types of PWR fuel assemblies and BWR fuel assemblies with or without fuel channels. The one exception is as follows:

i. The South Texas Units 1 & 2 SNF, and CE 16x16 System 80 SNF are too long to be accommodated in the available MPC cavity length.

In addition to satisfying the cross sectional and length compatibility, the active fuel region of the SNF must be enveloped in the axial direction by the neutron absorber located in the MPC fuel basket. Alignment of the neutron absorber with the active fuel region is ensured by the use of upper and lower fuel spacers suitably designed to support the bottom and restrain the top of the fuel assembly. The spacers axially position the SNF assembly such that its active fuel region is properly aligned with the neutron absorber in the fuel basket. Figure 2.1.5 provides a pictorial representation of the fuel spacers positioning the fuel assembly active fuel region. Both the upper and lower fuel spacers are designed to perform their function under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage.

In summary, the geometric compatibility of the SNF with the MPC designs does not require the definition of a design basis fuel assembly. This, however, is not the case for structural, confinement, shielding, thermal-hydraulic, and criticality criteria. In fact, a particular fuel type in a category (PWR or BWR) may not control the cask design in all of the above-mentioned criteria. To ensure that no SNF listed in Refs. [2.1.1] and [2.1.2] which is geometrically admissible in the MPC is precluded, it is necessary to determine the governing fuel specification for each analysis criterion. To make the necessary determinations, potential candidate fuel assemblies for each qualification criterion were considered. Table 2.1.1 lists the PWR fuel assemblies that were evaluated. These fuel assemblies were evaluated to define the governing design criteria for PWR fuel. The BWR fuel assembly designs evaluated are listed in Table 2.1.2. Tables 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 provide the fuel characteristics determined to be acceptable for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System. Section 2.1.9 summarizes the authorized contents for the HI-STORM 100 System. Any fuel assembly that has fuel

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characteristics within the range of Tables 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 and meets the other limits specified in Section 2.1.9 is acceptable for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System. Tables 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 present the groups of fuel assembly types defined as "array/classes" as described in further detail in Chapter 6. Table 2.1.5 lists the BWR and PWR fuel assembly designs which are found to govern for three qualification criteria, namely reactivity, shielding, and thermal. Substantiating results of analyses for the governing assembly types are presented in the respective chapters dealing with the specific qualification topic. Additional information on the design basis fuel definition is presented in the following subsections.

## 2.1.2 Intact SNF Specifications

Intact fuel assemblies are defined as fuel assemblies without known or suspected cladding defects greater than pinhole leaks and hairline cracks, and which can be handled by normal means. The design payload for the HI-STORM 100 System is intact ZR or stainless steel (SS) clad fuel assemblies with the characteristics listed in Tables 2.1.17 through 2.1.24.

Intact fuel assemblies without fuel rods in fuel rod locations cannot be loaded into the HI-STORM 100 unless dummy fuel rods, which occupy a volume greater than or equal to the original fuel rods, replace the missing rods prior to loading. Any intact fuel assembly that falls within the geometric, thermal, and nuclear limits established for the design basis intact fuel assembly, as defined in Section 2.1.9 can be safely stored in the HI-STORM 100 System.

The range of fuel characteristics specified in Tables 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 have been evaluated in this FSAR and are acceptable for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System within the decay heat, burnup, and cooling time limits specified in Section 2.1.9 for intact fuel assemblies.

#### 2.1.3 Damaged SNF and Fuel Debris Specifications

Damaged fuel and fuel debris are defined in Table 1.0.1.

To aid in loading and unloading, damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris will be loaded into stainless steel damaged fuel containers (DFCs) provided with 250 x 250 fine mesh screens, for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System (see Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2B, C, and D). The MPC-24E and MPC 32 are designed to accommodate PWR damaged fuel. The MPC-24EF and MPC-32F are designed to accommodate PWR damaged fuel and fuel debris. The MPC-68 is designed to accommodate BWR damaged fuel and fuel debris. The MPC-68 is designed to accommodate BWR damaged fuel. The MPC-68F and MPC-68FF are designed to accommodate BWR damaged fuel. The MPC-68F and MPC-68FF are designed to accommodate BWR damaged fuel and fuel debris. The appropriate structural, thermal, shielding, criticality, and confinement analyses have been performed to account for damaged fuel and fuel debris and are described in their respective chapters that follow. The limiting design characteristics for damaged fuel assemblies and restrictions on the number and location of damaged fuel containers authorized for loading in each MPC model are provided in Section 2.1.9. Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies contained in Transnuclear-designed damaged fuel canisters and one Dresden Unit 1 thoria rod canister have been approved for storage directly in the HI-STORM 100 System without re-packaging (see Figures 2.1.2 and 2.1.2A).

MPC contents classified as fuel debris are required to be stored in DFCs and in the applicable "F"

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model MPC as specified in Section 2.1.9. The "F"(or "FF") indicates the MPC is qualified for storage of intact fuel, damaged fuel, and fuel debris, in quantities and locations specified in Section 2.1.9. The basket designs for the standard and "F" model MPCs are identical. The lid and shell designs of the "F" models are unique in that the upper shell portion of the canister is thickened for additional strength needed under hypothetical accident conditions of transportation under 10 CFR 71. This design feature is not required for dry storage, but must be considered in fuel loading for dry storage to ensure the dual purpose function of the MPC by eliminating the need to re-package the fuel for transportation. Figure 2.1.9 shows the details of the differences between the standard and "F" model MPC shells. These details are common for both the PWR and BWR series MPC models.

#### 2.1.4 Deleted

#### 2.1.5 <u>Structural Parameters for Design Basis SNF</u>

The main physical parameters of an SNF assembly applicable to the structural evaluation are the fuel assembly length, envelope (cross sectional dimensions), and weight. These parameters, which define the mechanical and structural design, are specified in Section 2.1.9. The centers of gravity reported in Section 3.2 are based on the maximum fuel assembly weight. Upper and lower fuel spacers (as appropriate) maintain the axial position of the fuel assembly within the MPC basket and, therefore, the location of the center of gravity. The upper and lower fuel spacers are designed to withstand normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage. An axial clearance of approximately 2 to 2-1/2 inches is provided to account for the irradiation and thermal growth of the fuel assemblies. The suggested upper and lower fuel spacer lengths are listed in Tables 2.1.9 and 2.1.10. In order to qualify for storage in the MPC, the SNF must satisfy the physical parameters listed in Section 2.1.9.

#### 2.1.6 <u>Thermal Parameters for Design Basis SNF</u>

The principal thermal design parameter for the stored fuel is the peak fuel cladding temperature, which is a function of the maximum heat generation rate per assembly and the decay heat removal capabilities of the HI-STORM 100 System. No attempt is made to link the maximum allowable decay heat per fuel assembly with burnup, enrichment, or cooling time. Rather, the decay heat per fuel assembly is adjusted to yield peak fuel cladding temperatures with an allowance for margin to the temperature limit. The same fuel assembly decay heats are used for all fuel assembly designs within a given class of fuel assemblies (i.e., ZR clad PWR, stainless steel clad BWR, etc.).

To ensure the permissible fuel cladding temperature limits are not exceeded, Section 2.1.9 specifies the allowable decay heat per assembly for each MPC model. For both uniform and regionalized loading of moderate and high burnup fuel assemblies, the allowable decay heat per assembly is presented in Section 2.1.9.

Section 2.1.9 also includes separate cooling time, burnup, and decay heat limits for uniform fuel loading and regionalized fuel loading. Regionalized loading a llows higher heat emitting fuel assemblies to be stored in the center fuel storage locations than would otherwise be authorized for storage under uniform loading conditions.

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The fuel cladding temperature is also affected by the heat transfer characteristics of the fuel assemblies. There is no single fuel assembly design used in all thermal calculations that is bounding of all others. Instead, each thermal calculation, comprising the overall thermal analysis presented in Chapter 4, was performed using the fuel assembly design that results in the most conservative result for the individual calculation. By always using the fuel assembly design that is most conservative for a particular calculation, it is ensured that each calculation is bounding for all fuel assembly designs. The bounding fuel assembly design for each thermal calculation and fuel type is provided in Table 2.1.5.

Finally, the axial variation in the heat generation rate in the design basis fuel assembly is defined based on the axial burnup distribution. For this purpose, the data provided in Refs. [2.1.7] and [2.1.8] are utilized and summarized in Table 2.1.11 and Figures 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 for reference. These distributions are representative of fuel assemblies with the design basis burnup levels considered. These distributions are used for analyses only, and do not provide a criteria for fuel assembly acceptability for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System.

Except for MPC-68F, fuel may be stored in the MPC using one of two storage strategies, namely, uniform loading and regionalized loading. Uniform loading allows storage of any fuel assembly in any fuel storage location, subject to additional restrictions, such as those for loading of fuel assemblies containing non-fuel hardware as defined in Table 1.0.1. Regionalized fuel loading allows for higher heat emitting fuel assemblies to be stored in the central core basket storage locations (inner region) with lower heat emitting fuel assemblies in the peripheral fuel storage locations (outer region). Regionalized loading allows storage of higher heat emitting fuel assemblies than would otherwise be permitted using the uniform loading strategy. The definition of the regions for each MPC model provided in Table 2.1.13. Regionalized fuel loading is not permitted in MPC-68F.

#### 2.1.7 Radiological Parameters for Design Basis SNF

The principal radiological design criteria for the HI-STORM 100 System are the 10CFR72.104 site boundary dose rate limits and maintaining operational dose rates as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The radiation dose is directly affected by the gamma and neutron source terms of the SNF assembly.

The gamma and neutron sources are separate and are affected differently by enrichment, burnup, and cooling time. It is recognized that, at a given burnup, the radiological source terms increase monotonically as the initial enrichment is reduced. The shielding design basis fuel assembly, therefore, is evaluated at conservatively high burnups, low cooling times, and low enrichments, as discussed in Chapter 5. The shielding design basis fuel assembly thus bounds all other fuel assemblies.

The design basis dose rates can be met by a variety of burnup levels and cooling times. Section 2.1.9 provides the procedure for determining burnup and cooling time limits for all of the authorized fuel assembly array/classes for both uniform fuel loading and regionalized loading. Table 2.1.11 and Figures 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 provide the axial distribution for the radiological source terms for PWR and BWR fuel assemblies based on the axial burnup distribution. The axial burnup distributions are representative of fuel assemblies with the design basis burnup levels considered. These distributions

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are used for analyses only, and do not provide a criteria for fuel assembly acceptability for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System.

Thoria rods placed in Dresden Unit 1 Thoria Rod Canisters meeting the requirements of Table 2.1.12 and Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one Antimony-Beryllium neutron source have been qualified for storage. Up to one Thoria Rod Canister is authorized for storage in combination with other intact and damaged fuel, and fuel debris as specified in Section 2.1.9.

Non-fuel hardware, as defined in Table 1.0.1, has been evaluated and is authorized for storage in the PWR MPCs as specified in Section 2.1.9.

#### 2.1.8 Criticality Parameters for Design Basis SNF

As discussed earlier, the MPC-68, MPC-68F, MPC-68FF, MPC-32 and MPC-32F feature a basket without flux traps. In the aforementioned baskets, there is one panel of neutron absorber between two adjacent fuel assemblies. The MPC-24, MPC-24E, and MPC-24EF employ a construction wherein two neighboring fuel assemblies are separated by two panels of neutron absorber with a water gap between them (flux trap construction).

The minimum <sup>10</sup>B areal density in the neutron absorber panels for each MPC model is shown in Table 2.1.15.

For all MPCs, the <sup>10</sup>B areal density used for the criticality analysis is conservatively established below the minimum values shown in Table 2.1.15. For Boral, the value used in the analysis is 75% of the minimum value, while for METAMIC, it is 90% of the minimum value. This is consistent with NUREG-1536 [2.1.5] which suggests a 25% reduction in <sup>10</sup>B areal density credit when subject to standard acceptance tests, and which allows a smaller reduction when more comprehensive tests of the areal density are performed.

The criticality analyses for the MPC-24, MPC-24E and MPC-24EF (all with higher enriched fuel) and for the MPC-32 and MPC-32F were performed with credit taken for soluble boron in the MPC water during wet loading and unloading operations. Table 2.1.14 and 2.1.16 provide the required soluble boron concentrations for these MPCs.

#### 2.1.9 Summary of Authorized Contents

Tables 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.12, and 2.1.17 through 2.1.29 together specify the limits for spent fuel and non-fuel hardware authorized for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System. The limits in these tables are derived from the safety analyses described in the following chapters of this FSAR. Fuel classified as damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris must be stored in damaged fuel containers for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System.

Tables 2.1.17 through 2.1.24 are the baseline tables that specify the fuel assembly limits for each of the MPC models, with appropriate references to the other tables in this section for certain other limits. Tables 2.1.17 through 2.1.24 refer to Section 2.1.9.1 for ZR-clad fuel limits on minimum cooling time, maximum decay heat, and maximum burnup for uniform and regionalized fuel loading.

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Limits on decay heat, burnup, and cooling time for stainless steel-clad fuel are provided in Tables 2.1.17 through 2.1.24.

## 2.1.9.1 Decay Heat, Burnup, and Cooling Time Limits for ZR-Clad Fuel

Each ZR-clad fuel assembly and any PWR integral non-fuel hardware (NFH) to be stored in the HI-STORM 100 System must meet the following limits, in addition to meeting the physical limits specified elsewhere in this section, to be authorized for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System. The contents of each fuel storage location (fuel assembly and NFH) to be stored must be verified to have, as applicable:

- A decay heat less than or equal to the maximum allowable value.
- An assembly a verage enrichment greater than or equal to the minimum value u sed in determining the maximum allowable burnup.
- A burnup less than or equal to the maximum allowable value.
- A cooling time greater than or equal to the minimum allowable value.

The maximum allowable ZR-clad fuel storage location decay heat values are determined using the methodology described in Section 2.1.9.1.1 or 2.1.9.1.2 depending on whether uniform fuel loading or regionalized fuel loading is being implemented<sup>†</sup>. The decay heat limits are independent of burnup, cooling time, or enrichment and are based strictly on the thermal analysis described in Chapter 4. Decay heat limits must be met for all contents in a fuel storage location (i.e., fuel and PWR non-fuel hardware, as applicable).

The maximum allowable average burnup per fuel storage location is determined by calculation as a function of minimum enrichment, maximum allowable decay heat, and minimum cooling time from 3 to 20 years, as described in Section 2.1.9.1.3.

Section 12.2.10 describes how compliance with these limits may be verified, including practical examples.

#### 2.1.9.1.1 Uniform Fuel Loading Decay Heat Limits for ZR-Clad Fuel

Table 2.1.26 provides the maximum allowable decay heat per fuel storage location for ZR-clad fuel in uniform fuel loading for each MPC model.

#### 2.1.9.1.2 Regionalized Fuel Loading Decay Heat Limits for ZR-Clad Fuel

Table 2.1.27 provides the maximum allowable decay heat per fuel storage location for ZR-clad

\* Note that the stainless steel-clad fuel limits apply to all fuel in the MPC, if a mixture of stainless steel and ZRclad fuel is stored in the same MPC. The stainless steel-clad fuel assembly decay heat limits may be found in Table 2.1.17 through 2.1.24

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fuel in both the inner and outer regions for regionalized fuel loading in each MPC model.

#### 2.1.9.1.3 Burnup Limits as a Function of Cooling Time for ZR-Clad Fuel

The maximum allowable ZR-clad fuel assembly average burnup varies with the following parameters, based on the shielding analysis in Chapter 5:

- Minimum required fuel assembly cooling time
- Maximum allowable fuel assembly decay heat
- Minimum fuel assembly average enrichment

The calculation described in this section is used to determine the maximum allowable fuel assembly burnup for minimum cooling times between 3 and 20 years, using maximum decay heat and minimum enrichment as input values. This calculation may be used to create multiple burnup versus cooling time tables for a particular fuel assembly array/class and different minimum enrichments. The allowable maximum burnup for a specific fuel assembly may be calculated based on the assembly's particular enrichment and cooling time.

- (i) Choose a fuel assembly minimum enrichment,  $E_{235}$ .
- (ii) Calculate the maximum allowable fuel assembly average burnup for a minimum cooling time between 3 and 20 years using the equation below:

$$Bu = (A \times q) + (B \times q^2) + (C \times q^3) + [D \times (E_{235})^2] + (E \times q \times E_{235}) + (F \times q^2 \times E_{235}) + G$$

Equation 2.1.9.3

Where:

Bu = Maximum allowable assembly average burnup (MWD/MTU)

- q = Maximum allowable decay heat per fuel storage location determined in Section 2.1.9.1 or 2.1.9.2 (kW)
- $E_{235}$  = Minimum fuel assembly average enrichment (wt. % <sup>235</sup>U) (e.g., for 4.05 wt. %, use 4.05)

A through G = Coefficients from Tables 2.1.28 or 2.1.29 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class and minimum cooling time.

#### 2.1.9.1.4 Other Considerations

In computing the allowable maximum fuel storage location decay heats and fuel assembly average burnups, the following requirements apply:

• Calculated burnup limits shall be rounded down to the nearest integer

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- Calculated burnup limits greater than 68,200 MWD/MTU for PWR fuel and 65,000 MWD/MTU for BWR fuel must be reduced to be equal to these values.
- Linear interpolation of calculated burnups between cooling times for a given fuel assembly maximum decay heat and minimum enrichment is permitted. For example, the allowable burnup for a minimum cooling time of 4.5 years may be interpolated between those burnups calculated for 4 and 5 years.
- ZR-clad fuel assemblies must have a minimum enrichment, as defined in Table 1.0.1, greater than or equal to the value used in determining the maximum allowable burnup per Section 2.1.9.1.3 to be authorized for storage in the MPC.
- When complying with the maximum fuel storage location decay heat limits, users must account for the decay heat from both the fuel assembly and any PWR non-fuel hardware, as applicable for the particular fuel storage location, to ensure the decay heat emitted by all contents in a storage location does not exceed the limit.

Section 12.2.10 provides a practical example of determining fuel storage location decay heat, burnup, and cooling time limits and verifying compliance for a set of example fuel assemblies.

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#### Table 2.1.1

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#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLIES EVALUATED TO DETERMINE DESIGN BASIS SNF

Assembly Class	Array Type
B&W 15x15	All
B&W 17x17	All
CE 14x14	All
CE 16x16	All except System 80 <sup>TM</sup>
WE 14x14	All
WE 15x15	All
WE 17x17	All
St. Lucie	All
Ft. Calhoun	All
Haddam Neck (Stainless Steel Clad)	All
San Onofre 1 (Stainless Steel Clad)	All
Indian Point 1	All

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#### Table 2.1.2

#### BWR FUEL ASSEMBLIES EVALUATED TO DETERMINE DESIGN BASIS SNF

Assembly Class	Array Type			
GE BWR/2-3	All 7x7	All 8x8	A11 9x9	All 10x10
GE BWR/4-6	All 7x7	All 8x8	A11 9x9	All 10x10
Humboldt Bay	All 6x6	All 7x7 (ZR Clad)		
Dresden-1	All 6x6	A11 8x8		
LaCrosse (Stainless Steel Clad)	All			

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Fuel Assembly Array/ Class	14x14 A	14x14 B	14x14 C	14x14 D	14x14E
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	SS	SS
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	<u>≤</u> 365	<u>≤</u> 412	<b>≤</b> 438	<u>≤</u> 400	≤206
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, and 24EF without soluble boron	≤4.6 (24)	≤4.6 (24)	≤4.6 (24)	≤4.0 (24)	≤ 5.0 (24)
credit) (wt % <sup>235</sup> U) (Note 7)	≤ 5.0 (24E/24EF)				
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, 24EF, 32 or 32F with soluble boron credit - see Note 5) (wt % <sup>235</sup> U)	<u>≤</u> 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤5.0	≤ 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	179	179	176	180	173
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	<u>≥</u> 0.400	<u>≥</u> 0.417	≥ 0.440	<u>≥</u> 0.422	<u>≥</u> 0.3415
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.3514	≤ 0.3734	<b>≤ 0.3880</b>	<u>≤</u> 0.3890	<u>≤</u> 0.3175
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.3444	≤ 0.3659	≤ 0.3805	≤ 0.3835	≤ 0.3130
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.556	<u>≤</u> 0.556	≤ 0.580	<u>≤</u> 0.556	Note 6
Active Fuel Length (in.)	≤ 150	≤150	≤ 150	≤ 144	≤ 102
No. of Guide and/or Instrument Tubes	17	17	5 (Note 4)	16	0
Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.017	≥ 0.017	≥ 0.038	≥ 0.0145	N/A

 Table 2.1.3

 PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

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Fuel Assembly Array/Class	15x15 A	15x15 B	15x15 C	15x15 D	15x15 E	15x15 F
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	<u>≤</u> 473	<u>≤</u> 473	<u>≤</u> 473	<u>≤</u> 495	<u>&lt;</u> 495	≤495
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, and 24EF without soluble boron credit) (wt % <sup>235</sup> U) (Note 7)	≤4.1 (24) ≤4.5 (24E/24EF)					
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, 24EF, 32 or 32F with soluble boron credit – see Note 5) (wt % <sup>235</sup> U)	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0 
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	204	204	204	208	208	208
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.418	≥ 0.420	≥ 0.417	≥ 0.430	≥ 0.428	<u>≥</u> 0.428
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.3660	<u>≤</u> 0.3736	<u>≤</u> 0.3640	<u>≤</u> 0.3800	<u>≤</u> 0.3790	<u>≤</u> 0.3820
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.3580	<u>≤</u> 0.3671	<u>≤</u> 0.3570	≤ 0.3735	≤ 0.3707	<u>≤</u> 0.3742
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.550	<u>≤</u> 0.563	<u>≤</u> 0.563	<u>≤</u> 0.568	<u>≤</u> 0.568	<u>≤</u> 0.568
Active Fuel Length (in.)	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	≤ 150	<u>≤</u> 150
No. of Guide and/or Instrument Tubes	21	21	21	17	17	17
Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.0165	≥ 0.015	≥ 0.0165	≥ 0.0150	≥ 0.0140	<u>≥</u> 0.0140

# Table 2.1.3 (continued)PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

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Fuel Assembly Array and Class	15x15 G	15x15H	16x16 A	17x17A	17x17 B	17x17 C
Clad Material (Note 2)	SS	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	zr
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	<u>≤</u> 420	<u>&lt;</u> 495	<u>≤</u> 448	<u>≤</u> 433	<u>≤</u> 474	<u>≤</u> 480
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, and 24EF without soluble boron credit) (wt % <sup>235</sup> U) (Note 7)	≤4.0 (24) ≤4.5 (24E/24EF)	≤ 3.8 (24) ≤ 4.2 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.6 (24) ≤ 5.0 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.0 (24) ≤ 4.4 (24E/24EF)	≤ 4.0 (24) ≤ 4.4 (24E/24EF)	≤4.0 (24) ≤4.4 (24E/24EF)
Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, 24EF, 32 or 32F with soluble boron credit – see Note 5) (wt % <sup>235</sup> U)	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤ 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤5.0   
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	204	208	236	264	264	264
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.422	≥ 0.414	≥ 0.382	≥ 0.360	≥ 0.372	≥ 0.377
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	<b>≤</b> 0.3890	<u>≤</u> 0.3700	≤ 0.3320	<u>≤</u> 0.3150	≤0.3310	≤ 0.3330
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.3825	≥ 0.3622	≤ 0.3255	<u>≤</u> 0.3088	≤ 0.3232	≤ 0.3252
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.563	≤ 0.568	≤ 0.506	<u>≤</u> 0.496	<u>≤</u> 0.496	≤ 0.502
Active Fuel length (in.)	≤ 144	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150
No. of Guide and/or Instrument Tubes	21	17	5 (Note 4)	25	25	25
Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness (in.)	<u>≥</u> 0.0145	≥ 0.140	≥ 0.0400	≥ 0.016	≥ 0.014	≥ 0.020

Table 2.1.3 (continued) PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

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#### Table 2.1.3 (continued) PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS

Notes:

- 1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Maximum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.
- 2. See Table 1.0.1 for the definition of "ZR."
- 3. Design initial uranium weight is the nominal uranium weight specified for each assembly by the fuel manufacturer or reactor user. For each PWR fuel assembly, the total uranium weight limit specified in this table may be increased up to 2.0 percent for comparison with users' fuel records to account for manufacturer's tolerances.
- 4. Each guide tube replaces four fuel rods.
- 5. Soluble boron concentration per Tables 2.1.14 and 2.1.16, as applicable.
- 6. This fuel assembly array/class includes only the Indian Point Unit 1 fuel assembly. This fuel assembly has two pitches in different sectors of the assembly. These pitches are 0.441 inches and 0.453 inches.
- 7. For those MPCs loaded with both intact fuel assemblies and damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris, the maximum initial enrichment of the intact fuel assemblies, damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris is 4.0 wt.% <sup>235</sup>U.

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Fuel Assembly Array and Class	6x6 A	6x6 B	6x6 C	7x7 A	7x7 B	8x8 A
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	zr
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	≤110	≤110	≤110	≤100	<u>≤</u> 198	≤120
Maximum Planar- Average Initial Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U) (Note 14)	<u>≤</u> 2.7	≤2.7 for UO₂ rods. See Note 4 for MOX rods	<u>≤</u> 2.7	≤2.7	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 2.7
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U)	<u>≤</u> 4.0	≤4.0	<u>≤</u> 4.0	<u>≤</u> 5.5	<u>≤</u> 5.0	<u>≤</u> 4.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	35 or 36	35 or 36 (up to 9 MOX rods)	36	49	49	63 or 64
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	≥ 0.5550	≥ 0.5625	≥ 0.5630	<u>≥</u> 0.4860	<u>≥</u> 0.5630	<u>≥</u> 0.4120
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.5105	<u>≤</u> 0.4945	<u>≤</u> 0.4990	<u>≤ 0.4204</u>	<u>≤</u> 0.4990	≤ 0.3620
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.4980	<u>≤</u> 0.4820	<u>≤</u> 0.4880	≤0.4110	<u>≤0.4910</u>	≤ 0.3580
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.710	≤ 0.710	<u>≤</u> 0.740	<b>≤</b> 0.631	<u>≤</u> 0.738	<u>≤</u> 0.523
Active Fuel Length (in.)	<u>≤</u> 120	≤ 120	≤ 77.5	≤ 80	≤150	<u>≤</u> 120
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	1 or 0	1 or 0	0	0	0	1 or 0
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	> 0	> 0	N/A	N/A	N/A	≥0
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤ 0.060	<u>≤</u> 0.060	<u>≤</u> 0.060	≤ 0.060	<u>≤</u> 0.120	<u>≤</u> 0.100

 Table 2.1.4

 BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

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Fuel Assembly Array and Class	8x8 B	8x8 C	8x8 D	8x8 E	8x8F	9x9 A
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	<u>≤</u> 192	<u>&lt; 190</u>	<u>&lt; 190</u>	<u>≤</u> 190	<u>≤</u> 191	<u>≤</u> 180
Maximum Planar- Average Initial Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U) (Note 14)	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>&lt;</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.0	<u>≤</u> 4.2
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U)	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤5.0	≤ 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	63 or 64	62	60 or 61	59	64	74/66 (Note 5)
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	<u>≥</u> 0.4840	<u>≥</u> 0.4830	<u>≥</u> 0.4830	<u>≥</u> 0.4930	≥ 0.4576	<u>≥</u> 0.4400
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.4295	<u>≤</u> 0.4250	≤ 0.4230	≤ 0.4250	≤ 0.3996	≤ 0.3840
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.4195	<u>≤</u> 0.4160	≤ 0.4140	<u>≤</u> 0.4160	≤ 0.3913	<u>≤</u> 0.3760
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.642	<u>≤0.6</u> 41	<u>≤</u> 0.640	<u>≤</u> 0.640	≤ 0.609	≤0.566
Design Active Fuel Length (in.)	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	≤150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	1 or 0	2	1 - 4 (Note 7)	5	N/A (Note 12)	2
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.034	> 0.00	> 0.00	≥ 0.034	≥ 0.0315	> 0.00
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤0.120	<u>≤</u> 0.120	<u>≤</u> 0.120	<u>≤</u> 0.100	≤ 0.055	≤ 0.120

Table 2.1.4 (continued) BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

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Fuel Assembly Array and Class	9x9 B	9x9 C	9x9 D	9x9 E (Note 13)	9x9 F (Note 13)	9x9 G
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	<u>≤</u> 180	<u>≤</u> 182	<u>&lt;</u> 182	<u>≤</u> 183	<u>≤</u> 183	<u>≤</u> 164
Maximum Planar- Average Initial Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U) (Note 14)	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.2	_ ≤4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.0	<u>≤</u> 4.0	<u>≤</u> 4.2
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U)	≤ 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0	. ≤ 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	72	80	79	76	76	72
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	<u>≥</u> 0.4330	≥ 0.4230	<u>≥</u> 0.4240	<u>≥</u> 0.4170	<u>≥</u> 0.4430	≥ 0.4240
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	≤ 0.3810	≤ 0.3640	<u>≤</u> 0.3640	<u>≤</u> 0.3640	≤ 0.3860	≤ 0.3640
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤0.3740	<u>≤</u> 0.3565	≤ 0.3565	≤ 0.3530	≤ 0.3745	≤ 0.3565
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.572	≤ 0.572	≤0.572	≤0.572	≤ 0.572	≤ 0.572
Design Active Fuel Length (in.)	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 150	≤ 150	≤ 150	<u>≤</u> 150
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	1 (Note 6)	1	2	5	5	1 (Note 6)
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	> 0.00	≥ 0.020	≥ 0.0300	≥ 0.0120	<u>≥</u> 0.0120	<u>≥</u> 0.0320
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.100	≤ 0.100	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120

Table 2.1.4 (continued) BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

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Fuel Assembly Array and Class	10x10 A	10x10 B	10x10 C	10x10 D	10x10 E
Clad Material (Note 2)	ZR	ZR	ZR	SS	SS
Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)	<u>≤</u> 188	<u>≤</u> 188	<u>≤</u> 179	≤125	<u>≤</u> 125
Maximum Planar-Average Initial Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U) (Note 14)	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.2	<u>≤</u> 4.0	<u>≤</u> 4.0
Initial Maximum Rod Enrichment (wt.% <sup>235</sup> U)	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤ 5.0	<u>≤</u> 5.0	≤ 5.0	≤ 5.0
No. of Fuel Rod Locations	92/78 (Note 8)	91/83 (Note 9)	96	100	96
Fuel Clad O.D. (in.)	<u>≥</u> 0.4040	<u>≥</u> 0.3957	≥ 0.3780	≥ 0.3960	<u>≥</u> 0.3940
Fuel Clad I.D. (in.)	<u>≤</u> 0.3520	<u>≤0.3480</u>	≤ 0.3294	≤ 0.3560	≤ 0.3500
Fuel Pellet Dia. (in.)	≤ 0.3455	<u>≤</u> 0.3420	≤ 0.3224	≤ 0.3500	≤0.3430
Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)	≤ 0.510	<u>≤</u> 0.510	<u>≤</u> 0.488	≤ 0.565	≤ 0.557
Design Active Fuel Length (in.)	<u>≤</u> 150	≤150	<u>≤</u> 150	<u>≤</u> 83	<u>&lt;</u> 83
No. of Water Rods (Note 11)	2	1 (Note 6)	5 (Note 10)	0	4
Water Rod Thickness (in.)	≥ 0.030	> 0.00	≥ 0.031	N/A	≥ 0.022
Channel Thickness (in.)	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.120	≤ 0.055	≤ 0.080	≤ 0.080

# Table 2.1.4 (continued) BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

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#### Table 2.1.4 (continued) BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS

#### NOTES:

- 1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Maximum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.
- 2. See Table 1.0.1 for the definition of "ZR."
- 3. Design initial uranium weight is the nominal uranium weight specified for each assembly by the fuel manufacturer or reactor user. For each BWR fuel assembly, the total uranium weight limit specified in this table may be increased up to 1.5 percent for comparison with users' fuel records to account for manufacturer tolerances.
- 4.  $\leq 0.635$  wt. % <sup>235</sup>U and  $\leq 1.578$  wt. % total fissile plutonium (<sup>239</sup>Pu and <sup>241</sup>Pu), (wt. % of total fuel weight, i.e., UO<sub>2</sub> plus PuO<sub>2</sub>)
- 5. This assembly class contains 74 total rods; 66 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.
- 6. Square, replacing nine fuel rods.
- 7. Variable.
- 8. This assembly contains 92 total fuel rods; 78 full length rods and 14 partial length rods.
- 9. This assembly class contains 91 total fuel rods; 83 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.
- 10. One diamond-shaped water rod replacing the four center fuel rods and four rectangular water rods dividing the assembly into four quadrants.
- 11. These rods may also be sealed at both ends and contain Zr material in lieu of water.
- 12. This assembly is known as "QUAD+." It has four rectangular water cross segments dividing the assembly into four quadrants.
- 13. For the SPC 9x9-5 fuel assembly, each fuel rod must meet either the 9x9E or the 9x9F set of limits or clad O.D., clad I.D., and pellet diameter.
- 14. For those MPCs loaded with both intact fuel assemblies and damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris, the maximum planar average initial enrichment for the intact fuel assemblies is limited to 3.7 wt.%<sup>235</sup>U, as applicable.

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# DESIGN BASIS FUEL ASSEMBLY FOR EACH DESIGN CRITERION

Criterion	BWR	PWR
Reactivity (Criticality)	GE12/14 10x10 with Partial Length Rods (Array/Class 10x10A)	B&W 15x15 (Array/Class 15x15F)
Shielding	GE 7x7	B&W 15x15
Fuel Assembly Effective Planar Thermal Conductivity	GE-11 9x9	<u>W</u> 17x17 OFA
Fuel Basket Effective Axial Thermal Conductivity	GE 7x7	<u>W</u> 14x14 OFA
MPC Density and Heat Capacity	Dresden 6x6	<u>W</u> 14x14 OFA
MPC Fuel Basket Axial Resistance to Thermosiphon Flow	GE-11 9x9	<u>W</u> 17x17 OFA

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Fuel Assembly Type	Assembly Length w/o NFH <sup>1</sup> (in.)	Location of Active Fuel from Bottom (in.)	Max. Active Fuel Length (in.)	Upper Fuel Spacer Length (in.)	Lower Fuel Spacer Length (in.)
CE 14x14	157	4.1	137	9.5	10.0
CE 16x16	176.8	4.7	150	0	0
BW 15x15	165.7	8.4	141.8	6.7	4.1
W 17x17 OFA	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
W 17x17 Std	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
W 17x17 V5H	160.1	3.7	144	7.9	8.5
W 15x15	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
W 14x14 Std	159.8	3.7	145.2	9.2	7.5
W 14x14 OFA	159.8	3.7	144	8.2	8.5
Ft. Calhoun	146	6.6	128	10.25	20.25
St. Lucie 2	158.2	5.2	136.7	10.25	8.05
B&W 15x15 SS	137.1	3.873	120.5	19.25	19.25
W 15x15 SS	137.1	3.7	122	19.25	19.25
W 14x14 SS	137.1	3.7	120	19.25	19.25
Indian Point 1	137.2	17.705	101.5	18.75	20.0

#### SUGGESTED PWR UPPER AND LOWER FUEL SPACER LENGTHS

Note: Each user shall specify the fuel spacer length based on their fuel assembly length, presence of a DFC, and allowing an approximate two to 2-1/2 inch gap under the MPC lid. F uel spacers shall be sized to ensure that the active fuel region of intact fuel assemblies remains within the neutron poison region of the MPC basket with water in the MPC.

NFH is an abbreviation for non-fuel hardware, including control components. Fuel assemblies with control components may require shorter fuel spacers.

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Fuel Assembly Type	Assembly Length (in.)	Location of Active Fuel from Bottom (in.)	Max. Active Fuel Length (in.)	Upper Fuel Spacer Length (in.)	Lower Fuel Spacer Length (in.)
GE/2-3	171.2	7.3	150	4.8	0
GE/4-6	176.2	7.3	150	0	0
Dresden 1	134.4	11.2	110	18.0	28.0
Humboldt Bay	95.0	8.0	79	40.5	40.5
Dresden 1 Damaged Fuel or Fuel Debris	142.1 <sup>†</sup>	11.2	110	17.0	16.9
Humboldt Bay Damaged Fuel or Fuel Debris	105.5 <sup>†</sup>	8.0	79	35.25	35.25
LaCrosse	102.5	10.5	83	37.0	37.5

#### SUGGESTED BWR UPPER AND LOWER FUEL SPACER LENGTHS

Note: Each user shall specify the fuel spacer length based on their fuel assembly length, presence of a DFC, and allowing an approximate two to 2-1/2 inch gap under the MPC lid. Fuel spacers shall be sized to ensure that the active fuel region of intact fuel assemblies remains within the neutron poison region of the MPC basket with water in the MPC.

<sup>†</sup> Fuel assembly length includes the damaged fuel container.

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	PWR DISTRIBUTION <sup>1</sup>					
Interval	Axial Distance From Bottom of Active Fuel (% of Active Fuel Length)	Normalized Distribution				
1	0% to 4-1/6%	0.5485				
2	4-1/6% to 8-1/3%	0.8477				
3	8-1/3% to 16-2/3%	1.0770				
4	16-2/3% to 33-1/3%	1.1050				
5	33-1/3% to 50%	1.0980				
6	50% to 66-2/3%	1.0790				
7	66-2/3% to 83-1/3%	1.0501				
8	83-1/3% to 91-2/3%	0.9604				
9	91-2/3% to 95-5/6%	0.7338				
10	95-5/6% to 100%	0.4670				
	BWR DISTRIBUTION	N <sup>2</sup>				
Interval	Axial Distance From Bottom of Active Fuel (% of Active Fuel Length)	Normalized Distribution				
1	0% to 4-1/6%	0.2200				
2	4-1/6% to 8-1/3%	0.7600				
3	8-1/3% to 16-2/3%	1.0350				
4	16-2/3% to 33-1/3%	1.1675				
5	33-1/3% to 50%	1.1950				
6	50% to 66-2/3%	1.1625				
7	66-2/3% to 83-1/3%	1.0725				
8	83-1/3% to 91-2/3%	0.8650				
9	91-2/3% to 95-5/6%	0.6200				
10	95-5/6% to 100%	0.2200				

Table 2.1.11 NORMALIZED DISTRIBUTION BASED ON BURNUP PROFILE

1 Reference 2.1.7 2

Reference 2.1.8

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#### PARAMETER MPC-68 or MPC-68F Cladding Type Zircaloy 98.2 wt.% ThO<sub>2</sub>, 1.8 wt.% UO<sub>2</sub> Composition with an enrichment of 93.5 wt. % <sup>235</sup>U Number of Rods Per Thoria < 18 Canister Decay Heat Per Thoria Canister $\leq 115$ watts Post-Irradiation Fuel Cooling Cooling time $\geq$ 18 years and Time and Average Burnup Per average burnup $\leq 16,000$ MWD/MTIHM Thoria Canister Initial Heavy Metal Weight $\leq$ 27 kg/canister Fuel Cladding O.D. $\geq$ 0.412 inches Fuel Cladding I.D. $\leq$ 0.362 inches Fuel Pellet O.D. $\leq$ 0.358 inches Active Fuel Length $\leq$ 111 inches $\leq$ 550 lbs., including Thoria Rods Canister Weight Canister Material Type 304 SS

#### DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS FOR THORIA RODS IN D-1 THORIA ROD CANISTERS

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MPC MODEL	REGION 1 FUEL STORAGE LOCATIONS*	REGION 2 FUEL STORAGE LOCATIONS
MPC-24, 24E and 24EF	9, 10, 15, and 16	All Other Locations
MPC-32/32F	7, 8, 12 through 15, 18 through 21, 25, and 26	All Other Locations
MPC-68/68F/68FF	11 through 14, 18 through 23, 27 through 32, 37 through 42, 46 through 51, 55 through 58	All Other Locations

Table 2.1.13 MPC Fuel Loading Regions

\*Note: Refer to Figures 1.2.2 through 1.2.4

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# Soluble Boron Requirements for MPC-24/24E/24EF Fuel Wet Loading and Unloading Operations

MPC MODEL	FUEL ASSEMBLY MAXIMUM AVERAGE ENRICHMENT (wt % <sup>235</sup> U)	MINIMUM SOLUBLE BORON CONCENTRATION (ppmb)
MPC-24	All fuel assemblies with initial enrichment <sup>1</sup> less than the prescribed value for soluble boron credit	0
MPC-24	One or more fuel assemblies with an initial enrichment <sup>1</sup> greater than or equal to the prescribed value for no soluble boron credit and $\leq 5.0$ wt. %	<u>≥</u> 400
MPC-24E/24EF	All fuel assemblies with initial enrichment <sup>1</sup> less than the prescribed value for soluble boron credit	0
MPC-24E/24EF	All fuel assemblies classified as intact fuel assemblies and one or more fuel assemblies with an initial enrichment <sup>1</sup> greater than or equal to the prescribed value for no soluble boron credit and $\leq 5.0$ wt. %	≥ 300
MPC-24E/24EF	One or more fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel or fuel debris and one or more fuel assemblies with initial enrichment > 4.0 wt.% and $\leq$ 5.0 wt.%	≥ 600

<sup>1</sup>Refer to Table 2.1.3 for these enrichments.

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	MINIMUM <sup>10</sup> B LOADING (g/cm <sup>2</sup> )		
MPC MODEL	Boral Neutron Absorber Panels	METAMIC Neutron Absorber Panels	
MPC-24	0.0267	0.0223	
MPC-24E and MPC-24EF	0.0372	0.0310	
MPC-32/32F	0.0372	0.0310	
MPC-68 and MPC-68FF	0.0372	0.0310	
MPC-68F	0.01	N/A (Note 1)	

# MINIMUM BORAL <sup>10</sup>B LOADING IN NEUTRON ABSORBER PANELS

Notes:

1. All MPC-68F canisters are equipped with Boral neutron absorber panels.

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	All Intact Fuel Assemblies		One or More Damaged Fuel Assemblies or Fuel Debris	
Fuel Assembly Array/Class	Initial Enrichment ≤4.1 wt.% <sup>235</sup> U (ppmb)	Initial Enrichment > 4.1 wt.% and ≤ 5.0 wt.% <sup>235</sup> U (ppmb)	Initial Enrichment ≤ 4.1 wt.% <sup>235</sup> U (ppmb)	Initial Enrichment > 4.1 wt.% and ≤ 5.0 wt.% <sup>235</sup> U (ppmb)
14x14A/B/C/D/E	1,300	1,900	1,500	2,300
15x15A/B/C/G	1,800	2,500	1,900	2,700
15x15D/E/F/H	1,900	2,600	2,100	2,900
16x16A	1,300	1,900	1,500	2,300
17x17A/B/C	1,900	2,600	2,100	2,900

Soluble Boron Requirements for MPC-32 and MPC-32F Wet Loading and Unloading Operations

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PARAMETER	VALUE	
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide, PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	
Maximum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	
Post-irradiation Cooling Time and Average Burnup per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: > 8 years and < 40.000 MWD/MTU	
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1	
Non-Fuel Hardware Burnup and Cooling Time	As specified in Table 2.1.25	
Fuel Assembly Length	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)	
Fuel Assembly Width	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)	
Fuel Assembly Weight	$\leq$ 1,680 lbs (including non-fuel hardware)	
Other Limitations	<ul> <li>Quantity is limited to up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies.</li> <li>Neutron sources, damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris are not permitted for storage in MPC-24.</li> <li>BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location.</li> <li>CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, and/or APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell location.</li> <li>CRAs, RCCAs, 0, 15, and/or 16</li> <li>Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Table 2.1.14.</li> </ul>	

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PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)			
Fuel Type(s)	Uranium oxide, BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for the applicable array/class, with or without channels	Uranium oxide, BWR damaged fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for the applicable array/class, with or without channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFCs)	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B, with or without channels	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR damaged fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B, with or without channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFCs)
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 2.1.4 for the applicable array/class	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 2.1.4 for the applicable array/class	ZR	ZR
Maximum Initial Planar-Average Enrichment per Assembly and Rod Enrichment	As specified in Table 2.1.4 for the applicable array/class	Planar Average: ≤ 2.7 wt% <sup>235</sup> U for array/classes 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A; ≤ 4.0 wt% <sup>235</sup> U for all other array/classes Rod: As specified in Table 2.1.4	As specified in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B	As specified in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B

#### LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-68

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# Table 2.1.18 (cont'd)

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)			
Post-irradiation Cooling Time and Average Burnup per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1; except as provided in Notes 2 and 3.	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1; except as provided in Notes 2 and 3.	Cooling time ≥ 18 years and average burnup ≤ 30,000 MWD/MTIHM.	Cooling time $\geq$ 18 years and average burnup $\leq$ 30,000 MWD/MTIHM.
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	SS clad: Note 4 $ZR \ clad:$ As specified in Section 2.1.9.1; except as provided in Notes 2 and 3. SS clad: $\leq 95$ Watts	SS clad: Note 4. ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1; except as provided in Notes 2 and 3. SS clad: $\leq 95$ Watts	≤ 115 Watts	≤ 115 Watts
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 176.5 in. (nominal design)	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A: $\leq 135.0$ in. (nominal design) All Other array/classes: $\leq 176.5$ in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 5.85 in. (nominal design)	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A: $\leq 4.7$ in. (nominal design) All Other array/classes: $\leq 5.85$ in. (nominal design)	≤4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤4.70 in. (nominal design)

# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-68

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# Table 2.1.18 (cont'd)

PARAMETER		VALUE (	Note 1)	
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 700 lbs. (including channels)	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A: $\leq 550$ lbs. (including channels and DFC) All Other array/classes: $\leq 700$ lbs. (including channels and DFC)	≤ 400 lbs, including channels	≤ 550 lbs, including channels and DFC
Other Limitations	<ul> <li>Quantity is limeeting the sof array/class assemblies in</li> <li>Up to 16 dan 1 or Humbol 8, 9, 16, 25, 1 comprised of</li> <li>SS-clad fuel fuel cell loca 47 through 5</li> <li>Dresden Uni source are pershall be in a</li> <li>Fuel debris i</li> </ul>	imited to up to one ( specifications listed is s 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C n DFCs and intact fu naged fuel assemblie dt Bay may be store 34, 35, 44, 53, 60, 61 f intact fuel assembli assemblies with stai ations 19 through 22, 0. t 1 fuel assemblies we ermitted. The antimo water rod location. s not permitted for st	1) Dresden Unit 1 the in Table 2.1.12 plus , 7x7A, and/or 8x8A el assemblies up to a es from plants other t d in DFCs in fuel cel l, 66, 67, and/or 68, es up to a total of 68 nless steel channels n 28 through 31, 38 the vith one antimony-be ny-beryllium neutron corage in MPC-68.	oria rod canister any combination damaged fuel total of 68. han Dresden Unit l locations 1, 2, 3, with the balance must be stored in trough 41, and/or cryllium neutron n source material

#### LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-68

Notes:

- 1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.
- 2. Array/class 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time ≥ 18 years, an average burnup ≤ 30,000 MWD/MTU, and a maximum decay heat ≤ 115 Watts.
- 3. Array/class 8x8F fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time ≥ 10 years, an average burnup ≤ 27,500 MWD/MTU, and a maximum decay ≤ 183.5 Watts.
- 4. SS-clad fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time ≥ 10 years, and an average burnup ≤ 22,500 MWD/MTU.

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PARAMETER	VALUE (Notes 1 and 2)				
Fuel Type(s)	Uranium oxide, BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, or 8x8A, with or without Zircaloy channels	Uranium oxide, BWR damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6A, 6x6C, 7x7A, or 8x8A, with or without Zircaloy channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFCs)	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B, with or without Zircaloy channels	Mixed Oxide (MOX) BWR damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris meeting the limits in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B, with or without Zircaloy channels, placed in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFCs))	
Cladding Type	ZR	ZR	ZR	ZR	
Maximum Initial Planar-Average Enrichment per Assembly and Rod Enrichment	As specified in Table 2.1.4 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 2.1.4 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B	As specified in Table 2.1.4 for array/class 6x6B	
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	Cooling time ≥ 18 years and average burnup ≤ 30,000 MWD/MTU.	Cooling time $\geq 18$ years and average burnup $\leq 30,000$ MWD/MTU.	Cooling time ≥ 18 years and average burnup ≤ 30,000 MWD/MTIHM.	Cooling time $\geq$ 18 years and average burnup $\leq$ 30,000 MWD/MTIHM.	
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	$\leq$ 115 Watts	$\leq$ 115 Watts	$\leq$ 115 Watts	$\leq$ 115 Watts	
Fuel Assembly Length	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	≤ 135.0 in. (nominal design)	
Fuel Assembly Width	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	≤ 4.70 in. (nominal design)	
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 400 lbs, (including channels)	≤ 550 lbs, (including channels and DFC)	≤ 400 lbs, (including channels)	$\leq$ 550 lbs, (including channels and DFC)	

# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-68F

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# Table 2.1.19 (cont'd)

# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-68F

PARAMETER	VALUE
Other Limitations	<ul> <li>Quantity is limited to up to four (4) DFCs containing Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay uranium oxide or MOX fuel debris. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with array/class 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A fuel assemblies of the following type, as applicable:</li> </ul>
	- uranium oxide BWR intact fuel assemblies
	- MOX BWR intact fuel assemblies
	- uranium oxide BWR damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs
	- MOX BWR damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs
	- up to one (1) Dresden Unit 1 thoria rod canister meeting the specifications listed in Table 2.1.12.
	• Stainless steel channels are not permitted.
	<ul> <li>Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one antimony-beryllium neutron source are permitted. The antimony-beryllium neutron source material shall be in a water rod location.</li> </ul>

Notes:

- 1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.
- 2. Only fuel from the Dresden Unit 1 and Humboldt Bay plants are permitted for storage in the MPC-68F.

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PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)	
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	Uranium oxide PWR damaged fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class, placed in a Damaged Fuel Container (DFC)
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Maximum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, and Average Burnup per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≥ 8 yrs and ≤ 40,000 MWD/MTU	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≥ 8 yrs and ≤ 40,000 MWD/MTU
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≤710 Watts	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≤710 Watts
Non-fuel hardware post-irradiation Cooling Time and Burnup	As specified in Table 2.1.25	As specified in Table 2.1.25
Fuel Assembly Length	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 1680 lbs (including non-fuel hardware)	$\leq$ 1680 lbs (including DFC and non-fuel hardware)

#### LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-24E

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# Table 2.1.20 (cont'd)

PARAMETER	VALUE
Other Limitations	<ul> <li>Quantity is limited to up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies or up to four (4) damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs may be stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19, and/or 22. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with intact fuel assemblies.</li> <li>Fuel debris and neutron sources are not authorized for storage in the MPC-24E.</li> <li>BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location.</li> <li>CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, and/or APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 9, 10, 15, and/or 16.</li> <li>Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Table 2.1.14.</li> </ul>

#### LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-24E

Notes:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.

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PARAMETER	VALUE	(Note 1)
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide, PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class.	Uranium oxide, PWR damaged fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class.
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Maximum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class
Post-irradiation Cooling Time and Average Burnup per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1
	SS clad: $\geq$ 9 years and $\leq$ 30,000 MWD/MTU or $\geq$ 20 years and $\leq$ 40,000 MWD/MTU	SS clad: $\geq$ 9 years and $\leq$ 30,000 MWD/MTU or $\geq$ 20 years and $\leq$ 40,000 MWD/MTU
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	ZR-clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1	ZR-clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1
	SS-clad: ≤ 500 Watts	SS-clad: ≤ 500 Watts
Non-fuel hardware post-irradiation cooling time and burnup	As specified in Table 2.1.25	As specified in Table 2.1.25
Fuel Assembly Length	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	$\leq$ 1,680 lbs (including non- fuel hardware)	$\leq$ 1,680 lbs (including DFC and non-fuel hardware)

# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-32

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# Table 2.1.21 (cont'd)

#### LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-32

PARAMETER	VALUE
Other Limits	<ul> <li>Quantity is limited to up to 32 PWR intact fuel assemblies and/or up to eight (8) damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs in fuel cell locations 1, 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 29, and/or 32, with the balance intact fuel assemblies up to a total of 32.</li> <li>Fuel debris and neutron sources are not permitted for storage in MPC-32.</li> <li>BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location.</li> <li>CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, and/or APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 13, 14, 19, and/or 20.</li> <li>Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Table 2.1.16.</li> </ul>

# NOTES:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.

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PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)	
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide or MOX BWR	Uranium oxide or MOX BWR
	intact fuel assemblies meeting	damaged fuel assemblies of fuel
	the limits in Table 2.1.4 for the	debris meeting the limits in Table
	applicable array/class, with or	2.1.4 for the applicable
	without channels.	array/class, with or without
Cladding Trans	7D on Stainlass Staal (SS)	ZB or Steinlass Steel (SS)
Cladding Type	ZR of Stalliess Steel (SS)	ZR of Stallies Sieel (SS)
	2 1 4 for the applicable	2 1 4 for the applicable
	2.1.4 for the applicable	2.1.4 for the applicable
Maximum Initial Dianar Average	As especified in Table 2.1.4 for	Dianar Average:
Enrichment per Assembly and	the applicable fuel assembly	Fialial Average.
Rod Enrichment	array/class	< 2.7 wt% <sup>235</sup> U for array/classes
	array, crass	6x6A 6x6B 6x6C 7x7A and
		8x8A:
		$< 4.0 \text{ wt}\%^{235}$ U for all other
		array/classes
		Rod:
		As specified in Table 2.1.4
Post-irradiation cooling time and	ZR clad: As specified in	ZR clad: As specified in
average burnup per Assembly	Section 2.1.9.1; except as	Section 2.1.9.1; except as
	provided in Notes 2 and 3.	provided in Notes 2 and 3.
	SS alade Nata 4	SS aladi Nata 4
Decay Heat Per Eyel Storage	7D alad: As specified in Section	7P olad: As specified in Section
Location	2.1.0.1: except as provided in	2 1 0 1; except as provided in
Location	Notes 2 and 3	Notes 2 and 3
	110103 2 4110 5.	110103 2 und 5.
	SS clad: ≤ 95 Watts	SS clad: ≤ 95 Watts
Fuel Assembly Length	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C,	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C,
	$7x7A$ , and $8x8A$ : $\leq 135.0$ in.	$7x7A$ , and $8x8A$ : $\leq 135.0$ in.
	(nominal design)	(nominal design)
	All Other array/classes:	All Other array/classes:
	$\leq$ 176.5 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 176.5 in. (nominal design)

# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-68FF

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.

# Table 2.1.22 (cont'd)

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)	
Fuel Assembly Width	Array/classes $6x6A$ , $6x6B$ , $6x6C$ , $7x7A$ , and $8x8A$ : $\leq 4.7$ in. (nominal design)All Other array/classes: $\leq 5.85$ in. (nominal design)	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A: ≤ 4.7 in. (nominal design) All Other array/classes: ≤ 5.85 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A: ≤ 550 lbs. (including channels) All Other array/classes:	Array/classes 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A: ≤ 550 lbs. (including channels and DFC) All Other array/classes:
	$\leq$ 700 lbs. (including channels)	$\leq$ 700 lbs. (including channels and DFC)
Other Limitations	<ul> <li>Quantity is limited to up to one (1) Up to eight (8) Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris in DFCs, and any combination of Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs and intact fuel assemblies up to a total of 68.</li> <li>Up to 16 damaged fuel assemblies and/or up to eight (8) fuel assemblies classified as fuel debris from plants other than Dresden Unit 1 or Humboldt Bay may be stored in DFCs in MPC-68FF. DFCs shall be located only in fuel cell locations 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 16, 25, 34, 35, 44, 53, 60, 61, 66, 67, and/or 68, with the balance comprised of intact fuel assemblies meeting the above specifications, up to a total of 68.</li> <li>SS-clad fuel assemblies with stainless steel channels must be stored in fuel cell locations 19 through 22, 28 through 31, 38 through 41, and/or 47 through 50.</li> <li>Dresden Unit 1 fuel assemblies with one antimony-beryllium neutron source are permitted. The antimony-beryllium neutron source material shall be in a</li> </ul>	

# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-68FF

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.

- Array/class 6x6A, 6x6B, 6x6C, 7x7A, and 8x8A fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time  $\geq$  18 years, 2. an average burnup  $\leq$  30,000 MWD/MTU, and a maximum decay heat  $\leq$  115 Watts.
- Array/class 8x8F fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time  $\geq$  10 years, an average burnup  $\leq$  27,500 3. MWD/MTU, and a maximum decay  $\leq$  183.5 Watts.
- 4. SS-clad fuel assemblies shall have a cooling time  $\geq 10$  years, and an average burnup  $\leq 22,500$ MWD/MTU.

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# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-24EF

PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)	
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	Uranium oxide PWR damaged fuel assemblies and/or fuel debris meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class, placed in a Damaged Fuel Container (DFC)
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) assemblies as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Maximum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class	As specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable array/class
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, and Average Burnup per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: $\geq 8$ yrs and $\leq 40,000$ MWD/MTU	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: $\geq 8$ yrs and $\leq 40,000$ MWD/MTU
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≤710 Watts	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1 SS clad: ≤710 Watts
Non-fuel hardware post-irradiation Cooling Time and Burnup	As specified in Table 2.1.25	As specified in Table 2.1.25
Fuel Assembly Length	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	≤ 1680 lbs (including non-fuel hardware)	$\leq$ 1680 lbs (including DFC and non-fuel hardware)

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# Table 2.1.23 (cont'd)

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# LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-24EF

PARAMETER	VALUE
Other Limitations	<ul> <li>Quantity per MPC: up to 24 PWR intact fuel assemblies or up to four (4) damaged fuel assemblies and/or fuel classified as fuel debris in DFCs may be stored in fuel storage locations 3, 6, 19, and/or 22. The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with intact fuel assemblies.</li> <li>Neutron sources are not authorized for storage in the MPC-24EF.</li> <li>BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location.</li> <li>CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, and/or APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 9, 10, 15, and/or 16.</li> <li>Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Neuron sources are not authorized for storage in MPC-24EF.</li> <li>BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement gui tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibratic suppressor inserts may be stored with fuel assem in any fuel cell location.</li> <li>CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, and/or APSRs may be stowith fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 9, 10, and/or 16.</li> <li>Soluble boron requirements during wet loading a unloading are specified in Table 2.1.14.</li> </ul>

Notes:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.

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PARAMETER	VALUE (Note 1)	
Fuel Type	Uranium oxide, PWR intact fuel assemblies meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class	Uranium oxide, PWR damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris in DFCs meeting the limits in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class
Cladding Type	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class	ZR or Stainless Steel (SS) as specified in Table 2.1.3 for the applicable fuel assembly array/class
Maximum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	As specified in Table 2.1.3	As specified in Table 2.1.3
Post-irradiation Cooling Time, Average Burnup, and Minimum Initial Enrichment per Assembly	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1
	SS clad: $\geq$ 9 years and $\leq$ 30,000 MWD/MTU or $\geq$ 20 years and $\leq$ 40,000MWD/MTU	SS clad: $\geq$ 9 years and $\leq$ 30,000 MWD/MTU or $\geq$ 20 years and $\leq$ 40,000MWD/MTU
Decay Heat Per Fuel Storage Location	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1	ZR clad: As specified in Section 2.1.9.1
	SS clad: ≤ 500 Watts	SS clad: $\leq$ 500 Watts
Non-fuel hardware post- irradiation Cooling Time and Burnup	As specified in Table 2.1.25	As specified in Table 2.1.25
Fuel Assembly Length	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 176.8 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Width	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)	$\leq$ 8.54 in. (nominal design)
Fuel Assembly Weight	$\leq$ 1,680 lbs (including non-fuel hardware)	$\leq$ 1,680 lbs (including DFC and non-fuel hardware)

#### LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-32F

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL
PARAMETER	VALUE
Other Limitations	<ul> <li>Quantity is limited to up to 32 PWR intact fuel assemblies and/or up to eight (8) damaged fuel assemblies in DFCs in fuel cell locations 1, 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 29, and/or 32, with the balance intact fuel assemblies up to a total of 32.</li> <li>Neutron sources are not permitted for storage in MPC-32.</li> <li>BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, and/or vibration suppressor inserts may be stored with fuel assemblies in any fuel cell location.</li> <li>CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, and/or APSRs may be stored with fuel assemblies in fuel cell locations 13, 14, 19, and/or 20.</li> <li>Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Trable 2.1 16</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Soluble boron requirements during wet loading and unloading are specified in Table 2.1.16.</li> </ul>

#### LIMITS FOR MATERIAL TO BE STORED IN MPC-32F

NOTES:

1. A fuel assembly must meet the requirements of any one column and the other limitations to be authorized for storage.

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Post-irradiation Cooling Time (yrs)	Inserts (Note 4) Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)	Guide Tube Hardware (Note 5) Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)	Control Component (Note 6) Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)	APSR Maximum Burnup (MWD/MTU)
<u>≥</u> 3	<u>≤</u> 24,635	N/A (Note 7)	N/A	N/A
<u>≥</u> 4	≤ 30,000	<u>≤</u> 20,000	N/A	N/A
≥5	<u>≤</u> 36,748	≤ 25,000	≤ 630,000	<u>≤</u> 45,000
<u>≥</u> 6	<u>≤</u> 44,102	≤ 30,000	-	≤ 54,500
<u>≥</u> 7	≤ 52,900	≤ 40,000	-	≤ 68,000
<u>≥</u> 8	≤ 60,000	≤ 45,000	-	≤ 83,000
<u>≥</u> 9	-	≤ 50,000	-	≤111,000
<u>≥</u> 10	-	<u>≤</u> 60,000	-	≤ 180,000
≥11	-	≤ 75,000	-	≤ 630,000
≥ 12	-	<u>≤</u> 90,000	-	-
<u>≥</u> 13	-	≤ 180,000	-	-
<u>≥</u> 14	-	<u>≤</u> 630,000	-	-

#### NON-FUEL HARDWARE BURNUP AND COOLING TIME LIMITS (Notes 1, 2, and 3)

#### NOTES:

HI-STORM FSAR

- 1. Burnups for non-fuel hardware are to be determined based on the burnup and uranium mass of the fuel assemblies in which the component was inserted during reactor operation.
- 2. Linear interpolation between points is permitted, except that TPD and APSR burnups > 180,000 MWD/MTU and  $\leq$  630,000 MWD/MTU must be cooled  $\geq$  14 years and  $\geq$  11 years, respectively.
- 3. Applicable to uniform loading and regionalized loading.
- 4. Includes Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs), Wet Annular Burnable Absorbers (WABAs), and vibration suppressor inserts.
- 5. Includes Thimble Plug Devices (TPDs), water displacement guide tube plugs, and orifice rod assemblies.
- 6. Includes Control Rod Assemblies (CRAs), Control Element Assemblies (CEAs), and Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs).
- 7. N/A means not authorized for loading at this cooling time.

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#### MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DECAY HEAT PER FUEL STORAGE LOCATION (UNIFORM LOADING, ZR-CLAD)

MPC Model	Decay Heat per Fuel Assembly (kW)
Intact F	Fuel Assemblies
MPC-24	≤ 1.157
MPC-24E/24EF	≤ 1.173
MPC-32/32F	<u>≤</u> 0.898
MPC-68/68FF	<u>≤ 0.414</u>
Damaged Fuel As	ssemblies and Fuel Debris
MPC-24	≤ 1.099
MPC-24E/24EF	≤ 1.114
MPC-32/32F	<u>≤</u> 0.718
MPC-68/68FF	≤ 0.393

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MPC Model	Number of Fuel Storage Locations in Inner and Outer Regions	Inner Region Maximum Decay Heat per Assembly (kW)	Outer Region Maximum Decay Heat per Assembly (kW)
MPC-24	4 and 20	1.470	0.900
MPC-24E/24EF	4 and 20	1.540	0.900
MPC-32/32F	12 and 20	1.131	0.600
MPC-68/68FF	32 and 36	0.500	0.275

#### MPC FUEL STORAGE REGIONS AND MAXIMUM DECAY HEAT

Note: These limits apply to intact fuel assemblies, damaged fuel assemblies and fuel debris.

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling			Arra	y/Class 14:	x14A		
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G
≥3	20277.1	303.592	-68.329	-139.41	2993.67	-498.159	-615.411
≥4	35560.1	-6034.67	985.415	-132.734	3578.92	-723.721	-609.84
≥5	48917.9	-14499.5	2976.09	-150.707	4072.55	-892.691	-54.8362
<u>≥</u> 6	59110.3	-22507	5255.61	-177.017	4517.03	-1024.01	613.36
≥7	67595.6	-30158.1	7746.6	-200.128	4898.71	-1123.21	716.004
≥8	74424.9	-36871.1	10169.4	-218.676	5203.64	-1190.24	741.163
≥ 9	81405.8	-44093.1	12910.8	-227.916	5405.34	-1223.27	250.224
<u>≥</u> 10	86184.3	-49211.7	15063.4	-237.641	5607.96	-1266.21	134.435
≥11	92024.9	-55666.8	17779.6	-240.973	5732.25	-1282.12	-401.456
≥ 12	94775.8	-58559.7	19249.9	-246.369	5896.27	-1345.42	-295.435
≥13	100163	-64813.8	22045.1	-242.572	5861.86	-1261.66	-842.159
<u>≥</u> 14	103971	-69171	24207	-242.651	5933.96	-1277.48	-1108.99
≥15	108919	-75171.1	27152.4	-243.154	6000.2	-1301.19	-1620.63
<u>≥</u> 16	110622	-76715.2	28210.2	-240.235	6028.33	-1307.74	-1425.5
≥17	115582	-82929.7	31411.9	-235.234	5982.3	-1244.11	-1948.05
<u>≥ 18</u>	119195	-87323.5	33881.4	-233.28	6002.43	-1245.95	-2199.41
≥ 19	121882	-90270.6	35713.7	-231.873	6044.42	-1284.55	-2264.05
≥20	124649	-93573.5	37853.1	-230.22	6075.82	-1306.57	-2319.63

#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling			Arra	y/Class 14	x14B		
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G
≥ 3	18937.9	70.2997	-28.6224	-130.732	2572.36	-383.393	-858.17
<u>≥</u> 4	32058.7	-4960.63	745.224	-125.978	3048.98	-551.656	-549.108
≥5	42626.3	-10804.1	1965.09	-139.722	3433.49	-676.643	321.88
<u>≥</u> 6	51209.6	-16782.3	3490.45	-158.929	3751.01	-761.524	847.282
<u>≥</u> 7	57829.9	-21982	5009.12	-180.026	4066.65	-846.272	1200.45
<u>≥</u> 8	62758	-26055.3	6330.88	-196.804	4340.18	-928.336	1413.17
<u>≥ 9</u>	68161.4	-30827.6	7943.87	-204.454	4500.52	-966.347	1084.69
≥10	71996.8	-34224.3	9197.25	-210.433	4638.94	-1001.83	1016.38
≥11	75567.3	-37486.1	10466.9	-214.95	4759.55	-1040.85	848.169
≥12	79296.7	-40900.3	11799.6	-212.898	4794.13	-1040.51	576.242
<u>≥</u> 13	82257.3	-43594	12935	-212.8	4845.81	-1056.01	410.807
≥14	83941.2	-44915.2	13641	-215.389	4953.19	-1121.71	552.724
≥15	87228.5	-48130	15056.9	-212.545	4951.12	-1112.5	260.194
<u>≥</u> 16	90321.7	-50918.3	16285.5	-206.094	4923.36	-1106.35	-38.7487
≥17	92836.2	-53314.5	17481.7	-203.139	4924.61	-1109.32	-159.673
<u>≥</u> 18	93872.8	-53721.4	17865.1	-202.573	4956.21	-1136.9	30.0594
<u>≥</u> 19	96361.6	-56019.1	19075.9	-199.068	4954.59	-1156.07	-125.917
≥20	98647.5	-57795.1	19961.8	-191.502	4869.59	-1108.74	-217.603

# PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling	Array/Class 14x14C						
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G
≥3	19176.9	192.012	-66.7595	-138.112	2666.73	-407.664	-1372.41
<u>≥</u> 4	32040.3	-4731.4	651.014	-124.944	3012.63	-530.456	-890.059
<u>≥</u> 5	43276.7	-11292.8	2009.76	-142.172	3313.91	-594.917	-200.195
≥6	51315.5	-16920.5	3414.76	-164.287	3610.77	-652.118	463.041
<u>≥</u> 7	57594.7	-21897.6	4848.49	-189.606	3940.67	-729.367	781.46
≥8	63252.3	-26562.8	6273.01	-199.974	4088.41	-732.054	693.879
≥9	67657.5	-30350.9	7533.4	-211.77	4283.39	-772.916	588.456
≥ 10	71834.4	-34113.7	8857.32	-216.408	4383.45	-774.982	380.243
≥11	75464.1	-37382.1	10063	-218.813	4460.69	-776.665	160.668
≥ 12	77811.1	-39425.1	10934.3	-225.193	4604.68	-833.459	182.463
≥13	81438.3	-42785.4	12239.9	-220.943	4597.28	-803.32	-191.636
<u>≥</u> 14	84222.1	-45291.6	13287.9	-218.366	4608.13	-791.655	-354.59
<u>≥</u> 15	86700.1	-47582.6	14331.2	-218.206	4655.34	-807.366	-487.316
<u>≥</u> 16	88104.7	-48601.1	14927.9	-219.498	4729.97	-849.446	-373.196
≥17	91103.3	-51332.5	16129	-212.138	4679.91	-822.896	-654.296
<u>≥ 18</u>	93850.4	-53915.8	17336.9	-207.666	4652.65	-799.697	-866.307
≥ 19	96192.9	-55955.8	18359.3	-203.462	4642.65	-800.315	-1007.75
≥20	97790.4	-57058.1	19027.7	-200.963	4635.88	-799.721	-951.122

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#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

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Cooling			Array/	Class 15x1	5A/B/C		
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	Е	F	G
<u>≥ 3</u>	15789.2	119.829	-21.8071	-127.422	2152.53	-267.717	-580.768
<u>≥</u> 4	26803.8	-3312.93	415.027	-116.279	2550.15	-386.33	-367.168
<u>≥</u> 5	36403.6	-7831.93	1219.66	-126.065	2858.32	-471.785	326.863
<u>≥</u> 6	44046.1	-12375.9	2213.52	-145.727	3153.45	-539.715	851.971
<u>≥</u> 7	49753.5	-16172.6	3163.61	-166.946	3428.38	-603.598	1186.31
<u>≥ 8</u>	55095.4	-20182.5	4287.03	-183.047	3650.42	-652.92	1052.4
<u>≥ 9</u>	58974.4	-23071.6	5156.53	-191.718	3805.41	-687.18	1025
<u>≥</u> 10	62591.8	-25800.8	5995.95	-195.105	3884.14	-690.659	868.556
≥11	65133.1	-27747.4	6689	-203.095	4036.91	-744.034	894.607
<u>≥</u> 12	68448.4	-30456	7624.9	-202.201	4083.52	-753.391	577.914
≥13	71084.4	-32536.4	8381.78	-201.624	4117.93	-757.16	379.105
<u>≥</u> 14	73459.5	-34352.3	9068.86	-197.988	4113.16	-747.015	266.536
≥15	75950.7	-36469.4	9920.52	-199.791	4184.91	-779.222	57.9429
≥16	76929.1	-36845.6	10171.3	-197.88	4206.24	-794.541	256.099
≥17	79730	-39134.8	11069.4	-190.865	4160.42	-773.448	-42.6853
≥18	81649.2	-40583	11736.1	-187.604	4163.36	-785.838	-113.614
<u>≥ 19</u>	83459	-41771.8	12265.9	-181.461	4107.51	-758.496	-193.442
≥20	86165.4	-44208.8	13361.2	-178.89	4107.62	-768.671	-479.778

#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling		Array/Class 15x15D/E/F/H						
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	Е	F	G	
≥3	15192.5	50.5722	-12.3042	-126.906	2009.71	-235.879	-561.574	
≥4	25782.5	-3096.5	369.096	-113.289	2357.75	-334.695	-254.964	
≥5	35026.5	-7299.87	1091.93	-124.619	2664	-414.527	470.916	
≥6	42234.9	-11438.4	1967.63	-145.948	2945.81	-474.981	1016.84	
<u>≥</u> 7	47818.4	-15047	2839.22	-167.273	3208.95	-531.296	1321.12	
<u>≥</u> 8	52730.7	-18387.2	3702.43	-175.057	3335.58	-543.232	1223.61	
≥9	56254.6	-20999.9	4485.93	-190.489	3547.98	-600.64	1261.55	
≥ 10	59874.6	-23706.5	5303.88	-193.807	3633.01	-611.892	1028.63	
≥11	62811	-25848.4	5979.64	-194.997	3694.14	-618.968	862.738	
≥ 12	65557.6	-27952.4	6686.74	-198.224	3767.28	-635.126	645.139	
≥ 13	67379.4	-29239.2	7197.49	-200.164	3858.53	-677.958	652.601	
<u>≥</u> 14	69599.2	-30823.8	7768.51	-196.788	3868.2	-679.88	504.443	
≥15	71806.7	-32425	8360.38	-191.935	3851.65	-669.917	321.146	
<u>≥</u> 16	73662.6	-33703.5	8870.78	-187.366	3831.59	-658.419	232.335	
≥17	76219.8	-35898.1	9754.72	-189.111	3892.07	-694.244	-46.924	
<u>≥</u> 18	76594.4	-35518.2	9719.78	-185.11	3897.04	-712.82	236.047	
<u>≥</u> 19	78592.7	-36920.8	10316.5	-179.54	3865.84	-709.551	82.478	
≥20	80770.5	-38599.9	11051.3	-175.106	3858.67	-723.211	-116.014	

#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling		Array/Class 16x16A							
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	E	F	G		
≥3	17038.2	158.445	-37.6008	-136.707	2368.1	-321.58	-700.033		
≥4	29166.3	-3919.95	508.439	-125.131	2782.53	-455.722	-344.199		
≥5	40285	-9762.36	1629.72	-139.652	3111.83	-539.804	139.67		
≥6	48335.7	-15002.6	2864.09	-164.702	3444.97	-614.756	851.706		
≥7	55274.9	-20190	4258.03	-185.909	3728.11	-670.841	920.035		
≥8	60646.6	-24402.4	5483.54	-199.014	3903.29	-682.26	944.913		
≥9	64663.2	-27753.1	6588.21	-215.318	4145.34	-746.822	967.914		
≥ 10	69306.9	-31739.1	7892.13	-218.898	4237.04	-746.815	589.277		
≥11	72725.8	-34676.6	8942.26	-220.836	4312.93	-750.85	407.133		
≥ 12	76573.8	-38238.7	10248.1	-224.934	4395.85	-757.914	23.7549		
<u>≥</u> 13	78569	-39794.3	10914.9	-224.584	4457	-776.876	69.428		
<u>≥</u> 14	81559.4	-42453.6	11969.6	-222.704	4485.28	-778.427	-203.031		
<u>≥</u> 15	84108.6	-44680.4	12897.8	-218.387	4460	-746.756	-329.078		
<u>≥</u> 16	86512.2	-46766.8	13822.8	-216.278	4487.79	-759.882	-479.729		
<u>≥</u> 17	87526.7	-47326.2	14221	-218.894	4567.68	-805.659	-273.692		
<u>&gt;18</u>	90340.3	-49888.6	15349.8	-212.139	4506.29	-762.236	-513.316		
<u>≥ 19</u>	93218.2	-52436.7	16482.4	-207.653	4504.12	-776.489	-837.1		
≥20	95533.9	-54474.1	17484.2	-203.094	4476.21	-760.482	-955.662		

#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

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Cooling		Array/Class 17x17A							
Time (years)	Α	B	С	D	E	F	G		
≥3	16784.4	3.90244	-10.476	-128.835	2256.98	-287.108	-263.081		
≥4	28859	-3824.72	491.016	-120.108	2737.65	-432.361	-113.457		
≥5	40315.9	-9724	1622.89	-140.459	3170.28	-547.749	425.136		
≥ 6	49378.5	-15653.1	3029.25	-164.712	3532.55	-628.93	842.73		
≥7	56759.5	-21320.4	4598.78	-190.58	3873.21	-698.143	975.46		
<u>≥</u> 8	63153.4	-26463.8	6102.47	-201.262	4021.84	-685.431	848.497		
≥9	67874.9	-30519.2	7442.84	-218.184	4287.23	-754.597	723.305		
≥10	72676.8	-34855.2	8928.27	-222.423	4382.07	-741.243	387.877		
≥11	75623	-37457.1	9927.65	-232.962	4564.55	-792.051	388.402		
≥ 12	80141.8	-41736.5	11509.8	-232.944	4624.72	-787.134	-164.727		
≥13	83587.5	-45016.4	12800.9	-230.643	4623.2	-745.177	-428.635		
<u>≥</u> 14	86311.3	-47443.4	13815.2	-228.162	4638.89	-729.425	-561.758		
≥15	87839.2	-48704.1	14500.3	-231.979	4747.67	-775.801	-441.959		
<u>≥</u> 16	91190.5	-51877.4	15813.2	-225.768	4692.45	-719.311	-756.537		
· ≥17	94512	-55201.2	17306.1	-224.328	4740.86	-747.11	-1129.15		
<u>≥</u> 18	96959	-57459.9	18403.8	-220.038	4721.02	-726.928	-1272.47		
<u>≥</u> 19	99061.1	-59172.1	19253.1	-214.045	4663.37	-679.362	-1309.88		
<u>≥</u> 20	100305	-59997.5	19841.1	-216.112	4721.71	-705.463	-1148.45		

#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

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Cooling	Array/Class 17x17B/C						
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G
≥3	15526.8	18.0364	-9.36581	-128.415	2050.81	-243.915	-426.07
<u>≥</u> 4	26595.4	-3345.47	409.264	-115.394	2429.48	-350.883	-243.477
<u>≥</u> 5	36190.4	-7783.2	1186.37	-130.008	2769.53	-438.716	519.95
<u>≥</u> 6	44159	-12517.5	2209.54	-150.234	3042.25	-489.858	924.151
<u>≥</u> 7	50399.6	-16780.6	3277.26	-173.223	3336.58	-555.743	1129.66
<u>≥</u> 8	55453.9	-20420	4259.68	-189.355	3531.65	-581.917	1105.62
≥9	59469.3	-23459.8	5176.62	-199.63	3709.99	-626.667	1028.74
<u>≥</u> 10	63200.5	-26319.6	6047.8	-203.233	3783.02	-619.949	805.311
≥11	65636.3	-28258.3	6757.23	-214.247	3972.8	-688.56	843.457
≥12	68989.7	-30904.4	7626.53	-212.539	3995.62	-678.037	495.032
<u>≥</u> 13	71616.6	-32962.2	8360.45	-210.386	4009.11	-666.542	317.009
≥14	73923.9	-34748	9037.75	-207.668	4020.13	-662.692	183.086
<u>≥</u> 15	76131.8	-36422.3	9692.32	-203.428	4014.55	-655.981	47.5234
<u>≥</u> 16	77376.5	-37224.7	10111.4	-207.581	4110.76	-703.37	161.128
<u>≥</u> 17	80294.9	-39675.9	11065.9	-201.194	4079.24	-691.636	-173.782
<u>≥</u> 18	82219.8	-41064.8	11672.1	-195.431	4043.83	-675.432	-286.059
≥19	84168.9	-42503.6	12309.4	-190.602	4008.19	-656.192	-372.411
≥20	86074.2	-43854.4	12935.9	-185.767	3985.57	-656.72	-475.953

#### PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Rev. 3

Cooling	Array/Class 7x7B							
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G	
<u>≥</u> 3	26409.1	28347.5	-16858	-147.076	5636.32	-1606.75	1177.88	
≥4	61967.8	-6618.31	-4131.96	-113.949	6122.77	-2042.85	-96.7439	
≥ 5	91601.1	-49298.3	17826.5	-132.045	6823.14	-2418.49	-185.189	
<u>≥</u> 6	111369	-80890.1	35713.8	-150.262	7288.51	-2471.1	86.6363	
<u>≥</u> 7	126904	-108669	53338.1	-167.764	7650.57	-2340.78	150.403	
≥8	139181	-132294	69852.5	-187.317	8098.66	-2336.13	97.5285	
<u>≥9</u>	150334	-154490	86148.1	-193.899	8232.84	-2040.37	-123.029	
≥ 10	159897	-173614	100819	-194.156	8254.99	-1708.32	-373.605	
≥11	166931	-186860	111502	-193.776	8251.55	-1393.91	-543.677	
≥12	173691	-201687	125166	-202.578	8626.84	-1642.3	-650.814	
≥13	180312	-215406	137518	-201.041	8642.19	-1469.45	-810.024	
≥14	185927	-227005	148721	-197.938	8607.6	-1225.95	-892.876	
≥15	191151	-236120	156781	-191.625	8451.86	-846.27	-1019.4	
≥16	195761	-244598	165372	-187.043	8359.19	-572.561	-1068.19	
≥17	200791	-256573	179816	-197.26	8914.28	-1393.37	-1218.63	
<u>≥18</u>	206068	-266136	188841	-187.191	8569.56	-730.898	-1363.79	
≥ 19	210187	-273609	197794	-182.151	8488.23	-584.727	-1335.59	
<u>≥</u> 20	213731	-278120	203074	-175.864	8395.63	-457.304	-1364.38	

# BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling	Array/Class 8x8B							
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	E	F	G	
≥3	28219.6	28963.7	-17616.2	-147.68	5887.41	-1730.96	1048.21	
<u>≥</u> 4	66061.8	-10742.4	-1961.82	-123.066	6565.54	-2356.05	-298.005	
≥5	95790.7	-53401.7	19836.7	-134.584	7145.41	-2637.09	-298.858	
<u>≥6</u>	117477	-90055.9	41383.9	-154.758	7613.43	-2612.69	-64.9921	
≥7	134090	-120643	60983	-168.675	7809	-2183.3	-40.8885	
<u>≥</u> 8	148186	-149181	81418.7	-185.726	8190.07	-2040.31	-260.773	
≥9	159082	-172081	99175.2	-197.185	8450.86	-1792.04	-381.705	
<u>≥10</u>	168816	-191389	113810	-195.613	8359.87	-1244.22	-613.594	
≥11	177221	-210599	131099	-208.3	8810	-1466.49	-819.773	
≥ 12	183929	-224384	143405	-207.497	8841.33	-1227.71	-929.708	
≥13	191093	-240384	158327	-204.95	8760.17	-811.708	-1154.76	
<u>≥14</u>	196787	-252211	169664	-204.574	8810.95	-610.928	-1208.97	
≥15	203345	-267656	186057	-208.962	9078.41	-828.954	-1383.76	
<u>≥</u> 16	207973	-276838	196071	-204.592	9024.17	-640.808	-1436.43	
<u>≥</u> 17	213891	-290411	211145	-202.169	9024.19	-482.1	-1595.28	
<u>≥18</u>	217483	-294066	214600	-194.243	8859.35	-244.684	-1529.61	
≥ 19	220504	-297897	219704	-190.161	8794.97	-10.9863	-1433.86	
≥20	227821	-318395	245322	-194.682	9060.96	-350.308	-1741.16	

# BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling		Array/Class 8x8C/D/E							
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G		
≥3	28592.7	28691.5	-17773.6	-149.418	5969.45	-1746.07	1063.62		
<u>≥</u> 4	66720.8	-12115.7	-1154	-128.444	6787.16	-2529.99	-302.155		
≥5	96929.1	-55827.5	21140.3	-136.228	7259.19	-2685.06	-334.328		
≥6	118190	-92000.2	42602.5	-162.204	7907.46	-2853.42	-47.5465		
≥7	135120	-123437	62827.1	-172.397	8059.72	-2385.81	-75.0053		
≥8	149162	-152986	84543.1	-195.458	8559.11	-2306.54	-183.595		
≥9	161041	-177511	103020	-200.087	8632.84	-1864.4	-433.081		
≥ 10	171754	-201468	122929	-209.799	8952.06	-1802.86	-755.742		
≥11	179364	-217723	137000	-215.803	9142.37	-1664.82	-847.268		
<u>≥</u> 12	186090	-232150	150255	-216.033	9218.36	-1441.92	-975.817		
≥13	193571	-249160	165997	-213.204	9146.99	-1011.13	-1119.47		
<u>≥</u> 14	200034	-263671	180359	-210.559	9107.54	-694.626	-1312.55		
<u>≥</u> 15	205581	-275904	193585	-216.242	9446.57	-1040.65	-1428.13		
<u>≥</u> 16	212015	-290101	207594	-210.036	9212.93	-428.321	-1590.7		
<u>≥</u> 17	216775	-299399	218278	-204.611	9187.86	-398.353	-1657.6		
<u>&gt;18</u>	220653	-306719	227133	-202.498	9186.34	-181.672	-1611.86		
<u>≥ 19</u>	224859	-314004	235956	-193.902	8990.14	145.151	-1604.71		
≥20	228541	-320787	245449	-200.727	9310.87	-230.252	-1570.18		

# BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling		Array/Class 9x9A							
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G		
≥3	30538.7	28463.2	-18105.5	-150.039	6226.92	-1876.69	1034.06		
≥4	71040.1	-16692.2	1164.15	-128.241	7105.27	-2728.58	-414.09		
≥ 5	100888	-60277.7	24150.1	-142.541	7896.11	-3272.86	-232.197		
<u>≥</u> 6	124846	-102954	50350.8	-161.849	8350.16	-3163.44	-91.1396		
<u>&gt;</u> 7	143516	-140615	76456.5	-185.538	8833.04	-2949.38	-104.802		
≥8	158218	-171718	99788.2	-196.315	9048.88	-2529.26	-259.929		
≥9	172226	-204312	126620	-214.214	9511.56	-2459.19	-624.954		
≥10	182700	-227938	146736	-215.793	9555.41	-1959.92	-830.943		
≥11	190734	-246174	163557	-218.071	9649.43	-1647.5	-935.021		
≥12	199997	-269577	186406	-223.975	9884.92	-1534.34	-1235.27		
≥13	207414	-287446	204723	-228.808	10131.7	-1614.49	-1358.61		
<u>≥</u> 14	215263	-306131	223440	-220.919	9928.27	-988.276	-1638.05		
<u>≥</u> 15	221920	-321612	239503	-217.949	9839.02	-554.709	-1784.04		
<u>≥16</u>	226532	-331778	252234	-216.189	9893.43	-442.149	-1754.72		
≥17	232959	-348593	272609	-219.907	10126.3	-663.84	-1915.3		
≥18	240810	-369085	296809	-219.729	10294.6	-859.302	-2218.87		
≥ 19	244637	-375057	304456	-210.997	10077.8	-425.446	-2127.83		
≥20	248112	-379262	309391	-204.191	9863.67	100.27	-2059.39		

### BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

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Cooling		Array/Class 9x9B								
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	Е	F	G			
≥3	30613.2	28985.3	-18371	-151.117	6321.55	-1881.28	988.92			
<u>≥</u> 4	71346.6	-15922.9	631.132	-128.876	7232.47	-2810.64	-471.737			
≥ 5	102131	-60654.1	23762.7	-140.748	7881.6	-3156.38	-417.979			
≥6	127187	-105842	51525.2	-162.228	8307.4	-2913.08	-342.13			
≥7	146853	-145834	79146.5	-185.192	8718.74	-2529.57	-484.885			
≥8	162013	-178244	103205	-197.825	8896.39	-1921.58	-584.013			
<u>≥ 9</u>	176764	-212856	131577	-215.41	9328.18	-1737.12	-1041.11			
≥10	186900	-235819	151238	-218.98	9388.08	-1179.87	-1202.83			
<u>≥</u> 11	196178	-257688	171031	-220.323	9408.47	-638.53	-1385.16			
≥ 12	205366	-280266	192775	-223.715	9592.12	-472.261	-1661.6			
≥ 13	215012	-306103	218866	-231.821	9853.37	-361.449	-1985.56			
≥ 14	222368	-324558	238655	-228.062	9834.57	3.47358	-2178.84			
<u>≥</u> 15	226705	-332738	247316	-224.659	9696.59	632.172	-2090.75			
<u>≥16</u>	233846	-349835	265676	-221.533	9649.93	913.747	-2243.34			
≥17	243979	-379622	300077	-222.351	9792.17	1011.04	-2753.36			
<u>&gt; 18</u>	247774	-386203	308873	-220.306	9791.37	1164.58	-2612.25			
<u>≥19</u>	254041	-401906	327901	-213.96	9645.47	1664.94	-2786.2			
≥20	256003	-402034	330566	-215.242	9850.42	1359.46	-2550.06			

# BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling		Array/Class 9x9C/D							
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	Е	F	G		
≥3	30051.6	29548.7	-18614.2	-148.276	6148.44	-1810.34	1006		
≥4	70472.7	-14696.6	-233.567	-127.728	7008.69	-2634.22	-444.373		
≥5	101298	-59638.9	23065.2	-138.523	7627.57	-2958.03	-377.965		
≥6	125546	-102740	49217.4	-160.811	8096.34	-2798.88	-259.767		
≥7	143887	-139261	74100.4	-184.302	8550.86	-2517.19	-275.151		
≥8	159633	-172741	98641.4	-194.351	8636.89	-1838.81	-486.731		
≥9	173517	-204709	124803	-212.604	9151.98	-1853.27	-887.137		
≥ 10	182895	-225481	142362	-218.251	9262.59	-1408.25	-978.356		
≥11	192530	-247839	162173	-217.381	9213.58	-818.676	-1222.12		
≥12	201127	-268201	181030	-215.552	9147.44	-232.221	-1481.55		
≥13	209538	-289761	203291	-225.092	9588.12	-574.227	-1749.35		
≥ 14	216798	-306958	220468	-222.578	9518.22	-69.9307	-1919.71		
<u>≥</u> 15	223515	-323254	237933	-217.398	9366.52	475.506	-2012.93		
<u>≥</u> 16	228796	-334529	250541	-215.004	9369.33	662.325	-2122.75		
<u>≥17</u>	237256	-356311	273419	-206.483	9029.55	1551.3	-2367.96		
≥18	242778	-369493	290354	-215.557	9600.71	659.297	-2589.32		
≥ 19	246704	-377971	302630	-210.768	9509.41	1025.34	-2476.06		
≥20	249944	-382059	308281	-205.495	9362.63	1389.71	-2350.49		

### BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Cooling		Array/Class 9x9E/F							
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	E	F	G		
≥3	30284.3	26949.5	-16926.4	-147.914	6017.02	-1854.81	1026.15		
≥4	69727.4	-17117.2	1982.33	-127.983	6874.68	-2673.01	-359.962		
<u>≥5</u>	98438.9	-58492	23382.2	-138.712	7513.55	-3038.23	-112.641		
≥6	119765	-95024.1	45261	-159.669	8074.25	-3129.49	221.182		
≥7	136740	-128219	67940.1	-182.439	8595.68	-3098.17	315.544		
<u>≥</u> 8	150745	-156607	88691.5	-193.941	8908.73	-2947.64	142.072		
<u>≥9</u>	162915	-182667	109134	-198.37	8999.11	-2531	-93.4908		
≥10	174000	-208668	131543	-210.777	9365.52	-2511.74	-445.876		
≥11	181524	-224252	145280	-212.407	9489.67	-2387.49	-544.123		
<u>≥12</u>	188946	-240952	160787	-210.65	9478.1	-2029.94	-652.339		
≥13	193762	-250900	171363	-215.798	9742.31	-2179.24	-608.636		
<u>≥</u> 14	203288	-275191	196115	-218.113	9992.5	-2437.71	-1065.92		
<u>≥</u> 15	208108	-284395	205221	-213.956	9857.25	-1970.65	-1082.94		
<u>≥</u> 16	215093	-301828	224757	-209.736	9789.58	-1718.37	-1303.35		
≥17	220056	-310906	234180	-201.494	9541.73	-1230.42	-1284.15		
<u>≥</u> 18	224545	-320969	247724	-206.807	9892.97	-1790.61	-1381.9		
<u>≥ 19</u>	226901	-322168	250395	-204.073	9902.14	-1748.78	-1253.22		
≥20	235561	-345414	276856	-198.306	9720.78	-1284.14	-1569.18		

#### BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

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Cooling	Array/Class 9x9G								
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G		
≥3	35158.5	26918.5	-17976.7	-149.915	6787.19	-2154.29	836.894		
<u>≥</u> 4	77137.2	-19760.1	2371.28	-130.934	8015.43	-3512.38	-455.424		
<u>≥</u> 5	113405	-77931.2	35511.2	-150.637	8932.55	-4099.48	-629.806		
<u>≥</u> 6	139938	-128700	68698.3	-173.799	9451.22	-3847.83	-455.905		
≥7	164267	-183309	109526	-193.952	9737.91	-3046.84	-737.992		
≥8	182646	-227630	146275	-210.936	10092.3	-2489.3	-1066.96		
<u>≥</u> 9	199309	-270496	184230	-218.617	10124.3	-1453.81	-1381.41		
≥ 10	213186	-308612	221699	-235.828	10703.2	-1483.31	-1821.73		
≥11	225587	-342892	256242	-236.112	10658.5	-612.076	-2134.65		
≥12	235725	-370471	285195	-234.378	10604.9	118.591	-2417.89		
≥13	247043	-404028	323049	-245.79	11158.2	-281.813	-2869.82		
<u>≥</u> 14	253649	-421134	342682	-243.142	11082.3	400.019	-2903.88		
<u>≥</u> 15	262750	-448593	376340	-245.435	11241.2	581.355	-3125.07		
<u>≥</u> 16	270816	-470846	402249	-236.294	10845.4	1791.46	-3293.07		
≥17	279840	-500272	441964	-241.324	11222.6	1455.84	-3528.25		
<u>≥</u> 18	284533	-511287	458538	-240.905	11367.2	1459.68	-3520.94		
<u>≥ 19</u>	295787	-545885	501824	-235.685	11188.2	2082.21	-3954.2		
≥20	300209	-556936	519174	-229.539	10956	2942.09	-3872.87		

### BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

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Cooling		Array/Class 10x10A/B							
Time (years)	A	В	С	D	Е	F	G		
≥3	29285.4	27562.2	-16985	-148.415	5960.56	-1810.79	1001.45		
≥4	67844.9	-14383	395.619	-127.723	6754.56	-2547.96	-369.267		
≥5	96660.5	-55383.8	21180.4	-137.17	7296.6	-2793.58	-192.85		
≥6	118098	-91995	42958	-162.985	7931.44	-2940.84	60.9197		
≥7	135115	-123721	63588.9	-171.747	8060.23	-2485.59	73.6219		
<u>≥</u> 8	148721	-151690	84143.9	-190.26	8515.81	-2444.25	-63.4649		
<u>&gt; 9</u>	160770	-177397	104069	-197.534	8673.6	-2101.25	-331.046		
≥ 10	170331	-198419	121817	-213.692	9178.33	-2351.54	-472.844		
≥11	179130	-217799	138652	-209.75	9095.43	-1842.88	-705.254		
≥ 12	186070	-232389	151792	-208.946	9104.52	-1565.11	-822.73		
<u>≥</u> 13	192407	-246005	164928	-209.696	9234.7	-1541.54	-979.245		
≥14	200493	-265596	183851	-207.639	9159.83	-1095.72	-1240.61		
≥15	205594	-276161	195760	-213.491	9564.23	-1672.22	-1333.64		
≥16	209386	-282942	204110	-209.322	9515.83	-1506.8Ġ	-1286.82		
≥17	214972	-295149	217095	-202.445	9292.34	-893.6	-1364.97		
<u>≥18</u>	219312	-302748	225826	-198.667	9272.27	-878.536	-1379.58		
≥19	223481	-310663	235908	-194.825	9252.9	-785.066	-1379.62		
≥20	227628	-319115	247597	-199.194	9509.02	-1135.23	-1386.19		

### BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

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Cooling		Array/Class 10x10C								
Time (years)	Α	В	С	D	E	F	G			
<u>≥</u> 3	31425.3	27358.9	-17413.3	-152.096	6367.53	-1967.91	925.763			
≥4	71804	-16964.1	1000.4	-129.299	7227.18	-2806.44	-416.92			
≥ 5	102685	-62383.3	24971.2	-142.316	7961	-3290.98	-354.784			
≥6	126962	-105802	51444.6	-164.283	8421.44	-3104.21	-186.615			
<u>≥</u> 7	146284	-145608	79275.5	-188.967	8927.23	-2859.08	-251.163			
<u>≥</u> 8	162748	-181259	105859	-199.122	9052.91	-2206.31	-554.124			
<u>≥ 9</u>	176612	-214183	133261	-217.56	9492.17	-1999.28	-860.669			
<u>≥</u> 10	187756	-239944	155315	-219.56	9532.45	-1470.9	-1113.42			
≥11	196580	-260941	174536	-222.457	9591.64	-944.473	-1225.79			
≥12	208017	-291492	204805	-233.488	10058.3	-1217.01	-1749.84			
<u>≥ 13</u>	214920	-307772	221158	-234.747	10137.1	-897.23	-1868.04			
<u>≥ 14</u>	222562	-326471	240234	-228.569	9929.34	-183.47	-2016.12			
<u>≥</u> 15	228844	-342382	258347	-226.944	9936.76	117.061	-2106.05			
<u>≥16</u>	233907	-353008	270390	-223.179	9910.72	360.39	-2105.23			
<u>≥</u> 17	244153	-383017	304819	-227.266	10103.2	380.393	-2633.23			
<u>≥18</u>	249240	-395456	321452	-226.989	10284.1	169.947	-2623.67			
<u>≥ 19</u>	254343	-406555	335240	-220.569	10070.5	764.689	-2640.2			
≥20	260202	-421069	354249	-216.255	10069.9	854.497	-2732.77			

#### BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY COOLING TIME-DEPENDENT COEFFICIENTS (ZR-CLAD FUEL)

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FIGURE 2.1.1; DAMAGED FUEL CONTAINER FOR DRESDEN UNIT-1/ HUMBOLDT BAY SNF REPORT HI-2002444 REVISION 3

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FIGURE 2.1.2; TN DAWAGED FUEL CANISTER FOR DRESDEN UNIT-1

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1 .	SECTION A-A SECTION B-B	
	FIGURE 2.1.2A; TN THORIA ROD CANISTER FOR DRESDEN UNIT-1	DRULOLON 1
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CFR 72.248.



FIGURE 2.1.2C; HOLTEC DAMAGED FUEL CONTAINER FOR BWR SNF IN MPC-68/68FF

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FIGURE 2.1.2D; HOLTEC DAMAGED FUEL CONTAINER FOR PWR SNF IN MPC-32/32F REPORT HI-2002444 G:\SAR DOCUMENTS\HI-STORM FSAR\REVISION 3\CHAPTER 2\PDF FIGURES



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**FIGURE 2.1.6** 

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#### 2.2 <u>HI-STORM 100 DESIGN CRITERIA</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System is engineered for unprotected outside storage for the duration of its design life. Accordingly, the cask system is designed to withstand normal, off-normal, and environmental phenomena and accident conditions of storage. Normal conditions include the conditions that are expected to occur regularly or frequently in the course of normal operation. Off-normal conditions include those infrequent events that could reasonably be expected to occur during the lifetime of the cask system. Environmental phenomena and accident conditions include events that are postulated because their consideration establishes a conservative design basis.

Normal condition loads act in combination with all other loads (off-normal or environmental phenomena/accident). Off-normal condition loads and environmental phenomena and accident condition loads are not applied in combination. However, loads that occur as a result of the same phenomena are applied simultaneously. For example, the tornado winds loads are applied in combination with the tornado missile loads.

In the following subsections, the design criteria are established for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions for storage. Loads that require consideration under each condition are identified and the design criteria discussed. Based on consideration of the applicable requirements of the system, the following loads are identified:

Normal (Long-Term Storage) Condition: Dead Weight, Handling, Pressure, Temperature, Snow

<u>Off-Normal Condition</u>: Pressure, Temperature, Leakage of One Seal, Partial Blockage of Air Inlets, Off-Normal Handling of HI-TRAC, Supplemental Cooling System Power Failure

<u>Accident Condition</u>: Handling Accident, Tip-Over, Fire, Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes, Tornado, Flood, Earthquake, Fuel Rod Rupture, Confinement Boundary Leakage, Explosion, Lightning, Burial Under Debris, 100% Blockage of Air Inlets, Extreme Environmental Temperature Supplemental Cooling System Operational Failure

<u>Short-Term Operations</u>: This loading condition is defined to accord with ISG-11, Revision 3 guidance [2.0.8]. This includes those normal operational evolutions necessary to support fuel loading or unloading activities. These include, but are not limited to MPC cavity drying, helium backfill, MPC transfer, and on-site handling of a loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask.

Each of these conditions and the applicable loads are identified with applicable design criteria established. Design criteria are deemed to be satisfied if the specified allowable limits are not exceeded.

- 2.2.1 Normal Condition Design Criteria
- 2.2.1.1 Dead Weight

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand the static loads due to the weights of each of its

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components, including the weight of the HI-TRAC with the loaded MPC atop the storage overpack.

# 2.2.1.2 <u>Handling</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand loads experienced during routine handling. Normal handling includes:

- i. vertical lifting and transfer to the ISFSI of the HI-STORM overpack with loaded MPC
- ii. lifting, upending/downending, and transfer to the ISFSI of the HI-TRAC with loaded MPC in the vertical or horizontal position
- iii. lifting of the loaded MPC into and out of the HI-TRAC, HI-STORM, or HI-STAR overpack

The loads shall be increased by 15% to include any dynamic effects from the lifting operations as directed by CMAA #70 [2.2.16].

Handling operations of the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask or HI-STORM overpack are limited to working area ambient temperatures greater than or equal to  $0^{\circ}$ F. This limitation is specified to ensure that a sufficient safety margin exists before brittle fracture might occur during handling operations. Subsection 3.1.2.3 provides the demonstration of the adequacy of the HI-TRAC transfer cask and the HI-STORM overpack for use during handling operations at a minimum service temperature of  $0^{\circ}$ F.

Lifting attachments and devices shall meet the requirements of ANSI N14.6<sup>†</sup> [2.2.3].

# 2.2.1.3 <u>Pressure</u>

The MPC internal pressure is dependent on the initial volume of cover gas (helium), the volume of fill gas in the fuel rods, the fraction of fission gas released from the fuel matrix, the number of fuel rods assumed to have ruptured, and temperature.

The normal condition MPC internal design pressure bounds the cumulative effects of the maximum fill gas volume, normal environmental ambient temperatures, the maximum MPC heat load, and an assumed 1% of the fuel rods ruptured with 100% of the fill gas and 30% of the significant radioactive gases (e.g.,  $H^3$ , Kr, and Xe) released in accordance with NUREG-1536.

Table 2.2.1 provides the design pressures for the HI-STORM 100 System.

For the storage of damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris in a damaged fuel container, it is conservatively assumed that 100% of the fuel rods are ruptured with 100% of the rod fill gas and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Yield and ultimate strength values used in the stress compliance demonstration per ANSI N14.6 shall utilize confirmed material test data through either independent coupon testing or material suppliers= CMTR or COC, as appropriate. To ensure consistency between the design and fabrication of a lifting component, compliance with ANSI N14.6 in this FSAR implies that the guidelines of ASME Section III, Subsection NF for Class 3 structures are followed for material procurement and testing, fabrication, and for NDE during manufacturing.

30% of the significant radioactive gases (e.g.,  $H^3$ , Kr, and Xe) released for both normal and offnormal conditions. For PWR assemblies stored with non-fuel hardware, it is assumed that 100% of the gasses in the non-fuel hardware (e.g., BPRAs) is also released. This condition is bounded by the pressure calculation for design basis intact fuel with 100% of the fuel rods ruptured in all of the fuel assemblies. It is shown in Chapter 4 that the accident condition design pressure is not exceeded with 100% of the fuel rods ruptured in all of the design basis fuel assemblies. Therefore, rupture of 100% of the fuel rods in the damaged fuel assemblies or fuel debris will not cause the MPC internal pressure to exceed the accident design pressure.

The MPC internal design pressure under accident conditions is discussed in Subsection 2.2.3.

The HI-STORM overpack and MPC external pressure is a function of environmental conditions which may produce a pressure loading. The normal and off-normal condition external design pressure is set at ambient standard pressure (1 atmosphere).

The HI-STORM overpack is not capable of retaining internal pressure due to its open design, and, therefore, no analysis is required or provided for the overpack internal pressure.

The HI-TRAC is not capable of retaining internal pressure due to its open design and, therefore, ambient and hydrostatic pressures are the only pressures experienced. Due to the thick steel walls of the HI-TRAC transfer cask, it is evident that the small hydrostatic pressure can be easily withstood; no analysis is required or provided for the HI-TRAC internal pressure. However, the HI-TRAC water jacket does experience internal pressure due to the heat-up of the water contained in the water jacket. Analysis is presented in Chapter 3 that demonstrates that the design pressure in Table 2.2.1 can be withstood by the water jacket and Chapter 4 demonstrates by analysis that the water jacket design pressure will not be exceeded. To provide an additional layer of safety, a pressure relief device set at the design pressure is provided, which ensures the pressure will not be exceeded.

# 2.2.1.4 Environmental Temperatures

To evaluate the long-term effects of ambient temperatures on the HI-STORM 100 System, an upper bound value on the annual average ambient temperatures for the continental United States is used. The normal temperature specified in Table 2.2.2 is bounding for all reactor sites in the contiguous United States. The "normal" temperature set forth in Table 2.2.2 is intended to ensure that it is greater than the annual average of ambient temperatures at any location in the continental United States. In the northern region of the U.S., the design basis "normal" temperature used in this FSAR will be exceeded only for brief periods, whereas in the southern U.S, it may be straddled daily in summer months. Inasmuch as the sole effect of the "normal" temperature is on the computed fuel cladding temperature to establish long-term fuel integrity, it should not lie below the time averaged yearly mean for the ISFSI site. Previously licensed cask systems have employed lower "normal" temperatures (viz. 75° F in Docket 72-1007) by utilizing national meteorological data.

Likewise, within the thermal analysis, a conservatively assumed soil temperature of the value specified in Table 2.2.2 is utilized to bound the annual average soil temperatures for the continental United States. The 1987 ASHRAE Handbook (HVAC Systems and Applications) reports average

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earth temperatures, from 0 to 10 feet below grade, throughout the continental United States. The highest reported annual average value for the continental United States is 77° F for Key West, Florida. Therefore, this value is specified in Table 2.2.2 as the bounding soil temperature.

Confirmation of the site-specific annual average ambient temperature and soil temperature is to be performed by the licensee, in accordance with 10CFR72.212. The annual average temperature is combined with insolation in accordance with 10CFR71.71 averaged over 24 hours to establish the normal condition temperatures in the HI-STORM 100 System.

## 2.2.1.5 Design Temperatures

The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) requires that the value of the vessel design temperature be established with appropriate consideration for the effect of heat generation internal or external to the vessel. The decay heat load from the spent nuclear fuel is the internal heat generation source for the HI-STORM 100 System. The ASME Code (Section III, Paragraph NCA-2142) requires the design temperature to be set at or above the maximum through thickness mean metal temperature of the pressure part under normal service (Level A) condition. Consistent with the terminology of NUREG-1536, we refer to this temperature as the "Design Temperature for Normal Conditions". Conservative calculations of the steady-state temperature field in the HI-STORM 100 System, under assumed environmental normal temperatures with the maximum decay heat load, result in HI-STORM component temperatures at or below the normal condition design temperatures for the HI-STORM 100 System defined in Table 2.2.3.

Maintaining fuel rod cladding integrity is also a design consideration. The fuel rod peak cladding temperature (PCT) limits for the long-term storage and short-term normal operating conditions meet the intent of the guidance in ISG-11, Revision 3 [2.0.8]. For moderate burnup fuel, the previously licensed PCT limit of 570°C (1058°F) may be used [2.0.9] (see also Section 4.5).

## 2.2.1.6 Snow and Ice

The HI-STORM 100 System must be capable of withstanding pressure loads due to snow and ice. ASCE 7-88 (formerly ANSI A58.1) [2.2.2] provides empirical formulas and tables to compute the effective design pressure on the overpack due to the accumulation of snow for the contiguous U.S. and Alaska. Typical calculated values for heated structures such as the HI-STORM 100 System range from 50 to 70 pounds per square foot. For conservatism, the snow pressure loading is set at a level in Table 2.2.8 which bounds the ASCE 7-88 recommendation.

## 2.2.2 Off-Normal Conditions Design Criteria

As the HI-STORM 100 System is passive, loss of power and instrumentation failures are not defined as off-normal conditions. The off-normal condition design criteria are defined in the following subsections.

A discussion of the effects of each off-normal condition is provided in Section 11.1. Section 11.1 also provides the corrective action for each off-normal condition. The location of the detailed

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analysis for each event is referenced in Section 11.1.

# 2.2.2.1 <u>Pressure</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand loads due to off-normal pressure. The off-normal condition MPC internal design pressure bounds the cumulative effects of the maximum fill gas volume, off-normal environmental ambient temperatures, the maximum MPC heat load, and an assumed 10% of the fuel rods r uptured with 100% of the fill gas and 30% of the significant radioactive gases (e.g.,  $H^3$ , Kr, and Xe) released in accordance with NUREG-1536.

## 2.2.2.2 Environmental Temperatures

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand off-normal environmental temperatures. The offnormal environmental temperatures are specified in Table 2.2.2. The lower bound temperature occurs with no solar loads and the upper bound temperature occurs with steady- state insolation. Each bounding temperature is assumed to persist for a duration sufficient to allow the system to reach steady-state temperatures.

Limits on the peaks in the time-varying ambient temperature at an ISFSI site is recognized in the FSAR in the specification of the off-normal temperatures. The lower bound off-normal temperature is defined as the minimum of the 72-hour average of the ambient temperature at an ISFSI site. Likewise, the upper bound off-normal temperature is defined by the maximum of 72-hour average of the ambient temperature. The lower and upper bound off-normal temperatures listed in Table 2.2.2 are intended to cover all ISFSI sites in the continent U.S. The 72-hour average of temperature used in the definition of the off-normal temperature recognizes the considerable thermal inertia of the HI-STORM 100 storage system which reduces the effect of undulations in instantaneous temperature on the internals of the multi-purpose canister.

## 2.2.2.3 Design Temperatures

In addition to the normal condition design temperatures, which apply to long-term storage and short term normal operating conditions (e.g., MPC drying operations and onsite transport operations), we also define an "off-normal/accident condition temperature" pursuant to the provisions of NUREG-1536 and Regulatory Guide 3.61. This is, in effect, the temperature which may exist during a transient event (examples of such instances are the overpack blocked air duct off-normal event and fire accident). The off-normal/accident design temperatures of Table 2.2.3 are set down to bound the maximax (maximum in time and space) value of the thru-thickness average temperature of the structural or non-structural part, as applicable, during the transient event. These enveloping values, therefore, will bound the maximum temperature reached anywhere in the part, excluding skin effects during or immediately after, a transient event.

## 2.2.2.4 Leakage of One Seal

The MPC enclosure vessel is designed to have no credible leakage under all normal, off-normal, and hypothetical accident conditions of storage.

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The confinement boundary is defined by the MPC shell, baseplate, MPC lid, port cover plates, closure ring, and associated welds. Most confinement boundary welds are inspected by radiography | or ultrasonic examination. Field welds are examined by the liquid penetrant method on the root (if more than one weld pass is required) and final weld passes. In addition to liquid penetrant examination, the MPC lid-to-shell weld is pressuretested, and volumetrically examined or multi-pass liquid penetrant examined. The vent and drain port cover plates are subject to liquid penetrant examination. These inspection and testing techniques are performed to verify the integrity of the confinement boundary.

# 2.2.2.5 Partial Blockage of Air Inlets

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand the partial blockage of the overpack air inlets. This event is conservatively defined as a complete blockage of two (2) of the four air inlets. Because the overpack air inlets and outlets are covered by fine mesh steel screens, located 90° apart, and inspected routinely (or alternatively, exit vent air temperature monitored), it is unlikely that all vents could become blocked by blowing debris, animals, etc. during normal and off-normal operations. Two of the air inlets are conservatively assumed to be completely blocked to demonstrate the inherent thermal stability of the HI-STORM 100 System.

# 2.2.2.6 Off-Normal HI-TRAC Handling

During upending and/or downending of the HI-TRAC 100 or HI-TRAC 125 transfer cask, the total lifted weight is distributed among both the upper lifting trunnions and the lower pocket trunnions. Each of the four trunnions on the HI-TRAC therefore supports approximately one-quarter of the total weight. This even distribution of the load would continue during the entire rotation operation. The HI-TRAC 125D transfer cask design does not include pocket trunnions. Therefore, the entire load is held by the lifting trunnions.

If the lifting device cables begin to "go slack" while upending or downending the HI-TRAC 100 or HI-TRAC 125, the eccentricity of the pocket trunnions would immediately cause the cask to pivot, restoring tension on the cables. Nevertheless, the pocket trunnions are conservatively analyzed to support one-half of the total weight, doubling the load per trunnion. This condition is analyzed to demonstrate that the pocket trunnions in the standard HI-TRAC design possess sufficient strength to support the increased load under this off-normal condition.

## 2.2.3 Environmental Phenomena and Accident Condition Design Criteria

Environmental phenomena and accident condition design criteria are defined in the following subsections.

The minimum acceptance criteria for the evaluation of the accident conditions are that the MPC confinement boundary maintains radioactive material confinement, the MPC fuel basket structure maintains the fuel contents subcritical, the stored SNF can be retrieved by normal means, and the

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#### system provides adequate shielding.

A discussion of the effects of each environmental phenomenon and accident condition is provided in Section 11.2. The consequences of each accident or environmental phenomenon are evaluated against the requirements of 10CFR72.106 and 10CFR20. Section 11.2 also provides the corrective action for each event. The location of the detailed analysis for each event is referenced in Section 11.2.

#### 2.2.3.1 Handling Accident

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand loads due to a handling accident. Even though the loaded HI-STORM 100 System will be lifted in accordance with approved, written procedures and may use lifting equipment which complies with ANSI N14.6-1993 [2.2.3], certain drop events are considered herein to demonstrate the defense-in-depth features of the design.

The loaded HI-STORM overpack will be lifted so that the bottom of the cask is at a height less than the vertical lift limit (see Table 2.2.8) above the ground. For conservatism, the postulated drop event assumes that the loaded HI-STORM 100 overpack falls freely from the vertical lift limit height before impacting a thick reinforced concrete pad. The deceleration of the cask must be maintained below 45 g's. Additionally, the overpack must continue to suitably shield the radiation emitted from the loaded MPC. The use of lifting devices designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 having redundant drop protection features to lift the loaded overpack will eliminate the lift height limit. The lift height limit is dependent on the characteristics of the impacting surface which are specified in Table 2.2.9. For site-specific conditions, which are not encompassed by Table 2.2.9, the licensee shall evaluate the site-specific conditions to ensure that the drop accident loads do not exceed 45 g's. The methodology used in this alternative analysis shall be commensurate with the analyses in Appendix 3.A and shall be reviewed by the Certificate Holder.

The loaded HI-TRAC will be lifted so that the lowest point on the transfer cask (i.e., the bottom edge of the cask/lid assemblage) is at a height less than the calculated horizontal lift height limit (see Table 2.2.8) above the ground, when lifted horizontally outside of the reactor facility. For conservatism, the postulated drop event assumes that the loaded HI-TRAC falls freely from the horizontal lift height limit before impact.

Analysis is provided that demonstrates that the HI-TRAC continues to suitably shield the radiation emitted from the loaded MPC, and that the HI-TRAC end plates (top lid and transfer lid for HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 and the top lid and pool lid for HI-TRAC 125D) remain attached. Furthermore, the HI-TRAC inner shell is demonstrated by analysis to not deform sufficiently to hinder retrieval of the MPC. The horizontal lift height limit is dependent on the characteristics of the impacting surface which are specified in Table 2.2.9. For site-specific conditions, which are not encompassed by Table 2.2.9, the licensee shall evaluate the site-specific conditions to ensure that the drop accident loads do not exceed 45 g's. The methodology used in this alternative analysis shall be commensurate with the methodology described in this FSAR and shall be reviewed by the Certificate Holder. The use of lifting devices designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 having redundant drop protection features during horizontal lifting of the loaded HI-TRAC outside of the

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reactor facilities eliminate the need for a horizontal lift height limit.

The loaded HI-TRAC, when lifted in the vertical position outside of the Part 50 facility shall be lifted with devices designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and having redundant drop protection features unless a site-specific analysis has been performed to determine a lift height limit. For vertical lifts of HI-TRAC with suitably designed lift devices, a vertical drop is not a credible accident for the HI-TRAC transfer cask and no vertical lift height limit is required to be established. Likewise, while the loaded HI-TRAC is positioned atop the HI-STORM 100 overpack for transfer of the MPC into the overpack (outside the Part 50 facility), the lifting equipment will remain engaged with the lifting trunnions of the HI-TRAC transfer cask or suitable restraints will be provided to secure the HI-TRAC. This ensures that a tip-over or drop from atop the HI-STORM 100 overpack is not a credible accident for the HI-TRAC transfer cask. The design criteria and conditions of use for MPC transfer operations from the HI-TRAC transfer cask to the HI-STORM 100 overpack at a Cask Transfer Facility are specified in Subsection 2.3.3.1 of this FSAR.

The loaded MPC is lowered into the HI-STORM or HI-STAR overpack or raised from the overpack using the HI-TRAC transfer cask and a MPC lifting system designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and having redundant drop protection features. Therefore, the possibility of a loaded MPC falling freely from its highest elevation during the MPC transfer operations into the HI-STORM or HI-STAR overpacks is not credible.

The magnitude of loadings imparted to the HI-STORM 100 System due to drop events is heavily influenced by the compliance characteristics of the impacted surface. Two "pre-approved" concrete pad designs for storing the HI-STORM 100 System are presented in Table 2.2.9. Other ISFSI pad designs may be used provided the designs are reviewed by the Certificate Holder to ensure that impactive and impulsive loads under accident events such as cask drop and non-mechanistic tip-over are less than the design basis limits when analyzed using the methodologies established in this FSAR.

## 2.2.3.2 <u>Tip-Over</u>

The free-standing HI-STORM 100 System is demonstrated by analysis to remain kinematically stable under the design basis environmental phenomena (tornado, earthquake, etc.). However, the HI-STORM 100 overpack and MPC shall also withstand impacts due to a hypothetical tip-over | event. The structural integrity of a loaded HI-STORM 100 System after a tip-over onto a reinforced concrete pad is demonstrated by analysis. The cask tip-over is not postulated as an outcome of any environmental phenomenon or accident condition. The cask tip-over is a non-mechanistic event.

The ISFSI pad for deploying a free-standing HI-STORM overpack must possess sufficient structural stiffness to meet the strength limits set forth in the ACI Code selected by the ISFSI owner. At the same time, the pad must be sufficiently compliant such that the maximum deceleration under a tip-over event is below the limit set forth in Table 3.1.2 of this FSAR.

During original licensing for the HI-STORM 100 System, a single set of ISFSI pad and subgrade design parameters (now labeled Set A) was established. Experience has shown that achieving a

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maximum concrete compressive strength (at 28 days) of 4,200 psi can be difficult. Therefore, a second set of ISFSI pad and subgrade design parameters (labeled Set B) has been developed. The Set B ISFSI parameters include a thinner concrete pad and less stiff subgrade, which allow for a higher concrete compressive strength. Cask deceleration values for all design basis drop and tipover events with the HI-STORM 100, HI-STORM 100S, and HI-STORM 100S Version B overpacks have been verified to be less than or equal to the design limit of 45 g's for both sets of ISFSI pad parameters.

The original set and the new set (Set B) of acceptable ISFSI pad and subgrade design parameters are specified in Table 2.2.9. Users may design their ISFSI pads and subgrade in compliance with either parameter Set A or Set B. Alternatively, users may design their site-specific ISFSI pads and subgrade using any combination of design parameters resulting in a structurally competent pad that meets the provisions of ACI-318 and also limits the deceleration of the cask to less than or equal to 45 g's for the design basis drop and tip-over events for the HI-STORM 100, HI-STORM 100S, and HI-STORM 100S Version B overpacks. The structural analyses for site-specific ISFSI pad design shall be performed using methodologies consistent with those described in this FSAR, as applicable.

If the HI-STORM 100 System is deployed in an anchored configuration (HI-STORM 100A), then tip-over of the cask is structurally precluded along with the requirement of target compliance, which warrants setting specific limits on the concrete compressive strength and subgrade Young's Modulus. Rather, at the so-called high seismic sites (ZPAs greater than the limit set forth in the CoC for free standing casks), the ISFSI pad must be sufficiently rigid to hold the anchor studs and maintain the integrity of the fastening mechanism embedded in the pad during the postulated seismic event. The ISFSI pad must be designed to minimize a physical uplift during extreme environmental event (viz., tornado missile, DBE, etc.). The requirements on the ISFSI pad to render the cask anchoring function under long-term storage are provided in Section 2.0.4.

# 2.2.3.3 <u>Fire</u>

The possibility of a fire accident near an ISFSI site is considered to be extremely remote due to the absence of significant combustible materials. The only credible concern is related to a transport vehicle fuel tank fire engulfing the loaded HI-STORM 100 overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask while it is being moved to the ISFSI.

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand temperatures due to a fire event. The HI-STORM overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask fire accidents for storage are conservatively postulated to be the result of the spillage and ignition of 50 gallons of combustible transporter fuel. The HI-STORM overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask surfaces are considered to receive an incident radiation and forced convection heat flux from the fire. Table 2.2.8 provides the fire durations for the HI-STORM overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask based on the amount of flammable materials assumed. The temperature of fire is assumed to be 1475° F in accordance with 10CFR71.73.

The accident condition design temperatures for the HI-STORM 100 System, and the fuel rod cladding limits are specified in Table 2.2.3. The specified fuel cladding temperature limits are based on the temperature limits specified in ISG-11, Rev. 3 [2.0.9].

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# 2.2.3.4 Partial Blockage of MPC Basket Vent Holes

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to withstand reduction of flow area due to partial blockage of the MPC basket vent holes. As the MPC basket vent holes are internal to the confinement barrier, the only events that could partially block the vents are fuel cladding failure and debris associated with this failure, or the collection of crud at the base of the stored SNF assembly. The HI-STORM 100 System maintains the SNF in an inert environment with fuel rod cladding temperatures below accepted values (Table 2.2.3). Therefore, there is no credible mechanism for gross fuel cladding degradation during storage in the HI-STORM 100. For the storage of damaged BWR fuel assemblies or fuel debris, the assemblies and fuel debris will be placed in damaged fuel containers prior to placement in the MPC. The damaged fuel container is equipped with fine mesh screens which ensure that the damaged fuel and fuel debris will not escape to block the MPC basket vent holes. In addition, each MPC will be loaded once for long-term storage and, therefore, buildup of crud in the MPC due to numerous loadings is precluded. Using crud quantities reported in an Empire State Electric Energy Research Corporation Report [2.2.6], a layer of crud of conservative depth is assumed to partially block the MPC basket vent holes. The crud depths for the different MPCs are listed in Table 2.2.8.

## 2.2.3.5 <u>Tornado</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand pressures, wind loads, and missiles generated by a tornado. The prescribed design basis tornado and wind loads for the HI-STORM 100 System are consistent with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76 [2.2.7], ANSI 57.9 [2.2.8], and ASCE 7-88 [2.2.2]. Table 2.2.4 provides the wind speeds and pressure drops which the HI-STORM 100 overpack must withstand while maintaining kinematic stability. The pressure drop is bounded by the accident condition MPC external design pressure.

The kinematic stability of the HI-STORM overpack, and continued integrity of the MPC confinement boundary, while within the storage overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask, must be demonstrated under impact from tornado-generated missiles in conjunction with the wind loadings. Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.5.1.4 of NUREG-0800 [2.2.9] stipulates that the postulated missiles include at least three objects: a massive high kinetic energy missile that deforms on impact (large missile); a rigid missile to test penetration resistance (penetrant missile); and a small rigid missile of a size sufficient to pass through any openings in the protective barriers (micro-missile). SRP 3.5.1.4 suggests an automobile for a large missile, a rigid solid steel cylinder for the penetrant missile, and a solid sphere for the small rigid missile, all impacting at 35% of the maximum horizontal wind speed of the design basis tornado. Table 2.2.5 provides the missile data used in the analysis, which is based on the above SRP guidelines. The effects of a large tornado missile are considered to bound the effects of a light general aviation airplane crashing on an ISFSI facility.

During horizontal handling of the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask outside the Part 50 facility, tornado missile protection shall be provided to prevent tornado missiles from impacting either end of the HI-TRAC. The tornado missile protection shall be designed such that the large tornado missile cannot impact the bottom or top of the loaded HI-TRAC, while in the horizontal position. Also, the

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missile protection for the top of the HI-TRAC shall be designed to preclude the penetrant missile and micro-missile from passing through the penetration in the HI-TRAC top lid, while in the horizontal position. With the tornado missile protection in place, the impacting of a large tornado missile on either end of the loaded HI-TRAC or the penetrant missile or micro-missile entering the penetration of the top lid is not credible. Therefore, no analyses of these impacts are provided.

### 2.2.3.6 <u>Flood</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand pressure and water forces associated with a flood. Resultant loads on the HI-STORM 100 System consist of buoyancy effects, static pressure loads, and velocity pressure due to water velocity. The flood is assumed to deeply submerge the HI-STORM 100 System (see Table 2.2.8). The flood water depth is based on the hydrostatic pressure which is bounded by the MPC external pressure stated in Table 2.2.1.

It must be shown that the MPC does not collapse, buckle, or allow water in-leakage under the hydrostatic pressure from the flood.

The flood water is assumed to be nonstagnant. The maximum allowable flood water velocity is determined by calculating the equivalent pressure loading required to slide or tip over the HI-STORM 100 System. The design basis flood water velocity is stated in Table 2.2.8. Site-specific safety reviews by the licensee must confirm that flood parameters do not exceed the flood depth, slide, or tip-over forces.

If the flood water depth exceeds the elevation of the top of the HI-STORM overpack inlet vents, then the cooling air flow would be blocked. The flood water may also carry debris which may act to block the air inlets of the overpack. Blockage of the air inlets is addressed in Subsection 2.2.3.13.

Most reactor sites are hydrologically characterized as required by Paragraph 100.10(c) of 10CFR100 and further articulated in Reg. Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants" and Reg. Guide 1.102, "Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants." It is assumed that a complete characterization of the ISFSI's hydrosphere including the effects of hurricanes, floods, seiches and tsunamis is available to enable a site-specific evaluation of the HI-STORM 100 System for kinematic stability. An evaluation for tsunamis<sup>†</sup> for certain coastal sites should also be performed to demonstrate that sliding or tip-over will not occur and that the maximum flood depth will not be exceeded.

Analysis for each site for such transient hydrological loadings must be made for that site. It is expected that the plant licensee will perform this evaluation under the provisions of 10CFR72.212.

### 2.2.3.7 <u>Seismic Design Loadings</u>

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<sup>†</sup> A tsunami is an ocean wave from seismic or volcanic activity or from submarine landslides. A tsunami may be the result of nearby or distant events. A tsunami loading may exist in combination with wave splash and spray, storm surge and tides.

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand loads arising due to a seismic event and must be shown not to tip over during a seismic event. Subsection 3.4.7 contains calculations based on conservative static "incipient tipping" calculations which demonstrate static stability. The calculations in Section 3.4.7 result in the values reported in Table 2.2.8, which provide the maximum horizontal zero period acceleration (ZPA) versus vertical acceleration multiplier above which static incipient tipping would occur. This conservatively assumes the peak acceleration values of each of the two horizontal earthquake components and the vertical component occur simultaneously. The maximum horizontal ZPA provided in Table 2.2.8 is the vector sum of two horizontal earthquakes.

For anchored casks, the limit on zero period accelerations is set by the structural capacity of the sector lugs and anchoring studs. Table 2.2.8 provides the limits for HI-STORM 100A for the maximum vector sum of two horizontal earthquake peak ZPA's along with the coincident limit on the vertical ZPA.

# 2.2.3.8 <u>100% Fuel Rod Rupture</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand loads due to 100% fuel rod rupture. For conservatism, 100 percent of the fuel rods are assumed to rupture with 100 percent of the fill gas and 30% of the significant radioactive gases (e.g., H<sup>3</sup>, Kr, and Xe) released in accordance with NUREG-1536. All of the fill gas contained in non-fuel hardware, such as Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies (BPRAs) is also assumed to be released in analyzing this event.

### 2.2.3.9 Confinement Boundary Leakage

No credible scenario has been identified that would cause failure of the confinement system. Section 7.1 provides a discussion as to why leakage of any magnitude from the MPC is not credible, based on the materials and methods of fabrication and inspection.

## 2.2.3.10 <u>Explosion</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand loads due to an explosion. The accident condition MPC external pressure and overpack pressure differential specified in Table 2.2.1 bounds all credible external explosion events. There are no credible internal explosive events since all materials are compatible with the various operating environments, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, or appropriate preventive measures are taken to preclude internal explosive events (see Section 1.2.1.3.1.1). The MPC is composed of stainless steel, neutron absorber material, and prior to CoC Amendment 2, possibly optional aluminum alloy 1100 heat conduction elements. For these materials, and considering the protective measures taken during loading and unloading operations there is no credible internal explosive event.

### 2.2.3.11 Lightning

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand loads due to lightning. The effect of lightning on the HI-STORM 100 System is evaluated in Chapter 11.

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## 2.2.3.12 Burial Under Debris

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand burial under debris. Such debris may result from floods, wind storms, or mud slides. Mud slides, blowing debris from a tornado, or debris in flood water may result in duct blockage, which is addressed in Subsection 2.2.3.13. The thermal effects of burial under debris on the HI-STORM 100 System is evaluated in Chapter 11. Siting of the ISFSI pad shall ensure that the storage location is not located near shifting soil. Burial under debris is a highly unlikely accident, but is analyzed in this FSAR.

## 2.2.3.13 <u>100% Blockage of Air Inlets</u>

For conservatism, this accident is defined as a complete blockage of all four bottom air inlets. Such a blockage may be postulated to occur during accident events such as a flood or tornado with blowing debris. The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand the temperature rise as a result of 100% blockage of the air inlets and outlets. The fuel cladding temperature must be shown to remain below the off-normal/accident temperature limit specified in Table 2.2.3.

## 2.2.3.14 Extreme Environmental Temperature

The HI-STORM 100 System must withstand extreme environmental temperatures. The extreme accident level temperature is specified in Table 2.2.2. The extreme accident level temperature occurs with steady-state insolation. This temperature is assumed to persist for a duration sufficient to allow the system to reach steady-state temperatures. The HI-STORM overpack and MPC have a large thermal inertia. Therefore, this temperature is assumed to persist over three days (3-day average).

## 2.2.3.15 Bounding Hydraulic, Wind, and Missile Loads for HI-STORM 100A

In the anchored configuration, the HI-STORM 100A System is clearly capable of withstanding much greater lateral loads than a free-standing overpack. Coastal sites in many areas of the world, particularly the land mass around the Pacific Ocean, may be subject to severe fluid inertial loads. Several publications [2.2.10, 2.2.11] explain and quantify the nature and source of such environmental hazards.

It is recognized that a lateral fluid load may also be accompanied by an impact force from a fluid borne missile (debris). Rather than setting specific limits for these loads on an individual basis, a limit on the static overturning base moment on the anchorage is set. This bounding overturning moment is given in Table 2.2.8 and is set at a level that ensures that structural safety margins on the sector lugs and on the anchor studs are essentially equal to the structural safety margins of the same components under the combined effect of the net horizontal and vertical seismic load limits in Table 2.2.8. The ISFSI owner bears the responsibility to establish that the lateral hydraulic, wind, and missile loads at his ISFSI site do not yield net overturning moments, when acting separately or together, that exceed the limit value in Table 2.2.8. If loadings are increased above those values for free-standing casks, their potential effect on the other portions of the cask system must be considered.

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# 2.2.4 Applicability of Governing Documents

The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), 1995 Edition, with Addenda through 1997 [2.2.1], is the governing code for the structural design of the MPC, the metal structure of the HI-STORM 100 overpack, and the HI-TRAC transfer cask, except for Sections V and IX. The latest effective editions of ASME Section V and IX may be used, provided a written reconciliation of the later edition against the 1995 Edition, including addenda, is performed by the certificate holder. The MPC enclosure vessel and fuel basket are designed in accordance with Section III, Subsections NB Class 1 and NG Class 1, respectively. The metal structure of the overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask are designed in accordance with Section NF Class 3. The ASME Code is applied to each component consistent with the function of the component.

ACI 349 is the governing code for the plain concrete in the HI-STORM 100 overpack. ACI 318-95 is the applicable code utilized to determine the allowable compressive strength of the plain concrete credited during structural analysis. Appendix 1.D provides the sections of ACI 349 and ACI 318-95 applicable to the plain concrete.

Table 2.2.6 provides a summary of each structure, system and component (SSC) of the HI-STORM 100 System that is identified as important to safety, along with its function and governing Code. Some components perform multiple functions and in those cases, the most restrictive Code is applied. In accordance with NUREG/CR-6407, "Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components", and according to importance to safety, components of the HI-STORM 100 System are classified as A, B, C, or NITS (not important to safety) in Table 2.2.6. Section 13.1 provides the criteria used to classify each item. The classification of necessary auxiliary equipment is provided in Table 8.1.6.

Table 2.2.7 lists the applicable governing Code for material procurement, design, fabrication and inspection of the components of the HI-STORM 100 System. The ASME Code section listed in the design column is the section used to define allowable stresses for structural analyses.

Table 2.2.15 lists the alternatives to the ASME Code for the HI-STORM 100 System and the justification for those alternatives.

The MPC enclosure vessel and certain fuel basket designs utilized in the HI-STORM 100 System are identical to the MPC components described in the SARs for the HI-STAR 100 System for storage (Docket 72-1008) and transport (Docket 71-9261). To avoid unnecessary repetition of the large numbers of stress analyses, this document refers to those SARs, as applicable, if the MPC loadings for storage in the HI-STORM 100 System do not exceed those computed in the HI-STAR documents. Many of the loadings in the HI-STAR applications envelope the HI-STORM loadings on the MPC, and, therefore, a complete re-analysis of the MPC is not provided in the FSAR. Certain individual MPC analyses may have been required to license a particular MPC fuel basket design for HI-STORM that was not previously licensed for HI-STAR. These unique analyses are summarized in the appropriate location in this FSAR.

Table 2.2.16 provides a summary comparison between the loading elements. Table 2.2.16 shows that

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most of the loadings remain unchanged and several are less than the HI-STAR loading conditions. In addition to the magnitude of the loadings experienced by the MPC, the application of the loading must also be considered. Therefore, it is evident from Table 2.2.16 that the MPC stress limits can be ascertained to be qualified a priori if the HI-STAR analyses and the thermal loadings under HI-STORM storage are not more severe compared to previously analyzed HI-STAR conditions. In the analysis of each of the normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, the effect on the MPC is evaluated and compared to the corresponding condition analyzed in the HI-STAR 100 System SARs [2.2.4 and 2.2.5]. If the HI-STORM loading is greater than the HI-STAR loading or the loading is applied differently, the analysis of its effect on the MPC is evaluated in Chapter 3.

#### 2.2.5 <u>Service Limits</u>

In the ASME Code, plant and system operating conditions are commonly referred to as normal, upset, emergency, and faulted. Consistent with the terminology in NRC documents, this FSAR utilizes the terms normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

The ASME Code defines four service conditions in addition to the Design Limits for nuclear components. They are referred to as Level A, Level B, Level C, and Level D service limits, respectively. Their definitions are provided in Paragraph NCA-2142.4 of the ASME Code. The four levels are used in this FSAR as follows:

- a. Level A Service Limits: Level A Service Limits are used to establish allowables for normal condition load combinations.
- b. Level B Service Limits: Level B Service Limits are used to establish allowables for off-normal condition load combinations.
- c. Level C Service Limits: Level C Service Limits are not used.
- d. Level D Service Limits: Level D Service Limits are used to establish allowables for accident condition load combinations.

The ASME Code service limits are used in the structural analyses for definition of allowable stresses and allowable stress intensities. Allowable stresses and stress intensities for structural analyses are tabulated in Chapter 3. These service limits are matched with normal, off-normal, and accident condition loads combinations in the following subsections.

The MPC confinement boundary is required to meet Section III, Class 1, Subsection NB stress intensity limits. Table 2.2.10 lists the stress intensity limits for the Levels A, B, C, and D service limits for Class 1 structures extracted from the ASME Code (1995 Edition). The limits for the MPC fuel basket, required to meet the stress intensity limits of Subsection NG of the ASME Code, are listed in Table 2.2.11. Table 2.2.12 lists allowable stress limits for the steel structure of the HI-STORM overpack and HI-TRAC which are analyzed to meet the stress limits of Subsection NF, Class 3. Only service levels A, B, and D requirements, normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, are applicable.

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## 2.2.6 Loads

Subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3 describe the design criteria for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, respectively. Table 2.2.13 identifies the notation for the individual loads that require consideration. The individual loads listed in Table 2.2.13 are defined from the design criteria. Each load is assigned a symbol for subsequent use in the load combinations.

The loadings listed in Table 2.2.13 fall into two broad categories; namely, (i) those that primarily affect kinematic stability, and (ii) those that produce significant stresses. The loadings in the former category are principally applicable to the overpack. Tornado wind (W'), earthquake (E), and tornado-borne missile (M) are essentially loadings which can destabilize a cask. Analyses reported in Chapter 3 show that the HI-STORM 100 overpack structure will remain kinematically stable under these loadings. Additionally, for the missile impact case (M), analyses that demonstrate that the overpack structure remains unbreached by the postulated missiles are provided in Chapter 3.

Loadings in the second category produce global stresses that must be shown to comply with the stress intensity or stress limits, as applicable. The relevant loading combinations for the fuel basket, the MPC, the HI-TRAC and the HI-STORM overpack are different because of differences in their function. For example, the fuel basket does not experience a pressure loading because it is not a pressure vessel. The specific load combination for each component is specified in Subsection 2.2.7.

# 2.2.7 Load Combinations

To demonstrate compliance with the design requirements for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage, the individual loads, identified in Table 2.2.13, are combined into load combinations. In the formation of the load combinations, it is recognized that the number of combinations requiring detailed analyses is reduced by defining bounding loads. Analyses performed using bounding loads serve to satisfy the requirements for analysis of a multitude of separately identified loads in combination.

For example, the values established for internal and external pressures ( $P_i$  and  $P_o$ ) are defined such that they bound other surface-intensive loads, namely snow (S), tornado wind (W'), flood (F), and explosion ( $E^{\circ}$ ). Thus, evaluation of pressure in a load combination established for a given storage condition enables many individual load effects to be included in a single load combination.

Table 2.2.14 identifies the combinations of the loads that are required to be considered in order to ensure compliance with the design criteria set forth in this chapter. Table 2.2.14 presents the load combinations in terms of the loads that must be considered together. A number of load combinations are established for each ASME Service Level. Within each loading case, there may be more than one analysis that is required to demonstrate compliance. Since the breakdown into specific analyses is most applicable to the structural evaluation, the identification of individual analyses with the applicable loads for each load combination is found in Chapter 3. Table 3.1.3 through 3.1.5 define the particular evaluations of loadings that demonstrate compliance with the load combinations of Table 2.2.14.

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For structural analysis purposes, Table 2.2.14 serves as an intermediate classification table between the definition of the loads (Table 2.2.13 and Section 2.2) and the detailed analysis combinations (Tables 3.1.3 through 3.1.5).

Finally, it should be noted that the load combinations identified in NUREG-1536 are considered as applicable to the HI-STORM 100 System. The majority of load combinations in NUREG-1536 are directed toward reinforced concrete structures. Those load combinations applicable to steel structures are directed toward frame structures. As stated in NUREG-1536, Page 3-35 of Table 3-1, "Table 3-1 does not apply to the analysis of confinement casks and other components designed in accordance with Section III of the ASME B&PV Code." Since the HI-STORM 100 System is a metal shell structure, with concrete primarily employed as shielding, the load combinations of NUREG-1536 are interpreted within the confines and intent of the ASME Code.

## 2.2.8 <u>Allowable Stresses</u>

The stress intensity limits for the MPC confinement boundary for the design condition and the service conditions are provided in Table 2.2.10. The MPC confinement boundary stress intensity limits are obtained from ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB. The stress intensity limits for the MPC fuel basket are presented in Table 2.2.11 (governed by Subsection NG of Section III). The steel structure of the overpack and the HI-TRAC meet the stress limits of Subsection NF of ASME Code, Section III for plate and shell components. Limits for the Level D condition are obtained from Appendix F of ASME Code, Section III for the steel structure of the overpack. The ASME Code is not applicable to the HI-TRAC transfer cask for accident conditions, service level D conditions. The HI-TRAC transfer cask has been shown by analysis to not deform sufficiently to apply a load to the MPC, have any shell rupture, or have the top lid, pool lid, or transfer lid (as applicable) detach.

The following definitions of terms apply to the tables on stress intensity limits; these definitions are the same as those used throughout the ASME Code:

- S<sub>m</sub>: Value of Design Stress Intensity listed in ASME Code Section II, Part D, Tables 2A, 2B and 4
- Sy: Minimum yield strength at temperature
- S<sub>u</sub>: Minimum ultimate strength at temperature

**HI-STORM FSAR** 

### DESIGN PRESSURES

Pressure Location	Condition	Pressure (psig)
MPC Internal Pressure	Normal	100
-	Off-Normal	110
	Accident	200
MPC External Pressure	Normal	(0) Ambient
	Off-Normal	(0) Ambient
	Accident	60
Overpack External Pressure	Normal	(0) Ambient
	Off-Normal	(0) Ambient
	Accident	10 (differential pressure for 1 second maximum) or 5 (differential pressure steady state)
HI-TRAC Water Jacket	Normal	60
	Off-normal	60
	Accident	N/A (Under accident conditions, the water jacket is assumed to have lost all water thru the pressure relief valves)

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# ENVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURES

Condition	Temperature (°F)	Comments		
HI-STORM 100 Overpack				
Normal Ambient (Bounding Annual Average)	80			
Normal Soil Temperature (Bounding Annual Average)	77			
Off-Normal Ambient (3-Day Average)	-40 and 100	-40°F with no insolation 100°F with insolation		
Extreme Accident Level Ambient (3-Day Average)	125	125°F with insolation starting at steady-state off-normal high environment temperature		
HI-TRAC Transfer Cask				
Normal (Bounding Annual Average)	100			
Off-Normal (3-Day Average)	0 and 100	0° F with no insolation 100° F with insolation		

Note:

1. Handling operations with the loaded HI-STORM overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask are limited to working area ambient temperatures greater than or equal to 0°F as specified in Subsection 2.2.1.2.

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This FSAR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.

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#### DESIGN TEMPERATURES

HI-STORM 100 Component	Long Term, Normal Condition Design Temperature Limits (Long-Term Events) (° F)	Off-Normal and Accident Condition Temperature Limits (Short-Term Events) <sup>†</sup> (° F)
MPC shell	500	775
MPC basket	725	950
MPC Neutron Absorber	800	950
MPC lid	550	775
MPC closure ring	400	775
MPC baseplate	400	775
MPC Heat Conduction Elements	725	950
HI-TRAC inner shell	400	600
HI-TRAC pool lid/transfer lid	350	700
HI-TRAC top lid	400	700
HI-TRAC top flange	400	700
HI-TRAC pool lid seals	350	N/A
HI-TRAC bottom lid bolts	350	700
HI-TRAC bottom flange	350	700
HI-TRAC top lid neutron shielding	300	350
HI-TRAC radial neutron shield	307	N/A
HI-TRAC radial lead gamma shield	350	600
Remainder of HI-TRAC	350	700
Fuel Cladding	752	752 or 1058 (Short Term Operations) <sup>††</sup>
		(Off-normal and Accident Conditions)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> For accident conditions that involve heating of the steel structures and no mechanical loading (such as the blocked air duct accident), the permissible metal temperature of the steel parts is defined by Table 1A of ASME Section II (Part D) for Section III, Class 3 materials as 700°F. For the ISFSI fire event, the maximum temperature limit for ASME Section 1 equipment is appropriate (850°F in Code Table 1A).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> Normal short term operations includes MPC drying and onsite transport per Reference [2.0.8]. The 1058°F temperature limit applies to MPCs containing all moderate burnup fuel as discussed in Reference [2.0.9]. The limit for MPCs containing one or more high burnup fuel assemblies is 752°F. See also Section 4.3.

# Table 2.2.3 (continued)

# DESIGN TEMPERATURES

HI-STORM 100 Component	Long Term, Normal Condition Design Temperature Limits (Long-Term Events) (°F)	Off-Normal and Accident Condition Temperature Limits (Short-Term Events) <sup>†</sup> (°F)
Overpack outer shell	350	600
Overpack concrete	300	350
Overpack inner shell	350	400
Overpack Lid Top and Bottom Plate	450	550
Remainder of overpack steel structure	350	400

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# TORNADO CHARACTERISTICS

Condition	Value	
Rotational wind speed (mph)	290	
Translational speed (mph)	70	
Maximum wind speed (mph)	360	
Pressure drop (psi)	3.0	

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# TORNADO-GENERATED MISSILES

Missile Description	Mass (kg)	Velocity (mph)
Automobile	1800	126
Rigid solid steel cylinder (8 in. diameter)	125	126
Solid sphere (1 in. diameter)	0.22	126

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MPC<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards (as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Confinement	Shell	Λ	ASME Section III; Subsection NB	Alloy X <sup>(5)</sup>	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Confinement	Baseplate	Λ	ASME Section III; Subsection NB	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Confinement	Lid (One-piece design and top portion of optional two- piece design)	A	ASME Section III; Subsection NB	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Confinement	Closure Ring	A	ASME Section III; Subsection NB	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Confinement	Port Cover Plates	A	ASME Section III; Subsection NB	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Criticality Control	Basket Cell Plates	A	ASME Section III; Subsection NG core support structures (NG- 1121)	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Criticality Control	Neutron Absorber	A	Non-code	NA	NA	NA	Aluminum/SS
Shielding	Drain and Vent Shield Block	С	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Shielding	Plugs for Drilled Holes	NITS	Non-code	SA 193B8 (or equivalent)	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.

3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.

4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.

5) For details on Alloy X material, see Appendix 1.A.

6) Must be Type 304, 304LN, 316, or 316 LN with tensile strength  $\geq$  75 ksi, yield strength  $\geq$  30 ksi and chemical properties per ASTM A554.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MPC<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards (as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Shielding	Bottom portion of optional two-piece MPC lid design	В	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Upper Fuel Spacer Column	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NG (only for stress analysis)	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Sheathing	A	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	Aluminum/SS	NA
Structural Integrity	Shims	NITS	Non-code (shims, welded directly to angle or parallel plate basket supports, are ASME Section II)	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	ΝΑ	NA
Structural Integrity	Basket Supports (Angled Plate or Parallel Plates with connecting end shim)	A	ASME Section III; Subsection NG internal structures (NG-1122)	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Form	Basket Supports (Flat Plates)	NITS	Non-Code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Lift Lug	С	NUREG-0612	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Lift Lug Baseplate	C	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) For details on Alloy X material, see Appendix 1.A.
- 6) Must be Type 304, 304LN, 316, or 316 LN with tensile strength  $\geq$  75 ksi, yield strength  $\geq$  30 ksi and chemical properties per ASTM A554.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MPC<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards (as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Structural Integrity	Upper Fuel Spacer Bolt	NITS	Non-code	A193-B8 (or equiv.)	Per ASME Section	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Upper Fuel Spacer End Plate	В	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Lower Fuel Spacer Column	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NG (only for stress analysis)	Stainless Steel. See Note 6	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Lower Fuel Spacer End Plate	В	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Vent Shield Block Spacer	С	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NΛ
Operations	Vent and Drain Tube	С	Non-code	S/S	Per ASME Section	Thread area surface hardened	NA
Operations	Vent & Drain Cap	С	Non-code	S/S	Per ASME Section II	NA	NA
Operations	Vent & Drain Cap Seal Washer	NITS	Non-code	Aluminum	NA	NA	Aluminum/SS
Operations	Vent & Drain Cap Seal Washer Bolt	NITS	Non-code	Aluminum	NA	NA	NA
Operations	Reducer	NITS	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Operations	Drain Line	NITS	Non-code	Alloy X	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) For details on Alloy X material, see Appendix 1.A.
- 6) Must be Type 304, 304LN, 316, or 316 LN with tensile strength  $\geq$  75 ksi, yield strength  $\geq$  30 ksi and chemical properties per ASTM A554.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MPC<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards (as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Operations	Damaged Fuel Container	С	ASME Section III; Subsection NG	304 S/S except for locking spring, which may be any type of SS	See Appendix 1.A	NA	NA
Operations	Drain Line Guide Tube	NITS	Non-code	S/S	NA	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) For details on Alloy X material, see Appendix 1.A.
- 6) Must be Type 304, 304LN, 316, or 316 LN with tensile strength  $\geq$  75 ksi, yield strength  $\geq$  30 ksi and chemical properties per ASTM A554.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM OVERPACK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Shielding	Radial Shield	B	ACI 349, App. 1.D	Concrete	See Table 1.D.1	NA	NA
Shielding	Shield Block Ring (100)	В	See Note 6	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Shielding	Lid Shield Ring (100S and 100S Version B) and Shield Block Shell (100S)	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70 or SA515-70 (SA515-70 not permitted for 100S Version B)	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Shielding	Shield Block Shell (100)	В	See Note 6	SA516-70 or SA515-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Shielding	Pedestal Shield	В	ACI 349, App. 1-D	Concrete	See Table 1.D.1	NĀ	NA
Shielding	Lid Shield	В	ACI 349, App. 1-D	Concrete	See Table 1.D.1	NA	NA
Shielding	Shield Shell (eliminated from design 6/01)	В	See Note 6	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	NA	NA
Shielding	Shield Block	В	ACI 349, App. 1-D	Concrete	See Table 1.D.1	NĀ	NA
Shielding	Gamma Shield Cross Plates & Tabs	С	Non-code	SA240-304	NA	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bills of Material and drawings in Chapter 1. All components are "as applicable" based in the overpack drawing/BOM unless otherwise noted.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All exposed steel surfaces (except threaded holes) to be painted with Thermaline 450 or equivalent to the extent practical.
- 6) Welds will meet AWS D1.1 requirements for prequalified welds, except that welder qualification and weld procedures of ASME Code Section IX may be substituted.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM OVERPACK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Structural Integrity	Baseplate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.3	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Outer Shell	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	ΝΛ
Structural Integrity	Inner Shell	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Concrete Form	Pedestal Shell	B	See Note 6	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Concrete Form	Pedestal Plate (100) Pedestal Baseplate (100S)	В	See Note 6	SA516-70 or SA515-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Table 3.3.2	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Bottom Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Shell	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Inlet Vent Vertical & Horizontal Plates	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Thermal	Exit Vent Horizontal Plate (100)	В	See Note 6	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Thermal	Exit Vent Vertical/Side Plate	В	See Note 6	SA516-70 or SA515-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bills of Material and drawings in Chapter 1. All components are "as applicable" based in the overpack drawing/BOM unless otherwise noted.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All exposed steel surfaces (except threaded holes) to be painted with Thermaline 450 or equivalent to the extent practical.
- 6) Welds will meet AWS D1.1 requirements for prequalified welds, except that welder qualification and weld procedures of ASME Code Section IX may be substituted.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM OVERPACK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Thermal	Heat Shield	В	N/A	C/S	N/A	See Note 5	N/A
Thermal	Heat Shield Ring	В	N/A	C/S	N/A	See Note 5	N/A
Structural Integrity	Top Plate, including shear ring	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Top (Cover) Plate, including shear ring	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Radial Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Stud & Nut	В	ASME Section II	SA564-630 or SA 193-B7 (stud) SA 194-2H (nut)	See Table 3.3.4	Threads to have cadmium coating (or similar lubricant for corrosion protection)	NA
Structural Integrity	100S Lid Washer	В	Non-Code	SA240-304	Per ASME Section II	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Bolt Anchor Block	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF ANSI N14.6	SA350-LF3, SA350-LF2, or SA203E	See Table 3.3.3	See Note 5	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bills of Material and drawings in Chapter 1. All components are "as applicable" based in the overpack drawing/BOM unless otherwise noted.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All exposed steel surfaces (except threaded holes) to be painted with Thermaline 450 or equivalent to the extent practical.
- 6) Welds will meet AWS D1.1 requirements for prequalified welds, except that welder qualification and weld procedures of ASME Code Section IX may be substituted.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM OVERPACK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Structural Integrity	Channel	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70 (galvanized) or SA240-304	See Table 3.3.2 or Table 3.3.1	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Channel Mounts	B	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	A36 or equivalent	Per ASME Section II	See Note 5	ΝΛ
Shielding	Pedestal Platform	В	Non-Code	A36 or equivalent	NA	See Note 5	NA
Operations	Storage Marking Nameplate	NITS	Non-code	SA240-304	ΝΛ	NA	NA
Operations	Exit Vent Screen Sheet	NITS	Non-code	SA240-304	NA	NA	NA
Operations	Drain Pipe	NITS	Non-code	C/S or S/S	NA	See Note 5	NA
Operations	Exit & Inlet Screen Frame	NITS	Non-code	SA240-304	NA	ΝΛ	NA
Operations	Temperature Element & Associated Temperature Monitoring Equipment	С	Non-code	NA	NA	NA	NA
Operations	Screen	NITS	Non-code	Mesh Wire	NA	NA	NA
Operations	Paint	NITS	Non-code	Thermaline 450 or equivalent	NA	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bills of Material and drawings in Chapter 1. All components are "as applicable" based in the overpack drawing/BOM unless otherwise noted.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All exposed steel surfaces (except threaded holes) to be painted with Thermaline 450 or equivalent to the extent practical.
- 6) Welds will meet AWS D1.1 requirements for prequalified welds, except that welder qualification and weld procedures of ASME Code Section IX may be substituted.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM OVERPACK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Structural Integrity	100S Version B Base Bottom Plate	В	ASME III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	100S Version B Base Spacer Block	В	Non-code	SA36	NA	See Note 5	NA
Shielding	100S Version B Base Shield Block	В	Non-code	SA36	NA	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	100S Version B Base Top Plate	В	ASME III; Subsection NF	SA 516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	100S Version B Base MPC Support	В	Non-code	SA36	ΝΛ	See Note 5	NA
Shielding	100S Version B Lid Outer Ring	В	ASME III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Operations	100S Version B Lid Vent Duct	NITS	Non-code	Carbon Steel	NA	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	100S Version B Lid Inner Ring	В	ASME III; Subsection NF	SA36	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Operations	100S Version B Lid Stud Pipe	NITS	Non-code	Carbon Steel	ΝΛ	See Note 5	NA
Operations	100S Version B Lid Stud Spacer	NITS	Non-code	Carbon Steel	NA	See Note 5	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bills of Material and drawings in Chapter 1. All components are "as applicable" based in the overpack drawing/BOM unless otherwise noted.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All exposed steel surfaces (except threaded holes) to be painted with Thermaline 450 or equivalent to the extent practical.
- 6) Welds will meet AWS D1.1 requirements for prequalified welds, except that welder qualification and weld procedures of ASME Code Section IX may be substituted.

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Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Operations	100S Version B Lid Lift Block	В	ASME III; Subsection NF	SA36	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Shielding	100S Version B Lid Vent Shield	В	Non-code	SA36	NA	See Note 5	NA
Operations	100S Version B Lid Stud Washer	С	Non-code	Stainless Steel	NA	See Note 5	NA
Operations	100S Version B Lid Stud Cap	NITS	Non-code	PVC	NA	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	100S Version B Radial Gusset	В	ASME III; Subsection NF	SA 516-70	ΝΛ	See Note 5	NA

#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM OVERPACK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bills of Material and drawings in Chapter 1. All components are "as applicable" based in the overpack drawing/BOM unless otherwise noted.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All exposed steel surfaces (except threaded holes) to be painted with Thermaline 450 or equivalent to the extent practical.
- 6) Welds will meet AWS D1.1 requirements for prequalified welds, except that welder qualification and weld procedures of ASME Code Section IX may be substituted.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Shielding	Radial Lead Shield	B	Non-code	Lead	NA	NA	NA
Shielding	Pool Lid Lead Shield	B	Non-code	Lead	NA	NA	NΛ
Shielding	Top Lid Shielding	B	Non-code	Holtite	NA	NA	NA
Shielding	Plugs for Lifting Holes	NITS	Non-code	C/S or S/S	NA	NA	
Structural Integrity	Outer Shell	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Inner Shell	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA ·
Structural Integrity	Radial Ribs	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Water Jacket Enclosure Shell Panels (HI-TRAC 100 and 125)	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Water Jacket Enclosure Shell Panels (HI-TRAC 125D)	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70 or SA515-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Water Jacket End Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Top Flange	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA350-LF3	See Table 3.3.3	See Note 5	ΝΛ
Structural Integrity	Lower Water Jacket Shell	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	ΝΛ

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All external surfaces to be painted with Carboline 890. Top surface of doors to be painted with Thermaline 450.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Structural Integrity	Pool Lid Outer Ring	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70 or SA 203E or SA350-LF3	See Table 3.3.3	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Pool Lid Top Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Top Lid Outer Ring	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Top Lid Inner Ring	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Top Lid Top Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Top Lid Bottom Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Fill Port Plugs	С	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	Carbon Steel	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All external surfaces to be painted with Carboline 890. Top surface of doors to be painted with Thermaline 450.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Structural Integrity	Pool Lid Bolt	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA193-B7	See Table 3.3.4	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Lifting Trunnion Block	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA350-LF3	See Table 3.3.3	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lifting Trunnion	A	ANSI N14.6	SB637 (N07718)	See Table 3.3.4	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Pocket Trunnion (HI- TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 only)	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF ANSI N14.6	SA350-LF3	See Table 3.3.3	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Dowel Pins	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA564-630	See Table 3.3.4	NA	SA350-LF3
Structural Integrity	Water Jacket End Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Pool Lid Bottom Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Top Lid Lifting Block	С	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Bottom Flange Gussets (HI-TRAC 125D only)	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Operations	Top Lid Stud or bolt	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA193-B7	See Table 3.3.4	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All external surfaces to be painted with Carboline 890. Top surface of doors to be painted with Thermaline 450.

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#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Operations	Top Lid Nut	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA194-2H	NA	NA	NA
Operations	Pool Lid Gasket	NITS	Non-code	Elastomer	NA	NA	NA
Operations	Lifting Trunnion End Cap (HI-TRAC 100 and HI- TRAC 125 only)	С	Non-code	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Operations	End Cap Bolts (HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 only)	NITS	Non-code	SA193-B7	See Table 3.3.4	NA	NA
Operations	Drain Pipes	NITS	Non-code	SA106	NA	NA	NA
Operations	Drain Bolt	NITS	Non-code	SA193-B7	See Table 3.3.4	NA	NA
Operations	Couplings, Valves and Vent Plug	NITS	Non-code	Commercial	NA	NA	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All external surfaces to be painted with Carboline 890. Top surface of doors to be painted with Thermaline 450.

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#### **TABLE 2.2.6**

#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM HI-TRAC TRANSFER LID (HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 ONLY)<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength ( ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Shielding	Side Lead Shield	B	Non-code	Lead	NA	NA	NA
Shielding	Door Lead Shield	B	Non-code	Lead	NA	NA	
Shielding	Door Shielding	B	Non-code	Holtite	NA	NA	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Top Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Bottom Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Intermediate Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lead Cover Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lead Cover Side Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Door Top Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Door Middle Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Door Bottom Plate	B	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Door Wheel Housing	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70 (SA350-LF3)	See Table 3.3.2 (Table 3.3.3)	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Door Interface Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All external surfaces to be painted with Carboline 890. Top surface of doors to be painted with Thermaline 450.

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#### **TABLE 2.2.6**

#### MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM HI-TRAC TRANSFER LID (HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 ONLY)<sup>(1,2)</sup>

Primary Function	Component <sup>(3)</sup>	Safety Class <sup>(4)</sup>	Codes/Standards ( as applicable to component)	Material	Strength (ksi)	Special Surface Finish/Coating	Contact Matl. ( if dissimilar)
Structural Integrity	Door Side Plate	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Wheel Shaft	С	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA 193-B7	36 ( yield)	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Lid Housing Stiffener	B	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Structural Integrity	Door Lock Bolt	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NB	SA193-B7	See Table 3.3.4	NA	ΝΛ
Structural Integrity	Door End Plate	B	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	ΝΛ
Structural Integrity	Lifting Lug and Pad	В	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Operations	Wheel Track	С	ASME Section III; Subsection NF	SA-36	36 ( yield)	See Note 5	ΝΛ
Operations	Door Handle	NITS	Non-code	C/S or S/S	NΛ	See Note 5	NA
Operations	Door Wheels	NITS	Non-code	Forged Steel	ΝΛ	NA	NA
Operations	Door Stop Block	C	Non-code	SA516-70	See Table 3.3.2	See Note 5	NA
Operations	Door Stop Block Bolt	С	Non-code	SA193-B7	See Table 3.3.4	NA	NΛ

Notes: 1) There are no known residuals on finished component surfaces

- 2) All welding processes used in welding the components shall be qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX. All welds shall be made using welders qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX. Weld material shall meet the requirements of ASME Section II and the applicable Subsection of ASME Section III.
- 3) Component nomenclature taken from Bill of Materials in Chapter 1.
- 4) A, B, and C denote important to safety classifications as described in the Holtec QA Program. NITS stands for Not Important to Safety.
- 5) All external surfaces to be painted with Carboline 890. Top surface of doors to be painted with Thermaline 450.

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HI-STORM 100 Component	Material Procurement	Design	Fabrication	Inspection
Overpack steel structure	Section II, Section III, Subsection NF, NF-2000	Section III, Subsection NF, NF-3200	Section III, Subsection NF, NF-4000	Section III, Subsection NF, NF-5350, NF- 5360 and Section V
Anchor Studs for HI-STORM 100A	Section II, Section III, Subsection NF, NF-2000*	Section III, Subsection NF, NF- 3300	NA	NA
MPC confinement boundary	Section II, Section III, Subsection NB, NB-2000	Section III, Subsection NB, NB-3200	Section III, Subsection NB, NB-4000	Section III, Subsection NB, NB-5000 and Section V
MPC fuel basket	Section II, Section III, Subsection NG, NG-2000; core support structures (NG- 1121)	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-3300 and NG-3200; core support structures (NG-1121)	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-4000; core support structures (NG-1121)	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-5000 and Section V; core support structures (NG-1121)
HI-TRAC Trunnions	Section II, Section III, Subsection NF, NF-2000	ANSI 14.6	Section III, Subsection NF, NF-4000	See Chapter 9
MPC basket supports (Angled Plates)	Section II, Section III, Subsection NG, NG-2000; internal structures (NG-1122)	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-3300 and NG-3200; internal structures (NG- 1122)	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-4000; internal structures (NG- 1122)	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-5000 and Section V; internal structures (NG-1122)
HI-TRAC steel structure	Section II, Section III, Subsection NF, NF-2000	Section III, Subsection NF, NF-3300	Section III, Subsection NF, NF-4000	Section III, Subsection NF, NF-5360 and Section V
Damaged fuel container	Section II, Section III, Subsection NG, NG-2000	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-3300 and NG-3200	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-4000	Section III, Subsection NG, NG-5000 and Section V
Overpack concrete	ACI 349 as specified by Appendix 1.D	ACI 349 and ACI 318-95 as specified by Appendix 1.D	ACI 349 as specified by Appendix 1.D	ACI 349 as specified by Appendix 1.D

#### HI-STORM 100 ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL CODE APPLICABILITY

\* Except impact testing shall be determined based on service temperature and material type.

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# ADDITIONAL DESIGN INPUT DATA FOR NORMAL, OFF-NORMAL, AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

Item	Condition	Value
Snow Pressure Loading (lb./ft <sup>2</sup> )	Normal	100
Constriction of MPC Basket Vent Opening By Crud Settling (Depth of Crud, in.)	Accident	0.85 (MPC-68) 0.36 (MPC-24 and MPC-32)
Cask Environment During the Postulated Fire Event (Deg. F)	Accident	1475
HI-STORM Overpack Fire Duration (seconds)	Accident	217
HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Fire Duration (minutes)	Accident	4.8
Maximum submergence depth due to flood (ft)	Accident	125
Flood water velocity (ft/s)	Accident	15
Interaction Relation for Horizontal & Vertical acceleration for HI-STORM	Accident	$G_H + 0.53 G_V = 0.53^{\dagger\dagger}$ (HI-STORM 100, 100S, and 100S Version B) $G_H = 2.12; G_V = 1.5$ (HI-STORM 100A)
Net Overturning Moment at base of HI-STORM 100A (ft-lb)	Accident	18.7x10 <sup>6</sup>
HI-STORM 100 Overpack Vertical Lift Height Limit (in.)	Accident	11 <sup>†††</sup> (HI-STORM 100 and 100S), OR By Users (HI-STORM 100A)
HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Horizontal Lift Height Limit (in.)	Accident	42***

<sup>††</sup> See Subsection 3.4.7.1 for definition of G<sub>H</sub> and G<sub>V</sub>. The coefficient of friction may be increased above 0.53 based on testing described in Subsection 3.4.7.1

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†††</sup> For ISFSI and subgrade design parameter Sets A and B. Users may also develop a site-specific lift height limit.

PARAMETER	PARAMETER SET "A" <sup>†</sup>	PARAMETER SET "B"
Concrete thickness, t <sub>p</sub> , (inches)	<u>≤</u> 36	<u>≤</u> 28
Concrete Compressive Strength (at 28 days), fc', (psi)	<u>≤</u> 4,200	≤ 6,000 psi
Reinforcement Top and Bottom (both directions)	Reinforcing bar shall be 60 ksi Yield Strength ASTM Material	Reinforcing bar shall be 60 ksi Yield Strength ASTM Material
Subgrade Effective Modulus of Elasticity <sup>††</sup> (measured prior to ISFSI pad installation), E, (psi)	≤28,000	<u>≤</u> 16,000

#### EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTABLE ISFSI PAD DESIGN PARAMETERS

NOTE: A static coefficient of friction of  $\geq 0.53$  between the ISFSI pad and the bottom of the overpack shall be verified by test. The test procedure shall follow the guidelines included in the Sliding Analysis in Subsection 3.4.7.1.

<sup>†</sup> The characteristics of this pad are identical to the pad considered by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (see Appendix 3.A).

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An acceptable method of defining the soil effective modulus of elasticity applicable to the drop and tipover analysis is provided in Table 13 of NUREG/CR-6608 with soil classification in accordance with ASTM-D2487 Standard Classification of Soils for Engineering Purposes (Unified Soil Classification System USCS) and density determination in accordance with ASTM-D1586 Standard Test Method for Penetration Test and Split/Barrel Sampling of Soils.

STRESS CATEGORY	DESIGN	LEVELS A & B	LEVEL D <sup>††</sup>
Primary Membrane, P <sub>m</sub>	Sm	N/A <sup>†††</sup>	AMIN (2.4S <sub>m</sub> , .7S <sub>u</sub> )
Local Membrane, P <sub>L</sub>	1.5Sm	N/A	150% of P <sub>m</sub> Limit
Membrane plus Primary Bending	1.5Sm	N/A	150% of P <sub>m</sub> Limit
Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending	1.5S <sub>m</sub>	N/A	150% of P <sub>m</sub> Limit
Membrane plus Primary Bending plus Secondary	N/A	3S <sub>m</sub>	N/A
Average Shear Stress <sup>††††</sup>	0.6S <sub>m</sub>	0.6S <sub>m</sub>	0.42S <sub>u</sub>

#### Table 2.2.10 MPC CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY STRESS INTENSITY LIMITS FOR DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS (ELASTIC ANALYSIS PER NB-3220)<sup>†</sup>

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Stress combinations including F (peak stress) apply to fatigue evaluations only.
 Governed by Appendix F, Paragraph F-1331 of the ASME Code, Section III.
 No Specific stress limit applicable.
 Governed by NB-3227.2 or F-1331.1(d).

# MPC BASKET STRESS INTENSITY LIMITS FOR DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS (ELASTIC ANALYSIS PER NG-3220)

STRESS CATEGORY	DESIGN	LEVELS A & B	LEVEL $D^{\dagger}$
Primary Membrane, P <sub>m</sub>	S <sub>m</sub>	Sm	AMIN $(2.4S_m, .7S_u)^{\dagger\dagger}$
Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending	1.5S <sub>m</sub>	1.5S <sub>m</sub>	150% of P <sub>m</sub> Limit
Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending plus Secondary	N/A <sup>†††</sup>	3S <sub>m</sub>	N/A

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Governed by Appendix F, Paragraph F-1331 of the ASME Code, Section III. Governed by NB-3227.2 or F-1331.1(d). t

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ttt No specific stress intensity limit applicable.

#### Table 2.2.12 STRESS LIMITS FOR DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS FOR THE STEEL STRUCTURE OF THE OVERPACK AND HI-TRAC (ELASTIC ANALYSIS PER NF-3260)

		SERVICI	E CONDITION
STRESS CATEGORY	DESIGN + LEVEL A	LEVEL B	LEVEL D <sup>†</sup>
Primary Membrane, P <sub>m</sub>	S	1.33S	AMAX (1.2S <sub>y</sub> , 1.5S <sub>m</sub> ) but < .7S <sub>u</sub>
Primary Membrane, P <sub>m</sub> , plus Primary Bending, P <sub>b</sub>	1.5S	1.9958	150% of P <sub>m</sub>
Shear Stress (Average)	0.65	0.65	<0.42S <sub>u</sub>

**Definitions:** 

S = Allowable Stress Value for Table 1A, ASME Section II, Part D.

 $S_m$  = Allowable Stress Intensity Value from Table 2A, ASME Section II, Part D

 $S_{\mu} = Ultimate Strength$ 

Governed by Appendix F, Paragraph F-1332 of the ASME Code, Section III. HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

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# NOTATION FOR DESIGN LOADINGS FOR NORMAL, OFF-NORMAL, AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

NORMAL CONDITION				
LOADING	NOTATION			
Dead Weight	D			
Handling Loads	Н			
Design Pressure (Internal)	Pi			
Design Pressure (External) <sup>†</sup>	Po			
Snow	S			
Operating Temperature	Т			
OFF-NORMAI	CONDITION			
Loading	Notation			
Off-Normal Pressure (Internal)	P <sub>i</sub> '			
Off-Normal Pressure (External) <sup>†</sup>	Po			
Off-Normal Temperature	Τ'			
Off-Normal HI-TRAC Handling	H,			

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> External Design Pressure P<sub>o</sub> bounds off-normal external pressures. Similarly, Accident pressures P<sub>i</sub><sup>\*</sup> and P<sub>o</sub><sup>\*</sup>, respectively, bound actual internal and external pressures under all postulated environment phenomena and accident events.

# NOTATION FOR DESIGN LOADINGS FOR NORMAL, OFF-NORMAL, AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

ACCIDENT CONDITIONS				
LOADING	NOTATION			
Handling Accident	H'			
Earthquake	Е			
Fire	T <sup>*</sup>			
Tornado Missile	М			
Tornado Wind	W'			
Flood	F			
Explosion	E			
Accident Pressure (Internal)	P <sub>i</sub> •			
Accident Pressure (External)	Po*			

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CONDITION	LOADING CASE	МРС	OVERPACK	HI-TRAC
Design (ASME Code Pressure Compliance)	1	P <sub>i</sub> , P <sub>o</sub>	N/A	N/A
Normal (Level A)	1	D,T,H,P <sub>i</sub>	D,T,H	D, T <sup>†††</sup> , H, P <sub>i (water jacket)</sub>
	2	D,T,H,P <sub>o</sub>	N/A	N/A
Off-Normal (Level B)	1	D, T', H, P <sub>i</sub> '	D, T', H	N/A <sup>†††</sup> (H' pocket trunnion)
	2	D,T,H,P。	N/A	N/A
	1	D, T, P <sub>i</sub> , H'	D, T, H'	D,T,H'
Accident (Level D)	2	D, T <sup>•</sup> , P <sub>i</sub> <sup>•</sup>	N/A	N/A
	3	D, T, P.*****	D, T, P <sub>o</sub> <sup>•</sup> ††††	D, T, P <sub>o</sub> <sup>•††††</sup>
	4	N/A	D, T, (E, M, F, W') <sup>†††††</sup>	D, T, (M, W') <sup>†††††</sup>

 Table 2.2.14

 APPLICABLE LOAD CASES AND COMBINATIONS FOR EACH CONDITION AND COMPONENT<sup>1, 11</sup>

<sup>†</sup> The loading notations are given in Table 2.2.13. Each symbol represents a loading type and may have different values for different components. The different loads are assumed to be additive and applied simultaneously.

<sup>††</sup> N/A stands for "Not Applicable."

<sup>†††</sup> T (normal condition) for the HI-TRAC is 100°F and P<sub>i(water jacket)</sub> is 60 psig and, therefore, there is no off-normal temperature or load combination because Load Case 1, Normal (Level A), is identical to Load Case 1, Off-Normal (Level B). Only the off-normal handling load on the pocket trunnion is analyzed separately.

<sup> $\dagger$ </sup> the external pressure due to explosion.

<sup>ttttt</sup> (E, M, F, W') means loads are considered separately in combination with D, T. E and F not applicable to HI-TRAC.

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Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
MPC, MPC basket assembly, HI- STORM overpack steel structure, and HI-TRAC transfer cask steel structure.	Subsection NCA	General Requirements. Requires preparation of a Design Specification, Design Report, Overpressure Protection Report, Certification of Construction Report, Data Report, and other administrative controls for an ASME Code stamped vessel.	Because the MPC, overpack, and transfer cask are not ASME Code stamped vessels, none of the specifications, reports, certificates, or other general requirements specified by NCA are required. In lieu of a Design Specification and Design Report, the HI- STORM FSAR includes the design criteria, service conditions, and load combinations for the design and operation of the HI-STORM 100 System as well as the results of the stress analyses to demonstrate that applicable Code stress limits are met. Additionally, the fabricator is not required to have an ASME-certified QA program. All important-to-safety activities are governed by the NRC-approved Holtec QA program. Because the cask components are not certified to the Code, the terms "Certificate Holder" and "Inspector" are not germane to the manufacturing of NRC- certified cask components. To eliminate ambiguity, the responsibilities assigned to the Certificate Holder in the various articles of Subsections NB, NG, and NF of the Code, as applicable, shall be interpreted to apply to the NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) holder (and by extension, to the component fabricator) if the requirement must be fulfilled. The Code term "Inspector" means the QA/QC personnel of the CoC holder and its vendors assigned to oversee and inspect the manufacturing process.

# LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

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# LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
МРС	NB-1100	Statement of requirements for Code stamping of components.	MPC enclosure vessel is designed and will be fabricated in accordance with ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB to the maximum practical extent, but Code stamping is not required.
MPC basket supports and lift lugs	NB-1130	NB-1132.2(d) requires that the first connecting weld of a nonpressure-retaining structural attachment to a component shall be considered part of the component unless the weld is more than 2t from the pressure-retaining portion of the component, where t is the nominal thickness of the pressure-retaining material. NB-1132.2(e) requires that the first connecting weld of a welded nonstructural attachment to a component shall conform to NB-4430 if the connecting weld is within 2t from the pressure- retaining portion of the component.	The MPC basket supports (nonpressure-retaining structural attachment) and lift lugs (nonstructural attachments (relative to the function of lifting a loaded MPC) that are used exclusively for lifting an empty MPC) are welded to the inside of the pressure- retaining MPC shell, but are not designed in accordance with Subsection NB. The basket supports and associated attachment welds are designed to satisfy the stress limits of Subsection NG and the lift lugs and associated attachment welds are designed to satisfy the stress limits of Subsection NF, as a minimum. These attachments and their welds are shown by analysis to meet the respective stress limits for their service conditions. Likewise, non-structural items, such as shield plugs, spacers, etc. if used, can be attached to pressure-retaining parts in the same manner.

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#### LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
МРС	NB-2000	Requires materials to be supplied by ASME- approved material supplier.	Materials will be supplied by Holtec approved suppliers with Certified Material Test Reports (CMTRs) in accordance with NB-2000 requirements.
MPC, MPC basket assembly, HI- STORM overpack, and HI-TRAC transfer cask	NB-3100 NG-3100 NF-3100	Provides requirements for determining design loading conditions, such as pressure, temperature, and mechanical loads.	These requirements are not applicable. The HI- STORM FSAR, serving as the Design Specification, establishes the service conditions and load combinations for the storage system.
MPC	NB-3350	NB-3352.3 requires, for Category C joints, that the minimum dimensions of the welds and throat thickness shall be as shown in Figure NB- 4243-1.	Due to MPC basket-to-shell interface requirements, the MPC shell-to-baseplate weld joint design (designated Category C) does not include a reinforcing fillet weld or a bevel in the MPC baseplate, which makes it different than any of the representative configurations depicted in Figure NB-4243-1. The transverse thickness of this weld is equal to the thickness of the adjoining shell (1/2 inch). The weld is designed as a full penetration weld that receives VT and RT or UT, as well as final surface PT examinations. Because the MPC shell design thickness is considerably larger than the minimum thickness required by the Code, a reinforcing fillet weld that would intrude into the MPC cavity space is not included. Not including this fillet weld provides for a higher quality radiographic examination of the full penetration weld. From the standpoint of stress analysis, the fillet weld serves to reduce the local bending stress (secondary stress) produced by the gross structural discontinuity defined by the flat plate/shell junction. In the MPC design, the shell and baseplate thicknesses are well beyond that required to meet their respective membrane stress intensity limits.

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# LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
MPC, MPC basket assembly, HI- STORM overpack steel structure, and HI-TRAC transfer cask steel structure	NB-4120 NG-4120 NF-4120	NB-4121.2, NG-4121.2, and NF-4121.2 provide requirements for repetition of tensile or impact tests for material subjected to heat treatment during fabrication or installation.	In-shop operations of short duration that apply heat to a component, such as plasma cutting of plate stock, welding, machining, coating, and pouring of lead are not, unless explicitly stated by the Code, defined as heat treatment operations. For the steel parts in the HI-STORM 100 System components, the duration for which a part exceeds the off-normal temperature limit defined in Chapter 2 of the FSAR shall be limited to 24 hours in a particular manufacturing process (such as the HI-TRAC lead pouring process).
MPC, HI-STORM overpack steel structure, HI-TRAC transfer cask steel structure	NB-4220 NF-4220	Requires certain forming tolerances to be met for cylindrical, conical, or spherical shells of a vessel.	The cylindricity measurements on the rolled shells are not specifically recorded in the shop travelers, as would be the case for a Code-stamped pressure vessel. Rather, the requirements on inter-component clearances (such as the MPC-to-transfer cask) are guaranteed through fixture-controlled manufacturing. The fabrication specification and shop procedures ensure that all dimensional design objectives, including inter-component annular clearances are satisfied. The dimensions required to be met in fabrication are chosen to meet the functional requirements of the dry storage components. Thus, although the post-forming Code cylindricity requirements are not evaluated for compliance directly, they are indirectly satisfied (actually exceeded) in the final manufactured components.
MPC Lid and Closure Ring Welds	NB-4243	Full penetration welds required for Category C	MPC lid and closure ring are not full penetration welds. They are welded independently to provide a

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# LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
		Joints (flat head to main shell per NB-3352.3)	redundant seal. Additionally, a weld efficiency factor of 0.45 has been applied to the analyses of these welds.
MPC Closure Ring, Vent and Drain Cover Plate Welds	NB-5230	Radiographic (RT) or ultrasonic (UT) examination required.	Root (if more than one weld pass is required) and final liquid penetrant examination to be performed in accordance with NB-5245. The closure ring provides independent redundant closure for vent and drain cover plates.
MPC Lid to Shell Weld	NB-5230	Radiographic (RT) or ultrasonic (UT) examination required.	Only UT or multi-layer liquid penetrant (PT) examination is permitted. If PT examination alone is used, at a minimum, it will include the root and final weld layers and each approx. 3/8" of weld depth.
MPC Enclosure Vessel and Lid	NB-6111	All completed pressure retaining systems shall be pressure tested.	The MPC vessel is seal welded in the field following fuel assembly loading. The MPC vessel shall then be pressure tested as defined in Chapter 9. Accessibility for leakage inspections preclude a Code compliant pressure test. All MPC vessel welds (except closure ring and vent/drain cover plate) are inspected by volumetric examination, except the MPC lid-to-shell weld shall be verified by volumetric or multi-layer PT examination. If PT alone is used, at a minimum, it must include the root and final layers and each approximately 3/8 inch of weld depth. For either UT or PT, the maximum undetectable flaw size must be determined in accordance with ASME Section XI methods. The critical flaw size shall not cause the primary stress limits of NB-3000 to be exceeded. The inspection results, including relevant findings (indications) shall be made a permanent part of the user's records by video, photographic, of other means which provide an equivalent record of weld integrity. The video or photographic records should be taken during the final interpretation period described in ASME Section V, Article 6. T-676. The vent/drain cover plate and the closure ring

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Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
			welds are confirmed by liquid penetrant examination. The inspection of the weld must be performed by qualified personnel and shall meet the acceptance requirements of ASME Code Section III, NB-5350 for PT or NB-5332 for UT.
MPC Enclosure Vessel	NB-7000	Vessels are required to have overpressure protection.	No overpressure protection is provided. Function of MPC enclosure vessel is to contain radioactive contents under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage. MPC vessel is designed to withstand maximum internal pressure considering 100% fuel rod failure and maximum accident temperatures.
MPC Enclosure Vessel	NB-8000	States requirements for nameplates, stamping and reports per NCA-8000.	The HI-STORM 100 System is to be marked and identified in accordance with 10CFR71 and 10CFR72 requirements. Code stamping is not required. QA data package to be in accordance with Holtec approved QA program.
MPC Basket Assembly	NG-2000	Requires materials to be supplied by ASME approved Material Supplier.	Materials will be supplied by Holtec approved supplier with CMTRs in accordance with NG-2000 requirements.

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# LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
MPC Basket Assembly	NG-4420	NG-4427(a) requires a fillet weld in any single continuous weld may be less that the specified fillet weld dimension by not more than 1/16 inch, provided that the total undersize portion of the weld does not exceed 10 percent of the length of the weld. Individual undersize weld portions shall not exceed 2 inches in length.	Modify the Code requirement (intended for core support structures) with the following text prepared to accord with the geometry and stress analysis imperatives for the fuel basket: For the longitudinal MPC basket fillet welds, the following criteria apply: 1) The specified fillet weld throat dimension must be maintained over at least 92 percent of the total weld length. All regions of undersized weld must be less than 3 inches long and separated from each other by at least 9 inches. 2) Areas of undercuts and porosity beyond that allowed by the applicable ASME Code shall not exceed 1/2 inch in weld length. The total length of undercut and porosity over any 1-foot length shall not exceed 2 inches. 3) The total weld length in which items (1) and (2) apply shall not exceed a total of 10 percent of the overall weld length. The limited access of the MPC basket panel longitudinal fillet welds makes it difficult to perform effective repairs of these welds and creates the potential for causing additional damage to the basket assembly (e.g., to the neutron absorber and its sheathing) if repairs are attempted. The acceptance criteria provided in the foregoing have been established to comport with the objectives of the basket design and preserve the margins demonstrated in the supporting stress analysis. From the structural standpoint, the weld acceptance criteria are established to ensure that any departure from the ideal, continuous fillet weld seam would not alter the primary bending stresses on which the design of the fuel baskets is predicated. Stated differently, the permitted weld discontinuities are limited in size to ensure that they remain classifiable as local stress elevators ("peak stress", F, in the ASME Code for which specific stress intensity limits do not apply).

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## LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
MPC Basket Assembly	NG-8000	States requirements for nameplates, stamping and reports per NCA-8000.	The HI-STORM 100 System is to be marked and identified in accordance with 10CFR71 and 10CFR72 requirements. No Code stamping is required. The MPC basket data package is to be in conformance with Holtec's QA program.
Overpack Steel Structure	NF-2000	Requires materials to be supplied by ASME approved Material Supplier.	Materials will be supplied by Holtec approved supplier with CMTRs in accordance with NF-2000 requirements.
HI-TRAC Steel Structure	NF-2000	Requires materials to be supplied by ASME approved Material Supplier.	Materials will be supplied by Holtec approved supplier with CMTRs in accordance with NF-2000 requirements.
Overpack Baseplate and Lid Top Plate	NF-4441	Requires special examinations or requirements for welds where a primary member thickness of 1" or greater is loaded to transmit loads in the through thickness direction.	The margins of safety in these welds under loads experienced during lifting operations or accident conditions are quite large. The overpack baseplate welds to the inner shell, pedestal shell, and radial plates are only loaded during lifting conditions and have large safety factors during lifting. Likewise, the top lid plate to lid shell weld has a large structural margin under the inertia loads imposed during a non-mechanistic tipover event.

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# LIST OF ASME CODE EXCEPTIONS FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Component	Reference ASME Code Section/Article	Code Requirement	Exception, Justification & Compensatory Measures
Overpack Steel Structure	NF-3256 NF-3266	Provides requirements for welded joints.	Welds for which no structural credit is taken are identified as "Non-NF" welds in the design drawings by an "*". These non-structural welds are specified in accordance with the pre-qualified welds of AWS D1.1. These welds shall be made by welders and weld procedures qualified in accordance with AWS D1.1 or ASME Section IX. Welds for which structural credit is taken in the safety analyses shall meet the stress limits for NF-3256.2, but are not required to meet the joint configuration requirements specified in these Code articles. The geometry of the joint designs in the cask structures are based on the fabricability and accessibility of the joint, not generally contemplated by this Code section governing supports.
HI-STORM Overpack and HI- TRAC Transfer Cask	NF-3320 NF-4720	NF-3324.6 and NF-4720 provide requirements for bolting	These Code requirements are applicable to linear structures wherein bolted joints carry axial, shear, as well as rotational (torsional) loads. The overpack and transfer cask bolted connections in the structural load path are qualified by design based on the design loadings defined in the FSAR. Bolted joints in these components see no shear or torsional loads under normal storage conditions. Larger clearances between bolts and holes may be necessary to ensure shear interfaces located elsewhere in the structure engage prior to the bolts experiencing shear loadings (which occur only during side impact scenarios). Bolted joints that are subject to shear loads in accident conditions are qualified by appropriate stress analysis. Larger bolt-to-hole clearances help ensure more efficient operations in making these bolted connections, thereby minimizing time spent by operations personnel in a radiation area. Additionally, larger bolt-to-hole clearances allow interchangeability of the lids from one particular fabricated cask to another.

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#### COMPARISON BETWEEN HI-STORM MPC LOADINGS WITH HI-STAR MPC LOADINGS<sup>†</sup>

Loading Condition	Difference Between MPC Loadings Under HI-STAR and HI-STORM Conditions
Dead Load	Unchanged
Design Internal Pressure (normal, off-normal, & accident)	Unchanged
Design External Pressure (normal, off-normal, & accident)	HI-STORM normal and off-normal external pressure is ambient which is less than the HI-STAR 40 psig. The accident external pressure is unchanged.
Thermal Gradient (normal, off- normal, & accident)	Determined by analysis in Chapters 3 and 4
Handling Load (normal)	Unchanged
Earthquake (accident)	Inertial loading increased less than 0.1g's (for free-standing overpack designs).
Handling Load (accident)	HI-STORM vertical and horizontal deceleration loadings are less than those in HI-STAR, but the HI-STORM cavity inner diameter is different and therefore the horizontal loading on the MPC is analyzed in Chapter 3.

<sup>†</sup>HI-STAR MPC loadings are those specified in HI-STAR SARs under Docket Numbers 71-9261 and 72-1008.

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# 2.3 SAFETY PROTECTION SYSTEMS

#### 2.3.1 General

The HI-STORM 100 System is engineered to provide for the safe long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The HI-STORM 100 will withstand all normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions without any uncontrolled release of radioactive material or excessive radiation exposure to workers or members of the public. Special considerations in the design have been made to ensure long-term integrity and confinement of the stored SNF throughout all cask operating conditions. The design considerations which have been incorporated into the HI-STORM 100 System to ensure safe long-term fuel storage are:

- 1. The MPC confinement barrier is an enclosure vessel designed in accordance with the ASME Code, Subsection NB with confinement welds inspected by radiography (RT) or ultrasonic testing (UT). Where RT or UT is not possible, a redundant closure system is provided with field welds which are pressure tested and/or inspected by the liquid penetrant method (see Section 9.1).
- 2. The MPC confinement barrier is surrounded by the HI-STORM overpack which provides for the physical protection of the MPC.
- 3. The HI-STORM 100 System is designed to meet the requirements of storage while maintaining the safety of the SNF.
- 4. The SNF once initially loaded in the MPC does not require opening of the canister for repackaging to transport the SNF.
- 5. The decay heat emitted by the SNF is rejected from the HI-STORM 100 System through passive means. No active cooling systems are employed.

It is recognized that a rugged design with large safety margins is essential, but that is not sufficient to ensure acceptable performance over the service life of any system. A carefully planned oversight and surveillance plan, which does not diminish system integrity but provides reliable information on the effect of passage of time on the performance of the system is essential. Such a surveillance and performance assay program will be developed to be compatible with the specific conditions of the licensee's facility where the HI-STORM 100 System is installed. The general requirements for the acceptance testing and maintenance programs are provided in Chapter 9. Surveillance requirements are specified in the Technical Specifications in Appendix A to the CoC.

The structures, systems, and components of the HI-STORM 100 System designated as important to safety are identified in Table 2.2.6. Similar categorization of structures, systems, and components, which are part of the ISFSI, but not part of the HI-STORM 100 System, will

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be the responsibility of the 10CFR72 licensee. For HI-STORM 100A, the ISFSI pad is designated ITS, Category C as discussed in Subsection 2.0.4.1.

#### 2.3.2 <u>Protection by Multiple Confinement Barriers and Systems</u>

#### 2.3.2.1 Confinement Barriers and Systems

The radioactivity which the HI-STORM 100 System must confine originates from the spent fuel assemblies and, to a lesser extent, the contaminated water in the fuel pool. This radioactivity is confined by multiple confinement barriers.

Radioactivity from the fuel pool water is minimized by preventing contact, removing the contaminated water, and decontamination.

An inflatable seal in the annular gap between the MPC and HI-TRAC, and the elastomer seal in the HI-TRAC pool lid prevent the fuel pool water from contacting the exterior of the MPC and interior of the HI-TRAC while submerged for fuel loading. The fuel pool water is drained from the interior of the MPC and the MPC internals are dried. The exterior of the HI-TRAC has a painted surface which is decontaminated to acceptable levels. Any residual radioactivity deposited by the fuel pool water is confined by the MPC confinement boundary along with the spent nuclear fuel.

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed with several confinement barriers for the radioactive fuel contents. Intact fuel assemblies have cladding which provides the first boundary preventing release of the fission products. Fuel assemblies classified as damaged fuel or fuel debris are placed in a damaged fuel container which restricts the release of fuel debris. The MPC is a seal welded enclosure which provides the confinement boundary. The MPC confinement boundary is defined by the MPC baseplate, shell, lid, closure ring, and port cover plates.

The MPC confinement boundary has been designed to withstand any postulated off-normal operations, internal change, or external natural phenomena. The MPC is designed to endure normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage with the maximum decay heat loads without loss of confinement. Designed in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB, with certain NRC-approved alternatives, the MPC confinement boundary provides assurance that there will be no release of radioactive materials from the cask under all postulated loading conditions. Redundant closure of the MPC is provided by the MPC closure ring welds which provide a second barrier to the release of radioactive material from the MPC internal cavity. Therefore, no monitoring system for the confinement boundary is required.

Confinement is discussed further in Chapter 7. MPC field weld examinations, and pressure testing are performed to verify the confinement function. Fabrication inspections and tests are also performed, as discussed in Chapter 9, to verify the confinement boundary.

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#### 2.3.2.2 Cask Cooling

To facilitate the passive heat removal capability of the HI-STORM 100, several thermal design criteria are established for normal and off-normal conditions. They are as follows:

- The heat rejection capacity of the HI-STORM 100 System is deliberately understated by conservatively determining the design basis fuel that maximizes thermal resistance (see Section 2.1.6). Additional margin is built into the calculated cask cooling rate by using the design basis fuel assembly that offers maximum resistance to MPC internal helium circulation.
- The MPC fuel basket is formed by a honeycomb structure of stainless steel plates with full-length edge-welded intersections, which allows the unimpaired conduction of heat.
- The MPC confinement boundary ensures that the helium atmosphere inside the MPC is maintained during normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage and transfer. The MPC confinement boundary maintains the helium confinement atmosphere below the design temperatures and pressures stated in Table 2.2.3 and Table 2.2.1, respectively.
- The MPC thermal design maintains the fuel rod cladding temperatures below the values stated in Chapter 4 such that fuel cladding is not degraded during the long term storage period.
- The HI-STORM is optimally designed with cooling vents and an MPC to overpack annulus which maximize air flow, while providing superior radiation shielding. The vents and annulus allow cooling air to circulate past the MPC removing the decay heat.

#### 2.3.3 Protection by Equipment and Instrumentation Selection

#### 2.3.3.1 Equipment

Design criteria for the HI-STORM 100 System are described in Section 2.2. The HI-STORM 100 System may include use of ancillary or support equipment for ISFSI implementation. Ancillary equipment and structures utilized outside of the reactor facility's 10CFR Part 50 structures may be broken down into two broad categories, namely Important to Safety (ITS) ancillary equipment and Not Important to Safety (NITS) ancillary equipment. NUREG/CR-6407, "Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components According to Importance to Safety", provides guidance for the determination of a component's safety classification. Certain ancillary equipment (such as trailers, rail cars, skids, portable cranes, transporters, or air pads) are not required to be designated as ITS for most

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ISFSI implementations, if the HI-STORM 100 is designed to withstand the failure of these components.

The listing and ITS designation of ancillary equipment in Table 8.1.6 follows NUREG/CR-6407. ITS ancillary equipment utilized in activities that occur outside the 10CFR Part 50 structure shall be engineered to meet all functional, strength, service life, and operational safety requirements to ensure that the design and operation of the ancillary equipment is consistent with the intent of this Safety Analysis Report. The design for these components shall consider the following information, as applicable:

- 1. Functions and boundaries of the ancillary equipment
- 2. The environmental conditions of the ISFSI site, including tornado-borne missile, tornado wind, seismic, fire, lightning, explosion, ambient humidity limits, flood, tsunami and any other environmental hazards unique to the site.
- 3. Material requirements including impact testing requirements
- 4. Applicable codes and standards
- 5. Acceptance testing requirements
- 6. Quality assurance requirements
- 7. Foundation type and permissible loading
- 8. Applicable loads and load combinations
- 9. Pre-service examination requirements
- 10. In-use inspection and maintenance requirements
- 11. Number and magnitude of repetitive loading significant to fatigue
- 12. Insulation and enclosure requirements (on electrical motors and machinery)
- 13. Applicable Reg. Guides and NUREGs.
- 14. Welding requirements
- 15. Painting, marking, and identification requirements
- 16. Design Report documentation requirements
- 17. Operational and Maintenance (O&M) Manual information requirements

All design documentation shall be subject to a review, evaluation, and safety assessment process in accordance with the provisions of the QA program described in Chapter 13.

Users may effectuate the inter-cask transfer of the MPC between the HI-TRAC transfer cask and either the HI-STORM 100 or the HI-STAR 100 overpack in a location of their choice, depending upon site-specific needs and capabilities. For those users choosing to perform the MPC inter-cask transfer using devices not integral to structures governed by the regulations of | 10 CFR Part 50 (e.g., fuel handling or reactor building), a Cask Transfer Facility (CTF) is required. The CTF is a stand-alone facility located on-site, near the ISFSI that incorporates or is compatible with lifting devices designed to lift a loaded or unloaded HI-TRAC transfer cask, place it atop the overpack, and transfer the loaded MPC to or from the overpack. The detailed design criteria which must be followed for the design and operation of the CTF are set down in Paragraphs A through R below.

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The inter-cask transfer operations consist of the following potential scenarios of MPC transfer:

- Transfer between a HI-TRAC transfer cask and a HI-STORM overpack
- Transfer between a HI-TRAC transfer cask and a HI-STAR 100 overpack

In both scenarios, the standard design HI-TRAC is mounted on top of the overpack (HI-STAR 100, HI-STORM 100, HI-STORM 100S) and the MPC transfer is carried out by opening the transfer lid doors located at the bottom of the HI-TRAC transfer cask and by moving the MPC vertically to the cylindrical cavity of the recipient cask. For the HI-TRAC 125D design, the MPC transfer is carried out in a similar fashion, except that there is no transfer lid involved - the pool lid is removed while the transfer cask is mounted atop the HI-STORM overpack with the HI-STORM mating device located between the two casks (see Figure 1.2.18). However, the devices utilized to lift the HI-TRAC cask to place it on the overpack and to vertically transfer the MPC may be of stationary or mobile type.

The specific requirements for the CTF employing stationary and mobile lifting devices are somewhat different. The requirements provided in the following specification for the CTF apply to both types of lifting devices, unless explicitly differentiated in the text.

- 1. General Specifications:
  - i. The cask handling functions which may be required of the Cask Transfer Facility include:
    - a. Upending and downending of a HI-STAR 100 overpack on a flatbed rail car or other transporter (see Figure 2.3.1 for an example).
    - b. Upending and downending of a HI-TRAC transfer cask on a heavy-haul transfer trailer or other transporter (see Figure 2.3.2 for an example)
    - c. Raising and placement of a HI-TRAC transfer cask on top of a HI-STORM 100 overpack for MPC transfer operations (see Figure 2.3.3 for an example of the cask arrangement with the standard design HI-TRAC transfer cask. The HI-TRAC 125D design would include the mating device and no transfer lid).
    - Raising and placement of a HI-TRAC transfer cask on top of a HI-STAR 100 overpack for MPC transfer operations (see Figure 2.3.4 for an example of the cask arrangement with the standard

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design HI-TRAC transfer cask. The HI-TRAC 125D design would include the mating device and no transfer lid).

- e. MPC transfer between the HI-TRAC transfer cask and the HI-STORM overpack.
- f. MPC transfer between the HI-TRAC transfer cask and the HI-STAR 100 overpack.
- ii. Other Functional Requirements:

The CTF should possess facilities and capabilities to support cask operations such as :

- a. Devices and areas to support installation and removal of the HI-STORM overpack lid.
- b. Devices and areas to support installation and removal of the HI-STORM 100 overpack vent shield block inserts.
- c. Devices and areas to support installation and removal of the HI-STAR 100 closure plate.
- d. Devices and areas to support installation and removal of the HI-STAR 100 transfer collar.
- e. Features to support positioning and alignment of the HI-STORM overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask.
- f. Features to support positioning and alignment of the HI-STAR 100 overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask.
- g. Areas to support jacking of a loaded HI-STORM overpack for insertion of a translocation device underneath.
- h. Devices and areas to support placement of an empty MPC in the HI-TRAC transfer cask or HI-STAR 100 overpack
- i. Devices and areas to support receipt inspection of the MPC, HI-TRAC transfer cask, HI-STORM overpack, and HI-STAR overpack.

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- j. Devices and areas to support installation and removal of the HI-STORM mating device (HI-TRAC 125D only).
- iii. Definitions:

The components of the CTF covered by this specification consist of all structural members, lifting devices, and foundations which bear all or a significant portion of the dead load of the transfer cask or the multipurpose canister during MPC transfer operations. The definitions of key terms not defined elsewhere in this FSAR and used in this specification are provided below. The following terms are used to define key components of the CTF.

- Connector Brackets: The mechanical part used in the load path which connects to the cask trunnions. A fabricated weldment, slings, and turnbuckles are typical examples of connector brackets.
- CTF structure: The CTF structure is the stationary, anchored portion of the CTF which provides the required structural function to support MPC transfer operations, including lateral stabilization of the HI-TRAC transfer cask and, if required, the overpack, to protect against seismic events. The MPC lifter, if used in the CTF design, is integrated into the CTF structure (see Lifter Mount).
- HI-TRAC lifter(s): The HI-TRAC lifter is the mechanical lifting device, typically consisting of jacks or hoists, that is utilized to lift a loaded or unloaded HI-TRAC to the required elevation in the CTF so that it can be mounted on the overpack.<sup>†</sup>
- Lifter Mount: A beam-like structure (part of the CTF structure) that supports the HI-TRAC and MPC lifter(s).
- Lift Platform: The lift platform is the intermediate structure that transfers the vertical load of the HI-TRAC transfer cask to the HI-TRAC lifters.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The term overpack is used in this specification as a generic term for the HI-STAR 100 and the various HI-STORM overpacks.

- Mobile crane: A mobile crane is a device defined in ASME B30.5-1994, Mobile and Locomotive Cranes. A mobile crane may be used in lieu of the HI-TRAC lifter and/or an MPC lifter provided all requirements set forth in this subsection are satisfied.
- MPC lifter: The MPC lifter is a mechanical lifting device, typically consisting of jacks or hoists, that is utilized to vertically transfer the MPC between the HI-TRAC transfer cask and the overpack.
- Pier: The portion of the reinforced concrete foundation which projects above the concrete floor of the CTF.
- Single-Failure-Proof (SFP): A single-failure-proof handling device is one wherein all directly loaded tension and compression members are engineered to satisfy the enhanced safety criteria given in of NUREG-0612.
- Translocation Device: A low vertical profile device used to laterally position an overpack such that the bottom surface of the overpack is fully supported by the top surface of the device. Typical translocation devices are air pads and Hillman rollers.
- iv. Important to Safety Designation:

All components and structures which comprise the CTF shall be given an ITS category designation in accordance with a written procedure which is consistent with NUREG/CR-6407 and the Holtec quality assurance program.

- B. Environmental and Design Conditions
  - i. Lowest Service Temperature (LST): The LST for the CTF is 0°F (consistent with the specification for the HI-TRAC transfer cask in Subsection 3.1.2.3).
  - ii. Snow and Ice Load, S: The CTF structure shall be designed to withstand the dead weight of snow and ice for unheated structures as set forth in ASCE 7-88 [2.2.2] for the specific ISFSI site.

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iii. Tornado Missile, M, and Tornado Wind,W': The tornado wind and tornado-generated missile data applicable to the HI-STORM 100 System (Tables 2.2.4 and 2.2.5) will be used in the design of the CTF structure unless existing site design basis data or a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for the CTF site with due consideration of short operation durations indicates that a less severe tornado missile impact or wind loading on the CTF structure can be postulated. The PRA analysis can be performed in the manner of the EPRI Report NP-2005, "Tornado Missile Simulation and Design Methodology Computer Code Manual". USNRC Reg. Guide 1.117 and Section 2.2.3 of NUREG-800 may be used for guidance in establishing the appropriate tornado missile and wind loading for the CTF structure.

The following additional clarifications apply to the large tornado missile (4,000 lb. automobile) in Tables 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 in the CTF structure analysis:

- The missile has a planform area of 20 sq. ft. and impact force characteristics consistent with the HI-TRAC missile impact analysis.
- The large missile can strike the CTF structure in any orientation up to an elevation of 15 feet.

If the site tornado missile data developed by the ISFSI owner suggests that tornado missiles of greater kinetic energies than that postulated in this FSAR (Table 2.2.4 and 2.2.5) should be postulated for CTF during its use, then the integrity analysis of the CTF structure shall be carried out under the site-specific tornado missiles. This situation would also require the HI-TRAC transfer cask and the overpack to be re-evaluated under the provisions of 10CFR72.212 and 72.48.

The wind speed specified in this FSAR (Tables 2.2.4 and 2.2.5), likewise, shall be evaluated for their applicability to the site. Lower or higher site-specific wind velocity, compared to the design basis values cited in this FSAR shall be used if justified by appropriate analysis, which may include PRA.

Intermediate penetrant missile and small missiles postulated in this FSAR are not considered to be a credible threat to the functional

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integrity of the CTF structure and, therefore, need not be considered.

- iv. Flood: The CTF will be assumed to be flooded to the highest elevation for the CTF facility determined from the local meteorological data. The flood velocity shall be taken as the largest value defined for the ISFSI site.
- v. Lightning: Meteorological data for the region surrounding the ISFSI site shall be used to specify the applicable lightning input to the CTF structure for personnel safety evaluation purposes.
- vi. Water Waves (Tsunami, Y): Certain coastal CTF sites may be subject to sudden, short duration waves of water, denoted in the literature by various terms, such as tsunami. If the applicable meteorological data for the CTF site indicates the potential of such water-borne loadings on the CTF structure, then such a loading, with due consideration of the short duration of CTF operations, shall be defined for the CTF structure.
- vii. Design Basis Earthquake (DBE), E: The DBE event applicable to the CTF facility pursuant to 10CFR100, Appendix A, shall be specified. The DBE should be specified as a set of response spectra or acceleration time-histories for use in the CTF structural and impact consequence analyses.
- viii. Design Temperature: All material properties used in the stress analysis of the CTF structure shall u tilize a reference design temperature of 150°F.
- C. Heavy Load Handling:
  - i. Apparent dead load, D\*: The dead load of all components being lifted shall be increased in the manner set forth in Subsection 3.4.3 to define the Apparent Dead Load, D\*.
  - ii. NUREG-0612 Conformance:

The Connector Bracket, HI-TRAC lifter, and MPC lifter shall comply with the guidance provided in NUREG-0612 (1980) for single failure proof devices. Where the geometry of the lifting device is different from the configurations contemplated by NUREG-0612, the following exceptions apply:

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- a. Mobile cranes at the CTF shall conform to the guidelines of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 with the exception that mobile cranes shall meet the requirements of ANSI B30.5, "Mobile and Locomotive Cranes", in lieu of the requirements of ANSI B30.2, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes". The mobile crane used shall have a minimum safety factor of two over the allowable load table for the crane in accordance with Section 5.1.6(1)(a) of NUREG-0612, and shall be capable of stopping and holding the load during a DBE event.
- b. Section 5.1.6(2) of NUREG-0612 specifies that new cranes should be designed to meet the requirements of NUREG-0554. For mobile cranes, the guidance of Section 5.1.6(2) of NUREG-0612 does not apply.
- iii. Defense-in-Depth Measures:
  - a. The lift platform and the lifter mount shall be designed to ensure that the stresses produced under the apparent dead load, D\*, are less than the Level A (normal condition) stress limits for ASME Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3, linear structures.
  - b. The CTF structure shall be designed to ensure that the stresses produced in it under the apparent dead load, D\*, are less than the Level A (normal condition) stress limits for ASME Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3, linear structures.
  - c. Maximum deflection of the lift platform and the lifter mount under the apparent dead load shall comply with the limits set forth in CMAA-70.
  - d. When the HI-TRAC transfer cask is stacked on the overpack, HI-TRAC shall be either held by the lifting device or laterally restrained by the CTF structure. Furthermore, when the HI-TRAC transfer cask is placed atop the overpack, the overpack shall be laterally restrained from uncontrolled movement, if required by the analysis specified in Subsection 2.3.3.1.N.
  - e. The design of the lifting system shall ensure that the lift platform (or lift frame) is held horizontal at all times and that the symmetrically situated axial members are symmetrically loaded.

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- f. In order to minimize occupational radiation exposure to ISFSI personnel, design of the MPC lifting attachment (viz., sling) should not require any human activity inside the HI-TRAC cylindrical space.
- g. The HI-TRAC lifter and MPC lifter shall possess design features to avoid side-sway of the payload during lifting operations.
- h. The lifter (HI-TRAC and MPC) design shall ensure that any electrical malfunction in the motor or the power supply will not lead to an uncontrolled lowering of the load.
- i. The kinematic stability of HI-TRAC or HI-STORM standing upright in a n unrestrained configuration (if such a condition exists during the use of the CTF) shall be analytically evaluated and ensured under all postulated extreme environmental phenomena loadings for the CTF facility.
- iv. Shielding Surety:

The design of the HI-TRAC and MPC lifters shall preclude the potential for the MPC to be removed, completely or partially, from the cylindrical space formed by the HI-TRAC and the underlying overpack.

v. Specific Requirements for Mobile Cranes:

A mobile crane, if used in the CTF in the role of the HI-TRAC lifter or MPC lifter is governed in part by ANSI/ASME N45.2.15 with technical requirements specified in ANSI B30.5 (1994).

When lifting the MPC from an overpack to the HI-TRAC transfer cask, limit switches or load limiters shall be set to ensure that the mobile crane is prevented from lifting loads in excess of 110% of the loaded MPC weight.

An analysis of the consequences of a potential MPC vertical drop which conforms to the guidelines of Appendix A to NUREG-0612 shall be performed. The analysis shall demonstrate that a postulated drop would not result in the MPC experiencing a deceleration in excess of its design basis deceleration specified in this FSAR.

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- vi. Lift Height Limitation: The HI-TRAC lift heights shall be governed by the Technical Specifications.
- vii. Control of Side Sway: Procedures shall provide provisions to ensure that the load is lifted essentially vertically with positive control of the load. Key cask lifting and transfer procedures, as determined by the user, should be reviewed by the Certificate Holder before their use.
- D. Loads and Load Combinations for the CTF Structure

The applicable loadings for the CTF have been summarized in paragraph B in the preceding. A stress analysis of the CTF structure shall be performed to demonstrate compliance with the Subsection NF stress limits for Class 3 linear structures for the service condition germane to each load combination. Table 2.3.2 provides the load combinations (the symbols in Table 2.3.2 are defined in the preceding text and in Table 2.2.13).

- E. Materials and Failure Modes
  - i. Acceptable Materials and Material Properties: All materials used in the design of the CTF shall be ASTM approved or equal, consistent with the ITS category of the part. Reinforced concrete, if used, shall comply with the provisions of ACI 318 (89). The material property and allowable stress values for all steel structures shall be taken from the ASME and B&PV Code, Section II, wherever such data is available; otherwise, the data provided in the ASTM standards shall be used.
  - ii. Brittle Fracture: All structural components in the CTF structure and the lift platform designated as primary load bearing shall have an NDTT equal to 0°F or lower (consistent with the ductile fracture requirements for ASME Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 structures).
  - iii. Fatigue: Fatigue failure modes of primary structural members in the CTF structure whose failure may result in uncontrolled lowering of the HI-TRAC transfer cask or the MPC (critical members) shall be evaluated. A minimum factor of safety of 2 on the number of permissible loading cycles on the critical members shall apply.
  - iv. Buckling: For all critical members in the CTF structure (defined above), potential failure modes through buckling under axial compression shall be considered. The margin of safety against buckling shall comply with

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the provisions of ASME Section III, Subsection NF, for Class 3 linear structures.

F. CTF Pad

A reinforced concrete pad in conformance with the specification for the ISFSI pad set forth in this FSAR (see Table 2.2.9) may be used in the region of the CTF where the overpack and HI-TRAC are stacked for MPC transfer. Alternatively, the pad may be designed using the guidelines of ACI-318(89).

G. Miscellaneous Components

Hoist rings, turnbuckles, slings, and other appurtenances which are in the load path during heavy load handling at the CTF shall be single-failure-proof.

H. Structural Welds

All primary structural welds in the CTF structure shall comply with the specifications of ASME Section III for Class 3 NF linear structures.

I. Foundation

The design of the CTF structure foundation and piers, including load combinations, shall be in accordance with ACI-318(89).

J. Rail Access

The rail lines that enter the Cask Transfer Facility shall be set at grade level with no exposed rail ties or hardware other than the rail itself.

K. Vertical Cask Crawler/Translocation Device Access (If Required)

i. The cask handling bay in the CTF shall allow access of a vertical cask crawler or translocation device carrying a transfer cask or overpack. The building floor shall be equipped with a smooth transition to the cask travel route such that the vertical cask crawler tracks do not have to negotiate sharp lips or slope transitions and the translocation devices have a smooth transition. Grading of exterior aprons shall be no more than necessary to allow water drainage.

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- ii. If roll-up doors are used, the roll up doors shall have no raised threshold that could damage the vertical cask crawler tracks (if a crawler is used).
- iii. Exterior aprons shall be of a material that will not be damaged by the vertical cask crawler tracks, if a crawler is used.
- L. Facility Floor
  - i. The facility floor shall be sufficiently flat to allow optimum handling of casks with a translocation device.
  - ii. Any floor penetrations, in areas where translocation device operations may occur, shall be equipped with flush inserts.
  - iii. The rails, in areas where translocation device operations may occur shall be below the finish level of the floor. Flush inserts, if necessary, shall be sized for installation by hand.
- M. Cask Connector Brackets
  - i. Primary lifting attachments between the cask and the lifting platform are the cask connector brackets. The cask connector brackets may be lengthened or shortened to allow for differences in the vehicle deck height of the cask delivery vehicle and the various lifting operations. The connector brackets shall be designed to perform cask lifting, upending and downending functions. The brackets shall be designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 [Reference 2.2.3] and load tested at 300% of the load applied to them during normal handling.
  - ii. The connector brackets shall be equipped with a positive engagement to ensure that the cask lifting attachments do not become inadvertently disconnected during a seismic event and during normal cask handling operations.
  - iii. The design of the connector brackets shall ensure that the HI-TRAC transfer cask is fully secured against slippage during MPC transfer operations.

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#### N. Cask Restraint System

A time-history analysis of the stacked overpack/HI-TRAC transfer cask assemblage under the postulated ISFSI Level D events in Table 2.3.2 shall be performed to demonstrate that a minimum margin of safety of 1.1 against overturning or kinematic instability exists and that the CTF structure complies with the applicable stress limits (Table 2.3.2) and that the maximum permissible deceleration loading specified in the FSAR is not exceeded. If required to meet the minimum margin of safety of 1.1, a cask restraining system shall be incorporated into the design of the Cask Transfer Facility to provide lateral restraint to the overpack (HI-STORM or HI-STAR 100).

O. Design Life

The Cask Transfer Facility shall be constructed to have a minimum design life of 40 years.

P. Testing Requirements

In addition to testing recommended in NUREG-0612 (1980), a structural adequacy test of the CTF structure at 125% of its operating load prior to its first use in a cask loading campaign shall be performed. This test should be performed in accordance with the guidance provided in the CMAA Specification 70 [2.2.16].

Q. Quality Assurance Requirements

All components of the CTF shall be manufactured in full compliance with the quality assurance requirements applicable to the ITS category of the component as set forth in the Holtec QA program.

- R. Documentation Requirements
  - i. O&M Manual: An Operations and Maintenance Manual shall be prepared which contains, at minimum, the following items of information:
    - Maintenance Drawings
    - Operating Procedures

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ii. Design Report: A QA-validated design report documenting full compliance with the provisions of this specification shall be prepared and archived for future reference in accordance with the provisions of the Holtec QA program.

#### 2.3.3.2 Instrumentation

As a consequence of the passive nature of the HI-STORM 100 System, instrumentation which is important to safety is not necessary. No instrumentation is required or provided for HI-STORM 100 storage operations, other than normal security service instruments and TLDs.

However, in lieu of performing the periodic inspection of the HI-STORM overpack vent screens, temperature elements may be installed in two of the overpack exit vents to continuously monitor the air temperature. If the temperature elements and associated temperature monitoring instrumentation are used, they shall be designated important to safety as specified in Table 2.2.6.

The temperature elements and associated temperature monitoring instrumentation provided to monitor the air outlet temperature shall be suitable for a temperature range of -40°F to 500°F. At a minimum, the temperature elements and associated temperature monitoring instrumentation shall be calibrated for the temperatures of 32°F (ice point), 212°F (boiling point), and 449°F (melting point of tin) with an accuracy of +/- 4°F.

#### 2.3.4 <u>Nuclear Criticality Safety</u>

The criticality safety criteria stipulates that the effective neutron multiplication factor,  $k_{eff}$ , including statistical uncertainties and biases, is less than 0.95 for all postulated arrangements of fuel within the cask under all credible conditions.

#### 2.3.4.1 <u>Control Methods for Prevention of Criticality</u>

The control methods and design features used to prevent criticality for all MPC configurations are the following:

- a. Incorporation of permanent neutron absorbing material in the MPC fuel basket walls.
- b. Favorable geometry provided by the MPC fuel basket

Additional control methods used to prevent criticality for the MPC-24, MPC-24E, and MPC-24EF (all with higher enriched fuel), and the MPC-32 and MPC-32F are the following:

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- a. Loading of PWR fuel assemblies must be performed in water with a minimum boron content as specified in Table 2.1.14 or 2.1.16, as applicable.
- b. Prevention of fresh water entering the MPC internals.

Administrative controls and shall be used to ensure that fuel placed in the HI-STORM 100 | System meets the requirements described in Chapters 2 and 6. All appropriate criticality analyses are presented in Chapter 6.

#### 2.3.4.2 Error Contingency Criteria

Provision for error contingency is built into the criticality analyses performed in Chapter 6. Because biases and uncertainties are explicitly evaluated in the analysis, it is not necessary to introduce additional contingency for error.

#### 2.3.4.3 <u>Verification Analyses</u>

In Chapter 6, critical experiments are selected which reflect the design configurations. These critical experiments are evaluated using the same calculation methods, and a suitable bias is incorporated in the reactivity calculation.

2.3.5 <u>Radiological Protection</u>

#### 2.3.5.1 <u>Access Control</u>

As required by 10CFR72, uncontrolled access to the ISFSI is prevented through physical protection means. A peripheral fence with an appropriate locking and monitoring system is a standard approach to limit access. The details of the access control systems and procedures, including division of the site into radiation protection areas, will be developed by the licensee (user) of the ISFSI utilizing the HI-STORM 100 System.

#### 2.3.5.2 Shielding

The shielding design is governed by 10CFR72.104 and 10CFR72.106 which provide radiation dose limits for any real individual located at or beyond the nearest boundary of the controlled area. The individual must not receive doses in excess of the limits given in Table 2.3.1 for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

The objective of shielding is to assure that radiation dose rates at key locations are as low as practical in order to maintain occupational doses to operating personnel As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 106 for dose at the controlled area boundary. Three locations are of particular interest in the storage mode:

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- · immediate vicinity of the cask
- restricted area boundary
- controlled area (site) boundary

Dose rates in the immediate vicinity of the loaded overpack are important in consideration of occupational exposure. Conservative evaluations of dose rate have been performed and are described in Chapter 5 based on the contents of the BWR and PWR MPCs permitted for storage as described in Section 2.1.9. Actual dose rates in operation will be lower than those reported in Chapter 5 for the following reasons:

- The shielding evaluation model has a number of conservatisms, as discussed in Chapter 5.
- No single cask will likely contain design basis fuel in each fuel storage location and the full compliment of non-fuel hardware allowed by the CoC.
- No single cask will contain fuel and non-fuel hardware at the limiting burnups and cooling times allowed by the CoC.

Consistent with 10 CFR 72, there is no single dose rate limit established for the HI-STORM 100 System. Compliance with the regulatory limits on occupational and controlled area doses is performance-based, as demonstrated by dose monitoring performed by each cask A design objective for the maximum average radial surface dose rate has been established as 135 mrem/hr. Areas adjacent to the inlet and exit vents which pass through the radial shield are limited to 135 mrem/hr. The average dose rate at the top of the overpack is limited to below 60 mrem/hr. Chapter 5 of this FSAR presents the analyses and evaluations to establish HI-STORM 100 compliance with these design objectives.

Because of the passive nature of the HI-STORM 100 System, human activity related to the system is infrequent and of short duration. Personnel exposures due to operational and maintenance activities are discussed in Chapter 10. Chapter 10 also provides information concerning temporary shielding which may be utilized to reduce the personnel dose during loading, unloading, transfer, and handling operations. The estimated occupational doses for personnel comply with the requirements of 10CFR20.

For the loading and unloading of the HI-STORM overpack with the MPC, three transfer cask designs are provided (i.e., HI-TRAC 125, HI-TRAC 100, and HI-TRAC 125D). The two 125 ton HI-TRAC provide better shielding than the 100 ton HI-TRAC due to the increased shielding thickness and corresponding greater weight. Provided the licensee is capable of utilizing the 125 ton HI-TRAC, ALARA considerations would normally dictate that the 125 ton HI-TRAC due to crane capacity limitations, floor loading limitations, or other site-specific considerations. As

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with other dose reduction-based plant activities, , individual users who cannot accommodate the 125 ton HI-TRAC should perform a cost-benefit analysis of the actions (e.g., plant modifications) that would be necessary to use the 125 ton HI-TRAC. The cost of the action(s) would be weighed against the value of the projected reduction in radiation exposure and a decision made based on each plant's particular ALARA implementation philosophy.

Dose rates at the restricted area and site boundaries shall be in accordance with applicable regulations. Licensees shall demonstrate compliance with 10CFR72.104 and 10CFR72.106 for the actual fuel being stored, the ISFSI storage array, and the controlled area boundary distances.

The analyses presented in Chapters 5, 10, and 11 demonstrate that the HI-STORM 100 System is capable of meeting the above radiation dose limits.

#### 2.3.5.3 <u>Radiological Alarm System</u>

There are no credible events that could result in release of radioactive materials or increases in direct radiation above the requirements of 10CFR72.106.

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This FSAR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.

#### 2.3.6 <u>Fire and Explosion Protection</u>

There are no combustible or explosive materials associated with the HI-STORM 100 System. No such materials would be stored within an ISFSI. However, for conservatism we have analyzed a hypothetical fire accident as a bounding condition for HI-STORM 100. An evaluation of the HI-STORM 100 System in a fire accident is discussed in Chapter 11.

Small overpressures may result from accidents involving explosive materials which are stored or transported near the site. Explosion is an accident loading condition considered in Chapter 11.

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This FSAR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.

#### Table 2.3.1

#### RADIOLOGICAL SITE BOUNDARY REQUIREMENTS

BOUNDARY OF CONTROLLED AREA (m) (minimum)	100
NORMAL AND OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS:	
Whole Body (mrem/yr)	25
Thyroid (mrem/yr)	75
Any Other Critical Organ (mrem/yr)	25
DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT:	
TEDE (rem)	5
DDE + CDE to any individual organ or tissue (other than lens of the eye) (rem)	50
Lens dose equivalent (rem)	15
Shallow dose equivalent to skin or any extremity (rem)	50

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This FSAR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.

#### Table 2.3.2

#### Load Combinations<sup>†</sup> and Service Condition Definitions for the CTF Structure

Load Combination	Service Condition for Section III of the ASME Code for Definition of Allowable Stress	Comment	
D*	Level A	All primary load bearing	
D+S	Level A	members must satisfy Level A stress limits.	
D+M <sup>††</sup> +W'	<u></u>		
D+F Level D		Factor of safety against overturning shall be $> 1.1$	
D+E			
Or D+V			

<sup>††</sup> This load may be reduced or eliminated based on a PRA for the CTF site.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The reinforced concrete portion of the CTF structure shall also meet factored combinations of the above loads set forth in ACI-318(89).



### FIGURE 2.3.1; HI-STAR 100 UPENDING AND DOWNENDING ON A RAIL CAR

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#### FIGURE 2.3.2; HI-TRAC UPENDING AND DOWNENDING ON A HEAVY-HAUL TRANSPORT TRAILER

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#### FIGURE 2.3.3; HI-TRAC PLACEMENT ON HI-STORM 100 FOR MPC TRANSFER OPERATIONS

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# FIGURE 2.3.4; HI-TRAC PLACEMENT ON HI-STAR 100 FOR MPC TRANSFER OPERATIONS

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#### 2.4 DECOMMISSIONING CONSIDERATIONS

Efficient decommissioning of the ISFSI is a paramount objective of the HI-STORM 100 System. The HI-STORM 100 System is ideally configured to facilitate rapid, safe, and economical decommissioning of the storage site.

The MPC is being licensed for transport off-site in the HI-STAR 100 dual-purpose cask system (Reference Docket No. 71-9261). No further handling of the SNF stored in the MPC is required prior to transport to a licensed centralized storage facility or licensed repository.

The MPC which holds the SNF assemblies is engineered to be suitable as a waste package for permanent internment in a deep Mined Geological Disposal System (MGDS). The materials of construction permitted for the MPC are known to be highly resistant to severe environmental conditions. No carbon steel, paint, or coatings are used or permitted in the MPC. Therefore, the SNF assemblies stored in the MPC should not need to be removed. However, to ensure a practical, feasible method to defuel the MPC, the top of the MPC is equipped with sufficient gamma shielding and markings locating the drain and vent locations to enable semiautomatic (or remotely actuated) boring of the MPC lid to provide access to the MPC vent and drain. The circumferential welds of the MPC lid closure ring can be removed by semiautomatic or remotely actuated means, providing access to the SNF.

Likewise, the overpack consists of steel and concrete rendering it suitable for permanent burial. Alternatively, the MPC can be removed from the overpack, and the latter reused for storage of other MPCs.

In either case, the overpack would be expected to have no interior or exterior radioactive surface contamination. Any neutron activation of the steel and concrete is expected to be extremely small, and the assembly would qualify as Class A waste in a stable form based on definitions and requirements in 10CFR61.55. As such, the material would be suitable for burial in a near-surface disposal site as Low Specific Activity (LSA) material.

If the MPC needs to be opened and separated from the SNF before the fuel is placed into the MGDS, the MPC interior metal surfaces will be decontaminated using existing mechanical or chemical methods. This will be facilitated by the MPC fuel basket and interior structures' smooth metal surfaces designed to minimize crud traps. After the surface contamination is removed, the MPC radioactivity will be diminished significantly, allowing near-surface burial or secondary applications at the licensee's facility.

It is also likely that both the overpack and MPC, or extensive portions of both, can be further decontaminated to allow recycle or reuse options. After decontamination, the only radiological hazard the HI-STORM 100 System may pose is slight activation of the HI-STORM 100 materials caused by irradiation over a 40-year storage period.

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Due to the design of the HI-STORM 100 System, no residual contamination is expected to be left behind on the concrete ISFSI pad. The base pad, fence, and peripheral utility structures will require no decontamination or special handling after the last overpack is removed.

To evaluate the effects on the MPC and HI-STORM overpack caused by irradiation over a 40-year storage period, the following analysis is provided. Table 2.4.1 provides the conservatively determined quantities of the major nuclides after 40 years of irradiation. The calculation of the material activation is based on the following:

- Beyond design basis fuel assemblies (B&W 15x15, 4.8% enrichment, 70,000 MWD/MTU, and five-year cooling time) stored for 40 years. A constant source term for 40 years was used with no decrease in the neutron source term. This bounds the source term associated with the limiting PWR burnup of 68,200 MWD/MTU.
- Material quantities based on the drawings in Section 1.5.
- A constant flux equal to the initial loading condition is conservatively assumed for the full 40 years.
- Material activation is based on MCNP-4A calculations.

As can be seen from the material activation results presented in Table 2.4.1, the MPC and HI-STORM overpack activation is very low, even including the very conservative assumption of a constant flux for 40 years. The results for the concrete in the HI-STORM overpack can be conservatively applied to the ISFSI pad. This is extremely conservative because the overpack shields most of the flux from the fuel and, therefore, the ISFSI pad will experience a minimal flux.

In any case, the HI-STORM 100 System would not impose any additional decommissioning requirements on the licensee of the ISFSI facility per 10CFR72.30, since the HI-STORM 100 System could eventually be shipped from the site.

#### Table 2.4.1 MPC ACTIVATION

Nuclide	Activity After 40-Year Storage (Ci/m <sup>3</sup> )
<sup>54</sup> Mn	2.20e-3
<sup>55</sup> Fe	3.53e-3
<sup>59</sup> Ni	2.91e-6
<sup>60</sup> Co	3.11e-4
<sup>63</sup> Ni	9.87e-5
Total	6.15e-3

#### HI-STORM OVERPACK ACTIVATION

Nuclide	Activity After 40-Year Storage (Ci/m <sup>3</sup> )
	Overpack Steel
<sup>54</sup> Mn	3.62e-4
<sup>55</sup> Fe	7.18e-3
Total	7.18e-3
	Overpack Concrete
<sup>39</sup> Ar	3.02e-6
<sup>41</sup> Ca	2.44e-7
<sup>54</sup> Mn	1.59e-7
<sup>55</sup> Fe	2.95e-5
Total	3.43e-5

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#### 2.5 <u>REGULATORY COMPLIANCE</u>

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Chapter 2 provides the principal design criteria related to structures, systems, and components important to safety. These criteria include specifications regarding the fuel, as well as, external conditions that may exist in the operating environment during normal and off-normal operations, accident conditions, and natural phenomena events. The chapter has been written to provide sufficient information to a llow verification of c ompliance with 10CFR72, NUREG-1536, and Regulatory Guide 3.61. A more detailed evaluation of the design criteria and an assessment of compliance with those criteria is provided in Chapters 3 through 13.

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[2.0.2]	American Concrete Institute, "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures", ACI 349-85, ACI, Detroit, Michigan <sup>†</sup>
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[2.0.4]	NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, "Establishing Quality Assurance Programs for Packaging Used in the Transport of Radioactive Material," USNRC, Washington, D.C. Rev. 1 (1986).
[2.0.5]	J.W. McConnell, A.L. Ayers, and M.J. Tyacke, "Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Component According to Important to Safety," Idaho Engineering Laboratory, NUREG/CR-6407, INEL- 95-0551, 1996.
[2.0.6]	NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities, March 2000
[2.0.7]	ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF and Appendix F, and Code Section II, Part D, Materials, 1995, with Addenda through 1997.
[2.0.8]	"Cladding Considerations for the Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel," USNRC Interim Staff Guidance-11, Revision 3, November 17, 2003.
[2.0.9]	USNRC Memorandum from Christopher L. Brown to M. Wayne Hodges, "Scoping Calculations for Cladding Hoop Stresses in Low Burnup Fuel," dated January 29,2004.
[2.1.1]	ORNL/TM-10902, "Physical Characteristics of GE BWR Fuel Assemblies", by R.S. Moore and K.J. Notz, Martin Marietta (1989).
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[2.1.3]	Deleted.
[2.1.4]	Deleted.

<sup>†</sup> The 1997 edition of ACI-349 is specified for ISFSI pad and embedment design for deployment of the anchored HI-STORM 100A and HI-STORM 100SA.

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[2.1.6]	DOE Multi-Purpose Canister Subsystem Design Procurement. Specification.
[2.1.7]	S.E. Turner, "Uncertainty Analysis - Axial Burnup Distribution Effects," presented in "Proceedings of a Workshop on the Use of Burnup Credit in Spent Fuel Transport Casks", SAND-89-0018, Sandia National Laboratory, Oct., 1989.
[2.1.8]	Commonwealth Edison Company, Letter No. NFS-BND-95-083, Chicago, Illinois.
[2.2.1]	ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995 with Addenda through 1997.
[2.2.2]	ASCE 7-88 (formerly ANSI A58.1), "Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures", American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, NY, 1990.
[2.2.3]	ANSI N14.6-1993, "Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 Kg) or More", June 1993.
[2.2.4]	Holtec Report HI-2012610, "Final Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STAR 100 Cask System", NRC Docket No. 72-1008, latest revision , .
[2.2.5]	Holtec Report HI-951251, "Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STAR 100 Cask System", NRC Docket No. 71-9261, latest revision.
[2.2.6]	"Debris Collection System for Boiling Water Reactor Consolidation Equipment", EPRI Project 3100-02 and ESEERCO Project EP91-29, October 1995.
[2.2.7]	Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants, Regulatory Guide 1.76, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 1974.
[2.2.8]	ANSI/ANS 57.9-1992, "Design Criteria for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (dry type)", American Nuclear Society, LaGrange Park, Illinois.
[2.2.9]	NUREG-0800, SRP 3.5.1.4, USNRC, Washington, DC.

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[2.2.10]	United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants", August 1973 and Rev. 1, April 1976.
[2.2.11]	"Estimate of Tsunami Effect at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Generating Station, California." B.W. Wilson, PG&E (September 1985, Revision 1).
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[2.2.13]	Deleted.
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[2.2.15]	Deleted.
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#### **APPENDIX 2.A**

#### GENERAL DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISFSI PAD FOR HI-STORM 100A

#### 2.A.1 General Comments

As stated in Section 2.0.4, an ISFSI slab that anchors a spent fuel storage cask should be classified as "important to safety." This classification of the slab follows from the provisions of 10CFR72, which require that the cask system retain its capacity to store spent nuclear fuel in a safe configuration subsequent to a seismic or other environmental event. Since the slab for anchored HI-STORM deployment is designated as ITS, the licensee is required to determine whether the reactor site parameters, including earthquake intensity and large missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases. The intent of the regulatory criteria is to ensure that the slab meets all interface requirements of the cask design and the geotechnical characteristics of the ISFSI site.

This appendix provides general requirements for design and construction of the ISFSI concrete pad as an ITS structure, and also establishes the framework for ensuring that the ISFSI design bases are clearly articulated. The detailed design of the ISFSI pad for anchored HI-STORM deployment shall comply with the technical provisions set forth in this appendix.

#### 2.A.2 General Requirements for ISFSI Pad

- 1. Consistent with the provisions of NUREG-1567 [2.0.6], all concrete work shall comply with the requirements of ACI-349-97 [2.0.2].
- 2. All reinforcing steel shall be manufactured from high strength billet steel conforming to ASTM designation A615 Grade 60.
- 3. The ISFSI owner shall develop appropriate mixing, pouring, reinforcing steel placement, curing, testing, and documentation procedures to ensure that all provisions of ACI 349-97 [2.0.2] are met.
- 4. The placement, depth, and design and construction of the slab shall take into account the depth of the frost line at the ISFSI location. The casks transmit a very small amount of heat into the cask pad through conduction. The American Concrete Institute guidelines on reinforced concrete design of ground level slabs to minimize thermal and shrinkage induced cracking shall be followed.

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- 5. General Requirements for Steel Embedment: The steel embedment, excluding the pretensioned anchorage studs, is required to follow the provisions stipulated in ACI 349-97 [2.0.2], Appendix B "Steel Embedment" and the associated Commentary on Appendix B, as applicable. Later editions of this Code may be used provided a written reconciliation is performed. An example of one acceptable embedment configuration is provided in Figure 2.A.1. Site-specific embedment designs may vary from this example, depending on the geotechnical characteristics of the site-specific foundation. The embedment designer shall consider any current, relevant test data in designing the pad embedment for HI-STORM 100A and HI-STORM 100SA.
- The ISFSI owner shall ensure that pad design analyses, using interface loads provided in this 6. report, demonstrate that all structural requirements of NUREG-1567 and ACI-349-97 are satisfied.
- 7. Unless the load handling device is designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and incorporates redundant drop protection features, the ISFSI owner shall ensure that a permissible cask carry height is computed for the site-specific pad/foundation configuration such that the design basis deceleration set forth in this FSAR are not exceeded in the event of a handling accident involving a vertical drop.
- 8. The ISFSI owner shall ensure that the pad/foundation configuration provides sufficient safety margins for overall kinematic stability of the cask/pad/foundation assemblage.
- 9. The ISFSI owner shall ensure that the site-specific seismic inputs, established at the top surface of the ISFSI pad, are bounded by the seismic inputs used as the design basis for the attachment components. If required, the ISFSI owner shall perform additional analyses to ensure that the site-specific seismic event or durations greater than the design basis event duration analyzed in this report, do not produce a system response leading to structural safety factors (defined as allowable stress (load) divided by calculated stress (load)) less than 1.0. Table 2.0.5 and Table 2.2.8 provide the limiting values of ZPAs in the three orthogonal directions that must not be exceeded at an ISFSI site (on the pad top surface) to comply with the general CoC for the HI-STORM 100A (and 100SA) System.
- 10. An ISFSI pad used to support anchored HI-STORM overpacks, unlike the case of free standing overpacks, may experience tensile (vertically upward) anchorage forces in addition to compression loads. The reinforcing steel (pattern and quantity) must be selected to meet the demands of the anchorage forces under seismic and other environmental conditions that involve destabilizing loadings (such as the large tornado missile defined in this FSAR).

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#### 2.A.3 Steel Embedment for Anchored Casks

Figure 2.A.1 shows a typical fastening arrangement for the HI-STORM 100A System. The details of the rebars in the pad (which are influenced by the geotechnical characteristics of the foundation and its connection to the underlying continuum) are not shown in Figure 2.A.1. Representative dimensions of the embedment and anchorage system are provided in Table 2.A.1.

The embedment detail illustrated in Figure 2.A.1 is designed to resist a load equal to the ASME Code, Section III Appendix F Level D load capacity of the cask anchor studs. The figure does not show the additional reinforcement required to ensure that tensile cracking of concrete is inhibited (see Figure B-4 in the Commentary ACI-349R-97) as this depends on the depth chosen for the ITS ISFSI pad concrete. The ACI Code contemplates ductile failure of the embedment steel and requires that the ultimate load capacity of the steel embedment be less than the limit pullout strength of the concrete surrounding the embedment that resists the load transferred from the cask anchor stud. If this criterion cannot be assured, then additional reinforcement must be added to inhibit concrete cracking (per Subsection B.4.4 of Appendix B of ACI-349-97).

The anchor stud receptacle described in Figure 2.A.1 is configured so that the cask anchor studs (which interface with the overpack baseplate as well as the pad embedment per Table 2.0.5 and are designed in accordance with ASME Section III, Subsection NF stress limits), sits flush with the ISFSI top surface while the cask is being positioned. Thus, a translocation device such as an "air pad" (that requires a flat surface) can be used to position the HI-STORM overpack at the designated location. Subsequent to positioning of the cask, the cask anchor stud is raised, the anchor stud nut installed, and the anchor stud preload applied. The transfer of load from the cask anchor stud to the embedment is through the bearing surface of the lower head of the cask anchor stud and the upper part of the anchor stud receptacle shown in the figure. The members of the anchoring system illustrated in Figure 2.A.1, as well as other geometries developed by the ISFSI designer, must meet the following criteria:

- i. The weakest structural link in the system shall be in the ductile member. In other words, the tension capacity of the anchor stud/anchor receptacle group (based on the material ultimate strengths) shall be less than the concrete pull-out strength (computed with due recognition of the rebars installed in the pad).
- ii. The maximum ratio of embedment plus cask anchor stud effective tensile stiffness to the effective compressive stiffness of the embedment plus concrete shall not exceed 0.25 in order to ensure the effectiveness of the pre-load.
- iii. The maximum axial stress in the cask anchor studs under normal and seismic conditions shall be governed by the provisions of ASME Section III Subsection NF (1995).

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iv. The load-bearing members of the HI-STORM 100A anchorage system shall be considered important-to-safety. This includes the following components shown in Figure 2.A.1: anchor stud and nut, top ring, upper collar, anchor receptacle, and anchor ring.

For sites with lower ZPA DBE events, compared to the limiting ZPAs set down in this FSAR, the size of the anchor studs and their number can be appropriately reduced. However, the above three criteria must be satisfied in all cases.

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#### Table 2.A.1

#### Typical Embedment and Anchoring Data\*

Nominal diameter of the anchor stud, (inch)	2	
Thickness of the embedment ring, (inch)	2	
I.D. of the embedment ring, (inch)	130	
Anchor receptacle:		
Upper Position O.D. and I.D. (inch)	O.D.: 2.5 / I.D.: 2.125 (min.)	
Lower portion O.D. and I.D. (inch)	O.D.: 4.875 / I.D.: 3.625 (min.)	
Depth of anchor receptacle collar, d, (inch)	2.5	
Free fall height of the anchor stud, he,( inch)	8	
Representative Materials of Construction are as follows: <sup>†</sup>		
Anchor Studs:	Per Table 2.0.4	
Anchor Receptacle:	Low carbon steel such as A-36, A-105	
Top Ring, Upper Collar, Anchor Ring:	Low carbon steel such as A-36, SA-516-Gr. 70	

\* Refer to Figure 2.A.1

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The ISFSI designer shall ensure that all permanently affixed embedment parts (such as the anchor receptacle) made from materials vulnerable to deleterious environmental effects (e.g. low carbon steel) are protected through the use of suitably engineered corrosion barrier. Alternatively, the selected material of construction must be innately capable of withstanding the long term environmental conditions at the ISFSI site.



#### Appendix 2.B The Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) System

#### 2.B.1 System Overview

The Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) system is used to remove the remaining moisture in the MPC cavity after all of the water that can practically be removed through the drain line using a hydraulic pump or an inert gas has been expelled in the water blowdown operation. The FHD system is required to be used for MPCs containing at least one high burnup fuel assembly. The FHD method of moisture removal is optional for all other MPCs.

Expelling the water from the MPC using a conventional pump or a water displacement method using inert gas would remove practically all of the contained water except for the small quantity remaining on the MPC baseplate below the bottom of the drain line and an even smaller adherent amount wetting the internal surfaces. A skid-mounted, closed loop dehydration system will be used to remove the residual water from the MPC such that the partial pressure of the trace quantity of water vapor in the MPC cavity gas is brought down to  $\leq 3$  torr. The FHD system, engineered for this purpose, shall utilize helium gas as the working substance.

The FHD system, schematically illustrated in Figure 2.B.1, can be viewed as an assemblage of four thermal modules, namely, (i) the condensing module, (ii) the demoisturizer module, (iii) the helium circulator module and (iv) the pre-heater module. The condensing module serves to cool the helium/vapor mixture exiting the MPC to a temperature well below its dew point such that water may be extracted from the helium stream. The condensing module is equipped with suitable instrumentation to provide a direct assessment of the extent of condensation that takes place in the module during the operation of the FHD system. The demoisturizer module, engineered to receive partially cooled helium exiting the condensing module, progressively chills the recirculating helium gas to a temperature that is well below the temperature corresponding to the partial pressure of water vapor at 3 torr.

The motive energy to circulate helium is provided by the helium circulator module, which is sized to provide the pressure rise necessary to circulate helium at the requisite rate. The last item, labeled the pre-heater module, serves to pre-heat the flowing helium to the desired temperature such that it is sufficiently warm to boil off any water present in the MPC cavity.

The pre-heater module, in essence, serves to add supplemental heat energy to the helium gas (in addition to the heat generated by the stored SNF in the MPC) so as to facilitate rapid conversion of water into vapor form. The heat input from the pre-heater module can be adjusted in the manner of a conventional electric heater so that the recirculating helium entering the MPC is sufficiently dry and hot to evaporate water, but not unduly hot to place unnecessary thermal burden on the condensing module.

The FHD system described in the foregoing performs its intended function by continuously removing water entrained in the MPC through successive cooling, moisture removal and reheating of the working substance in a closed loop. In a classical system of the FHD genre, the moisture removal operation occurs in two discrete phases. In the beginning of the FHD system's

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operation (Phase 1), the helium exiting the MPC is laden with water vapor produced by boiling of the entrained bulk water. The condensing module serves as the principal device to condense out the water vapor from the helium stream in Phase 1. Phase 1 ends when all of the bulk water in the MPC cavity is vaporized. At this point, the operation of the FHD system moves on to steadily lowering the relative humidity and bulk temperature of the circulating helium gas (Phase 2). The demoisturizer module, equipped with the facility to chill flowing helium, plays the principal role in the dehydration process in Phase 2.

#### 2.B.2 Design Criteria

The design criteria set forth below are intended to ensure that design and operation of the FHD system will drive the partial pressure of the residual vapor in the MPC cavity to  $\leq 3$  torr if the gas has met the specified temperature or dew point value and duration criteria. The FHD system shall be designed to ensure that during normal operation (i.e., excluding startup and shutdown ramps) the following criteria are met:

- i. The temperature of helium gas in the MPC shall be at least 15°F higher than the saturation temperature at coincident pressure.
- ii. The pressure in the MPC cavity space shall be less than or equal to 60.3 psig (75 psia).
- iii. The recirculation rate of helium shall be sufficiently high (minimum hourly throughput equal to ten times the nominal helium mass backfilled into the MPC for fuel storage operations) so as to produce a turbulated flow regime in the MPC cavity.
- iv. The partial pressure of the water vapor in the MPC cavity will not exceed 3 torr. The limit will be met if the gas temperature at the demoisturizer outlet is verified by measurement to remain  $\leq 21^{\circ}$ F for  $\geq 30$  minutes or if the dew point of the gas exiting the MPC is verified by measurement to remain  $\leq 22.9^{\circ}$ F for  $\geq 30$  minutes.

In addition to the above system design criteria, the individual modules shall be designed in accordance with the following criteria:

- i. The condensing module shall be designed to de-vaporize the recirculating helium gas to a dew point of 120°F or less.
- ii. The demoisturizer module shall be configured to be introduced into its helium conditioning function <u>after</u> the condensing module has been operated for the required length of time to assure that the bulk moisture vaporization in the MPC (defined as Phase 1 in Section 2.B.1) has been completed.
- iii. The helium circulator shall be sized to effect the minimum flow rate of circulation required by the system design criteria described above.

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iv. The pre-heater module shall be engineered to ensure that the temperature of the helium gas in the MPC meets the system design criteria described above.

#### 2.B.3 Analysis Requirements

The design of the FHD system shall be subject to the confirmatory analyses listed below to ensure that the system will accomplish the performance objectives set forth in this FSAR.

- i. System thermal analysis in Phase 1: Characterize the rate of condensation in the condensing module and helium temperature variation under Phase 1 operation (i.e., the scenario where there is some unevaporated water in the MPC) using a classical thermal-hydraulic model wherein the incoming helium is assumed to fully mix with the moist helium inside the MPC.
- ii. System thermal analysis in Phase 2: Characterize the thermal performance of the closed loop system in Phase 2 (no unvaporized moisture in the MPC) to predict the rate of condensation and temperature of the helium gas exiting the condensing and the demoisturizer modules. Establish that the system design is capable to ensure that partial pressure of water vapor in the MPC will reach  $\leq$  3 torr if the temperature of the helium gas exiting the demoisturizer is predicted to be at a maximum of 21°F for 30 minutes.
- iii. Fuel Cladding Temperature Analysis: A steady-state thermal analysis of the MPC under the forced helium flow scenario shall be performed using the methodology described in HI-STORM 100 FSAR Subsections 4.4.1.1.1 through 4.4.1.1.4 with due recognition of the forced convection process during FHD system operation. This analysis shall demonstrate that the peak temperature of the fuel cladding under the most adverse condition of FHD system operation (design maximum heat load, no moisture, and maximum helium inlet temperature), is below the peak cladding temperature limit for normal conditions of storage for the applicable fuel type (PWR or BWR) and cooling time at the start of dry storage.

#### 2.B.4 Acceptance Testing

The first FHD system designed and built for the MPC drying function required by HI-STORM's technical specifications shall be subject to confirmatory testing as follows:

- a. A representative quantity of water shall be placed in a manufactured MPC (or equivalent mock-up) and the closure lid and RVOAs installed and secured to create a hermetically sealed container.
- b. The MPC cavity drying test shall be conducted for the worst case scenario (no heat generation within the MPC available to vaporize water).

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- c. The drain and vent line RVOAs on the MPC lid shall be connected to the terminals located in the pre-heater and condensing modules of the FHD system.
- d. The FHD system shall be operated through the moisture vaporization (Phase 1) and subsequent dehydration (Phase 2). The FHD system operation will be stopped after the temperature of helium exiting the demoisturizer module has been at or below 21°F for thirty minutes (nominal). Thereafter, a sample of the helium gas from the MPC will be extracted and tested to determine the partial pressure of the residual water vapor in it. The FHD system will be deemed to have passed the acceptance testing if the partial pressure in the extracted helium sample is less than or equal to 3 torr.



## FIGURE 2.B.1: SCHEMATIC OF THE FORCED HELIUM DEHYDRATION SYSTEM

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#### Appendix 2.C

#### The Supplemental Cooling System

#### 2.C.1 Purpose

The Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) will be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the limit set forth in Chapter 2 of the FSAR during normal short-term operations(as defined in Section 2.2).

2.C.2 General Description and Requirements

The SCS is a water circulation system for cooling the MPC inside the HI-TRAC transfer cask during on-site transport. The system consists of a skid-mounted coolant pump and an air-cooled heat exchanger. During normal SCS operation, heat is removed by water from the HI-TRAC annulus and rejected to the heat sink (ambient air) across the air cooler heat exchange surfaces. The SCS shall be designed to meet the following criteria:

- (i) The pump is sized to limit the coolant temperature rise (from annulus inlet to outlet) to a reasonably low value (20°F) and the air-cooled heat exchanger sized for the design basis heat load at an a mbient a ir temperature of 1 00°F. The pump and a ir-cooler fan are powered by electric motors with a backup power supply for uninterrupted operation.
- (ii) The closed loop cooling circuit will utilize a contamination-free fluid medium in contact with the external surfaces of the MPC and inside surfaces of the HI -TRAC transfer cask to minimize corrosion. Figure 2.C.1 shows a typical P&ID for a SCS.
- (iii) The number of active components in the SCS will be minimized.
- (iv) All passive components such as tubular heat exchangers, manually operated valves and fittings shall be designed to applicable standards (TEMA, ANSI).
- 2.C.3 Thermal/Hydraulic Design Criteria
  - (i) The heat dissipation capacity of the SCS shall be equal to or greater than the minimum necessary to ensure that the peak cladding temperature is below the ISG-11, Rev. 3 limit of 400°C (752°F). All heat transfer surfaces in heat exchangers shall be assumed to be fouled to the maximum limits specified in a widely used heat exchange equipment standard such as the Standards of Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association.
  - (ii) The coolant utilized to extract heat from the MPC shall be high purity water. Antifreeze may be used to prevent water from freezing if warranted by operating conditions.

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- 2.C.4 Mechanical Requirements
  - (i) All pressure boundaries (as defined in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1) shall have pressure ratings that are greater than the maximum system operating pressure by at least 15 psi.
  - (ii) All ASME Code components shall comply with Section VIII Division 1 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
  - (iii) Prohibited Materials

The following materials will not be in contact with the system coolant in the SCS.

- Lead
- Mercury
- Sulfur
- Saran
- Silastic L8-53
- Cadmium
- Tin
- Antimony
- Bismuth
- Mischmetal
- Neoprene or similar gasket materials made of halogen containing elastomers
- Phosphorus
- Zinc
- Copper and Copper Alloys
- Rubber-bonded asbestos
- Nylon
- Magnesium oxide (e.g., insulation)
- Materials that contain halogens in amounts exceeding 75 ppm
- (iv) All gasketed and packed joints shall have a minimum design pressure rating of the pump shut-off pressure plus 15 psi.
- (v) The SCS skid shall be equipped with appropriate lifting lugs to permit its handling by the plant's lifting devices in full compliance with NUREG-0612 provisions.
- 2.C.5 Regulatory Requirements

The SCS is classified as Important-to-Safety Category B.

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#### CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURAL EVALUATION<sup>†</sup>

#### 3.0 <u>OVERVIEW</u>

In this chapter, the structural components of the HI-STORM 100 System that are important to safety (ITS) are identified and described. The objective of the structural analyses is to ensure that the integrity of the HI-STORM 100 System is maintained under all credible loads for normal, off-normal, and design basis accident/natural phenomena. The chapter results support the conclusion that the confinement, criticality control, radiation shielding, and retrievability criteria set forth by 10CFR72.236(l), 10CFR72.124(a), 10CFR72.104, 10CFR72.106, and 10CFR72.122(l) are met. In particular, the design basis information contained in the previous two chapters and in this chapter provides sufficient data to permit structural evaluations to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10CFR72.24. To facilitate regulatory review, the assumptions and conservatism's inherent in the analyses are identified along with a complete description of the analytical methods, models, and acceptance criteria. A summary of other material considerations, such as corrosion and material fracture toughness is also provided. Design calculations for the HI-TRAC transfer cask are included where appropriate to comply with the guidelines of NUREG-1536.

This revision to the HI-STORM Safety Analysis Report, the first since the HI-STORM 100 System | was issued a Part 72 Certificate-of-Compliance, incorporates several features into the structural analysis to respond to the changing needs of the U.S. nuclear power generation industry. The most significant changes to this chapter for this revision are:

- The incorporation of structural results associated with the MPC-32 and the MPC-24E/24EF fuel baskets. In the case of the MPC-32, this revision simply returns results of analyses that were contained in this chapter prior to the initial CoC. In the case of the 24E basket, the new results are based on the same structural analysis model used for all the other baskets evaluated.
- The revision of the analyses of free thermal expansion and MPC canister shell to incorporate the changed temperature distribution from the inclusion of the thermosiphon effect (convective heat transfer inside the canister).
- The introduction of new analyses that permit the use of additional damaged fuel canisters in the HI-STORM 100.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulatory Guide 3.61. However, the material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements of NUREG-1536. Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in Chapter 1, Section 1.0, herein. Finally, all terms-of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the terminology of the glossary (Table 1.0.1) and component nomenclature of the Bill-of-Materials (Section 1.5).

- The inclusion of shorter versions of the HI-STORM overpack (designated as HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S Version B) to accommodate plants with reduced clearances. In general, we show that the HI-STORM 100S is bounded by results previously obtained.
- Revisions to approved HI-TRAC analyses to accommodate fabrication enhancements.
- Enhancement of the handling accident and tipover analyses to provide an additional qualified reference ISFSI pad configuration with higher strength concrete.
- Introduction of an anchored HI-STORM (designated as HI-STORM 100A). This enhancement permits use of a HI-STORM at sites in high seismic zones where a freestanding cask is not acceptable.

The organization of technical information in this chapter follows the format and content guidelines of USNRC Regulatory Guide 3.61 (February 1989). The FSAR ensures that the responses to the review requirements listed in NUREG-1536 (January 1997) are complete and comprehensive. The areas of NRC staff technical inquiries, with respect to structural evaluation in NUREG-1536, span a wide array of technical topics within and beyond the material in this chapter. To facilitate the staff's review to ascertain compliance with the stipulations of NUREG-1536, Table 3.0.1 "Matrix of NUREG-1536 Compliance - Structural Evaluation", is included in this chapter. A comprehensive cross-reference of the topical areas set forth in NUREG-1536, and the location of the required compliance information is contained in Table 3.0.1.

Section 3.7 describes in detail HI-STORM 100 System's compliance to NUREG-1536 Structural Evaluation Requirements.

The HI-STORM 100 System matrix of compliance table given in this section is developed with the supposition that the storage overpack is designated as a steel structure that falls within the purview of subsection 3.V.3 "Other Systems Components Important to Safety" (page 3-28 of NUREG-1536), and therefore, does not compel the use of reinforced concrete. (Please refer to Table 1.0.3 for an explicit statement of exception on this matter). The concrete mass installed in the HI-STORM 100 overpack is accordingly equipped with "plain concrete" for which the sole applicable industry code is ACI 318.1 (92). Plain concrete, in contrast to reinforced concrete, is the preferred shielding material HI-STORM 100 because of three key considerations:

- (i) Plain concrete is more amenable to a void free pour than reinforced concrete in narrow annular spaces typical of ventilated vertical storage casks.
- (ii) The tensile strength bearing capacity of reinforced concrete is not required to buttress the steel weldment of the HI-STORM 100 overpack.

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(iii) The compression and bearing strength capacity of plain concrete is unaffected by the absence of rebars. A penalty factor, on the compression strength, pursuant to the provisions of ACI-318.1 is, nevertheless, applied to insure conservatism. However, while plain concrete is the chosen shielding embodiment for the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack, all n ecessary technical, procedural Q.C., and Q.A. provisions to insure nuclear grade quality will be implemented by utilizing the relevant sections from ACI-349 (85) as specified in Appendix 1.D.

In other words, guidelines of NUREG 1536 pertaining to reinforced concrete are considered to insure that the material specification, construction quality control and quality assurance of the shielding concrete comply with the provisions of ACI 349 (85). These specific compliance items are listed in the compliance matrix.
<b>TABLE 3.0.1</b>
MATRIX OF NUREG-1536 COMPLIANCE ITEMS – STRUCTURAL EVALUATION <sup>†</sup>

PARAGRAPH IN	NUREG-1536	LOCATION IN FSAR	LOCATION OUTSIDE
NUREG-1536	<b>COMPLIANCE ITEM</b>	CHAPTER 3	OF FSAR CHAPTER 3
IV.1.a	ASME B&PV Compliance		
	NB	3.1.1	Tables 2.2.6,2.2.7
	NG	3.1.1	Tables 2.2.6,2.2.7
IV.2	Concrete Material		Appendix 1.D
	Specification		
IV.4	Lifting Devices	3.1; 3.4	
V.	Identification of SSC that		Table 2.2.6
	are ITS		
	Applicable	3.6.1	Table 2.2.6
	Codes/Standards		
"	Loads		Table 2.2.13
66	Load Combinations	3.1.2.1.2; Tables 3.1.1-	Table 2.2.14
<u> </u>	Summary of Safety Factors	343.3442.34431-3	
		346-349 Tables 343-	
		3.4.9	
"	Design/Analysis	Chapter 3	
	Procedures		
"	Structural Acceptance		Tables 2.2.10-2.2.12
1	Criteria	]	

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PARAGRAPH IN	NUREG-1536	LOCATION IN FSAR	LOCATION OUTSIDE
NUREG-1536	COMPLIANCE ITEM	CHAPTER 3	OF FSAR CHAPTER 3
"	Material/QC/Fabrication	Table 3.4.2	Chap. 9; Chap. 13
"	Testing/In-Service		Chap. 9; Chap. 12
	Surveillance		
"	Conditions for Use		Table 1.2.6; Chaps. 8,9,12
V.1.a	Description of SSC	3.1.1	1.2
V.1.b.i.(2)	Identification of Codes &		Tables 2.2.6, 2.2.7
	Standards		
V.1.b.ii	Drawings/Figures		1.5
"	Identification of		1.5; 2.3.2; 7.1; Table 7.1.1
	Confinement Boundary		
"	Boundary Weld	3.3.1.4	1.5; Table 7.1.2
	Specifications		· · ·
"	Boundary Bolt Torque	NA	
"	Weights and C.G. Location	Tables 3.2.1-3.2.4	
"	Chemical/Galvanic	3.4.1; Table 3.4.2	
	Reactions	l	
V.1.c	Material Properties	3.3; Tables 3.3.1-3.3.5	1.A; 1.C; 1.D
"	Allowable Strengths	Tables 3.1.6-3.1.17	Tables 2.2.10-2.2.12; 1.D
"	Suitability of Materials	3.3; Table 3.4.2	1.A; 1.B; 1.D
"	Corrosion	3.3	
"	Material Examination		9.1.1
	before Fabrication		

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TABLE 3.0.1 (CONTINUED)
MATRIX OF NUREG-1536 COMPLIANCE ITEMS – STRUCTURAL EVALUATION

PARAGRAPH IN	NUREG-1536	LOCATION IN FSAR	LOCATION OUTSIDE
NUREG-1536	<b>COMPLIANCE ITEM</b>	CHAPTER 3	OF FSAR CHAPTER 3
66	Material Testing and		9.1; Table 9.1.1; 1.D
	Analysis		
66	Material Traceability		9.1.1
"	Material Long Term	3.3; 3.4.11; 3.4.12	9.2
	Performance	·	
"	Materials Appropriate to		Chap. 1
	Load Conditions		
	Restrictions on Use		Chap. 12
66	Temperature Limits	Table 3.1.17	Table 2.2.3
"	Creep/Slump	3.4.4.3.3.2	
	Brittle Fracture	3.1.2.3; Table 3.1.18	
	Considerations		
	Low Temperature		2.2.1.2
	Handling		
V.1.d.i.(1)	Normal Load Conditions		2.2.1; Tables 2.2.13,2.2.14
66	Fatigue	3.1.2.4	
sc	Internal	3.4.4.1	2.2.2; Tables 2.2.1,2.2.3
	Pressures/Temperatures for		
	Hot and Cold Conditions		
<b>66</b>	Required Evaluations		
	Weight+Pressure	3.4.4.3.1.2	
"	Weight/Pressure/Temp.	3.4.4.3.1.2	
"	Free Thermal Expansion	3.4.4.2	4.4.5; Figure 4.4.30

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PARAGRAPH IN	NUREG-1536	LOCATION IN FSAR	LOCATION
NUREG-1536	<b>COMPLIANCE ITEM</b>	CHAPTER 3	OUTSIDE OF FSAR
			CHAPTER 3
V.1.d.i.(2)	Off-Normal Conditions		2.2.2; Tables 2.2.13,
			2.2.14; 11.1
V.1.d.i.(3)	Accident Level Events and	Tables 3.1.1, 3.1.2	2.2.3; Tables 2.2.13,
	Conditions		2.2.14; 11.2
V.1.d.i.(3).(a)	Storage Cask Vertical Drop	3.1.2.1.1.2; 3.4.10; 3.A	2.2.3.1
"	Storage Cask Tipover	3.1.2.1.1.1; 3.4.10; 3.A	2.2.3.2
"	Transfer Cask Horizontal	3.4.9	2.2.3.1
	Drop		
V.1.d.i.(3).(b)	Explosive Overpressure	3.1.2.1.1.4	2.2.3.10
V.1.d.i.(3).(c)	Fire		
"	Structural Evaluations	3.4.4.2	2.2.3.3
< <u>.</u>	Material Properties		11.2
"	Material Suitability	3.1.2.2; 3.3.1.1	Table 2.2.3; 11.2
V.1.d.i.(3).(d)	Flood		
"	Identification	3.1.2.1.1.3; 3.4.6	2.2.3.6
"	Cask Tipover	3.4.6	
"	Cask Sliding	3.4.6	
"	Hydrostatic Loading	3.1.2.1.1.3; 3.4.6	72-1008(3.H)
"	Consequences		11.2
V.1.d.i.(3).(e)	Tornado Winds		
"	Specification	3.1.2.1.1.5	2.2.3.5; Table 2.2.4
"	Drag Coefficients	3.4.8	
"	Load Combination	3.4.8	

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PARAGRAPH IN	NUREG-1536	LOCATION IN FSAR	LOCATION OUTSIDE
NUREG-1536	<b>COMPLIANCE ITEM</b>	CHAPTER 3	OF FSAR CHAPTER 3
"	Overturning – Transfer	NA	
V.1.d.i.(3).(f)	Tornado Missiles		
"	Missile Parameters	3.1.2.1.1.5	Table 2.2.5
"	Tipover	3.4.8	
	Damage	3.4.8.1; 3.4.8.2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
٠٠	Consequences	3.4.8.1; 3.4.8.2	11.2
V.1.d.i.(3).(g)	Earthquakes		
66	Definition of DBE	3.1.2.1.1.6; 3.4.7	2.2.3.7; Table 2.2.8
"	Sliding	3.4.7	
"	Overturning	3.4.7	
46	Structural Evaluations	3.4.7	11.2
V.1.d.i.(4).(a)	Lifting Analyses		
	Trunnions		
"	Requirements	3.1.2.1.2; 3.4.3.1; 3.4.3.2	72-1008(3.4.3); 2.2.1.2
"	Analyses	3.4.3.1; 3.4.3.2	72-1008(3.4.3)
"	Other Lift Analyses	3.4.3.7-3.4.3.9	
V.1.d.i.(4).(b)	Fuel Basket		
"	Requirements	3.1.2.1.2; Table 3.1.3	
	Specific Analyses	3.4.4.2; 3.4.4.3; 3.6.3	72-1008(3.4.4.3.1.2; 3.4.4.3.1.6; 3.M; 3.H; 3.I)

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PARAGRAPH IN	NUREG-1536	LOCATION IN FSAR	LOCATION OUTSIDE
NUREG-1536	<b>COMPLIANCE ITEM</b>	CHAPTER 3	OF FSAR CHAPTER 3
"	Dynamic Amplifiers	3.4.4.4.1	
<b>\$</b> \$	Stability	3.4.4.3; 3.4.4.4	72-1008(Figures 3.4.27-32)
V.1.d.i.(4).(c)	Confinement Closure Lid		
	Bolts	1	
"	Pre-Torque	NĀ	
66	Analyses	NA	
"	Engagement Length	NA	
66	Miscellaneous Bolting		
66	Pre-Torque	3.4.3.7; 3.4.3.8	
66	Analyses	3.4.4.3.2.2	
66	Engagement Length	3.4.3.5; 3.4.3.7; 3.4.3.8	
V.1.d.i.(4)	Confinement		
<b>cc</b>	Requirements	3.1.2.1.2; Table 3.1.4	Chap. 7
	Specific Analyses	3.6.3; Tables 3.4.3, 3.4.4	72-1008(3.E; 3.K; 3.I;
			3.4.4.3.1.5)
"	Dynamic Amplifiers	3.4.4.1	
66	Stability	3.4.4.3.1	72-1008(3.H)
66	Overpack		
66	Requirements	3.1.2.1.2; Tables 3.1.1,	
		3.1.5	
	Specific Analyses	3.6.3; 3.4.4.3	

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PARAGRAPH IN	NUREG-1536	LOCATION IN FSAR	LOCATION OUTSIDE
NUREG-1536	<b>COMPLIANCE ITEM</b>	CHAPTER 3	OF FSAR CHAPTER 3
66	Dynamic Amplifiers	3.4.4.3.2	
<u> </u>	Stability	3.4.4.3; Table 3.1.1; 3.4.4.5	
66	Transfer Cask		
66	Requirements	3.1.2.1.2; Table 3.1.5	
66	Specific Analyses	3.4.4.3; 3.6.3	
66	Dynamic Amplifiers	3.4.4.4.1	
66	Stability	NA	2.2.3.1

<sup>†</sup> Legend for Table 3.0.1

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Per the nomenclature defined in Chapter 1, the first digit refers to the chapter number, the second digit is the section number within the chapter; an alphabetic character in the second place means it is an appendix to the chapter.

72-1008HI-STAR 100 Docket Number where the referenced item is locatedNANot Applicable for this item

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## 3.1 <u>STRUCTURAL DESIGN</u>

## 3.1.1 <u>Discussion</u>

The HI-STORM 100 System consists of three principal components: the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC), the storage overpack, and the transfer cask. The MPC is a hermetically sealed, welded structure of cylindrical profile with flat ends and a honeycomb fuel basket. A complete description is provided in Subsection 1.2.1.1 wherein the anatomy of the MPC and its fabrication details are presented with the aid of figures. The MPCs utilized in the HI-STORM 100 System are identical to those for the HI-STAR 100 System submitted under Dockets 72-1008 and 71-9261. The evaluation of the MPCs presented herein draws upon the work described in those earlier submittals. In this section, the discussion is confined to characterizing and establishing the structural features of the MPC, the storage overpack, and the HI-TRAC transfer cask. Since a detailed discussion of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask geometries is presented in Section 1.2, attention is focused here on structural capabilities and their inherent margins of safety for housing the MPC. Detailed design drawings for the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Section 1.5.

The design of the MPC seeks to attain three objectives that are central to its functional adequacy, namely:

- Ability to Dissipate Heat: The thermal energy produced by the stored spent fuel must be transported to the outside surface of the MPC such that the prescribed temperature limits for the fuel cladding and for the fuel basket metal walls are not exceeded.
- Ability to Withstand Large Impact Loads: The MPC, with its payload of nuclear fuel, must be sufficiently robust to withstand large impact loads associated with the postulated handling accident events. Furthermore, the strength of the MPC must be sufficiently isotropic to meet structural requirements under a variety of handling and tip-over accidents.
- Restraint of Free End Expansion: The membrane and bending stresses produced by restraint of free-end expansion of the fuel basket are categorized as primary stresses. In view of the concentration of heat generation in the fuel basket, it is necessary to ensure that structural constraints to its external expansion do not exist.

Where the first two criteria call for extensive inter-cell connections, the last criterion requires the opposite. The design of the MPC seeks to realize all of the above three criteria in an optimal manner.

From the description presented in Chapter 1, the MPC enclosure vessel is the confinement vessel designed to meet ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB stress limits. The enveloping canister shell, the baseplate, and the lid system form a complete confinement boundary for the stored fuel that is referred to as the "enclosure vessel". Within this cylindrical shell confinement vessel is an integrally welded assemblage of cells of square cross sectional openings for fuel storage, referred to herein as the fuel basket. The fuel basket is analyzed under the provisions of Subsection NG of Section III of the ASME Code. All multi-purpose canisters designed for deployment in the HI-STORM 100 and HI-STAR 100 systems are exactly alike in their external dimensions. The essential

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difference between the MPCs lies in the fuel baskets. Each fuel storage MPC is designed to house fuel assemblies with different characteristics. Although all fuel baskets are configured to maximize structural ruggedness through extensive inter-cell connectivity, they are sufficiently dissimilar in structural details to warrant separate evaluations. Therefore, analyses for each of the MPC types were carried out to ensure structural compliance. Inasmuch as no new MPC designs are introduced in this application, and all MPC designs were previously reviewed by the USNRC under Docket 72-1008, the MPC analyses submitted under Docket Numbers 72-1008 and 71-9261 for the HI-STAR 100 System are not reproduced herein unless they need to be modified by HI-STORM 100 conditions or geometry differences. Analyses provided in the HI-STAR 100 System safety analysis reports that are applicable to the HI-STORM 100 System are referenced in this FSAR by docket number and subsection or appendix.

Components of the HI-STORM 100 System that are important to safety and their applicable design codes are defined in Chapter 2.

Some of the key structural functions of the MPC in the storage mode are:

- 1. To position the fuel in a subcritical configuration, and
- 2. To provide a confinement boundary.

Some of the key structural functions of the overpack in the storage mode are:

- 1. To serve as a missile barrier for the MPC,
- 2. To provide flow paths for natural convection,
- 3. To ensure stability of the HI-STORM 100 System, and
- 4. To maintain the position of the radiation shielding.
- 5. To allow movement of the overpack with a loaded MPC inside.

Some structural features of the MPCs that allow the system to perform these functions are summarized below:

• There are no gasketed ports or openings in the MPC. The MPC does not rely on any sealing arrangement except welding. The absence of any gasketed or flanged joints makes the MPC structure immune from joint leaks. The confinement boundary contains no valves or other pressure relief devices.

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- The closure system for the MPCs consists of two components, namely, the MPC lid and the closure ring. The MPC lid can be either a single thick circular plate continuously welded to the MPC shell along its circumference or two dual lids welded around their common periphery. The MPC closure system is shown in the Design Drawings in Section 1.5. The MPC lid is equipped with vent and drain ports which are utilized for evacuating moisture and air from the MPC following fuel loading, and subsequent backfilling with an inert gas (helium) at a specified mass. The vent and drain ports are covered by a cover plate and welded before the closure ring is installed. The closure ring is a circular annular plate edge-welded to the MPC lid and shell. The two closure members are interconnected by welding around the inner diameter of the ring. Lift points for the MPC are provided in the MPC lid.
- The MPC fuel baskets consist of an array of interconnecting plates. The number of storage cells formed by this interconnection process varies depending on the type of fuel being stored. Basket designs containing cell configurations for PWR and BWR fuel have been designed and are explained in detail in Section 1.2. All baskets are designed to fit into the same MPC shell. Welding of the basket plates along their edges essentially renders the fuel basket into a multiflange beam. Figure 3.1.1 provides an isometric illustration of a fuel basket for the MPC-68 design.
- The MPC basket is separated from its supports by a gap. The gap size decreases as a result of thermal expansion (depending on the magnitude of internal heat generation from the stored spent fuel). The provision of a small gap between the basket and the basket support structure is consistent with the natural thermal characteristics of the MPC. The planar temperature distribution across the basket, as shown in Section 4.4, approximates a shallow parabolic profile. This profile will create high thermal stresses unless structural constraints at the interface between the basket and the basket support structure are removed.
- The MPCs will be loaded with fuel with widely varying heat generation rates. The basket/basket support structure gap tends to be reduced for higher heat generation rates due to increased thermal expansion rates. Gaps between the fuel basket and the basket support structure are specified to be sufficiently large such that a gap exists around the periphery after any thermal expansion.
- A small number of flexible thermal conduction elements (thin aluminum tubes) are interposed between the basket and the MPC shell. The elements are designed to be resilient. They do not provide structural support for the basket, and thus their resistance to thermal growth is negligible.

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It is quite evident from the geometry of the MPC that a critical loading event pertains to the drop condition when the MPC is postulated to undergo a handling side drop (the longitudinal axis of the MPC is horizontal) or tip-over. Under the side drop or tip-over condition the flat panels of the fuel basket are subject to an equivalent pressure loading that simulates the deceleration-magnified inertia load from the stored fuel and the MPC's own metal mass.

The MPC fuel basket maintains the spent nuclear fuel in a subcritical arrangement. Its safe operation is assured by maintaining the physical configuration of the storage cell cavities intact in the aftermath of a drop event. This requirement is considered to be satisfied if the MPC fuel basket meets the stress intensity criteria set forth in the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NG. Therefore, the demonstration that the fuel basket meets Subsection NG limits ensures that there is no impairment of ready retrievability (as required by NUREG-1536), and that there is no unacceptable effect on the subcritical arrangement.

The MPC confinement boundary contains no valves or other pressure relief devices. The MPC enclosure vessel is shown to meet the stress intensity criteria of the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB for all service conditions. Therefore, the demonstration that the enclosure vessel meets Subsection NB limits ensures that there is no unacceptable release of radioactive materials.

The HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is a steel cylindrical structure consisting of inner and outer low carbon steel shells, a lid, and a baseplate. Between the two shells is a thick cylinder of unreinforced (plain) concrete. Additional regions of fully confined (by enveloping steel structure) unreinforced concrete are attached to the lid and to the baseplate depending on the specific configuration (see applicable figures in previous chapters). The storage overpack serves as a missile and radiation barrier, provides flow paths for natural convection, provides kinematic stability to the system, and acts as a cushion for the MPC in the event of a tip-over accident. The storage overpack is not a pressure vessel since it contains cooling vents that do not allow for a differential pressure to develop across the overpack wall. The structural steel components of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack are designed to meet the stress limits of the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3. Short versions of the HI-STORM 100 overpack, designated as the HI-STORM 100S, and the HI-STORM 100S Version B, are included in this revision. To accommodate nuclear plants with limited height access, the HI-STORM 100S has a re-configured lid and a lower overall height. There are minor weight redistributions but the overall bounding weight of the system is unchanged. The HI-STORM 100S Version B incorporates other improvements and modifications designed to improve fabricability and enhance some margins. Structural analyses are revisited if and only if the modified configuration cannot be demonstrated to be bounded by the original calculation. New or modified calculations focused on the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S Version B are clearly identified within the text of this chapter. Unless otherwise designated, general statements using the terminology "HI-STORM 100" also apply to the HI-STORM 100S and to the HI-STORM 100S Version B. The HI-STORM 100S overpacks can carry all MPC's and transfer casks that can be carried in the HI-STORM 100.

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and Section 3.0, the principal shielding material utilized in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack is plain concrete. Plain concrete was selected for the HI-STORM 100

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Overpack in lieu of reinforced concrete, because there is no structural imperative for incorporating tensile load bearing strength into the contained concrete. From a purely practical standpoint, the absence of rebars facilitate pouring and curing of concrete with minimal voids, which is an important consideration in light of its shielding function in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack. Plain concrete, however, acts essentially identical to reinforced concrete under compressive and bearing loads, even though ACI standards apply a penalty factor on the compressive and bearing strength of concrete in the absence of rebars (vide ACI 318.1).

Accordingly, the plain concrete in the HI-STORM 100 is considered as a structural material only to the extent that it may participate in supporting direct compressive loads. The allowable compression/bearing resistance is defined and quantified in the ACI 318.1(92) Building Code for Structural Plain Concrete.

In general, strength analysis of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack and its confined concrete is carried out only to demonstrate that the concrete is able to perform its radiation protection function and that retrievability of the MPC subsequent to any postulated accident condition of storage or handling is maintained.

A discrete ITS component in the HI-STORM 100 System is the HI-TRAC transfer cask. The HI-TRAC serves to provide a missile and radiation barrier during transport of the MPC from the fuel pool to the HI-STORM 100 Overpack. The HI-TRAC body is a double-walled steel cylinder that constitutes its structural system. Contained between the two steel shells is an intermediate lead cylinder. Attached to the exterior of the HI-TRAC body outer shell is a water jacket that acts as a radiation barrier. The HI-TRAC is not a pressure vessel since it contains a penetration in the HI-TRAC top lid that does not allow for a differential pressure to develop across the HI-TRAC wall. Nevertheless, in the interest of conservatism, structural steel components of the HI-TRAC are subject to the stress limits of the ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3.

Since both the HI-STORM 100 and HI-TRAC may serve as an MPC carrier, their lifting attachments are designed to meet the design safety factor requirements of NUREG-0612 [3.1.1] and ANSI N14.6-1993 [3.1.2] for single-failure-proof lifting equipment.

Table 2.2.6 provides a listing of the applicable design codes for all structures, systems, and components which are designated as ITS. Since no structural credit is required for the weld between the adjustable basket support pieces (i.e., shims and basket support flat plates), the adjustable basket supports are classified as NITS.

#### 3.1.2 Design Criteria

Principal design criteria for normal, off-normal, and accident/environmental events are discussed in Section 2.2. In this section, the loads, load combinations, and allowable stresses used in the structural evaluation of the HI-STORM 100 System are presented in more detail.

Consistent with the provisions of NUREG-1536, the central objective of the structural analysis presented in this chapter is to ensure that the HI-STORM 100 System possesses sufficient structural

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capability to withstand normal and off-normal loads and the worst case loads under natural phenomenon or accident events. Withstanding such loadings enables the HI-STORM 100 System to successfully preclude the following negative consequences:

- unacceptable risk of criticality
- unacceptable release of radioactive materials
- unacceptable radiation levels
- impairment of ready retrievability of the SNF

The above design objectives for the HI-STORM 100 System can be particularized for individual components as follows:

- The objectives of the structural analysis of the MPC are to demonstrate that:
  - 1. Confinement of radioactive material is maintained under normal, off-normal, accident conditions, and natural phenomenon events.
  - 2. The MPC basket does not deform under credible loading conditions such that the subcriticality or retrievability of the SNF is jeopardized.
- The objectives of the structural analysis of the storage overpack are to demonstrate that:
  - 1. Tornado-generated missiles do not compromise the integrity of the MPC confinement boundary.
  - 2. The overpack can safely provide for on-site transfer of the loaded MPC and ensure adequate support to the HI-TRAC transfer cask during loading and unloading of the MPC.
  - 3. The radiation shielding remains properly positioned in the case of any normal, off-normal, or natural phenomenon or accident event.
  - 4. The flow path for the cooling air flow shall remain available under normal and off-normal conditions of storage and after a natural phenomenon or accident event.
  - 5. The loads arising from normal, off-normal, and accident level conditions exerted on the contained MPC do not exceed the structural design criteria of the MPC.
  - 6. No geometry changes occur under any normal, off-normal, and accident level conditions of storage that may preclude ready retrievability of the contained MPC.

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- 7. A freestanding storage overpack can safely withstand a non-mechanistic tipover event with a loaded MPC within the overpack. The HI-STORM 100A is specifically engineered to be permanently attached to the ISFSI pad. The ISFSI pad engineered for the anchored cask is designated as "Important to Safety". Therefore, the non-mechanistic tipover is not applicable to the HI-STORM 100A.
- 8. The inter-cask transfer of a loaded MPC can be carried out without exceeding the structural capacity of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack, provided all required auxiliary equipment and components specific to an ISFSI site comply with their Design Criteria set forth in this FSAR and the handling operations are in full compliance with operational limits and controls prescribed in this FSAR.
- The objective of the structural analysis of the HI-TRAC transfer cask is to demonstrate that:
  - 1. Tornado generated missiles do not compromise the integrity of the MPC confinement boundary while the MPC is contained within HI-TRAC.
  - 2. No geometry changes occur under any postulated handling or storage conditions that may preclude ready retrievability of the contained MPC.
  - 3. The structural components perform their intended function during lifting and handling with the loaded MPC.
  - 4. The radiation shielding remains properly positioned under all applicable handling service conditions for HI-TRAC.
  - 5. The lead shielding, top lid, and transfer lid doors remain properly positioned during postulated handling accidents.

The aforementioned objectives are deemed to be satisfied for the MPC, the overpack, and the HI-TRAC, if stresses (or stress intensities, as applicable) calculated by the appropriate structural analyses are less than the allowables defined in Subsection 3.1.2.2, and if the diametral change in the storage overpack (or HI-TRAC), if any, after any event of structural consequence to the overpack (or transfer cask), does not preclude ready retrievability of the contained MPC.

Stresses arise in the components of the HI-STORM 100 System due to various loads that originate under normal, off-normal, or accident conditions. These individual loads are combined to form load combinations. Stresses and stress intensities resulting from the load combinations are compared to their respective allowable stresses and stress intensities. The following subsections present loads, load combinations, and the allowable limits germane to them for use in the structural analyses of the MPC, the overpack, and the HI-TRAC transfer cask.

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## 3.1.2.1 Loads and Load Combinations

The individual loads applicable to the HI-STORM 100 System and the HI-TRAC cask are defined in Section 2.2 of this report (Table 2.2.13). Load combinations are developed by assembling the individual loads that may act concurrently, and possibly, synergistically (Table 2.2.14). In this subsection, the individual loads are further clarified as appropriate and the required load combinations are identified. Table 3.1.1 contains the load combinations for the storage overpack where kinematic stability is of primary importance. The load combinations where stress or load level is of primary importance are set forth in Table 3.1.3 for the MPC fuel basket, in Table 3.1.4 for the MPC confinement boundary, and in Table 3.1.5 for the storage overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask. Load combinations are applied to the mathematical models of the MPCs, the overpack, and the HI-TRAC. Results of the analyses carried out under bounding load combinations are compared with their respective allowable stresses (or stress intensities, as applicable). The analysis results from the bounding load combinations are also a ssessed, where warranted, to ensure satisfaction of the functional performance criteria discussed in the preceding subsection.

## 3.1.2.1.1 Individual Load Cases

The individual loads that address each design criterion applicable to the structural design of the HI-STORM 100 System are catalogued in Table 2.2.13. Each load is given a symbol for subsequent use in the load combination listed in Table 2.2.14.

Accident condition and natural phenomena-induced events, collectively referred to as the "Level D" condition in Section III of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Codes, in general, do not have a universally prescribed limit. For example, the impact load from a tornado-borne missile, or the overturning load under flood or tsunami, cannot be prescribed as design basis values with absolute certainty that all ISFSI sites will be covered. Therefore, as applicable, allowable magnitudes of such loadings are postulated for the HI-STORM 100 System. The allowable values are drawn from regulatory and industry documents (such as for tornado missiles and wind) or from an intrinsic limitation in the system (such as the permissible "drop height" under a postulated handling accident). In the following, the essential characteristic of each "Level D" type loading is explained.

## 3.1.2.1.1.1 <u>Tip-Over</u>

It is required to demonstrate that the free-standing HI-STORM 100 storage overpack, containing a loaded MPC, will not tip over as a result of a postulated natural phenomenon event, including tornado wind, a tornado-generated missile, a seismic or a hydrological event (flood). However, to demonstrate the defense-in-depth features of the design, a non-mechanistic tip-over scenario per NUREG-1536 is analyzed. Since the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S Version B have an overall length that is less than the regular HI-STORM 100, the maximum impact velocity of the overpack will be reduced. Therefore, the results of the tipover analysis for the HI-STORM 100 (reported in Appendix 3.A) are bounding for the HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S Version B. The potential of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack tipping over during the lowering (or raising) of the loaded MPC into (or out of) it with the HI-TRAC cask mounted on it is ruled out because of the

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safeguards and devices mandated by this FSAR for such operations (Subsection 2.3.3.1 and Technical Specification 4.9). The physical and procedural barriers under the MPC handling operations have been set down in the FSAR to preclude overturning of the HI-STORM/HI-TRAC assemblage with an extremely high level of certainty. Much of the ancillary equipment needed for the MPC transfer operations must be custom engineered to best accord with the structural and architectural exigencies of the ISFSI site. Therefore, with the exception of the HI-TRAC cask, their design cannot be prescribed, a priori, in this FSAR. However, carefully drafted Design Criteria and conditions of use set forth in this FSAR eliminate the potential of weakening of the safety measures contemplated herein to preclude an overturning event during MPC transfer operations. Subsection 2.3.3.1 contains a comprehensive set of design criteria for the ancillary equipment and components required for MPC transfer operations to ensure that the design objective of precluding a kinematic instability event during MPC transfer operations is met. Further information on the steps taken to preclude system overturning during MPC transfer operations may be found in Chapter 8, Section 8.0.

In the HI-STORM 100A configuration, wherein the overpack is physically anchored to the ISFSI pad, the potential for a tip-over is a' priori precluded. Therefore, the ISFSI pad need not be engineered to be sufficiently compliant to limit the peak MPC deceleration to Table 2.2.8 values. The stiffness of the pad, however, may be controlled by the ISFSI structural design and, therefore, may result in a reduced "carry height" from that specified for a freestanding cask. If a non-single failure proof lifting device is employed to carry the cask over the pad, determination of maximum carry height must be performed by the ISFSI owner once the ISFSI pad design is formalized.

## 3.1.2.1.1.2 Handling Accident

A handling accident during transport of a loaded HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is assumed to result in a vertical drop. The HI-STORM 100 storage overpack will not be handled in a horizontal position while containing a loaded MPC. Therefore, a side drop is not considered a credible event.

HI-TRAC can be carried in a horizontal orientation while housing a loaded MPC. Therefore, a handling accident during transport of a loaded HI-TRAC in a horizontal orientation is considered to be a credible accident event.

As discussed in the foregoing, the vertical drop of the HI-TRAC and the tip-over of the assemblage of a loaded HI-TRAC on the top of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack during MPC transfer operations do not need to be considered.

## 3.1.2.1.1.3 <u>Flood</u>

The postulated flood event results into two discrete scenarios which must be considered; namely,

- 1. stability of the HI-STORM 100 System due to flood water velocity, and
- 2. structural effects of hydrostatic pressure and water velocity induced lateral pressure.

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The maximum hydrostatic pressure on the cask in a flood where the water level is conservatively set at 125 feet is calculated as follows:

Using

p = the maximum hydrostatic pressure on the system (psi),  $\gamma$  = weight density of water = 62.4 lb/ft<sup>3</sup> h = the height of the water level = 125 ft;

The maximum hydrostatic pressure is

$$p = \gamma h = (62.4 \text{ lb/ft}^3)(125 \text{ ft})(1 \text{ ft}^2/144 \text{ in}^2) = 54.2 \text{ psi}$$

The accident condition design external pressure for the MPC (Table 2.2.1) bounds the maximum hydrostatic pressure exerted by the flood.

## 3.1.2.1.1.4 <u>Explosion</u>

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Explosion, by definition, is a transient event. Explosive materials (except for the short duration when a limited quantity of motive fuel for placing the loaded MPC on the ISFSI pad is present in the tow vehicle) are prohibited in the controlled area by specific stipulation in the HI-STORM 100 Technical Specification. However, pressure waves emanating from explosions in areas outside the ISFSI are credible.

Pressure waves from an explosive blast in a property near the ISFSI site result in an impulsive aerodynamic loading on the stored HI-STORM 100 Overpacks. Depending on the rapidity of the pressure build-up, the inside and outside pressures on the HI-STORM METCON<sup>TM</sup> shell may not equalize, leading to a net lateral loading on the upright overpack as the pressure wave traverses the overpack. The magnitude of the dynamic pressure wave is conservatively set to a value below the magnitude of the pressure differential that would cause a tip-over of the cask if the pulse duration were set at one second. With the maximum design basis pressure pulse established (by setting the design basis pressure differential sufficiently low that cask tip-over is not credible due to the travelling pressure wave), the stress state under this condition requires analysis. The lateral pressure difference, applied over the overpack full height, causes axial and circumferential stresses and strains to develop. Level D stress limits must not be exceeded under this state of stress. It must also be demonstrated that no permanent ovalization of the cross section occurs that leads to loss of clearance to remove the MPC after the explosion.

Once the pressure wave traverses the cask body, then an elastic stability evaluation is warranted. An all-enveloping pressure from the explosion may threaten safety by buckling the overpack outer shell.

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In contrast to the overpack, the MPC is a closed pressure vessel. Because of the enveloping overpack around it, the explosive pressure wave would manifest as an external pressure on the external surface of the MPC.

The maximum overpressure on the MPC resulting from an explosion is limited by the HI-STORM Technical Specification to be equal to or less than the accident condition design external pressure or external pressure differential specified in Table 2.2.1. The design external pressure differential is applied as a component of the load combinations.

### 3.1.2.1.1.5 <u>Tornado</u>

The three components of a tornado load are:

- 1. pressure changes,
- 2. wind loads, and
- 3. tornado-generated missiles.

Wind speeds and tornado-induced pressure drop are specified in Table 2.2.4. Tornado missiles are listed in Table 2.2.5. A central functional objective of a storage overpack is to maintain the integrity of the "confinement boundary", namely, the multi-purpose canister stored inside it. This operational imperative requires that the mechanical loadings associated with a tornado at the ISFSI do not jeopardize the physical integrity of the loaded MPC. Potential consequences of a tornado on the cask system are:

- Instability (tip-over) due to tornado missile impact plus either steady wind or impulse from the pressure drop (only applicable for free-standing cask).
- Stress in the overpack induced by the lateral force caused by the steady wind or missile impact.
- Loadings applied on the MPC transmitted to the inside of the overpack through its openings or as a secondary effect of loading on the enveloping overpack structure.
- Excessive storage overpack permanent deformation that may prevent ready retrievability of the MPC.
- Excessive storage overpack permanent deformation that may significantly reduce the shielding effectiveness of the storage overpack.

Analyses must be performed to ensure that, due to the tornado-induced loadings:

• The loaded overpack does not become kinematically unstable (only applicable for free-standing cask).

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- The overpack does not deform plastically such that the retrievability of the stored MPC is threatened.
- The MPC does not sustain an impact from an incident missile.
- The MPC is not subjected to inertia loads (acceleration or deceleration) in excess of its design basis limit set forth in Chapter 2 herein.
- The overpack does not deform sufficiently due to tornado-borne missiles such that the shielding effectiveness of the overpack is significantly affected.

The results obtained for the HI-STORM 100 bound the corresponding results for the HI-STORM 100S versions because of the reduced height. In the anchored configuration (HI-STORM 100A), the kinematic stability requirement stated above is replaced with the requirement that the stresses in the anchor studs do not exceed level D stress limits for ASME Section III, Class 3, Subsection NF components.

## 3.1.2.1.1.6 Earthquake

Subsections 2.2.3.7 and 3.4.7 contain the detailed specification of the seismic inputs applied to the HI-STORM 100 System. The design basis earthquake is assumed to be at the top of the ISFSI pad. Potential consequences of a seismic event are sliding/overturning of a free-standing cask, overstress of the sector lugs and anchor studs for the anchored HI-STORM 100A, and lateral force on the overpack causing excessive stress and deformation of the storage overpack.

In the anchored configuration (HI-STORM 100A), a seismic event results in a fluctuation in the state of stress in the anchor bolts and a local bending action on the sector lugs.

Analyses must be performed to ensure that:

- The maximum axial stress in the anchor bolts remains below the Level D stress limits for Section III Class 3 Subsection NF components.
- The maximum primary membrane plus bending stress intensity in the sector lugs during the DBE event satisfies Level D stress limits of the ASME Code, Subsection NF.
- The anchor bolts will not sustain fatigue failure due to pulsation in their axial stress during the DBE event.
- The stress in the weld line joining the sector lugs to the HI-STORM 100 weldment is within Subsection NF limits for Level D condition.

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## 3.1.2.1.1.7 <u>Lightning</u>

The HI-STORM 100 Overpack contains over 25,000 lb of highly conductive carbon steel with over 700 square feet of external surface area. Such a large surface area and metal mass is adequate to dissipate any lightning that may strike the HI-STORM 100 System. There are no combustible materials on the HI-STORM 100 surface. Therefore, lightning will not impair the structural performance of components of the HI-STORM 100 System that are important to safety.

## 3.1.2.1.1.8 <u>Fire</u>

The potential structural consequences of a fire are: the possibility of an interference developing between the storage overpack and the loaded MPC due to free thermal expansion; and, the degradation of material properties to the extent that their structural performance is affected during a subsequent recovery action. The fire condition is addressed to the extent necessary to demonstrate that these adverse structural consequences do not materialize.

## 3.1.2.1.1.9 <u>100% Fuel Rod Rupture</u>

The effect on structural performance by 100% fuel rod rupture is felt as an increase in internal pressure. The accident internal pressure limit set in Chapter 2 bounds the pressure from 100% fuel rod rupture. Therefore, no new load condition has been identified.

### 3.1.2.1.2 Load Combinations

Load combinations are created by summing the effects of several individual loads. The load combinations are selected for the normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. The loadings appropriate for HI-STORM 100 under the various conditions are presented in Table 2.2.14. These loadings are combined into meaningful combinations for the various HI-STORM 100 System components in Tables 3.1.1, and 3.1.3-3.1.5. Table 3.1.1 lists the load combinations that address overpack stability. Tables 3.1.3 through 3.1.5 list the applicable load combinations for the fuel basket, the enclosure vessel, and the overpack and HI-TRAC, respectively.

As discussed in Subsection 2.2.7, the number of discrete load combinations for each situational condition (i.e., normal, off-normal, etc.) is consolidated by defining bounding loads for certain groups of loadings. Thus, the accident condition pressure  $P_0^*$  bounds the surface loadings arising from accident and extreme natural phenomenon events, namely, tornado wind W', flood F, and explosion  $E^*$ .

As noted previously, certain loads, namely earthquake E, flowing water under flood condition F, force from an explosion pressure pulse F\*, and tornado missile M, act to destabilize a cask. Additionally, these loads act on the overpack and produce essentially localized stresses at the HI-STORM 100 System to ISFSI interface. Table 3.1.1 provides the load combinations that are relevant to the stability analyses of freestanding casks. The site ISFSI DBE zero period acceleration (ZPA) must be bounded by the design basis seismic ZPA defined by the Load Combination C of Table 3.1.1 to demonstrate that the margin against tip-over during a seismic event is maintained.

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The major constituents in the HI-STORM 100 System are: (i) the fuel basket, (ii) the enclosure vessel, (iii) the HI-STORM 100 (or HI-STORM 100S versions) Overpack, and (iv) the HI-TRAC transfer cask. The fuel basket and the enclosure vessel (EV) together constitute the multi-purpose canister. The multi-purpose canister (MPC) is common to HI-STORM 100 and HI-STAR 100, and as such, has been extensively analyzed in the storage FSAR and transport SAR (Dockets 72-1008 and 71-9261) for HI-STAR 100. Many of the loadings on the MPC (fuel basket and enclosure vessel) are equal to or bounded by loadings already considered in the HI-STAR 100 SAR documents. Where such analyses have been performed, their location in the HI-STAR 100 SAR documents is indicated in this HI-STORM 100 SAR for continuity in narration. A complete account of analyses and results for all load combinations for all four constituents parts is provided in Section 3.4 as required by Regulatory Guide 3.61.

In the following, the loadings listed as applicable for each situational condition in Table 2.2.14 are addressed in meaningful load combinations for the fuel basket, enclosure vessel, and the overpack. Each component is considered separately.

#### Fuel Basket

Table 3.1.3 summarizes all loading cases (derived from Table 2.2.14) that are germane to demonstrating compliance of the fuel baskets to Subsection NG when these baskets are housed within HI-STORM 100 or HI-TRAC.

The fuel basket is not a pressure vessel; therefore, the pressure loadings are not meaningful loads for the basket. Further, the basket is structurally decoupled from the enclosure vessel. The gap between the basket and the enclosure vessel is sized to ensure that no constraint of free-end thermal expansion of the basket occurs. The demonstration of the adequacy of the basket-to the-enclosure vessel (EV) gap to ensure absence of interference is a physical problem that must be analyzed.

The normal handling loads on the fuel basket in an MPC within the HI-STORM 100 System or the HI-TRAC transfer cask are identical to or bounded by the normal handling loads analyzed in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR Docket Number 72-1008.

Three accident condition scenarios must be considered: (i) drop with the storage overpack axis vertical; (ii) drop with the HI-TRAC axis horizontal; and (iii) storage overpack tipover. The vertical drop scenario is considered in the HI-STAR 100 SAR.

The horizontal drop and tip-over must consider multiple orientation of the fuel basket, as the fuel basket is not radially symmetric. Therefore, two horizontal drop orientations are considered which are referred to as the 0 degree drop and 45 degree drop, respectively. In the 0 degree drop, the basket drops with its panels oriented parallel and normal to the vertical (see Figure 3.1.2). The 45-degree drop implies that the basket's honeycomb section is rotated meridionally by 45 degrees (Figure 3.1.3).

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#### Enclosure Vessel

Table 3.1.4 summarizes all load cases that are applicable to structural analysis of the enclosure vessel to ensure integrity of the confinement boundary.

The enclosure vessel is a pressure vessel consisting of a cylindrical shell, a thick circular baseplate at the bottom, and a thick circular lid at the top. This pressure vessel must be shown to meet the primary stress intensity limits for ASME Section III Class 1 at the design temperature and primary plus secondary stress intensity limits under the combined action of pressure plus thermal loads.

Normal handling of the enclosure vessel is considered in Docket 72-1008; the handling loads are independent of whether the enclosure vessel is within HI-STAR 100, HI-STORM 100, or HI-TRAC.

The off-normal condition handling loads are identical to the normal condition and, therefore, a separate analysis is not required.

Analyses presented in this chapter are intended to demonstrate that the maximum decelerations in drop and tip-over accident events are limited by the bounding values in Table 3.1.2. The vertical drop event is considered in the HI-STAR 100 SAR Docket 72-1008.

The deceleration loadings developed in the enclosure vessel during a horizontal drop event are combined with those due to  $P_i$  (internal pressure) acting alone. The accident condition pressure is bounded by  $P_i^*$ . The design basis deceleration for the MPC in the HI-STAR 100 System is 60g's, whereas the design basis deceleration for the MPC in the HI-STORM 100 System is 45g's. The design pressures are identical. The fire event (T<sup>\*</sup> loading) is considered for ensuring absence of interference between the enclosure vessel and the fuel basket and between the enclosure vessel and the overpack.

It is noted that the MPC basket-enclosure vessel thermal expansion and stress analyses are reconsidered in this submittal to reflect the different MPC-to-overpack gaps that exist in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack versus the HI-STAR 100 overpack, coupled with the different design basis decelerations.

#### Storage Overpack

Table 3.1.5 identifies the load cases to be considered for the overpack. These are in addition to the kinematic criteria listed in Table 3.1.1. Within these load cases and kinematic criteria, the following items must be addressed:

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## Normal Conditions

- The dead load of the HI-TRAC with the heaviest loaded MPC (dry) on top of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack must be shown to be able to be supported by the metal-concrete (METCON<sup>™</sup>) structure consisting of the two concentric steel shells and the steel rib plates, and by the concrete columns away from the vent regions.
- The dead load of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack itself must be supportable by the steel structure with no credit for concrete strength other than self-support in compression.
- Normal handling loads must be accommodated without taking any strength credit from the contained concrete other than self-support in compression.

## Accident Conditions

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- Maximum flood water velocity for the overpack with an empty MPC must be specified to ensure that no sliding or tip-over occurs.
- Tornado missile plus wind on an overpack with an empty MPC must be specified to demonstrate that no cask tip-over occurs.
- Tornado missile penetration analysis must demonstrate that the postulated large and penetrant missiles cannot contact the MPC. The small missile must be shown not to penetrate the MPC pressure vessel boundary, since it can enter the overpack cavity through the vent ducts.
- Under seismic conditions, a fully loaded, free-standing HI-STORM 100 overpack must be demonstrated to not tip over under the maximum ZPA event. The maximum sliding of the overpack must demonstrate that casks will not impact each other.
- Under a non-mechanistic postulated tip-over of a fully loaded, freestanding HI-STORM 100 overpack, the overpack lid must not dislodge.
- Accident condition stress levels must not be exceeded in the steel and compressive stress levels in the concrete must remain within allowable limits.
- Accident condition induced gross general deformations of the storage overpack must be limited to values that do not preclude ready retrievability of the MPC.

As noted earlier, analyses performed using the HI-STORM 100 generally provide results that are identical to or bound results for the shorter HI-STORM 100S versions; therefore, analyses are not repeated specifically for the HI-STORM 100S unless the specific geometry changes significantly influence the safety factors.

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## HI-TRAC Transfer Cask

Table 3.1.5 identifies load cases applicable to the HI-TRAC transfer cask.

The HI-TRAC transfer cask must provide radiation protection, must act as a handling cask when carrying a loaded MPC, and in the event of a postulated accident must not suffer permanent deformation to the extent that ready retrievability of the MPC is compromised. This submittal includes three types of transfer casks: a 125-ton HI-TRAC (referred to as the HI-TRAC 125), a modified version of the HI-TRAC 125 called the HI-TRAC 125D, and a 100-ton HI-TRAC. The details of these three transfer casks are provided in the design drawings in Section 1.5. The same steel structures (i.e., shell thicknesses, lid thicknesses, etc.) are maintained with the only major differences being in the amount of lead shielding, the water jacket configuration, the bottom flange, and the lower dead weight loading. Therefore, all structural analyses performed for the HI-TRAC 125 are repeated for the HI-TRAC 125D and the HI-TRAC 100 only if it cannot be clearly demonstrated that the HI-TRAC 125 calculation is bounding.

## 3.1.2.2 <u>Allowables</u>

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The important to safety components of the HI-STORM 100 System are listed in Table 2.2.6. Allowable stresses, as appropriate, are tabulated for these components for all service conditions.

In Subsection 2.2.5, the applicable service level from the ASME Code for determination of allowables is listed. Table 2.2.14 provides a tabulation of normal, off-normal, and accident conditions and the service levels defined in the ASME Code, along with the applicable loadings for each service condition.

Allowable stresses and stress intensities are calculated using the data provided in the ASME Code and Tables 2.2.10 through 2.2.12. Tables 3.1.6 through 3.1.16 contain numerical values of the stresses/stress intensities for all MPC, overpack, and HI-TRAC load bearing materials as a function of temperature.

In all tables the terms S,  $S_m$ ,  $S_y$ , and  $S_u$ , respectively, denote the design stress, design stress intensity, minimum yield strength, and the ultimate strength. Property values at intermediate temperatures that are not reported in the ASME Code are obtained by linear interpolation. Property values are not extrapolated beyond the limits of the Code in any structural calculation.

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Additional terms relevant to the analyses are extracted from the ASME Code (Figure NB-3222-1, for example) as follows:

Symbol	Description	Notes
P <sub>m</sub>	Average primary stress across a solid section	Excludes effects of discontinuities and concentrations. Produced by pressure and mechanical loads.
PL	Average stress across any solid section	Considers effects of discontinuities but not concentrations. Produced by pressure and mechanical loads, including earthquake inertial effects.
P <sub>b</sub>	Primary bending stress	Component of primary stress proportional to the distance from the centroid of a solid section. Excludes the effects of discontinuities and concentrations. Produced by pressure and mechanical loads, including earthquake inertial effects.
Pe	Secondary expansion stress	Stresses that result from the constraint of free-end displacement. Considers effects of discontinuities but not local stress concentration. (Not applicable to vessels.)
Q	Secondary membrane plus bending stress	Self-equilibrating stress necessary to satisfy continuity of structure. Occurs at structural discontinuities. Can be caused by pressure, mechanical loads, or differential thermal expansion.
F	Peak stress	Increment added to primary or secondary stress by a concentration (notch), or, certain thermal stresses that may cause fatigue but not distortion. This value is not used in the tables.

It is shown that there is no interference between component parts due to free thermal expansion. Therefore,  $P_e$  does not develop within any HI-STORM 100 component.

It is recognized that the planar temperature distribution in the fuel basket and the overpack under the maximum heat load condition is the highest at the cask center and drops monotonically, reaching its lowest value at the outside surface. Strictly speaking, the allowable stresses/stress intensities at any location in the basket, the enclosure vessel, or the overpack should be based on the coincident metal temperature under the specific operating condition. However, in the interest of conservatism, reference temperatures are established for each component, which are upper bounds on the metal temperature for each situational condition. Table 3.1.17 provides the reference temperatures for the fuel basket and the MPC canister utilizing Tables 3.1.6 through 3.1.16, and provides conservative numerical limits for the stresses and stress intensities for all loading cases. Reference temperatures for the MPC baseplate and the MPC lid are 400 degrees F and 550 degrees F, respectively, as specified in Table 2.2.3.

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Finally, the lift devices in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack and HI-TRAC casks and the multi-purpose canisters, collectively referred to as "trunnions", are subject to specific limits set forth by NUREG-0612: the primary stresses in a trunnion must be less than the smaller of 1/10 of the material ultimate strength and 1/6 of the material yield strength under a normal handling condition (Load Case 01 in Table 3.1.5). The load combination D+H in Table 3.1.5 is equivalent to 1.15D. This is further explained in Subsection 3.4.3.

The region around the trunnions is part of the NF structure in HI-STORM 100 and HI-TRAC and NB pressure boundary in the MPC, and as such, must satisfy the applicable stress (or stress intensity) limits for the load combination. In addition to meeting the applicable Code limits, it is further required that the primary stress required to maintain equilibrium at the defined trunnion/mother structure interface must not exceed the material yield stress at three times the handling condition load (1.15D). This criterion, mandated by Regulatory Guide 3.61, Section 3.4.3, insures that a large safety factor exists on non-local section yielding at the trunnion/mother structure interface that would lead to unacceptable section displacement and rotation.

## 3.1.2.3 Brittle Fracture

The MPC canister and basket are constructed from a series of stainless steels termed Alloy X. These stainless steel materials do not undergo a ductile-to-brittle transition in the minimum temperature range of the HI-STORM 100 System. Therefore, brittle fracture is not a concern for the MPC components. Such an assertion can not be made a priori for the HI-STORM storage overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask that contain ferritic steel parts. In general, the impact testing requirements for the HI-STORM overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask are a function of two parameters: the Lowest Service Temperature (LST) and the normal stress level. The significance of these two parameters, as they relate to impact testing of the overpack and the transfer cask, is discussed below.

In normal storage mode, the LST of the HI-STORM storage overpack structural members may reach -40°F in the limiting condition wherein the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the contained MPCs emits no (or negligible) heat and the ambient temperature is at -40°F (design minimum per Chapter 2: Principal Design Criteria). During the HI-STORM handling operations, the applicable lowest service temperature is 0°F (which is the threshold ambient temperature below which lifting and handling of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack or the HI-TRAC cask is not permitted by the Technical Specification). Therefore, two distinct LSTs are applicable to load bearing metal parts within the HI-STORM 100 Overpack and the HI-TRAC cask; namely,

- LST = 0°F for the HI-STORM overpack during handling operations and for the HI-TRAC transfer cask during all normal operating conditions.
- LST = -40°F for the HI-STORM overpack during all non-handling operations (i.e., normal storage mode).

Parts used to lift the overpack or the transfer cask, which include the anchor block in the HI-STORM 100 overpack, and the pocket trunnions, the lifting trunnions and the lifting trunnion block in HI-TRAC, will henceforth be referred to as "significant-to-handling" (STH) parts. The applicable code

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for these elements of the structure is ANSI N14.6. All other parts of the overpack and the transfer cask will be referred to as "NF" components. It is important to ensure that all materials designated as "NF" or "STH" parts possess sufficient fracture toughness to preclude brittle fracture. For the STH parts, the necessary level of protection against brittle fracture is deemed to exist if the NDT (nil ductility transition) temperature of the part is at least 40° below the LST. Therefore, the required NDT temperature for all STH parts is -40°F.

It is well known that the NDT temperature of steel is a strong function of its composition, manufacturing process (viz., fine grain vs. coarse grain practice), thickness, and heat treatment. For example, according to Burgreen [3.1.3], increasing the carbon content in carbon steels from 0.1% to 0.8% leads to the change in NDT from -50°F to approximately 120°F. Likewise, lowering of the normalizing temperature in the ferritic steels from 1200°C to 900°C lowers the NDT from 10°C to -50°C [3.1.3]. It, therefore, follows that the fracture toughness of steels can be varied significantly within the confines of the ASME Code material specification set forth in Section II of the Code. For example, SA516 Gr. 70 (which is a principal NF material in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack) can have a maximum carbon content of up to 0.3% in plates up to four inches thick. Section II further permits normalizing or quenching followed by tempering to enhance fracture toughness. Manufacturing processes which have a profound effect on fracture toughness, but little effect on tensile or yield strength of the material, are also not specified with the degree of specificity in the ASME Code to guarantee a well defined fracture toughness. In fact, the Code relies on actual coupon testing of the part to ensure the desired level of protection against brittle fracture. For Section III, Subsection NF Class 3 parts, the desired level of protection is considered to exist if the lowest service temperature is equal to or greater than the NDT temperature (per NF 2311(b)(10)). Accordingly, the required NDT temperature for all load bearing metal parts in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack (NF and STH) is -40°F. Likewise, the NDT temperature for all NF parts in HI-TRAC (except for STH parts) is set equal to 0°F.

The STH components (HI-STORM bolt anchor block, HI-TRAC lifting trunnion, HI-TRAC lifting trunnion block, and HI-TRAC pocket trunnion) have thicknesses greater than 2". SA350-LF3 has been selected as the material for these items (except for the lifting trunnions) due to its capability to maintain acceptable fracture toughness at low temperatures (see Table 5 in SA350 of ASME Section IIA). Additionally, material for the HI-TRAC top flange, pool lid (100 ton) and pool lid outer ring (125 ton) has been defined as SA350-LF3, SA350-LF2, or SA203E (see Table A1.15 of ASME Section IIA) in order to achieve low temperature fracture toughness. The HI-TRAC lifting trunnion is fabricated from SB-637 Grade N07718, a high strength nickel alloy material. This material has a high resistance to fracture at low temperatures. All other steel structural materials in the HI-STORM 100 overpack and HI-TRAC cask are made of SA516 Gr. 70 or SA515 Gr. 70 (with some components having an option for SA203E or SA350-LF3 depending on material availability).

The SA516 Gr. 70 material used to fabricate the overpack and the transfer cask is exempt from impact testing per NF-2311(b). The specific reasons are:

1. The LST for handling operations is above the Minimum Design Temperature of SA516 Gr. 70 (for thickness less than 2-1/2") per Figure NF-2311(b)-1, and;

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2. During non-handling operations (i.e., normal storage mode), the maximum tensile stress in the HI-STORM overpack is less than the threshold limit of 6,000 p si specified in NF-2311(b)(7).

Table 3.1.18 provides a summary of impact testing requirements to satisfy the requirements for prevention of brittle fracture.

### 3.1.2.4 <u>Fatigue</u>

In storage, the HI-STORM 100 System is not subject to significant cyclic loads. Failure due to fatigue is not a concern for the HI-STORM 100 System.

In an anchored installation, however, the anchor studs sustain a pulsation in the axial load during the seismic event. The amplitude of axial stress variation under the DBE event is computed in this chapter and a significant margin of safety against fatigue failure during the DBE event is demonstrated.

The system is subject to cyclic temperature fluctuations. These fluctuations result in small changes of thermal expansions and pressures in the MPC. The loads resulting from these changes are small and do not significantly contribute to the "usage factor" of the cask.

Inspection of the HI-TRAC trunnions specified in Chapter 9 will preclude use of a trunnion that exhibits visual damage.

#### 3.1.2.5 Buckling

Certain load combinations subject structural sections with relatively large slenderness ratios (such as the enclosure vessel shell) to compressive stresses that may actuate buckling instability <u>before</u> the allowable stress is reached. Tables 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 list load combinations for the enclosure vessel and the HI-STORM 100/HI-TRAC structures; the cases which warrant stability (buckling) check are listed therein (note that a potential buckling load has already been identified as a consequence of a postulated explosion).

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## LOAD COMBINATIONS SIGNIFICANT TO HI-STORM 100 OVERPACK KINEMATIC STABILITY ANALYSIS

Loading Case	Combinations <sup>†</sup>	Comment	Analysis of this Load Case Presented in:
A	D+F	This case establishes flood water flow velocity with a minimum safety factor of 1.1 against overturning and sliding.	Subsection 3.4.6
В	D + M + W'	Demonstrate that the HI-STORM 100 Overpack with minimum SNF stored (minimum D) will not tip over.	Subsection 3.4.8
С	D+E	Establish the value of ZPA <sup>††</sup> that will not cause the overpack to tip over.	Subsection 3.4.7

<sup>†</sup> Loading symbols are defined in Table 2.2.13

<sup>††</sup> ZPA is zero period acceleration

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## DESIGN BASIS DECELERATIONS FOR THE DROP EVENTS

Case	Value <sup>†</sup> (in multiples of acceleration duc to gravity)
Vertical axis drop (HI-STORM 100 Overpack only)	45
Horizontal axis (side) drop (HI-TRAC only)	45

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The design basis value is set from the requirements of the HI-STORM 100 System, as its components are operated as a storage system. The MPC is designed to higher loadings (60g's vertical and horizontal) when in a HI-STAR 100 overpack. Analysis of the MPC in a HI-STAR 100 overpack under a 60g loading is provided in HI-STAR 100 Docket Numbers 71-9261 and 72-1008.

#### LOADING CASES FOR THE FUEL BASKET

Load Case I.D.	Loading <sup>†</sup>	Notes	Location Where this Case is Evaluated	
F1	Τ, Τ'	Demonstrate that the most adverse of the temperature distributions in the basket will not cause fuel basket to expand and contact the enclosure vessel wall. Compute the secondary stress intensity and show that it is small.	Subsection 3.4.4.2	
F2 (Note 1)	D+H	Conservatively add the stresses in the basket due to vertical and horizontal orientation handling to form a bounding stress intensity.	Table 3.4.9 of HI- STAR FSAR (Docket 72-1008)	
F3 F3.a (Note 2)	D + H'	Vertical axis drop event	HI-STAR FSAR, Subsection 3.4.4.3.1.6	
F3.b (Note 3)	D + H'	Side Drop, 0 degree orientation (Figure 3.1.2)	Table 3.4.6	
F3.c (Note 3)	D + H'	Side Drop, 45 degree orientation (Figure 3.1.3)	Table 3.4.6	

Notes:

- 1. Load Case F2 for the HI-STORM 100 System is identical to Load Case F2 for the HI-STAR 100 System in Docket Number 72-1008, Table 3.1.3.
- 2. Load Case F3.a is bounded by the 60g deceleration analysis performed for the HI-STAR 100 System in Docket Number 72-1008, Subsection 3.4.4.3.1.6. The HI-STORM 100 vertical deceleration loading is limited to 45g.
- 3. Load Cases F3.b and F3.c are analyzed here for a 45g deceleration, while the MPC is housed within a HI-STORM 100 Overpack or a HI-TRAC transfer cask. The initial clearance at the interface between the MPC shell and the HI-STORM 100 Overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask is greater than or equal to the initial clearance between the MPC shell and the HI-STAR 100 overpack. This difference in clearance directly affects the stress field. The side drop analysis for the MPC in the HI-STAR 100 overpack under 60g's bounds the corresponding analysis of the MPC in HI-TRAC for 45 g's.

The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13.

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LOADING CASES FOR THE ENCLOSURE VESSEL	(CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY)
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Load Case I.D.	Load Combination <sup>†</sup>	Notes	Comments and Location Where this Case is Analyzed		
E1 (Note 1)					
El.a	Design internal pressure, P <sub>I</sub>	Primary stress intensity limits in the shell, baseplate, and closure ring	E1.a         Lid         Docket 72-1008         3.E.8.1.1           Baseplate         Docket 72-1008         3.I.8.1           Shell         3.4.4.3.1.2           Supports         N/A		
E1.b	Design external pressure, P <sub>o</sub>	Primary stress intensity limits, buckling stability	E1.b Lid P <sub>i</sub> bounds Baseplate P <sub>i</sub> bounds Shell Docket 72-1008 Buckling methodology in 3.H		
E1.c	Design internal pressure, P <sub>i</sub> , Plus Temperature, T	Primary plus secondary stress intensity under Level A condition	El.c Lid, Baseplate, and Shell Section 3.4.4.3.1.2		
E2	$D + H + (P_i, P_o)^{\dagger\dagger}$	Vertical lift, internal operating pressure conservatively assumed to be equal to the normal design pressure. Principal area of concern is the lid assembly.	LidDocket 72-10083.E.8.1.2BaseplateDocket 72-10083.I.8.2ShellDocket 72-1008Table 3.4.9 (stress)Docket 72-1008Buckling methodology in 3.HSupportsDocket 72-1008		

<sup>†</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13.

<sup>††</sup> The notation ( $P_i$ ,  $P_o$ ) means that both cases are checked with either  $P_o$  or  $P_i$  applied.

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## TABLE 3.1.4 (CONTINUED)

## LOADING CASES FOR THE ENCLOSURE VESSEL (CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY)

Load Case I.D.	Load Combination <sup>†</sup>	Notes	Comments and Location Where this Case is Analyzed		
E3 E3.a (Note 2)	D + H' + (P <sub>o</sub> , P <sub>i</sub> )	Vertical axis drop event	E3.a	Lid Baseplate Shell Supports	Docket 72-10083.E.8.2.1-2 Docket 72-10083.I.8.3 Docket 72-1008Buckling methodology in 3.H N/A
E3.b (Note 3)	D + H' + (P <sub>i</sub> , P <sub>o</sub> )	Side drop, 0 degree orientation (Figure 3.1.2)	E3.b	Lid Baseplate Shell Supports	End drop bounds End drop bounds Table 3.4.6 Table 3.4.6
E3.c (Note 3)	D + H' + (P <sub>i</sub> , P <sub>o</sub> )	Side drop, 45 degree orientation (Figure 3.1.3)	E3.c	Lid Baseplate Shell Supports	End drop bounds End drop bounds Table 3.4.6 Table 3.4.6
E4	Т	Demonstrate that interference with the overpack will not develop for T.	Sectio	on 3.4.4.2	

<sup>†</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13.

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# TABLE 3.1.4 (CONTINUED)

# LOADING CASES FOR THE ENCLOSURE VESSEL (CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY)

Load Case I.D.	Load Combination <sup>†</sup>	Notes	Comments and Location Where this Case is Analyzed	
E5 (Note 1)	$P_i^*$ or $P_o^* + D + T^*$	Demonstrate compliance with level D stress limits – buckling stability.	Lid Baseplate Shell Supports	Docket 72-1008 3.E.8.2.1.3 Docket 72-1008 3.I.8.4 Docket 72-1008 Buckling methodology in 3.H Docket 72-1008 3.4.4.3.1.5 (thermal stress) N/A

Notes:

- 1. Load Cases E1.a, E1.b, E2, and E5 are identical to the load cases presented in Docket Number 72-1008, Table 3.1.4. Design pressures and MPC weights are identical.
- 2. Load Case E3.a is bounded by the 60g deceleration analysis performed for the HI-STAR 100 System in Docket Number 72-1008. The HI-STORM 100 vertical deceleration loading is limited to 45g.
- 3. Load Cases E3.b and E3.c are analyzed in this HI-STORM 100 SAR for a 45g deceleration, while the MPC is housed within the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack. The interface between the MPC shell and storage overpack is not identical to the MPC shell and HI-STAR 100 overpack. The analysis for an MPC housed in HI-TRAC is not performed since results are bounded by those reported in the HI-STAR 100 TSAR for a 60g deceleration.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13.

Load Case I.D.	Loading <sup>†</sup>	Notes	Location in FSAR	
01	$D + H + T + (P_0, P_i)$	Vertical load handling of HI-STORM 100 Overpack/HI-TRAC.	Overpack	3.4.3.5
			HI-TRAC	
			Shell	3.4.3.3,
				3.4.3.4
			Pool lid	3.4.3.8
			Transfer lid	3.4.3.9
02				
02.a	$D + H' + (P_o, P_i)$	Storage Overpack: End drop; primary stress intensities must meet level D stress limits.	Overpack	3.4.4.3.2.3
02 b	$D + H' + (P, P_1)$	HI-TRAC: Horizontal (side) drop: meet level D	HITRAC	
02.0		stress limits for NF Class 3 components away	Shell	3491
	ļ	from the impacted zone: show lids stay in-place	Transfer Lid	344333
		Show primary and secondary impact decelerations are within design basis. (This case is only applicable to HI-TRAC.)	Slapdown	3.4.9.2
02.c	D + H'	Storage Overpack: Tip-over; any permanent deformations must not preclude ready retrieval of the MPC.	Overpack	3.4.10, 3.A

## LOAD CASES FOR THE HI-STORM 100 OVERPACK/HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK

<sup>†</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13

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# TABLE 3.1.5 (CONTINUED)

# LOAD CASES FOR THE HI-STORM 100 OVERPACK/HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK

Load Case I.D.	Loading <sup>†</sup>	Notes	Location in FSAR	
03	D (water jacket)	Satisfy primary membrane plus bending stress limits for water jacket (This case is only applicable to HI-TRAC).		3.4.4.3.3.4
04	M (penetrant missiles)	Demonstrate that no thru-wall breach of the HI- STORM overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask occurs, and the primary stress levels are not exceeded. Small and intermediate missiles are examined for HI-STORM and HI-TRAC. Large missile penetration is also examined for HI- TRAC.	Overpack HI-TRAC	3.4.8.1 3.4.8.2.1, 3.4.8.2.2
05	Po	Explosion: must not produce buckling or exceed primary stress levels in the overpack structure.		3.4.4.5.2, 3.4.7.2

Notes:

1. Under each of these load cases, different regions of the structure are analyzed to demonstrate compliance.

The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13

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#### **DESIGN, LEVELS A AND B: STRESS INTENSITY**

Code:	ASME NB
Material:	SA203-E
Service Conditions:	Design, Levels A and B
Item:	Stress Intensity

Temp.			Classification	and Value (ksi)		·
(Deg. F)	Sm	$\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{m}}^{\dagger}$	$P_L^{\dagger}$	$\overline{P_L + P_b^{\dagger}}$	$P_L + P_b + Q^{\dagger\dagger}$	Pett
-20 to 100	23.3	23.3	35.0	35.0	69.9	69.9
200	23.3	23.3	35.0	35.0	69.9	69.9
300	23.3	23.3	35.0	35.0	69.9	69.9
400	22.9	22.9	34.4	34.4	68.7	68.7
500	21.6	21.6	32.4	32.4	64.8	64.8

Definitions:

Sm	=	Stress intensity values per ASME Code
Pm	=	Primary membrane stress intensity
P <sub>L</sub> '	=	Local membrane stress intensity
Pb	=	Primary bending stress intensity
Pe	=	Expansion stress
Q	=	Secondary stress
$P_L + F$	Ъ =	Either primary or local membrane plus primary bending

Definitions for Table 3.1.6 apply to all following tables unless modified.

### Notes:

1. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.10.

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<sup>†</sup> ††

Evaluation required for Design condition only.

Evaluation required for Levels A and B only. Penot applicable to vessels.

# LEVEL D: STRESS INTENSITY

Code:	ASME NB
Material:	SA203-E
Service Condition:	Level D
Item:	Stress Intensity

	Class	sification and Value	(ksi)
Temp. (Deg. F)	Pm	PL	$P_L + P_b$
-20 to 100	49.0	70.0	70.0
200	49.0	70.0	70.0
300	49.0	70.0	70.0
400	48.2	68.8	68.8
500	45.4	64.9	64.9

Notes:

- 1. Level D allowables per NB-3225 and Appendix F, Paragraph F-1331.
- 2. Average primary shear stress across a section loaded in pure shear may not exceed  $0.42 S_u$ .
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.10.
- 4.  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ , and  $P_b$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

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#### **DESIGN, LEVELS A AND B: STRESS INTENSITY**

Code:	ASME NB
Material:	SA350-LF3
Service Conditions:	Design, Levels A and B
Item:	Stress Intensity

Temp.	Classification and Value (ksi)					
(Deg. F)	Sm	$P_m^{\dagger}$	$P_L^{\dagger}$	$P_L + P_b^{\dagger}$	$P_L + P_b + Q^{\dagger\dagger}$	P <sub>e</sub> <sup>††</sup>
-20 to 100	23.3	23.3	35.0	35.0	69.9	69.9
200	22.8	22.8	34.2	34.2	68.4	68.4
300	22.2	22.2	33.3	33.3	66.6	66.6
400	21.5	21.5	32.3	32.3	64.5	64.5
500	20.2	20.2	30.3	30.3	60.6	60.6
600	18.5	18.5	27.75	27.75	55.5	55.5
700	16.8	16.8	25.2	25.2	50.4	50.4

Notes:

1. Source for  $S_m$  is ASME Code

2. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.10.

3.  $S_m$ ,  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ ,  $P_b$ , Q, and  $P_e$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Evaluation required for Design condition only.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> Evaluation required for Levels A and B conditions only. P<sub>e</sub> not applicable to vessels.

#### LEVEL D, STRESS INTENSITY

Code:	ASME NB
Material:	SA350-LF3
Service Conditions:	Level D
Item:	<b>Stress Intensity</b>

Town (Dog E)	Classification and Value (ksi)			
Temp. (Beg. I')	Pm	PL	$P_L + P_b$	
-20 to 100	49.0	70.0	70.0	
200	48.0	68.5	68.5	
300	46.7	66.7	66.7	
400	45.2	64.6	64.6	
500	42.5	60.7	60.7	
600	38.9	58.4	58.4	
700	35.3	53.1	53.1	

- 1. Level D allowables per NB-3225 and Appendix F, Paragraph F-1331.
- 2. Average primary shear stress across a section loaded in pure shear may not exceed 0.42 S<sub>u</sub>.
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.10.
- 4.  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ , and  $P_b$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

## **DESIGN AND LEVEL A: STRESS**

Code:ASME NFMaterial:SA516, Grade 70, SA350-LF3, SA203-EService Conditions:Design and Level AItem:Stress

	Classification and Value (ksi)			
Temp. (Deg. F)	S	Membrane Stress	Membrane plus Bending Stress	
-20 to 650	17.5	17.5	26.3	
700	16.6	16.6	24.9	

- 1. S = Maximum allowable stress values from Table 1A of ASME Code, Section II, Part D.
- 2. Stress classification per Paragraph NF-3260.
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.12.

# LEVEL B: STRESS

Code:	ASME NF
Material:	SA516, Grade 70, SA350-LF3, and SA203-E
Service Conditions:	Level B
Item:	Stress

	Classification a	Classification and Value (ksi)		
Temp. (Deg. F)	Membrane Stress	Membrane plus Bending Stress		
-20 to 650	23.3	34.9		
700	22.1	33.1		

Notes:

1. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.12 with allowables from Table 3.1.10.

#### LEVEL D: STRESS INTENSITY

Code:ASME NFMaterial:SA516, Grade 70Service Conditions:Level DItem:Stress Intensity

Temp (Deg F)	Classification and Value (ksi)			
10mp. (20g. 1)	S <sub>m</sub>	Pm	$P_m + P_b$	
-20 to 100	23.3	45.6	68.4	
200	23.1	41.5	62.3	
300	22.5	40.4	60.6	
400	21.7	39.1	58.7	
500	20.5	36.8	55.3	
600	18.7	33.7	50.6	
650	18.4	33.1	49.7	
700	18.3	32.9	49.3	

- 1. Level D allowable stress intensities per Appendix F, Paragraph F-1332.
- 2.  $S_m = Stress intensity values per Table 2A of ASME, Section II, Part D.$
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.12.
- 4.  $P_m$  and  $P_b$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

#### **DESIGN, LEVELS A AND B: STRESS INTENSITY**

Code:	ASME NB
Material:	Alloy X
Service Conditions:	Design, Levels A and B
Item:	Stress Intensity

Tomp	Classification and Numerical Value					
(Deg. F)	Sm	$P_m^{\dagger}$	$P_L^{\dagger}$	$P_L + P_b^{\dagger}$	$\begin{array}{c} P_L + \\ P_b + Q^{\dagger\dagger} \end{array}$	$\mathbf{P_e}^{\dagger\dagger}$
-20 to 100	20.0	20.0	30.0	30.0	60.0	60.0
200	20.0	20.0	30.0	30.0	60.0	60.0
300	20.0	20.0	30.0	30.0	60.0	60.0
400	18.7	18.7	28.1	28.1	56.1	56.1
500	17.5	17.5	26.3	26.3	52.5	52.5
600	16.4	16.4	24.6	24.6	49.2	49.2
650	16.0	16.0	24.0	24.0	48.0	48.0
700	15.6	15.6	23.4	23.4	46.8	46.8
750	15.2	15.2	22.8	22.8	45.6	45.6
800	14.9	14.9	22.4	22.4	44.7	44.7

Notes:

- 1.  $S_m =$  Stress intensity values per Table 2A of ASME II, Part D.
- 2. Alloy X  $S_m$  values are the lowest values for each of the candidate materials at temperature.
- 3. Stress classification per NB-3220.
- 4. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.10.
- 5.  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ ,  $P_b$ , Q, and  $P_e$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Evaluation required for Design condition only.

tt Evaluation required for Levels A, B conditions only. Pe not applicable to vessels.

# LEVEL D: STRESS INTENSITY

Code:	ASME NB
Material:	Alloy X
Service Conditions:	Level D
Item:	Stress Intensity

Temp. (Deg.	Classification and Value (ksi)			
<b>F</b> )	P <sub>m</sub>	PL	$P_L + P_b$	
-20 to 100	48.0	72.0	72.0	
200	48.0	72.0	72.0	
300	46.2	69.3	69.3	
400	44.9	67.4	67.4	
500	42.0	63.0	63.0	
600	39.4	59.1	59.1	
650	38.4	57.6	57.6	
700	37.4	56.1	56.1	
750	36.5	54.8	54.8	
800	35.8	53.7	53.7	

- 1. Level D stress intensities per ASME NB-3225 and Appendix F, Paragraph F-1331.
- 2. The average primary shear strength across a section loaded in pure shear may not exceed  $0.42 \text{ S}_{u}$ .
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.10.
- 4.  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ , and  $P_b$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

#### DESIGN, LEVELS A AND B: STRESS INTENSITY

Code:	ASME NG
Material:	Alloy X
Service Conditions:	Design, Levels A and B
Item:	Stress Intensity

Tomp	Classification and Value (ksi)				
(Deg. F)	S <sub>m</sub>	Pm	P <sub>m</sub> +P <sub>b</sub>	P <sub>m</sub> +P <sub>b</sub> +Q	Pe
-20 to 100	20.0	20.0	30.0	60.0	60.0
200	20.0	20.0	30.0	60.0	60.0
300	20.0	20.0	30.0	60.0	60.0
400	18.7	18.7	28.1	56.1	56.1
500	17.5	17.5	26.3	52.5	52.5
600	16.4	16.4	24.6	49.2	49.2
650	16.0	16.0	24.0	48.0	48.0
700	15.6	15.6	23.4	46.8	46.8
750	15.2	15.2	22.8	45.6	45.6
800	14.9	14.9	22.4	44.7	44.7

Notes:

1.  $S_m =$ Stress intensity values per Table 2A of ASME, Section II, Part D.

- 2. Alloy X S<sub>m</sub> values are the lowest values for each of the candidate materials at temperature.
- 3. Classifications per NG-3220.
- 4. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.11.
- 5.  $P_m$ ,  $P_b$ , Q, and  $P_e$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

#### LEVEL D: STRESS INTENSITY

Code:	ASME NG
Material:	Alloy X
Service Conditions:	Level D
Item:	<b>Stress Intensity</b>

Temp.	Classification and Value (ksi)			
(Deg. F)	Pm	PL	$P_L + P_b$	
-20 to 100	48.0	72.0	72.0	
200	48.0	72.0	72.0	
300	46.2	69.3	69.3	
400	44.9	67.4	67.4	
500	42.0	63.0	63.0	
600	39.4	59.1	59.1	
650	38.4	57.6	57.6	
700	37.4	56.1	56.1	
750	36.5	54.8	54.8	
800	35.8	53.7	53.7	

- 1. Level D stress intensities per ASME NG-3225 and Appendix F, Paragraph F-1331.
- 2. The average primary shear strength across a section loaded in pure shear may not exceed  $0.42 \text{ S}_{u}$ .
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.11.
- 4.  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ , and  $P_b$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.

Load Case	Case Material	Reference Temperature <sup>†</sup> , ° F	Stress Intensity Allowables, ksi		
I.D.	Material		Pm	$P_L + P_b$	$P_L + P_b + Q$
F1	Alloy X	725	15.4	23.1	46.2
F2	Alloy X	725	15.4	23.1	46.2
F3	Alloy X	725	36.9	55.4	NL
E1	Alloy X	500	17.5	26.3	52.5
E2	Alloy X	500	17.5	26.3	52.5
E3	Alloy X	500	42.0	63.0	NL <sup>††</sup>
E4	Alloy X	500	17.5	26.3	52.5
E5	Alloy X	775	36.15	54.25	NL

#### REFERENCE TEMPERATURES AND STRESS LIMITS FOR THE VARIOUS LOAD CASES

Notes:

- 1. Q,  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ , and  $P_b$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.
- 2. Reference temperatures for Load Cases E1-E4 are for MPC shell; for MPC lid and MPC baseplate, reference temperatures are 550 deg. F and 400 deg. F, respectively (per Table 2.2.3) and stress intensity allowables should be adjusted accordingly.

<sup>†</sup> Values for reference temperatures are taken as the design temperatures (Table 2.2.3)

<sup>††</sup> NL: No specified limit in the Code

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#### TABLE 3.1.17 (CONTINUED)

Load	Reference		Stress	Stress Intensity Allowables, ksi		
Case I.D.	Case Material I.D.	Temperature, <sup>5,11</sup> <sup>O</sup> F	Pm	$P_L + P_b$	$P_L + P_b + Q$	
	SA203-E	400	17.5	26.3	NL <sup>†††</sup>	
01	SA350-LF3	400	17.5	26.3	NL	
SA516 Gr. 70 SA515 Gr. 70	400	17.5	26.3	NL		
	SA203-E	400	41.2	61.7	NL	
02	SA350-LF3	400	38.6	58.0	NL	
SA516 Gr. 70 SA515 Gr. 70	400	39.1	58.7	NL		
	SA203-E	400	17.5	26.3	NL	
03	SA350-LF3	400	17.5	26.3	NL	
	SA516 Gr. 70 SA515 Gr. 70	400	17.5	26.3	NL	
	SA203-E	400	41.2	61.7	NL	
04	SA350-LF3	400	38.6	58.0	NL	
	SA516 Gr. 70 SA515 Gr. 70	400	39.1	58.7	NL	

#### REFERENCE TEMPERATURES AND STRESS LIMITS FOR THE VARIOUS LOAD CASES

Note:

- 1.  $P_m$ ,  $P_L$ ,  $P_b$ , and Q are defined in Table 3.1.6.
- 2. Load Cases 01 and 03 are for Normal Conditions; therefore the values listed refer to allowable stress, not allowable stress intensity

<sup>†††</sup> NL: No specified limit in the Code

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Values for reference temperatures are taken as the design temperatures (Table 2.2.3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> For storage fire analysis, temperatures are defined by thermal solution

# **TABLE 3.1.18<sup>†</sup>**

# FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TEST REQUIREMENTS

Material	Test Requirement	Test Temperature	Acceptance Criterion
Bolting (SA193 B7)	Not required (per NF-2311(b)(13) and Note (e) to Figure NF-2311(b)-1)	-	-
Ferritic steel with nominal section thickness of 5/8" or less	Not required per NF-2311(b)(1)	-	-
Normalized SA516 Gr. 70 (thickness greater than 5/8", but less than or equal to 2-1/2")	Not required per NF-2311(b)(7), NF- 2311(b)(13), and curve D in Figure NF- 2311(b)-1	•	-
SA203, SA515 Gr. 70, SA350- LF2, SA350-LF3 (thickness greater than 5/8")	Per NF-2331	See Note 1. (Also must meet ASME Section IIA requirements)	Table NF-2331(a)-3 or Figure NF- 2331(a)-2 (Also must meet ASME Section IIA requirements)
Weld material	<ul> <li>Test per NF-2430 if:</li> <li>1) either of the base materials of the production weld requires impact testing, or;</li> <li>2) either of the base materials is SA516 Gr. 70 with nominal section thickness greater than 5/8".</li> </ul>	See Note 1	Per NF-2330

Note:

1. Required NDT temperature = -40 deg. F for all materials in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack, -40 deg. F for HI-TRAC "STH" materials, and 0 deg. F for HI-TRAC "NF" materials.

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## **DESIGN AND LEVEL A: STRESS**

Code:ASME NFMaterial:SA36Service Conditions:Design and Level AItem:Stress

	Classification and Value (ksi)		
Temp. (Deg. F)	s	Membrane Stress	Membrane plus Bending Stress
-20 to 650	14.5	14.5	21.8
700	13.9	13.9	20.9

- 1. S = Maximum allowable stress values from Table 1A of ASME Code, Section II, Part D.
- 2. Stress classification per Paragraph NF-3260.
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.12.

# LEVEL B: STRESS

Code:	ASME NF
Material:	SA36
Service Conditions:	Level B
Item:	Stress

	Classification and Value (ksi)	
Temp. (Deg. F)	Membrane Stress	Membrane plus Bending Stress
-20 to 650	19.3	28.9
700	18.5	27.7

Notes:

.

1. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.12 with allowables from Table 3.1.19.

# LEVEL D: STRESS INTENSITY

Code:	ASME NF
Material:	SA36
Service Conditions:	Level D
Item:	Stress Intensity

Temp. (Deg. F)	Classification and Value (ksi)		
	Sm	Pm	$P_m + P_b$
-20 to 100	19.3	43.2	64.8
200	19.3	37.0	55.5
300	19.3	36.0	54.0
400	19.3	34.7	52.1
500	19.3	32.8	49.2
600	17.7	30.0	45.0
650	17.4	29.5	44.3
700	17.3	29.2	43.8

- 1. Level D allowable stress intensities per Appendix F, Paragraph F-1332.
- 2.  $S_m = Stress intensity values per Table 2A of ASME, Section II, Part D.$
- 3. Limits on values are presented in Table 2.2.12.
- 4.  $P_m$  and  $P_b$  are defined in Table 3.1.6.











# 3.2 WEIGHTS AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 provide the calculated weights of the individual HI-STORM 100 components as well as the total system weights. The actual weights will vary within a narrow range of the calculated values due to the tolerances in metal manufacturing and fabrication permitted by the ASME Codes. Contained water mass during fuel loading is not included in this table.

The locations of the calculated centers of gravity (CGs) are presented in Table 3.2.3. All centers of gravity are located on the cask centerline since the non-axisymmetric effects of the cask system plus contents are negligible.

Table 3.2.4 provides the lift weight when the HI-TRAC transfer cask with the heaviest fully loaded MPC is being lifted from the fuel pool. The effect of buoyancy is neglected, and the weight of rigging is set at a conservative value.

In all weight tables, bounding values are also listed where necessary for use in structural calculations where their use will provide a conservative result.

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Item	Bounding Weight (lb)
MPC-24	
Without SNF	42,000
<ul> <li>Fully loaded with SNF and Fuel Spacers</li> </ul>	90,000
MPC-32	
• Without SNF	36,000
• Fully loaded with SNF and Fuel Spacers	90,000
MPC-68/68F/68FF	
Without SNF	39,000
<ul> <li>Fully loaded with SNF and Fuel Spacers</li> </ul>	90,000
MPC-24E/EF	
Without SNF	45,000
<ul> <li>Fully loaded with SNF and Fuel Spacers</li> </ul>	90,000
HI-STORM 100 Overpack <sup>†</sup>	
Overpack top lid	23,000
<ul> <li>Overpack w/ lid (empty)</li> </ul>	270,000
<ul> <li>Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24</li> </ul>	360,000
<ul> <li>Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32</li> </ul>	360,000
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	360,000
<ul> <li>Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF</li> </ul>	360,000
HI-STORM 100S(232) Overpack <sup>†</sup>	
Overpack top lid	25,500 <sup>††</sup>
• Overpack w/ lid (empty)	270,000
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	360,000
<ul> <li>Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32</li> </ul>	360,000
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	360,000
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	360.000

# TABLE 3.2.1HI-STORM OVERPACK WEIGHT DATA

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### TABLE 3.2.1 (CONTINUED) HI-STORM OVERPACK WEIGHT DATA

Item	Bounding Weight (lb)
HI-STORM 100S(243) Overpack <sup>†</sup>	
Overpack top lid	25,500 <sup>††</sup>
<ul> <li>Overpack w/ lid (empty)</li> </ul>	270,000
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	360,000
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	360,000
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	360,000
<ul> <li>Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF</li> </ul>	360,000
HI-STORM 100A Overpack <sup>†</sup>	Same as above
HI-STORM 100S Version B(218) Overpack (values in parentheses use high density concrete in overpack body)	
Overpack top lid	29,000
• Overpack w/ lid (empty)	270,000 (305,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	360,000 (395,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	360,000 (395,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	360,000 (395,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	360,000 (395,000)
HI-STORM 100S Version B(229) Overpack (values in parentheses use high density concrete in overpack body)	
Overpack top lid	29,000
• Overpack w/ lid (empty)	270,000 (320,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	360,000 (410,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	360,000 (410,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	360,000 (410,000)
• Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	360,000 (410,000)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The bounding weights for the HI-STORM 100S(232) and 100S(243) overpacks listed in the above table are based on a maximum concrete (dry) density of 160.8 pcf. For improved shielding effectiveness, higher density concrete (up to 200 pcf dry) can be poured in the radial cavity of each of the HI-STORM 100S overpacks. At 200 pcf, the bounding weights of an empty overpack and a fully loaded overpack increase to 320,000 lb and 410,000 lb, respectively. Higher density concrete cannot be used in the HI-STORM 100 or 100A overpacks.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> Value is based on a maximum concrete (dry) density of 155 pcf. For improved shielding effectiveness, higher density concrete (up to 200 pcf dry) can be poured in the HI-STORM 100S lids. At 200 pcf, the bounding weight of the lid increases to 28,000 lb.

Item	Bounding Weight (lb)
Top Lid	2,750
Pool Lid	12,500
Transfer Lid	24,500
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	143,500
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid and Transfer Lid (water jacket filled)	155,000
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	226,000
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-32 (water jacket filled)	233,500
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 68/68F/68FF(water jacket filled)	231,000
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	229,000
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	237,500
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-32 (water jacket filled)	245,000
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	242,500
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	240,500

# TABLE 3.2.2HI-TRAC 125 TRANSFER CASK WEIGHT DATA

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# TABLE 3.2.2 (CONTINUED)HI-TRAC 100 TRANSFER CASK WEIGHT DATA

Item	Bounding Weight (lb)
Top Lid	1,500
Pool Lid	8,000
Transfer Lid	17,000
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	102,000
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid and Transfer Lid (water jacket filled)	111,000
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	183,500
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-32 (water jacket filled)	191,000
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	188,500
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	186,500
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	192,000
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-32 (water jacket filled)	199,000
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	196,500
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	194,500

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# TABLE 3.2.2 (CONTINUED) HI-TRAC 125D TRANSFER CASK WEIGHT DATA

Item	Bounding Weight (lb)
Top Lid	2,750
Pool Lid	12,500
HI-TRAC 125D w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	146,000
HI-TRAC 125D w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	228,500
HI-TRAC 125D w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-32 (water jacket filled)	236,000
HI-TRAC 125D w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	233,500
HI-TRAC 125D w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	231,500

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Component	Height of CG Above Datum <sup>†</sup> (in)
MPC-24 (empty)	109.0
MPC-32 (empty)	113.2
MPC-68/68F/68FF (empty)	111.5
MPC-24E/EF (empty)	108.9
HI-STORM 100 Overpack (empty)	116.8
HI-STORM 100S(232) Overpack (empty)	111.7
HI-STORM 100S(243) Overpack (empty)	117.4
HI-STORM 100S Version B(218) Overpack (empty)(height using standard weight concrete bounds height calculated using high density concrete)	108.77(108.45)
HI-STORM 100S Version B(229) Overpack (empty)(height using standard weight concrete bounds height calculated using high density concrete)	114.27(113.94)
HI-STORM 100 Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	118.7
HI-STORM 100 Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	119.0
HI-STORM 100 Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	119.2
HI-STORM 100S(232) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	113.8
HI-STORM 100S(232) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	113.7
HI-STORM 100S(232) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	114.0
HI-STORM 100S(232) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	114.2
HI-STORM 100S(243) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	118.1
HI-STORM 100S(243) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	117.9
HI-STORM 100S(243) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	118.2
HI-STORM 100S(243) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	118.4
HI-STORM 100S Version B(218) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	110.83
HI-STORM 100S Version B(218) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	111.88
HI-STORM 100S Version B(218) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	111.45
HI-STORM 100S Version B(218) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	110.80

# TABLE 3.2.3 CENTERS OF GRAVITY OF HI-STORM SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS

<sup>†</sup> See notes at end of table.

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# TABLE 3.2.3 (CONTINUED)CENTERS OF GRAVITY OF HI-STORM SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS

Component	Height of CG Above Datum <sup>†</sup> (in)
HI-STORM 100S Version B(229) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24	114.95
HI-STORM 100S Version B(229) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-32	116.00
HI-STORM 100S Version B(229) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF	115.58
HI-STORM 100S Version B(229) Overpack w/ fully loaded MPC-24E/EF	114.93
HI-TRAC 125 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	99.5
HI-TRAC 125 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 32 (water jacket filled)	99.5
HI-TRAC 125 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	99.8
HI-TRAC 125 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	100.1
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	91.0
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid and Transfer Lid (water jacket filled)	91.1
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	97.3
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-32 (water jacket filled)	97.2
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	97.6
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	98.0
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	100.3
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 32 (water jacket filled)	100.3
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	100.7
HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Transfer Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24E/EF (water jacket filled)	101.0

<sup>†</sup> See notes at end of table.

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# TABLE 3.2.3 (CONTINUED)CENTERS OF GRAVITY OF HI-STORM SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS

Component	Height of CG Above Datum (in)
HI-TRAC 125D Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	92.4
HI-TRAC 125D Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-24 (water jacket filled)	97.6
HI-TRAC 125D Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC-32 (water jacket filled)	97.5
HI-TRAC 125D Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 68/68F/68FF (water jacket filled)	97.8
HI-TRAC 125D Transfer Cask w/ Top Lid, Pool Lid, and fully loaded MPC- 24E/EF (water jacket filled)	98.2

#### Notes:

- 1. The datum used for calculations involving the HI-STORM is the bottom of the overpack baseplate. The datum used for calculations involving the HI-TRAC is the bottom of the pool lid or transfer lid, as appropriate.
- 2. The datum used for calculations involving only the MPC is the bottom of the MPC baseplate.
- 3. The CG heights of the HI-STORM overpacks are calculated based on standard density concrete (i.e., 150 pcf dry). At higher densities, the CG heights are slightly lower, which makes the HI-STORM overpacks less prone to tipping.

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Item	Estimated Weight (lb)	Bounding Weight (lb)
HI-TRAC 125 w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	142,976	
MPC-32 fully loaded with SNF and fuel spacers	89,765 <sup>†</sup>	
HI-TRAC 125 Top Lid	-2,730 <sup>tt</sup>	
Water in MPC and HI-TRAC 125 Annulus	16,570	
Water in Water Jacket	-9,757 <sup>†††</sup>	
Lift yoke	4,200	
Inflatable annulus seal	50	
TOTAL	241,074	250,000

TABLE 3.2.4LIFT WEIGHT ABOVE POOL WITH HI-TRAC 125

<sup>†</sup> Includes MPC closure ring.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> HI-TRAC top lid weight is included in transfer cask weight. However, the top lid is not installed during in-pool operations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†††</sup> Total weight of HI-TRAC 125 includes water in water jacket. However, during removal from the fuel pool no water is in the water jacket since the water within the MPC cavity provides sufficient shielding.

Item	Estimated Weight (lb)	Bounding Weight (lb)
HI-TRAC 100 w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	100,194	
MPC-32 fully loaded with SNF and fuel spacers	89,765 <sup>†</sup>	
HI-TRAC 100 Top Lid	-1,203 <sup>††</sup>	
Water in MPC and HI-TRAC 100 Annulus	16,570	
Water in Water Jacket	-7,562 <sup>†††</sup>	
Lift yoke	3,200	
Inflatable annulus seal	50	
TOTAL	201,014	202,000

#### TABLE 3.2.4 (CONTINUED) LIFT WEIGHT ABOVE POOL WITH HI-TRAC 100

Note: HI-TRAC transfer cask weight is without removable portion of pocket trunnion.

t Includes MPC closure ring.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> HI-TRAC top lid weight is included in transfer cask weight. However, the top lid is not installed during in-pool operations.

ttt Total weight of HI-TRAC 100 includes water in water jacket. However, during removal from the fuel pool no water is in the water jacket since the water within the MPC cavity provides sufficient shielding.

Item	Estimated Weight (lb)	Bounding Weight (lb)
HI-TRAC 125D w/ Top Lid and Pool Lid (water jacket filled)	145,635	
MPC-32 fully loaded with SNF and fuel spacers	89,765 <sup>†</sup>	
HI-TRAC 125D Top Lid	-2,575 <sup>††</sup>	
Water in MPC and HI-TRAC 125D Annulus	16,570	
Water in Water Jacket	-8,955***	
Lift yoke	4,200	
Inflatable annulus seal	50	
TOTAL	244,690	250,000

# TABLE 3.2.4 (CONTINUED) LIFT WEIGHT ABOVE POOL WITH HI-TRAC 125D

<sup>†</sup> Includes MPC closure ring.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> HI-TRAC top lid weight is included in transfer cask weight. However, the top lid is not installed during in-pool operations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†††</sup> Total weight of HI-TRAC 125D includes water in water jacket. However, during removal from the fuel pool no water is in the water jacket since the water within the MPC cavity provides sufficient shielding.

### 3.3 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIALS

Table 2.2.6 provides a comprehensive listing of materials of construction, applicable code, and ITS designation for all functional parts in the HI-STORM 100 System. This section provides the mechanical properties used in the structural evaluation. The properties include yield stress, ultimate stress, modulus of elasticity, Poisson's ratio, weight density, and coefficient of thermal expansion. Values are presented for a range of temperatures which envelopes the maximum and minimum temperatures under all service conditions discussed in the preceding section where structural analysis is performed.

The materials selected for use in the MPC, HI-STORM 100 Overpack, and HI-TRAC transfer cask are presented in the Bills-of-Material in Section 1.5. In this chapter, the materials are divided into two categories, structural and nonstructural. Structural materials are materials that act as load bearing members and are, therefore, significant in the stress evaluations. Materials that do not support mechanical loads are considered nonstructural. For example, the HI-TRAC inner shell is a structural material, while the lead between the inner and outer shell is a nonstructural material. For nonstructural materials, the only property that is used in the structural analysis is weight density. In local deformation analysis, however, such as the study of penetration from a tornado-borne missile, the properties of lead in HI-TRAC and plain concrete in HI-STORM 100 are included.

### 3.3.1 <u>Structural Materials</u>

# 3.3.1.1 <u>Alloy X</u>

A hypothetical material termed Alloy X is defined for all MPC structural components. The material properties of Alloy X are the least favorable values from the set of candidate alloys. The purpose of a least favorable material definition is to ensure that all structural analyses are conservative, regardless of the actual MPC material. For example, when evaluating the stresses in the MPC, it is conservative to work with the minimum values for yield strength and ultimate strength. This guarantees that the material used for fabrication of the MPC will be of equal or greater strength than the hypothetical material used in the analysis. In the structural evaluation, the only property for which it is not always conservative to use the set of minimum values is the coefficient of thermal expansion. Two sets of values for the coefficient of thermal expansion are specified, a minimum set and a maximum set. For each analysis, the set of coefficients, minimum or maximum that causes the more severe load on the cask system is used.

Table 3.3.1 lists the numerical values for the material properties of Alloy X versus temperature. These values, taken from the ASME Code, Section II, Part D [3.3.1], are used in all structural analyses. The maximum temperatures in some MPC components may exceed the allowable limits of temperature during short time duration loading operations, off-normal transfer operations, or storage accident events. However, no maximum temperature for Alloy X used at or within the confinement boundary exceeds 1000°F. As shown in ASME Code Case N-47-33 (Class 1 Components in Elevated Temperature Service, 1995 Code Cases, Nuclear Components), the strength properties of austenitic stainless steels do not change due to exposure to 1000°F temperature for up to 10,000 hours. Therefore, there is no significant effect on mechanical properties of the confinement or basket

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material during the short time duration loading. A further description of Alloy X, including the materials from which it is derived, is provided in Appendix 1.A.

Two properties of Alloy X that are not included in Table 3.3.1 are weight density and Poisson's ratio. These properties are assumed constant for all structural analyses, regardless of temperature. The values used are shown in the table below.

PROPERTY	VALUE	
Weight Density (lb/in <sup>3</sup> )	0.290	
Poisson's Ratio	0.30	

#### 3.3.1.2 Carbon Steel, Low-Alloy and Nickel Alloy Steel

The carbon steels in the HI-STORM 100 System are SA516 Grade 70 and SA515 Grade 70. The nickel alloy and low alloy steels are SA203-E and SA350-LF3, respectively. These steels are not constituents of Alloy X. The material properties of SA516 Grade 70 and SA515 Grade 70 are shown in Tables 3.3.2. The material properties of SA203-E and SA350-LF3 are given in Table 3.3.3.

Two properties of these steels that are not included in Tables 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are weight density and Poisson's ratio. These properties are assumed constant for all structural analyses. The values used are shown in the table below.

PROPERTY	VALUE
Weight Density (lb/in <sup>3</sup> )	0.283
Poisson's Ratio	0.30

#### 3.3.1.3 Bolting Materials

Material properties of the bolting materials used in the HI-STORM 100 System and HI-TRAC lifting trunnions are given in Table 3.3.4. The properties of representative anchor studs used to fasten HI-STORM 100A are listed in Table 1.2.7.

#### 3.3.1.4 <u>Weld Material</u>

All weld materials utilized in the welding of the Code components comply with the provisions of the appropriate ASME subsection (e.g., Subsection NB for the MPC enclosure vessel) and Section IX. All non-code welds will be made using weld procedures that meet Section IX of the ASME Code. The minimum tensile strength of the weld wire and filler material (where applicable) will be equal to or greater than the tensile strength of the base metal listed in the ASME Code.

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# 3.3.2 <u>Nonstructural Materials</u>

# 3.3.2.1 Solid Neutron Shield

The solid neutron shielding material in the HI-TRAC top lid and transfer lid doors is not considered as a structural member of the HI-STORM 100 System. Its load carrying capacity is neglected in all structural analyses except where such omission would be non-conservative. The only material property of the solid neutron shield that is important to the structural evaluation is weight density (1.63g/cm<sup>3</sup>).

# 3.3.2.2 Solid Neutron Absorber

The fuel basket solid neutron absorber is not a structural member of the HI-STORM 100 System. Its load carrying capacity is neglected in all structural analyses. The only material property of the solid neutron absorber that is important to the structural evaluation is weight density. As the MPC fuel baskets can be constructed with neutron absorber panels of variable areal density, the weight that produces the most severe cask load is assumed in each analysis (density 2.644 g/cm<sup>3</sup>).

### 3.3.2.3 <u>Concrete</u>

The primary function of the plain concrete in the HI-STORM storage overpack is shielding. Concrete in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack is not considered as a structural member, except to withstand compressive, bearing, and penetrant loads. While concrete is not considered a structural member, its mechanical behavior must be quantified to determine the stresses in the structural members (steel shells surrounding it) under accident conditions. Table 3.3.5 provides the concrete mechanical properties. Allowable, bearing strength in concrete for normal loading conditions is calculated in accordance with ACI 318.1 [3.3.2]. The procedure specified in ASTM C-39 is utilized to verify that the assumed compressive strength will be realized in the actual in-situ pours. In addition, although the concrete is not reinforced (since the absence of reinforcement does not degrade the compressive strength), the requirements of ACI-349 [3.3.3] are imposed to insure the suitability of the concrete mix. Appendix 1.D provides additional information on the requirements on plain concrete for use in HI-STORM 100 storage overpack.

To enhance the shielding performance of the HI-STORM storage overpack, high density concrete can be used during fabrication. The permissible range of concrete densities is specified in Table 1.D.1. The structural calculations consider the most conservative density value (i.e., maximum or minimum weight), as appropriate.

# 3.3.2.4 <u>Lead</u>

Lead is not considered as a structural member of the HI-STORM 100 System. Its load carrying capacity is neglected in all structural analysis, except in the analysis of a tornado missile strike where it acts as a missile barrier. Applicable mechanical properties of lead are provided in Table 3.3.5.

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# 3.3.2.5 <u>Aluminum Heat Conduction Elements</u>

Optional aluminum heat conduction elements may be located between the fuel basket and MPC vessel. They are optional thin flexible elements whose sole function is to transmit heat as described in Chapter 4. They are not credited with any structural load capacity and are shaped to provide negligible resistance to basket thermal expansion. The total weight of the aluminum inserts is less than 1,000 lb. per MPC.
			Alloy X	<u> </u>					
Temp. (Deg. F)	Sy	S <sub>u</sub> <sup>†</sup>	α <sub>min</sub>	α <sub>max</sub>	Е				
-40	30.0	75.0 (70.0)	8.54	8.55	28.82				
100	30.0	75.0 (70.0)	8.54	8.55	28.14				
150	27.5	73.0 (68.1)	8.64	8.67	27.87				
200	25.0	71.0 (66.2)	8.76	8.79	27.6				
250	23.75	68.5 (63.85)	8.88	8.9	27.3				
300	22.5	66.0 (61.5)	8.97	9.0	27.0				
350	21.6	65.2 (60.75)	9.10	9.11	26.75				
400	20.7	64.4 (60.0)	9.19	9.21	26.5				
450	20.05	64.0 (59.65)	9.28	9.32	26.15				
500	19.4	63.5 (59.3)	9.37	9.42	25.8				
550	18.8	63.3 (59.1)	9.45	9.50	25.55				
600	18.2	63.1 (58.9)	9.53	9.6	25.3				
650	17.8	62.8 (58.6)	9.61	9.69	25.05				
700	17.3	62.5 (58.4)	9.69	9.76	24.8				
750	16.9	62.2 (58.1)	9.76	9.81	24.45				
800	16.6	61.7 (57.6)	9.82	9.90	24.1				

### TABLE 3.3.1 ALLOY X MATERIAL PROPERTIES

Definitions:

 $S_y =$ Yield Stress (ksi)

 $\alpha$  = Mean Coefficient of thermal expansion (in./in. per degree F x 10<sup>-6</sup>)

 $S_u = Ultimate Stress (ksi)$ 

 $E = Young's Modulus (psi x 10^6)$ 

Notes:

- 1. Source for S<sub>y</sub> values is Table Y-1 of [3.3.1].
- 2. Source for  $S_u$  values is Table U of [3.3.1].
- 3. Source for  $\alpha_{\min}$  and  $\alpha_{\max}$  values is Table TE-1 of [3.3.1].
- 4. Source for E values is material group G in Table TM-1 of [3.3.1].

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The ultimate stress of Alloy X is dependent on the product form of the material (i.e., forging vs. plate). Values in parentheses are based on SA-336 forged materials (type F304, F304LN, F316, and F316LN), which are used solely for the one-piece construction MPC lids. All other values correspond to SA-240 plate material.

Temp.		SA516 and SA	515, Grade 70	
(Deg. F)	Sy	Su	α	E
-40	38.0	70.0		29.95
100	38.0	70.0	5.53 (5.73)	29.34
150	36.3	70.0	5.71 (5.91)	29.1
200	34.6	70.0	5.89 (6.09)	28.8
250	34.15	70.0	6.09 (6.27)	28.6
300	33.7	70.0	6.26 (6.43)	28.3
350	33.15	70.0	6.43 (6.59)	28.0
400	32.6	70.0	6.61 (6.74)	27.7
450	31.65	70.0	6.77 (6.89)	27.5
500	30.7	70.0	6.91 (7.06)	27.3
550	29.4	70.0	7.06 (7.18)	27.0
600	28.1	70.0	7.17 (7.28)	26.7
650	27.6	70.0	7.30 (7.40)	26.1
700	27.4	70.0	7.41 (7.51)	25.5
750	26.5	69.3	7.50 (7.61)	24.85

TABLE 3.3.2SA516 AND SA515, GRADE 70 MATERIAL PROPERTIES

Definitions:

 $S_y =$ Yield Stress (ksi)

 $\alpha$  = Mean Coefficient of thermal expansion (in./in. per degree F x 10<sup>-6</sup>)

 $S_u = Ultimate Stress (ksi)$ 

 $E = Young's Modulus (psi x 10^6)$ 

### Notes:

- 1. Source for S<sub>y</sub> values is Table Y-1 of [3.3.1].
- 2. Source for  $S_u$  values is Table U of [3.3.1].
- 3. Source for  $\alpha$  values is material group C in Table TE-1 of [3.3.1].
- 4. Source for E values is "Carbon steels with C less than or equal to 0.30%" in Table TM-1 of [3.3.1].
- 5. Values for SA515 are given in parentheses where different from SA516.

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Temp.	SA35	0-LF3 an	d LF2	SA350-LF3/SA	А203-Е		SA203-)	E
(Deg. F)	Sm	Sy	Su	Е	α	Sm	Sy	Su
-20	23.3	37.5 (36.0)	70.0	28.2		23.3	40.0	70.0
100	23.3	37.5 (36.0)	70.0	27.6	6.27	23.3	40.0	70.0
200	22.8 (21.9)	34.2 (32.9)	68.5 (70.0)	27.1	6.54	23.3	36.5	70.0
300	22.2 (21.3)	33.2 (31.9)	66.7 (70.0)	26.7	6.78	23.3	35.4	70.0
400	21.5 (20 <i>.</i> 6)	32.2 (30.9)	64.6 (70.0)	26.1	6.98	22.9	34.3	68.8
500	20.2 (19.4)	30.3 (29.2)	60.7 (70.0)	25.7	7.16	21.6	32.4	64.9
600	18.5 (17.8)	- (26.6)	- (70.0)	-	-	-	-	-
700	16.8 (17.3)	- (26.0)	- (70.0)	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 3.3.3SA350-LF3 AND SA203-E MATERIAL PROPERTIES

Definitions:

 $S_m = Design Stress Intensity (ksi)$ 

 $S_y =$  Yield Stress (ksi)

 $S_u =$  Ultimate Stress (ksi)

 $\alpha$  = Coefficient of Thermal Expansion (in./in. per degree F x 10<sup>-6</sup>)

E = Young's Modulus (psi x 10<sup>6</sup>)

Notes:

1. Source for  $S_m$  values is ASME Code.

2. Source for S<sub>y</sub> values is ASME Code.

- 3. Source for  $S_u$  values is ratio ing  $S_m$  values.
- 4. Source for  $\alpha$  values is material group E in Table TE-1 of [3.3.1].
- 5. Source for E values is material group B in Table TM-1 of [3.3.1].
- 6. Values for LF2 are given in parentheses where different from LF3.

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Temp. (I F)	Deg.		SB637-N07718				
		Sy	Su	E	α	S <sub>m</sub>	
-100		150.0	185.0	29.9	•••	50.0	
-20		150.0	185.0			50.0	
70	_	150.0	185.0	29.0	7.05	50.0	
100		150.0	185.0		7.08	50.0	
200		144.0	177.6	28.3	7.22	48.0	
300		140.7	173.5	27.8	7.33	46.9	
400		138.3	170.6	27.6	7.45	46.1	
500		136.8	168.7	27.1	7.57	45.6	
600		135.3	166.9	26.8	7.67	45.1	
		SA193	Grade B7 (2.5 to 4	4 inches diamet	er)		
Temp. (I F)	Deg.	Sy	Su	Е	α	•	
100		95.0	115.00	•	5.73		
200		88.5	107.13	•	6.09	•	
300		85.1	103.02	-	6.43	-	
400		82.3	99.63	-	5.9	•	

### TABLE 3.3.4 BOLTING MATERIAL PROPERTIES

Definitions:

 $S_m = Design stress intensity (ksi)$ 

S<sub>y</sub> ≈ Yield Stress (ksi)

 $\alpha$  = Mean Coefficient of thermal expansion (in./in. per degree F x 10<sup>-6</sup>)

 $S_u = Ultimate Stress (ksi)$ 

 $E = Young's Modulus (psi x 10^6)$ 

### Notes:

1. Source for  $S_m$  values is Table 4 of [3.3.1].

2. Source for S<sub>y</sub> values is ratioing design stress intensity values.

3. Source for S<sub>u</sub> values is ratioing design stress intensity values.

4. Source for  $\alpha$  values is Tables TE-1 and TE-4 of [3.3.1], as applicable.

5. Source for E values is Table TM-1 of [3.3.1].

6. Source for  $S_y$  values for SA193 bolts is Table Y-1 of [3.3.1]; source for  $S_u$  is by ratioing  $S_y$ .

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SA193 Grade B7 (less than 2.5 inch diameter)							
Temp. (Deg. F)	Sy	Su	E	α	-		
100	105.0	125.00	-	5.73	-		
200	98.0	116.67	-	6.09	-		
300	94.1	112.02		6.43			
400	91.5	108.93	-	6.74	-		
Temp.	SA705-630/SA564-630 (Age Hardened at 1075 degrees F)						
(Deg. F)	Sy	Su	E	α	S <sub>m</sub>		
200	115.6	145.0	28.5	5.9			
300	110.7	145.0	27.9	5.9			
400	106.9	145.0	27.3	5.91			
SA705-630/SA564-630 (Age Hardened at 1150 degrees F)							
200	97.1	135.0	28.5	5.9			
300	93.0	135.0	27.9	5.9			

### TABLE 3.3.4 (CONTINUED) BOLTING MATERIAL PROPERTIES

Definitions:

 $S_m = Design stress intensity (ksi)$ 

 $S_y =$ Yield Stress (ksi)

 $\alpha$  = Mean Coefficient of thermal expansion (in./in. per degree F x 10<sup>-6</sup>)

 $S_u = Ultimate Stress (ksi)$ 

 $E = Young's Modulus (psi x 10^6)$ 

#### Notes:

1. Source for S<sub>y</sub> values is Table Y-1 of [3.3.1].

2. Source for  $S_u$  values is Table U of [3.3.1].

3. Source for  $\alpha$  values is Tables TE-1 and TE-4 of [3.3.1], as applicable.

4. Source for E values is Table TM-1 of [3.3.1].

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# TABLE 3.3.5CONCRETE AND LEAD MECHANICAL PROPERTIES

PROPERTY	VALUE					
CONCRETE:						
Compressive Strength (psi)			See Ta	ble 1.D.1		
Nominal Density (lb/ft <sup>3</sup> )		See Table 1.D.1				
Allowable Bearing Stress (psi)			1,	823 <sup>†</sup>		
Allowable Axial Compression (psi)	1,266 <sup>†</sup>					
Allowable Flexure, extreme fiber tension (psi)	187 <sup>†,††</sup>					
Allowable Flexure, extreme fiber compression (psi)	2,145 <sup>†</sup>					
Mean Coefficient of Thermal Expansion (in/in/deg. F)	5.5E-06					
Modulus of Elasticity (psi)		57,00	0 (compress	ive strength	(psi)) <sup>1/2</sup>	
LEAD:	-40°F	-20°F	70°F	200°F	300°F	600°F
Yield Strength (psi)	700	680	640	490	380	20
Modulus of Elasticity (ksi)	2.4E+3 2.4E+3 2.3E+3 2.0E+3 1.9E+3 1.5E+3			1.5E+3		
Coefficient of Thermal Expansion (in/in/deg. F)	15.6E-6	15.7E-6	16.1E-6	16.6E-6	17.2E-6	20.2E-6
Poisson's Ratio	0.40					
Density (lb/cubic ft.)				708		

Notes:

1. Concrete allowable stress values based on ACI 318.1.

2. Lead properties are from [3.3.5].

<sup>†</sup>Values listed correspond to concrete compressive stress = 3,300 psi <sup>††</sup> No credit for tensile strength of concrete is taken in the calculations

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Temp.	SA36				
(Deg. F)	Sy	Su	α	E	
-40	36.0	58.0		29.95	
100	36.0	58.0	5.53	29.34	
150	34.4	55.4	5.71	29.1	
200	32.8	52.8	5.89	28.8	
250	32.35	52.1	6.09	28.6	
300	31.9	51.4	6.26	28.3	
350	31.35	50.5	6.43	28.0	
400	30.8	49.6	6.61	27.7	
450	29.95	48.3	6.77	27.5	
500	29.1	46.9	6.91	27.3	
550	27.85	44.9	7.06	27.0	
600	26.6	42.9	7.17	26.7	
650	26.1	42.1	7.30	26.1	
700	25.9	41.7	7.41	25.5	

## **TABLE 3.3.6 SA36 MATERIAL PROPERTIES**

Definitions:

 $S_y =$ Yield Stress (ksi)

- $\alpha$  = Mean Coefficient of thermal expansion (in./in. per degree F x 10<sup>-6</sup>)
- $S_{\mu} = Ultimate Stress (ksi)$

 $E = Young's Modulus (psi x 10^6)$ 

Notes:

- Source for  $S_y$  values is Table Y-1 of [3.3.1]. Source for  $S_u$  values is ratioing  $S_y$  values. 1.
- 2.
- Source for  $\alpha$  values is material group C in Table TE-1 of [3.3.1]. 3.
- 4. Source for E values is "Carbon steels with C less than or equal to 0.30%" in Table TM-1 of [3.3.1].

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### 3.4 GENERAL STANDARDS FOR CASKS

### 3.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions

In this section, it is shown that there is no credible mechanism for significant chemical or galvanic reactions in the HI-STORM 100 System during long-term storage operations (including HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100A).

The MPC, which is filled with helium, provides a nonaqueous and inert environment. Insofar as corrosion is a long-term time-dependent phenomenon, the inert gas environment in the MPC precludes the incidence of corrosion during storage on the ISFSI. Furthermore, the only dissimilar material groups in the MPC are: (1) the neutron absorber material and stainless steel and (2) aluminum and stainless steel. Neutron absorber materials and stainless steel have been used in close proximity in wet storage for over 30 years. Many spent fuel pools at nuclear plants contain fuel racks, which are fabricated from neutron absorber materials and stainless steel materials, with geometries similar to the MPC. Not one case of chemical or galvanic degradation has been found in fuel racks built by Holtec. This experience provides a sound basis to conclude that corrosion will not occur in these materials. Additionally, the aluminum conduction inserts and stainless steel basket are very close on the galvanic series chart. Aluminum, like other metals of its genre (e.g., titanium and magnesium) rapidly passivates in an aqueous environment, leading to a thin ceramic (Al<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>) barrier, which renders the material essentially inert and corrosion-free over long periods of application. The physical properties of the material, e.g., thermal expansion coefficient, diffusivity, and thermal conductivity, are essentially unaltered by the exposure of the aluminum metal stock to an aqueous environment.

The aluminum in the optional heat conduction elements will quickly passivate in air and in water to form a protective oxide layer that prevents any significant hydrogen production during MPC cask loading and unloading operations. The aluminum in the neutron absorber material (i.e., Boral), particularly in the core area, will also react with the water to generate hydrogen gas. The exact rate of generation and total amount of hydrogen generated is a function of a number of variables (see Section 1.2.1.3.1.1) and cannot be predicted with any certainty. Therefore, to preclude the potential for hydrogen ignition during lid welding or cutting, the operating procedures in Chapter 8 require monitoring for combustible gas and either exhausting or purging the space beneath the MPC lid with an inert gas during these activities. Once the MPC cavity is drained, dried, and backfilled with helium, the source of the hydrogen gas (the aluminum-water reaction) is eliminated.

The HI-STORM 100 storage overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask each combine low alloy and nickel alloy steels, carbon steels, neutron and gamma shielding materials, and bolting materials. All of these materials have a long history of nongalvanic behavior within close proximity of each other. The internal and external steel surfaces of each of the storage overpacks are sandblasted and coated to preclude surface oxidation. The HI-TRAC coating does not chemically react with borated water. Therefore, chemical or galvanic reactions involving the storage overpack materials are highly unlikely and are not expected.

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In accordance with NRC Bulletin 96-04 [3.4.7], a review of the potential for chemical, galvanic, or other reactions among the materials of the HI-STORM 100 System, its contents and the operating environments, which may produce adverse reactions, has been performed. Table 3.4.2 provides a listing of the materials of fabrication for the HI-STORM 100 System and evaluates the performance of the material in the expected operating environments during short-term loading/unloading operations and long-term storage operations. As a result of this review, no operations were identified which could produce adverse reactions beyond those conditions already analyzed in this FSAR.

### 3.4.2 <u>Positive Closure</u>

There are no quick-connect/disconnect ports in the confinement boundary of the HI-STORM 100 System. The only access to the MPC is through the storage overpack lid, which weighs over 23,000 pounds (see Table 3.2.1). The lid is fastened to the storage overpack with large bolts. Inadvertent opening of the storage overpack is not feasible; opening a storage overpack requires mobilization of special tools and heavy-load lifting equipment.

### 3.4.3 Lifting Devices

As required by Reg. Guide 3.61, in this subsection, analyses for <u>all</u> lifting operations applicable to the deployment of a member of the HI-STORM 100 family are presented to demonstrate compliance with applicable codes and standards.

The HI-STORM 100 System has the following components and devices participating in lifting operations: lifting trunnions located at the top of the HI-TRAC transfer cask, lid lifting connections for the HI-STORM 100 lid and for other lids in the HI-TRAC transfer cask, connections for lifting and carrying a loaded HI-STORM 100 vertically, and lifting connections for the loaded MPC.

Analyses of HI-STORM 100 storage overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask lifting devices are reported in this submittal. Analyses of MPC lifting operations are presented in the HI-STAR 100 | FSAR (Docket Number 72-1008, Subsection 3.4.3) and are also applicable here.

The evaluation of the adequacy of the lifting devices entails careful consideration of the applied loading and associated stress limits. The load combination D+H, where H is the "handling load", is the generic case for all lifting adequacy assessments. The term D denotes the dead load. Quite obviously, D must be taken as the bounding value of the dead load of the component being lifted. In all lifting analyses considered in this document, the handling load H is assumed to be 0.15D. In other words, the inertia amplifier during the lifting operation is assumed to be equal to 0.15g. This value is consistent with the guidelines of the Crane M anufacturer's A ssociation of A merica (CMAA), Specification No. 70, 1988, Section 3.3, which stipulates a dynamic factor equal to 0.15 for slowly executed lifts. Thus, the "apparent dead load" of the component for stress analysis purposes is  $D^* = 1.15D$ . Unless otherwise stated, all lifting analyses in this report use the "apparent dead load",  $D^*$ , as the lifted load.

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Analysis methodology to evaluate the adequacy of the lifting device may be analytical or numerical. For the analysis of the trunnion, an accepted conservative technique for computing the bending stress is to assume that the lifting force is applied at the tip of the trunnion "cantilever" and that the stress state is fully developed at the base of the cantilever. This conservative technique, recommended in NUREG-1536, is applied to all trunnion analyses presented in this SAR and has also been applied to the trunnions analyzed in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR.

In general, the stress analysis to establish safety pursuant to NUREG-0612, Regulatory Guide 3.61, and the ASME Code, requires evaluation of three discrete zones which may be referred to as (i) the trunnion, (ii) the trunnion/component interface, hereinafter referred to as Region A, and (iii) the rest of the component, specifically the stressed metal zone adjacent to Region A, herein referred to as Region B. During this discussion, the term "trunnion" applies to any device used for lifting (i.e., trunnions, lift bolts, etc.)

Stress limits germane to each of the above three areas are discussed below:

- i. Trunnion: NUREG-0612 requires that under the "apparent dead load", D<sup>•</sup>, the maximum primary stress in the trunnion be less than 10% of the trunnion material ultimate strength and less than 1/6th of the trunnion material yield strength. Because of the materials of construction selected for trunnions in all HI-STORM 100 System components, the ultimate strength-based limit is more restrictive in every case. Therefore, all trunnion safety factors reported in this document pertain to the ultimate strength-based limit.
- Region A: Trunnion/Component Interface: Stresses in Region A must meet ASME Code Level A limits under applied load D\*. Additionally, Regulatory Guide 3.61 requires that the primary stress under 3D\*, associated with the cross-section, be less than the yield strength of the applicable material. In cases involving section bending, the developed section moment may be compared against the plastic moment at yield. The circumferential extent of the characteristic cross-section at the trunnion/component interface is calculated based on definitions from ASME Section III, Subsection NB and is defined in terms of the shell thickness and radius of curvature at the connection to the trunnion block. By virtue of the construction geometry, only the mean shell stress is categorized as "primary" for this evaluation.
- iii. Region B: Typically, the stresses in the component in the vicinity of the trunnion/component interface are higher than elsewhere. However, exceptional situations exist. For example, when lifting a loaded MPC, the MPC baseplate, which supports the entire weight of the fuel and the fuel basket, is a candidate location for high stress even though it is far removed from the lifting location (which is located in the top lid).

Even though the baseplate in the MPC would normally belong to the Region B category, for conservatism it was considered as Region A in the HI-STAR 100 SAR. The pool lid and the transfer lid of the HI-TRAC transfer cask also fall into this dual

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category. In general, however, all locations of high stress in the component under D<sup>\*</sup> must also be checked for compliance with ASME Code Level A stress limits.

Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all analyses of lifting operations presented in this report follow the load definition and allowable stress provisions of the foregoing. Consistent with the practice adopted throughout this chapter, results are presented in dimensionless form, as safety factors, defined as

Safety Factor, 
$$\beta = \frac{\text{Allowable Stress in the Region Considered}}{\text{Computed Maximum Stress in the Region}}$$

The safety factor, defined in the manner of the above, is the <u>added margin</u> over what is mandated by the applicable code (NUREG-0612 or Regulatory Guide 3.61).

In the following subsections, we briefly describe each of the lifting analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with regulations. Summary results are presented for each of the analyses.

It is recognized that stresses in Region A are subject to two distinct criteria, namely Level A stress limits under D\* and yield strength at 3D\*. We will identify the applicable criteria in the summary tables, under the column heading "Item", using the "3D\*" identifier.

All of the lifting analyses reported on in this Subsection are designated as Load Case 01 in Table 3.1.5.

# 3.4.3.1 <u>125 Ton HI-TRAC Lifting Analysis - Trunnions</u>

The lifting device in the HI-TRAC 125 cask is presented in Holtec Drawing 1880 (Section 1.5 herein). The two lifting trunnions for HI-TRAC are spaced at 180 degrees. The trunnions are designed for a two-point lift in accordance with the aforementioned NUREG-0612 criteria. Figure 3.4.21 shows the overall lifting configuration. The lifting analysis demonstrates that the stresses in | the trunnions, computed using the conservative methodology described previously, comply with NUREG-0612 provisions.

HI-TRAC 125 Lifting Trunnions <sup>†</sup>				
	Value (ksi)	Safety Factor		
Bending stress	16.09	1.13		
Shear stress	7.26	1.50		

Specifically, the following results are obtained:

<sup>†</sup> The lifted load is 245,800 lb.(a value that bounds the actual lifted weight from the pool after the lift yoke weight is eliminated per Table 3.2.4).

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Note that the safety factor presented in the previous table represents the <u>additional</u> margin beyond the mandated limit of 6 on yield strength and 10 on tensile strength. The results above are also valid for the HI-TRAC 125D since the dimensions used as input, as well as the bounding load, are applicable to both the HI-TRAC 125D and 125D transfer casks.

### 3.4.3.2 <u>125 Ton HI-TRAC Lifting - Trunnion Lifting Block Welds, Bearing, and Thread</u> Shear Stress (Region A)

As part of the Region A evaluation, the weld group connecting the lifting trunnion block to the inner and outer shells, and to the HI-TRAC top flange, is analyzed. Conservative analyses are also performed to determine safety factors for bearing stress and for thread shear stress at the interface between the trunnion and the trunnion block. The following results are obtained for the HI-TRAC 125 and 125D transfer casks:

125 Ton HI-TRAC Lifting Trunnion Block (Region A Evaluation)					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor		
Trunnion Block Bearing Stress	5.95	11.4	1.91		
Trunnion Block Thread Shear Stress	5.05	6.84	1.35		
Weld Shear Stress (3D*)	4.35 <sup>†</sup>	11.4	2.62		

<sup>†</sup> No quality factor has been applied to the weld group. (Subsection NF or NUREG-0612 do not apply penalty factors to the structural welds).

### 3.4.3.3 <u>125 Ton HI-TRAC Lifting - Structure near Trunnion (Region B/Region A)</u>

A three-dimensional elastic model of the HI-TRAC 125 metal components is analyzed using the ANSYS finite element code. The structural model includes, in addition to the trunnion and the trunnion block, a portion of the inner and outer HI-TRAC shells and the HI-TRAC top flange. Stress results over the characteristic interface section are summarized and compared with allowable strength limits per ASME Section III, Subsection NF, and per Regulatory Guide 3.61. The results show that the primary stresses in the HI-TRAC 125 structure comply with the level A stress limits for Subsection NF structures.

The results from the analysis are summarized below:

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HI-TRAC 125 Trunnion Region (Regions A and B)					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor		
Membrane Stress	6.19	17.5	2.83		
Membrane plus Bending Stress	8.19	26.25	3.2		
Membrane Stress (3D <sup>•</sup> )	18.6	34.6	1.86		

The results above are also valid for the HI-TRAC 125D since the dimensions and the configuration of the inner shell, outer shell, top flange, and the trunnion block are the same in both the HI-TRAC 125 and 125D transfer casks.

### 3.4.3.4 <u>100 Ton HI-TRAC Lifting Analysis</u>

The lifting trunnions and the trunnion blocks for the 100 Ton HI-TRAC are identical to the trunnions analyzed for the 125 Ton HI-TRAC. However, the outer shell geometry (outer diameter) is different. A calculation performed in the spirit of strength-of-materials provides justification that, despite the difference in local structure at the attachment points, the stresses in the body of the HI-TRAC 100 Ton unit meet the allowables set forth in Subsection 3.1.2.2.

Figure 3.4.10 illustrates the differences in geometry, loads, and trunnion moment arms between the body of the 125-Ton HI-TRAC and the body of the 100-Ton HI-TRAC. It is reasonable to assume that the level of stress in the 100 Ton HI-TRAC body, in the immediate vicinity of the interface (Section X-X in Figure 3.4.10), is proportional to the applied force and the bending moment applied. In the figure, the subscripts 1 and 0 refer to 100 Ton and 125 Ton casks, respectively. Figure 3.4.10 | shows the location of the area centroid (with respect to the outer surface) and the loads and moment arms associated with each construction. Conservatively, neglecting all other interfaces between the top of the trunnion block and the top flange and between the sides of the trunnion block and the top shells, equilibrium is maintained by developing a force and a moment in the section comprised of the two shell segments interfacing with the base of the trunnion block.

The most limiting stress state is in the outer shell at the trunnion block base interface. The stress level in the outer shell at Section X-X is proportional to P/A + Mc/I. Evaluating the stress for a unit width of section permits an estimate of the stress state in the HI-TRAC 100 outer shell if the corresponding stress state in the HI-TRAC 125 is known (the only changes are the applied load, the moment arm and the geometry). Using the geometry shown in Figure 3.4.10 gives the result as:

Stress (HI-TRAC 100 outer shell) = 1.236 x Stress (HI-TRAC 125 outer shell)

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The tabular results in the previous subsection can be adjusted accordingly and are reported below:

100 Ton HI-TRAC Near Trunnion (Region A and Region B)					
Item Safety Factor					
Membrane Stress	2.29				
Membrane plus Bending Stress	2.59				
Membrane Stress (3D*) 1.50					

### 3.4.3.5 <u>HI-STORM 100 Lifting Analyses</u>

There are two vertical lifting scenarios for the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack carrying a fully loaded MPC. Figure 3.4.17 shows a schematic of these lifting scenarios. Both lifting scenarios are examined using finite element models that focus on the local regions near the lift points. The analysis is based on the geometry of the HI-STORM 100; the alterations to the lid and to the length of the overpack barrel to configure the HI-STORM 100S have no effect on the conclusions reached in the area of the baseplate. Therefore, there is no separate analysis for the baseplate, inboard of the inner shell, for the HI-STORM 100S as the results are identical to or bounded by the results presented here. Since the upper portion of the HI-STORM 100S, the HI-STORM 100S lid, and the radial ribs and anchor block have a different configuration than the HI-STORM 100S. Similarly, where differences in construction between the HI-STORM 100 and the HI-STORM 100S Version B exist, separate calculations have been performed and the results summarized here.

Scenario #1 considers a "bottom lift" where the fully loaded HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is lifted vertically by four synchronized hydraulic jacks each positioned at one of the four inlet air vents. This lift allows for installation and removal of "air pads" which may be used for horizontal positioning of HI-STORM 100 at the ISFSI pad.

Scenario #2, labeled the "top lift scenario" considers the lifting of a fully loaded HI-STORM 100 vertically through the four lifting lugs located at the top end.

No structural credit is assumed for the HI-STORM concrete in either of the two lifting scenarios except as a vehicle to transfer compressive loads.

For the bottom lift, a three-dimensional one-quarter symmetry finite element model of the bottom region of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is constructed. The model includes the inner shell, the outer shell, the baseplate, the inlet vent side and top plates, and the radial plates connecting the inner and outer shells.

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In the finite element analysis, the concrete is modeled as an equivalent pressure load applied over the baseplate as well as the four horizontal inlet vent plates. In reality, the concrete is supported only at the four inlet vents, directly above the hydraulic jacks. In other words, the concrete has sufficient strength to carry its own weight between these four support locations. The average shear stress in the concrete on a vertical cross section at the edge of an inlet vent is calculated as:

$$\tau_{concrete} = \frac{\rho V}{2A}$$

where:

- $\rho$  equals the weight density of concrete;
- V equals the volume of unsupported concrete between two adjacent inlet vents;
- A cross-sectional area of concrete at location of maximum shear stress;

For  $\rho = 160.8 \text{ lb/ft}^3$ ,  $V = 231 \text{ ft}^3$ , and  $A = 5,665 \text{ in}^2$  (= 27.5 in × 206 in), the average shear stress is only 3.28 psi, which is negligible compared to the allowable shear stress of 126.5 psi for 4,000 psi compressive strength concrete. If the density of concrete is increased to 200 lb/ft<sup>3</sup>, the shear stress increases by roughly 0.8 psi. Clearly, the concrete can support this load. Moreover, the positive effect that the concrete strength has on the results outweighs any adverse impact due to high density concrete. Therefore, the safety factors reported in Appendix 3.D (where the concrete is treated like water) for the bottom lift remain conservative for concrete densities up to 200 lb/ft<sup>3</sup>.

For the analysis of the "top lift" scenario, a three-dimensional 1/8-symmetry finite element model of the top segment of HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is constructed. The metal HI-STORM 100 material is modeled (shells, radial plates, lifting block, ribs, vent plates, etc.) using shell or solid elements. Lumped weights are used to ensure that portions of the structure not modeled are, in fact, properly represented as part of a lifted load. The model is supported vertically at the lifting lug. The results are reported in tabular form at the end of this subsection.

The finite element results for the HI-STORM 100 in Appendix 3.D, as well as the results of similar analyses for the HI-STORM 100S, are based on inner and outer shell thicknesses of 1-1/4" and 3/4", respectively. Per Bill of Material 1575 and Drawing 3669, the thickness of both shells may be changed to 1" as an option for the HI-STORM 100 and 100S overpacks. With respect to the lifting analyses, the 1" thick inner and outer shells would have a negligible effect on the maximum calculated stress in the inlet vent horizontal plate, the HI-STORM 100 and 100S are valid for either thickness option.

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To provide an alternate calculation to demonstrate that the bolt anchor blocks are adequate, we compute the average normal stress in the net metal area of the block under three times the lifted load. Further conservatism is introduced by including an additional 15% for dynamic amplification, i.e., the total load is equal to 3D\*.

The average normal load in one bolt anchor block is

Load =  $3 \times 1.15 \times 360,000 \text{ lb.}/4 = 310,500 \text{ lb.}$  (Weight comes from Table 3.2.1)

The net area of the bolt anchor block is

Area =  $(3.14159)/4 \times (5^{\circ} \times 5^{\circ} - 3.25^{\circ} \times 3.25^{\circ}) = 11.34$  sq. inch (Dimensions from BM-1575)

Therefore, the safety factor (yield strength at 350 degrees F/calculated stress from Table 3.3.3) is

SF = 31,400 psi/ (Load/Area) = 1.14

The shear stress in the threads of the lifting block is also examined. This analysis considers a cylindrical area of material under an axial load resisting the load by shearing action. The diameter of the area is the basic pitch diameter of the threads, and the length of the cylinder is the thread engagement length.

The analysis also examines the capacity of major welds in the load path and the compression | capacity of the pedestal shield and pedestal shield shell.

The table below summarizes key results obtained from the analyses described above for the HI-STORM 100.

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HI-STORM 100 Top and Bottom Lifting Analyses <sup>†‡</sup>					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor		
Primary Membrane plus Bending - Bottom Lift - Inlet Vent Plates - Region B	8.0 ·	26.3	3.28		
Primary Membrane - Top Lift - Radial Rib Under Lifting Block - Region B	6.67	17.5	2.63		
Primary Membrane plus Bending – Top Lift - Baseplate – Region B	7.0	26.3	3.75		
Primary Membrane Region A (3D*)	19.97	33.15	1.66		
Primary Membrane plus Bending Region A (3D*)	24.02	33.15	1.38		
Lifting Block Threads - Top Lift – Region A (3D*)	10.67	18.84	1.76		
Lifting Stud - Top Lift –Region A (3D*)	43.733	108.8	2.49		
Welds – Anchor Block-to-Radial Rib Region B	5.74	19.695	3.43		
Welds – Anchor Block-to-Radial Rib Region A (3D*)	17.21	19.62	1.14		
Welds – Radial Rib-to-Inner and Outer Shells Region B	5.83	21.00	3.60		
Welds – Radial Rib-to-Inner and Outer Shells Region A (3D*)	17.49	19.89	1.13		
Weld – Baseplate-to Inner Shell Region A (3D*)	1.59	19.89	12.48		
Weld – Baseplate-to-Inlet Vent Region A (3D*)	14.89	19.89	1.33		
Pedestal Shield Concrete (3D*)	0.096	1.266	13.19		
Pedestal Shell (3D*)	3.269	33.15	10.14		

<sup>†</sup> Regions A and B are defined at beginning of Subsection 3.4.3

<sup>‡</sup> The lifted load is 360000 lb. and an inertia amplification of 15% is included.

It is concluded that all structural integrity requirements are met during a lift of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack under either the top lift or the bottom lift scenario. All factors of safety are greater than 1.0 using criteria from the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF for Class 3 plate and shell supports and from USNRC Regulatory Guide 3.61.

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Similar	calculations	have	been	performed	for	the	HI-STORM	100S	where	differences	in
configu	ration warrant	. The	results	are summa	rized	1 in t	he table below	v:			

HI-STORM 100S	HI-STORM 100S Top and Bottom Lifting Analyses <sup>†‡</sup>					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor			
Primary Membrane plus Bending - Bottom Lift - Inlet Vent Plates - Region A (3D*)	9.824	33.15	3.374			
Lifting Block Threads - Top Lift – Region A (3D*)	5.608	18.840	3.36			
Lifting Stud - Top Lift –Region A (3D*)	49.806	83.7	1.68			
Welds – Anchor Block-to-Radial Rib Region B	5.556	21.0	3.78			
Welds – Anchor Block-to-Radial Rib Region A (3D*)	16.670	18.84	1.13			
Welds – Radial Rib-to-Inner and Outer Shells Region B	5.631	21.00	3.73			
Welds – Radial Rib-to-Inner and Outer Shells Region A (3D*)	16.895	19.89	1.18			
Weld – Baseplate-to Inner Shell Region A (3D*)	1,592	19.89	12.49			
Weld – Baseplate-to-Inlet Vent Region A (3D*)	8.982	19.89	2.214			
Radial Rib Membrane Stress – Bottom Lift Region A (3D*)	10.58	33.15	3.132			
Pedestal Shield Concrete (3D*)	0.095	1.535	16.17			
Pedestal Shell (3D*)	3.235	33.15	10.24			

Regions A and B are defined at beginning of Subsection 3.4.3
The lifted load is 410,000 lb, and an inertia amplification of 159

The lifted load is 410,000 lb. and an inertia amplification of 15% is included. The increased weight (over the longer HI-STORM 100) comes from conservatively assuming an increase in concrete weight density in the HI-STORM 100S overpack and lid to provide additional safety margin.

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Similar calculations have been performed for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B where differences in configuration warrant. The results are summarized in the table below for the heaviest HI-STORM 100S Version B (using high density concrete and with SA 564-630 stud material):

HI-STORM 100S Version B Top and Bottom Lifting Analyses					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor		
Primary Membrane - Bottom Lift - Inlet Vent Plates - Region A (3D*)	27.06	33.15	1.22		
Primary Membrane + Bending - Bottom Lift - Inlet Vent Plates - Region A (3D*)	20.455	33.15	1.62		
Lifting Block Threads - Top Lift -Region A (3D*)	6.548	19.620	3.00		
Lifting Stud - Top Lift – Region A (3D*)	49.199	108.8	2.21		
Welds – Anchor Block-to-Radial Rib Region B	5.507	19.695	3.58		
Welds – Anchor Block-to-Radial Rib Region A (3D*)	16.523	19.620	1.19		
Welds – Radial Rib-to-Inner and Outer Shells Region B	6.120	21.00	3.43		
Welds – Radial Rib-to-Inner and Outer Shells Region A (3D*)	18.36	19.89	1.08		
Weld-Baseplate-to Inner Shell Region A (3D*)	2.724	19.89	7.302		
Radial Rib to Inner and Outer Shell – Bottom Lift Region A (3D*)	17.761	19.89	1.12		

For the longest HI-STORM 100, Version B, with high-density concrete, the lifted load is 406,400 lb.

It is concluded that all structural integrity requirements are met during a lift of the HI-STORM 100, HI-STORM 100S, and HI-STORM 100S, Version B storage overpacks under either the top lift or the bottom lift scenario. All factors of safety are greater than 1.0 using criteria from the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF for Class 3 plate and shell supports and from USNRC Regulatory Guide 3.61.

### 3.4.3.6 MPC Lifting Analysis

The MPC lifting analyses are found in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR (Docket-72-1008). Some results of the analyses in that document (Appendices 3.K, 3.E, 3.I and 3.Y Docket-72-1008) are summarized here for completeness.

Summary of MPC Lifting Analyses					
Item Thread Engagement Safety Factor (NUREG- 0612) Region A Safety Region B Safety Factor <sup>†</sup>					
MPC	1.08	1.09	1.56		

<sup>†</sup> The factor reported here is for the MPC baseplate.

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When dual lids are used on the MPC, the outer lid transfers the entire lifted load to the peripheral weld. The maximum bending stress in the outer lid from the lifted load can be conservatively computed by strength of materials theory using the solution for a simply supported circular plate under a central concentrated load equal to 115% of the bounding MPC load. The calculation and result are presented below using tabular results from Timoshenko, Strength of Materials, Vol. II, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition.

P = 90,000 lb. x 1.15 Outer Diameter a = 67.375" Effective Central Diameter where load is applied b= 13.675" (conservative assumption) a/b = 5Lid thickness = 4.75" (Dual lids) From the reference, k=1.745 and the maximum bending stress under the amplified lifted load is

 $\sigma = kP/h^2 = 8005 psi$ 

Table 3.4.7 provides results for the stress in the lid under normal condition internal pressure. For the case with dual lids, the stress must be doubled. From the table, the pressure stress is

 $S = 2 \times 1,633 \text{ psi}$ 

Therefore, the combined bending stress at the center of the dual lid is 11,271. Using the allowable strength from Table 3.4.7, the safety factor is

SF = 25,450 psi/11,271 psi = 2.258

### 3.4.3.7 <u>Miscellaneous Lid Lifting Analyses</u>

The HI-STORM 100 lid lifting analysis is performed to ensure that the threaded connections | provided in the lid are adequately sized. The lifting analysis of the top lid is based on a vertical orientation of loading from an attached lifting device. The top lid of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is lifted using four lugs that are threaded into holes in the top plate of the lid (Holtec Drawing 1495, Section 1.5). It is noted that failure of the lid attachment would not result in any event of safety consequence because a free-falling HI-STORM 100 lid cannot strike a stored MPC (due to its size and orientation). Operational limits on the carry height of the HI-STORM 100 lid above the top of the storage overpack containing a loaded MPC preclude any significant lid rotation out of the horizontal plane in the event of a handling accident. Therefore, contact between the top of the MPC and the edge of a dropped lid due to uncontrolled lowering of the lift during the lid placement operation is judged to be a non-credible scenario. Except for location of the lift points, the lifting device for the HI-STORM 100 lid. Since the lid weight for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B bounds the HI-STORM 100 and the HI-STORM 100S, the calculated safety factors for the lifting of the HI-STORM 100S lid are reduced and are also reported in the summary table below.

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In addition to the HI-STORM 100 top lid lifting analysis, the strength qualification of the lid lifting holes, and associated lid lifting devices, for the HI-TRAC pool lid and top lid has been performed. The qualification is based on the Regulatory Guide 3.61 requirement that a load factor of 3 results in stresses less than the yield stress. The results for the HI-TRAC 125 bound the results for the HI-TRAC 125D, and the HI-TRAC 100, since the lid weights used in the calculation are greater than or equal to all other HI-TRAC lid weights. Example commercially available lifting structures are considered and it is shown that thread engagement lengths are acceptable. Loads to lifting devices are permitted to be at a maximum angle of 45 degrees from vertical. A summary of results, pertaining to the various lid lifting operations, is given in the table below:

Summary of HI-STORM 100 Lid Lifting Analyses						
Item	Dead Load (lb)	Minimum Safety Factor				
HI-STORM 100 (100S) Top Lid Lifting	23,000 (29,000 <sup>†</sup> )	2.802 (2.22)				
HI-TRAC Pool Lid Lifting	12,500	4.73				
HI-TRAC Top Lid Lifting	2,750	11.38				
<sup>†</sup> Bounding weight of HI-STORM 100S, Version B top lid with 200 pcf concrete.						

The analysis demonstrates that thread engagement is sufficient for the threaded holes used solely for lid lifting and that commercially available lifting devices engaging the threaded holes, are available. We note that all reported safety factors are based on an allowable strength equal to 33.3% of the yield strength of the lid material when evaluating shear capacity of the internal threads and based on the working loads of the commercially available lifting devices associated with the respective threaded holes.

### 3.4.3.8 <u>HI-TRAC Pool Lid Analysis - Lifting MPC From the Spent Fuel Pool (Load Case 01</u> in Table 3.1.5)

During lifting of the MPC from the spent fuel pool, the HI-TRAC pool lid supports the weight of a loaded MPC plus water (see Figure 3.4.21). Calculations are performed to show structural integrity under this condition for both the HI-TRAC 100 and the HI-TRAC 125 transfer casks. In accordance with the general guidelines set down at the beginning of Subsection 3.4.3, the pool lid is considered as both Region A and Region B for evaluating safety factors. The analysis shows that the stress in the pool lid top plate is less than the Level A allowable stress under pressure equivalent to the heaviest MPC, contained water, and lid self weight (Region B evaluation). Stresses in the lids and bolts are also shown to be below yield under three times the applied lifted load (Region A evaluation using Regulatory Guide 3.61 criteria). The threaded holes in the HI-TRAC pool lid are also examined for acceptable engagement length under the condition of lifting the MPC from the pool. It is demonstrated that the pool lid peripheral bolts have adequate engagement length into the pool lid to permit the transfer of the required load. The safety factor is defined based on the strength limits imposed by Regulatory Guide 3.61.

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The following table summarizes the results of the analyses for the HI-TRAC pool lid, as well as the results of similar calculations for the HI-TRAC 125D. Results given in the following table compare calculated stress (or load) and allowable stress (or load). In all cases, the safety factor is defined as the allowable value divided by the calculated value.

HI-TRAC Pool Lid Lifting a Loaded MPC Evaluation <sup>†</sup>					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 125 - Region B Analysis - Pool Lid Top Plate	10.1	26.3	2.604		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 125 - Region B Analysis - Pool Lid Bottom Plate	5.05	26.3	5.208		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 100 - Region B Analysis- Pool Lid Top Plate	10.06	26.3	2.614		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 100 - Region B Analysis- Pool Lid Bottom Plate	6.425	26.3	4.093		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 125D - Region B Analysis - Pool Lid Top Plate	10.1	26.3	2.604		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 125D - Region B Analysis - Pool Lid Bottom Plate	5.05	26.3	5.208		
Lid Bolt Stress - HI-TRAC 125 - (3D*)	18.92	95.0	5.02		
Lid Bolt Stress - HI-TRAC 100 - (3D*)	18.21	95.0	5.216		
Lid Bolt Force - HI-TRAC 125D - (3D*)	25.77 <sup>‡</sup>	84.05 <sup>‡</sup>	3.262		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 125 - Region A Analysis - Pool Lid Top Plate (3D*)	30.3	33.15	1.094		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 125 - Region A Analysis - Pool Lid Bottom Plate (3D*)	15.15	33.15	2.188		
Lid Bending Stress -HI-TRAC 100 - Region A Analysis- Pool Lid Top Plate (3D*)	30.19	33.15	1.098		
Lid Bending Stress -HI-TRAC 100 - Region A Analysis- Pool Lid Bottom Plate (3D*)	19.28	33.15	1.72		
Lid Bending Stress - HI-TRAC 125D - Region A Analysis - Pool Lid Top Plate (3D*)	30.3	33.15	1.094		
Lid Bending Stress -HI-TRAC 125D - Region A Analysis- Pool Lid Bottom Plate (3D*)	15.15	33.15	2.188		
Lid Thread Engagement Length (HI-TRAC 125)	137.5‡	324.6‡	2.362		

Region A and B defined at beginning of Subsection 3.4.3.

Calculated and allowable value for this item in (kips).

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#### 3.4.3.9 HI-TRAC Transfer Lid Analysis - Lifting MPC Away from Spent Fuel Pool (Load Case 01 in Table 3.1.5)

During transfer to or from a storage overpack using a HI-TRAC 125 or a HI-TRAC 100, the HI-TRAC transfer lid supports the weight of a loaded MPC. Figure 3.4.21 illustrates the lift operation. In accordance with the general lifting analysis guidelines, the transfer lid should be considered as both a Region A (Regulatory Guide 3.61 criteria) and a Region B location (ASME Section III, Subsection NF for Class 3 plate and shell structures) for evaluation of safety factors. The HI-TRAC 125 transfer lid and the HI-TRAC 100 transfer lid are analyzed separately because of differences in geometry. The HI-TRAC 125D employs a specially designed mating device in combination with the pool lid to transfer a loaded MPC to or from a storage overpack. Thus, a transfer lid analysis is not performed for the HI-TRAC 125D. Results for the HI-TRAC 125D pool lid are presented in the previous subsection.

It is shown that the transfer lid doors can support a loaded MPC together with the door weight without exceeding ASME NF stress limits and the more conservative limits of Regulatory Guide 3.61. It is also shown that the connecting structure transfers the load to the cask body without overstress. The following tables summarize the results for both HI-TRAC casks:

HI-TRAC 125 Transfer Lid – Lifting Evaluation <sup>†</sup>					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor		
HI-TRAC 125 - Door Plate – (3D*)	9.381	32.7	3.486		
HI-TRAC 125 - Door Plate Region B	3.127	26.25	8.394		
HI-TRAC 125 – Wheel Track (3D*)	26.91	36.0	1.338		
HI-TRAC 125 - Door Housing Bottom Plate- Region B	7.701	26.25	3.409		
HI-TRAC 125 - Door Housing Bottom Plate- (3D*)	23.103	32.7	1.415		
HI-TRAC 125 - Door Housing Stiffeners- (3D*)	4.131	32.7	7.913		
HI-TRAC 125 - Housing Bolts-Region B	29.96	57.5	1.919		
HI-TRAC 125 – Housing Bolts (3D*)	89.88	95.0	1.057		
HI-TRAC 125 – Lid Top Plate (3D*)	30.907	32.7	1.058		
Parion A and P defined at bacinning of Subsection 2.4.2					

Region A and B defined at beginning of Subsection 3.4.3

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HI-TRAC 100 Transfer Lid – Lifting Evaluation <sup>†</sup>					
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor		
HI-TRAC 100 - Door Plate - (3D*)	22.188	32.7	1.474		
HI-TRAC 100 - Door Plate – Region B	7.396	26.25	3.549		
HI-TRAC 100 – Wheel Track (3D*)	13.011	36.0	2.767		
HI-TRAC 100 – Door Housing Bottom Plate- Region B	7.447	26.25	3.525		
HI-TRAC 100 – Door Housing Bottom Plate- (3D*)	22.336	32.7	1.464		
HI-TRAC 100 – Door Housing Stiffeners- (3D*)	4.917	32.7	6.65		
HI-TRAC 100 – Welds Connecting Door Housing Stiffeners (3D*)	11.802	32.7	2.771		
HI-TRAC 100 - Housing Bolts-Region B	22.478	57.5	2.558		
HI-TRAC 100 – Housing Bolts (3D*)	67.423	95.0	1.409		
HI-TRAC 100 – Lid Top Plate (3D*)	19.395	32.7	1.686		

Region A and B defined at beginning of Subsection 3.4.3

### 3.4.3.10 <u>HI-TRAC Bottom Flange Evaluation during Lift (Load Case 01 in Table 3.1.5)</u>

During a lifting operation, the HI-TRAC transfer cask body supports the load of a loaded MPC, and the transfer lid (away from the spent fuel pool) or the pool lid plus contained water (lifting from the spent fuel pool). In either case, the load is transferred to the bottom flange of HI-TRAC through the bolts and a state of stress in the flange and the supporting inner and outer shells is developed. Figure 3.4.21 illustrates the lifting operation. This area of the HI-TRAC 125 is analyzed to demonstrate that the required limits on stress are maintained for both ASME and Regulatory Guide 3.61. The bottom flange is considered as an annular plate subject to a total bolt load acting at the bolt circle and supported by reaction loads developed in the inner and outer shells of HI-TRAC. The solution for maximum flange bending stress is found in the classical literature and stresses and corresponding safety factors developed for the bottom flange and for the outer and inner shell weld shear stress. Since the welds are partial penetration, weld stress evaluation bounds an evaluation of direct stress. The table below summarizes the results of the evaluation.

Safety Factors in HI-TRAC Bottom Flange During a Lift Operation							
Item Value(ksi) Allowable(ksi) Safety Fact							
Bottom Flange – Region B	7.798	26.25	3.37				
Bottom Flange (3D*)	23.39	33.15	1.42				
Outer Shell (3D*)	4.773	33.15	6.94				

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The bottom flange of the HI-TRAC 125D is different from the HI-TRAC 125 in several respects. Namely, the thickness of the bottom flange is less, and the groove weld connecting the bottom flange to the inner shell is smaller. In addition, the bottom flange of the HI-TRAC 125D is reinforced by eight gusset plates, whereas the HI-TRAC 125 bottom flange is not reinforced. Therefore, to account for these differences, the evaluation described above has been repeated for the HI-TRAC 125D. The results for the HI-TRAC 125D are summarized in the table below. Note that the following results are conservative since the HI-TRAC 125D bottom flange evaluation neglects the reinforcing strength of the gusset plates.

Safety Factors in HI-TRAC 125D Bottom Flange During a Lift Operation			
Item	Value(ksi)	Allowable(ksi)	Safety Factor
Bottom Flange – Region B	9.594	26.25	2.74
Bottom Flange (3D*)	28.78	33.15	1.15
Outer Shell (3D*)	4.710	33.15	7.04

### 3.4.3.11 <u>Conclusion</u>

Synopses of lifting device, device/component interface, and component stresses, under all contemplated lifting operations for the HI-STORM 100 System have been presented in the foregoing. The HI-STORM storage overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask have been evaluated for limiting stress states. The results show that all factors of safety are greater than 1.

### 3.4.4 <u>Heat</u>

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The thermal evaluation of the HI-STORM 100 System is reported in Chapter 4.

### 3.4.4.1 <u>Summary of Pressures and Temperatures</u>

Design pressures and design temperatures for all conditions of storage are listed in Tables 2.2.1 and 2.2.3, respectively.

### 3.4.4.2 Differential Thermal Expansion

Consistent with the requirements of Reg. Guide 3.61, Load Cases F1 (Table 3.1.3) and E4 (Table 3.1.4) a re defined to s tudy the effect of d ifferential thermal expansion a mong the c onstituent components in the HI-STORM 100 System. The temperatures necessary to perform the differential thermal expansion analyses for the MPC in the HI-STORM 100 and HI-TRAC casks are provided in Chapter 4. The material presented in Subsection 4.4.5 demonstrates that a physical interference between discrete components of the HI-STORM 100 System (e.g. storage overpack and enclosure vessel) will not develop due to differential thermal expansion during any operating condition.

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### 3.4.4.2.1 Normal Hot Environment

Closed form calculations are performed in Subsection 4.4.5 to demonstrate that initial gaps between the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack or the HI-TRAC transfer cask and the MPC canister, and between the MPC canister and the fuel basket, will not close due to thermal expansion of the system components under loading conditions, defined as F1 and E4 in Tables 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, respectively. To assess this in the most conservative manner, the thermal solutions computed in Chapter 4, including the thermosiphon effect, are surveyed for the following information.

- The radial temperature distribution in each of the fuel baskets at the location of peak center metal temperature.
- The highest and lowest mean temperatures of the canister shell for the hot environment condition.

Tables 4.4.9, 4.4.10, 4.4.26, and 4.4.27 present the resulting temperatures used in the evaluation of the MPC expansion in the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack. Table 4.5.2 presents similar results for the MPC in the HI-TRAC transfer cask.

Using the temperature information in the above-mentioned tables, simplified thermoelastic solutions of equivalent axisymmetric problems are used to obtain conservative estimates of gap closures. The following procedure, which conservatively neglects axial variations in temperature distribution, is utilized.

- 1. Use the surface temperature information for the fuel basket to define a parabolic distribution in the fuel basket that bounds (from above) the actual temperature distribution. Using this result, generate a conservatively high estimate of the radial and axial growth of the different fuel baskets u sing classical closed form solutions for thermoelastic deformation in cylindrical bodies.
- 2. Use the temperatures obtained for the canister to predict an estimate of the radial and axial growth of the canister to check the canister-to-basket gaps.
- 3. Use the temperatures obtained for the canister to predict an estimate of the radial and axial growth of the canister to check the canister-to-storage overpack and canister-to-HI-TRAC gaps.
- 4. For given initial clearances, compute the operating clearances.

The results are summarized in Subsection 4.4.5 for normal storage conditions. It can be verified by referring to the Design Drawings provided in Section 1.5 of this report and Subsection 4.4.5, that the clearances between the MPC basket and canister structure, as well as between the MPC shell and storage overpack or HI-TRAC inside surface, are sufficient to preclude a temperature induced interference from differential thermal expansions under normal operating conditions.

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### 3.4.4.2.2 Fire Accident

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It is shown in Chapter 11 that the fire accident has a small effect on the MPC temperatures because of the short duration of the fire accidents and the large thermal inertia of the storage overpack. Therefore, a structural evaluation of the MPC under the postulated fire event is not required. The conclusions reached in Subsection 3.4.4.2.1 are also appropriate for the fire accident with the MPC housed in the storage overpack. Analysis of fire accident temperatures of the MPC housed within the HI-TRAC for thermal expansion is unnecessary, as the HI-TRAC, directly exposed to the fire, expands to increase the gap between the HI-TRAC and MPC.

As expected, the external surfaces of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack that are directly exposed to the fire event experience maximum rise in temperature. The outer shell and top plate in the top lid are the external surfaces that are in direct contact with heated air from fire. The table below, extracted from data provided in Chapter 11, provides the maximum temperatures attained at the key locations in HI-STORM 100 storage overpack under the postulated fire event.

Component	Maximum Fire Condition Temperature (Deg. F)
Storage Overpack Inner Shell	300
Storage Overpack Radial Concrete Mid-Depth	184
Storage Overpack Outer Shell	570
Storage Overpack Lid	<570

The following conclusions are readily reached from the above table.

- The maximum metal temperature of the carbon steel shell most directly exposed to the combustion air is well below 600°F (Table 2.2.3 applicable short-term temperature limit). 600°F is well below the permissible temperature limit in the ASME Code for the outer shell material.
- The bulk temperature of concrete is well below the normal condition temperature limit of 300°F specified in Table 2.2.3 and Appendix 1.D. ACI-349 permits 350°F as the short-term temperature limit; the shielding concrete in the HI-STORM 100 Overpack, as noted in Appendix 1.D, will comply with the specified compositional and manufacturing provisions of ACI-349. As the detailed information in Section 11.2 shows, the radial extent in the concrete where the local temperature exceeds 350°F begins at the outer shell/concrete interface and ends in less than one-inch. Therefore, the potential loss in the shielding material's effectiveness is less than 4% of the concrete shielding mass in the overpack annulus.
- The metal temperature of the inner shell does not exceed 300°F at any location, which is below the accident condition temperature limit of 400°F specified in Table 2.2.3 for the inner shell.

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• The presence of a stitch weld between the overpack inner shell and the overpack top plate ensures that there will be no pressure buildup in the concrete annulus due to the concrete losing water that then turns to steam.

The above summary confirms that the postulated fire event will not jeopardize the structural integrity of the HI-STORM 100 Overpack or significantly diminish its shielding effectiveness.

The above conclusions, as relevant, also apply to the HI-TRAC fire considered in Chapter 11. Water jacket over-pressurization is precluded by the safety valve set point. The non-structural effects of loss of water have been evaluated in Chapter 5 and shown to meet regulatory limits. Therefore, it is concluded that the postulated fire event will not cause significant loss in storage overpack or HI-TRAC shielding function.

### 3.4.4.3 <u>Stress Calculations</u>

This subsection presents calculations of the stresses in the different components of the HI-STORM 100 System from the effects of mechanical load case assembled in Section 3.1. Loading cases for the MPC fuel basket, the MPC enclosure vessel, the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask are listed in Tables 3.1.3 through 3.1.5, respectively. The load case identifiers defined in Tables 3.1.3 through 3.1.5 denote the cases considered.

The purpose of the analyses is to provide the necessary assurance that there will be no unacceptable risk of criticality, unacceptable release of radioactive material, unacceptable radiation levels, or impairment of ready retrievability of fuel from the MPC and the MPC from the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack or from the HI-TRAC transfer cask.

For all stress evaluations, the allowable stresses and stress intensities for the various HI-STORM 100 System components are based on bounding high metal temperatures to provide additional conservatism (Table 3.1.17 for the MPC basket, for example).

In addition to the loading cases germane to stress evaluations mentioned above, three cases pertaining to the stability of HI-STORM 100 are also considered (Table 3.1.1).

The results of various stress calculations on components are reported. The calculations are either performed directly as part of the text, or carried out in a separate calculation report that provides details of strength of materials evaluations or finite element numerical analysis. The specific calculations reported in this subsection are:

- 1. MPC stress calculations
- 2. HI-STORM 100 storage overpack stress calculations
- 3. HI-TRAC stress calculations

The MPC calculations reported in this document are complemented by analyses in the HI-STAR 100 Dockets. As noted earlier in this chapter, calculations for MPC components that are reported in HI-STAR 100 FSAR and SAR (Docket Numbers 72-1008 or 71-9261) are not repeated here unless

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geometry or load changes warrant reanalysis. For example, analysis of the MPC lid is not included in this submittal since neither the MPC lid loading nor geometry is affected by the MPC being placed in HI-TRAC or HI-STORM 100. MPC stress analyses reported herein focus on the basket and canister stress distributions due to the design basis (45g) lateral deceleration imposed by a nonmechanistic tip-over of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack or a horizontal drop of HI-TRAC. In the submittals for the HI-STAR 100 FSAR and SAR (Docket Numbers 72-1008 and 71-9261, for storage and transport, respectively), the design basis deceleration was 60g. In this submittal the design basis deceleration is 45g. However, since the geometry of the MPC external boundary condition, viz. canister-to-storage overpack gap, has changed, a reanalysis of the MPC stresses under the lateral deceleration loads is required. This analysis is performed and the results are summarized in this subsection.

The HI-STORM 100 storage overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask have been evaluated for certain limiting load conditions that are germane to the storage and operational modes specified for the system in Tables 3.1.1 and 3.1.5. The determination of component safety factors at the locations considered in the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack and in the HI-TRAC transfer cask is based on the allowable stresses permitted by the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF for Class 3 plate and shell support structures.

### 3.4.4.3.1 MPC Stress Calculations

The structural function of the MPC in the storage mode is stated in Section 3.1. The calculations presented here demonstrate the ability of the MPC to perform its structural function. The purpose of the analyses is to provide the necessary assurance that there will be no unacceptable risk of criticality, unacceptable release of radioactive material, or impairment of ready retrievability.

### 3.4.4.3.1.1 Analysis of Load Cases E.3.b, E.3.c (Table 3.1.4) and F.3.b, F.3.c (Table 3.1.3)

Analyses are performed for each of the MPC designs. The following subsections describe the model, individual loads, load combinations, and analysis procedures applicable to the MPC. Unfortunately, unlike vertical loading cases, where the analyses performed in the HI-STAR 100 dockets remain fully applicable for application in HI-STORM 100, the response of the MPC to a horizontal loading event is storage overpack-geometry dependent. Under a horizontal drop event, for example, the MPC and the fuel basket structure will tend to flatten. The restraint to this flattening offered by the storage overpack will clearly depend on the difference in the diameters of the storage overpack, the diameter difference is larger than that in HI-STAR 100; therefore, the external restraint to MPC ovalization under a horizontal drop event is less effective. For this reason, the MPC stress analysis for lateral loading scenarios must be performed anew for the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack; the results from the HI-STAR 100 analyses will not be conservative. The HI-TRAC transfer casks and HI-STAR 100 overpack inner diameters are identical. Therefore, the analysis of the MPC in the HI-STAR 100 overpack under 60g's for the side impact (Docket 72-1008) bounds the analysis of the MPC in the HI-STAR 100 overpack under 45g's.

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### Description of Finite Element Models of the MPCs Under Lateral Loading

A finite element model of each MPC is used to assess the effects of the accident loads. The models are constructed using ANSYS [3.4.1], and they are identical to the models used in Holtec's HI-STAR 100 submittals in Docket Numbers 72-1008 and 71-9261. The following model description is common to all MPCs.

The MPC structural model is two-dimensional. It represents a one-inch long cross section of the MPC fuel basket and MPC canister.

The MPC model includes the fuel basket, the basket support structures, and the MPC shell. A basket support is defined as any structural member that is welded to the inside surface of the MPC shell. A portion of the storage overpack inner surface is modeled to provide the correct restraint conditions for the MPC. Figures 3.4.1 through 3.4.9 show typical MPC models. The fuel basket support structure shown in the figures is a multi-plate structure consisting of solid shims or support members having two separate compressive load supporting members. For conservatism in the finite element model some dual path compression members (i.e., "V" angles) are simulated as single columns. Therefore, the calculated stress intensities in the fuel basket angle supports from the finite element solution are conservatively overestimated in some locations.

The ANSYS model is not intended to resolve the detailed stress distributions in weld areas. Individual welds are not included in the finite element model. A separate analysis for basket welds and for the basket support "V" angles is performed outside of ANSYS.

No credit is taken for any load support offered by the neutron absorber panels, sheathing, and the aluminum heat conduction elements. Therefore, these so-called non-structural members are not represented in the model. The bounding MPC weight used, however, does include the mass contributions of these non-structural components.

The model is built using five ANSYS element types: BEAM3, PLANE82, CONTAC12, CONTAC26, and COMBIN14. The fuel basket and MPC shell are modeled entirely with twodimensional beam elements (BEAM3). Plate-type basket supports are also modeled with BEAM3 elements. Eight-node plane elements (PLANE82) are used for the solid-type basket supports. The gaps between the fuel basket and the basket supports are represented by two-dimensional point-to-point contact elements (CONTAC12). Contact between the MPC shell and the storage overpack is modeled using two-dimensional point-to-ground contact elements (CONTAC26) with an appropriate clearance gap.

Two orientations of the deceleration vector are considered. The 0-degree drop model includes the storage overpack-MPC interface in the basket orientation illustrated in Figure 3.1.2. The 45-degree drop model represents the storage overpack-MPC interface with the basket oriented in the manner of Figure 3.1.3. The 0-degree and the 45-degree drop models are shown in Figures 3.4.1 through 3.4.6. Table 3.4.1 lists the element types and number of elements for current MPC's.

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A contact surface is provided in the model used for drop analyses to represent the interface between the storage overpack channels and the MPC. As the MPC makes contact with the storage overpack, the MPC shell deforms to mate with the channels that are welded at equal intervals around the storage overpack inner surface. The nodes that define the elements representing the fuel basket and the MPC shell are located along the centerline of the plate material. As a result, the line of nodes that forms the perimeter of the MPC shell is inset from the real boundary by a distance that is equal to half of the shell thickness. In order to maintain the specified MPC shell/storage overpack gap dimension, the radius of the storage overpack channels is decreased by an equal amount in the model.

The three discrete components of the HI-STORM 100 System, namely the fuel basket, the MPC shell, and the storage overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask, are engineered with small diametral clearances which are large enough to permit unconstrained thermal expansion of the three components under the rated (maximum) heat duty condition. A small diametral gap under ambient conditions is also necessary to assemble the system without physical interference between the contiguous surfaces of the three components. The required gap to ensure unrestricted thermal expansion between the basket and the MPC shell is small and will further decrease under maximum heat load conditions, but will introduce a physical nonlinearity in the structural events involving lateral loading (such as side drop of the system) under ambient conditions. It is evident from the system design drawings that the fuel basket that is non-radially symmetric is in proximate contact with the MPC shell at a discrete number of locations along the circumferences. At these locations, the MPC shell, backed by the channels attached to the storage overpack, provides a support line to the fuel basket during lateral drop events. Because the fuel basket, the MPC shell, and the storage overpack or HI-TRAC are all three-dimensional structural weldments, their inter-body clearances may be somewhat uneven at different azimuthal locations. As the lateral loading is increased, clearances close at the support locations, resulting in the activation of the support from the storage overpack or HI-TRAC.

The bending stresses in the basket and the MPC shell at low lateral loading levels which are too small to close the support location clearances are secondary stresses since further increase in the loading will activate the storage overpack's or HI-TRAC's transfer cask support action, mitigating further increase in the stress. Therefore, to compute primary stresses in the basket and the MPC shell under lateral drop events, the gaps should be assumed to be closed. However, in the analyses, we have conservatively assumed that an initial gap of 0.1875" exists, in the direction of the applied deceleration, at all support locations between the fuel basket and the MPC shell and that the clearance gap between the shell and the storage overpack at the support locations is 3/16". In the evaluation of safety factors for the MPC-24, MPC-32, and MPC-68, the total stress state produced by the applied loading on these configurations is conservatively compared with primary stress levels, even though the self-limiting stresses should be considered secondary in the strict definition of the Code. To illustrate the conservatism, we have eliminated the secondary stress (that develops to close the clearances) in the comparison with primary stress allowable values and report safety factors for the MPC-24E that are based only on primary stresses necessary to maintain equilibrium with the inertia forces.

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ANSYS requires that for a static solution all bodies be constrained to prevent rigid body motion. Therefore, in the 0 degree and 45 degree drop models, two-dimensional linear spring elements (COMBIN14) join the various model components, i.e., fuel basket and enclosure vessel, at the point of initial contact. This provides the necessary constraints for the model components in the direction of the impact. By locating the springs at the points of initial contact, where the gaps remain closed, the behavior of the springs is identical to the behavior of a contact element. Linear springs and contact elements that connect the same two components have equal stiffness values.

### Description of Individual Loads and Boundary Conditions Applied to the MPCs

The method of applying each individual load to the MPC model is described in this subsection. The individual loads are listed in Table 2.2.14. A free-body diagram of the MPC corresponding to each individual load is given in Figures 3.4.7-3.4.9. In the following discussion, reference to vertical and horizontal orientations is made. Vertical refers to the direction along the cask axis, and horizontal refers to a radial direction.

Quasi-static structural analysis methods are used. The effects of any dynamic load factors (DLFs) are included in the final evaluation of safety factors. All analyses are carried out using the design basis decelerations in Table 3.1.2.

The MPC models used for side drop evaluations are shown in Figures 3.4.1 through 3.4.6. In each model, the fuel basket and the enclosure vessel are constrained to move only in the direction that is parallel to the acceleration vector. The storage overpack inner shell, which is defined by three nodes needed to represent the contact surface, is fixed in all degrees of freedom. The fuel basket, enclosure vessel, and storage overpack inner shell are all connected at one location by linear springs, as described in Subsection 3.4.4.3.1.1 (see Figure 3.4.1, for example). Detailed side drop evaluations here focus on an MPC within a HI-STORM 100 storage overpack. Since the analyses performed in Docket Number 72-1008 for the side drop condition in the HI-STAR 100 storage overpack demonstrates a safe condition under a 60g deceleration, no new analysis is required for the MPC and contained fuel basket and fuel during a side drop in the HI-TRAC, which is limited to a 45g deceleration (HI-TRAC and HI-STAR 100 overpacks have the same inside dimensions).

### Accelerations

During a side impact event, the stored fuel is directly supported by the cell walls in the fuel basket. Depending on the orientation of the drop, 0 or 45 degrees (see Figures 3.4.8 and 3.4.9), the fuel is supported by either one or two walls. In the finite element model this load is effected by applying a uniformly distributed pressure over the full span of the supporting walls. The magnitude of the pressure is determined by the weight of the fuel assembly (Table 2.1.6), the axial length of the fuel basket support structure, the width of the cell wall, and the impact acceleration. It is assumed that the load is evenly distributed along an axial length of basket equal to the fuel basket support structure. For example, the pressure applied to an impacted cell wall during a 0-degree side drop event is calculated as follows:

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$$p = \frac{a_n W}{L c}$$

where:

p = pressure

- $a_n =$  ratio of the impact acceleration to the gravitational acceleration
- W = weight of a stored fuel assembly
- L = axial length of the fuel basket support structure
- c = width of a cell wall

For the case of a 45-degree side drop the pressure on any cell wall equals p (defined above) divided by the square root of 2.

It is evident from the above that the effect of deceleration on the fuel basket and canister metal structure is accounted for by amplifying the gravity field in the appropriate direction.

### Internal Pressure

Design internal pressure is applied to the MPC model. The inside surface of the enclosure vessel shell is loaded with pressure. The magnitude of the internal pressure applied to the model is taken from Table 2.2.1.

For this load condition, the center node of the fuel basket is fixed in all degrees of freedom to numerically satisfy equilibrium.

# Temperature

Temperature distributions are developed in Chapter 4 and applied as nodal temperatures to the finite element model of the MPC enclosure vessel (confinement boundary). Maximum design heat load has been used to develop the temperature distribution used to demonstrate compliance with ASME Code stress intensity levels.

# Analysis Procedure

The analysis procedure for this set of load cases is as follows:

1. The stress intensity and deformation field due to the combined loads is determined by the finite element solution. Results are postprocessed and tabulated in the calculation package associated with this FSAR.

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2. The results for each load combination are compared to allowables. The comparison with allowable values is made in Subsection 3.4.4.4.

### 3.4.4.3.1.2 Analysis of Load Cases El.a and El.c (Table 3.1.4)

Since the MPC shell is a pressure vessel, the classical Lame's calculations should be performed to demonstrate the shell's performance as a pressure vessel. We note that dead load has an insignificant effect on this stress state. We first perform calculations for the shell under internal pressure. Subsequently, we examine the entire confinement boundary as a pressure vessel subject to both internal pressure and temperature gradients. Finally, we perform confirmatory hand calculations to gain confidence in the finite element predictions.

The stress from internal pressure is found for normal and accident pressures conditions using classical formulas:

Define the following quantities:

P = pressure, r = MPC radius, and t = shell thickness.

Using classical thin shell theory, the circumferential stress,  $\sigma_1 = Pr/t$ , the axial stress  $\sigma_2 = Pr/2t$ , and the radial stress  $\sigma_3 = -P$  are computed for both normal and accident internal pressures. The results are given in the following table (conservatively using the outer radius for r):

Classical Shell Theory Results for Normal and Accident Internal Pressures				
Item	σ1 (psi)	σ <sub>2</sub> (psi)	σ3 (psi)	σ1 - σ3 (psi)
P= 100 psi	6838	3419	-100	6938
P= 200 psi	13675	6838	-200	13875

Finite Element Analysis (Load Case E1.a and E1.c of Table 3.1.4)

The MPC shell, the top lid, and the baseplate together form the confinement boundary (enclosure vessel) for storage of spent nuclear fuel. In this section, we evaluate the operating condition consisting of dead weight, internal pressure, and thermal effects for the hot condition of storage. The top and bottom plates of the MPC enclosure vessel (EV) are modeled using plane axisymmetric elements, while the shell is modeled using the axisymmetric thin shell element. The thickness of the top lid varies in the different MPC types and can be either a single thick lid, or two dual lids welded around their common periphery; the minimum thickness top lid is modeled in the finite element analysis. As applicable, the results for the MPC top lid are modified to account for the fact that in the dual lid configuration, the two lids act independently under mechanical loading. The temperature distributions for all MPC constructions are nearly identical in magnitude and gradient and reflect the

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thermosiphon effect inside the MPC. Temperature differences across the thickness of both the baseplate and the top lid exist during HI-STORM 100's operations. There is also a thermal gradient from the center of the top lid and baseplate out to the shell wall. The metal temperature profile is essentially parabolic from the centerline of the MPC out to the MPC shell. There is also a parabolic temperature profile along the length of the MPC canister. Figure 3.4.11 shows a sketch of the confinement boundary structure with identifiers A-I locating points where temperature input data is used to represent a continuous temperature distribution for analysis purposes. The overall dimensions of the confinement boundary are also shown in the figure.

The temperatures for confinement thermal stress analysis are determined from the thermal numerical analyses supporting the results in Chapter 4. The MPC-68 is identified to have the maximum through thickness thermal gradients. For conservatism, a bounding temperature profile is defined for all MPC types and used as input for thermal stress analysis. The particular thermal inputs used are for an MPC inside of a HI-STORM 100 or 100S; the corresponding inputs for an MPC inside of a HI-STORM 100 or 100S; the corresponding inputs for an MPC inside of a HI-STORM 100 or 100S; the corresponding inputs for an MPC inside of a HI-STORM 100 or 100S; the corresponding inputs for an MPC inside of a HI-STORM 100 version B are not bounding. Because of the intimate contact between the two lid plates when the MPC lid is a two-piece unit, there is no significant thermal discontinuity through the thickness; thermal stresses arising in the MPC top lid will be bounding when there is only a single lid. Therefore, for thermal stresses, results from the analysis that considers the lid as a one-piece unit are used and are amplified to reflect the increase in stress in the dual lid configuration.

Figure 3.4.12 shows details of the finite element model of the top lid (considered as a single piece), canister shell, and baseplate. The top lid is modeled with 40 axisymmetric quadrilateral elements; the weld connecting the lid to the shell is modeled by a single element solely to capture the effect of the top lid attachment to the canister offset from the middle surface of the top lid. The MPC canister is modeled by 50 axisymmetric shell elements, with 20 elements concentrated in a short length of shell appropriate to capture the so-called "bending boundary layer" at both the top and bottom ends of the canister. The remaining 10 shell elements model the MPC canister structure away from the shell ends in the region where stress gradients are expected to be of less importance. The baseplate is modeled by 20 axisymmetric quadrilateral elements. Deformation compatibility at the connections is enforced at the top by the single weld element, and deformation and rotation compatibility at the bottom by additional shell elements between nodes 106-107 and 107-108.

The geometry of the model is listed below (terms are defined in Figure 3.4.12):

$H_t =$	9.5" (the minimum total thickness lid is assumed)
$R_L =$	0.5 x 67.25" (Bill of Materials for Top Lid)
$L_{MPC} =$	190.5" (Design Drawings in Section 1.5)
t <sub>s</sub> =	0.5"
t <sub>BP</sub> =	0.5 x 68.375"

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$$\beta$$
=  $2\sqrt{R_s t_s} \approx 12"$  (the "bending boundary layer")

Stress analysis results are obtained for two cases as follows:

- a. internal pressure = 100 psi
- b. internal pressure = 100 psi plus applied temperatures

For this configuration, dead weight of the top lid acts to reduce the stresses due to pressure. For example, the equivalent pressure simulating the effect of the weight of the top lid is an external pressure of 3 psi, which reduces the pressure difference across the top lid to 97 psi. The dead weight of the top lid is neglected to provide additional conservatism in the results. The dead weight of the baseplate, however, adds approximately 0.73 psi to the effective internal pressure acting on the base. The effect of dead weight is still insignificant compared to the 100 psi design pressure, and is therefore neglected. The thermal loading in the confinement vessel is obtained by developing a parabolic temperature profile to the entire length of the MPC canister and to the top lid and baseplate. The temperature data provided at locations A-I in Figure 3.4.11 and 3.4.12 are sufficient to establish the profiles. Through-thickness temperatures are assumed linearly interpolated between top and bottom surfaces of the top lid and baseplate. Finally, in the analysis, all material properties and expansion coefficients are considered to be temperature-dependent in the model.

Results for stress intensity are reported for the case of internal pressure alone and for the combined loading of pressure plus temperature (Load Case E1.c in Table 3.1.4). Tables 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 report results at the inside and outside surfaces of the top lid and baseplate at the centerline and at the extreme radius. Canister results are reported in the "bending boundary layer" and at a location near mid-length of the MPC canister. In the tables, the calculated value is the value from the finite element analysis, the categories are  $P_m = primary$  membrane;  $P_L + P_b = local$  membrane plus primary bending; and  $P_L + P_b + Q = primary$  plus secondary stress intensity. The allowable strength value is obtained from the appropriate table in Section 3.1 for Level A conditions, and the safety factor SF is defined as the allowable strength divided by the calculated value. Allowable strengths for Alloy X are taken at 550 degrees F, 400 degrees F, and 500 degrees F, respectively, for the MPC lid, baseplate, and canister shell. The results given in Tables 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 demonstrate the ruggedness of the MPC as a confinement boundary. Since mechanically induced stresses in the top lid are increased when a dual lid configuration is considered, the stress results obtained from an analysis of a single top lid must be corrected to reflect the maximum stress state when a dual lid configuration is considered. The modifications required are based on the following logic:

Consider the case of a simply supported circular plate of thickness h under uniform lateral pressure "q". Classical strength of materials provides the solution for the maximum stress, which occurs at the center of the plate, in the form:

 $\sigma_s = 1.225q(a/h)^2$  where a is the radius of the plate and h is the plate thickness.

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Now consider the MPC simply supported top lid as fabricated from two plates "1" and "2", of thickness  $h_1$  and  $h_2$ , respectively, where the lower surface of plate 2 is subjected to the internal pressure "q", the upper surface of plate 1 is the outer surface of the helium retention boundary, and the lower surface of plate 1 and the upper surface of plate 2 are in contact. The following sketch shows the dual lid configuration for the purposes of this discussion:



From classical plate theory, if it is assumed that the interface pressure between the two plates is uniform and that both plates deform to the same central deflection, then if

 $h_1+h_2 = h$ , and if  $h_2/h_1 = r$ 

the following relations exist between the maximum stress in the two individual plates,  $\sigma_1$ ,  $\sigma_2$  and the maximum stress  $\sigma_s$  in the single plate of thickness "h":

$$\frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_s} = \frac{(1+r)^2}{(1+r^3)} \qquad \qquad \frac{\sigma_2}{\sigma_s} = \frac{(1+r)^2}{(1+r^3)}r$$

Since the two lid thicknesses are the same in the dual lid configuration, r = 1.0 so that the stresses in plates 1 and 2 are both two times larger than the maximum stress computed for the single plate lid having the same total thickness. In Tables 3.4.7 and 3.4.8, bounding results for the singlel lid configuration are reported; a doubling of the calculated stress values (and a halving of the top lid safety factors) results when the dual lid configuration is considered.

Confirmatory Closed Form Solution

The results in Table 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 also show that the baseplate and the shell connection to the baseplate are the most highly stressed regions under the action of internal pressure. To confirm the finite element results, we perform an alternate closed form solution using classical plate and shell theory equations that are listed in or developed from the reference (Timoshenko and Woinowsky-Krieger, Theory of Plate and Shells, McGraw Hill, Third Edition).

Assuming that the thick baseplate receives little support against rotation from the thin shell, the bending stress at the centerline is evaluated by considering a simply supported plate of radius a and thickness h, subjected to lateral pressure p. The maximum bending stress is given by

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$$\sigma = \frac{3(3+\nu)}{8} p\left(\frac{a}{h}\right)^2$$

where:

a = .5 x 68.375" h = 2.5" v = 0.3 (Poisson's Ratio) p = 100 psi

Calculating the stress in the plate gives  $\sigma = 23,142$  psi.

Now consider the thin MPC shell (t = 0.5") and first assume that the baseplate provides a clamped support to the shell. Under this condition, the bending stress in the thin shell at the connection to the plate is given as

$$\sigma_{\rm Bp} = 3 \,\mathrm{p} \, \frac{\mathrm{a}}{\mathrm{t}} \, \frac{(1 - \nu/2)}{\sqrt{3} \, (1 - \nu^2)^{1/2}} = 10,553 \,\mathrm{psi}$$

In addition to this stress, there is a component of stress in the shell due to the baseplate rotation that causes the shell to rotate. The joint rotation is essentially driven by the behavior of the baseplate as a simply supported plate; the shell offers little resistance because of the disparity in thickness and will essentially follow the rotation of the thick plate.

Using formulas from thin shell theory, the additional axial bending stress in the shell due to this rotation  $\theta$  can be written in the form

$$\sigma_{B\theta} = 12 \ \beta D_s \frac{\theta}{t^2}$$

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where

$$\theta = pa^3/8D(1+v)*\left(\frac{1}{1+\alpha}\right)$$

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$$D = \frac{Eh^3}{12(1-\nu^2)} \qquad E = plate Young's Modulus$$

$$\alpha = \frac{2\beta at^3}{h^3(1+\nu)}$$
$$D_s = \frac{Et^3}{12(1-\nu^2)}$$

$$\beta^2 = \sqrt{3(1-\nu^2)} / at$$

Substituting the numerical values gives

We note that the approximate solution is independent of the value chosen for Young's Modulus as long as the material properties for the plate and shell are the same.

Combining the two contributions to the shell bending stress gives the total extreme fiber stress in the longitudinal direction as 51,116 psi.

The baseplate stress value, 23,142 psi, compares well with the finite element result in Table 3.4.7. The shell joint stress, 51,116 psi, is greater than the finite element result in Table 3.4.7. This is due to the local effects of the shell-to-baseplate connection offset. That is, the connection between shell and baseplate in the finite element model is at the surface of the baseplate, not at the middle surface of the baseplate. This offset will cause an additional bending moment that will reduce the rotation of the plate and hence, reduce the stress in the shell due to the rotation of the baseplate.

In summary, the approximate closed form solution confirms the accuracy of the finite element analysis in the baseplate region.

From Table 2.2.1, the off-normal design internal pressure is 110 psi, or ten percent greater than the normal design pressure. Whereas Level A service limits are used to establish allowables for the normal design pressure, Level B service limits are used for off-normal loads. Since Subsection NB of the ASME Code permits an identical 10% increase in allowable stress intensity values for primary

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stress intensities generated by Level B Service Loadings, it stands to reason that the safety factors reported in Tables 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 bound the case of off-normal design internal pressure.

Under the accident pressure, the MPC baseplate experiences bending. Table NB-3217-1 permits the bending stress at the outer periphery of the baseplate and in the shell wall at the connection to be considered as a secondary bending stress if the primary bending stress at the center of the baseplate can be shown to meet the stress limits without recourse to the restraint provided by the MPC shell. To this end, the bending stress at the center of the baseplate is computed in a conservative manner assuming the baseplate is simply supported at the periphery. The bending stress for a simply supported circular plate is

$$\sigma = (9/8) p \left( \frac{r}{t} \right)^2$$

At the accident pressure, conservatively set at twice the normal operating pressure, the maximum stress is:

Bending stress at center of baseplate = 46,284 psi

Since this occurrence is treated as a Level D event, the stress intensity is compared with the limit from Table 3.1.14 and the safety factor computed as, "SF", where

SF = 67,400 psi/(46,284+200) psi = 1.45

Evaluation of MPC Baseplate Alternate Support Configuration

The stress state in the MPC baseplate and adjacent canister is evaluated to assess the effect of the discrete support of the MPC under the action of vertical loading plus pressure and temperature. The alternate MPC supports consist of bearing pads (shims) at six locations around the periphery plus a central support to transfer vertical loads to the HI-STORM. The baseplate of the MPC has been previously analyzed under loading from the fuel basket and the fuel assemblies assuming the baseplate plate continuously supported around the periphery by the MPC canister shell (e.g., this condition arises during lifting and lowering of the MPC into the storage overpack). To evaluate the effect of a discrete support configuration, a finite element model of 1/2 of the baseplate is constructed using shell elements and includes a sufficient portion of the MPC canister to simulate the canisterto-baseplate joint and the bending boundary layer in the canister shell. Vertical loads from fuel assemblies and fuel basket are applied to the baseplate as a uniform pressure and a ring loading, respectively (these loads have been applied in the same manner in the evaluation of the baseplate under the MPC lowering condition for HI-STORM 100 system). The total vertical load is resisted at the peripheral and central discrete support locations. Under normal conditions of storage, the baseplate/canister is subject to normal service pressure and temperature plus the one-g dead weight loading. The state of stress in the MPC under design pressure and normal operating temperature has been previously considered using an axi-symmetric finite element model, and the results are discussed above (see "Finite Element Analysis") and summarized in Tables 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 (Level A condition). In Table 3.4.8, although the actual metal temperatures were used to develop the solution

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for the thermal stresses, the allowable stresses were conservatively chosen at the design temperature rather than at the actual operating temperature as befits a Level A analysis.

The stress intensities arising in the MPC baseplate and in the lower portion of the canister from the added vertical load are added to the previously determined stress intensities arising from internal pressure and temperature (reported in Table 3.4.8 and adjusted downward for actual service pressure) to obtain the total stress intensity for the Level A normal operating condition. The computed stress intensities are then amplified to simulate the vertical seismic event and again summed with the results from Table 3.4.8 to obtain the total stress intensity for the Level D condition.

The primary and secondary stress intensities in the MPC baseplate and canister shell are computed for the Level A normal operating condition. The maximum primary stress intensity in the MPC baseplate is also determined for the Level D vertical seismic event. All computed safety factors are above 1.0.

### 3.4.4.3.1.3 <u>Elastic Stability and Yielding of the MPC Basket under Compression Loads (Load</u> Case F3 in Table 3.1.3)

This load case corresponds to the scenario wherein the loaded MPC is postulated to drop causing a compression state in the fuel basket panels.

a. Elastic Stability

Following the provisions of Appendix F of the ASME Code [3.4.3] for stability analysis of Subsection NG structures, (F-1331.5(a)(1)), a comprehensive buckling analysis is performed using ANSYS. For this analysis, ANSYS's large deformation capabilities are used. This feature allows ANSYS to account for large nodal rotations in the fuel basket, which are characteristic of column buckling. The interaction between compressive and lateral loading, caused by the deformation, is exactly included. Subsequent to the large deformation analysis, the basket panel that is most susceptible to buckling failure is identified by a review of the results. The lateral displacement of a node located at the mid-span of the panel is measured for the range of impact decelerations. The buckling or collapse load is defined as the impact deceleration for which a slight increase in its magnitude results in a disproportionate increase in the lateral displacement.

The stability requirement for the MPC fuel basket under lateral loading is satisfied if two-thirds of the collapse deceleration load is greater than the design basis horizontal acceleration (Table 3.1.2). This analysis was performed for the HI-STAR 100 submittal (Docket Number 72-1008) under a 60g deceleration loading. Within the HI-STAR 100 FSAR (Docket Number 72-1008), Figures 3.4.27 through 3.4.32 are plots of lateral displacement versus impact deceleration for the MPC-24, MPC-32, and MPC-68. It should be noted that the displacements (in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR) in Figures 3.4.27 through 3.4.31 are expressed in  $1 \times 10^{-1}$  inch and Figure 3.4.32 is expressed in  $1 \times 10^{-2}$  inch. The plots in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR clearly show that the large deflection collapse load of the MPC fuel basket is greater than 1.5 times the design basis deceleration for all baskets in all orientations. The results for the MPC-24E are similar. Thus, the requirements of Appendix F are met for lateral

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deceleration loading under Subsection NG stress limits for faulted conditions.

An alternative solution for the stability of the fuel basket panel is obtained using the methodology espoused in NUREG/CR-6322 [3.4.13]. In particular, we consider the fuel basket panels as wide plates in accordance with Section 5 of NUREG/CR-6322. We use eq.(19) in that section with the "K" factor set to the value appropriate to a clamped panel. Material properties are selected corresponding to a metal temperature of 500 degrees F which bounds computed metal temperatures at the periphery of the basket. In general, the basket periphery sees the largest loading in an impact scenario. The critical buckling stress is:

$$\sigma_{\rm cr} = \left( \frac{\pi}{K} \right)^2 \frac{E}{12(1-\nu^2)} \left( \frac{h}{a} \right)^2$$

where h is the panel thickness, a is the unsupported panel length, E is the Young's Modulus of Alloy X at 500 degrees F,  $\nu$  is Poisson's Ratio, and K=0.65 (per Figure 6 of NUREG/CR-6322).

The MPC-24 has a small h/a ratio; the results of the finite element stress analyses under design basis deceleration load show that this basket is subject to the highest compressive load in the panel. Therefore, the critical buckling load is computed using the geometry of the MPC-24. The following table shows the results from the finite element stress analysis and from the stability calculation.

Panel Buckling Results From NUREG/CR-6322					
ItemFinite Element StressCritical BucklingFactor of(ksi)Stress (ksi)Safety					
Stress	12.585	45.32	3.601		

For a stainless steel member under an accident condition load, the recommended safety factor is 2.12. We see that the calculated safety factor exceeds this value; therefore, we have independently confirmed the stability predictions of the large deflection analysis based on classical plate stability analysis by employing a simplified method.

Stability of the basket panels, under longitudinal deceleration loading, is demonstrated in the following manner. Under 60g deceleration in Docket Number 72-1008, the axial compressive stress in the baskets were computed for the MPC-24, 68, and 32, as:

MPC-24	3,458 psi
MPC-68	3,739 psi
MPC-32	4,001 psi

For the 45g design basis decelerations for HI-STORM 100, the basket axial stresses are reduced by 25%.

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The above values represent the amplified weight, including the nonstructural sheathing and the neutron absorber material, divided by the bearing area resisting axial movement of the basket. To demonstrate that elastic instability is not a concern, the buckling stress for an MPC-24 flat panel is computed.

For elastic stability, Reference [3.4.8] provides the formula for critical axial stress as

$$\sigma_{cr} = \frac{4 \pi^2 E}{12 (1 - v^2)} \left(\frac{T}{W}\right)^2$$

where T is the panel thickness and W is the width of the panel, E is the Young's Modulus at the metal temperature and v is the metal Poisson's Ratio. The following table summarizes the calculation for the critical buckling stress using the formula given above:

Elastic Stability Result for a Flat Panel			
Reference Temperature	725 degrees F		
Т (МРС-24)	5/16 inch		
w	10.777 inch		
E	24,600,000 psi		
Critical Axial Stress	74,781 psi		

It is noted the critical axial stress is an order of magnitude greater than the computed basket axial stress reported in the foregoing and demonstrates that elastic stability under longitudinal deceleration load is not a concern for any of the fuel basket configurations.

b. Yielding

The safety factor against yielding of the basket under longitudinal compressive stress from a design basis inertial loading is given, using the results for the MPC-32, by

SF = 17,100/4,001 = 4.274

Therefore, plastic deformation of the fuel basket under design basis deceleration is not credible.

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## 3.4.4.3.1.4 MPC Baseplate Analysis (Load Case E2)

A bounding analysis is performed in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR (Docket Number 72-1008, Appendix 3.I) to evaluate the stresses in the MPC baseplate during the handling of a loaded MPC. The stresses in the MPC baseplate calculated in that appendix are compared to Level A stress limits and remain unchanged whether the overpack is HI-STAR 100, HI-STORM 100, or HI-TRAC. Therefore, no new analysis is needed. We have reported results for this region in Subsection 3.4.3 where an evaluation has been performed for stresses under three times the supported load.

## 3.4.4.3.1.5 Analysis of the MPC Top Closure (Load Case E2)

The FSAR for the HI-STAR 100 System (Docket Number 72-1008, Appendix 3.E) contains stress analysis of the MPC top closure during lifting. Loadings in that analysis are also valid for the HI-STORM 100 System. From Table 2.2.1, the off-normal design internal pressure is 110 psi, or ten percent greater than the normal design pressure. Whereas Level A service limits are used to establish allowables for the normal design pressure, Level B service limits are used for off-normal loads. Since Subsection NB of the ASME Code permits an identical 10% increase in allowable stress intensity values for primary stress intensities generated by Level B Service Loadings, it stands to reason that the safety factors reported for normal pressure are also valid for the case of off-normal design internal pressure.

## 3.4.4.3.1.6 Structural Analysis of the Fuel Support Spacers (Load Case E3.a)

Upper and lower fuel support spacers are utilized to position the active fuel region of the spent nuclear fuel within the poisoned region of the fuel basket. It is necessary to ensure that the spacers will continue to maintain their structural integrity after an accident event. Ensuring structural integrity implies that the spacer will not buckle under the maximum compressive load, and that the maximum compressive stress will not exceed the compressive strength of the spacer material (Alloy X). Detailed calculations in Docket Number 72-1008, Appendix 3.J, demonstrate that large structural margins in the fuel spacers are available for the entire range of spacer lengths which may be used in HI-STORM 100 applications (for the various acceptable fuel types). The calculations for the HI-STORM 100 45g load are bounded by those for the HI-STAR 100 60g load.

### 3.4.4.3.1.7 External Pressure (Load Case E1.b, Table 3.1.4)

The design external pressure for the MPC is zero psi. The outer surface of the MPC shell is conservatively subject to a net external pressure of 2 psi. The methodology for analysis of the MPC under this external pressure is provided in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR Docket Number 72-1008. Using the identical methodology with input loads and decelerations appropriate to the HI-STORM, safety factors > 1.0 are obtained for all relevant load cases.

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## 3.4.4.3.1.8 Miscellaneous MPC Structural Evaluations

Calculations are performed to determine the minimum fuel basket weld size, the capacity of the sheathing welds, the stresses in the MPC cover plates, and the stresses in the fuel basket supports. The following paragraphs briefly describe each of these evaluations.

The fillet welds in the fuel basket honeycomb are made by an autogenous operation that has been shown to produce highly consistent and porosity free weld lines. However, Subsection NG of the ASME Code permits only 40% quality credit on double fillet welds which can be only visually examined (Table NG-3352-1). Subsection NG, however, fails to provide a specific stress limit on such fillet welds. In the absence of a Code mandated limit, Holtec International's standard design procedure requires that the weld section possess as much load resistance capability as the parent metal section. Since the loading on the honeycomb panels is essentially that of section bending, it is possible to develop a closed form expression for the required weld throat thickness "t" corresponding to panel thickness "h".

The sheathing is welded to the fuel basket cell walls to protect and position the neutron absorber material. Force equilibrium relationships are used to demonstrate that the sheathing weld is adequate to support a 45g deceleration load applied vertically and horizontally to the sheathing and the confined neutron absorber material. The analysis assumes that the weld is continuous and then modifies the results to reflect the amplification due to intermittent welding.

The MPC cover plates are welded to the MPC lid during loading operations. The cover plates are part of the confinement boundary for the MPC. No credit is taken for the pressure retaining abilities of the quick disconnect couplings for the MPC vent and drain. Therefore, the MPC cover plates must meet ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB limits for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. Conservatively, the accident condition pressure loading is applied, and it is demonstrated that the Level A limits for Subsection NB are met.

The fuel basket internal to the MPC canister is supported by a combination of angle fuel basket supports and flat plate or solid bar fuel basket supports. These fuel basket supports are subject to significant load only when a lateral acceleration is applied to the fuel basket and the contained fuel. The quasi-static finite element analyses of the MPC's, under lateral inertia loading, focused on the structural details of the fuel basket and the MPC shell. Basket supports were modeled in less detail, which served only to properly model the load transfer path between fuel basket and canister. Safety factors reported for the fuel basket supports from the finite element analyses, are overly conservative, and do not reflect available capacity of the fuel basket angle support. A strength of materials analysis of the fuel basket angle supports is performed to complement the finite element results. Weld stresses in the load path are computed, direct stress in the support configurations.

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Minimum Weld Sizes for Fuel Baskets				
Basket Type	Panel Thickness (h), in	t/h Ratio	Minimum Weld Size (t), in	
MPC-24	5/16	0.57	0.178	
MPC-68	1/4	0.516	0.129	
MPC-32	9/32	0.57	0.160	
MPC-24E	5/16	0.455	0.142	

The results of these evaluations are summarized in the tables below.

Miscellaneous Stress Results for MPC						
Stress (ksi)	Allowable Stress (ksi)	Safety Factor				
7.724	27.93	3.62				
17.60	24.425*0.967	1.34				
4.716	18.99*0.967	3.89				
19.78	26.67	1.35				
32.393	59.1	1.82				
2.185 kips/in	8.886 kips/in	4.07				
	Stress (ksi)   7.724   17.60   4.716   19.78   32.393   2.185 kips/in	Ilscellaneous Stress Results for MPC   Stress (ksi) Allowable Stress (ksi)   7.724 27.93   17.60 24.425*0.967   4.716 18.99*0.967   19.78 26.67   32.393 59.1   2.185 kips/in 8.886 kips/in				

### 3.4.4.3.1.9 Structural Integrity of Damaged Fuel Containers

The damaged fuel containers or canisters (DFCs) to be deployed in the HI-STAR 100 System transport package have been evaluated to demonstrate that the containers are structurally adequate to support the mechanical loads postulated during normal lifting operations, while in long-term storage, and during a hypothetical end drop. The evaluations address the following damaged/failed fuel containers for transportation in the HI-STAR 100 System:

- Holtec-designed MPC-24E (PWR) DFC
- Holtec-designed MPC-68 (BWR) DFC
- Transnuclear-designed DFC for Dresden Unit 1 fuel
- Transnuclear-designed Thoria Rod Canister for Dresden Unit 1

The structural load path in each of the analyzed containers is evaluated using basic strength of materials formulations. The various structural components are modeled as axial or bending members and their stresses are computed. Depending on the particular DFC, the load path includes components such as the container sleeve and collar, various weld configurations, load tabs, closure

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components and lifting bolts. Axial plus bending stresses are computed, together with applicable bearing stresses and weld stresses. Comparisons are then made with the appropriate allowable strengths at temperature. Input data for all DFCs comes from the applicable drawings. The design temperature for lifting evaluations is set at 150°F (since the DFC is in the spent fuel pool). The design temperature for accident conditions is set at 725°F.

The upper closure assembly must meet the requirements set forth for special lifting devices used in nuclear applications [3.1.2]. The remaining components of the damaged fuel container are governed by the stress limits of the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG [3.4.10] and Section III, Appendix F [3.4.3], as applicable.

DFC Type	Loading Condition – DFC Component	Calculated Stress (ksi)	Allowable Stress (ksi)	Safety Factor = (Allowable Stress) / (Calculated Stress)	Remarks
Holtec-designed MPC-24E (PWR)	Normal Lift – Lifting Bolt	24.99	27.00	1.08	ANSI N14-6 stress limit
DFC	60g End Drop – Baseplate-to-Container Sleeve Welds	3.95	26.59	6.73	ASME Level D stress limit
Holtec-designed MPC-68 (BWR) DFC	Normal Lift – Lifting Bolt-to-Top Plate Weld	5.80	12.00	2.07	ASME Level A stress limit
	60g End Drop – Baseplate-to-Container Sleeve Welds	1.59	26.59	16.7	ASME Level D stress limit
Transnuclear- designed DFC for	Normal Lift – Lid Frame Assembly	0.527	4.583	8.70	Bearing stress
Dresden Unit 1	60g End Drop – Bottom Assembly	12.32	37.92	3.08	ASME Level D stress limit
Transnuclear- designed Thoria	Normal Lift – Lid Frame Assembly	0.373	4.583	12.3	Bearing stress

The following table presents the minimum safety factors, from all of the stress computations, for each of the above listed DFCs.

The table above demonstrates that the DFCs are structurally adequate to support the mechanical loads postulated during normal lifting operations and during a hypothetical end drop. Moreover, since the HI-STAR design basis handling accident bounds the corresponding load for HI-STORM (60g vs. 45g), the DFCs can be carried safely in both the HI-STAR and HI-STORM Systems.

8.73

37.92

4.34

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Rod Canister for

Dresden Unit 1

60g End Drop -

Bottom Assembly

ASME Level

D stress limit

## 3.4.4.3.2 HI-STORM 100 Storage Overpack Stress Calculations

The structural functions of the storage overpack are stated in Section 3.1. The analyses presented here demonstrate the ability of components of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack to perform their structural functions in the storage mode. Load Cases considered are given in Table 3.1.5. The nomenclature used to identify the load cases (Load Case Identifier) considered is also given in Table 3.1.5.

The purpose of the analyses is to provide the necessary assurance that there will be no unacceptable release of radioactive material, unacceptable radiation levels, or impairment of ready retrievability of the MPC from the storage overpack. Results obtained using the HI-STORM 100 configuration are identical to or bound results for the HI-STORM 100S configuration.

### 3.4.4.3.2.1 <u>HI-STORM 100 Compression Under the Static Load of a Fully Loaded HI-TRAC</u> Positioned on the Top of HI-STORM 100 (Load Case 01 in Table 3.1.5)

During the loading of HI-STORM 100, a HI-TRAC transfer cask with a fully loaded MPC may be placed on the top of a HI-STORM 100 storage overpack. During this operation, the HI-TRAC may be held by a single-failure-proof lifting device so a handling accident is not credible. The HI-STORM 100 storage overpack must, however, possess the compression capacity to support the additional dead load. The following analysis provides the necessary structural integrity demonstration; safety factors are large and results for the HI-STORM 100 overpack are representative of the margins for the 100S and 100S Version B overpacks.

Define the following quantities for analysis purposes:

 $W_{HT}$  = Bounding weight of HI-TRAC 125D (loaded w/ MPC-32) = 236,000 lb (Table 3.2.2)

 $W_{MD}$  = Weight of mating device = 15,000 lb

 $W_{TOTAL} = W_{HT} + W_{MD} = 251,000 \text{ lb}$ 

The total weight of the HI-TRAC 125D plus the mating device is greater than the weight of a loaded HI-TRAC 125 with the transfer lid. Therefore, the following calculations use the weight for the HI-TRAC 125D as input.

The dimensions of the compression components of HI-STORM 100 are as follows:

outer diameter of outer shell =	$D_o = 132.5^{"}$
outer diameter of inner shell =	$D_i = 76''$ (1 for HI-STORM 100S version B)
thickness of inner shell =	$t_i = 1.25$ " (1" for HI-STORM 100S Version B)
thickness of radial ribs =	$t_r = 0.75$ " (ribs are not full-length for HI-STORM 100S Version B)

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In what follows, detailed results are provided using the classic HI-STORM 100 dimensions. While Bill of Material 1575 provides the option to fabricate the inner and outer shells from 1" thick material, the above dimensions (i.e.,  $t_0$  and  $t_i$ ) are used because they minimize the total cross sectional metal area.

The metal area of the outer shell is

$$A_o = \frac{\pi}{4} (D_o^2 - (D_o - 2t_o)^2) = \frac{\pi}{4} (132.5^2 - 131^2)$$
  
= 310.43 in<sup>2</sup>

The metal area of the radial ribs is

$$A_r = 4 t_r (D_o - 2 t_o - D_i) / 2 = \frac{3}{2} (131 - 76) = 82.5 in^2$$

The metal area of the inner shell is

$$A_i = \frac{\pi}{4} (76^2 - 73.5^2) = 293.54 \qquad in^2$$

There are four radial ribs that extend full length and can carry load. For the HI-STORM 100S Version B, the radial ribs are not counted as part of the compression load carrying area since they are not full-length. The concrete radial shield can also support compression load. The area of concrete available to support compressive loading is

$$A_{\text{concrete}} = \frac{\pi}{4} ((D_0 - 2t_0)^2 - (D_i)^2) - A_r$$
$$= \frac{\pi}{4} (131^2 - 76^2) - 82.5 \text{ in}^2$$
$$= (8,994 - 82.5) \text{ in}^2 = 8,859.5 \text{ in}^2$$

The areas computed above are calculated at a section below the air outlet vents. To correct the above areas for the presence of the air outlet vents (HI-STORM 100 only since HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S, Version B have the air outlet vents located in the lid), we note that Bill-of-Materials 1575 in Chapter 1 gives the size of the horizontal plate of the air outlet vents as:

Peripheral width = w = 16.5" Radial depth = d = 27.5" (over concrete in radial shield)

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Using these values, the following final areas are obtained:

 $A_o = A_o(\text{no vent}) - 4t_ow = 260.93 \text{ sq. inch}$  $A_i = A_i(\text{no vent}) - 4t_iw = 211.04 \text{ sq. inch}$  $A_{\text{concrete}} = A_{\text{concrete}}(\text{no vent}) - 4dw = 7044.2 \text{ sq. inch}$ 

The loading case is a Level A load condition. The load is apportioned to the steel and to the concrete in accordance with the values of EA for the two materials (E(steel) = 28,000,000 psi and E(concrete)=3,605,000 psi).

EA(steel)= $28x_{10}^6$  psix (260.93+211.04+82.5)in<sup>2</sup> =15,525.21b x 10<sup>6</sup> lbs.

EA(concrete) =3.605 x  $10^6$  x (7044.2) in<sup>2</sup> = 25,394.3 x  $10^6$  lb.

Therefore, the total HI-TRAC load will be apportioned as follows:

 $F_{\text{STEEL}} = (15,525.2/40,919.5) \times 251,000 = 95,231.5 \text{ lb.}$ 

 $F_{\text{CONCRETE}} = (25,394.3/40,919.5) \times 251,000 = 155,768.5 \text{ lb.}$ 

Therefore, if the load is apportioned as above, with all load-carrying components in the path acting, the compressive stress in the steel is

If we conservatively neglect the compression load bearing capacity of concrete, then

$$\sigma_{\text{STEEL}} = \frac{251,000}{554.5} = 452.7 \text{ psi}$$

If we include the concrete, then the maximum compressive stress in the concrete is:

 $\sigma_{\text{CONCRETE}} = \frac{F_{\text{CONCRETE}}}{A_{\text{CONCRETE}}} = 22.1 \, \text{psi}$ 

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It is clear that HI-STORM 100 storage overpack can support the dead load of a fully loaded HI-TRAC 125D and the mating device placed on top for MPC transfer into or out of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack cavity. The calculated stresses at a cross-section through the air outlet ducts are small and give rise to large factors of safety. The metal cross-section at the base of the HI-STORM storage overpack will have a slightly larger metal area (because the width of the air-inlet ducts is smaller) but will be subject to additional dead load from the weight of the supported metal components of the HI-STORM storage overpack plus the loaded HI-TRAC weight. At the base of the storage overpack, the additional stress in the outer shell and the radial plates is due solely to the weight of the component. Based on the maximum concrete density, the additional stress in these components is computed as:

 $\Delta \sigma = (200 \text{lb./cu.ft.}) \times 18.71 \text{ ft./144 sq.in./sq.ft.} = 26.0 \text{ psi}$ 

This stress will be further increased by a small amount because of the material cut away by the airinlet ducts; however, the additional stress still remains small. The inner shell, however, is subject to additional loading from the top lid of the storage overpack and from the radial shield. From the Structural Calculation Package (HI-981928)(see Subsection 3.6.4 for the reference), and from Table 3.2.1, the following weights are obtained (for conservatism, use the 100S, Version B lid weight with 200 pcf concrete even though the shell geometry is for the classic HI-STORM 100):

HI-STORM 100S, Version B Top Lid weight < 29,000 lb. HI-STORM 100 Inner Shell weight < 19,000 lb. HI-STORM 100 Shield Shell weight < 11,000 lb.

Note that the shield shell was removed from the HI-STORM 100 design as of June 2001. However, it is conservative to include the shield shell weight in the following calculations.

Using the calculated inner shell area at the top of the storage overpack for conservatism, gives the metal area of the inner shell as:

 $A_i = A_i$ (no vent) –  $4t_i$ w = 211.04 sq. inch

Therefore, the additional stress from the HI-STORM 100S, Version B storage overpack components, at the base of the overpack, is:

 $\Delta \sigma = 280 \text{ psi}$ 

and a maximum compressive stress in the inner shell predicted as:

Maximum stress = 453 psi + 280 psi = 733 psi

The safety factor at the base of the storage overpack inner shell (minimum section) is

SF = 17,500psi/733 psi = 23.9

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The preceding analysis is bounding for the 100 Ton HI-TRAC transfer cask because of the lower HI-TRAC weight.

The preceding analysis is representative of all overpacks since the bounding lid weight from the Version B has been used. Based on the computed safety factor, it is concluded that all versions of the HI-STORM 100 and HI-STORM 100S can safely support the heaviest HI-TRAC while performing a vertical fuel transfer operation.

#### 3.4.4.3.2.2 <u>HI-STORM 100 Lid Integrity Evaluation (Load Case 02.c, Table 3.1.5)</u>

A non-mechanistic tip over of the HI-STORM 100 results in high decelerations at the top of the storage overpack. The storage overpack lid diameter is less than the storage overpack outer diameter. This ensures that the storage overpack lid does not directly strike the ground but requires analysis to demonstrate that the lid remains intact and does not separate from the body of the storage overpack. Figure 3.4.19 shows the scenario.

The HI-STORM 100 overpack has two lid designs, which rely on different mechanisms to resist separation from the overpack body. The original design relies solely on the lid studs to resist the shear and axial loads on the lid. In the new design, the bolt holes are enlarged and a shear ring is welded to the underside of the lid top plate. These changes insure that the lid studs only encounter axial (tensile) loads. The in-plane load is resisted by the shear ring as it bears against the top plate. The HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S, Version B has only one lid design, which utilizes a shear ring. Calculations have been performed for both HI-STORM 100 lid configurations, as well as the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S, Version B lid geometry, to demonstrate that the lid can withstand a non-mechanistic tip-over.

The deceleration level for the non-mechanistic tip-over bounds all other decelerations, directed in the plane of the lid, experienced under other accident conditions such as flood or earthquake as can be demonstrated by evaluating the loads resulting from these natural phenomena events.

It is shown that the weight of the HI-STORM 100 lid, amplified by the design basis deceleration, can be supported entirely by the shear capacity available in the four studs<sup>†</sup>. If only a single stud is loaded initially during a tipover (because of tolerances), the stud hole will enlarge rather than the stud fail in shear. Therefore, it is assured that all four bolts will resist the tipover load regardless of the initial position of the HI-STORM 100 lid.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The tip-over event is non-mechanistic by definition since the HI-STORM 100 System is designed to preclude tip-over under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of storage, including extreme natural phenomena events. Thus, the tip-over event cannot be categorized as an operating or test condition as contemplated by ASME Section III, Article NCA-2141. The bolted connection between the overpack top lid and the overpack body provided by the top lid studs and nuts serves no structural function during normal or off-normal storage conditions, or for credible accident events. Therefore, the ASME Code does not apply to the construction of the HI-STORM top plate-to-overpack connection (the lid studs, nuts, and the through holes in the top plate). However, for conservatism, the stress limits from ASME III, Subsection NF are used for the analysis of the lid bolts.

The following tables summarize the limiting results obtained from the detailed analyses, and from the similar detailed analysis for the HI-STORM 100 lid with shear ring, for the HI-STORM 100S(243), and for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B(229). The results for the longer HI-STORM 100S and HI-STORM 100S, Version B bound the corresponding results for the shorter versions of these units.

HI-STORM 100 Top Lid Integrity (No Shear Ring)					
Item Value (ksi) Allowable (ksi) Safety Facto					
Lid Shell-Lid Top Plate Weld Shear Stress	6.733	29.4	4.367		
Lid Shell-Lid Top Plate Combined Stress	9.11	29.4	3.226		
Attachment Bolt Shear Stress	44.82	60.9	1.359		
Attachment Bolt Combined Shear and Tension Interaction at Interface with Anchor Block			1.21		

HI-STORM 100 Top Lid Integrity (With Shear Ring)						
Item Value (ksi) Allowable (ksi) Safety Factor						
Lid Top Plate-to-Lid Shell Weld Combined Stress	7.336	29.4	4.007			
Shield Block Shells-to-Lid Top Plate Weld Combined Stress	1.768	29.4	16.63			
Attachment Bolt Tensile Stress	28.02	107.13	3.823			
Shear Ring-to-Lid Top Plate Weld Stress	32.11	40.39	1.258			
Shear Ring Bearing Stress	25.43	63.0	2.477			
Top Plate-to-Outer Shell Weld Stress	35.61	40.39	1.134			

HI-STORM 100S(243) Top Lid Integrity <sup>†</sup>					
Item Value (ksi) Allowable (ksi) Safety F					
Inner and Outer Shell Weld to Base	17.61	29.4	1.669		
Shield Block Shell-to-Lid Weld Shear Stress	7.692	29.4	3.822		
Attachment Bolt Tensile Stress	37.38	107.13	2.866		
Shear Ring-to-Overpack Shell Weld Stress	33.24	42.0	1.264		
Shear Ring Bearing Stress	19.36	63.0	3.254		
Lid Shield Ring-to-Shear Ring Weld Stress	20.95	42.0	2.004		

<sup>†</sup> Results are based on a bounding weight of 28,000 lb for the HI-STORM 100S top lid.

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HI-STORM 100S, Version B(229) Top Lid Integrity <sup>†</sup>			
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor
Lid Outer Ring to Lid Shield Ring Weld	26.15	42.0	1.606
Shield Block Shell-to-Lid Weld Shear Stress	26.94	42.0	1.559
Attachment Bolt Tensile Stress	41.563	107.13	2.578
Shear Ring-to-Overpack Shell Weld Stress	30.57	42.0	1.374
Shear Ring Bearing Stress	20.59	63.0	3.06
Lid Shield Ring-to-Shear Ring Weld Stress	32.36	42.0	1.298

<sup>†</sup> Results are based on a bounding weight of 29,000 lb for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B top lid.

## 3.4.4.3.2.3 Vertical Drop of HI-STORM 100 Storage Overpack (Load Case 02.a of Table 3.1.5)

A loaded HI-STORM 100, with the top lid in place, drops vertically and impacts the ISFSI. Figure 3.4.20 illustrates the drop scenario. The regions of the structure that require detailed examination are the storage overpack top lid, the inlet vent horizontal plate, the pedestal shield, the inlet vent vertical plate, and all welds in the load path. These components are examined for the Level D event of a HI- STORM 100 drop developing the design basis deceleration.

The table provided below summarizes the results of the analyses for the weight and configuration of the HI-STORM 100. The results for the HI-STORM 100S are bounded by the results given below. Any calculation pertaining to the pedestal is bounding since the pedestal dimensions and corresponding weights are less in the HI-STORM 100S. The HI-STORM 100S, Version B, however, has sufficient differences in configuration to merit a separate evaluation using similar analyses; therefore, a separate summary table of results is provided for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B.

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HI-STORM 100 Load Case 02.a Evaluation			
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor
Lid Bottom Plate Bending Stress Intensity	6.00	58.7	9.777 <sup>†</sup>
Lid Bottom Plate Collapse Load	10450x1.06 (in.*lb./in.)	12730 (in.*1b./in.)	1.15 <sup>†</sup>
Weld- lid bottom plate-to-lid shell	10.91	29.4	2.695
Lid Shell – Membrane Stress Intensity	1.90	39.1	20.58
Lid Top (2" thick) Plate Bending Stress Intensity	11.27	58.7	5.208*
Inner Shell – Membrane Stress Intensity	11.46	39.1	3.41
Outer Shell – Membrane Stress Intensity	3.401	39.1	11.495
Inlet Vent Horizontal Plate Bending Stress Intensity	46.20	58.7	1.271
Inlet Vent Vertical Plate Membrane Stress Intensity	12.86	39.1	3.04
Pedestal Shield – Compression	1.252	1.266	1.011
Weld – outer shell-to-baseplate	2.569	29.4	11.443
Weld – inner shell-to-baseplate	6.644	29.4	4.425
Weld-Pedestal shell-to-baseplate	2.281	29.4	12.887

<sup>†</sup> Note that the dynamic load factor for the lid top plate is negligible and for the lid bottom | plate is 1.06. This dynamic load factor has been incorporated in the above table.

\* For the HI-STORM 100S, this safety factor is conservatively evaluated to be 1.357 because | of increased load on the upper of the two lid plates.

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HI-STORM 100S, Version B Load Case 02.a Evaluation				
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor	
Lid Vent Shield Bending Stress Intensity	13.09	53.91	4.118	
Lid Inner Ring Compression	16.80	35.94	2.139	
Inner Shell Compression	8.180	35.94	4.39	
Outer Shell Compression	2.604	35.94	13.8	
Weld – outer shell-to-baseplate	5.404	29.4	5.44	
Weld – inner shell-to-baseplate	7.183	29.4	4.093	

Applicable analyses are performed for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B for the amplified loads resulting from the vertical drop of a fully loaded cask with the top lid in place.

An assessment of the potential for instability of the compressed inner and outer shells under the compressive loading during the drop event has also been performed. The methodology is from ASME Code Case N-284 (Metal Containment Shell Buckling Design Methods, Division I, Class MC (8/80)). This Code Case has been previously accepted by the NRC as an acceptable method for evaluation of stability in vessels. The results obtained are conservative in that the loading in the shells is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the entire length of the shells. In reality, the component due to the amplified weight of the shell varies from zero at the top of the shell to the maximum value at the base of the shell. It is concluded that large factors of safety exist so that leastic or plastic instability of the inner and outer shells does not provide a limiting condition. The results for the HI-STORM 100 bound similar results for the HI-STORM 100S since the total weight of the same conclusion; namely, that elastic or plastic instability of the inner and outer shells is not a concern under the postulated design basis load cases.

The results do not show any gross regions of stress above the material yield point that would imply the potential for gross deformation of the storage overpack subsequent to the handling accident. MPC stability has been evaluated in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR for a drop event with 60g deceleration and shown to satisfy the Code Case N-284 criteria. Therefore, ready retrievability of the MPC is maintained as well as the continued performance of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack as the primary shielding device.

#### 3.4.4.3.3 <u>HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Stress Calculations</u>

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The structural functions of the transfer cask are stated in Section 3.1. The analyses presented here demonstrate the ability of components of the HI-TRAC transfer cask to perform their structural functions in the transfer mode. Load Cases considered are given in Table 3.1.5.

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The purpose of the analyses is to provide the necessary assurance that there will be no unacceptable release of radioactive material, unacceptable radiation levels, or impairment of ready retrievability.

### 3.4.4.3.3.1 Analysis of Pocket Trunnions (Load Case 01 of Table 3,1.5)

The HI-TRAC 125 and HI-TRAC 100 transfer casks have pocket trunnions attached to the outer shell and to the water jacket. During the rotation of HI-TRAC from horizontal to vertical or vice versa (see Figure 3.4.18), these trunnions serve to define the axis of rotation. The HI-TRAC is also supported by the lifting trunnions during this operation. Two load conditions are considered: Level A when all four trunnions support load during the rotation; and, Level B when the hoist cable is assumed slack so that the entire load is supported by the rotation trunnions. A dynamic amplification of 15% is assumed in both cases appropriate to a low-speed operation. Figure 3.4.23 shows a free body of the trunnion and shows how the applied force and moment are assumed to be resisted by the weld group that connects the trunnion to the outer shell. Drawings 1880 (sheet 10) and 2145 (sheet 10) show the configuration. An optional construction for the HI-TRAC 100 permits the pocket trunnion base to be split to reduce the "envelope" of the HI-TRAC. For that construction, bolts and dowel pins are used to insure that the force and moment applied to the pocket trunnions are transferred properly to the body of the transfer cask. The analysis also evaluates the bolts and dowel pins and demonstrates that safety factors greater than 1.0 exist for bolt loads, dowel bearing and tearout, and dowel shear. Allowable strengths and loads are computed using applicable sections of ASME Section III, Subsection NF.

Unlike the HI-TRAC 125 and the HI-TRAC 100, the HI-TRAC 125D is designed and fabricated without pocket trunnions. An L-shaped rotation frame is used to upend and downend the HI-TRAC 125D, instead of pocket trunnions. Thus, a pocket trunnion analysis is not applicable to the HI-TRAC 125D.

The table below summarizes the results for the HI-TRAC 125 and the HI-TRAC 100:

Pocket Trunnion Weld Evaluation Summary			
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi) <sup>†</sup>	Safety Factor
HI-TRAC 125 Pocket Trunnion-Outer Shell Weld Group Stress	7.979	23.275	2.917
HI-TRAC 125 Pocket Trunnion–Water Jacket Weld Group Stress	5.927	23.275	3.9
HI-TRAC 100 Pocket Trunnion-Outer Shell Weld Group Stress	6.603	23.275	3.525
HI-TRAC 100 Pocket Trunnion-Water Jacket Weld Group Stress	5.244	23.275	4.438
HI-TRAC 100 Pocket Trunnion–Bolt Tension at Optional Split	45.23	50.07	1.107
HI-TRAC 100 Pocket Trunnion-Bearing Stress on Base Surfaces at Dowel	6.497	32.7	5.033
HI-TRAC 100 Pocket Trunnion-Tear-out Stress on Base Surfaces at Dowel	2.978	26.09	8.763
HI-TRAC 100 Pocket Trunnion–Shear Stress on Dowel Cross Section at Optional Split	29.04	37.93	1.306

<sup>†</sup> Allowable stress is reported for the Level B loading, which results in the minimum safety factor.

To provide additional information on the local stress state adjacent to the rotation trunnion, a new finite element analysis is undertaken to provide details on the state of stress in the metal structure surrounding the rotation trunnions for the HI-TRAC 125. The finite element analysis has been based on a model that includes major structural contributors from the water jacket enclosure shell panels, radial channels, end plates, outer and inner shell, and bottom flange. In the finite element analysis, the vertical trunnion load has been oriented in the direction of the HI-TRAC 125 longitudinal axis. The structural model has been confined to the region of the HI-TRAC adjacent to the rotation trunnion block; the extent of the model in the longitudinal direction has been determined by calculating the length of the "bending boundary layer" associated with a classical shell analysis. This was considered to be a sufficient length to capture maximum shell stresses arising from the Level B (off-normal) rotation trunnion loading. The local nature of the stress around the trunnion block is

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clearly demonstrated by the finite element results.

Consistent with the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NF, for Class 3 components, safety factors for primary membrane stress have been computed. Primary stresses are located away from the immediate vicinity of the trunnion; although the NF Code sets no limits on primary plus secondary stresses that arise from the gross structural discontinuity immediately adjacent to the trunnion, these stresses are listed for information. The results are summarized in the table below for | the Level B load distribution for the HI-TRAC 125.

ITEMHI-TRAC 125	CALCULATED VALUE	ALLOWABLE VALUE
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary Stress –Inner Shell)	-0.956	23.275
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress - Inner Shell)	-1.501	23.275
Longitudinal Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress – Outer Shell)	-0.830	23.275
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress - Outer Shell)	-0.436	23.275
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary Stress – Radial Channels)	2.305	23.275
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress - Radial Channels)	-0.631	23.275
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress -Inner Shell)	1.734	No Limit (34.9)*
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Inner Shell)	-1.501	NL
Longitudinal Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Outer Shell)	2.484	NL
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Outer Shell)	-2.973	NL
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Radial Channels)	-13.87	NL
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Radial Channels)	-2.303	NL

\* The NF Code sets no limits (NL) for primary plus secondary stress (see Table 3.1.17). Nevertheless, to demonstrate the robust design with its large margins of safety, we list here, for information only, the allowable value for Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending Stress appropriate to temperatures up to 650 degrees F.

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The only stress of any significance is the longitudinal stress in the radial channels. This stress occurs immediately adjacent to the trunnion block/radial channel interface and by its localized nature is identifiable as a stress arising at the gross structural discontinuity (secondary stress).

The finite element analysis has also been performed for the HI-TRAC 100 transfer cask. The following table summarizes the results:

ITEM -HI-TRAC 100	CALCULATED VALUE	ALLOWABLE VALUE
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary Stress –Inner Shell)	-0.756	23.275
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress - Inner Shell)	-2.157	23.275
Longitudinal Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress – Outer Shell)	-0.726	23.275
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress - Outer Shell)	-0.428	23.275
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary Stress – Radial Channels)	2.411	23.275
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary Stress - Radial Channels)	-0.5305	23.275
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Inner Shell)	2.379	NL
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Inner Shell)	-2.157	NL
Longitudinal Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Outer Shell)	3.150	NL
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Outer Shell)	-3.641	NL
Longitudinal Stress - (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Radial Channels)	-15.51	NL
Tangential Stress (ksi) (Primary plus Secondary Stress - Radial Channels)	-2.294	NL

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The finite element analyses of the metal structure adjacent to the trunnion block did not include the state of stress arising from the water jacket internal pressure. These stresses are conservatively computed based on a two-dimensional strip model that neglects the lower annular plate. The water jacket bending stresses are summarized below:

Tangential Bending Stress in Water Jacket Outer Panel from Water Pressure (including hydrostatic and inertia effects)	Calculated Value (ksi)	
HI-TRAC 125	18.41	
HI-TRAC 100	22.47	

To establish a minimum safety factor for the outer panels of the water jacket for the Level A condition, we must add primary membrane circumferential stress from the trunnion load analysis to primary circumferential bending stress from the water jacket bending stress. Then, the safety factors may be computed by comparison to the allowable limit for primary membrane plus primary bending stress. The following results are obtained:

Results for L	Results for Load Case 01 in Water Jacket (Load Case 01) - Level A Load			
Circumferential	CALCULATED	ALLOWABLE	SAFETY FACTOR	
Stress in Water	VALUE (ksi)	VALUE (ksi)	(allowable	
Jacket Outer			value/calculated	
Enclosure			value)	
HI-TRAC 125	18.797	26.25	1.397	
HI-TRAC 100	22.781	26.25	1.152	

To arrive at minimum safety factors for primary membrane plus bending stress in the outer panel of the water jacket for the Level B condition, we amplify the finite element results the trunnion load analysis, add the appropriate stress from the two-dimensional water jacket calculation, and compare the results to the increased Level B allowable. The following results are obtained:

Results for L	Results for Load Case 01 in Water Jacket (Load Case 01) - Level B Load		
Circumferential Stress in Water Jacket Outer Enclosure	CALCULATED VALUE (ksi)	ALLOWABLE VALUE (ksi)	SAFETY FACTOR (allowable value/calculated value)
HI-TRAC 125	19.041	35.0	1.84
HI-TRAC 100	23.00	35.0	1.52

All safety factors are greater than 1.0; the Level A load condition governs.

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#### 3.4.4.3.3.2 Lead Slump in HI-TRAC 125 - Horizontal Drop Event (Case 02.b in Table 3.1.5)

During a side drop of the HI-TRAC 125 transfer cask, the lead shielding must be shown not to slump and cause significant amounts of shielding to be lost in the top area of the lead annulus. Slumping of the lead is not considered credible in the HI-TRAC transfer cask because of:

- a. the shape of the interacting surfaces
- b. the ovalization of the shell walls under impact
- c. the high coefficient of friction between lead and steel
- d. The inertia force from the MPC inside the HI-TRAC will compress the inner shell at the impact location and locally "pinch" the annulus that contains the lead; this opposes the tendency for the lead to slump and open up the annulus at the impact location.

Direct contact of the outer shell of the HI-TRAC with the ISFSI pad is not credible since there is a water jacket that surrounds the outer shell. The water jacket metal shell will experience most of the direct impact. Nevertheless, to conservatively analyze the lead slump scenario, it is assumed that there is no water jacket, the impact occurs far from either end of the HI-TRAC so as to ignore any strengthening of the structure due to end effects, the impact occurs directly on the outer shell of the HI-TRAC, and the contact force between HI-TRAC and the MPC is ignored. All of these assumptions are conservative in that their imposition magnifies any tendency for the lead to slump.

To confirm that lead slump is not credible, a finite element analysis of the lead slump problem, incorporating the conservatisms listed above, during a postulated HI-TRAC 125 horizontal drop (see Figure 3.4.22) is carried out. The HI-TRAC 125 cask body modeled consists only of an inner steel shell, an outer steel shell, and a thick lead annulus shield contained between the inner and outer shell. A unit length of HI-TRAC is modeled and the contact at the lead/steel interface is modeled as a compression-only interface. Interface frictional forces are conservatively neglected. As the HI-TRAC 125 has a greater lead thickness, analysis of the HI-TRAC 125 is considered to bound the HI-TRAC 100. Furthermore, since there are no differences between the HI-TRAC 125 and the HI-TRAC 125D with respect to the finite element model, the results are valid for both 125-Ton transfer casks.

The analysis is performed in two parts:

First, to maximize the potential for lead/steel separation, the shells are ignored and the gap elements grounded. This has the same effect as assuming the shells to be rigid and maximizes the potential and magnitude of any separation at the lead/steel interface (and subsequent slump). This also maximizes the contact forces at the portion of the interface that continues to have compression forces developed. The lead annulus is subjected to a 45g deceleration and the deformation, stress field, and interface force solution developed. This solution establishes a conservative result for the movement of the lead relative to the metal shells.

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In the second part of the analysis, the lead is removed and replaced by the conservative (high) interface forces from the first part of the analysis. These interface forces, together with the 45g deceleration-induced inertia forces from the shell self weight are used to obtain a solution for the stress and deformation field in the inner and outer metal shells.

The results of the analysis are as follows:

- a. The maximum predicted lead slump at a location 180 degrees from the impact point is 0.1". This gap decreases gradually to 0.0" after approximately 25 degrees from the vertical axis. The decrease in the diameter of the inner shell of the transfer cask (in the direction of the deceleration) is approximately 0.00054". This demonstrates that ovalization of the HI-TRAC shells does not occur. Therefore, the lead shielding deformation is confined to a local region with negligible deformation of the confining shells.
- b. The stress intensity distribution in the shells demonstrates that high stresses are concentrated, as anticipated, only near the assumed point of impact with the ISFSI pad. The value of the maximum stress intensity (51,000 psi) remains below the allowable stress intensity for primary membrane plus primary bending for a Level D event (58,700 psi). Thus, the steel shells continue to perform their function and contain the lead. The stress distribution, obtained using the conservatively large interface forces, demonstrates that permanent deformation could occur only in a localized region near the impact point. Since the "real" problem precludes direct impact with the outer shell, the predicted local yielding is simply a result of the conservatisms imposed in the model.

It is concluded that a finite element analysis of the lead slump under a 45g deceleration in a side drop clearly indicates that there is no appreciable change in configuration of the lead shielding and no overstress of the metal shell structure. Therefore, retrievability of the MPC is not compromised and the HI-TRAC transfer cask continues to provide shielding.

## 3.4.4.3.3.3 <u>HI-TRAC Lid Stress Analysis During HI-TRAC Drop Accident (Load Case 02.b in</u> <u>Table 3.1.5)</u>

The stress in the HI-TRAC 125 transfer lid is analyzed when the lid is subject to the deceleration loads of a side drop Figure 3.4.22 is a sketch of the scenario. The analysis shows that the cask body, under a deceleration of 45g's, will not separate from the transfer lid during the postulated side drop. This event is considered a Level D event in the ASME parlance.

The bolts that act as doorstops to prevent opening of the doors are also checked for their load capacity. It is required that sufficient shear capacity exists to prevent both doors from opening and exposing the MPC.

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The only difference between the HI-TRAC 100 and the HI-TRAC 125 transfer lid doors is that the HI-TRAC 100 has less lead and has no middle steel plate. A similar analysis of the HI-TRAC 100 shows that all safety factors are greater than 1.0. The table given below summarizes the results for both units:

Transfer Lid Attachment Integrity Under Side Drop			
Item – Shear Capacity	Value (kip) or (ksi)	Capacity (kip) or (ksi)	Safety Factor= Capacity/Value
HI-TRAC 125 Attachment (kip)	1,272.0	1,770.0	1.392
HI-TRAC 125 Door Lock Bolts (ksi)	20.24	48.3	2.387
HI-TRAC 100 Attachment (kip)	1,129.0	1,729.0	1.532
HI-TRAC 100 Door Lock Bolts (ksi)	13.81	48.3	3.497

All safety factors are greater than 1.0 and are based on actual interface loads. For the HI-TRAC 125 and the HI-TRAC 100, the interface load (primary impact at transfer lid) computed from the handling accident analysis is bounded by the values given below:

BOUNDING INTERFACE LOADS COMPUTED FROM HANDLING ACCIDENT ANALYSES		
Item Bounding Value from Appendix 3.AN (kip)		
HI-TRAC 125	1,300	
HI-TRAC 100 1,150		

The HI-TRAC 125D transfer cask does not utilize a transfer lid. Instead, the MPC is transferred to or from a storage overpack using the HI-TRAC pool lid and a special mating device. Therefore, an analysis is performed to demonstrate that the pool lid will not separate from the cask body during the postulated side drop. The results of this analysis are summarized in the following table.

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HI-TRAC 125D Pool Lid Attachment Integrity Under Side Drop			
Item	Calculated Value	Allowable Limit	Safety Factor
Lateral Shear Force (kips)	562.5	1083	1.925
Maximum Bolt Tensile Stress (ksi)	11.41	116.4	10.20
Combined Tension and Shear Interaction	0.279	1.00	3.58

### 3.4.4.3.3.4 Stress Analysis of the HI-TRAC Water Jacket (Load Case 03 in Table 3.1.5)

The water jacket is assumed subject to internal pressure from pressurized water and gravity water head. Calculations are performed for the HI-TRAC 125, the HI-TRAC 125D, and the HI-TRAC 100 to determine the water jacket s tress under internal pressure plus hydrostatic load. R esults are obtained for the water jacket configuration and the connecting welds for all HI-TRAC transfer casks. The table below summarizes the results of the analyses.

Water Jacket Stress Evaluation			
Item	Value (ksi)	Allowable (ksi)	Safety Factor
HI-TRAC 125 Water Jacket Enclosure Shell Panel Bending Stress	18.41	26.25	1.426
HI-TRAC 100 Water Jacket Enclosure Shell Panel Bending Stress	22.47	26.25	1.168
HI-TRAC 125 Water Jacket Bottom Flange Bending Stress	18.3	26.25	1.434
HI-TRAC 100 Water Jacket Bottom Flange Bending Stress	16.92	26.25	1.551
HI-TRAC 125 Weld Stress - Enclosure Panel Single Fillet Weld	2.22	21.0	9.454
HI-TRAC 100 Weld Stress – Enclosure Panel Single Fillet Weld	1.841	21.0	11.408
HI-TRAC 125 Weld Stress – Bottom Flange to Outer Shell Double Fillet Weld	14.79	21.0	1.42
HI-TRAC 125 - Enclosure Panel Direct Stress	1.571	17.5	11.142
HI-TRAC 100 - Enclosure Panel Direct Stress	1.736	17.5	10.84
HI-TRAC 125D Water Jacket Bottom Flange Bending Stress	18.88	26.25	1.39
HI-TRAC 125D Water Jacket Enclosure Shell Panel Bending Stress	10.80	26.25	2.43
HI-TRAC 125D Weld Stress – Enclosure Panel to Radial Rib Plug Welds	1.093	17.5	16.01
HI-TRAC 125D Weld Stress – Bottom Flange to Outer Shell Single Fillet Weld	3.133	21.0	6.70

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### 3.4.4.3.3.5 <u>HI-TRAC Top Lid Separation (Load Case 02.b in Table 3.1.5)</u>

The potential of top lid separation under a 45g deceleration side drop event requires evaluation. It is concluded by analysis that the connection provides acceptable protection against top lid separation. It is also shown that the bolts and the lid contain the MPC within the HI-TRAC cavity during and after a drop event. The results from the HI-TRAC 125 bound the corresponding results from the HI-TRAC 100 because the top lid bolts are identical in the two units and the HI-TRAC 125 top lid weighs more. The analysis also bounds the HI-TRAC 125D because the postulated side drop of the HI-TRAC 125, during which the transfer lid impacts the target surface, produces a larger interface load between the MPC and the top lid of the HI-TRAC than the nearly horizontal drop of the HI-TRAC 125D. The table below provides the results of the bounding analysis.

HI-TRAC Top Lid Separation Analysis			
Item	Value	Capacity	Safety Factor= Capacity/Value
Attachment Shear Force (lb.)	123,750	957,619	7.738
Tensile Force in Stud (lb.)	132,000	1,117,222	8.464
Bending Stress in Lid (ksi)	35.56	58.7	1.65
Shear Load per unit Circumferential Length in Lid (lb./in)	533.5	29,400	55.10

#### 3.4.4.4 <u>Comparison with Allowable Stresses</u>

Consistent with the formatting guidelines of Reg. Guide 3.61, calculated stresses and stress intensities from the finite element and other analyses are compared with the allowable stresses and stress intensities defined in Subsection 3.1.2.2 per the applicable sections of [3.4.2] and [3.4.4] for defined normal and off-normal events and [3.4.3] for accident events (Appendix F).

### 3.4.4.4.1 <u>MPC</u>

Table 3.4.6 provides summary data extracted from the numerical analysis results for the fuel basket, enclosure vessel, and fuel basket supports based on the design basis deceleration. The results presented in Table 3.4.6 do not include any dynamic amplification due to internal elasticity of the structure (i.e., local inertia effects). Calculations suggest that a uniform conservative dynamic amplifier would be 1.08 independent of the duration of impact. If we recognize that the tip-over event for HI-STORM 100 is a long duration event, then a dynamic amplifier of 1.04 is appropriate. The summary data provided in Table 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 gives the lowest safety factor computed for the fuel basket and for the MPC, respectively. Safety factors reported for the MPC shell in Table 3.4.4 are based on allowable strengths at 500 deg. F. Modification of the fuel basket safety factor for

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dynamic amplification leaves considerable margin. Factors of safety greater than 1 indicate that calculated results are less than the allowable strengths.

A perusal of the results in Tables 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 under different load combinations for the fuel basket and the enclosure vessel reveals that all factors of safety are above 1.0 even if we use the most conservative value for dynamic amplification factor. The relatively modest factor of safety in the fuel basket under side drop events (Load Case F3.b and F3.c) in Table 3.4.3 warrants further explanation since a very conservative finite element model of the structure has been utilized in the analysis.

The wall thickness of the storage cells, which is by far the most significant variable in a fuel basket's structural strength, is significantly greater in the MPCs than in comparable fuel baskets licensed in the past. For example, the cell wall thickness in the TN-32 basket (Docket No. 72-1021, M-56), is 0.1 inch and that in the NAC-STC basket (Docket No. 71-7235) is 0.048 inch. In contrast, the cell wall thickness in the MPC-68 is 0.25 inch. In spite of their relatively high flexural rigidities, computed margins in the fuel baskets are rather modest. This is because of some assumptions in the analysis that lead to an overstatement of the state of stress in the fuel basket. For example:

- i. The section properties of longitudinal fillet welds that attach contiguous cell walls to each other are completely neglected in the finite element model (Figure 3.4.7). The fillet welds strengthen the cell wall section modulus at the very locations where maximum stresses develop.
- ii. The radial gaps at the fuel basket-MPC shell and at the MPC shell-storage overpack interface are explicitly modeled. As the applied loading is incrementally increased, the MPC shell and fuel basket deform until a "rigid" backing surface of the storage overpack is contacted, making further unlimited deformation under lateral loading impossible. Therefore, some portion of the fuel basket and enclosure vessel (EV) stress has the characteristics of secondary stresses (which by definition, are selflimited by deformation in the structure to achieve compatibility). For conservativeness in the incremental analysis, we make no distinction between deformation controlled (secondary) stress and load controlled (primary) stress in the stress categorization of the MPC-24, 32, and 68 fuel baskets. We treat all stresses, regardless of their origin, as primary stresses. Such a conservative interpretation of the Code has a direct (adverse) effect on the computed safety factors. As noted earlier, the results for the MPC-24E are properly based only on primary stresses to illustrate the conservatism in the reporting of results for the MPC-24, 32, and 68 baskets.
- iii. A uniform pressure simulates the SNF inertia loading on the cell panels, which is a most conservative approach for incorporating the SNF/cell wall structure interaction.

The above assumptions act to depress the computed values of factors of safety in the fuel basket finite element analysis and render conservative results.

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The reported factors of safety do not include the effect of dynamic load amplifiers. The duration of impact and the predominant natural frequency of the basket panels under drop events result in the dynamic load factors that do not exceed 1.08. Therefore, since all reported factors of safety are greater than the DLF, the MPC is structurally adequate for its intended functions.

Tables 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 report stress intensities and safety factors for the confinement boundary subject to internal pressure alone and internal pressure plus the normal operating condition temperature with the most severe thermal gradient. The final values for safety factors in the various locations of the confinement boundary provide assurance that the MPC enclosure vessel is a robust pressure vessel.

## 3.4.4.4.2 Storage Overpack and HI-TRAC

The result from analyses of the storage overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask is shown in Table 3.4.5. The location of each result is indicated in the table. Safety factors for lifting operations where three times the lifted load is applied are reported in Section 3.4.3.

The table shows that all allowable stresses are much greater than their associated calculated stresses and that safety factors are above the limit of 1.0.

## 3.4.4.5 Elastic Stability Considerations

### 3.4.4.5.1 <u>MPC Elastic Stability</u>

Stability calculations for the MPC have been carried out in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR, Docket Number 72-1008. Using identical methodology with input loads and decelerations appropriate to the HI-STORM, safety factors > 1.0 are obtained for all relevant load cases. Note that for HI-STORM, the design external pressure differential is reduced to 0.0 psi, and the peak deceleration under accident events is reduced from 60g's (HI-STAR) to 45g's.

### 3.4.4.5.2 <u>HI-STORM 100 Storage Overpack Elastic Stability</u>

HI-STORM 100 (and 100S and the 100S Version B) storage overpack shell buckling is not a credible scenario since the two steel shells plus the entire radial shielding act to resist vertical compressive loading. Subsection 3.4.4.3.2.3 develops values for compressive stress in the steel shells of the storage overpack. Because of the low value for compressive stress coupled with the fact that the concrete shielding backs the steel shells, we can conclude that instability is unlikely. Note that the entire weight of the storage overpack can also be supported by the concrete shielding acting in compression. Therefore, in the unlikely event that a stability limit in the steel was approached, the load would simply shift to the massive concrete shielding. Notwithstanding the above comments, stability analyses of the storage overpack have been performed for bounding cases of longitudinal compressive stress with nominal circumferential compressive stress. This latter case is for a bounding all-around external pressure on the HI-STORM 100 outer shell. The latter case is listed as Load Case 05 in Table 3.1.5 and is performed to demonstrate that explosions or other environmental

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events that could lead to an all-around external pressure on the outer shell do not cause a buckling instability. ASME Code Case N-284, a methodology accepted by the NRC, has been used for this analysis. The storage overpack shells for the HI-STORM 100 are examined individually assuming that the four radial plates provide circumferential support against a buckling deformation mode. The analysis of the storage overpack outer shell for a bounding external pressure of

#### $p_{ext} = 30 psi$

together with a nominal compressive axial load that bounds the dead weight load at the base of the outer shell, gives a safety factor against an instability of:

Safety Factor = 
$$(1/0.466) \times 1.34 = 2.88$$

The factor 1.34 is included in the above result since the analysis methodology of Code Case N-284 builds in this factor for a stability analysis for an accident condition. The suite of stability analyses have also been performed for the HI-STORM 100S Version B. No credit is taken for any support provided by the concrete shielding and the effect of support by radial ribs is conservatively neglected (since the ribs in the HI-STORM 100S Version B do not extend the full height of the overpack. It is shown that the safety factor computed for the classic HI-STORM 100 is a lower bound for all of the HI-STORM 100S versions.

The external pressure for the overpack stability considered here significantly bounds the short-time 10-psi differential pressure (between outer shell and internal annulus) specified in Table 2.2.1.

The same postulated external pressure condition can also act on the HI-TRAC during movement from the plant to the ISFSI pad. In this case, the lead shielding acts as a backing for the outer shell of the HI-TRAC transfer cask just as the concrete does for the storage overpack. The water jacket metal structure provides considerable additional structural support to the extent that it is reasonable to state that instability under external pressure is not credible. If it is assumed that the all-around water jacket support is equivalent to the four locations of radial support provided in the storage overpack, then it is clear that the instability result for the storage overpack bounds the results for the HI-TRAC transfer cask. This occurs because the R/t ratio (mean radius-to-wall thickness) of the HI-TRAC outer shell is less than the corresponding ratio for the HI-STORM storage overpack. Therefore, no HI-TRAC analysis is performed.

#### 3.4.5 <u>Cold</u>

A discussion of the resistance to failure due to brittle fracture is provided in Subsection 3.1.2.3.

The value of the ambient temperature has two principal effects on the HI-STORM 100 System, namely:

i. The steady-state temperature of all material points in the cask system will go up or down by the amount of change in the ambient temperature.

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ii. As the ambient temperature drops, the absolute temperature of the contained helium will drop accordingly, producing a proportional reduction in the internal pressure in accordance with the Ideal Gas Law.

In other words, the temperature gradients in the system under steady-state conditions will remain the same regardless of the value of the ambient temperature. The internal pressure, on the other hand, will decline with the lowering of the ambient temperature. Since the stresses under normal storage condition arise principally from pressure and thermal gradients, it follows that the stress field in the MPC under -40 degree F ambient would be smaller than the "heat" condition of storage, treated in the preceding subsection. Additionally, the allowable stress limits tend to increase as the component temperatures decrease.

Therefore, the stress margins computed in Section 3.4.4 can be conservatively assumed to apply to the "cold" condition as well.

Finally, it can be readily shown that the HI-STORM 100 System is engineered to withstand "cold" temperatures (-40 degrees F), as set forth in the Technical Specification, without impairment of its storage function.

Unlike the MPC, the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is an open structure; it contains no pressure. Its stress field is unaffected by the ambient temperature, unless low temperatures produce brittle fracture due to the small stresses which develop from self-weight of the structure and from the minute difference in the thermal expansion coefficients in the constituent parts of the equipment (steel and concrete). To prevent brittle fracture, all steel material in HI-STORM 100 is qualified by impact testing as set forth in the ASME Code (Table 3.1.18).

The structural material used in the MPC (Alloy X) is recognized to be completely immune from brittle fracture in the ASME Codes.

As no liquids are included in the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack design, loads due to expansion of freezing liquids are not considered. The HI-TRAC transfer cask utilizes demineralized water in the water jacket. However, the specified lowest service temperature for the HI-TRAC is 0 degrees F and a 25% ethylene glycol solution is required for the temperatures from 0 degrees F to 32 degrees F. Therefore, loads due to expansion of freezing liquids are not considered.

There is one condition, however, that does require examination to insure ready retrievability of the fuel. Under a postulated loading of an MPC from a HI-TRAC transfer cask into a cold HI-STORM 100 storage overpack, it must be demonstrated that sufficient clearances are available to preclude interference when the "hot" MPC is inserted into a "cold" storage overpack. To this end, a bounding analysis for free thermal expansions has been performed in Subsection 4.4.5, wherein the MPC shell is postulated at its maximum design basis temperature and the thermal expansion of the overpack is ignored. The results from the evaluation of free thermal expansion are summarized in Subsection 4.4.5. The final radial clearance (greater than 0.25" radial) is sufficient to preclude jamming of the MPC upon insertion into a cold HI-STORM 100 storage overpack.

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## 3.4.6 <u>HI-STORM 100 Kinematic Stability under Flood Condition (Load Case A in Table</u> 3.1.1)

The flood condition subjects the HI-STORM 100 System to external pressure, together with a horizontal load due to water velocity. Because the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is equipped with ventilation openings, the hydrostatic pressure from flood submergence acts only on the MPC. As stated in subsection 3.1.2.1.1.3, the design external pressure for the MPC bounds the hydrostatic pressure from flood submergence. Subsection 3.4.4.5.2 has reported a positive safety factor against instability from external pressure in excess of that expected from a complete submergence in a flood. The analysis performed below is also valid for the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S, Version B.

The water velocity associated with flood produces a horizontal drag force, which may act to cause sliding or tip-over. In accordance with the provisions of ANSI/ANS 57.9, the acceptable upper bound flood velocity, V, must provide a minimum factor of safety of 1.1 against overturning and sliding. For HI-STORM 100, we set the upper bound flood velocity design basis at 15 feet/sec. Subsequent calculations conservatively assume that the flow velocity is uniform over the height of the storage overpack.

The overturning horizontal force, F, due to hydraulic drag, is given by the classical formula:

$$F = Cd A V^*$$

where:

V<sup>•</sup> is the velocity head =  $\frac{\rho V^2}{2g}$ ; ( $\rho$  is water weight density, and g is acceleration due to gravity)

to gravity).

- A: projected area of the HI-STORM 100 cylinder perpendicular to the fluid velocity vector.
- Cd: drag coefficient

The value of Cd for flow past a cylinder at Reynolds number above 5E+05 is given as 0.5 in the literature (viz. Hoerner, Fluid Dynamics, 1965).

The drag force tending to cause HI-STORM 100's sliding is opposed by the friction force, which is given by

 $F_f = \mu K W$ 

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where:

- $\mu$  = limiting value of the friction coefficient at the HI-STORM 100/ISFSI pad interface (conservatively taken as 0.25, although literature citations give higher values).
- K = buoyancy coefficient (documented in HI-981928, Structural Calculation Package for HI-STORM 100 (see citation in Subsection 3.6.4).
- W: Minimum weight of HI-STORM 100 with an empty MPC.

## Sliding Factor of Safety

The factor of safety against sliding,  $\beta_1$ , is given by

$$\beta_{\rm I} = \frac{\rm F_f}{\rm F} = \frac{\mu \rm KW}{\rm Cd \, A \, V^{*}}$$

It is apparent from the above equation,  $\beta$ , will be minimized if the empty weight of HI-STORM 100 is used in the above equation.

As stated previously,  $\mu$ = 0.25, Cd = 0.5.

V<sup>\*</sup> corresponding to 15 ft./sec. water velocity is 218.01 lb per sq. ft.

A = length x diameter of HI-STORM 100 = 132.5" x 231.25"/144 sq. in./sq.ft. = 212.78 sq. ft.

K = buoyancy factor = 0.64 (per calculations in HI-981928)

W = empty weight of overpack w/ lid = 270,000 lbs. (Table 3.2.1)

Substituting in the above formula for  $\beta$ , we have

 $\beta_1 = 1.86 > 1.1$  (required)

Since the weight of the HI-STORM 100S or HI-STORM 100S, Version B, plus the weight of an empty MPC-32 (i.e., the lightest MPC) is greater than 270,000 lb, the above calculation is also valid for these two units for the entire range of concrete densities.

### **Overturning Factor of Safety**

For determining the margin of safety against overturning  $\beta_2$ , the cask is assumed to pivot about a fixed point located at the outer edge of the contact circle at the interface between HI-STORM 100 and the ISFSI. The overturning moment due to a force  $F_T$  applied at height H<sup>\*</sup> is balanced by a restoring moment from the reaction to the cask buoyant force KW acting at radius D/2.

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$$F_{T} H^{\bullet} = KW \frac{D}{2}$$
$$F_{T} = \frac{KWD}{2H^{\bullet}}$$

W is the empty weight of the storage overpack.

We have,

W = 270,000 lb. (Table 3.2.1)

 $H^* = 119.2"$  (maximum height of mass center per Table 3.2.3)

D = 132.5" (Holtec Drawing 1495)

K = 0.64 (calculated in HI-981928)

 $F_{T} = 96,040 \text{ lb.}$ 

 $F_T$  is the horizontal drag force at incipient tip-over.

 $F = Cd A V^* = 23,194$  lbs. (drag force at 15 feet/sec)

The safety factor against overturning,  $\beta_2$ , is given as:

$$\beta_2 = \frac{F_T}{F} = 4.14 > 1.1$$
 (required)

This result bounds the result for the HI-STORM 100S, for the HI-STORM 100S Version B, as well as for the densified concrete shielding option, since the calculation uses a conservative lower bound weight and a bounding height for the center of gravity.

In the next subsection, results are presented to show that the load F (equivalent to an inertial deceleration of F/360,000 lb = 0.0644 g's applied to the loaded storage overpack) does not lead to large global circumferential stress or ovalization of the storage overpack that could prevent ready retrievability of the MPC. It is shown in Subsection 3.4.7 that a horizontal load equivalent to 0.47g's does not lead to circumferential stress levels and ovalization of the HI-STORM storage overpack to prevent ready retrievability of the MPC. The load used for that calculation clearly bounds the side load induced by flood.

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# 3.4.7 Seismic Event and Explosion - HI-STORM 100

#### 3.4.7.1 Seismic Event (Load Case C in Table 3.1.1)

#### **Overturning Analysis**

The HI-STORM 100 System plus its contents may be assumed to be subject to a seismic event consisting of three orthogonal statistically independent acceleration time-histories. For the purpose of performing a conservative analysis to determine the maximum ZPA that will not cause incipient tipping, the HI-STORM 100 System is considered as a rigid body subject to a net horizontal quasi-static inertia force and a vertical quasi-static inertia force. This is consistent with the approach used in previously licensed dockets. The vertical seismic load is conservatively assumed to act in the most unfavorable direction (upwards) at the same instant. The vertical seismic load is assumed to be equal to or less than the net horizontal load with  $\varepsilon$  being the ratio of vertical component to one of the horizontal components. For use in calculations, define  $D_{BASE}$  as the contact patch diameter, and  $H_{CG}$  as the height of the centroid of an empty HI-STORM 100 System (no fuel). Conservatively, assume

D<sub>BASE</sub> = 132.5" (Drawing 1495, Sheet 1 specifies 133.875" including overhang for welding)

Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 give HI-STORM 100 weight data and center-of-gravity heights.

The weights and center-of-gravity heights are reproduced here for calculation of the composite center-of-gravity height of the storage overpack together with an empty MPC.

Weight (pounds)	C.G. Height (Inches); H
Overpack - $W_0 = 270,000$	116.8
MPC-24 - $W_{24} = 42,000$	$109.0 + 24 = 133.0^{\dagger}$
MPC-68 - $W_{68} = 39,000$	111.5 + 24 = 135.5
MPC-32 - $W_{32} = 36,000$	113.2 + 24 = 137.2
MPC-24E - $W_{24E} = 45,000$	108.9 + 24 = 132.9

The height of the composite centroid,  $H_{CG}$ , is determined from the equation

 $H_{cg} = \frac{W_o \times 116.8 + W_{MPC} \times H}{W_o + W_{MPC}}$ 

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From Table 3.2.3, it is noted that MPC C.G. heights are measured from the base of the MPC. Therefore, the thickness of the overpack baseplate and the concrete MPC pedestal must be added to determine the height above ground.

Performing the calculations for all of the MPCs gives the following results:

### H<sub>cg</sub> (inches)

MPC-24 with storage overpack	118.98
MPC-68 with storage overpack	119.16
MPC-32 with storage overpack	119.20
MPC-24E with storage overpack	119.10

A conservative overturning stability limit is achieved by using the largest value of  $H_{CG}$  (call it H) from the above. Because the HI-STORM 100 System is a radially symmetric structure, the two horizontal seismic accelerations can be combined vectorially and applied as an overturning force at the C.G. of the cask. The net overturning static moment is

#### WG<sub>H</sub>H

where W is the total system weight and  $G_H$  is the resultant zero period acceleration seismic loading (vectorial sum of two orthogonal seismic loads) so that WG<sub>H</sub> is the inertia load due to the resultant horizontal acceleration. The overturning moment is balanced by a vertical reaction force, acting at the outermost contact patch radial location  $r = D_{BASE}/2$ . The resistive moment is minimized when the vertical zero period acceleration  $G_V$  tends to reduce the apparent weight of the cask. At that instant, the moment that resists "incipient tipping" is:

#### W (1-G<sub>V</sub>) r

Performing a static moment balance and eliminating W results in the following inequality to ensure a "no-overturning condition:

$$\mathbf{G}_{\mathrm{H}} + \frac{\mathbf{r}}{\mathrm{H}} \mathbf{G}_{\mathrm{V}} \le \frac{\mathbf{r}}{\mathrm{H}}$$

Using the values of r and H for the HI-STORM 100 (r = 66.25", H = 119.20"), representative combinations of G<sub>H</sub> and G<sub>V</sub> that satisfy the limiting equality relation are computed and tabulated below:

Acceptable Net Horizontal G-Level (HI-STORM100), G <sub>11</sub>	Acceptable Vertical G-Level, Gv	
0.467	0.16	
0.445	0.20	
0.417	0.25	
0.357	0.357	

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We repeat the above computations using the weight and c.g. location of the HI-STORM 100S(232). Because of the lowered center of gravity positions, the maximum net horizontal "G" levels are slightly increased.

Performing the calculations for all of the MPCs gives the following results:

#### H<sub>cg</sub> (inches)

MPC-24 with storage overpack	113.89
MPC-68 with storage overpack	114.07
MPC-32 with storage overpack	114.11
MPC-24E with storage overpack	114.01

Using the values of r and H for the HI-STORM 100S(232) (r = 66.25", H = 114.11"), representative combinations of  $G_H$  and  $G_V$  that satisfy the limiting equality relation are computed and tabulated below:

Acceptable Net Horizontal G-Level (HI-STORM 100S(232)), G <sub>H</sub>	Acceptable Vertical G-Level, Gv
0.488	0.16
0.464	0.20
0.435	0.25
0.367	0.367

The limiting values of  $G_H$  and  $G_V$  for the HI-STORM 100S(243), which is taller than the HI-STORM 100S(232), are the same as the HI-STORM 100.

If the HI-STORM 100 or the HI-STORM 100S is fabricated using high density concrete (i.e., above 160.8 pcf dry), the C.G. height of the overpack decreases and thereby enables the cask system to withstand higher g-loads. This conclusion becomes immediately clear when the maximum acceptable vertical g-level is expressed in the following form:

$$G_v = 1 - \frac{H}{r}G_H$$

For fixed values of  $G_H$  and r, the value of  $G_V$  increases as H decreases. Therefore, the representative combinations of  $G_H$  and  $G_V$  given above for the HI-STORM 100 and the HI-STORM 100S are conservative for the densified concrete shielding option.

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Since the HI-STORM 100S, Version B has further reduced the centroid of the loaded units, it is expected that acceptable G-Levels are further increased. The following calculations provide the limiting G-level combinations for the HI-STORM 100S Version B with standard weight concrete. As noted previously, the result for standard weight concrete will bound the corresponding result for the high density concrete (densified) shielding option.

We repeat the above computations using the weight and c.g. location of the HI-STORM 100S(218). Because of the lowered center of gravity positions, the maximum net horizontal "G" levels are slightly increased.

Performing the calculations for all of the MPCs gives the following results:

H<sub>cg</sub> (inches)

MPC-24 with storage overpack	109.88
MPC-68 with storage overpack	110.12
MPC-32 with storage overpack	110.23
MPC-24E with storage overpack	109.93

Using the values of r and H for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B(218) (r = 66.25", H = 110.23"), representative combinations of G<sub>H</sub> and G<sub>V</sub> that satisfy the limiting equality relation are computed and tabulated below:

Acceptable Net Horizontal G-Level (HI-STORM 100S, Version B(218)), G <sub>H</sub>	Acceptable Vertical G-Level, G <sub>v</sub>
0.505	0.16
0.481	0.20
0.451	0.25
0.376	0.375

The limiting values of  $G_{\rm H}$  and  $G_{\rm V}$  for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B(229), which is taller than the HI-STORM 100S, Version B(218), are bounded by the values listed for the HI-STORM 100.

#### <u>Primary Stresses in the HI-STORM 100 Structure Under Net Lateral Load Over 180 degrees of</u> the Periphery

Under a lateral loading, the storage overpack will experience axial primary membrane stress in the inner and outer shells as it resists bending as a "beam-like" structure. Under the same kind of lateral loading over one-half of the periphery of the cylinder, the shells will tend to ovalize under the loading and develop circumferential stress. Calculations for stresses in both the axial and circumferential direction are required to demonstrate satisfaction of the Level D structural integrity

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requirements and to provide confidence that the MPC will be readily removable after a seismic event, if necessary. An assessment of the stress state in the structure under the seismic induced load will be shown to bound the results for any other condition that induces a peripheral load around part of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack perimeter. The specific analyses are performed using the geometry and loading for the HI-STORM 100; the results obtained for stress levels and the safety assessment are also applicable to an assessment of the HI-STORM 100S.

A simplified calculation to assess the flexural bending stress in the HI-STORM 100 structure under the limiting seismic event (at which tipping is incipient) is presented in the following:

A representative net horizontal acceleration of 0.47g is used to determine the primary stresses in the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack. The corresponding lateral seismic load, F, is given by

$$F = 0.47 W$$

This load will be maximized if the upper bound HI-STORM 100 weight (W = 410,000 lbs. (Table 3.2.1)) is used. Accordingly,

$$F = (0.47) (410,000) = 192,700$$
 lbs.

No dynamic amplification is assumed as the overpack, considered as a beam, has a natural frequency well into the rigid range.

The moment, M, at the base of the HI-STORM 100 due to this lateral force is given by

$$M = \frac{FH}{2}$$

where H = height of HI-STORM 100 (taken conservatively as 235 inches). Note that the loading has now been approximated as a uniform load acting over the full height of the cask.

The flexural stress,  $\sigma$ , is given by the ratio of the moment M to the section modulus of the steel shell structure, z, which is computed to be 12,640 in<sup>3</sup> for the HI-STORM 100 overpack with inner and outer shell thicknesses of 1-1/4" and 3/4", respectively. The use of this value is conservative since the steel section modulus associated with the optional 1" thick inner and outer shell design is slightly higher.

Therefore,

 $\sigma = \frac{(192,700)(235)}{(12,640)(2)} = 1,791 \, \text{psi}$ 

We note that the strength of concrete has been neglected in the above calculation.

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The maximum axial stress in the storage overpack shell will occur on the "compressive" side where the flexural bending stress algebraically sums with the direct compression stress  $\sigma_d$  from vertical compression.

From the representative acceleration tables, the vertical seismic accelerations corresponding to the net 0.47g horizontal acceleration is below 0.25g.

Therefore, using the maximum storage overpack weight (bounded by 410,000 lbs. from data in Table 3.2.1)

 $\sigma_{d} = \frac{(410,000)(1.25)}{554.47} = 924 \text{ psi}$ 

where 554.47 sq. inch is the metal area (cross section) of the steel structure in the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack as computed in Subsection 3.4.4.3.2.1. The total axial stress, therefore, is

 $\sigma_{\tau} = 1,791 + 924 = 2,715 \text{ psi}$ 

Per Table 3.1.12, the allowable membrane stress intensity for a Level D event is 39,750 psi at 350 degrees F.

The Factor of Safety,  $\beta$ , is, therefore

$$\beta = \frac{39,750}{2,715} = 14.6$$

Examination of the stability calculations for the overpack outer shell under a 45-g vertical end drop demonstrates that no instability will result from this compressive load induced by a seismic or other environmental load leading to bending of the storage overpack as a beam.

The previous calculation has focused on the axial stress in the members developed assuming that the storage overpack does not overturn but resists the lateral load by remaining in contact with the ground and bending like a beam. Since the lateral loading is only over a portion of the periphery, there is also the potential for this load to develop circumferential stress in the inner and outer shells to resist ovalization of the shells. To demonstrate continued retrievability of the MPC after a seismic event, it must be shown that either the stresses remain in the elastic range or that any permanent deformation that develops due to plasticity does not intrude into the MPC envelope after the event is ended. In the following subsection, classical formulas for the deformation of rings under specified surface loadings are used to provide a conservative solution for the circumferential stresses in the HI-STORM 100. Specifically, the solution for a point-supported ring subject to a gravitational induced load, as depicted in the sketch below, is implemented. This solution provides a conservative estimate of the circumferential stress and the deformation of the ring that will develop under the actual applied seismic load.

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Ring supported at base and loaded by its own weight, w, given per unit circumferential length.



The solution considers the geometry and load appropriate to a unit length of the inner and outer shells of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack with a total weight equal to the overpack bounding weight (no MPC) subject to a 45g deceleration inertial loading. The numerical results for the 45g tipover event can be directly applied here by multiplying by the factor "X", where "X" reflects the differences in the deceleration and the weights used for the tipover event and for the seismic load case here in this subsection.

 $X = (0.47g/45g) \times (410,0001b./270,0001b.) = 0.0159$ 

Using this factor on the tipover solution gives the following bounding results for maximum stresses (without regard for sign and location of the stress) and deformations:

Maximum circumferential stress due to bending moment = (29,310 psi x X) = 466 psi

Maximum circumferential stress due to mean tangential force =  $(18,900 \text{ lb./2 sq.inch}) \times X = 150.3$  psi

Change in diameter in the direction of the load = -0.11" x X = -0.0017"

Change in diameter perpendicular to the direction of the load = +0.06" x X = 0.0010"

From the above results, it is clear that no permanent ovalization of the storage overpack occurs during the seismic event and that circumferential stresses will remain elastic and are bounded by the stresses computed based on considering the storage overpack as a simple beam. Therefore, the safety factors based on maximum values of axial stress are appropriate. The magnitudes of the diameter changes that are suggested by the ring solution clearly demonstrate that ready retrievability of the MPC is maintained after the seismic event.

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Because of the low values for the calculated axial stress, the conclusions of the previous section are also valid for the HI-STORM 100S, and for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B.

#### Potential for Concrete Cracking

It can be readily shown that the concrete shielding material contained within the HI-STORM 100 structure will not crack due to the flexuring action of HI-STORM 100 during a bounding seismic event that leads to a maximum axial stress in the storage overpack. For this purpose, the maximum axial strain in the steel shell is computed by dividing the tensile stress developed by the seismic G forces (for the HI-STORM 100, for example) by the Young's Modulus of steel.

$$\zeta = \frac{1,791 - 858}{28 \,\mathrm{E} + 06} = 33.3 \,\mathrm{E} \cdot 06$$

where the Young's Modulus of steel is taken from Table 3.3.2 at 350 degrees F.

The acceptable concrete strain in tension is estimated from information in ACI-318.1 for plain concrete. The ratio of allowable tensile stress to concrete Young' Modulus is computed as

Allowable Concrete Strain =  $(5 \times (0.75) \times (f)^{1/2})/(57,000(f)^{1/2}) = 65.8E-06$ 

In the above expression, f is the concrete compressive strength.

Therefore, we conclude that considerable margins against tensile cracking of concrete under the bounding seismic event exist.

#### **Sliding Analysis**

An assessment of sliding of the HI-STORM 100 System on the ISFSI pad during a postulated seismic event is performed using a one-dimensional "slider block on friction supported surface" dynamic model. The results for the shorter HI-STORM 100S are comparable. The HI-STORM 100 is simulated as a rigid block of mass 'm' placed on a surface, which is subject to a sinusoidal acceleration of amplitude 'a'. The coefficient of friction of the block is assumed to be reduced by a factor  $\alpha$  to recognize the contribution of vertical acceleration in the most adverse manner (vertical acceleration acts to reduce the downward force on the friction interface). The equation of motion for such a "slider block" is given by:

$$m\ddot{x} = R + m a \sin \omega t$$

where:

 $\ddot{x}$ : relative acceleration of the slider block (double dot denotes second derivative of displacement 'x' in time)

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- a: amplitude of the sinusoidal acceleration input
- $\omega$ : frequency of the seismic input motion (radians/sec)
- t: time coordinate

R is the resistive Coulomb friction force that can reach a maximum value of  $\mu(mg)$ ( $\mu$ = coefficient of friction) and which always acts in the direction of opposite to  $\dot{x}(t)$ .

Solution of the above equation can be obtained by standard numerical integration for specified values of m, a,  $\alpha$  and  $\mu$ . The calculation is performed for representative horizontal and vertical accelerations of 0.47g and 0.16g, respectively. The input values are summarized below.

a = 0.47g  $\alpha$  = 0.84 = 1 - vertical acceleration (= 0.16g) m = 360,000 lbs/g  $\mu$  = 0.25

For establishing the appropriate value of  $\omega$ , reference is made to the USAEC publication TID-7024, "Nuclear Reactor and Earthquakes", page 35, 1963, which states that the significant energy of all seismic events in the U.S. essentially lies in the range of 0.4 to 10 Hz. Taking the mid-point value

 $\omega = (6.28) (0.5) (0.4+10) = 32.7 \text{ rad/sec.}$ 

The numerical solution of the above equation yields the maximum excursion of the slider block  $x_{max}$  as 0.12 inches, which is negligible compared to the spacing between casks.

Calculations performed at lower values of  $\omega$  show an increase in  $x_{max}$  with reducing  $\omega$ . At 1 Hz, for example,  $x_{max} = 3.2$  inches. It is apparent from the above that there is a large margin of safety against inter-module collision within the HI-STORM 100 arrays at an ISFSI, where the minimum installed spacing is over 2 feet (Table 1.4.1).

The above dynamic analysis indicates that the HI-STORM 100 System undergoes minimal lateral vibration under a seismic input with net horizontal ZPA g-values as high as 0.47 even under a bounding (from below) low interface surface friction coefficient of 0.25. Data reported in the literature (ACI-349R (97), Commentary on Appendix B) indicates that values of the coefficient of friction,  $\mu$ , as high as 0.7 are obtained at steel/concrete interfaces.

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To ensure against unreasonably low coefficients of friction, the ISFSI pad design may require a "broom finish" at the user's discretion. The bottom surface of the HI-STORM 100 is manufactured from plate stock (i.e. non-machine finish). A coefficient of friction value of 0.53 is considered to be a conservative numerical value for the purpose of ascertaining the potential for incipient sliding of the HI-STORM 100 System. The coefficient of friction is required to be verified by test (see Table 2.2.9).

The relationship between the vertical ZPA,  $G_V$ , (conservatively assumed to act opposite to the normal gravitational acceleration), and the resultant horizontal ZPA  $G_H$  to insure against incipient sliding is given from static equilibrium considerations as:

# $G_{\scriptscriptstyle H} + \mu G_{\scriptscriptstyle V} \leq \mu$

Using a conservative value of  $\mu$  equal to 0.53, the above relationship provides governing ZPA limits for a HI-STORM 100 (or 100S) System arrayed in a freestanding configuration. The table below gives representative combinations that meet the above limit.

G <sub>H</sub> (in g's)	G <sub>V</sub> (in g's)
0.445	0.16
0.424	0.20
0.397	0.25
0.350	0.34

Since the sliding inequality is independent of the weight and centroid of the cask system, the results above remain valid for HI-STORM overpacks with high density concrete and with different heights.

If the values for the DBE event at an ISFSI site satisfy the above inequality relationship for incipient sliding with coefficient of friction equal to 0.53, then the non-sliding criterion set forth in NUREG-1536 is assumed to be satisfied a'priori. However, if the ZPA values violate the inequality by a small amount, then it is permissible to satisfy the non-sliding criterion by implementing measures to roughen the HI-STORM 100/ISFSI pad interface to elevate the value of  $\mu$  to be used in the inequality relation. To demonstrate that the value of  $\mu$  for the ISFSI pad meets the required value implied by the above inequality, a series of Coulomb friction tests (under the QA program described in Chapter 13) shall be performed as follows:

Pour a concrete block with horizontal dimensions no less than  $2' \times 2'$  and a block thickness no less than 0.5'. Finish the top surface of the block in the same manner as the ISFSI pad surface will be prepared.

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Prepare a 6" x 6" x 2" SA516 Grade 70 plate specimen (approximate weight = 20.25 lb.) to simulate the bottom plate of the HI-STORM 100 overpack. Using a calibrated friction gage attached to the steel plate, perform a minimum of twenty (20) pull tests to measure the static coefficient of friction at the interface between the concrete block and the steel plate. The pull tests shall be performed on at least ten (10) different locations on the block using varying orientations for the pull direction.

The coefficient of friction to be used in the above sliding inequality relationship will be set as the average of the results from the twenty tests.

The satisfaction of the "no-sliding" criterion set down in the foregoing shall be carried out along with the "no-overturning" qualification (using the static moment balance method in the manner described at the beginning of this subsection) and documented as part of the ISFSI facility's CFR72.212 evaluation.

# Alternative Evaluation of Overturning and Sliding

In this subsection, an evaluation of the propensity for the free standing cask to be in a state of either incipient overturning or incipient sliding has been performed using a simple static analysis that is independent of time phasing of the input acceleration time histories and considers only the Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA) obtained from the response spectra. For both incipient overturning and incipient sliding, the following inequality must be satisfied to ensure satisfaction of the static criteria.

# $G_{\scriptscriptstyle H} + \mu G_{\scriptscriptstyle V} \leq \mu$

For the incipient overturning evaluation,  $\mu$ =(radius of cask base/height to loaded cask center-ofgravity). For the incipient sliding evaluation,  $\mu$ = Coulomb coefficient of friction =0.53 at the cask/ISFSI pad interface (unless testing justifies use of a higher value). The inequality has been derived assuming that the cask is resting on a flat and level surface that is subject to a seismic event characterized by a response spectra set with the net horizontal and vertical Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA) denoted by G<sub>H</sub> and G<sub>V</sub>, respectively.

This "screening" evaluation provides a conservative criterion to insure that top-of-pad acceleration time histories from the aggregate effect of soil structure interaction and free field acceleration would not predict initiation of overturning or sliding. If on-the-pad acceleration time histories are available, the applicable inequality (for overturning and sliding) may be satisfied at <u>each time instant</u> during the Design Basis Earthquake with  $G_{\rm H}$  and  $G_{\rm V}$  representing coincident values of the magnitude of the net horizontal and vertical acceleration vectors.

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# 3.4.7.2 Explosion (Load Case 05 in Table 3.1.5)

In the preceding subsection, it has been demonstrated that incipient tipping of the storage overpack will not occur under a side load equal to 0.47 times the weight of the cask. For a fully loaded cask with high density concrete, this side load is equal to

F = 192,700 lb.

If it is assumed that this side load is uniformly distributed over the height of the cask and that the cask centroid is approximately at the half-height of the overpack, then an equivalent pressure, P, acting over 180 degrees of storage overpack periphery, can be defined as follows:

P x (DH) = F

Where D = overpack outside diameter, and H = minimum height of a storage overpack (HI-STORM 100S Version B(218)).

For D = 132.5" and H = 218", the equivalent pressure is

 $P = 192,700 \text{ lb}/(132.5" \times 218") = 6.67 \text{ psi}$ 

Therefore, establishing 5 psi as the design basis steady state pressure differential (Table 2.2.1) across the overpack diameter is reasonable.

Since the actual explosion produces a transient wave, the use of a static incipient tip calculation is very conservative. To evaluate the margin against tip-over from a short-time pressure pulse, a Working Model analysis of the two-dimensional dynamic motion of the HI-STORM subject to a given initial angular velocity is carried out. Figures 3.4.25 and 3.4.26 provide details of the model and the solution for a HI-STORM 100 System (simulated as a rigid body) having a weight and inertia property appropriate to a minimum weight cask of height H=235". The results show that an initial angular velocity of 0.626 radians/second does not lead to a tipover of the storage overpack. The results bound those obtained for the HI-STORM 100S(232) and for the HI-STORM 100S Version B (229) since the overall cask height is reduced. The results for the HI-STORM 100S(243) are roughly equal to the results for the HI-STORM 100 Since the differences in height and weight are negligible. The results for the HI-STORM 100S Version B will be bounded by the results presented because of lower centroid location.

Continuing, the initial angular velocity can be related to a square wave pressure pulse of magnitude P and time duration T by the following formula:

 $I\omega = (P \times D \times H) \times (0.5 \times H) \times T$ 

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The above formula relates the change in angular motion resulting from an impulsive moment about the base of the overpack. D is the diameter of the outer shell, H is the height of the storage overpack, and I is the mass moment of inertia of the storage overpack about the mass center (assumed to be at half-height). For D=132.5", H=235", P=10 psi, T=1 second, and I=64,277,000 lb.inch sec<sup>2</sup>, the resulting initial angular velocity is:

 $\omega = 0.569$  radians/second

Therefore, an appropriate short time pressure limit is 10 psi with pulse duration less than or equal to 1 second. Table 2.2.1 sets this as the short-time external pressure differential.

The analysis in Subsection 3.4.7.1 evaluates ovalization of the shell by considering the seismically applied load as a line loading along the height of the overpack that is balanced by inertial body forces in the metal ring. The same solutions can be used to examine the circumferential stress state | that would be induced to resist an external pressure that developed around one-half of the periphery. Such a pressure distribution may be induced by a pressure wave crossing the cask from a nearby explosion. It is shown here that a uniform pressure load over one-half of the overpack outer shell | gives rise to an elastic stress state and deformation state that is bounded by a large margin by the results just presented for the seismic event in Subsection 3.4.7.1.

The case of an external pressure load from an explosion pressure wave (Load Case 05 in Table 3.1.5) is examined by combining the solutions for two different load cases. The combined case that | results is a balance of pressure load over one-half the perimeter and inertial body forces. The sketch below describes this:



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Both cases are considered under identical total loads (with the angle in case 3 set to 90 degrees). Therefore, adding the results from the two cases results in the desired combined case; namely, the balance of a peripheral external pressure with internal all around loading simulating an inertia load (since the reactions are identical in magnitude and opposite in direction, there is a complete cancellation of the concentrated loads).

Examination of the results shows that the algebraic sum of the two solutions gives results that are | smaller in magnitude than the case 1 solution for a line loading balanced by inertially induced body forces. The applied loading used to develop the solution for case 1 is 56,180 lb. per inch of storage | overpack axial length. This load is equivalent to an external pressure P = 424 psi applied over one-half of the outer perimeter of the shell as is shown below:

P x D = 56,180 lb./inch D = 132.5" Therefore, P = 424 psi

Since this is higher by a large margin than any postulated external pressure load, circumferential stresses induced by the differential pressure specified in Table 2.2.1 are insignificant. Specifically, by adding the results from the two solutions (ring load case 1 for a point support reaction to a body force + ring load case 3 for a point support reaction to a lateral pressure over one-half of the perimeter), it is determined that the circumferential bending stress from case 1 is reduced by the [ factor "R" to obtain the corresponding stress from the combined case. R is computed as the ratio of moment magnitudes from the combined case to the results of case 1 alone.

R = (maximum bending moment from case 1 + case 3)/(maximum bending moment from case 1)= 0.75/6.197 = 0.12

Examination of the graphs from the moment distribution from the two solutions shows that the individual terms always subtract and nearly cancel each other at every location.

Therefore, it is concluded that the maximum circumferential stress that develops under a pressure of 424 psi applied over one-half of the perimeter, and conservatively assumed balanced by inertia loading, is

Stress = 29,310 psi x 0.12 = 3517 psi

The stress due to a differential pressure of 10 psi (Table 2.2.1) is only 2.36% of the above value and needs no further evaluation for stress limits or deformation to demonstrate retrievability of the MPC. Because of the large margin obtained for a specific set of values appropriate to the HI-STORM 100, the same conclusion is reached for the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S, Version B; that is, differential pressures of the postulated magnitude will not affect retrievability of the stored MPC.

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# 3.4.7.3 <u>Anchored HI-STORM Systems Under High-Seismic DBE (Load Case C in Table</u> 3.1.1)

The anchored HI-STORM System (Figures 1.1.4 and 1.1.5) is assumed to be subjected to quasistatic inertial seismic loads corresponding to the ZPA design basis limits given in Table 2.2.8. The results from this quasi-static analysis are used to evaluate structural margins for the preloaded anchor studs and the sector lugs. In the quasi-static evaluation, the effect of the "rattling" of the MPC inside of the overpack is accounted for by the imposition of a dynamic load factor of 2.0 on the incremental stresses that arise during the seismic event. In addition to the quasi-static analysis, confirmatory 3-D dynamic analyses are performed using base acceleration excitation histories developed from two sets of response spectra. Figure 3.4.30 shows the two sets of response spectra that are assumed to be imposed at the top of the ISFSI pad. One set of response spectra is the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectra for 5% damping with zero period acceleration conservatively amplified to 1.5 in each direction. This spectra set has been used as the input spectra at many nuclear plants in the U.S. (although generally, the ZPA was much below 1.0). Three statistically independent acceleration time histories (two horizontal labeled as "H1", "H2") and one vertical (labeled as "VT") have been developed. A twenty-second duration event was considered. Figures 3.4.31 to 3.4.33 show the time histories. The second set of response spectra used for time history analysis has similar levels of zero period acceleration but has higher peak spectral acceleration values in the low frequency range (2-3 Hz). This spectra set is the design basis set for a Pacific coast U.S. plant. Figures 3.4.34 to 3.4.36 (labeled as "FN", "FP" for the two horizontal acceleration histories and "FV" for the vertical acceleration time history), show the corresponding time histories simulating a long duration seismic event (170 seconds).

The objectives of the quasi-static and dynamic seismic analyses are the following:

- i. Quantify the structural safety factor in the anchor studs and in the sector lugs that constitute the fastening system for the loaded HI-STORM 100A overpack. The structural safety factor is defined as the ratio of the permitted stress (stress intensity) per Subsection "NF" of the ASME Code to the maximum stress (stress intensity) developed in the loaded component.
- ii. Compute the safety factor against fatigue failure of the anchor studs from a single seismic event.
- iii. Quantify the interface loads applicable to the ISFSI pad to enable the ISFSI owner to design the ISFSI pad under the provisions of ACI-349 (85). The bounding interface loads computed for the maximum intensity seismic event (ZPA) and for extreme environmental loads may be used in pad design instead of the site-specific loads calculated for the loadings applicable to the particular ISFSI.

The above design objectives are satisfied by performing analyses of a loaded HI-STORM 100A System using a conservative set of input data and a conservative dynamic model. Calculations using the quasi-static model assume that the net horizontal inertia loads and the vertical inertia load correspond to the weight of the loaded cask times the appropriate ZPA. The results from the

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analyses are set down as the interface loads, and may be used in the ISFSI pad design work effort by the ISFSI owner. The information on the seismic analysis is presented in five paragraphs as follows:

Input data for analysis Quasi-static model and results Dynamic model and modeling assumptions. Results of dynamic analysis Summary of interface loads

a. Input Data for Analysis:

Key input data for the seismic analysis of a loaded HI-STORM 100A System is summarized in Table 3.4.10. As can be seen from Table 3.4.10, the input data used in the analysis is selected to bound the actual data, wherever possible, so as to maximize the seismic response. For example, a bounding weight of the loaded MPC and HI-STORM 100A overpack is used because an increase in the weight of the system directly translates into an increased inertial loading on the structure.

For quasi-static analysis, bounding ZPA values of 1.5 in all three directions are used with the vertical event directed upward to maximize the stud tension. The resulting ZPA's are then further amplified by the dynamic load factor (DLF=2.0) to reflect "rattling" of the MPC within the overpack. Input data for anchor stud lengths are representative. We consider long and short studs in order to evaluate the effect of stud spring rate.

For the confirmatory dynamic analyses, the time history base excitations are shown in Figures 3.4.31 through 3.4.36 and the propensity for "rattling" is included in the model.

b. Quasi-Static Model and Results:

We consider the HI-STORM100A baseplate as a rigid plate resting on the ISFSI pad with the twenty-eight studs initially preloaded so as to impart a compressive load at the baseplate pad interface that is balanced by a tensile load in the studs prior to the seismic event occurring. The discrete studs are replaced by a thin ring located at the stud circle radius for analysis purposes. The thickness of the thin ring is set so that the ring area is equal to the total stress area of the twenty-eight studs. Figure 3.4.37 shows a view of a segment of the baseplate with the outline of the ring. The ISFSI pad is represented by a linear spring and a rotational spring with spring constants determined from the exact solution for a rigid circular punch pressed into a elastic half-space. We assume that subsequent to pre-tensioning the studs, the seismic event occurs, represented by a net horizontal load DH and a net vertical load DV. In the analysis, the input loads DH and DV are:

 $G_{H} = (1.5^{2} \times 2)^{1/2} \times DLF = 4.242$ ;  $G_{V} = 1.5 \times DLF = 3.0$ DH =  $G_{H} \times 360,000$  lb.; DV =  $-G_{V} \times 360,000$  lb

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DH is the magnitude of the vector sum of the two horizontal ZPA accelerations multiplied by the bounding HI-STORM 100A weight. Similarly, DV is an upward directed load due to the vertical ZPA acceleration. The upward direction is chosen in order to maximize the stud tension as the assemblage of studs and foundation resists overturning from the moment induced by DH applied at the centroid of the cask. Figure 3.4.38 shows the free-body diagram associated with the seismic event. Essentially, we consider an analysis of a pre-compressed interface and determine the interface joint behavior under the imposition of an external loading (note that this kind of analysis is well established in the pressure vessel and piping area where it is usually associated with establishing the effectiveness of a gasketed joint). An analysis is performed to determine the maximum stud tension that results if the requirement of no separation between baseplate and pad is imposed under the imposed loading. The following result is obtained from static equilibrium, for a preload stress of 60 ksi, when the "no separation condition" is imposed:

$$\frac{2a/3h_{cg}(F_{preload}/W+1)(1+\alpha_1)}{G_H - 2a/3h_{cg}(G_V(1+\alpha_1)/(1+\alpha))} = 1.016$$

In the above equation,

 $F_{preload} =$  (Total stress area of twenty-eight, 2" diameter studs) x 60 ksi = 4,200,000 lb.

W = Bounding weight of loaded HI-STORM 100A = 360,000 lb.

a = 73.25 inches,

 $h_{cg} = 118.5$  inches

The coefficients  $\alpha$  and  $\alpha_1$  relate the stiffness of the totality of studs to the stiffness of the foundation under direct loading and under rotation. The result given above is for the representative case of stud free length "L", equal to

L= 42 inches, which gives  $\alpha$  and  $\alpha_1$  equal to 0.089 and 0.060, respectively.

A simplified confirmatory analysis of the above problem can be performed by considering the limiting case of a rigid baseplate and a rigid ISFSI pad. In the limit of a rigid ISFSI pad (foundation), the coefficients  $\alpha$  and  $\alpha_1$  go to zero. A related solution for the case of a rigid baseplate and a rigid foundation can be obtained when the criteria is not incipient separation, but rather, a more "liberal" incipient rotation about a point on the edge of the baseplate. That solution is given in "Mechanical Design of H eat E xchangers and P ressure Vessel C omponents", by S ingh and S oler (Arcturus Publishers, 1984). The result is (for 60 ksi pre-stress in each stud):

$$\frac{a/h_{cg}(F_{preload}/W+1)}{G_{H}-a/h_{cg}(G_{V})} = 1.284$$

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Although not a requirement of any design code imposed herein, the right hand side of the previous relationships can be viewed as the safety factor against incipient separation (or rotation about an edge) at the radius "a". Note that since we have assumed a bounding event, there is an additional margin of 1.5 in results since the Reg. Guide 1.60 event has not been applied with a ZPA in excess of 1.0.

For the real seismic event associated with a western U.S. plant having a slightly lower horizontal ZPA and a reduced vertical ZPA (see Figure 3.4.30). Using the same DLF = 2.0 to account for "rattling" of the confined MPC:

$$G_{\rm H} = 4.1$$
 ;  $G_{\rm V} = 2.6$ ,

the aforementioned safety factors are:

SF (incipient separation) = 1.076SF (incipient edging) = 1.372

The increment of baseplate displacement and rotation, up to incipient separation, is computed from the equilibrium and compatibility equations associated with the free body in Figure 3.4.38 and the change in stud tension computed. The following formula gives the stud tensile stress in terms of the initial preload and the incremental change from the application of the horizontal and vertical seismic load.

$$\sigma_{\text{stud}} = \sigma_{\text{preload}} + \alpha \frac{W}{NA_{\text{stress}}} \left( \frac{-G_{V}}{1+\alpha} + \left( \frac{3h_{\text{cg}}}{2a} \right) \left( \frac{c}{a} \right) \left( \frac{G_{H}}{1+\alpha_{1}} \right) \right)$$

In the above formula,

N = number of studs = 28 (maximum number based on HI-STORM dimensions). For lower seismic inputs, this might be reduced (in groups of 4 to retain symmetry).

 $A_{stress}$  = tensile stress area of a 2" diameter stud

2c = stud circle diameter

The results demonstrate that there is a relatively small change in stud stress from the initial pretension condition with the ISFSI pad foundation resisting the major portion of the overturning moment. For the geometry considered (maximum stud free length and nominal pre-stress), the maximum tensile stress in the stud increases by 9.1%. The following table summarizes the results from the quasi-static analysis using minimum ultimate strength for the stud to compute the safety factors. Note that under the seismic load, the direct stress in the stud is limited to 70% of the stud ultimate strength (per Appendix F of the ASME Code Section III). The allowable pad compressive stress is determined from the ACI Code assuming confined concrete and the minimum concrete compressive strength from Table 2.0.4. Because of the large compressive load at the interface from

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the pre-tensioning operation, the large frictional resistance inhibits sliding of the cask. Consequently, there will be no significant shear stress in the studs. Safety factors for sliding are obtained by comparing the ratio of horizontal load to vertical load with the coefficient of friction between steel and concrete (0.53). Values in parenthesis represent results obtained using ZPA values associated with the real seismic event for the western U.S. plant instead of the bounding Reg. Guide 1.60 event.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR STUDS AND INTERFACE FROM QUASI-STATIC SEISMIC EVALUATION WITH DLF = 2.0, Stud Prestress = 60 ksi						
Item	Calculated Value Allowable Value Safety Factor = (Allowable Value/Calculated Value					
Stud Stress(ksi) (42" stud free length)	65.48 (65.18)	87.5	1.336 (1.343)			
Maximum Pad Pressure (ksi)(42" stud free length)	3.126 (3.039)	4.76	1.52 (1.57)			
Stud Stress (ksi)(16" stud free length)	73.04 (72.34)	87.5	1.20 (1.21)			
Maximum Pad Pressure(ksi) (16" stud free length)	2.977 (2.898)	4.76	1.60 (1.64)			
Overpack Sliding	0.439 (0.407)	0.53	1.21 (1.31			

The effect of using a minimum stud free length in the embedment design is to increase the values of the coefficients  $\alpha$  and  $\alpha_1$  because the stud stiffness increases. The increase in stud stiffness, relative to the foundation stiffness results in an increase in incremental load on the studs. This is a natural and expected characteristic of preloaded configurations. It is noted that the stud safety factors are based on minimum ultimate strength and can be increased, without altering the calculated results, by changing the stud material.

The quasi-static analysis methodology has also been employed to evaluate the effects of variation in the initial pre-stress on the studs. The following tables reproduce the results above for the cases of lower bound stud pre-stress (55 ksi) and upper bound stud pre-stress (65 ksi) on the studs. Only the results using the values associated with the Reg. Guide 1.60 bounding event are reported.

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SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR STUDS AND INTERFACE FROM QUASI- STATIC SEISMIC EVALUATION WITH DLF = 2.0, Stud Prestress = 55 ksi				
Item	Calculated Value	Allowable Value	Safety Factor = (Allowable Value/Calculated Value)	
Stud Stress(ksi) (42" stud free length)	60.48	87.5	1.45	
Maximum Pad Pressure (ksi)(42" stud free length)	3.012	4.76	1.58	
Stud Stress (ksi)(16" stud free length)	68.07	87.5	1.29	
Maximum Pad Pressure(ksi) (16" stud free length)	2.862	4.76	1.663	
Overpack Sliding	0.488	0.53	1.09	

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR STUDS AND INTERFACE FROM QUASI- STATIC SEISMIC EVALUATION WITH DLF = 2.0, Stud Prestress = 65 ksi				
Item	Calculated Value	Allowable Value	Safety Factor = (Allowable Value/Calculated Value)	
Stud Stress(ksi) (42" stud free length)	70.48	87.5	1.24	
Maximum Pad Pressure (ksi)(42" stud free length)	3.24	4.76	1.47	
Stud Stress (ksi)(16" stud free length)	78.07	87.5	1.12	
Maximum Pad Pressure(ksi) (16" stud free length)	3.091	4.76	1.54	
Overpack Sliding	0.399	0.53	1.33	

The results above confirm the expectations that an increase in preload increases the safety factor against sliding. The calculated coefficient of friction in the above tables is computed as the ratio of applied horizontal load divided by available vertical load. For all combinations examined, ample margin against incipient separation at the interface exists.

Based on the results from the quasi-static analysis, an assessment of the safety factors in the sector lugs is obtained by performing a finite element analysis of a repeated element of one of the sector lugs. F igure 3.4.39 s hows the modeled section and the finite element mesh. The stud load is conservatively applied as a uniform downward pressure applied over a 5"x5" section of the extended baseplate simulating the washer between two gussets. This is conservative as the rigidity of the washer is neglected. The opposing pressure loading from the interface pressure is applied as a pressure over the entire extended baseplate flat plate surface. Only one half the thickness of each gusset plate is included in the model. The outer shell is modeled as 3/4" thick, which corresponds to the minimum thickness option per Bill of Material 1575.

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Two cases are considered: (1) the pre-loaded state (a Normal Condition of Storage-Level A stress limits apply); and, (2), the seismic load condition at the location of the maximum tensile load in a stud (an Accident Condition of Storage – Level D stress intensity limits apply). Figures 3.4.40 and 3.4.41 present the stress results for the following representative input conditions:

Level A analysis - Preload stress/bolt = 60 ksi

Level D analysis - Maximum Bolt stress (includes seismic increment) = 65.5 ksi

In the Level A analysis, the resisting local foundation pressure exactly balances the preload. For the Level D analysis, the opposing local foundation pressure = 190 psi (average over the area between gussets). This represents the reduced pressure under the highest loaded stud under the induced rotation of the storage system.

The most limiting weld stress is obtained by evaluating the available load capacity of the fillet weld attaching the extended baseplate annulus region to the gussets (approximately 25 inches of weld per segment) using a limit strength equal to 42% of the ultimate strength of the base material.

The following table summarizes the limiting safety factors for the sector lugs. Allowable values for primary bending stress and stress intensity are from Tables 3.1.10 and 3.1.12 for SA-516 Grade 70 @ 300 degrees F.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR SECTOR LUGS FROM QUASI-STATIC SEISMIC EVALUATION				
Item	Calculated Value	Allowable Value	Safety Factor = (Allowable Value/Calculated Value)	
Maximum Primary Membrane + Bending Stress Away From Loaded Region and Discontinuity (ksi) - Case 1 - Preload	15.62	26.3	1.68	
Maximum Primary Membrane + Bending Stress Intensity Away From Loaded Region and Discontinuity (ksi) – Case 2 - Preload + Seismic	36.67	60.6	1.65	
Maximum Weld Shear Load (kips)	150.8	194.9	1.29	

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#### c. Dynamic Model and Modeling Assumptions:

The dynamic model of the HI-STORM 100A System consists of the following major components.

i. The HI-STORM 100 overpack is modeled as a six degree-of-freedom (rigid body) component.

- ii. The loaded MPC is also modeled as a six degree-of-freedom (rigid body) component that is free to rattle inside the overpack shell. Gaps between the two bodies reflect the nominal dimensions from the drawings.
- iii. The contact between the MPC and the overpack is characterized by a coefficient of restitution and a coefficient of friction. For the dynamic analysis, the coefficient of restitution is set to 0.0, reflecting the large areas of nearly flat surface that come into contact and have minimal relative rebound. The coefficient of friction is set to 0.5 between all potentially contacting surfaces of the MPC/overpack interface.
- iv. The anchor studs, preloaded to axial stress  $\sigma_i$  (Table 3.4.10), induce a contact stress between the overpack base and the ISFSI pad. The loaded cask-pad interface can support a certain amount of overturning moment before an uplift (loss of circularity of the contact patch) occurs. The anchor studs are modeled as individual linear springs connecting the periphery of the extended baseplate to the ISFSI pad section. The resistance of the foundation is modeled by a vertical linear spring and three rotational springs connected between the cask baseplate center point and the surface of the flat plate modeling the driven ISFSI pad. The ISFSI pad is driven with the three components of acceleration time history applied simultaneously.

The HI-STORM 100A dynamic model described above is implemented on the public domain computer code WORKING MODEL (also known as VisualNastran) (See Subsection 3.6.2 for a description of the algorithm).

Figures 3.4.42 and 3.4.43 show the rigid body components of the dynamic model before and after assembly. The linear springs are not shown. Mass and inertia properties of the rigid bodies are consistent with the bounding property values in Table 3.4.10.

d. Results of Dynamic Analysis:

Figures 3.4.44 –3.4.47 show results of the dynamic analysis using the Reg. Guide 1.60 seismic time histories as input accelerations to the ISFSI pad. Figure 3.4.44 shows variation in the vertical foundation compressive force. Figure 3.4.45 shows the corresponding load variation over time for the stud having the largest instantaneous tensile load. An initial preload of approximately 150,000 lb is applied to each stud (corresponding to 60,160 psi stud tensile stress). This induces an initial compression load at the interface approximately equal to 571,000 lb. (including the dead weight of the loaded HI-STORM). Figures 3.4.44 and 3.4.45 clearly demonstrate that the foundation resists the majority of the oscillatory and impactive loading as would be expected of a preloaded configuration.

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Figure 3.4.46 shows the impulse (between the MPC and HI-STORM 100A) as a function of time. It is clear that the "spikes" in both the foundation reaction and the stud load over the total time of the event are related to the impacts of the rattling MPC. The results provide a graphic demonstration that the rattling of the MPC inside the overpack must be accounted for in any quasi-static representation of the event. The quasi-static results presented herein for the anchored system, using a DLF = 2.0, are in excellent agreement with the dynamic simulation results.

We note that the dynamic simulation, which uses an impulse-momentum relationship to simulate the rattling contact, leads to results having a number of sharp peaks. Given that the stress intensity limits in the Code assume static analyses, filtering of the dynamic results is certainly appropriate prior to comparing with any static allowable strength. We conservatively do not perform any filtering of the results prior to comparison with the quasi-static analysis; we note only that any filtering of the dynamic results to eliminate high-frequency effects resulting from the impulse-momentum contact model would increase the safety factors. Finally, Figure 3.4.47 shows the ratio of the net interface horizontal force (needed to maintain equilibrium) to the instantaneous compression force at the ISFSI pad interface with the base of the HI-STORM 100A. This ratio, calculated at each instant of time from the dynamic analysis results using the Reg. Guide 1.60 event, represents an instantaneous coefficient of friction that is required to ensure no interface relative movement. Figure 3.4.47 demonstrates that the required coefficient of friction is below the available value 0.53. Thus, the dynamic analysis confirms that the foundation interface compression, induced by the preloading action, is sufficient to maintain a positive margin against sliding without recourse to any resistance from the studs.

The results of the dynamic analysis using acceleration time histories from the Reg. Guide 1.60 response spectra (grounded at 1.5 g's) confirm the ability of the quasi-static solution, coupled with a dynamic load factor, to correctly establish structural safety factors for the anchored cask. The dynamic analysis confirms that stud stress excursions from the preload value are minimal despite the large overturning moments that need to be balanced.

A second dynamic simulation has been performed using the seismic time histories appropriate to a pacific coast U.S. nuclear plant (Figures 3.4.34-3.4.36). The ZPA of these time histories are slightly less than the Reg. Guide 1.60 time histories but the period of relatively strong motion extends over a longer time duration. The results from this second simulation exhibit similar behavior as those results presented above and provide a second confirmation of the validity of the safety factors predicted by the quasi-static analysis. Reference [3.4.14] (see Subsection 3.8) provides archival information and backup calculations for the results summarized here.

Stress cycle counting using Figure 3.4.45 suggests 5 significant stress cycles per second provides a bounding number for fatigue analysis. A fatigue reduction factor of 4 is appropriate for the studs (per ASME C ode r ules). Therefore, a conservative a nalysis of fatigue for the stud is based on a n alternating stress range of:

 $S(alt) = .5 \times (22,300 \text{ psi}) \times 4 = 44,600 \text{ psi}$  for 5 cycles per second. The value for the stress range is obtained as the difference between the largest tensile stress excursions from the mean value as indicated in the figure.

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To estimate fatigue life, we use a fatigue curve from the ASME Code for high strength steel bolting materials (Figure I.9.4 in Appendix I, ASME Code Section III Appendices) For an amplified alternating stress intensity range of 44,600 psi, Figure I.9.4 predicts cyclic life of 3,000 cycles. Therefore, the safety factor for failure of a stud by fatigue during one Reg. Guide 1.60 seismic event is conservatively evaluated as:

SF(stud fatigue) = 3,000/100 = 30.

For the long duration event, even if we make the conservative assumption of a nine-fold increase in full range stress cycles, the safety factor against fatigue failure of an anchor stud from a single seismic event is 3.33. Recognizing that the fatigue curve itself is developed from test data with a safety factor of 20 on life and 4 on stress, the results herein demonstrate that fatigue failure of the anchor stud, from a single seismic event, is not credible.

e. Summary of Interface Loads for ISFSI Pad Design:

Bounding interface loads are set down for use by the ISFSI pad designer and are based on the validated quasi-static analysis and a dynamic load factor of 2.0:

BOUNDING INTERFACE LOADS FOR ISFSI PAD STRUCTURAL/SEISMIC DESIGN			
D (Cask Weight)	360 kips		
D (Anchor Preload @ 65 ksi)	4,550 kips		
E (Vertical Load)	1,080 kips		
E (Net Horizontal Surface ShearLoad) 1,527.35 kips			
E (Overturning Moment)	15,083 kip-ft.		

# 3.4.8 <u>Tornado Wind and Missile Impact (Load Case B in Table 3.1.1 and Load Case 04 in</u> <u>Table 3.1.5</u>)

During a tornado event, the HI-STORM 100 System is assumed to be subjected to a constant wind force. It is also subject to impacts by postulated missiles. The maximum wind speed is specified in Table 2.2.4 and the three missiles, designated as large, intermediate, and small, are described in Table 2.2.5.

In contrast to a freestanding HI-STORM 100 System, the anchored overpack is capable of withstanding much greater lateral pressures and impulsive loads from large missiles. The quasistatic analysis result, presented in the previous subsection, can be used to determine a maximum permitted base overturning moment that will provide at least the same stud safety factors. This is accomplished by setting  $G_V = 0.0$ , DLF =1 and finding an appropriate  $G_H$  that gives equal or better stud safety factors. The resulting value of  $G^*_H$  establishes the limit overturning moment for combined tornado missile plus wind.,  $M_L$ . ( $G^*_H$  x Weight x  $h_{cg}$ ) is conservatively set as the maximum permissible moment at the base of the cask due to combined action of lateral wind and tornado missile loading. Thus, if the lateral force from a tornado missile impact is F at height h and that from steady tornado wind action is a resultant force W acting at cask mid-height (0.5H), and the

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two loads are acting synergistically to overturn the cask, then their magnitudes must satisfy the inequality

#### $0.5WH + Fh \le M_L$

where the limit moment is established to ensure that the safety factors for seismic load remain bounding.

 $M_L = 18,667$  kip-ft.

Tornado missile impact factors should be factored into "F" prior to determining the validity of the above inequality for any specific site.

In the case of a freestanding system, the post impact response of the HI-STORM 100 System is required to assess stability. Both the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack, and the HI-TRAC transfer cask are assessed for missile penetration.

The results for the post-impact response of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack demonstrate that the combination of tornado missile plus either steady tornado wind or instantaneous tornado pressure drop causes a rotation of the HI-STORM 100 to a maximum angle of inclination less than 3 degrees from vertical. This is much less than the angle required to overturn the cask. The results for the HI-STORM 100 are bounding since the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S Version B have a lower center of gravity when loaded. Since Appendix C uses a lower bound cask weight of 302,000 lb, the results are also bounding for HI-STORM overpacks that utilize high density concrete.

The maximum force (not including the initial pulse due to missile impact) acting on the projected area of the storage overpack is computed to be:

F = 91,920 lbs.

The instantaneous impulsive force due to the missile strike is not computed here; its effect is felt as an initial angular velocity imparted to the storage overpack at time equal to zero. The net resultant force due to the simultaneous pressure drop is not an all-around distributed loading that has a net resultant, but rather is more likely to be distributed only over 180 degrees (or less) of the storage overpack periphery. The circumferential stress and deformation field will be of the same order of magnitude as that induced by a seismic loading. Since the magnitude of the force due to F is less than the magnitude of the net seismically induced force considered in Subsection 3.4.7, the storage overpack global stress a nalysis performed in Subsection 3.4.7 remains governing. In the next subsection, results are provided for the circumferential stress and ovalization of the portion of the storage overpack due to the bounding estimate for the impact force of the intermediate missile.

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# 3.4.8.1 <u>HI-STORM 100 Storage Overpack</u>

This subsection considers the post impact behavior of the HI-STORM 100 System after impact from tornado missiles. During an impact, the system consisting of missile plus storage overpack and MPC satisfies conservation of linear and angular momentum. The large missile impact is assumed to be inelastic. This assumption conservatively transfers all of the momentum from the missile to the system. The intermediate missile and the small missile are assumed to be unyielding and hence the entire initial kinetic energy is assumed to be absorbed by motion of the cask and local yielding and denting of the storage overpack surface. It is shown that cask stability is maintained under the postulated wind and large missile loads. The conclusion is also valid for the HI-STORM 100S and for the HI-STORM 100S Version B with or without the densified concrete shielding option since their lower centers of gravity inherently provide additional stability margin.

The penetration potential of the missile strikes (Load Case 04 in Table 3.1.5) is examined first. The detailed calculations show that there will be no penetration through the concrete surrounding the inner shell of the storage overpack or penetration of the top closure plate. Therefore, there will be no impairment to the confinement boundary due to missile strikes during a tornado. Since the inner shell is not compromised by the missile strike, there will be no permanent deformation of the inner shell. Therefore, ready retrievability is assured after the missile strike. The following paragraphs summarize the analysis work for the HI-STORM 100.

- a. The small missile will dent any surface it impacts, but no significant puncture force is generated. The 1" missile can enter the air ducts, but geometry prevents a direct impact with the MPC.
- b. The following table summarizes the denting and penetration analysis performed for the intermediate missile. Denting is used to connote a local deformation mode | encompassing material beyond the impacting missile envelope, while penetration is used to connote a plug type failure mechanism involving only the target material immediately under the impacting missile. The results are applicable to the HI-STORM 100 and to the HI-STORM 100S. The HI-STORM 100S version B has a thicker outer shell than the classic HI-STORM 100, and a lid configuration that consists of a 1" lid cover plate backed by concrete and a 3" thick lid vent shield plate that acts as a barrier to a top lid missile strike. Therefore, the tabular results presented below are bounding for the HI-STORM 100S Version B.

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Location	Denting (in.)	Thru-Thickness Penetration
Storage overpack outer Shell	6.87 <sup>†</sup>	Yes (>0.75 in.)
Radial Concrete	9.27	No (<27.25 in.)
Storage overpack Top Lid	0.4	No (<4 in.)

<sup>†</sup> Based on minimum outer shell thickness of 3/4". Penetration is less for HI-STORM 100 and 100S overpacks with 1" thick outer shell.

The primary stresses that arise due to an intermediate missile strike on the side of the storage overpack and in the center of the storage overpack top lid are determined next. The analysis of the storage lid for the HI-STORM 100 bounds that for the HI-STORM 100S; because of the additional energy absorbing material (concrete) in the direct path of a potential missile strike on the top lid of the HI-STORM 100S lid, the energy absorbing requirements of the circular plate structure are much reduced. The analysis demonstrates that Level D stress limits are not exceeded in either the overpack outer shell or the top lid. The safety factor in the storage overpack, considered as a cantilever beam under tip load, is computed, as is the safety factor in the top lids, considered as two centrally loaded plates. The applied load, in each case, is the missile impact load. Similar calculations are performed for the HI-STORM 100S Version B using the same model and methodology. A summary of the results for axial stress in the storage overpack is given in the table below with numbers in parentheses representing the results of calculations for the geometry of the HI-STORM 100S Version B:

HI-STORM 100 MISSILE IMPACT - Global Axial Stress Results					
Item Value (ksi) Allowable (ksi) Safety Fa					
Outer Shell – Side Strike	14.35 <sup>†</sup> (15.17)	39.75	2.77 <sup>†</sup> (2.62)		
Top Lid - End Strike	44.14(47.57)	59.65	1.351(1.254)		

<sup>†</sup> Based on HI-STORM 100 overpack with inner and outer shell thicknesses of 1-1/4" and 3/4", respectively. Result is bounding for HI-STORM 100 overpacks made with 1" thick inner and outer shells because the section modulus of the steel structure is greater.

To demonstrate ready retrievability of the MPC, we must show that the storage overpack suffers no permanent deformation of the inner shell that would prevent removal of the MPC after the missile strike. To demonstrate ready retrievability (for both HI-STORM 100 and for HI-STORM 100S) a conservative evaluation of the circumferential stress and deformation state due to the missile strike on the outer shell is performed. A conservative estimate for the 8" diameter missile impact force, "Pi", on the side of the storage overpack is calculated as:

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Pi = 843,000 lb.

This force is conservative in that the target overpack is assumed rigid; any elasticity serves to reduce the peak magnitude of the force and increase the duration of the impact. The use of the upper bound value is the primary reason for the high axial stresses resulting from this force. To demonstrate continued ability to retrieve the MPC subsequent to the strike, circumferential stress and deformation that occurs locally in the ring section near the location of the missile strike are investigated.

Subsection 3.4.7 presents stress and displacement results for a composite ring of unit width consisting of the inner and outer shells of the storage overpack. The solution assumes that the net loading is 56,184 lb. applied on the 1" wide ring (equivalent to a 45G deceleration applied uniformly along the height on a storage overpack weight of 270,000 lb.). This solution can be applied directly to evaluate the circumferential stress and deformation caused by a tornado missile strike on the outer shell. Using the results for the 45g tipover event, an attenuation factor to adjust the results is developed that reflects the difference in load magnitude and the width of the ring that is effective in resisting the missile strike force. The strike force Pi is resisted by a combination of inertia force and shear resistance from the portion of the storage overpack above and below the location of the strike. The ring theory solution to determine the circumferential stress and deformation conservatively assumes that inertia alone, acting on an effective length of ring, balances the applied point load Pi. The effective width of ring that balances the impact load is conservatively set as the diameter of the impacting missile (8") plus the effect of the "bending boundary layer" length. This boundary layer length is conservatively set as a multiple of twice the square root of the product of mean radius times the average thickness of two shells making up the cylindrical body of the storage overpack. The mean radius of the composite cylinder and the average thickness of the inner and outer shells are

 $R_{mean} = 48"$ 

T =.5 x (.75"+1.25") = 1"

The bending boundary layer " $\beta$ " in a shell is generally accepted to be given as  $(2(R_{mean}T)^{1/2}) = 13.85$ " for this configuration. That is, the effect of a concentrated load is resisted mainly in a length along the shell equal to the bending boundary layer. For a strike away from the ends of the shell, a boundary layer length above and below the strike location would be effective (i.e., double the boundary layer length). However, to conservatively account for resistance above and below the location of the strike, this calculated result is only increased by 1.5 in the following analysis (rather than 2). Therefore, the effective width of ring is assumed as:

13.85" x 1.5 + 8" = 28.78"

The solution for the 45g tipover event (performed for a unit ring width and a load of 56,184 lb.) is directly applicable if we multiply all stress and displacement results by the factor "Y" where

Y = (1"/28.78") x (843,000 lb./56,184 lb.) = 0.521

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Using this factor gives the following bounding results for maximum circumferential stresses (without regard for sign and location of the stress) and deformations due to the postulated tornado missile strike on the side of the storage overpack outer shell:

Maximum circumferential stress due to bending moment = (29,310 psi x Y) = 15,271 psi

Maximum circumferential stress due to mean tangential force =  $(18,900 \text{ lb./2 sq.inch}) \times Y = 4,923$  psi

Change in diameter in the direction of the load = -0.11" x Y = -0.057"

Change in diameter perpendicular to the direction of the load = +0.06" x Y = 0.031"

Based on the above calculation, the safety factor on maximum stress for this condition is

SF = 39,750psi/15,271 psi = 2.60

The allowable stress for the above calculation is the Level D membrane stress intensity limit from Table 3.1.12. This is a conservative result since the stress intensity is localized and need not be compared to primary membrane stress intensity. Even with the overestimate of impact strike force used in the calculations here, the stresses remain elastic and the calculated diameter changes are small and do not prevent ready retrievability of the MPC. Note that because the stresses remain in the elastic range, there will be no post-strike permanent deformation of the inner shell.

The above calculations remain valid for the HI-STORM 100S, Version B using normal weight concrete and are bounding for the case where densified concrete is used.

3.4.8.2 <u>HI-TRAC Transfer Cask</u>

#### 3.4.8.2.1 Intermediate Missile Strike

HI-TRAC is always held by the handling system while in a vertical orientation completely outside of the fuel building (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 8). Therefore, considerations of instability due to a tornado missile strike are not applicable. However, the structural implications of a missile strike require consideration.

The penetration potential of the 8" missile strike on HI-TRAC (Load Case 04 in Table 3.1.5) is examined at two locations:

- 1. the lead backed outer shell of HI-TRAC.
- 2. the flat transfer lid consisting of multiple steel plates with a layer of lead backing.

In each case, it is shown that there is no penetration consequence that would lead to a radiological release. The following paragraphs summarize the analysis results.

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- a. The small missile will dent any surface it impacts, but no significant puncture force is generated.
- b. The following table summarizes the denting and penetration analysis performed for the intermediate missile. Denting connotes a local deformation mode encompassing | material beyond the impacting missile envelope, while penetration connotes a plug type failure mechanism involving only the target material immediately under the impacting missile. Where there is through-thickness penetration, the lead and the inner plate absorb any residual energy remaining after penetration of the outer plate in the 100 Ton HI-TRAC transfer lid. The table summarizes the bounding results for both transfer casks.

Location	Denting (in.)	Thru-Thickness Penetration
Outer Shell - lead backed	0.498	No (<1.0 in.)
Outer Transfer Lid Door	0.516	No (<0.75 in.) (HI-TRAC 125) Yes (>0.5 in.) (HI-TRAC 100)

The 8" missile will not penetrate the pool lid for the HI-TRAC 125D because it has a thicker bottom plate than the HI-TRAC 125 transfer lid door. In addition, the results for the 8" missile strike on the HI-TRAC outer shell are valid for the HI-TRAC 125D since all three transfer casks have the same outer shell thickness.

While the transfer cask is being transported in a horizontal orientation, the MPC lid is exposed. We conservatively assume no protective plate in place during this transport operation and evaluate the capacity of the lid peripheral groove weld to resist the impact load. The calculated result, conservatively based on a reduced 5/8" weld, is as follows:

HI-TRAC MISSILE IMPACT - Capacity Results					
ItemValue (lb)Capacity (lb)Safety Factor = Capacity/Value					
Top Lid Weld 2,262,000 2,789,000 1.23					

The final calculation in this subsection is an evaluation of the circumferential stress and deformation consequences of the horizontal missile strike on the periphery of the HI-TRAC shell. It is assumed that the HI-TRAC is simply supported at its ends (while in transit) and is subject to a direct impact from the 8" diameter missile. To compute stresses, an estimate of the peak impact force is required. The effect of the water jacket to aid in the dissipation of the impact force is conservatively

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neglected. The only portion of the HI-TRAC cylindrical body that is assumed to resist the impact load is the two metal shells. The lead is assumed only to act as a separator to maintain the spacing between the shells. The previous results from the lead slump analysis demonstrate that this conservative assumption on the behavior of the lead is valid. The peak value of the impact force is a function of the stiffness of the target. The target stiffness in this postulated event has the following contributions to the stiffness of the structure.

- a. a global stiffness based on a beam deformation mode, and
- b. a local stiffness based on a shell deformation mode

The global spring constant (i.e., the inverse of the global deflection of the cask body as a beam under a unit concentrated load) is a function of location of the strike along the length of the cask. The spring constant value varies from a minimum for a strike at the half-height to a maximum value for a strike near the supports (the trunnions). Since the peak impact force is larger for larger stiffness, it is conservative to maximize the spring constant value. Therefore, in the calculation, we neglect this spring constant for the computation of peak impact force and focus only on the spring constant arising from the local deformation as a shell, in the immediate vicinity of the strike. To this end, the spring constant is estimated by considering the three-dimensional effects of the shell solution to be replaced by the two-dimensional action of a wide ring. The width of the ring is equal to the "bending boundary layer" length on either side of the strike location plus the diameter of the striking missile. Following the analysis methodology already utilized subsection 3.4.8.1, the following information is obtained:

The mean radius of the composite cylinder and the average thickness of the inner and outer shells, are (use the 100 Ton HI-TRAC data since it provides an upper bound on stress and deformation):

 $R_{mean} = 36.893$ 

T =.5 x (.75"+1.00") = 0.875"

The bending boundary layer " $\beta$ " in a shell is generally accepted to be given as  $(2(R_{mean}T)^{1/2})$ . To account for resistance above and below the location of the strike, this calculated result is conservatively increased by multiplying by 1.5. Therefore, the effective width of ring is:

11.22" x 1.5 + 8" = 24.84"

The missile impact is modeled as a point load, acting on the ring, of magnitude equal to Pi = 20,570 | lb. The use of a point load in the analysis is conservative in that it overemphasizes the local stress. The actual strike area is an 8" diameter circle (or larger, if the effect of the water jacket were included).

The force is assumed resisted by inertia forces in the ring section. From the results, a spring constant can be defined as the applied load divided by the change in diameter of the ring section in the direction of the applied load.Based on this approach, the following local spring constant is obtained:

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 $K = Pi/D1_H = Pi/0.019'' = 1,083,000 lb./inch$ 

To determine the peak impact force, a dynamic analysis of a two-body system has been performed using the "Working Model" dynamic simulation code. A two mass-spring damper system is considered with the defined spring constant representing the ring deformation effect. Figure 3.4.24 shows the results from the dynamic analysis of the impact using the computer code "Working Model". The small square mass represents the missile, while the larger mass represents the portion of the HI-TRAC "ring" assumed to participate in the local impact. The missile weight is 275.5 lb. and the participating HI-TRAC weight is set to the weight of the equivalent ring used to determine the spring constant.

The peak impact force that results in each of the two springs used to simulate the local elasticity of the HI-TRAC (ring) is:

F(spring) = 124,400 lb.

Since there are two springs in the model, the total impact force is:

P(impact) = 248,800 lb.

To estimate circumferential behavior of the ring under the impact, the previous solution (using a load of 20,570 lb.) is used and amplified by the factor "Z", where:

Z = 248,800 lb./20,570 lb. = 12.095

Consequently, the maximum circumferential stress due to the ring moment, away from the impact | location, is:

3,037psi x (69,260 in-lb/180,900 in-lb) x Z = 14,230 psi

At the same location, the mean stress adds an additional component (the ring area is computed based on the effective width of the ring).

 $(5,143 \text{ lb.}/43.47 \text{ sq.in}) \times \mathbb{Z} = 1431 \text{ psi}$ 

Therefore, the safety factor on circumferential stress causing ovalization of an effective ring section that is assumed to resist the impact is:

SF(ring stress) = 39,750 psi/(1431psi + 14,230psi) = 2.54

The allowable stress for this safety factor calculation is obtained from Table 3.1.12 for primary membrane stress intensity for a Level D event at 350 degrees F material temperature. Noting that the actual circumferential stress in the ring remains in the elastic range, it is concluded that the MPC remains readily retrievable after the impact since there is no permanent ovalization of the cavity after the event. As noted previously, the presence of the water jacket adds an additional structural barrier

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that has been conservatively neglected in this analysis.

# 3.4.8.2.2 Large Missile Strike

The effects of a large tornado missile strike on the side (water jacket outer enclosure) of a loaded HI-TRAC has been simulated using a transient finite element model of the transfer cask and loaded MPC. The transient finite element code LSDYNA3D has been used (approved by the NRC for use in impact analysis (see Appendix 3.A, reference [3.A.4] for the benchmarking of this computer code)). An evaluation of MPC retrievability and global stress state (away from the impact area) are of primary interest. The finite element model includes the loaded MPC, the HI-TRAC inner and outer shells, the HI-TRAC water jacket, the lead shielding, and the appropriate HI-TRAC lids. The water in the water jacket has been neglected for conservatism in the results. The large tornado missile has been simulated by an impact force-time pulse applied on an area representing the frontal area of an 1800-kg. vehicle. The force-time data used has been previously approved by the USNRC (Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-9A, "Design of Structures for Missile Impact", Revision 2, 9/1974). The frontal impact area used in the finite element analysis is that area recommended in NUREG-0800, SRP 3.5.1.4, Revision 2, 1981).

A summary of the results is presented below for the HI-TRAC 100 and HI-TRAC 125 transfer casks. Since the dimensions of the inner shell, the outer shell, the lead shielding, and the water jacket enclosure panels are the same in both the HI-TRAC 125 and the HI-TRAC 125D, the results from the HI-TRAC 125 are considered accurate for the HI-TRAC 125D. The allowable value listed for the stress intensity for this Level D event comes from Table 3.1.17.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM LARGE TORNADO MISSILE IMPACT ANALYSIS			
ITEM – HI-TRAC 100	CALCULATED VALUE	ALLOWABLE VALUE	
Maximum Stress Intensity in Water Jacket (ksi)	28.331	58.7	
Maximum Stress Intensity in Inner Shell (ksi)	11.467	58.7	
Maximum Plastic Strain in Water Jacket	0.0000932	-	
Maximum Plastic Strain in Inner Shell	0.0	-	

The results from the dynamic analysis have been summarized below.

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ITEM – HI-TRAC 125	CALCULATED VALUE	ALLOWABLE VALUE
Maximum Stress Intensity in Water Jacket (ksi)	19.073	58.7
Maximum Stress Intensity in Inner Shell (ksi)	6.023	58.7
Maximum Plastic Strain in Water Jacket	0.0	-
Maximum Plastic Strain in Inner Shell	0.0	-

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The above results demonstrate that:

1. The retrievability of the MPC in the wake of a large tornado missile strike is not adversely affected since the inner shell does not experience any plastic deformation.

2. The maximum primary stress intensity, away from the impact interface on the HI-TRAC water jacket, is below the applicable ASME Code Level D allowable limit for NF, Class 3 structures.

# 3.4.9 <u>HI-TRAC Drop Events (Load Case 02.b in Table 3.1.5)</u>

During transit, the HI-TRAC 125 or HI-TRAC 100 transfer cask may be carried horizontally with the transfer lid in place. Analyses have been performed to demonstrate that under a postulated carry height; the design basis 45g deceleration is not exceeded. The analyses have been performed using two different simulation models. A simplified model of the drop event is performed using the computer simulation code "Working Model 2D". The analysis using "Working Model 2D" assumed the HI-TRAC and the contained MPC acted as a single rigid body. A second model of the drop event uses DYNA3D, considers the multi-body analysis of HI-TRAC and the contained MPC as individual bodies, and is finite element based. In what follows, we outline the problem and the results obtained using each solution methodology.

# 3.4.9.1 Working Model 2D Analysis of Drop Event

The analysis model conservatively neglects all energy absorption by any component of HI-TRAC; all kinetic energy is transferred to the ground through the spring-dampers that simulate the foundation (ground). If the HI-TRAC suffers a handling accident causing a side drop to the ground, impact will only occur at the top and bottom ends of the vessel. The so-called "hard points" are the top end lifting trunnions, the bottom end rotation trunnions, and the projecting ends of the transfer lid. Noting that the projecting hard points are of different dimensions and will impact the target at different times because of the HI-TRAC geometry, any simulation model must allow for this possibility.

A dynamic analysis of a horizontal drop, with the lowest point on the HI-TRAC assumed 50" above the surface of the target (larger than the design basis limit of 42"), is considered for the HI-TRAC | 125 and for the HI-TRAC 100. Figure 3.4.22 shows the transfer cask orientation. The HI-TRAC is

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considered as a rigid body (calculations demonstrate that the lowest beam mode frequency is well above 33 Hz so that no dynamic amplification need be included). The effects of the ISFSI pad and the underlying soil are included using a simple spring-damper model based on a static classical Theory of Elasticity solution. The "worst" orientation of a horizontally carried HI-TRAC with the transfer cask impacting an elastic surface is considered. The HI-TRAC is assumed to initially impact the target with the impact force occurring over the rectangular surface of the transfer lid (11.875" x 81"). "Worst" is defined here as meaning an impact at a location having the maximum value of an elastic spring constant simulating the resistance of the target interface. The geometry and material properties reflect the USNRC accepted reference pad and soil (Table 2.2.9 - the pad thickness used is 36" and the Young's Modulus of the elastic soil is the upper limit value E=28,000 psi). The use of an elastic representation of the target surface is conservative as it minimizes the energy absorption capacity of the target and maximizes the deceleration loads developed during the impact. The spring constant is also calculated based on an assumption that impact at the lower end of HI-TRAC first occurs at the pocket trunnion. The results demonstrate that this spring constant is lower and therefore would lead to a lower impact force. Therefore, the dynamic analysis of the handling accident is performed assuming initial impact with the flat rectangular short end of the transfer lid. Subsequent to the initial impact, the HI-TRAC rotates in accordance with the dynamic equations of equilibrium and a secondary impact at the top of the transfer cask occurs. The impact is at the edge of the water jacket.

HI-TRAC Handling Analysis – Working Model Analysis of Horizontal Drop			
Item	Value	Allowable	Safety Factor
HI-TRAC 125 – Primary Impact Deceleration (g's)	32.66	45	1.38
HI-TRAC 125 – Secondary Impact Deceleration (g's)	26.73	45	1.68
HI-TRAC 100 – Primary Impact Deceleration (g's)	33.18	45	1.36
HI-TRAC 100 – Secondary Impact Deceleration (g's)	27.04	45	1.66
Axial Membrane Stress Due to HI- TRAC 125 Bending as a Beam - Level D Drop (psi)	19.06	39.75	2.085
Axial Membrane Stress Due to HI- TRAC 100 Bending as a Beam - Level D Drop (psi)	15.77	39.75	2.52

The following table summarizes the results from the dynamic analyses (using the Working Model 2D computer code):

In the table above, the decelerations are measured at points corresponding to the base and top of the fuel assemblies contained inside the MPC. The dynamic drop analysis reported above, using the Working Model 2D rigid body-spring model proved that decelerations are below the design basis value and that global stresses were within allowable limits.

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#### 3.4.9.2 DYNA3D Analysis of Drop Event

An independent evaluation of the drop event to delineate the effect of target non-linearity and the flexibility of the transfer cask has been performed using DYNA3D. Both the HI-TRAC 125 and HI-TRAC 100 transfer casks are modeled as part of the cask-pad-soil interaction finite element model set forth in NUREG/CR-6608 and validated by an NRC reviewed and approved Holtec topical report (see reference [3.A.4] in Appendix 3.A). The model uses the identical MPC and target pad/soil models employed in the accident analyses of the HI-STORM 100 overpack. The HI-TRAC inner and outer shells, the contained lead, the transfer lid, the water jacket metal structure, and the top lids are included in the model. The water jacket is assumed empty for conservatism.

Two side drop orientations are considered (see Figures 3.4.27 and 3.4.28). The first drop assumes that the plane of the lifting and rotation trunnions is horizontal with primary impact on the short side of the transfer lid. This maximizes the angle of slapdown, and represents a credible drop configuration where the HI-TRAC cask is dropped while being carried horizontally. The second drop orientation assumes primary impact on the rotation trunnion and maximizes the potential for the lifting trunnion to participate in the secondary impact. This is a non-credible event that assumes complete separation from the transfer vehicle and a ninety-degree rotation prior to impact. Nevertheless, it is the only configuration where the trunnions could be involved in both primary and secondary impacts.

For each simulation performed, the lowest point on the HI-TRAC cask (either the transfer lid edge or the rotation trunnion) is set at 42" above the target interface. Decelerations are measured at the top lid, the cask centroidal position, and the transfer lid. Normal forces were measured at the primary impact interface, at the secondary impact interface, and at the top lid/MPC interface. Decelerations are filtered at 350 Hz.

The following key results summarize the analyses:

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ITEM	HI-TRA	C 125	HI-TRA	C 100	ALLOWABLE
Initial Orientation of Trunnions	Horizontal	Vertical	Horizontal	Vertical	
Max. Top Lid Vertical Deceleration - Secondary Impact (g's)	25.5	32	36.5	45 <sup>†</sup>	45
Centroid Vertical Deceleration – at Time of Secondary Impact (g's)	9.0	13.0	10.0	17.5	45
Max. Transfer Lid Vertical Deceleration – Primary Impact (g's)	30.8	23.5	35.0	31.75	45
Maximum Normal Force at Primary Impact Site (kips)	1,950.	1,700	1,700	1,700	-
Maximum Normal Force at Secondary Impact Site (kips)	1,300.	1,850.	1,500.	1,450.	-
Maximum MPC/Top Lid Interface Force (kips)	132.	-	39.	-	-
Maximum Diametral Change of Inner Shell (inch)	0.228	0.113	Not Computed	0.067	0.3725
Maximum Von Mises Stress (ksi)	37.577	38.367	40.690	40.444	58.7*

<sup>†</sup> The deceleration at the top of the basket is estimated at 41 g's

\* Allowable Level D Stress Intensity for Primary Plus Secondary Stress Intensity

The results summarized above demonstrate that both the HI-TRAC 125 and HI-TRAC 100 transfer casks are sufficiently robust to perform their function during and after the postulated handling accidents. We also note that the results, using the Working Model single rigid body dynamic model (see Subsection 3.4.9.1), are in reasonable agreement with the results predicted by the DYNA3D multi-body finite element dynamic model although performed for a different drop height with deceleration measurements at different locations on the HI-TRAC.

The results reported above for maximum interface force at the top lid/MPC interface are used as input to a separate analysis, which demonstrates that the top lid contains the MPC during and after a handling accident. The results reported above for the maximum normal force at the primary impact site (the transfer lid) have been used to calculate the maximum interface force at the bottom flange/transfer lid interface. This result is needed to insure that the interface forces used to evaluate transfer lid separation are indeed bounding. To obtain the interface force between the HI-TRAC transfer lid and the HI-TRAC bottom flange, it is sufficient to take a free-body of the transfer lid and write the dynamic force equilibrium equation for the lid. Figure 3.4.29 shows the free body with appropriate notation. The equation of equilibrium is:

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$$M_{TL}a_{TL} = F_I - G_I$$

where

 $M_{TL}$  = the mass of the transfer lid

 $a_{TL}$  = the time varying acceleration of the centroid of the transfer lid

 $F_I$  = the time varying contact force at the interface with the target

 $G_I$  = the time varying interface force at the bottom flange/transfer lid interface

Solving for the interface force give the result

 $G_I = F_I - M_{TL}a_{TL}$ 

Using the appropriate transfer lid mass and acceleration, together with the target interface force at the limiting time instant, provides values for the interface force. The table below provides the results of this calculation for the HI-TRAC 125 and HI-TRAC 100 transfer casks.

Item	Calculated from Equilibrium (kips)
HI-TRAC 125 – Trunnions Horizontal	1,183.
HI-TRAC 125 – Trunnions Vertical	1,272.
HI-TRAC 100 – Trunnions Horizontal	1,129.
HI-TRAC 100 – Trunnions Vertical	1,070.

#### 3.4.9.3 Horizontal Drop of HI-TRAC 125D

The previous subsection addressed the 42" horizontal drop of the HI-TRAC 125 and HI-TRAC 100, including an evaluation of the bolted connection between the transfer lid, which sustains the primary impact, and the cylindrical body of the loaded HI-TRAC. The HI-TRAC 125D does not have a bolted connection between the bottom flange and the cylindrical body of the cask. However, the transverse protrusions (bottom flange, lifting trunnions, and optional attachment lugs/support tabs at the top of the cask) spawn different impact scenarios. The uncontrolled lowering of the cask is assumed to occur from a height of 42" measured to the lowest location on the HI-TRAC 125D in the horizontal orientation.

The maximum decelerations for the HI-TRAC 125D are comparable to the drop results for the HI-TRAC 125 when the plane of the lifting and rotation trunnions is vertical. Although the HI-TRAC 125D has no rotation trunnions, its bottom flange extends radially beyond the water jacket shell by

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approximately the same amount as the HI-TRAC 125 rotation trunnions and thereby establishes a similar "hard point" for primary impact in terms of distance from the cask centerline. More important, because the bottom flange is positioned closer to the base of the HI-TRAC 125D than the rotation trunnions are in the HI-TRAC 125, the slap-down angle for the HI-TRAC 125D is less. The shallower angle decreases the participation of the lifting trunnion during the secondary impact, and increases the participation of the water jacket shell. Since the water jacket shell is a more flexible structure than the lifting trunnion, the deceleration of the HI-TRAC 125D cask during secondary impact is slightly less than the calculated deceleration of the HI-TRAC 125. In the HI-TRAC 125D, there is no bolted connection at the bottom flange/cask body interface that is active in load transfer from the flange to the cask body. It is therefore concluded that this drop scenario for the HI-TRAC 125D is bounded by the similar evaluation for the HI-TRAC 125.

A second HI-TRAC 125D drop scenario, where the two attachment lugs/support tabs are oriented in a vertical plane, is the most limiting scenario. This drop event is unique to HI-TRAC 125D serial numbers 3 and 4, since these are the only two transfer casks fabricated with attachment lugs/support tabs. The tab dimensions are such that primary impact occurs at the top end of the cask when the support tabs impact the target surface, followed by a slap-down and a secondary impact at the bottom flange.

The evaluation of HI-TRAC 125D drop scenario is performed using the computer code Working Model 3D (WM) (now known as Visual Nastran Desktop). First, the WM code is used to simulate | the "Scenario A" drop of the HI-TRAC 125 in order to establish appropriate parameters to "benchmark" WM against the DYNA3D solution. The table below summarizes the results of the Working Model/DYNA3D benchmark comparison. Figure 3.4.48 shows the benchmark | configuration after the drop event.

Comparison of HI-TRAC 125 Drop Results (Scenario A)				
	DYNA3D	Working Model		
Vertical Deceleration of Top Lid (secondary impact) g's	32	33.49		
Vertical Deceleration at Bottom Lid (primary impact on rotation trunnion) g's	23.5	23.59		

The benchmarked Working Model simulation was then modified to simulate the second drop scenario of the HI-TRAC 125D with support tabs in a vertical plane; primary impact now occurred at the top end with secondary impact at the bottom flange. Figure 3.4.49 shows the configuration of the HI-TRAC 125D after this scenario. The impact parameters were unchanged from the benchmark model except for location. The acceleration results from the 42" horizontal drop of the HI-TRAC 125D in this second drop scenario are summarized below.

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Results From HI-TRAC 125D 42" Drop				
Vertical Deceleration of Top Lid (primary impact on support tab) g's 36.75				
Vertical Deceleration of Pool Lid (secondary impact on bottom flange) g's 29.27				

The resulting g loads at the top of the active fuel region for the HI-TRAC 125D, with primary impact on the support tabs, are increased over the loads computed for the HI-TRAC 125 but remain well below the design basis limit.

Finally, stress calculations similar to those presented in Subsection 3.4.9.1 for the HI-TRAC 125 have also been performed for the HI-TRAC 125D using the above maximum decelerations. The table below summarizes the results:

Item	Value	Allowable	Safety Factor
Axial Membrane Stress Due to HI- TRAC 125D Bending as a Beam - Level D Drop (psi)	26.13	39.75	1.521
Shear Stress in Outer Shell Circumferential Weld Due to HI- TRAC 1 25D B ending as a B eam - Level D Drop (psi)	27.43	29.40	1.072

#### 3.4.10 <u>HI-STORM 100 Non-Mechanistic Tip-over and Vertical Drop Event (Load Cases</u> 02.a and 02.c in Table 3.1.5)

Pursuant to the provision in NUREG-1536, a non-mechanistic tip-over of a loaded HI-STORM 100 System on to the ISFSI pad is considered in this report. Analyses are also performed to determine the maximum deceleration sustained by a vertical free fall of a loaded HI-STORM 100 System from an 11" height onto the ISFSI pad. The objective of the analyses is to demonstrate that the plastic deformation in the fuel basket is sufficiently limited to permit the stored SNF to be retrieved by normal means, does not have a adverse effect on criticality safety, and that there is no significant loss of radiation shielding in the system.

Ready retrievability of the fuel is presumed to be ensured: if global stress levels in the MPC structure meet Level D stress limits during the postulated drop events; if any plastic deformations are localized; and if no significant permanent ovalization of the overpack into the MPC envelope space, remains after the event.

Subsequent to the accident events, the storage overpack must be shown to contain the shielding so that unacceptable radiation levels do not result from the accident.

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Appendix 3.A provides a description of the dynamic finite element analyses undertaken to establish the decelerations resulting from the postulated event. A non-mechanistic tip-over is considered together with an end drop of a loaded HI-STORM 100 System. A dynamic finite element analysis of each event is performed using a commercial finite element code well suited for such dynamic analyses with interface impact and non-linear material behavior. This code and methodology have been fully benchmarked against Lawrence Livermore Laboratories test data and correlation [3.4.12].

The table below provides the values of computed peak decelerations at the top of the fuel basket for the vertical drop and the non-mechanistic tipover scenarios. It is seen that the peak deceleration is below 45 g's.

	Max. Deceleration at the Top of the Basket (g's)			
Drop Event	Set A(36" Thick Pad)	Set B(28" Thick Pad)		
End Drop for 11 Inches	43.98	41.53		
Non-Mechanistic Tip-over	42.85	39.91		

#### Filtered Results for Drop and Tip-Over Scenarios for HI-STORM

The tipover analysis performed in Appendix 3.A is based on the HI-STORM 100 geometry and a bounding weight. The fact that the HI-STORM 100S(232) is shorter and has a lower center of gravity suggests that the impact kinetic energy is reduced so that the target would absorb the energy with a lower maximum deceleration. However, since the actual weight of a HI-STORM 100S(232) is less than that of a HI-STORM 100 by a significant amount, the predicted maximum rigid body deceleration would tend to increase slightly. Since there are two competing mechanisms at work, it is not a foregone conclusion that the maximum rigid body deceleration level is, in fact, reduced if a HI-STORM 100S(232) suffers a non-mechanistic tipover onto the identical target as the HI-STORM 100. The situation is clearer for the HI-STORM 100S(243), which is virtually equal in weight to the HI-STORM 100, yet its center of gravity when loaded is almost one inch lower. In what follows, we present a summary of the analysis undertaken to demonstrate conclusively that the result for maximum deceleration level in the HI-STORM 100 tipover event does bound the corresponding value for the HI-STORM 100S(232), and, therefore, we need only perform a detailed dynamic finite element analysis for the HI-STORM 100.

Appendix 3.A presents a result for the angular velocity of the cylindrical body representing a HI-STORM 100 just prior to impact with the defined target. The result is expressed in Subsection 3.A.6 in terms of the cask geometry, and the ratio of the mass divided by the mass moment of inertia about the corner point that serves as the rotation origin. Since the mass moment of inertia is also linearly related to the mass, the angular velocity at the instant just prior to target contact is independent of the cask mass. Subsequent to target impact, we investigate post-impact response by considering the cask as a cylinder rotating into a target that provides a resistance force that varies linearly with distance from the rotation point. We measure "time" as starting at the instant of impact, and develop a one-degree-of freedom equation for the post-impact response (for the rotation angle into the target)

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$$\ddot{\theta} + \omega^2 \theta = 0$$

where

$$\omega^2 = \frac{kL^3}{3I_A}$$

The initial conditions at time=0 are: the initial angle is zero and the initial angular velocity is equal to the rigid body angular velocity acquired by the tipover from the center-of-gravity over corner position. In the above relation, L is the length of the overpack, I is the mass moment of inertia defined in Appendix 3.A, and k is a "spring constant" associated with the target resistance. If we solve for the maximum angular acceleration subsequent to time =0, we obtain the result in terms of the initial angular velocity as:

 $\ddot{\theta}_{max} = \omega \dot{\theta}_{0}$ 

If we form the maximum linear acceleration at the top of the four-inch thick lid of the overpack, we can finally relate the decelerations of the HI-STORM 100 and the HI-STORM 100S(232) solely in terms of their geometry properties and their mass ratio. The value of "k", the target spring rate is the same for both overpacks so it does not appear in the relationship between the two decelerations. After substituting the appropriate geometry and calculated masses, we determine that the ratio of maximum rigid body decelerations at the top surface of the four-inch thick top lid plates is:

A HI-STORM 100S(232)/A HI-STORM 100 = 0.946

Therefore, as postulated, there is no need to perform a separate DYNA3D analysis for the HI-STORM 100S hypothetical tipover.

Moreover, according to Appendix 3.A, analysis of a single mass impacting a spring with a given initial velocity shows that the maximum deceleration " $a_M$ " of the mass is related to the dropped weight "w" and the drop height "h" as follows:

$$a_M \sim \frac{\sqrt{h}}{\sqrt{w}}$$

In other words, as the dropped weight increases, the maximum deceleration of the mass decreases. Therefore, the rigid body decelerations calculated in Appendix 3.A serve as a conservative upper bound for the densified concrete shielding option.

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as:

The same considerations apply to the HI-STORM 100S Version B. The overall lengths are reduced from the classic HI-STORM 100, but the actual weights may be reduced. Therefore, calculations similar to those given above for the HI-STORM 100S are needed to conclusively demonstrate that the non-mechanistic tipover analysis of the classic HI-STORM 100 remains bounding. The results of the calculations, which demonstrate that the design basis limits are met, are presented below together with maximum G levels computed for the 11" vertical drop:

ITEM	A HI-STORM 100S VERSION B(218)/A HI-STORM 100	A HI-STORM 100S VERSION B(229)/A HI-STORM 100	Max. Calculated G Level 11" Drop
HI-STORM 100S Version B(218)	0.91	-	44.378
HI-STORM 100S Version B(229)	-	0.98	43.837

A simple elastic strength of materials calculation is performed to demonstrate that the cylindrical storage overpack will not permanently deform to the extent that the MPC cannot be removed by normal means after a tip-over event. The results demonstrate that the maximum diametrical closure of the cylindrical cavity is less than the initial clearance between the overpack MPC support channels and the MPC canister. Primary circumferential membrane stresses in the MPC shell remain in the elastic range during a tip-over (see Table 3.4.6 summary safety factors); therefore, no permanent global ovalization of the MPC shell occurs as a result of the drop.

To demonstrate that the shielding material will continue to perform its function after a tip-over accident, the stress and strain levels in the metal components of the storage overpack are examined at the end of the tip-over event. The results obtained in Appendix 3.A for impact decelerations conservatively assumed a rigid storage overpack model to concentrate nearly all energy loss in the target. However, to assess the state of stress and strain in the storage overpack after an accident causing a tip-over, the tip-over analysis was also performed using a non-rigid storage overpack model using overpack material properties listed in Appendix 3.A. Figure 3.4.13 shows the calculated von Mises stress in the top lid and outer shell at 0.08 seconds after the initiation of impact. Figure 3.4.14 shows the residual plastic strains in the same components. Figures 3.4.15 and 3.4.16 provide similar results for the inner shell, the radial plates, and the support channels<sup>†</sup>. The results show that while some plastic straining occurs, accompanied by stress levels above the yield stress of the material, there is no tearing in the metal structure which confines the radiation shielding (concrete). Therefore, there is no gross failure of the metal shells enclosing the concrete. The shielding concrete will remain inside the confines of the storage overpack and maintain its performance after the tipover event. Although the preceding results are based on an overpack model having inner and outer shell thicknesses of 1-1/4" and 3/4", respectively, the conclusion holds for the optional HI-STORM design with 1" thick inner and outer shells since having a thicker steel shell at the primary point of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> During fabrication the channels are attached to the inner shell by one of two methods, either the channels are welded directly to the inner shell or they are welded to a pair of L-shaped angles (i.e., channel mounts) that are pre-fastened to the inner shell. The results presented in Figures 3.4.16a and 3.4.16b bound the results from both methods of attachment.

impact provides more strength and greater protection against a cavity breach. The results from these analyses are also applicable to the HI-STORM 100S and the HI-STORM 100S, Version B since the structural material at the top of the cask that would be locally deformed after a tipover event is essentially the same.

#### 3.4.11 Storage Overpack and HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Service Life

The term of the 10CFR72, Subpart L C of C, granted by the NRC is 20 years; therefore, the License Life (please see glossary) of all components is 20 years. Nonetheless, the HI-STORM 100 and 100S Storage overpacks and the HI-TRAC transfer cask are engineered for 40 years of design life, while satisfying the conservative design requirements defined in Chapter 2, including the regulatory requirements of 10CFR72. In addition, the storage overpack and HI-TRAC are designed, fabricated, and inspected under the comprehensive Quality Assurance Program discussed in Chapter 13 and in accordance with the applicable requirements of the ACI and ASME Codes. This assures high design margins, high quality fabrication, and verification of compliance through rigorous inspection and testing, as describe in Chapter 9 and the design drawings in Section 1.5. Technical Specifications defined in Chapter 12 assure that the integrity of the cask and the contained MPC are maintained throughout the components' design life. The design life of a component, as defined in the Glossary, is the minimum duration for which the equipment or system is engineered to perform its intended function if operated and maintained in accordance with the FSAR. The design life is essentially the lower bound value of the service life, which is the expected functioning life of the component or system. Therefore, component longevity should be: licensed life < design life < service life. (The licensed life, enunciated by the USNRC, is the most pessimistic estimate of a component's life span.) For purposes of further discussion, we principally focus on the service life of the HI-STORM 100 System components that, as stated earlier, is the reasonable expectation of equipment's functioning life span.

The service life of the storage overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask is further discussed in the following sections.

#### 3.4.11.1 Storage Overpack

The principal design considerations that bear on the adequacy of the storage overpack for the service life are addressed as follows:

#### **Exposure to Environmental Effects**

In the following text, all references to HI-STORM 100 also apply to HI-STORM 100S and to the HI-STORM 100S Version B. All exposed surfaces of HI-STORM 100 are made from ferritic steels that are readily painted. Concrete, which serves strictly as a shielding material, is completely encased in steel. Therefore, the potential of environmental vagaries such as spalling of concrete, are ruled out for HI-STORM 100. Under normal storage conditions, the bulk temperature of the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack will, because of its large thermal inertia, change very gradually with time. Therefore, material degradation from rapid thermal ramping conditions is not credible for the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack. Similarly, corrosion of structural steel embedded in the concrete

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structures due to salinity in the environment at coastal sites is not a concern for HI-STORM 100 because HI-STORM 100 does not rely on rebars (indeed, it contains no rebars). As discussed in Appendix 1.D, the aggregates, cement and water used in the storage cask concrete are carefully controlled to provide high durability and resistance to temperature effects. The configuration of the storage overpack assures resistance to freeze-thaw degradation. In addition, the storage overpack is specifically designed for a full range of enveloping design basis natural phenomena that could occur over the 40-year design life of the storage overpack as defined in Subsection 2.2.3 and evaluated in Chapter 11.

#### Material Degradation

The relatively low neutron flux to which the storage overpack is subjected cannot produce measurable degradation of the cask's material properties and impair its intended safety function. Exposed carbon steel components are coated to prevent corrosion. The controlled environment of the ISFSI storage pad mitigates damage due to direct exposure to corrosive chemicals that may be present in other industrial applications.

#### Maintenance and Inspection Provisions

The requirements for periodic inspection and maintenance of the storage overpack throughout the 40-year design life are defined in Chapter 9. These requirements include provisions for routine inspection of the storage overpack exterior and periodic visual verification that the ventilation flow paths of the storage overpack are free and clear of debris. ISFSIs located in a reas subject to atmospheric conditions that may degrade the storage cask or canister should be evaluated by the licensee on a site-specific basis to determine the frequency for such inspections to assure long-term performance. In addition, the HI-STORM 100 System is designed for easy retrieval of the MPC from the storage overpack should it become necessary to perform more detailed inspections and repairs on the storage overpack.

The above findings are consistent with those of the NRC's Waste Confidence Decision Review [3.4.11], which concluded that dry storage systems designed, fabricated, inspected, and operate in accordance with such requirements are adequate for a 100-year service life while satisfying the requirements of 10CFR72.

#### 3.4.11.2 <u>Transfer Cask</u>

The principal design considerations that bear on the adequacy of the HI-TRAC Transfer Cask for the service life are addressed as follows:

#### Exposure to Environmental Effects

All transfer cask materials that come in contact with the spent fuel pool are coated to facilitate decontamination. The HI-TRAC is designed for repeated normal condition handling operations with high factor of safety, particularly for the lifting trunnions, to assure structural integrity. The resulting cyclic loading produces stresses that are well below the endurance limit of the trunnion material, and therefore, will not lead to a fatigue failure in the transfer cask. All other off-normal or postulated

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accident conditions are infrequent or one-time occurrences that do not contribute significantly to fatigue. In addition, the transfer cask utilizes materials that are not susceptible to brittle fracture during the lowest temperature permitted for loading, as discussed in Chapter 12.

#### Material Degradation

All transfer cask materials that are susceptible to corrosion are coated. The controlled environment in which the HI-TRAC is used mitigates damage due to direct exposure to corrosive chemicals that may be present in other industrial applications. The infrequent use and relatively low neutron flux to which the HI-TRAC materials are subjected do not result in radiation embrittlement or degradation of the HI-TRAC's shielding materials that could impair the HI-TRAC's intended safety function. The HI-TRAC transfer cask materials are selected for durability and wear resistance for their deployment.

#### Maintenance and Inspection Provisions

The requirements for periodic inspection and maintenance of the HI-TRAC transfer cask throughout the 40-year design life are defined in Chapter 9. These requirements include provisions for routine inspection of the HI-TRAC transfer cask for damage prior to each use, including an annual inspection of the lifting trunnions. Precautions are taken during lid handling operations to protect the sealing surfaces of the pool lid. The leak tightness of the liquid neutron shield is verified periodically. The water jacket pressure relief valves and other fittings used can be easily removed.

#### 3.4.12 MPC Service Life

The term of the 10CFR72, Subpart L C of C, granted by the NRC (i.e., licensed life) is 20 years. Nonetheless, the HI-STORM 100 MPC is designed for 40 years of design life, while satisfying the conservative design requirements defined in Chapter 2, including the regulatory requirements of 10CFR72. Additional assurance of the integrity of the MPC and the contained SNF assemblies throughout the 40-year life of the MPC is provided through the following:

- Design, fabrication, and inspection in accordance with the applicable requirements of the ASME Code as described in Chapter 2 assures high design margins.
- Fabrication and inspection performed in accordance with the comprehensive Quality Assurance program discussed in Chapter 13 assures competent compliance with the fabrication requirements.
- Use of materials with known characteristics, verified through rigorous inspection and testing, as described in Chapter 9, assures component compliance with design requirements.
- Use of welding procedures in full compliance with Section III of the ASME Code ensures high-quality weld joints.

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Technical Specifications, as defined in Chapter 12, have been developed and imposed on the MPC that assure that the integrity of the MPC and the contained SNF assemblies are maintained throughout the 40-year design life of the MPC.

The principal design considerations bearing on the adequacy of the MPC for the service life are summarized below.

#### **Corrosion**

All MPC materials are fabricated from corrosion-resistant austenitic stainless steel and passivated aluminum. The corrosion-resistant characteristics of such materials for dry SNF storage canister applications, as well as the protection offered by these materials against other material degradation effects, a re well e stablished in the nuclear industry. The moisture in the MPC is removed to eliminate all oxidizing liquids and gases and the MPC cavity is backfilled with dry inert helium at the time of closure to maintain an atmosphere in the MPC that provides corrosion protection for the SNF cladding throughout the dry storage period. The preservation of this non-corrosive atmosphere is assured by the inherent sealworthiness of the MPC confinement boundary integrity (there are no gasketed joints in the MPC).

#### Structural Fatigue

The passive non-cyclic nature of dry storage conditions does not subject the MPC to conditions that might lead to structural fatigue failure. Ambient temperature and insolation cycling during normal dry storage conditions and the resulting fluctuations in MPC thermal gradients and internal pressure is the only mechanism for fatigue. These low stress, high-cycle conditions cannot lead to a fatigue failure of the MPC that is made from stainless alloy stock (endurance limit well in excess of 20,000 psi). All other off-normal or postulated accident conditions are infrequent or one-time occurrences, which cannot produce fatigue failures. Finally, the MPC uses materials that are not susceptible to brittle fracture.

#### Maintenance of Helium Atmosphere

The inert helium a tmosphere in the MPC provides a non-oxidizing environment for the SNF cladding to assure its integrity during long-term storage. The preservation of the helium atmosphere in the MPC is assured by the robust design of the MPC confinement boundary described in Section 7.1. Maintaining an inert environment in the MPC mitigates conditions that might otherwise lead to SNF cladding failures. The required mass quantity of helium backfilled into the canister at the time of closure and the associated fabrication and closure requirements for the canister are specifically set | down to assure that an inert helium atmosphere is maintained in the canister throughout the 40-year design life.

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#### Allowable Fuel Cladding Temperatures

The helium atmosphere in the MPC promotes heat removal and thus reduces SNF cladding temperatures during dry storage. In addition, the SNF decay heat will substantially attenuate over a 40-year dry storage period. Maintaining the fuel cladding temperatures below allowable levels during long-term dry storage mitigates the damage mechanism that might otherwise lead to SNF cladding failures. The allowable long-term SNF cladding temperatures used for thermal acceptance of the MPC design are conservatively determined, as discussed in Section 4.3.

#### Neutron Absorber Boron Depletion

The effectiveness of the fixed borated neutron absorbing material used in the MPC fuel basket design requires that sufficient concentrations of boron be present to assure criticality safety during worst case design basis conditions over the 40-year design life of the MPC. Information on the characteristics of the borated neutron absorbing material used in the MPC fuel basket is provided in Subsection 1.2.1.3.1. The relatively low neutron flux, which will continue to decay over time, to which this borated material is subjected, does not result in significant depletion of the material's available boron to perform its intended safety function. In addition, the boron content of the material used in the criticality safety analysis is conservatively based on the minimum specified boron areal density (rather than the nominal), which is further reduced by 25% for analysis purposes, as described in Section 6.1. Analysis discussed in Section 6.3.2 demonstrates that the boron depletion in the neutron absorber material is negligible over a 50-year duration. Thus, sufficient levels of boron are present in the fuel basket neutron absorbing material to maintain criticality safety functions over the 40-year design life of the MPC.

The above findings are consistent with those of the NRC's Waste Confidence Decision Review, which concluded that dry storage systems designed, fabricated, inspected, and operated in the manner of the requirements set down in this document are adequate for a 100-year service life, while satisfying the requirements of 10CFR72.

#### 3.4.13 Design and Service Life

The discussion in the preceding sections seeks to provide the logical underpinnings for setting the design life of the storage overpacks, the HI-TRAC transfer cask, and the MPCs as forty years. Design life, as stated earlier, is a lower bound value for the expected performance life of a component (service life). If operated and maintained in accordance with this Final Safety Analysis Report, Holtec International expects the service life of its HI-STORM 100 and HI-STORM 100S Version's components to substantially exceed their design life values.

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#### Table 3.4.1

#### FINITE ELEMENTS IN THE MPC STRUCTURAL MODELS

МРС Туре	Model Type		
Element Type	Basic	0 Degree Drop	45 Degree Drop
MPC-24	1068	1114	1113
BEAM3	1028	1028	1028
PLANE82	0	0	0
CONTAC12	40	38	38
CONTAC26	0	45	45
COMBIN14	0	3	2
MPC-32	1374	1604	1603
BEAM3	1346	1346	1346
CONTAC12	28	27	24
CONTAC26	0	229	228
COMBIN14	0	2	5
MPC-68	1842	2066	2063
BEAM3	1782	1782	1782
PLANE82	16	16	16
CONTAC12	44	43	40
CONTAC26	0	223	222
COMBIN14	0	2	3
MPC-24E	1070	1124	1122
BEAM3	1030	1030	1030
PLANE82	0	0	0
CONTAC12	40	38	38
CONTAC26	0	53	52
COMBIN14	0	3	2

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#### TABLE 3.4.2 HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY WITH OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Material/Component	Fuel Pool (Borated and Unborated Water) <sup>†</sup>	ISFSI Pad (Open to Environment)
Alloy X: - MPC Fuel Basket - MPC Baseplate - MPC Shell - MPC Lid - MPC Fuel Spacers	Stainless steels have been extensively used in spent fuel storage pools with both borated and unborated water with no adverse reactions or interactions with spent fuel.	The MPC internal environment will be an inert (helium) atmosphere and the external surface will be exposed to ambient air. No adverse interactions identified.
<u>Aluminum</u> : - Heat Conduction Elements	Aluminum and stainless steel form a galvanic couple. However, aluminum will be used in a passivated state. Upon passivation, aluminum forms a thin ceramic $(Al_2O_3)$ barrier. Therefore, during the short time they are exposed to pool water, significant corrosion of aluminum or production of hydrogen is not expected (see operational requirements under "Neutron Absorber Material" below).	In a non-aqueous atmosphere, galvanic corrosion is not expected.
<u>Neutron Absorber Material</u> : Extensive in-pool experience on spent fuel racks with no adverse reactions. See Chapter 8 for additional requirements for combustible gas monitoring and required actions for control of combustible gas accumulation under the MPC lid.		No adverse potential reactions identified.

<sup>†</sup> HI-TRAC/MPC short-term operating environment during loading and unloading.

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#### TABLE 3.4.2 (CONTINUED) HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY WITH OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Material/Component	Fuel Pool (Borated and Unborated Water) <sup>†</sup>	ISFSI Pad (Open to Environment)
Steels:           -         SA350-LF2           -         SA350-LF3           -         SA203-E           -         SA515 Grade 70           -         SA516 Grade 70           -         SA193 Grade B7           -         SA106 (HI-TRAC)	All exposed steel surfaces (except seal areas, and pocket trunnions) will be coated with paint specifically selected for performance in the operating environments. Even without coating, no adverse reactions (other than nominal corrosion) have been identified. Lid bolts are plated and the threaded portion of the bolt anchor blocks is coated to seal the threaded area.	Internal surfaces of the HI-TRAC will be painted and maintained. Exposed external surfaces (except those listed in fuel pool column) will be painted and will be maintained with a fully painted surface. No adverse reactions identified.
Steels:-SA516 Grade 70-SA203-E-SA350-LF3-A36Storage Overpack	HI-STORM 100 storage overpack is not exposed to fuel pool environment.	Internal and external surfaces will be painted (except for bolt locations that will have protective coating). External surfaces will be maintained with a fully painted surface. No adverse reaction identified.
Stainless Steels: - SA240 304 - SA193 Grade B8 - 18-8 S/S Miscellaneous Components	Stainless steels have been extensively used in spent fuel storage pools with both borated and unborated water with no adverse reactions.	Stainless steel has a long proven history of corrosion resistance when exposed to the atmosphere. These materials are used for bolts and threaded inserts. No adverse reactions with steel have been identified. No impact on performance.

<sup>†</sup> HI-TRAC/MPC short-term operating environment during loading and unloading.

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#### TABLE 3.4.2 (CONTINUED) HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY WITH OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Material/Component	Fuel Pool (Borated and Unborated Water) <sup>†</sup>	ISFSI Pad (Open to Environment)
Nickel Alloy: No adverse reactions with borated or unborated water.		Exposed to weathering effects. No adverse reactions with storage overpack closure plate. No impact on performance.
Lifting Trunnion		
Brass/Bronze:	Small surface of pressure relief valve will be exposed. No significant adverse impact identified.	Exposed to external weathering. No loss of function expected.
- Pressure Relief Valve HI-TRAC		
Holtite-A:	The neutron shield is fully enclosed. No adverse reaction identified. No adverse reactions with	The neutron shield is fully enclosed in the outer enclosure. No adverse reaction identified. No
- Solid Neutron Shield	thermal expansion foam or steel.	adverse reactions with thermal expansion foam or steel.

<sup>†</sup> HI-TRAC/MPC short-term operating environment during loading and unloading.

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#### TABLE 3.4.2 (CONTINUED) HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY WITH OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Material/Component Fuel Pool (Borated and Unborated Water) <sup>†</sup>		ISFSI Pad (Open to Environment)	
Paint: - Carboline 890 - Thermaline 450	Carboline 890 used for all HI-STORM 100 surfaces and only HI-TRAC exterior surfaces. Acceptable performance for short-term exposure in mild borated pool water. Thermaline 450 selected for HI-TRAC internal surfaces for excellent high temperature resistance properties. Will only be exposed to demineralized water during in-pool operations as annulus is filled prior to placement in the spent fuel pool and the inflatable seal prevents fuel pool water in-leakage. No adverse interaction identified which could affect MPC/fuel assembly performance.	Good performance on surfaces. Discoloration is not a concern.	
Elastomer Seals:	No adverse reactions identified.	Only used during fuel pool operations.	
Lead:	Enclosed by carbon steel. Lead is not exposed to fuel pool water. Lead has no interaction with carbon steel.	Enclosed by carbon steel. Lead is not exposed to ambient environment. Lead has no interaction with carbon steel.	
<u>Concrete</u> :	Storage overpack is not exposed to fuel pool water.	Concrete is enclosed by carbon steel and not exposed to ambient environment. Concrete has no interaction with carbon steel.	

<sup>†</sup> HI-TRAC/MPC short-term operating environment during loading and unloading.

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Load Case I.D.	Loading†	Safety Factor	Location in FSAR
F1	Τ, Τ'	No interference	Subsection 3.4.4.2
F2	D + H	2.87	Table 3.4.9 of Docket 72-1008
F3 F3.a	D + H' (end drop)	3.6	3.4.4.3.1.3
F3.b	D + H' (side drop 0 deg.)	1.32	Table 3.4.6
F3.c	D + H' (side drop 45 deg.)	1.28	Table 3.4.6

 TABLE 3.4.3

 FUEL BASKET RESULTS - MINIMUM SAFETY FACTORS

<sup>†</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13.

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Load Case I.D.	Load Combination <sup>†,††</sup>	Safety Factor	Location in FSAR Where the Analysis is Performed
E1			
E1.a	Design internal pressure, P <sub>I</sub>	8.59 <sup>†††</sup> 1.326 1.20 N/A	E.1.a Lid Table 3.4.7 Baseplate 3.I.8.1 of Docket 72-1008 Shell Table 3.4.7 Supports
E1.b	Design external pressure, Po	8.59 <sup>†††</sup> 1.326 38.5 N/A	E.1.b Lid P <sub>i</sub> bounds Baseplate P <sub>i</sub> bounds Shell Buckling methodology in 3.H of Docket 72-1008 Supports
E1.c	Design internal pressure, P <sub>i</sub> , plus Temperature T	1.09	E1.c Shell Table 3.4.8
E2	D + H + (P <sub>i</sub> , P <sub>o</sub> )	1.8 <sup>†††</sup> 1.088 2.64*0.967(stress), 45.5 5.85	Lid3.E.8.1.2 of Docket 72-1008Baseplate3.I.8.2 of Docket 72-1008ShellTable 3.4.9 of Docket 72-1008Buckling methodology in 3.H of Docket72-1008SupportsTable 3.4.9 of Docket 72-1008

#### **TABLE 3.4.4** MPC RESULTS - MINIMUM SAFETY FACTOR

Note: 0.967 multiplier reflects increase in MPC shell design temperature to 500 deg. F.

Note that in analyses, bounding pressures are applied, i.e., in buckling calculations  $P_o$  is used, and in stress evaluations either  $P_o$  or  $P_i$  is appropriate Minimum safety factor is based on the dual lid configuration. tt

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<sup>1</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13

Load Case I.D.	Load Combination <sup>†,††</sup>	Safety Factor	Locat	tion in FSAR	
E3			1		
E3.a	$(P_i, P_o) + D + H'$ , end drop	1.4 <sup>†††</sup>	E.a	Lid	3.E.8.2.1.2 of Docket 72-1008
		1.28		Baseplate	3.I.8.3 of Docket 72-1008
		1.72	1	Shell	Buckling methodology in 3.H of
					Docket 72-1008
		N/A		Supports	
E3.b	$(P_i, P_o) + D + H'$ , side drop 0	1.4 <sup>†††</sup>	E.b	Lid	end drop bounds
	deg.	1.28	}	Baseplate	end drop bounds
		1.06		Shell	Table 3.4.6
		1.18		Supports	Table 3.4.6
E3.c	$(P_i, P_o) + D + H'$ , side drop	1.4 <sup>†††</sup>	E.c.	Lid	end drop bounds
	45 deg.	1.28	1	Baseplate	end drop bounds
	5	1.41	1	Shell	Table 3.4.6
		1.56		Supports	Table 3.4.6

# TABLE 3.4.4 (CONTINUED)MPC RESULTS - MINIMUM SAFETY FACTOR

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The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13

the Note that in analyses, bounding pressures are applied, i.e., in buckling calculations Po is used, and in stress evaluations either Po or Pi is appropriate

ttt Minimum safety factor is based on the dual lid configuration.

Load Case I.D.	Load Combination <sup>†</sup> , <sup>††</sup>	Safety Factor	Location in FSAR	
E4	Т	Subsection 3.4.4.2 shows there are no primary stresses from thermal expansion.	Subsection 3.4.4.2	
E5	$D + T^* + (P_i^*, P_o^*)$	13.6 <sup>†††</sup> 1.78 1.15 (buckling) 13.6 (stress)	Lid Baseplate Shell	3.E.8.2.1.3 of Docket 72-1008 3.I.8.4 of Docket 72-1008 Buckling methodology in 3.H of Docket 72-1008 3.4.4.3.1.5 (thermal stress) of Docket 72- 1008
		N/A	Supports	N/A

## TABLE 3.4.4 (CONTINUED)MPC RESULTS - MINIMUM SAFETY FACTOR

<sup>†</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> Note that in analyses, bounding pressures are applied, i.e., in buckling calculations P<sub>o</sub> is used, and in stress evaluations either P<sub>o</sub> or P<sub>i</sub> is appropriate.

ttt Minimum safety factor is based on the dual lid configuration.

 TABLE 3.4.5

 HI-STORM 100 STORAGE OVERPACK AND HI-TRAC RESULTS - MINIMUM SAFETY FACTORS

Load Case I.D.	Loading <sup>†</sup>	Safety Factor	Location in FSAR	
01	$D + H + T + (P_o, P_i)$	1.33 N/A	Overpack Shell (inlet vent)/Base Top Lid	3.4.3.5 N/A
		2.83(125); 2.29(100) 2.604 (ASME Code limit) 2.61 (ASME Code limit) 2.91; 1.11(optional bolts)	HI-TRAC Shell Pool Lid Top Lid Pocket Trunnion	3.4.3.3; 3.4.3.4 3.4.3.8 N/A 3.4.4.3.3.1
02 02.a	D + H' + (P <sub>o</sub> ,P <sub>i</sub> ) (end drop/tip-over)	1.271 1.134	Overpack Shell Top Lid	3.4.4.3.2.3 3.4.4.3.2.2
02.b	$D + H' + (P_0, P_i)$ (side drop)	2.09 1.392 1.651	HI-TRAC Shell Transfer Lid Top Lid	3.4.9 3.4.4.3.3.3 3.4.4.3.3.5
03	D (water jacket)	1.168	3.4.4.3.3.4	
04	M (small and medium penetrant missiles)	2.65 (Side Strike); 1.35(End strike) 1.23 (End Strike)	Overpack HI-TRAC	3.4.8.1 3.4.8.2.1

<sup>†</sup> The symbols used for the loadings are defined in Table 2.2.13.

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#### TABLE 3.4.6 MINIMUM SAFETY FACTORS FOR MPC COMPONENTS DURING TIP-OVER 45g DECELERATIONS

Component Stress Beault	MPC-24		MPC-68	
Component - Stress Result	0 Degrees	45 Degrees	0 Degrees	45 Degrees
Fuel Basket - Primary Membrane (Pm)	3.46	4.83	3.01	4.36
	(1134)	(396)	(1603)	(1603)
Fuel Basket - Local Membrane Plus	1.32	1.33	2.18	1.44
Primary Bending (P <sub>L</sub> +P <sub>b</sub> )	(1065)	(577)	(1590)	(774)
Enclosure Vessel - Primary Membrane (Pm)	6.54*.967	6.62*.967	6.56*.967	6.86*.967
	(1354)	(1370)	(2393)	(2377)
Enclosure Vessel - Local Membrane Plus	2.52*.967	2.99*.967	1.10*.967	1.56*.967
Primary Bending (P <sub>L</sub> +P <sub>b</sub> )	(1278)	(1247)	(1925)	(1925)
Basket Supports – Primary Membrane (Pm)	NI/A	N1/A	· 7.15	9.37
	IN/A	IN/A	(1710)	(1699)
Basket Supports - Local Membrane Plus	N/A	N/A	1.18	1.56
Primary Bending (P <sub>L</sub> +P <sub>b</sub> )	N/A N/A		(1715)	(1704)

Notes:

1. Corresponding ANSYS element number shown in parentheses.

2. Multiplier of 0.967 reflects increase in Enclosure Vessel Design Temperature from 450 deg. F to 500 deg. F in this Revision (Table 2.2.3).

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#### TABLE 3.4.6 (CONTINUED) MINIMUM SAFETY FACTORS FOR MPC COMPONENTS DURING TIP-OVER 45g DECELERATIONS

	MPC-32		
Component - Stress Result	0 Degrees	45 Degrees	
Fuel Basket - Primary Membrane (P <sub>m</sub> )	3.51 (715)	4.96 (366)	
Fuel Basket - Local Membrane Plus Primary Bending (P <sub>L</sub> +P <sub>b</sub> )	1.51 (390)	1.28 (19)	
Enclosure Vessel - Primary Membrane (Pm)	4.11*.967 (1091)	5.59*.967 (1222)	
Enclosure Vessel - Local Membrane Plus Primary Bending (P <sub>L</sub> +P <sub>b</sub> )	1,11*.967 (1031)	1.46*.967 (1288)	
Basket Supports - Primary Membrane (Pm)	3.44 (905)	4.85 (905)	
Basket Supports - Local Membrane Plus Primary Bending (P <sub>L</sub> +P <sub>b</sub> )	1.30 (901)	1.71 (908)	

Notes:

1. Corresponding ANSYS element number shown in parentheses.

2. Multiplier of 0.967 reflects increase in Enclosure Vessel Design Temperature from 450 deg. F to 500 deg. F in this Revision (Table 2.2.3).

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# TABLE 3.4.6 (CONTINUED)MINIMUM SAFETY FACTORS FOR MPC-24E COMPONENTS DURING TIP-OVER45g DECELERATIONS

Components - Stress Result	0 Degrees	45 Degrees
Fuel Basket – Primary Membrane (P <sub>m</sub> )	-10,282 (3.59)	-7,412 (4.99)
Fuel Basket – Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending (P <sub>L</sub> + P <sub>b</sub> )	37,049 (1.50)	31,901 (1.74)
Enclosure Vessel – Primary Membrane (P <sub>m</sub> )	6,441 (6.75*.967)	6,442 (6.75*.967)
Enclosure Vessel – Primary Membrane plus Primary Bending ( $P_L + P_b$ )	23,070 (2.83*.967)	16,434 (3.97*.967)

Notes: 1. All stresses are reported in psi units and are based on closed gaps (primary stresses only).

2. The numbers shown in parentheses are the corresponding safety factors.

3. Multiplier of 0.967 reflects the increase in Enclosure Vessel Design Temperature from 450 deg. F to 500 deg. F in this Revision (Table 2.2.3).

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<b>TABLE 3.4.7</b>
STRESS INTENSITY RESULTS FOR CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY -
INTERNAL PRESSURE ONLY

Locations (Per Fig. 3.4.11)	Calculated Value of Stress Intensity (psi)	Category	Table 3.1.13 Allowable Value (psi) <sup>†</sup>	Safety Factor (Allowable/Calculated)
Top Lid				
A	1,633	$P_{L} + P_{b}$ $P_{m}$ $P_{L} + P_{b}$	25,450	15.6
Neutral Axis	21.9		16,950	774
B	1,604		25,450	15.9
C	695	$P_{L} + P_{b}$ $P_{m}$ $P_{L} + P_{b}$	25,450	36.6
Neutral Axis	732		16,950	23.2
D	2,962		25,450	8.59
<u>Baseplate</u> E Neutral Axis F	19,773 415 20,601	$P_{L} + P_{b}$ $P_{m}$ $P_{L} + P_{b}$	28,100 18,700 28,100	1.42 45.1 1.36
G	9,610	$\begin{array}{c} P_{L} + P_{b} \\ P_{m} \\ P_{L} + P_{b} \end{array}$	28,100	2.92
Neutral Axis	2,268		18,700	8.25
H	8,279		28,100	3.39

Stresses for the top lid are reported for the single lid configuration; stresses for the dual lid configuration are doubled.

<sup>†</sup> Allowable stress intensities are evaluated at 550 degrees F (lid), 400 degrees F (baseplate), and 500 degrees F (canister).

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#### TABLE 3.4.7 (CONTINUED) STRESS INTENSITY RESULTS FOR CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY -INTERNAL PRESSURE ONLY

Locations (Per Fig. 3.4.11)	Calculated Value of Stress Intensity (psi)	Category	Table 3.1.13 Allowable Value (psi) <sup>†</sup>	Safety Factor (Allowable/Calculated)
<u>Canister</u>				
I	6,788	P <sub>m</sub>	17,500	2.58
Upper Bending Boundary Layer Region	7,202 7,014	$P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$ $P_{L}$	52,500 26,300	7.29 3.75
Lower Bending Boundary Layer Region	43,645 11,349	$P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$ $P_{L}$	52,500 26,300	1.20 2.32

Allowable stress intensities are evaluated at 550 degrees F (lid), 400 degrees F (baseplate), and 500 degrees F (canister).

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<b>TABLE 3.4.8</b>
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STRESS INTENSITY RESULTS FOR
<b>CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY - PRESSURE PLUS THERMAL LOADING</b>

Locations (Per Fig. 3.4.11)	Calculated Value of Stress Intensity (psi)	Category	Allowable Stress Intensity (psi) <sup>†</sup>	Safety Factor (Allowable/Calculated)
<u>Top Lid</u>				
A Neutral Axis B C Neutral Axis D	7,866 6,553 3,409 13,646 12,182 11,145	$P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$ $P_{m} + P_{L}$ $P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$ $P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$ $P_{m} + P_{L}$ $P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$	50,850 25,450 50,850 50,850 25,450 50,850	6.46 3.88 14.9 3.73 2.09 4.56
Baseplate E Neutral Axis F G Neutral Axis H	19,417 223.1 19,860 4,836 1,201 4,473	$P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$ $P_{m} + P_{L}$ $P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$ $P_{m} + P_{L} + Q$ $P_{m} + P_{L}$ $P_{L} + P_{b} + Q$	56,100 28,100 56,100 56,100 28,100 56,100	2.89 126 2.82 11.6 23.4 12.5

Stresses for the top lid are reported for the single lid configuration; stresses for the dual lid configuration are doubled.

<sup>†</sup> Allowable stress intensities are evaluated at 550 degrees F (lid), 400 degrees F (baseplate), and 500 degrees F (canister).

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#### TABLE 3.4.8 (CONTINUED) PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STRESS INTENSITY RESULTS FOR CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY - PRESSURE PLUS THERMAL LOADING

Locations (Per Fig. 3.4.11)	Calculated Value of Stress Intensity (psi)	Category	Allowable Stress Intensity (psi) <sup>†</sup>	Safety Factor (Allowable/Calculated)
<u>Canister</u>				
I	6,799	PL	26,300	3.87
Upper Bending Boundary Layer Region	12,813 12,185	$P_L + P_b + Q$ $P_L$	52,500 26,300	4.10 2.16
Lower Bending Boundary Layer Region	48,378 12,028	P <sub>L</sub> + P <sub>b</sub> + Q P <sub>L</sub>	52,500 26,300	1.09 2.19

Allowable stress intensities are evaluated at 550 degrees F (lid), 400 degrees F (baseplate), and 500 degrees F (canister).

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Item	Loading	Safety Factor	FSAR Location Where Details are Provided
HI-STORM Top Lid Weld Shear	Tipover	3.22	3.4.4.3.2.2
HI-STORM Lid Bottom Plate	End Drop	9.777_	3.4.4.3.2.3
HI-STORM Lid Bottom Plate Welds	End Drop	2.695	3.4.4.3.2.3
Pedestal Shield Compression	End Drop	1.011	3.4.4.3.2.3
HI-STORM Inlet Vent Plate Bending Stress	End Drop	1.271	3.4.4.3.2.3
HI-STORM Lid Top Plate Bending	End Drop -100 100S	5.208 1.357	3.4.4.3.2.3
HI-TRAC Pocket Trunnion Weld	HI-TRAC Rotation	2.92	3.4.4.3.3.1
HI-TRAC 100 Optional Bolts - Tension	HI-TRAC Rotation	1.11	3.4.4.3.3.1
HI-STORM 100 Shell	Seismic Event	14.6	3.4.7
HI-TRAC Transfer Lid Door Lock Bolts	Side Drop	2.387	3.4.4.3.3.3
HI-TRAC Transfer Lid Separation	Side Drop	1.329	3.4.4.3.3.3
HI-STORM 100 Top Lid	Missile Impact	1.29	3.4.8.1
HI-STORM 100 Shell	Missile Impact	2.77	3.4.8.1
HI-TRAC Water Jacket – Enclosure Shell Bending	Pressure	1.17	3.4.4.3.3.4
HI-TRAC Water Jacket – Enclosure Shell Bending	Pressure plus Handling	1.14	3.4.4.3.3.1
HI-TRAC Water Jacket – Bottom Flange Bending	Pressure	1.39	3.4.4.3.3.4
HI-TRAC Water Jacket - Weld	Pressure	1.42	3.4.4.3.3.4
Fuel Basket Support Plate Bending	Side Drop	1.82	3.4.4.3.1.8
Fuel Basket Support Leg Stability	Side Drop	4.07	3.4.4.3.1.8
Fuel Basket Support Welds	Side Drop	1.35	3.4.4.3.1.8
MPC Cover Plates in MPC Lid	Accident Condition Internal Pressure	1.34	3.4.4.3.1.8
MPC Cover Plate Weld	Accident Condition Internal Pressure	3.89	3.4.4.3.1.8
HI-STORM Storage Overpack	External Pressure	2.88	3.4.8.1
HI-STORM Storage Overpack Circumferential Stress	Missile Strike	2.49	3.4.8.1
HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Circumferential Stress	Missile Strike	2.61	3.4.8.2
HI-TRAC Transfer Cask Axial Membrane Stress	Side Drop	2.09	3.4.9.1

## TABLE 3.4.9 SAFETY FACTORS FROM SUPPLEMENTARY CALCULATIONS

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# TABLE 3.4.10 INPUT DATA FOR SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF ANCHORED HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

Item	Data Used	Actual Value and Reference
Cask height, inch	231.25	231.25" (Dwg. 1495)
Contact diameter at ISFSI pad, inch	146.5	146.5 (Dwg. 3187)
Overpack empty, wt. Kips	270	267.87 (Table 3.2.1)
Bounding wt. of loaded MPC, kips	90	88.135 (Table 3.2.1)
Overpack-to-MPC radial gap (inch)	2.0	2.0' (Dwg. 1495, Sheets 2 and 5)
Overpack C.G. height above ISFSI	117.0	116.8 (Table 3.2.3)
pad, inch		
Overpack with Loaded MPC - C.G.	118.5	118.5 (Table 3.2.3)
height above ISFSI pad		
Applicable Response Spectra	Fig. 3.4-31 to 3.4-36	Figures 3.4-30
ZPA:	RG 1.60 Western Plant	
Horizontal 1	1.5 1.45	
Horizontal 2	1.5 1.45	Site-Specific
Vertical	1.5 1.3	
No. of Anchor Studs	28	Up to 28
Anchor Stud Diameter		
Inch	2.0	2.0 (BOM 3189)
Yield stress, ksi	80 (minimum)	Table 1.2.7
Ultimate stress, ksi	125 (minimum)	Table 1.2.7
Free length, inch*	16-42	Site-specific
Pre-load tensile stress, ksi*	55-65	55-65

\*For the confirmatory dynamic analyses, bolt spring rates were computed using the maximum length, and the preload stress was slightly above 60.1 ksi. For the static analysis, all combinations were evaluated.

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### Figure 3.4.18; HI-TRAC Upending in the Upending Frame

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## Figure 3.4.19; HI-STORM 100 Tip-Over Event

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Figure 3.4.20; HI-STORM 100 End Drop Event

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THE POOL LID

HI-TRAC LIFTING WITH THE TRANSFER LID

Figure 3.4.21; HI-TRAC Lifting with the Pool and Transfer Lids

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Figure 3.4.22; HI-TRAC Side Drop Event

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### FIGURE 3.4.24 WORKING MODEL SOLUTION FOR IMPACT FORCE ON HI-TRAC 100 TRANSFER CASK OUTER SHELL

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### FIGURE 3.4.25: HI-STORM 100 OVERTURNING SCENARIO -INITIAL ANGULAR VELOCITY = 0.628 RADIANS/SECOND ASSUMED CAUSED BY A PRESSURE PULSE

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### FIGURE 3.4.26: HI-STORM 100 OVERTURNING SCENARIO -INITIAL ANGULAR VELOCITY = 0.628 RADIANS/SECOND MAXIMUM ANGULAR EXCURSION

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## FIGURE 3.4.27; HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK IN SHORT-SIDE IMPACT (CASK RESTS AT A POSITION OF -5<sup>o</sup> FROM HORIZONTAL)



# FIGURE 3.4.28; HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK IN LONG-SIDE IMPACT (CASK RESTS AT A POSITION OF –1° FROM HORIZONTAL)

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### FIGURE 3.4.29; FREE-BODY OF TRANSFER LID DURING PRIMARY IMPACT WITH TARGET

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## FIGURE 3.4.30 SEISMIC SPECTRA SETS USED FOR TIME HISTORY ANALYSIS OF HI-STORM 100A ON ISFSI PAD

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FIGURE 3.4.32 - RG 1.60 "H2"

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FIGURE 3.4.33 - RG 1.60 "VT"

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FIGURE 3.4.34 Horizontal Acceleration Time history "FN"

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FIGURE 3.4.35 Horizontal Acceleration Time history "FP"

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FIGURE 3.4.36 Vertical Acceleration Time history "FV"

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#### FIGURE 3.4.37 GEOMETRY FOR QUASI-STATIC ANALYSIS

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#### FIGURE 3.4.38 FREE BODY FOR QUASI-STATIC ANALYSIS

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FIGURE 3.4.39 Sector Lug Finite Element Mesh

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FIGURE 3.4.40 Sector Lug Stress - Case 1 Preload

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FIGURE 3.4.41 Sector Lug Stress Intensity - Case 2 Preload + Seismic

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FIGURE 3.4.42: EXPLODED VIEW SHOWING GROUND PLANE, OVERPACK, MPC, AND OVERPACK TOP LID

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FIGURE 3.4.43: VIEW OF ASSEMBLED HI-STORM ON PAD-MPC INSIDE AND TOP LID ATTACHED (Note Extended Baseplate for Anchor Connections)

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FIGURE 3.4.44 Variation of Foundation Resistance Force vs. Time for Reg. Guide 1.60 Seismic Input

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FIGURE 3.4.45 Variation of Representative Stud Tensile Force vs. Time for Reg. Guide 1.60 Seismic Input

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FIGURE 3.4.46 MPC/HI-STORM 100A Impulse vs. Time - Reg. Guide 1.60 Event

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FIGURE 3.4.47 Instantaneous Calculated Coefficient of Friction – Reg. Guide 1.60 Event

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# FIGURE 3.4.48; HI-TRAC 125 BENCHMARK SIMULATION OF DROP SCENARIO A

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# 3.5 FUEL RODS

The cladding of the fuel rods is the initial confinement boundary in the HI-STORM 100 System. Analyses have been performed in Chapter 3 to ensure that the maximum temperature of the fuel cladding is below the Pacific Northwest Laboratory's threshold values for various cooling times. These temperature limits ensure that the fuel cladding will not degrade in an inert helium environment. Additional details on the fuel rod cladding temperature analyses for the spent fuel to be loaded into the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 3.

The dimensions of the storage cell openings in the MPC are equal to or greater than those used in spent fuel racks supplied by Holtec International. Thousands of fuel assemblies have been shuffled in and out of these cells over the years without a single instance of cladding failure. The vast body of physical evidence from prior spent fuel handling operations provides confirmation that the fuel handling and loading operations with the HI-STORM 100 MPC will not endanger or compromise the integrity of the cladding or the structural integrity of the assembly.

The HI-STORM 100 System is designed and evaluated for a maximum deceleration of 45g's. Studies of the capability of spent fuel rods to resist impact loads [3.5.1] indicate that the most vulnerable fuel can withstand 63 g's in the side impact orientation. Therefore, limiting the HI-STORM 100 System to a maximum deceleration of 45 g's (perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the overpack during all normal and hypothetical accident conditions) ensures that fuel rod cladding integrity is maintained. In [3.5.1], it is assumed that the fuel rod cladding provides the only structural resistance to bending and buckling of the rod. For accidents where the predominate deceleration is directed along the longitudinal axis of the overpack, [3.5.1] also demonstrates that no elastic instability or yielding of the cladding will occur until the deceleration level is well above the HI-STORM 100 limit of 45g's. The solutions presented in [3.5.1], however, assume that the fuel pellets are not intimately attached to the cladding when subjected to an axial deceleration load that may cause an elastic instability of the fuel rod cladding.

The limit based on classical Euler buckling analyses performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in [3.5.1] is 82 g's. In the LLNL report, the limiting axial load to ensure fuel rod stability is obtained by modeling the fuel rod as a simply supported beam with unsupported length equal to the grid strap spacing. The limit load under this condition is:

 $F = \pi^2 EI/L^2$ 

In the preceding formula, E = Young's Modulus of the cladding, I = area moment of inertia of the cladding, and L = spacing of the grid straps.

Assuming that F = WxA/g with W being the weight of a fuel rod, and A = the deceleration, the Euler buckling formula can be expressed as

$$A/g = \pi^2 (ER^3 tn/W_{fa}L^2) = \pi^2 \beta$$

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In the preceding formula, g = gravity,  $n = number of fuel rods in the fuel assembly, <math>W_{fa} =$  the total weight of the fuel assembly, t = cladding wall thickness, and R = cladding mean radius.

Using the preceding formula, a survey of a large variety of fuel assembly types in [3.5.1] concluded that a  $17 \times 17$  PWR assembly resulted in the minimum value for deceleration and results in the lower bound limit of:

## A/g = 82

The fuel pellet weight was omitted from the analysis in [3.5.1] by virtue of the assumption that under axial load, the cladding did not support the fuel pellet mass. Since the results may not be conservative because of the assumption concerning the behavior of the fuel pellet mass, a new analysis of the structural response of the fuel cladding is presented here. It is demonstrated that the maximum axially oriented deceleration that can be applied to the fuel cladding is in excess of the design basis deceleration specified in this FSAR. Therefore, the initial confinement boundary remains intact during a hypothetical accident of transport where large axially directed decelerations are experienced by the HI-STORM 100 package.

The analysis reported in this section of the FSAR considers the most limiting fuel rod in the fuel assembly. Most limiting is defined as the fuel rod that may undergo the largest bending (lateral) deformations in the event of a loss of elastic stability. The fuel rod is modeled as a thin-walled elastic tube capable of undergoing large lateral displacements in the event that high axial loads cause a loss of stability (i.e., the non-linear interaction of axial and bending behavior of the elastic tube is included in the problem formulation). The fuel rod and the fuel pellet mass is included in the analysis with the fuel pellet mass assumed to contribute only its mass to the analysis. In the HI-STORM 100 spent fuel basket, continuous support to limit lateral movement is provided to the fuel assembly along its entire length. The extent of lateral movement of any fuel rod in a fuel assembly is limited to: (1) the clearance gap between the grid straps and the fuel basket cell wall at the grid strap locations; and, (2) the maximum available gap between the fuel basket cell wall and the fuel rod in the region between the grid straps. Note that the grid straps act as fuel rod spacers at the strap locations; away from the grid straps, however, there is no restraint against fuel rod -to-rod contact under a loading giving rise to large lateral motion of the individual rods. Under the incremental application of axial deceleration to the fuel rod, the fuel rod compresses and displaces from the axially oriented inertial loads experienced. The non-linear numerical analysis proceeds to track the behavior of the fuel rod up to and beyond contact with the rigid confining walls of the HI-STORM 100 fuel basket.

The analysis is carried out for the "most limiting" spent fuel assembly. The "most limiting" criteria used herein is based on the simple elastic stability formula assuming buckling occurs only between grid straps. This is identical to the methodology employed in [3.5.1] to identify the fuel assembly that limits design basis axial deceleration loading. Table 3.5.1 presents tabular data for a wide variety of fuel assemblies. Considerable data was obtained using the tables in [3.5.2]. The configuration with the lowest value of "Beta" is the most limiting for simple elastic Euler buckling between grid straps; the Westinghouse 14x14 Vantage,"W14V", PWR configuration is used to obtain results.

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The material properties used in the non-linear analysis are those for irradiated Zircalloy and are obtained from [3.5.1]. The Young's Modulus and the cladding dynamic yield stress are set as:

E = 10,400,000 psi

 $\sigma_y = 80,500 \text{ psi}$ 

The fuel cladding material is assumed to have no tensile or compressive stress capacity beyond the material yield strength.

Calculations are performed for two limiting assumptions on the magnitude of resisting moment at the grid straps. Figures 3.5.1 through 3.5.9 aid in understanding the calculation. It is shown in the detailed calculations that the maximum stress in the fuel rod cladding occurs subsequent to the cladding deflecting and contacting the fuel basket cell wall. Two limiting analyses are carried out. The initial analysis assumes that the large deflection of the cladding between two grid straps occurs without any resisting moment at the grid strap supports. This maximizes the stress in the free span of the cladding, but eliminates all cladding stress at the grid strap supports. It is shown that this analysis provides a conservative lower bound on the limiting deceleration. The second analysis assumes a reasonable level of moment resistance to develop at the grid straps; the level developed is based on an assumed deflection shape for the cladding spans adjacent to the span subject to detailed analysis. For this second analysis, the limiting decelerations are much larger with the limit stress level occurring in the free span and at the grid strap support locations.

It is concluded that the most conservative set of assumptions on structural response still lead to the conclusion that the fuel rod cladding remains intact under the design basis deceleration levels set for the HI-STORM 100.

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Array ID	Array Name	Rod O.D. (in.)	Clad Thk. (in.)	R <sub>mean</sub> (in.)	# of Rods	Assy Wt. (lb.)	Rod Length (in.)	# of Spans	Average Span (in.)	Material Modulus	BETA
						PWR					
14x14A01	W140FA	0.4000	0.0243	0.20608	179	1177	151.85	6	25.30833	10400000	0.525127806
14x14A02	W140FA	0.4000	0.0243	0.20608	179	1177	151.85	6	25.30833	10400000	0.525127806
14x14A03	W14V	0.4000	0.0243	0.20608	179	1177	151.85	6	25.30833	10400000	0.525127806
14x14B01	W14STD	0.4220	0.0243	0.21708	179	1302	152.4	6	25.4	10400000	0.550863067
14x14B02	XX14TR	0.4170	0.0295	0.21588	179	1215	152	6	25.33333	10400000	0.708523868
14x14B03	XX14STD	0.4240	0.0300	0.21950	179	1271.2	149.1	8	18.6375	10400000	1.337586884
14x14C01	CE14	0.4400	0.0280	0.22700	176	1270	147	8	18.375	10400000	1.398051576
14x14C02	CE14	0.4400	0.0280	0.22700	176	1220	137	8	17.125	10400000	1.67556245
14x14D01	W14SS	0.4220	0.0165	0.21513	180	1247	126.68	6	21.11333	24700000	1.31385062
15x15A01	CE15P	0.4180	0.0260	0.21550	204	1360	140	9	15.55556	10400000	1.677523904
15x15B01	W15OFA	0.4220	0.0245	0.2.1713	204	1459	151.85	6	25.30833	10400000	0.569346561
15x15B02	W15V5H	0.4220	0.0245	0.21713	204	1459	151.85	6	25.30833	10400000	0.569346561
15x15B03	W15	0.4220	0.0243	0.21708	204	1440	151.83	6	25.305	10400000	0.571905185
15x15B04	W15	0.4220	0.0243	0.21708	204	1443	151.83	6	25.305	10400000	0.570716193
15x15B05	15(2a-319)	0.4220	0.0242	0.21705	204	1472	151.88	6	25.31333	10400000	0.556610964
15x15C01	SPC15	0.4240	0.0300	0.21950	204	1425	152	6	25.33333	10400000	0.73601861
15x15C02	SPC15	0.4240	0.0300	0.21950	204	1425	152	6	25.33333	10400000	0.73601861
15x15C03	XX15	0.4240	0.0300	0.21950	204	1432.8	152.065	6	25.34417	10400000	0.731386148
15x15C04	XX15	0.4170	0.0300	0.21600	204	1338.6	139.423	9	15.49144	10400000	1.996693327
15x15D01	BW15	0.4300	0.0265	0.22163	208	1515	153.68	7	21.95429	10400000	0.854569793
15x15D02	BW15	0.4300	0.0265	0.22163	208	1515	153.68	7	21.95429	10400000	0.854569793
15x15D03	BW15	0.4300	0.0265	0.22163	208	1515	153.68	7	21.95429	10400000	0.854569793
15x15G01	HN15SS	0.4220	0.0165	0.21513	204	1421	126.72	6	21.12	24700000	1.305875606
16x16A01	CE16	0.3820	0.0250	0.19725	236	1430	161	10	16.1	10400000	1.270423729

# Table 3.5.1 FUEL ASSEMBLY DIMENSIONAL DATA

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# Table 3.5.1 FUEL ASSEMBLY DIMENSIONAL DATA (continued)

Array ID	Array	Rod O.D.	Clad Thk.	R <sub>mean</sub> (in.)	# of Rods	Assy Wt.	Rod Length	# of Spans	Average	Material	BETA
	Name	(in.)	(in.)			(İb)	(in.)		Span (in.)	Modulus	
16x16A02	CE16	0.3820	0.0250	0.19725	236	1300	146.499	9	16.27767	10400000	1.367126598
17x17A01	W17OFA	0.3600	0.0225	0.18563	264	1373	151.635	7	21.66214	10400000	0.613275783
17x17A02	W17OFA	0.3600	0.0225	0.18563	264	1365	152.3	7	21.75714	10400000	0.611494853
17x17B01	W17STD	0.3740	0.0225	0.19263	264	1482	151.635	7	21.66214	10400000	0.634902014
17x17B02	W17P+	0.3740	0.0225	0.19263	264	1482	151.635	7	21.66214	10400000	0.634902014
17x17C01	BW17	0.3790	0.0240	0.19550	264	1505	152.688	7	21.81257	10400000	0.687604262
					E	SWR					
6x6A02	XX/ANF6	0.5645	0.0360	0.29125	36	328.4	116.65	4	29.1625	10400000	1.192294364
6x6C01	HB6	0.5630	0.0320	0.28950	36	270	83	3	20.75	10400000	2.500527046
7x7A01	HB7	0.4860	0.0330	0.25125	49	276	83.2	3	20.8	10400000	2.233705011
7x7B01	GE-7	0.5630	0.0320	0.28950	49	682.5	159	7	19.875	10400000	1.467601583
7x7B02	GE-7	0.5630	0.0370	0.29075	49	681	164	7	20.5	10400000	1.619330439
7x7B03	GE-7	0.5630	0.0370	0.29075	49	674.4	164	7	20.5	10400000	1.635177979
7x7B04	GE-7	0.5700	0.0355	0.29388	49	600	161.1	7	20.1375	10400000	1.887049713
7x7B05	GE-7	0.5630	0.0340	0.29000	49	600	161.1	7	20.1375	10400000	1.736760659
8x8B03	GE-8	0.4930	0.0340	0.25500	63	681	164	7	20.5	10400000	1.2906798
8x8C02	GE-8R	0.4830	0.0320	0.24950	62	600	159	7	19.875	10400000	1.352138354
8x8C03	GE-8R	0.4830	0.0320	0.24950	62	600	163.71	7	20.46375	10400000	1.27545448
9x9D01	XX/ANF9	0.4240	0.0300	0.21950	79	575.3	163.84	8	18.20444	10400000	1.367212516
10x10E01	XX10SS	0.3940	0.0220	0.20250	96	376.6	89.98	4	17.996	24700000	3.551678654

Array ID, Rod OD, Clad Thk and # of Rods from Tables 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Rmean, Average Span and THETA are Calculated.

Zircaloy Modulus from LLNL Report [2.9.1].

Stainless Steel (348H) Modulus from ASME Code, Section III, Part D.

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# Table 3.5.1 FUEL ASSEMBLY DIMENSIONAL DATA (continued)

PWR Assy. Wt., Rod Len. and # of Spans (exc. as noted below) from DOE/RW-0184, Vol. 3, UC-70, -71 and -85, Dec. 1987. Assy. Wt., Rod Len. and # of Spans for 15x15B03, 15x15B04, 15x15C01 and 15x15C02 from ORNL/TM-9591/V1-R1. BWR Assy. Wt., Rod Len. and # of Spans (exc. as noted below) from ORNL/TM-10902. Assy. Wt., Rod Len. and # of Spans for 6x6A02, 9x9D01 and 10x10E01 from DOE/RW-0184, Vol. 3, UC-70, -71 and -85, Dec. 1987. Assy. Wt., Rod Len. and # of Spans for 7x7B04 and 7x7B05 from ORNL/TM-9591/V1-R1. Assy. Wt. for 8x8C02 and 8x8C03 from ORNL/TM-9591/V1-R1.

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In the following, a physical description of the structural instability problem is provided with the aid of Figures 3.5.1 to 3.5.9. A stored fuel assembly consists of a square grid of fuel rods. Each fuel rod consists of a thin-walled cylinder surrounding and containing the fuel pellets. The majority of the total weight of a fuel rod is in the fuel pellets; however, the entire structural resistance of the fuel rod to lateral and longitudinal loads is provided by the cladding. Hereinafter, the use of the words "fuel rod", "fuel rod cladding", or just "cladding" means the structural thin cylinder. The weight of the fuel pellets is conservatively assumed to be attached to the cladding for all discussions and evaluations.

Figure 3.5.1 shows a typical fuel rod in a fuel assembly. Also shown in Figure 3.5.1 are the grid straps and the surrounding walls of the spent fuel basket cell walls. The grid straps serve to maintain the fuel rods in a square array at a certain number of locations along the length of the fuel assembly. When the fuel rod is subject to a loading causing a lateral deformation, the grid strap locations are the first locations along the length of the rod where contact with the fuel basket cell walls occurs. The fuel basket cell walls are assumed to be rigid surfaces. The fuel rod is assumed subject to some axial load and most likely has some slight initially deformed shape. For the purposes of the analysis, it is assumed that displacement under load occurs in a 2-D plane and that the ends of the fuel rod cladding have a specified boundary condition to restrain lateral deflection. The ends of the fuel rod cladding are assumed to be simply supported and the grid straps along the length of the fuel assembly are assumed to have gap " $g_1$ " relative to the cell walls of the fuel basket. The figure shows a typical fuel rod in the assembly that is located by gaps "g2" and "g3" with respect to the fuel basket walls. Because the individual fuel rod is long and slender and is not perfectly straight, it will deform under a small axial load into the position shown in Figure 3.5.2. The actual axial load is due to the distributed weight subject to a deceleration from a hypothetical accident of transport. For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that some equivalent axial load is applied to one end of the fuel rod cladding. Because of the distributed weight and the fact that a deceleration load is not likely to be exactly axially oriented, the predominately axial load will induce a lateral displacement of the fuel rod cladding between the two end supports. The displacement will not be symmetric but will be larger toward the end of the cladding where support against the axial deceleration is provided. Depending on the number of grid straps, either one or two grid straps will initially make contact with the fuel basket cell wall and the contact will not be exactly centered along the length of the cell. Figure 3.5.3 illustrates the position of the fuel rod after the axial load has increased beyond the value when initial contact occurred and additional grid straps are now in contact with the cell wall. The maximum stress in the fuel rod will occur at the location of maximum curvature and will be a function of the bending moment  $(F_2 x(g_2-g_1)).$ 

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At some load  $F_3 > F_2$ , either the limit stress in the fuel rod cladding is achieved or the rod begins to experience large lateral movements between grid plates because of the coupling between axial and lateral load and deformation. Figure 3.5.4 shows the deformation mode experienced by the fuel rod cladding caused by the onset of an instability between two grid straps that are in contact with the fuel basket cell wall.

Once the lateral displacement initiates, the rod displaces until contact with the cell wall occurs at the mid point "A" (see Figure 3.5.5) or the cladding stress exceeds the cladding material yield strength. Depending on the particular location of the fuel rod in the fuel assembly, the highest stressed portion of the fuel rod will occur in the segment with the larger of the two gaps " $g_2$ " and " $g_3$ ". For the discussion to follow, assume that  $g_2 > g_3$ . The boundary condition at the grid strap is conservatively assumed as simply-supported so that the analysis need not consider what happens in adjacent spans between grid straps. At this point in the loading process, the maximum bending moment occurs at the contact point and has the value  $F_4 \propto (g_2-g_1)$ . Figure 3.5.5 shows the displaced configuration at the load level where initial contact occurs with the fuel cell wall. If the maximum fuel rod stress (from the bending moment and from the axial load) equals the yield stress of the fuel rod cladding, it is assumed that  $F_3 = F_4$  is the maximum axial load that can be supported. The maximum stress in the fuel rod cladding occurs at point "A" in Figure 3.5.5 since that location has the maximum bending moment. If the cladding stress is still below yield, additional load can be supported. As the load is further increased, the bending moment is decreased and replaced by reaction loads, "V", at the grid strap and the contact point. These reaction loads V are shown in Figure 3.5.7 and are normal to the cell wall surface. Figure 3.5.6 shows the configuration after the load has been further increased from the value at initial contact. There are two distinct regions that need to be considered subsequent to initial contact with the fuel basket cell wall. During the additional loading phase, the point "A" becomes two "traveling" points, A, and A'. Since the bending moment at A' and A is zero, the moment  $F_5 x (g_2-g_1)$ is balanced by forces V at the grid strap and at point A or A'. This is shown in Figure 3.5.7 where the unsupported length current "a" is shown with the balancing load. At this point in the process, two "failure" modes are possible for the fuel rod cladding.

The axial load that develops in the unsupported region between the grid strap and point A' causes increased deformation and stress in that segment, or,

The straight region of the rod, between A and A', begins to experience a lateral deformation away from the cell wall.

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Note that in this latter scenario, the slope at A or A' remains zero so this should never govern unless the flat region becomes large. The final limit load occurs when the maximum stress in either portion of the rod exceeds the yield stress of the tube. In what follows, the most limiting fuel assembly from the array of fuel types considered is subject to detailed analysis and the limit load established. This limit axial load is considered as the product of the fuel rod weight times the deceleration. Therefore, establishing the limit load to reach cladding material yield establishes the limiting axial deceleration that can be imposed.

The preceding discussion has assumed end conditions of simple support for conservatism. The location of the fuel rod determines the actual free gap between grid straps. For example, a fuel rod furthest from the cell wall that resists lateral movement of the assembly moves to close up all of the clearances that exist between it and the resisting cell wall. The clearance between rods is the rod pitch minus the rod diameter. In a 14 x 14 assembly, there are 13 clearance gaps plus an additional clearance  $g_3$  between the nearest rod and the cell wall. Therefore, the gap  $g_2$  is given as

 $g_2 = 13$ (pitch-diameter) +  $g_3$ 

Figure 3.5.9 provides an illustration of the fuel rod deformation for a case of 5 fuel rods in a column. Clearly for this case, the available lateral movement can be considerable for the "furthest" fuel rod. On the other hand, for this fuel rod, there will be considerable moment resistance at the grid strap from the adjacent section of the fuel rod. The situation is different when the rod being analyzed is assumed to be the closest to the cell wall. In this case, the clearance gap is much smaller, but the moment resistance provided by adjacent sections of the rod is reduced. For calculation purposes, we assume that a moment resistance is provided as  $M = f x K\theta$  for the fuel rod under analysis where

K = 3EI/L, L= span between grid straps, and "f" is an assumed fraction of K

The preceding result for the rotational spring constant assumes a simple support at each end of the span with an end moment "M" applied. Classical strength of materials gives the result for the spring constant. The arbitrary assumption of a constant reduction in the spring constant is to account for undetermined interactions between axial force in the rod and the calculated spring constant. As the compressive force in the adjacent members increases, the spring constant will be reduced. On the other hand, as the adjacent span contacts its near cell wall, the spring constant increases. On balance, it should be conservative to assume a considerable reduction in the spring constant available to the span being analyzed in detail. As a further conservatism, we also use the angle  $\theta$  defined by the geometry and not include any additional elastic displacement shape. This will further reduce the value of the resisting moment at any stage of the solution. In the detailed calculations, two limiting cases are examined. To limit the analysis to a single rod, it is assumed that after "stack-up" of the rods (see Figure 3.5.9), the lateral support provided by the cell wall supports all of the rods. That is, the rods are considered to have non-deforming cross-section.

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Numerical Analysis - Based on the tabular results in Table 3.5.1, the fuel assembly with the smallest value for the deceleration based on the classical Euler buckling formula is analyzed in detail. The following input data is specified for the limiting 14 x 14 assembly [3.5.2]:

Inside dimension of a HI-STORM 100 fuel basket cell Outside envelope dimension of grid plate	l s := 8.75·in gp := 7.763·in
Outer diameter of fuel rod cladding	D := .4·in
Wall thickness of cladding	t := .0243·in
Weight of fuel assembly(including end fittings)	W := 1177·lbf
Number of fuel rods + guide/instrument tubes in a column or row	n := 14
Overall length of fuel rod between assumed end suppo	$L_t := 151 \cdot in$
Length of fuel rod between grid straps	L <sub>s</sub> := 25.3·in
Average clearance to cell wall at a grid strap location assuming a straight and centered fuel assembly	$g_1 := .5 \cdot (s - gp)$ $g_1 = 0.494$ in
Rod pitch	pitch := 0.556·in
Clearance := $(n - 1) \cdot (pitch - D)$ Cl	earance $= 2.028$ in
Minimum available clearance for lateral movement of rod between grid straps	a fuel
$g_3 := g_1 + .5 \cdot [gp - (n \cdot f_1)]$	D + Clearance)]
	$g_3 = 0.561 \text{ in}$
Maximum available clearances for lateral movement of fuel rod between grid straps	of a $g_2 := g_3 + Clearance$
	$g_2 = 2.589 in$
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This FSAR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.

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Young's Modulus of Zircalloy [3.5.1]	E := 10400000-psi
Dynamic Yield Strength of Zircalloy [3.5.1]	σ <sub>y</sub> := 80500·psi

Geometry Calculations:

Compute the metal cross section area A, the metal area moment of inertia I, and the total weight of a single fuel rod (conservatively assume that end fittings are only supported by fuel rods in the loading scenario of interest).

A := 
$$\frac{\pi}{4} \cdot \left[ D^2 - (D - 2 \cdot t)^2 \right]$$
  
A = 0.029 in<sup>2</sup>  
I :=  $\frac{\pi}{64} \cdot \left[ D^4 - (D - 2 \cdot t)^4 \right]$   
I = 5.082 × 10<sup>-4</sup> in<sup>4</sup>

$$W_r := \frac{W}{n^2} \qquad W_r = 6.005 \, lbf$$

As an initial lower bound calculation, assume no rotational support from adjacent spans and define a multiplying factor

f := 0.0

Compute the rotational spring constant available from adjacent sections of the rod.

$$K := 3 \cdot E \cdot \frac{I}{L_s} \cdot f \qquad \qquad K = 0 \, lbf \cdot in$$

Now compute the limit load, if applied at one end of the fuel rod cladding, that causes an overall elastic instability and contact with the cell wall. Assume buckling in a symmetric mode for a conservatively low result. The purpose of this calculation is solely to demonstrate the flexibility of the single fuel rod. No resisting moment capacity is assumed to be present at the fittings.

$$P_0 := \pi^2 \cdot E \cdot \frac{I}{L_t^2}$$
  $P_0 = 2.288 \, lbf$ 

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Note that this is less than the weight of the rod itself. This demonstrates that in the absence of any additional axial support, the fuel rod will bow and be supported by the cell walls under a very small axial load. In reality, however, there is additional axial support that would increase this initial buckling load. The stress induced in the rod by this overall deflected shape is small.

Stress<sub>1</sub> := 
$$\frac{P_0 \cdot g_1 \cdot D}{2 \cdot I}$$
 Stress<sub>1</sub> = 444.32 psi  
Stress<sub>d</sub> :=  $\frac{P_0}{A}$  Stress<sub>d</sub> = 79.76 psi

The conclusion of this initial calculation is that grid straps come in contact and we need only consider what happens between a grid strap. We first calculate the classical Euler buckling load based on a pin-ended rod and assuming conservatively that the entire weight of the rod is providing the axial driving force. This gives a conservatively low estimate of the limiting deceleration that can be resisted before a perfectly straight rod buckles.

$$a_{lim1} := \pi^2 \cdot E \cdot \frac{I}{L_s^2 \cdot W_r}$$
  $a_{lim1} = 13.57$ 

The rigid body angle of rotation at the grid strap under this load that causes contact is:

$$\theta_1 := \operatorname{atan}\left[2 \cdot \frac{(g_2 - g_1)}{L_s}\right] \qquad \theta_1 = 9.406 \operatorname{deg}$$

Conservatively assume resisting moment at the grid is proportional to this "rigid body" angle:

 $M_r := K \cdot \theta_1$   $M_r = 0$  in lbf (in this first analysis, no resisting moment is assumed)

The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and the resisting moment is

$$\sigma_{gs} := \frac{W_{r} \cdot a_{lim1}}{A} + \frac{M_{r} \cdot D}{2 \cdot I} \qquad \sigma_{gs} = 2841.172 \, psi$$

The total stress at the contact location is

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$$Stress_{2} := \frac{\left[ W_{r} \cdot a_{\lim 1} \cdot \left(g_{2} - g_{1}\right) - M_{r} \right] \cdot D}{2 \cdot I} \qquad Stress_{2} = 6.721 \times 10^{4} \text{ psi}$$

$$Stress_{2d} := \frac{W_{r} \cdot a_{\lim 1}}{A} \qquad Stress_{2d} = 2841.172 \text{ psi}$$

$$Stress_{2t} := Stress_{2} + Stress_{2d} \qquad Stress_{2t} = 7.005 \times 10^{4} \text{ psi}$$

This is the maximum value of the stress at this location since, for further increase in axial load, the moment will decrease with consequent large decrease in the total stress.

The safety factor is

$$\frac{\sigma_y}{\text{Stress}_{2t}} = 1.149$$

The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is

$$P_{ax} := \frac{(W_r \cdot a_{lim1})}{\cos(\theta_1)}$$
$$P_{ax} = 82.599 \,lbf$$

At this point in the load process, a certain axial load exists in the unsupported span on either side of the contact point. However, since the unsupported span is approximately 50% of the original span, the allowable deceleration limit is larger. As the axial load is incrementally increased, the moment at the contact point is reduced to zero with consequent increases in the lateral force V at the grid strap and at the contact points A and A'. Figure 3.5.8 provides the necessary information to determine the elastic deformation that occurs in the unsupported span as the axial load increases and the contact points separate (and, therefore, decreasing the free span).

From geometry, coupled with the assumption that the deflected shape is a half "sin" function with peak value " $\delta$ ", the following relations are developed:

Assume "a" is a fraction of 50% of the span (the following calculations show only the final iterated assumption for the fraction

 $\varepsilon := .9$  $a := \varepsilon \cdot \left(\frac{L_s}{2}\right)$  a = 11.385 in

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Calculate "b" in Figure 3.5.8

b := 
$$[(a)^{2} + (g_{2} - g_{1})^{2}]^{.5}$$
 b = 11.576 in

an equation for  $\delta$  can be developed from the geometric relation

$$\frac{(g_2-g_1)}{a}:=\frac{b}{2(R-\delta)}$$

The inverse of the radius of curvature, R, at the point of peak elastic deflection of the free span, is computed as the second derivative of the assumed sin wave deflection shape. Based on the geometry in Figure 3.5.8, the peak deflection is:

$$\delta := .5 \cdot \left[ \left[ a \cdot \frac{b}{2 \cdot \left(g_2 - g_1\right)} \right]^2 + 4 \cdot \left(\frac{b}{\pi}\right)^2 \right]^{.5} - a \cdot \frac{b}{4 \cdot \left(g_2 - g_1\right)} \right]^{.5} - a \cdot \frac{b}{4 \cdot \left(g_2 - g_1\right)} = 0$$

$$\delta = 0.426 \, \text{in}$$

For the assumed "a", the limiting axial load capacity in the unsupported region is conservatively estimated as:

$$a_{\lim 2} := \pi^2 \cdot E \cdot \frac{I}{(b)^2 \cdot W_r}$$
  $a_{\lim 2} = 64.816$ 

The corresponding rigid body angle is:

$$\theta_2 := \operatorname{atan}\left[1 \cdot \frac{(g_2 - g_1)}{a}\right] \qquad \theta_2 = 10.429 \operatorname{deg}$$

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The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is

$$P_{ax} := \frac{(W_r \cdot a_{\lim 2})}{\cos(\theta_2)}$$

$$P_{ax} = 395.763 \, \text{lbf}$$

The resisting moment is

 $M_r := K \cdot \theta_2$   $M_r = 0 in \cdot lbf$ 

The total stress in the middle of the unsupported section of free span "b" is

stress<sub>3</sub> := 
$$\frac{(P_{ax} \cdot \delta - M_r) \cdot D}{2 \cdot I}$$
 stress<sub>3</sub> =  $6.635 \times 10^4 \text{ psi}$   
stress<sub>3d</sub> :=  $\frac{P_{ax}}{A}$  stress<sub>3d</sub> =  $1.38 \times 10^4 \text{ psi}$ 

 $stress_{3t} := stress_3 + stress_{3d}$ 

stress<sub>3t</sub> =  $8.015 \times 10^4$  psi

The safety factor is

$$\frac{\sigma_y}{\text{stress}_{3t}} = 1.004$$

The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and any the resisting moment is

$$\sigma_{gs} := \frac{W_{r} \cdot a_{lim2}}{A} + \frac{M_{r} \cdot D}{2 \cdot I} \qquad \sigma_{gs} = 1.357 \times 10^{4} \text{ psi}$$
  
The safety factor is  $\frac{\sigma_{y}}{\sigma_{gs}} = 5.932$ 

For this set of assumptions, the stress capacity of the rod cladding has been achieved, so that the limit deceleration is:

$$A_{limit} := a_{lim2} \qquad A_{limit} = 64.816$$

This exceeds the design basis for the HI-STORM 100 package.

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If there is any restraining moment from the adjacent span, there is a possibility of exceeding the rod structural limits at that location due to the induced stress. Therefore, the above calculations are repeated for an assumed moment capacity at the grid strap.

$$\mathbf{f} := \mathbf{1}. \qquad \qquad \mathbf{K} := \mathbf{3} \cdot \mathbf{E} \cdot \frac{\mathbf{I}}{\mathbf{L}_{s}} \cdot \mathbf{f}$$

The rigid body angle of rotation at the grid strap under this load that causes contact is:

$$\theta_1 := \operatorname{atan}\left[2 \cdot \frac{(g_2 - g_1)}{L_s}\right] \qquad \theta_1 = 9.406 \operatorname{deg}$$

Conservatively assume resisting moment at the grid a function of this angle, is

$$M_r := K \cdot \theta_1 \qquad M_r = 102.875 \text{ in lbf}$$

The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and the resisting moment is

$$\sigma_{gs} := \frac{W_{r} \cdot a_{lim1}}{A} + \frac{M_{r} \cdot D}{2 \cdot I} \qquad \sigma_{gs} = 4.333 \times 10^{4} \text{ psi}$$

The total stress at the contact location is

$$Stress_{2} := \frac{\left[W_{r} \cdot a_{\lim 1} \cdot \left(g_{2} - g_{1}\right) - M_{r}\right] \cdot D}{2 \cdot I} \qquad Stress_{2} = 2.672 \times 10^{4} \text{ psi}$$

$$Stress_{2d} := \frac{W_{r} \cdot a_{\lim 1}}{A} \qquad Stress_{2d} = 2841.172 \text{ psi}$$

$$Stress_{2t} := Stress_{2} + Stress_{2d} \qquad Stress_{2t} = 2.956 \times 10^{4} \text{ psi}$$

This is the maximum value of the stress at this location since, for further increase in axial load, the moment will decrease with consequent large decrease in the total stress.

The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is

$$P_{ax} := \frac{(W_r \cdot a_{lim1})}{\cos(\theta_1)} \qquad P_{ax} = 82.599 \, lbf$$

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At this point in the load process, a certain axial load exists in the unsupported span on either side of the contact point. However, since the unsupported span is approximately 50% of the original span, the allowable deceleration limit is larger. As the axial load is incrementally increased, the moment at the contact point is reduced to zero with consequent increases in the lateral force V at the grid strap and at the contact points A and A'. Figure 3.5.8 provides the necessary information to determine the elastic deformation that occurs in the unsupported span as the axial load increases and the contact points separate (and, therefore, decreasing the free span).

From geometry, coupled with the assumption that the deflected shape is a half "sin" function with peak value " $\delta$ ", the following relations are developed:

Assume "a" is a fraction of 50% of the span (the following calculations show only the final iterated assumption for the fraction

$$\varepsilon := .7$$
  
 $a := \varepsilon \cdot \left(\frac{L_s}{2}\right)$   $a = 8.855 \text{ in}$ 

Calculate "b" in Figure 3.5.8

b := 
$$[(a)^{2} + (g_{2} - g_{1})^{2}]^{.5}$$
 b = 9.1 in

The inverse of the radius of curvature, R, at the point of peak elastic deflection of the free span, is computed as the second derivative of the assumed sin wave deflection shape. Based on the geometry in Figure 3.5.8, the peak deflection is:

$$\delta := .5 \cdot \left[ \left[ a \cdot \frac{b}{2 \cdot \left(g_2 - g_1\right)} \right]^2 + 4 \cdot \left(\frac{b}{\pi}\right)^2 \right]^{.5} - a \cdot \frac{b}{4 \cdot \left(g_2 - g_1\right)} \right]$$

$$\delta = 0.427 \, \text{in}$$

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For the assumed "a", the limiting axial load capacity in the unsupported region is conservatively estimated as:

$$a_{\lim 2} := \pi^2 \cdot E \cdot \frac{I}{(b)^2 \cdot W_r}$$
  $a_{\lim 2} = 104.9$ 

The corresponding rigid body angle is:

$$\theta_2 := \operatorname{atan}\left[1 \cdot \frac{(g_2 - g_1)}{a}\right] \qquad \theta_2 = 13.314 \operatorname{deg}$$

The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is

$$P_{ax} := \frac{(W_r \cdot a_{lim2})}{\cos(\theta_2)} \qquad P_{ax} = 647.331 \, lbf$$

The resisting moment is

$$M_r := K \cdot \theta_2 \qquad \qquad M_r = 145.619 \text{ in lbf}$$

The total stress in the middle of the unsupported section of free span "b" is

stress<sub>3</sub> := 
$$\frac{(P_{ax} \cdot \delta - M_r) \cdot D}{2 \cdot I}$$
 stress<sub>3</sub> =  $5.145 \times 10^4 \text{ psi}$   
stress<sub>3d</sub> :=  $\frac{P_{ax}}{A}$  stress<sub>3d</sub> =  $2.257 \times 10^4 \text{ psi}$ 

stress<sub>3t</sub> := stress<sub>3</sub> + stress<sub>3d</sub> stress<sub>3t</sub> = 
$$7.402 \times 10^4$$
 psi

The safety factor is

$$\frac{\sigma_y}{\text{stress}_{3t}} = 1.088$$

The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and any the resisting moment is

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$$\sigma_{gs} := \frac{W_{r} \cdot a_{lim2}}{A} + \frac{M_{r} \cdot D}{2 \cdot I} \qquad \sigma_{gs} = 7.928 \times 10^{4} \text{ psi}$$

The safety factor is

$$\frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_{gs}} = 1.015$$

For this set of assumptions, the stress capacity of the rod cladding has been achieved, so that the limit deceleration is:

 $A_{limit} := a_{lim2}$   $A_{limit} = 104.9$ 

## Conclusions

An analysis has demonstrated that for the most limiting PWR fuel assembly stored in the HI-STORM 100 fuel basket, a conservative lower bound limit on acceptable axial decelerations exceeds the 45g design basis of the cask. For a reasonable assumption of moment resisting capacity at the grid straps, the axial deceleration limit exceeds the design basis by a large margin.

It is concluded that fuel rod integrity is maintained in the event of a hypothetical accident condition leading to a 45g design basis deceleration in the direction normal to the target.

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### 3.6 SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

## 3.6.1 <u>Additional Codes and Standards Referenced in HI-STORM 100 System Design and</u> <u>Fabrication</u>

The following additional codes, standards and practices were used as aids in developing the design, manufacturing, quality control and testing methods for HI-STORM 100 System:

#### a. Design Codes

- (1) AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 1964 Edition and later.
- (2) ANSI N210-1976, "Design Requirements for Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations".
- (3) American Concrete Institute Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete, ACI-318-95.
- (4) Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures, ACI349-85/ACI349R-85, and ACI349.1R-80.
- (5) ASME NQA-1, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities.
- (6) ASME NQA-2-1989, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications.
- (7) ANSI Y14.5M, Dimensioning and Tolerancing for Engineering Drawings and Related Documentation Practices.
- (8) ACI Detailing Manual 1980.
- (9) Crane Manufacturer's Association of America, Inc., CMAA Specification #70, Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes, Revised 1988.
- b. <u>Material Codes Standards of ASTM</u>

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- (1) E165 Standard Methods for Liquid Penetrant Inspection.
- (2) A240 Standard Specification for Heat-Resisting Chromium and Chromium-Nickel Stainless Steel Plate, Sheet and Strip for Fusion-Welded Unfired Pressure Vessels.

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- (3) A262 Detecting Susceptibility to Intergranular Attack in Austenitic Stainless Steel.
- (4) A276 Standard Specification for Stainless and Heat-Resisting Steel Bars and Shapes.
- (5) A479 Steel Bars for Boilers & Pressure Vessels.
- (6) ASTM A564, Standard Specification for Hot-Rolled and Cold-Finished Age-Hardening Stainless and Heat-Resisting Steel Bars and Shapes.
- (7) C750 Standard Specification for Nuclear-Grade Boron Carbide Powder.
- (8) A380 Recommended Practice for Descaling, Cleaning and Marking Stainless Steel Parts and Equipment.
- (9) C992 Standard Specification for Boron-Based Neutron Absorbing Material Systems for Use in Nuclear Spent Fuel Storage Racks.
- (10) ASTM E3, Preparation of Metallographic Specimens.
- (11) ASTM E190, Guided Bend Test for Ductility of Welds.
- (12) NCA3800 Metallic Material Manufacturer's and Material Supplier's Quality System Program.
- c. <u>Welding Codes</u>: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX Welding and Brazing Qualifications, 1995 Edition.
- d. <u>Quality Assurance, Cleanliness, Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling</u> <u>Requirements</u>
  - (1) ANSI 45.2.1 Cleaning of Fluid Systems and Associated Components during Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.
  - (2) ANSI N45.2.2 Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items for Nuclear Power Plants (During the Construction Phase).
  - (3) ANSI N45.2.6 Qualifications of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants (Regulatory Guide 1.58).

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- (4) ANSI-N45.2.8, Supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for Installation, Inspection and Testing of Mechanical Equipment and Systems for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.
- (5) ANSI N45.2.11, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants.
- (6) ANSI-N45.2.12, Requirements for Auditing of Quality Assurance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants.
- (7) ANSI N45.2.13 Quality Assurance Requirements for Control of Procurement of Equipment Materials and Services for Nuclear Power Plants (Regulatory Guide 1.123).
- (8) ANSI N45.2.15-18 Hoisting, Rigging, and Transporting of Items for Nuclear Power Plants.
- (9) ANSI N45.2.23 Qualification of Quality Assurance Program Audit Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants (Regulatory Guide 1.146).
- (10) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel, Section V, Nondestructive Examination, 19955 Edition.
- (11) ANSI N16.9-75 Validation of Calculation Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety.

#### e. <u>Reference NRC Design Documents</u>

- (1) NUREG-0800, Radiological Consequences of Fuel Handling Accidents.
- (2) NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants", USNRC, Washington, D.C., July, 1980.
- (3) NUREG-1536, "Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems", USNRC, January 1997, Final Report.
- f. Other ANSI Standards (not listed in the preceding)
  - (1) ANSI/ANS 8.1 (N16.1) Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors.
  - (2) ANSI/ANS 8.17, Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors.
  - (3) N45.2 Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities 1971.

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- (4) N45.2.9 Requirements for Collection, Storage and Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records for Nuclear Power Plants 1974.
- (5) N45.2.10 Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions 1973.
- (6) ANSI/ANS 57.2 (N210) Design Requirements for Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants.
- (7) N14.6 (1993) American National Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials.
- (8) ANSI/ASME N626-3, Qualification and Duties of Personnel Engaged in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Div. 1, Certifying Activities.

#### g. <u>Code of Federal Regulations</u>

- (1) 10CFR20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation.
- (2) 10CFR21 Reporting of Defects and Non-compliance.
- (3) 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.
- (4) 10CFR50 Appendix B Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants.
- (5) 10CFR61 Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Material.
- (6) 10CFR71 Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material.
- h. <u>Regulatory Guides</u>
  - (1) RG 1.13 Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis (Revision 2 Proposed).
  - (2) RG 1.25 Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility of Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors.
  - (3) RG 1.28 (ANSI N45.2) Quality Assurance Program Requirements.
  - (4) RG 1.29 Seismic Design Classification (Rev. 3).
  - (5) RG 1.31 Control of Ferrite Content in Stainless Steel Weld Material.

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- (6) RG 1.38 (ANSI N45.2.2) Quality Assurance Requirements for Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.
- (7) RG 1.44 Control of the Use of Sensitized Stainless Steel.
- (8) RG 1.58 (ANSI N45.2.6) Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel.
- (9) RG 1.61 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 0, 1973.
- (10) RG 1.64 (ANSI N45.2.11) Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants.
- (11) RG 1.71 Welder Qualifications for Areas of Limited Accessibility.
- (12) RG 1.74 (ANSI N45.2.10) Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions.
- (13) RG 1.85 Materials Code Case Acceptability ASME Section 3, Div. 1.
- (14) RG 1.88 (ANSI N45.2.9) Collection, Storage and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance Records.
- (15) RG 1.92 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis.
- (16) RG 1.122 Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components.
- (17) RG 1.123 (ANSI N45.2.13) Quality Assurance Requirements for Control of Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants.
- (18) RG 1.124 Service Limits and Loading Combinations for Class 1 Linear-Type Component Supports, Revision 1, 1978.
- (19) Reg. Guide 3.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials at Fuels and Materials Facilities.
- (20) RG 3.41 Validation of Calculational Methods for Nuclear Criticality Safety, Revision 1, 1977.
- (21) Reg. Guide 8.8 Information Relative to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposure at Nuclear Power Plants will be as Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA).

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- (22) DG-8006, "Control of Access to High and Very High Radiation Areas in Nuclear Power Plants".
- i. Branch Technical Position
  - (1) CPB 9.1-1 Criticality in Fuel Storage Facilities.
  - (2) ASB 9-2 Residual Decay Energy for Light-Water Reactors for Long-Term Cooling.
- j. <u>Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800)</u>
  - (1) SRP 3.2.1 Seismic Classification.
  - (2) SRP 3.2.2 System Quality Group Classification.
  - (3) SRP 3.7.1 Seismic Design Parameters.
  - (4) SRP 3.7.2 Seismic System Analysis.
  - (5) SRP 3.7.3 Seismic Subsystem Analysis.
  - (6) SRP 3.8.4 Other Seismic Category I Structures (including Appendix D), Technical Position on Spent Fuel Rack.
  - (7) SRP 3.8.5 Foundations
  - (8) SRP 9.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage, Revision 3, 1981.
  - (9) SRP 9.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System.
  - (10) SRP 9.1.4 Light Load Handling System.
  - (11) SRP 9.1.5 Overhead Heavy Load Handling System.
  - (12) SRP 15.7.4 Radiological Consequences of Fuel Handling Accidents.
- k. <u>AWS Standards</u>

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- (1) AWS D1.1 Structural Welding Code, Steel.
- (2) AWS A2.4 Standard Symbols for Welding, Brazing and Nondestructive Examination.

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- (3) AWS A3.0 Standard Welding Terms and Definitions.
- (4) AWS A5.12 Tungsten Arc-welding Electrodes.
- (5) AWS QC1 Standards and Guide for Qualification and Certification of Welding Inspectors.
- 1. <u>Others</u>
  - (1) ASNT-TC-1A Recommended Practice for Nondestructive Personnel Qualification and Certification.
  - (2) SSPC SP-2 Surface Preparation Specification No. 2 Hand Tool Cleaning.
  - (3) SSPC SP-3 Surface Preparation Specification No. 3 Power Tool Cleaning.
  - (4) SSPC SP-10 Near-White Blast Cleaning.

#### 3.6.2 Computer Programs

Three computer programs, all with a well established history of usage in the nuclear industry, have been utilized to perform structural and mechanical analyses documented in this report. These codes are ANSYS, DYNA3D, and WORKING MODEL. ANSYS is a public domain code which utilizes the finite element method for structural analyses.

#### WORKING MODEL, Version V.3.0/V.4.0

This code is used in this 10CFR72 submittal to compute the dynamic load resulting from intermediate missile impact on the overpack closure and to evaluate the maximum elastic spring rate associated with the target during a HI-TRAC handling accident event.

WORKING MODEL has been previously utilized in similar dynamic analyses of the HI-STAR 100 system (Docket No. 72-1008).

"WORKING MODEL" (V3.0/V4.0) is a Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) tool with an integrated user interface that merges modeling, simulation, viewing, and measuring. The program includes a dynamics algorithm that provides automatic collision and contact handling, including detection, response, restitution, and friction.

Numerical integration is performed using the Kutta-Merson integrator which offers options for variable or fixed time-step and error bounding.

The Working Model Code is commercially available. Holtec has performed independent QA validation of the code (in accordance with Holtec's QA requirements) by comparing the solution

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of several classical dynamics problems with the numerical results predicted by Working Model. Agreement in all cases is excellent.

Additional theoretical material is available in the manual: "Users Manual, Working Model, Version 3", Knowledge Revolution, 66 Bovet Road, Suite 200, San Mateo, CA, 94402.

This code has been acquired by MSC Software and has now been designated "VisualNastran Desktop". The most current version, which has been used in this revision, is VN 2003. The descriptions given above are still valid.

#### <u>DYNA3D</u>

"DYNA3D" is a nonlinear, explicit, three-dimensional finite element code for solid and structural mechanics. It was originally developed at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories and is ideally suited for study of short-time duration, highly nonlinear impact problems in solid mechanics. DYNA3D is commercially available for both UNIX work stations and Pentium class PCs running Windows 95 or Windows NT. The PC version has been fully validated at Holtec following Holtec's QA procedures for commercial computer codes. This code is used to analyze the drop accidents and the tip-over scenario for the HI-STORM 100. Benchmarking of DYNA3D for these storage analyses is discussed and documented in Appendix 3.A. DYNA3D is also known as LS-DYNA and is currently supported and distributed by Livermore Software. Each update is independently subject to QA validation.

3.6.3 Appendices Included in Chapter 3

3.A HI-STORM Deceleration Under Postulated Vertical Drop Event and Tipover

#### 3.6.4 <u>Calculation Packages</u>

In addition to the calculations presented in Chapter 3, supporting calculation packages have been prepared to document other information pertinent to the analyses. As new components are added (e.g., the HI-STORM 100S versions and additional MPC's), supporting calculation packages back up the summary results reported herein.

The calculation packages contain additional details on component weights, supporting calculations for some results summarized in the chapter, and miscellaneous supporting data that supplements the results summarized in Chapter 3 of the FSAR. All of the finite element tabular data, node and element data, supporting figures, and numerical output for all fuel baskets are contained in the calculation package supplement supporting Revision 1 of the FSAR.

# 3.7 COMPLIANCE WITH NUREG-1536

Supporting information to provide reasonable assurance with respect to the adequacy of the HI-STORM 100 System to store spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the stipulations of the Technical Specifications (Chapter 12) is provided throughout this FSAR. An itemized table (Table 3.0.1 at the beginning of this chapter) has been provided to locate and collate the substantiating material to support the technical evaluation findings listed in NUREG-1536 Chapter 3, Article VI.

The following statements are germane to an affirmative safety evaluation:

- The design and structural analysis of the HI-STORM 100 System is in full compliance with the provisions of Chapter 3 of NUREG-1536 except as listed in the Table 1.0.3 (list of code compliance exceptions).
- The list of Regulatory Guides, Codes, and standards presented in Section 3.6 herein is in full compliance with the provisions of NUREG-1536.
- All HI-STORM 100 structures, systems, and components (SSC) that are important to safety (ITS) are identified in Table 2.2.6. Section 1.5 contains the design drawings that describe the HI-STORM 100 SSCs in complete detail. Explanatory narrations in Subsections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 provide sufficient textual details to allow an independent evaluation of their structural effectiveness.
- The requirements of 10CFR72.24 with regard to information pertinent to structural evaluation is provided in Chapters 2, 3, and 11.
- Technical Specifications pertaining to the structures of the HI-STORM 100 System have been provided in Section 12.3 herein pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR72.26.
- A series of analyses to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10CFR72.122(b) and (c), and 10CFR72.24(c)(3) have been performed which show that SSCs designated as ITS possess an adequate margin of safety with respect to all load combinations applicable to normal, off-normal, accident, and natural phenomenon events. In particular, the following information is provided:
  - i. Load combinations for the fuel basket, enclosure vessel, and the HI-STORM 100/HI-TRAC overpacks for normal, off-normal, accident, and natural phenomenon events are compiled in Tables 2.2.14, 3.1.1, and 3.1.3 through 3.1.5, respectively.
  - ii. Stress limits applicable to the materials are found in Subsection 3.3.

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iii. Stresses at various locations in the fuel basket, the enclosure vessel, and the HI-STORM 100/HI-TRAC overpacks have been computed by analysis.

Descriptions of stress analyses are presented in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.

iv. Factors of safety in the components of the HI-STORM 100 System are reported as below:

a.	Fuel basket	Tables 3.4.3 and 3.4.6
b.	Enclosure vessel	Tables 3.4.4, 3.4.6, 3.4.7, and 3.4.8
с.	HI-STORM 100 overpack/ HI-TRAC	Table 3.4.5
d.	Miscellaneous components	Table 3.4.9
e.	Lifting devices	Subsection 3.4.3

- The structural design and fabrication details of the fuel baskets whose safety function in the HI-STORM 100 System is to maintain nuclear criticality safety, have been carried out to comply with the provisions of Subsection NG of the ASME Code (loc. cit.) Section III. The structural factors of safety, summarized in Tables 3.4.3 and 3.4.6 for all credible load combinations under normal, offnormal, accident, and natural phenomenon events demonstrate that the Code limits are satisfied in all cases. As the stress analyses have been performed using linear elastic methods and the computed stresses are well within the respective ASME Code limits, it follows that the physical geometry of the fuel basket will not be altered under any load combination to create a condition adverse to criticality safety. This conclusion satisfies the requirement of 10CFR72.124(a), with respect to structural margins of safety for SSCs important to nuclear criticality safety.
- Structural margins of safety during handling, packaging, and transfer operations, mandated by the provisions of 10CFR Part 72.236(b), require that the lifting and handling devices are engineered to comply with the stipulations of ANSI N14.6, NUREG-0612, Regulatory Guide 3.61, and NUREG-1536, and that the components being handled meet the applicable ASME Code service condition stress limits. The requirements of the governing codes for handling operations are summarized in Subsection 3.4.3 herein. A summary table of factors of safety for all ITS components under lifting and handling operations, presented in Subsection

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3.4.3, shows that adequate structural margins exist in all cases.

- Consistent with the requirements of 10CFR72.236(i), the confinement boundary for the HI-STORM 100 System has been engineered to maintain confinement of radioactive materials under normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions. This assertion of confinement integrity is made on the strength of the following information provided in this FSAR.
  - i. The MPC Enclosure Vessel which constitutes the confinement boundary is designed and fabricated in accordance with Section III, Subsection NB (Class 1 nuclear components) of the ASME Code to the maximum extent practicable.
  - ii. The MPC lid of the MPC Enclosure Vessel is welded using a strength groove weld and is subjected to volumetric examination or multiple liquid penetrant examinations, pressure testing, and liquid penetrant (root and final) testing to establish a maximum confidence in weld joint integrity.
  - iii. The closure of the MPC Enclosure Vessel consists of *two* independent isolation barriers.
  - iv. The confinement boundary is constructed from stainless steel alloys with a proven history of material integrity under environmental conditions.
  - v. The load combinations for normal, off-normal, accident, and natural phenomena events have been compiled (Table 2.2.14) and applied on the MPC Enclosure Vessel (confinement boundary). The results, summarized in Tables 3.4.4 through 3.4.9, show that the factor of safety (with respect to the appropriate ASME Code limits) is greater than one in all cases. Design Basis natural phenomena events such as tornado-borne missiles (large, intermediate, or small) have also been analyzed to evaluate their potential for breaching the confinement boundary. Analyses presented in Subsection 3.4.8, and summarized in unnumbered tables in Subsection | 3.4.8, show that the integrity of the confinement boundary is preserved under all design basis projectile impact scenarios.
- The information on structural design included in this FSAR complies with the requirements of 10CFR72.120 and 10CFR72.122, and can be ascertained from the information contained in Table 3.7.1.
- The provisions of features in the HI-STORM 100 structural design, listed in Table 3.7.2, demonstrate compliance with the specific requirements of 10CFR72.236(e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), and (m).

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# NUREG -1536 COMPLIANCE MATRIX FOR 10CFR72.120 AND 10CFR72.122 REQUIREMENTS

	Item		Compliance	Location of Supporting Information in This Document
i.	Design and fabrication to acceptable quality standards	All ITS components designed ar Standards:	All ITS components designed and fabricated to recognized Codes and Standards:	
		• Basket:	Subsection NG, Section III	Subsections 2.0.1 and 3.1.1 Tables 2.2.6 and 2.2.7
		• Enclosure Vessel:	Subsection NB, loc. cit.	Subsections 2.0.1 and 3.1.1 Tables 2.2.6 and 2.2.7
		HI-STORM 100     Structure:	Subsection NF, loc. cit.	Subsections 2.0.2 and 3.1.1
		HI-TRAC Structure:	Subsection NF, loc. cit.	Subsections 2.0.3 and 3.1.1
ii.	Erection to acceptable quality standards	<ul> <li>Concrete in HI-STORM 100 meets requirements of :</li> <li>ACI –349(85)</li> </ul>		Appendix 1.D Subsection 3.3.2
iii.	Testing to acceptable quality standards	• All non-destructive examination of ASME Code components for provisions in the Code (see exceptions in Table 2.2.15).		Section 9.1
		• Pressure test of pressure vessel per the Code.		Section 9.1
		• Testing for radiation containment per provisions of NUREG-1536		Sections 7.1 and 9.1
		Concrete testing in accordance with ACI-349(85)		Appendix 1.D
iv.	Adequate structural protection against environmental	Analyses presented in Chapter 3 demonstrate that the confinement boundary will preserve its integrity under all postulated off-normal and natural		Section 2.2

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# NUREG -1536 COMPLIANCE MATRIX FOR 10CFR72.120 AND 10CFR72.122 REQUIREMENTS

	Item conditions and natural phenomena.	Compliance phenomena events listed in Chapters 2.	Location of Supporting Information in This Document Chapter 11
v.	Adequate protection against fires and explosions	• The extent of combustible (exothermic) material in the vicinity of the cask system is procedurally controlled (the sole source of hydrocarbon energy is diesel in the tow vehicle).	Subsections 12.3.20 and 12.3.21
		• Analyses show that the heat energy released from the postulated fire accident condition surrounding the cask will not result in impairment of the confinement boundary and will not lead to structural failure of the overpack. The effect on shielding will be localized to the external surfaces directly exposed to the fire which will result in a loss of the water in the water jacket for the HI-TRAC, and no significant change in the HI-STORM 100 overpack.	Subsection 11.2.4
		• Explosion effects are shown to be bounded by the Code external pressure design basis and there is no adverse effect on ready retrievability of the MPC.	Subsection 11.2.11 and Subsection 3.1.2.1.1.4; 3.4.7
vi.	Appropriate inspection, maintenance, and testing	Inspection, maintenance, and testing requirements set forth in this FSAR are in full compliance with the governing regulations and established industry practice.	Sections 9.1 and 9.2 Chapter 12
vii.	Adequate accessibility in emergencies.	The HI-STORM 100 overpack lid can be removed to gain access to the multi- purpose canister.	Chapter 8
		The HI-TRAC transfer cask has removable bottom and top lids.	Chapter 8
viii.	A confinement barrier that acceptably protects the spent fuel cladding during storage.	The peak temperature of the fuel cladding at design basis heat duty of each MPC has been demonstrated to be maintained below the limits specified in ISG-11 [4.1.4].	Subsection 4.4.2
	·	The confinement barriers consist of highly ductile stainless steel alloys. The	Subsection 3.1.1

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	Item	Compliance	Location of Supporting Information in This Document
		multi-purpose canister is housed in the overpack, built from a steel structure whose materials are selected and examined to maintain protection against brittle fracture under off-normal ambient (cold) temperatures (minimum of - 40°F).	Subsection 3.1.2.3
ix.	The structures are compatible with the appropriate monitoring systems.	The HI-STORM 100 overpack is a thick, upright cylindrical structure with large ventilation openings near the top and bottom. These openings are designed to prevent radiation streaming while enabling complete access to temperature monitoring probes.	Section 1.5, Subsection 2.3.3.2
x.	Structural designs that are compatible with ready retrievability of fuel.	The fuel basket is designed to be an extremely stiff honeycomb structure such that the storage cavity dimensions will remain unchanged under all postulated normal and accident events. Therefore, the retrievability of the spent nuclear fuel from the basket will not be jeopardized.	Subsection 3.1.1
		The MPC canister lid is attached to the shell with a groove weld which is made using an automated welding device. A similar device is available to remove the weld. Thus, access to the fuel basket can be realized.	Sections 8.1 and 8.3
		The storage overpack and the transfer casks are designed to withstand accident loads without suffering permanent deformations of their structures that would prevent retrievability of the MPC by normal means. It is demonstrated by analysis that there is no physical interference between the MPC and the enveloping HI-STORM storage overpack or HI-TRAC transfer cask.	Section 3.4

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# COMPLIANCE OF HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM WITH 10CFR72.236(e), ET ALS.

	Item	Compliance	Location of Supporting Information in This Document
i.	Redundant sealing of confinement systems.	Two physically independent lids, each separately welded to the MPC shell (Enclosure Vessel shell) provide a redundant confinement system.	Section 1.5, Drawings Section 7.1.
ii.	Adequate heat removal without active cooling systems.	Thermal analyses presented in Chapter 4 show that the HI-STORM 100 System will remove the decay heat generated from the stored spent fuel by strictly passive means and maintain the system temperature within prescribed limits.	Sections 4.4 and Sections 9.1 and 9.2
iii.	Storage of spent fuel for a minimum of 20 years.	The service life of the MPC, storage overpack, and HI-TRAC are engineered to be in excess of 20 years.	Subsections 3.4.11 and 3.4.12
iv.	Compatibility with wet or dry spent fuel loading and unloading facilities.	<ul> <li>The system is designed to eliminate any material significant interactions in the wet (spent fuel pool) environment.</li> <li>The HI-TRAC transfer cask is engineered for full compatibility with the MPCs, and standard loading and unloading facilities.</li> <li>The HI-TRAC System is engineered for MPC transfer on the ISFSI</li> </ul>	Subsection 3.4.1 Subsection 8.1.1 Subsection 8.1.1
		pad with full consideration of ALARA and handling equipment compatibility.	
v.	Ease of decontamination.	• The external surface of the multi-purpose canister is protected from contamination during fuel loading through a custom designed sealing device.	Figures 8.1.13 and 8.1.14
		• The HI-STORM storage overpack is not exposed to contamination	Chapter 8
		All exposed surfaces of the HI-TRAC transfer cask are coated to aid in decontamination	Section 1.5, Drawings
vi.	Inspection of defects that	• The MPC enclosure vessel is designed and fabricated in accordance	Section 9.1

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# COMPLIANCE OF HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM WITH 10CFR72.236(e), ET ALS.

	Item	Compliance	Location of Supporting Information in This Document
	might reduce confinement effectiveness.	with ASME Code, Section III, Subsection NB, to the maximum extent practical.	
		Pressure testing and NDE of the closure welds verify containment effectiveness.	
vii.	Conspicuous and durable marking.	The stainless steel lid of each MPC will have model number and serial number engraved for ready identification. The exterior envelope of the cask (the storage overpack) is marked in a	N/A
		conspicuous manner as required by 10CFR 72.236(k).	
viii.	Compatibility with removal of the stored fuel from the site, transportation, and ultimate disposal by the U.S. Department of Energy.	The MPC is designed to be in full compliance with the DOE's draft specification for transportability and disposal published under the now dormant "MPC" program.	Section 2.4 Subsection 1.2.1.1

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### 3.8 <u>REFERENCES</u>

- [3.1.1] NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- [3.1.2] ANSI N14.6-1993, "American National Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials," American National Standards Institute, Inc.
- [3.1.3] D. Burgreen, "Design Methods for Power Plant Structures", Arcturus Publishers, 1975.
- [3.1.4] Deleted.
- [3.1.5] NUREG/CR-1815, "Recommendations for Protecting Against Failure by Brittle Fracture in Ferritic Steel Shipping Containers Up to Four Inches Thick"
- [3.1.6] Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook, Manson.
- [3.3.1] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section II, Part D, 1995.
- [3.3.2] American Concrete Institute, "Building Code Requirements for Structural Plain Concrete (ACI 318.1-89) (Revised 1992) and Commentary - ACI 318.1R-89 (Revised 1992)".
- [3.3.3] American Concrete Institute, "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Structures" (ACI-349-85) and Commentary (ACI-349R-85)(For anchored casks, the requirements on the design of the steel embedment are ACI-349-97, including Appendix B and the Commentary (ACI-349R-97)).
- [3.3.5] J.H. Evans, "Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks, Volume 8, Experimental Study of Stress-Strain Properties of Lead Under Specified Impact Conditions", ORNL/TM-1312, Vol. 8, ORNL, Oak Ridge, TN, August, 1970.
- [3.4.1] ANSYS 5.3, ANSYS, Inc., 1996 (Current usage of ANSYS includes Versions up thru 7.0, 2003).
- [3.4.2] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NF, 1995.
- [3.4.3] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendices, 1995.
- [3.4.4] ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NB, 1995.
- [3.4.5] Deleted.

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- [3.4.7] NRC Bulletin 96-04: Chemical, Galvanic or Other Reactions in Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks, July 5, 1996.
- [3.4.8] Theory of Elastic Stability, S.P. Timoshenko and J. Gere, McGraw Hill, 2nd Edition.
- [3.4.9] Marks Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineering, 9th ed.
- [3.4.10] ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NG, 1995.
- [3.4.11] 10CFR71, Waste Confidence Decision Review, USNRC, September 11, 1990.
- [3.4.12] "Benchmarking of the Holtec LS-DYNA3D Model for Cask Drop Events", Holtec Report HI-971779, September 1997.
- [3.4.13] NUREG/CR-6322, Buckling Analysis of Spent Fuel Basket, Lawrcence Livermore National Laboratory, May, 1995.
- [3.4.14] Soler, A, "Calculation Package for High Seismic Support of HI-STORM 100A", Holtec Report HI-2002465, August 2000.
- [3.5.1] Chun, Witte, Schwartz, "Dynamic Impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies", UCID-21246, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, October 20, 1987.
- [3.5.2] Physical and Decay Characteristics of Commercial LWR Spent Fuel, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report, J. Roddy, H. Claiborne, R. Ashline, P. Johnson, and B. Rhyne, ORNL/TM-9591/V1-R1, 1/86.

### APPENDIX 3.A: HI-STORM DECELERATION UNDER POSTULATED VERTICAL DROP EVENT AND TIPOVER

#### 3.A.1 <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Handling accidents with a HI-STORM overpack containing a loaded MPC are credible events (Section 2.2.3). The stress analyses carried out in Chapter 3 of this safety analysis report assume that the inertial loading on the load bearing members of the MPC, fuel basket, and the overpack due to a handling accident are limited by the Table 3.1.2 decelerations. The maximum deceleration experienced by a structural component is the product of the rigid body deceleration sustained by the structure and the dynamic load factor (DLF) applicable to that structural component. The dynamic load factor (DLF) is a function of the contact impulse and the structural characteristics of the component. A solution for dynamic load factors is provided in Appendix 3.X.

The rigid body deceleration is a strong function of the load-deformation characteristics of the impact interface, weight of the cask, and the drop height or angle of free rotation. For the HI-STORM 100 System, the weight of the structure and its surface compliance characteristics are known. However, the contact stiffness of the ISFSI pad (and other surfaces over which the HI-STORM 100 may be carried during its movement to the ISFSI) is site-dependent. The contact resistance of the collision interface, which is composed of the HI-STORM 100 and the impacted surface compliance, therefore, is not known a priori for a specific site. Analyses for the rigid body decelerations are, therefore, presented here using a reference ISFSI pad (which is the pad used in a recent Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report and is the same reference pad used in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR). The finite element model (grid size, extent of model, soil properties, etc.) follows the LLNL report.

An in-depth investigation by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL) into the mechanics of impact between a cask-like impactor on a reinforced concrete slab founded on a soil-like subgrade has identified three key parameters, namely, the thickness of the concrete slab,  $t_p$ , compressive strength of the concrete  $f_c$ ' and equivalent Young's Modulus of the subgrade E. These three parameters are key variables in establishing the stiffness of the pad under impact scenarios. The LLNL reference pad parameters, which we hereafter denote as Set A, provide one set of values of  $t_p$ ,  $f_c$ ', and E that are found to satisfy the deceleration criteria applicable to the HI-STORM 100 cask. Another set of parameters, referred to as Set B herein, is also shown to satisfy the g-load limit requirements. In fact, an infinite number of combinations of  $t_p$ ,  $f_c$ ', and E can be compiled that would meet the g-load limit qualification. However, in addition to satisfying the g-limit criterion, the pad must be demonstrated to possess sufficient flexural and shear stiffness to meet the ACI 318 strength limits under factored load combinations. The minimum strength requirement to comply with ACI 318 provisions places a restriction on the lower bound values of  $t_p$ ,  $f_c$ ', and E that must be met in an ISFSI pad design.

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Our focus in this appendix, however, is to quantify the peak decelerations that would be experienced by a loaded HI-STORM 100 cask under the postulated impact scenarios for the two pad designs defined by parameter Sets A and B, respectively. The information presented in this appendix also serves to further authenticate the veracity of the Holtec DYNA3D model described in the 1997 benchmark report [3.A.4.]

## 3.A.2 <u>Purpose</u>

The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that the rigid body deceleration experienced by the HI-STORM 100 System during a handling accident or non-mechanistic tip-over are below the design basis deceleration of 45g's (Table 3.1.2). Two accidental drop scenarios of a loaded HI-STORM 100 cask on the ISFSI pad are considered in this appendix. They are:

- i. Tipover: A loaded HI-STORM 100 is assumed to undergo a non-mechanistic tipover event and impacting the ISFSI pad with an incipient impact angular velocity, which is readily calculated from elementary dynamics.
- ii. End drop: The loaded HI-STORM 100 is assumed to drop from a specified height h, with its longitudinal axis in the vertical orientation, such that its bottom plate impacts the ISFSI pad.

It is shown in Appendix 3.X that dynamic load factors are a function of the predominate natural frequency of vibration of the component for a given input load pulse shape. Dynamic load factors are applied, as necessary, to the results of specific component analyses performed using the loading from the design basis rigid body decelerations. Therefore, for the purposes of this Appendix 3.A, it is desired to demonstrate that the rigid body deceleration experienced in each of the drop scenarios is below the HI-STORM 100 45g design basis.

### 3.A.3 Background and Methodology

In 1997 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) published the experimentally obtained results of the so-called fourth series billet tests [3.A.1] together with a companion report [3.A.2] documenting a numerical solution that simulated the drop test results with reasonable accuracy. Subsequently, USNRC personnel published a paper [3.A.3] affirming the NRC's endorsement of the LLNL methodology. The LLNL simulation used modeling and simulation algorithms contained within the commercial computer code DYNA3D [3.A.6].

The LLNL cask drop model is not completely set forth in the above-mentioned LLNL reports. Using the essential information provided by the LLNL [3.A.2] report, however, Holtec is able to develop a finite element model for implementation on LS-DYNA3D [3.A.5] which is fully consistent with LLNL's (including the use of the Butterworth filter for discerning rigid body deceleration from "noisy" impact data). The details of the LS-DYNA3D dynamic model, henceforth referred to as the Holtec model, are contained in the proprietary benchmark report [3.A.4] wherein it is shown that the peak deceleration in <u>every</u> case of billet drop analyzed by LLNL is replicated within a small tolerance by the Holtec model. The case of the so-called "generic" cask, for which LLNL provided predicted response under side drop and tipover events, is also bounded by the Holtec model. In

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summary, the benchmarking effort documented in [3.A.4] is in full compliance with the guidance of the Commission [3.A.3].

Having developed and benchmarked an LLNL-consistent cask impact model, a very similar model is developed and used to prognosticate the HI-STORM drop scenarios. The reference elasto-plastic-damage characteristics of the target concrete continuum used by LLNL, and used in the HI-STAR 100 FSAR are replicated herein. The HI-STORM 100 target model is identical in all aspects to the reference pad approved for the HI-STAR 100 FSAR.

In the tipover scenario the cask surface structure must be sufficiently pliable to cushion the impact and limit the rigid body deceleration. The angular velocity at the contact time is readily calculated using planar rigid body dynamics and is used as an initial condition in the LS-DYNA3D simulation.

The end drop event produces a circular impact patch equal to the diameter of the overpack baseplate. The elasto-plastic-damage characteristics of the concrete target and the drop height determine the maximum deceleration. A maximum allowable height "h" is determined to limit the deceleration to a value below the design basis.

A description of the work effort and a summary of the results are presented in the following sections. In all cases, the reported decelerations are below the design basis of 45g's at the top of the MPC fuel basket.

3.A.4 Assumptions and Input Data

### 3.A.4.1 <u>Assumptions</u>

The assumptions used to create the model are completely described in Reference [3.A.4] and are shown there to be consistent with the LLNL simulation. There are key aspects, however, that are restated here:

The maximum deceleration experienced by the cask during a collision event is a direct function of the structural rigidity (or conversely, compliance) of the impact surface. The compliance of the ISFSI pad is quite obviously dependent on the thickness of the pad,  $t_p$ , the compressive strength of the concrete,  $f_c$ ' and stiffness of the sub-grade (expressed by its effective Young's modulus, E). The structural rigidity of the ISFSI pad will increase if any of the three above-mentioned parameters ( $t_p$ ,  $f_c$ ' or E) is increased. For the reference pad, the governing parameters (i.e.,  $t_p$ ,  $f_c$ ' and E) are assumed to be identical to the pad defined by LLNL [3.A.2], which is also the same as the pad utilized in the benchmark report [3.A.4]. We refer to the LLNL ISFSI pad parameters as Set A. (Table 3.A.1).

As can be seen from Table 3.A.1, the nominal compressive strength  $f_c$ ' in Set A is limited to 4200 psi. However, experience has shown that ISFSI owners have considerable practical difficulty in limiting the 28 day strength of poured concrete to 4200 psi, chiefly because a principal element of progress in reinforced concrete materials technology has been in realizing ever increasing concrete nominal strength. Inasmuch as a key objective of the ISFSI pad is to limit its structural rigidity (and

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not  $f_c$ ' per se), and limiting  $f_c$ ' to 4200 psi may be problematic in certain cases, an alternative set of reference pad parameters is defined (Set B in Table 3.A.1), which permits a higher value of  $f_c$ ' but much smaller values of pad thickness,  $t_p$  and sub-grade Young's modulus, E.

The ISFSI owner has the option of constructing the pad to comply with the limits of Set A or Set B without performing site-specific cask impact analyses. It is recognized that, for a specific ISFSI site, the reinforced concrete, as well as the underlying engineered fill properties, may be different at different locations on the pad or may be uniform, but non-compliant with either Set A or Set B. In that case, the site-specific conditions must be performed to demonstrate compliance with the design limits of the HI-STORM system (e.g., maximum rigid body g-load less than 45 g's). The essential data which define the pad (Set A and Set B) used to qualify the HI-STORM 100 are provided in Table 3.A.1.

The HI-STORM 100 steel structural elements (outer shell, inner shell, radial plates, lid, etc.), are fabricated from SA-516 Grade 70. The steel is described as a bi-linear elastic-plastic material with limited strain failure by five material parameters (E, S<sub>y</sub>, S<sub>u</sub>,  $\in_u$ , and  $\nu$ ). The numerical values used in the finite element model are shown in Table 3.A.2. The concrete located inside of the overpack for this dynamic analysis is defined to be identical with the concrete pad. This is conservative since the concrete assumed in the reference pad is reinforced. Therefore, the strength of the concrete inside the HI-STORM 100 absorbs less energy if it is also assumed to be reinforced.

### 3.A.4.2 Input Data

Table 3.A.1 characterizes the properties of the full-scale reference target pad used in the analysis of the full size HI-STORM 100 System. The principal strength parameters that define the stiffness of the pad, namely,  $t_p$ , E and  $f_c$  are input in the manner described in [3.A.2] and [3.A.4].

Table 3.A.2 contains the material description parameters for the steel types; SA-516-70 used in the numerical investigation.

Table 3.A.3 details the geometry of the HI-STORM 100 used in the drop simulations. This data is taken from applicable HI-STORM 100 drawings.

### 3.A.5 <u>Finite Element Model</u>

The finite-element model of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 overpack (baseplate, shells, radial plates, lid, concrete, etc.), concrete pad and a portion of the subgrade soil is constructed using the preprocessor integrated with the LS-DYNA3D software [3.A.5]. The deformation field for all postulated drop events (the end-drop and the tipover) exhibits symmetry with the vertical plane passing through the cask diameter and the concrete pad length. Using this symmetry condition of the deformation field only a half finite-element model is constructed. The finite-element model is organized into nineteen independent parts (the baseplate components, the outer shell, the inner shell, the radial plates, the channels, the lid components, the basket steel plates, the basket fuel zone, the concrete pad and the soil). The final model contains 30351 nodes, 24288 solid type finite-elements, 1531 shell type finite-elements, seven (7) materials, ten (10) properties and twenty-four (24)

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interfaces. The finite-element model used for the tipover-drop event is depicted in Figures 3.A.1 through 3.A.4. Figures 3.A.5 through 3.A.8 show the end-drop finite-element model.

The soil grid, shown in Figure 3.A.9, is a rectangular prism (800 inches long, 375 inches wide and 470 inches deep), is constructed from 13294 solid type finite-elements. The material defining this part is an elastic isotropic material. The central portion of the soil (400 inches long, 150 inches wide and 170 inches deep) where the stress concentration is expected to appear is discretized with a finer mesh.

The concrete pad is 320 inches long, 100 inches wide and is 36 inches thick. This part contains 8208 solid finite-elements. A uniform sized finite-element mesh, shown in Figure 3.A.10, is used to model the concrete pad. The concrete behavior is described using a special constitutive law and yielding surface (MAT\_PSEUDO\_TENSOR) contained within LS-DYNA3D. The geometry, the material properties, and the material behavior are identical to the LLNL reference pad (Material 16 IIB).

The half portion of the steel cylindrical overpack contains 1531 shell finite-elements. The steel material description (SA-516-70) is realized using a bi-linear elasto-plastic constitutive model (MAT\_PIECEWISE\_LINEAR\_PLASTICITY). Figure 3.A.11 depicts details of the steel components of the cask finite-element mesh, with the exception of the inner shell, channels and lid components, which are shown in Figures 3.A.12 and 3.A.13. The concrete filled between the inner and the outer shells, and contained in the baseplate and lid components is modeled using 1664 solid finite-elements and is depicted in Figure 3.A.14. The concrete material is defined identical to the pad concrete.

The MPC and the contained fuel are modeled in two parts that represent the lid and baseplate, and the fuel area. An elastic material is used for both parts. The finite-element mesh pertinent to the MPC contains 1122 solid finite-elements and is shown in Figure 3.A.15. The mass density is appropriate to match a representative weight of 356,521 lb. that is approximately mid-way between the upper and lower weight estimates for a loaded HI-STORM 100.

The total weight used in the analysis is approximately 2,000 lb. lighter than the HI-STORM 100 containing the lightest weight MPC.

Analysis of a single mass impacting a spring with a given initial velocity shows that both the maximum deceleration " $a_M$ " of the mass and the time duration of contact with the spring " $t_c$ " are related to the dropped weight "w" and drop height "h" as follows:

$$a_{\rm M} \sim \frac{\sqrt{h}}{\sqrt{w}}; t_{\rm c} \sim \sqrt{w}$$

Therefore, the most conservatism is introduced into the results by using the minimum weight. It is emphasized that the finite element model described in the foregoing is identical in its approach to the "Holtec model" described in the benchmark report [3.A.4]. Gaps between the MPC and the overpack are included in the model.

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#### 3.A.6 Impact Velocity

a. Linear Velocity: Vertical Drops

For the vertical drop event, the impact velocity, v, is readily calculated from the Newtonian formula:

$$v = \sqrt{(2 \, \text{gh})}$$

where

g = acceleration due to gravity

h = free-fall height

b. Angular Velocity: Tip-Over

The tipover event is an artificial construct wherein the HI-STORM 100 overpack is assumed to be perched on its edge with its C.G. directly over the pivot point A (Figure 3.A.16). In this orientation, the overpack begins its downward rotation with zero initial velocity. Towards the end of the tip-over, the overpack is horizontal with its downward velocity ranging from zero at the pivot point (point A) to a maximum at the farthest point of impact (point E in Figure 3.A.17). The angular velocity at the instant of impact defines the downward velocity distribution along the contact line.

In the following, an explicit expression for calculating the angular velocity of the cask at the instant when it impacts on the ISFSI pad is derived. Referring to Figure 3.A.16, let r be the length AC where C is the cask centroid. Therefore,

$$r = \left(\frac{d^2}{4} + h^2\right)^{1/2}$$

The mass moment of inertia of the HI-STORM 100 System, considered as a rigid body, can be written about an axis through point A, as

$$I_A = I_c + \frac{W}{g}r^2$$

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where  $I_c$  is the mass moment of inertia about a parallel axis through the cask centroid C and W is the weight of the cask (W = Mg).

Let  $\theta_1(t)$  be the rotation angle between a vertical line and the line AC. The equation of motion for rotation of the cask around point A, during the time interval prior to contact with the ISFSI pad, is

$$I_{A} \frac{d^{2} \theta_{1}}{dt^{2}} = Mgr \sin \theta_{1}$$

This equation can be rewritten in the form

$$\frac{I_A}{2} \frac{d(\dot{\theta}_1)^2}{d\theta_1} = Mgr\sin\theta_1$$

which can be integrated over the limits  $\theta_1 = 0$  to  $\theta_1 = \theta_{2f}$  (See Figure 3.A.17).

The final angular velocity  $\theta_1$  at the time instant just prior to contact with the ISFSI pad is given by the expression

$$\dot{\theta}_{1}(t_{\rm B}) = \sqrt{\frac{2\,{\rm Mgr}}{{\rm I}_{\rm A}}} \left(1 - \cos\theta_{2f}\right)$$

where, from Figure 3.A.17

$$\theta_{2f} = \cos^{-1}\left(\frac{d}{2r_1}\right)$$

This equation establishes the initial conditions for the final phase of the tip-over analysis; namely, the portion of the motion when the cask is decelerated by the resistive force at the ISFSI pad interface.

Using the data germane to HI-STORM 100 (Table 3.A.3), and the above equations, the angular velocity of impact is calculated as 1.49 rad/sec.

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# 3.A.7 <u>Results</u>

# 3.A.7.1 Set A Pad Parameters

It has been previously demonstrated in the benchmark report [3.A.4] that bounding rigid body decelerations are achieved if the cask is assumed to be rigid with only the target (ISFSI pad) considered as an energy absorbing media. Therefore, for the determination of the bounding decelerations reported in this appendix, the HI-STORM storage overpack was conservatively made rigid except for the radial channels that position the MPC inside of the overpack. The MPC material behavior was characterized in the identical manner used in the Livermore Laboratory analysis as was the target ISFSI pad and underlying soil. The LS-DYNA3D time-history results are processed using the Butterworth filter (in conformance with the LLNL methodology) to establish the rigid body motion time-history of the cask. The material points on the cask where the acceleration displacement and velocity are computed for each of the drop scenarios are shown in Figure 3.A.18.

Node 82533 (Channel A1), which is located at the center of the outer surface of the baseplate, serves as the reference point for end-drop scenarios.

Node 84392 (Channel A2), which is located at the center of the cask top lid outer surface, serves as the reference point for the tipover scenario with the pivot point indicated as Point 0 in Figure 3.A.18.

The final results are shown in Table 3.A.4.

i. Tipover:

The time-histories of the impact force, the displacement and velocity time-histories of Channel A2, and the average vertical deceleration of the overpack lid top plate have been determined for this event [3.A.7].

The deceleration at the top of the fuel basket is obtained by ratioing the average deceleration of the overpack lid top plate. The maximum filtered deceleration at the top of the fuel basket is 42.85g's, which is below the design basis limit.

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## ii. End Drop:

The drop height  $h = 11^{"}$  is considered in the numerical analysis. This is considered as an acceptable maximum carry height for the HI-STORM 100 System if lifted above a surface with design values of  $t_p$ ,  $f_c$ ', and E equal to those presented in Table 3.A.1 for Parameter Set "A". The maximum filtered deceleration at the top of the fuel basket is 43.98g's, which is below the design basis limit.

The computer code utilized in this analysis is LS-DYNA3D [3.A.5] validated under Holtec's QA system. Table 3.A.4 summarizes the key results from all impact simulations for the Set A parameters discussed in the foregoing.

The filter frequencies (to remove unwanted high-frequency contributions) for the Holtec cask analyses analyzed in this TSAR is the same as used for the corresponding problem analyzed in [3.A.2] and [3.A.4]. To verify the Butterworth filter parameters (350 Hz cutoff frequency, etc.) used in processing the numerical data, a Fourier power decomposition was generated.

## 3.A.7.2 <u>Set B Parameters</u>

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As stated previously, Set B parameters produce a much more compliant pad than the LLNL reference pad (Set A). This fact is borne out by the tipover and end analyses performed on the pad defined by the Set B parameters. Table 3.A.4 provides the filtered results for the two impact scenarios. In every case, the peak decelerations corresponding to Set B parameters are less than those for Set A (also provided in Table 3.A.4).

Impact force and acceleration time history curves for Set B have the same general shape as those for Set A and are contained in the calculation package [3.A.7]. All significant results are summarized in Table 3.A.4.

### 3.A.8 <u>Computer Codes and Archival Information</u>

The input and output files created to perform the analyses reported in this appendix are archived in Holtec International calculation package [3.A.7].

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#### 3.A.9 Conclusion

The DYNA3D analysis of HI-STORM 100 reported in this appendix leads to the following conclusion:

- a. If a loaded HI-STORM undergoes a free fall for a height of 11 inches in a vertical orientation on to a reference pad defined by Table 3.A.1, the maximum rigid body deceleration is less than 45g's for both Set A and Set B pad parameters.
- b. If a loaded HI-STORM 100 overpack pivots about its bottom edge and tips over on to a reference pad defined by Table 3.A.1, then the maximum rigid body deceleration of the cask centerline at the plane of the top of the MPC fuel basket cellular region is less than 45g's for both Set A and Set B parameters.

Table 3.A.4 provides key results for all drop cases studied herein for both pad parameter sets (A and B). If the pad designer maintains each of the three significant parameters ( $t_p$ ,  $f_c'$ , and E) below the limit for the specific set selected (Set A or Set B), then the stiffness of the pad at any ISFSI site will be lower and the computed decelerations at the ISFSI site will also be lower. Furthermore, it is recognized that a refinement of the cask dynamic model will accrue further reduction in the computed peak deceleration. For example, incorporation of the structural flexibility in the MPC enclosure vessel, fuel basket, etc., would lead to additional reductions in the computed values of the peak deceleration. These refinements, however, add to the computational complexity. Because g-limits are met without the above-mentioned and other refinements in the cask dynamic model, the simplified dynamic model described in this appendix was retained to reduce the overall computational effort.

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- 3.A.10 <u>References</u>
- [3.A.1] Witte, M., et al., "Evaluation of Low-Velocity Impacts Tests of Solid Steel Billet onto Concrete Pads.", Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-ID-126274, Livermore, California, March 1997.
- [3.A.2] Witte, M., et al., "Evaluation of Low-Velocity Impacts Tests of Solid Steel Billet onto Concrete Pads, and Application to Generic ISFSI Storage Cask for Tipover and Side Drop.", Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-ID-126295, Livermore, California, March 1997.
- [3.A.3] Tang, D.T., Raddatz, M.G., and Sturz, F.C., "NRC Staff Technical Approach for Spent Fuel Cask Drop and Tipover Accident Analysis", SFPO, USNRC (1997).
- [3.A.4] Simulescu, I., "Benchmarking of the Holtec LS-DYNA3D Model for Cask Drop Events", Holtec Report HI-971779, September 1997.
- [3.A.5] LS-DYNA3D, Version 936-03, Livermore Software Technology Corporation, September 1996.
- [3.A.6] Whirley, R.G., "DYNA3D, A Nonlinear, Explicit, Three-Dimensional Finite element Code for Solid and Structural Mechanics - User Manual.", Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-MA-107254, Revision 1, 1993.
- [3.A.7] Zhai, J. "Analysis of the Loaded HI-STORM 100 System Under Drop and Tip-Over Scenarios", Holtec Report HI-2002474, July 2000.

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Item	Parameter Set A	Parameter Set B
Thickness of concrete, (inches)	36	28
Nominal compressive strength of concrete at 28 days, (psi)	4,200	6,000
Max. modulus of elasticity of the subgrade (psi)	28,000	16,000

#### Table 3.A.1: Essential Variables to Characterize the ISFSI Pad (Set A and Set B)

- Notes: 1. The concrete Young's Modulus is derived from the American Concrete Institute recommended formula  $57,000\sqrt{f}$  where f is the nominal compressive strength of the concrete (psi).
  - 2. The effective modulus of elasticity of the subgrade will be measured by the classical "plate test" or other appropriate means before pouring of the concrete to construct the ISFSI pad.
  - 3. The pad thickness, concrete compressive strength, and the subgrade soil effective modulus are the upper bound values to ensure that the deceleration limits under the postulated events set forth in Table 3.1.2 are satisfied.

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Steel Type	Parameter	Value
SA-516-70 at T = 350 deg. F	Е	2.800E + 07
	Sy	3.315E+04 psi
	Su	7.000E+04 psi
	€u	0.21
	v	0.30

Table 3.A.2: Essential Steel Material Properties for HI-STORM 100 Overpack

Note that the properties of the steel components, except for the radial channels used to position the MPC, do not affect the results reported herein since the HI-STORM 100 is eventually assumed to behave as a rigid body (by internal constraint equations automatically computed by DYNA3D upon issue of a "make rigid" command). In Section 3.4, however, stress and strain results for an additional tip-over analysis, performed using the actual material behavior ascribed to the storage overpack, are presented for the sole purpose of demonstrating ready retrievability of the MPC after the tip-over. As an option, the radial channels may be fabricated from SA240-304 material. The difference in material properties, however, has a negligible effect on the end results.

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Overpack weight	267,664 lb
Radial Concrete weight	163,673 lb
Length of the cask	231.25 inches
Diameter of the bottom plate	132.50 inches
Inside diameter of the cask shell	72.50 inches
Outside diameter of the cask shells	132.50 inches
MPC weight (including fuel)	88,857 lb
MPC height	190.5 inches
MPC diameter	68.375 inches
MPC bottom plate thickness	2.5 inches
MPC top plate thickness	9.5 inches

Table 3.A.3: Key Input Data in Drop Analyses

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Drop Event	Drop Event (inch)		Impact Velocity (in/sec)	Max. Deceleration <sup>††</sup> at the Top of the (g's) Basket		Duration of Deceleration Pulse (msec)	
	Set A	Set B		Set A	Set B	Set A	Set B
End Drop for 11 inches	0.65	0.81	92.2	43.98	41.53	3.3	3.0
Non-Mechanistic Tip-over	4.25	5.61	304.03	42.85	39.91	2.3	2.0

Table 3.A.4: Filtered Results for Drop and Tip-Over Scenarios for HI-STORM  $100^{\dagger}$ 

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The passband frequency of the Butterworth filter is 350 Hz.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup>The distance of the top of the fuel basket is 206" from the pivot point. The distance of the top of the cask is 231.25" from the pivot point. Therefore, all displacements, velocities, and accelerations at the top of the fuel basket are 89.08% of those at the cask top (206"/231.25").




Fig 3.A.2 Tipover Finite-Element Model (Plan)

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Fig 3.A.3 Tipover Finite-Element Model (XZView)

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Fig 3.A.4 Tipover Finite-Element Model (YZ View)

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Fig 3.A.6 End-Drop Finite-Element Model (Plan)

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Fig 3.A.7 End-Drop Finite-Element Model (XZView)









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Fig 3.A.14 Overpack Concrete Components Finite-Element Model (3-D View)

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II-STORM FSAR Fig 3.A.15 MPC Finite-Element Model (3-D View) HI-2002As44AR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.





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# FIGURES 3.A.19 THROUGH 3.A.30

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# CHAPTER 4<sup>†</sup> THERMAL EVALUATION

## 4.0 <u>OVERVIEW</u>

The HI-STORM System is designed for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a vertical orientation. An array of HI-STORM Systems laid out in a rectilinear pattern will be stored on a concrete ISFSI pad in an open environment. In this section, compliance of the HI-STORM thermal performance to 10CFR72 requirements for outdoor storage at an ISFSI is established. The analysis considers passive rejection of decay heat from the stored SNF assemblies to the environment under the most severe design basis ambient conditions. Effects of incident solar radiation (insolation) and partial radiation blockage due to the presence of neighboring casks at an ISFSI site are included in the analyses. Finally, the thermal margins of safety for long-term storage of both moderate burnup (up to 45,000 MWD/MTU) and high burnup spent nuclear fuel (greater than 45,000 MWD/MTU) in the HI-STORM 100 System are quantified. Safe thermal performance during on-site loading, unloading and transfer operations utilizing the HI-TRAC transfer cask is also demonstrated.

The HI-STORM thermal evaluation adopts NUREG-1536 [4.4.10] and ISG-11 [4.1.4] guidelines to demonstrate safe storage of Commercial Spent Fuel (CSF)\*. These guidelines are stated below:

- 1. The fuel cladding temperature for long-term storage and short-term operations shall be limited to 400°C (752°F).
- 2. The fuel cladding temperature should be maintained below 570°C (1058°F) for accident and off-normal event conditions.
- 3. The maximum internal pressure of the cask should remain within its design pressures for normal (1% rod rupture), off-normal (10% rod rupture), and accident (100% rod rupture) conditions.
- 4. The cask and fuel materials should be maintained within their minimum and maximum temperature criteria for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.
- 5. For fuel assemblies proposed for storage, the cask system should ensure a very

Defined as nuclear fuel that is used to produce energy in a commercial nuclear reactor (See Table 1.0.1).

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t This chapter has been prepared in the format and section organization set forth in Regulatory Guide 3.61. However, the material content of this chapter also fulfills the requirements of NUREG-1536. Pagination and numbering of sections, figures, and tables are consistent with the convention set down in Chapter 1, Section 1.0, herein. Finally, all terms -of-art used in this chapter are consistent with the terminology of the glossary (Table 1.0.1) and component nomenclature of the Bill-of-Materials (Section 1.5).
\* Defined as nuclear fuel that is used to produce energy in a commercial nuclear reactor (See Table

low probability of cladding breach during long-term storage.

- 6. The HI-STORM System should be passively cooled.
- 7. The thermal performance of the cask should be within the allowable design criteria specified in FSAR Chapters 2 and 3 for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

As demonstrated in this chapter (see Subsections 4.4.6 and 4.5.6), the HI-STORM System is designed to comply with <u>all</u> of the criteria listed above. All thermal analyses to evaluate normal conditions of storage in a HI-STORM storage module are described in Section 4.4. All thermal analyses to evaluate normal handling and on-site transfer in a HI-TRAC transfer cask are described in Section 4.5. All analyses for off-normal conditions are described in Section 11.1. All analyses for accident conditions are described in Section 11.2. Sections 4.1 through 4.3 describe thermal analyses and input data that are common to all conditions. This FSAR chapter is in full compliance with NUREG-1536 requirements, subject to the exceptions and clarifications discussed in Chapter 1, Table 1.0.3 and to ISG-11 requirements (no exceptions).

This revision to the HI-STORM Safety Analysis Report incorporates several features into the thermal analysis to respond to the changing needs of the U.S. nuclear power generation industry and revisions to NRC regulations. The most significant change is:

- The thermal analysis is revised to comply with recently issued NRC Staff Guidance ("Cladding Considerations for the Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel," ISG-11, Rev. 3).
- The Aluminum Heat Conduction Elements (ACHEs), optional under Amendment 1 of CoC 1014, are removed from the design. Removing the ACHEs from the MPC eliminates the constriction of the downcomer flow and thus further enhances the thermal performance of the MPC.

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# 4.1 <u>DISCUSSION</u>

As discussed in Chapter 2, this revision of the HI-STORM FSAR seeks to establish complete compliance with the provisions of ISG-11 [4.1.4]. To ensure explicit compliance, the new condition "short term operations," corresponding to fuel loading activities, is defined in Chapter 2.

In Revision 1 of this FSAR, fuel loading, which includes MPC cavity drying, MPC lid welding, helium pressurization, and MPC transfer operations, was treated as part of the "off-normal" condition. It is not treated as a distinct fuel thermal state. Specifically, the maximum fuel cladding temperature for the fuel loading condition now formally referred to as "short term operations" is set equal to the PCT limit for normal storage conditions for all high-burnup CSF (see Section 4.3). Potential thermally challenging states for the spent fuel arise if the fuel drying process utilizes pressure reduction (i.e., vacuum drying) or when the loaded MPC is inside the HI-TRAC transfer cask. In the latter state, the rate of heat rejection from the MPC is somewhat less compared to the normal storage condition when the MPC is inside the ventilated overpack. Because the HI-TRAC transfer cask handling subsequent to helium pressurization of the MPC typically involves keeping the equipment vertical, the thermosiphon action inside the MPC is fully operational during these activities. As a result, the increase in the fuel cladding temperature in the HI-TRAC compared to the HI-STORM storage condition is fairly modest. The increase is more significant in the case where the HI-TRAC transfer cask, for reasons such as vertical height restrictions or seismic constraints as a plant, must be handled in the horizontal orientation. When the HI-TRAC is horizontal, the cessation of the thermosiphon action result in an additional rise in the fuel cladding temperature. Therefore, the short term evolutions that may be thermally limiting are analyzes as listed below:

- i. Vacuum Drying
- ii. Loaded MPC in HI-TRAC in the vertical orientation
- iii. Loaded MPC in HI-TRAC in the horizontal orientation

The threshold MPC heat generation rate at which the HI-STORM peak cladding temperature reaches a steady state equilibrium value approaching the normal storage peak clad temperature limit is computed in this chapter. Likewise, the MPC heat generation rates that produce the steady state equilibrium temperature approaching the normal storage peak clad temperature limit for the MPC-in-HI-TRAC condition in both vertical and horizontal configurations are computed in this chapter. These computed heat generation rates directly bear upon the compliance of the system with ISG-11 [4.1.4] and are, accordingly, adopted in the system Technical Specifications for high burnup fuel (HBF).

A cutaway view of the HI-STORM dry storage system has been presented earlier (see Figure 1.2.1). The system consists of a sealed MPC situated inside a vertical ventilated storage overpack. Air inlet and outlet ducts that allow for air cooling of the stored MPC are located at the bottom and top, respectively, of the cylindrical overpack. The SNF assemblies reside inside the MPC, which is sealed with a welded lid to form

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the confinement boundary. The MPC contains an all-alloy honeycomb basket structure with square-shaped compartments of appropriate dimensions to allow insertion of the fuel assemblies prior to welding of the MPC lid and closure ring. Each box panel, with the exception of exterior panels on the MPC-68 and MPC-32, is equipped with a thermal neutron absorber panel sandwiched between an Alloy X steel sheathing plate and the box panel, along the entire length of the active fuel region. The MPC is backfilled with helium up to the design-basis initial fill level (Table 1.2.2). This provides a stable, inert environment for long-term storage of the SNF. Heat is rejected from the SNF in the HI-STORM System to the environment by passive heat transport mechanisms only.

The helium backfill gas is an integral part of the MPC thermal design. The helium fills all the spaces between solid components and provides an improved conduction medium (compared to air) for dissipating decay heat in the MPC. To ensure that the helium gas is retained and is not diluted by lower conductivity air, the MPC confinement boundary is designed and fabricated to comply with the provisions of the ASME B&PV Code Section III, Subsection NB (to the maximum extent practical), as an all-seal-welded pressure vessel with redundant closures. It is demonstrated in Section 11.1.3 that the failure of one field-welded pressure boundary seal will not result in a breach of the pressure boundary. The helium gas is therefore retained and undiluted, and may be credited in the thermal analyses.

An important thermal design criterion imposed on the HI-STORM System is to limit the maximum fuel cladding temperature to within design basis limits (Table 4.3.1) for long-term storage of design basis SNF | assemblies. An equally important design criterion is to minimize temperature gradients in the MPC so as to minimize thermal stresses. In order to meet these design objectives, the MPC baskets are designed to possess certain distinctive characteristics, which are summarized in the following.

The MPC design minimizes resistance to heat transfer within the basket and basket periphery regions. This is ensured by an uninterrupted panel-to-panel connectivity realized in the all-welded honeycomb basket structure. The MPC design incorporates top and bottom plenums with interconnected downcomer paths. The top plenum is formed by the gap between the bottom of the MPC lid and the top of the honeycomb fuel basket, and by elongated semicircular holes in each basket cell wall. The bottom plenum is formed by large elongated semicircular holes at the base of all cell walls. The MPC basket is designed to eliminate structural discontinuities (i.e., gaps) which introduce large thermal resistances to heat flow. Consequently, temperature gradients are minimized in the design, which results in lower thermal stresses within the basket. Low thermal stresses are also ensured by an MPC design that permits unrestrained axial and radial growth of the basket. The possibility of stresses due to restraint on basket periphery thermal growth is eliminated by providing adequate basket-to-canister shell gaps to allow for basket thermal growth during heat-up to design basis temperatures.

It is heuristically apparent from the geometry of the MPC that the basket metal, the fuel assemblies, and the contained helium mass will be at their peak temperatures at or near the longitudinal axis of the MPC. The

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temperatures will attenuate with increasing radial distance from this axis, reaching their lowest values at the outer surface of the MPC shell. Conduction along the metal walls and radiant heat exchange from the fuel assemblies to the MPC metal mass would therefore result in substantial differences in the bulk temperatures of helium columns in different fuel storage cells. Since two fluid columns at different temperatures in communicative contact cannot remain in static equilibrium, the non-isotropic temperature field in the MPC internal space due to conduction and radiation heat transfer mechanisms guarantee the incipience of the third mode of heat transfer: natural convection.

The preceding paragraph introduced the internal helium thermosiphon feature engineered into the MPC design. It is recognized that the backfill helium pressure, in combination with low pressure drop circulation passages in the MPC design, induces a thermosiphon upflow through the multi-cellular basket structure to aid in removing the decay heat from the stored fuel assemblies. The decay heat absorbed by the helium during upflow through the basket is rejected to the MPC shell during the subsequent downflow of helium in the peripheral downcomers. This helium thermosiphon heat extraction process significantly reduces the burden on the MPC metal basket structure for heat transport by conduction, thereby minimizing internal basket temperature gradients and resulting thermal stresses.

The helium columns traverse the vertical storage cavity spaces, redistributing heat within the MPC. Elongated holes in the bottom of the cell walls, liberal flow space and elongated holes at the top, and wideopen downcomers along the outer periphery of the basket ensure a smooth helium flow regime. The most conspicuous beneficial effect of the helium thermosiphon circulation, as discussed above, is the mitigation of internal thermal stresses in the MPC. Another beneficial effect is reduction of the peak fuel cladding temperatures of the fuel assemblies located in the interior of the basket.

Four distinct MPC basket geometries are evaluated for thermal performance in the HI-STORM System. For intact PWR fuel storage, the MPC-24, MPC-24E, and MPC-32 designs are available. Four locations are designated for storing damaged PWR fuel in the MPC-24E design. A 68-cell MPC design (MPC-68, MPC-68F, and MPC-68FF) is available for storing BWR fuel (intact or damaged (including fuel debris)). All of the four basic MPC geometries (MPC-32, MPC-24, MPC-24E and MPC-68) are described in Chapter 1 wherein their licensing drawings can also be found.

The design maximum decay heat loads for storage of intact zircaloy clad fuel in the four MPCs are listed in Tables 4.4.20, 4.4.21, 4.4.28, and 4.4.29. Storage of intact stainless steel clad fuel is permitted for a low decay heat limit set forth in Chapter 2 (Tables 2.1.17 through 2.1.21). Storage of zircaby clad fuel with stainless steel clad fuel in an MPC is permitted. In this scenario, the zircaloy clad fuel must meet the lower decay heat limits for stainless steel clad fuel. Storage of damaged, zircaloy clad fuel is evaluated in Subsection 4.4.1.1.4. The axial heat distribution in each fuel assembly is assumed to follow the burnup profiles set forth by Table 2.1.11.

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Thermal analysis of the HI-STORM System is based on including all three fundamental modes of heat transfer, namely conduction, natural convection and radiation. Different combinations of these modes are active in different parts of the system. These modes are properly identified and conservatively analyzed within each part of the MPC, the HI-STORM storage overpack and the HI-TRAC transfer cask, to enable bounding calculations of the temperature distribution within the HI-STORM System to be performed. In addition to storage within the HI-STORM overpack, loaded MPCs will also be located for short durations inside the transfer cask (HI-TRAC) designed for moving MPCs into and out of HI-STORM storage modules.

Heat is dissipated from the outer surface of the HI-STORM storage overpack and HI-TRAC transfer cask to the environment by buoyancy induced airflow (natural convection) and thermal radiation. Heat transport through the cylindrical wall of the storage overpack and HI-TRAC is solely by conduction. While stored in a HI-STORM overpack, heat is rejected from the surface of the MPC via the parallel action of thermal radiation to the inner shell of the overpack and convection to a buoyancy driven airflow in the annular space between the outer surface of the MPC and the inner shell of the overpack. This situation is similar to the familiar case of natural draft flow in furnace stacks. When placed into a HI-TRAC cask for transfer operations, heat is rejected from the surface of the MPC to the inner shell of the HI-TRAC by conduction and thermal radiation.

Within the MPC, heat is transferred between metal surfaces (e.g., between neighboring fuel rod surfaces) via a combination of conduction through a gaseous medium (helium) and thermal radiation. Heat is transferred between the fuel basket and the MPC shell by thermal radiation and conduction.

As discussed later in this chapter, an array of conservative assumptions bias the results of the thermal analysis towards much reduced computed margins than would be obtained by a rigorous analysis of the problem.

The complete thermal analysis is performed using the industry standard ANSYS finite element modeling package [4.1.1] and the finite volume Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) code FLUENT [4.1.2]. ANSYS has been previously used and accepted by the NRC on numerous dockets [4.4.10,4.V.5.a]. The FLUENT CFD program is independently benchmarked and validated with a wide class of theoretical and experimental studies reported in the technical journals. Additionally, Holtec has confirmed the code's capability to reliably predict temperature fields in dry storage applications in a benchmark report [4.1.5] using independent full-scale test data from a loaded cask [4.1.3]. In this benchmarking report, the Holtec thermal model is shown to overpredict the measured fuel cladding temperature by a modest amount for every test set. In early 2000, PNL evaluated the thermal performance of HI-STORM 100 at discrete ambient temperatures using the COBRA-SFS Code. (Summary report communicated by T.E. Michener to J. Guttman (NRC staff) dated May 31, 2000 titled "TEMPEST Analysis of the Utah ISFSI Private Fuel Storage Facility and COBRA-SFS Analysis of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 Storage System"). The above-

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mentioned benchmarking report includes a comparison of the Holtec thermal model results with the PNL solution. The comparison shows that Holtec thermal model continues to be uniformly conservative. The benchmarking of the Holtec thermal model [4.1.5] against the EPRI test data [4.1.3] and PNL COBRA-SFS study validate the suitability of the thermal model employed to evaluate the thermal performance of the HI-STORM 100 System in this document.

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# 4.2 <u>SUMMARY OF THERMAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIALS</u>

Materials present in the MPCs include stainless steels (Alloy X), neutron absorber (Boral or METAMIC) and helium. Materials present in the HI-STORM storage overpack include carbon steels and concrete. Materials present in the HI-TRAC transfer cask include carbon steels, lead, Holtite-A neutron shield, and demineralized water<sup>†</sup>. In Table 4.2.1, a summary of references used to obtain cask material properties for performing all thermal analyses is presented.

Individual thermal conductivities of the alloys that comprise the Alloy X materials and the bounding Alloy X thermal conductivity are reported in Appendix 1.A of this report. Tables 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 provide numerical thermal conductivity data of materials at several representative temperatures. Thermal conductivity data for constituents of Boral (i.e., B<sub>4</sub>C core and aluminum cladding) is provided in Table 4.2.8. Boral is a compressed neutron absorbing core with a thin layer of aluminum on both sides. Because of its sandwich construction, its conduction properties are directionally dependent (i.e., non-isotropic). In contract to Boral, METAMIC is a homogeneous neutron absorbing material with a thermal conductivity that is higher than the Boral neutron absorbing B<sub>4</sub>C core (Figure 4.2.3) but lower than Boral's aluminum cladding. The equivalent conductivity in two principal directions (through thickness and width) is closely matched by METAMIC<sup>‡</sup>. Therefore, the two materials are considered equivalent in their heat transfer performance.

For the HI-STORM overpack, the thermal conductivity of concrete and the emissivity/absorptivity of painted surfaces are particularly important. Recognizing the considerable variations in reported values for these properties, we have selected values that are conservative with respect to both authoritative references and values used in analyses on previously licensed cask dockets. Specific discussions of the conservatism of the selected values are included in the following paragraphs.

As specified in Table 4.2.1, the concrete thermal conductivity is taken from Marks' Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, which is conservative compared to a variety of recognized concrete codes and references. Neville, in his book "Properties of Concrete" (4<sup>th</sup> Edition, 1996), gives concrete conductivity values as high as 2.1 Btu/(hr×ft×°F). For concrete with siliceous aggregates, the type to be used in HI-STORM overpacks, Neville reports conductivities of at least 1.2 Btu/(hr×ft×°F). Data from Loudon and Stacey, extracted from Neville, reports conductivities of 0.980 to 1.310 Btu/(hr×ft×°F) for normal weight concrete protected from the weather. ACI-207.1R provides thermal conductivity values for seventeen structures (mostly dams) at temperatures from 50-150°F. Every thermal conductivity value reported in ACI-207.1R is greater than the 1.05 Btu/(hr×ft×°F) value used in the HI-STORM thermal analyses.

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t Water from a primary source (e.g., lake or river) from which ionic impurities and precipitates have been removed.

For example, at 482°F, the through-thickness and width direction conductivities of Boral (B₄C thickness fraction = 0.82) are computed as 52.9 and 58.2 Btu/hr-ft-°F respectively. The SRMSS conductivity = [(52.9<sup>2</sup> + 58.2<sup>2</sup>)/2]<sup>0.5</sup> is 55.61 Btu/ hr-ft-°F compared to a lowerbound METAMIC conductivity (Figure 4.2.3) of 55.68 Btu/ hr-ft-°F (at 482°F).

Additionally, the NRC has previously approved analyses that use higher conductivity values than those applied in the HI-STORM thermal analysis. For example, thermal calculations for the NRC approved Vectra NUHOMS cask system (June 1996, Rev. 4A) used thermal conductivities as high as 1.17 Btu/(hr×ft×°F) at 100°F. Based on these considerations, the concrete thermal conductivity value stipulated for HI-STORM thermal analyses is considered to be conservative.

Holtite-A is a composite material consisting of approximately 37 wt% epoxy polymer, 1 wt% B<sub>4</sub>C and 62 wt% Aluminum trihydrate. Thermal conductivity of the polymeric component is low because polymers are generally characterized by a low conductivity (0.05 to 0.2 Btu/ft-hr-°F). Addition of fillers in substantial amounts raises the mixture conductivity up to a factor of ten. Thermal conductivity of epoxy filled resins with Alumina is reported in the technical literature† as approximately 0.5 Btu/ft-hr-°F and higher. In the HI-STORM FSAR, a conservatively postulated conductivity of 0.3 Btu/ft-hr-°F is used in the thermal models for the neutron shield region (in the HI-TRAC transfer cask). As the thermal inertia of the neutron shield is not credited in the analyses, the density and heat capacity properties are not reported herein.

Surface emissivity data for key materials of construction are provided in Table 4.2.4. The emissivity properties of painted external surfaces are generally excellent. Kern [4.2.5] reports an emissivity range of 0.8 to 0.98 for a wide variety of paints. In the HI-STORM thermal analysis, an emissivity of 0.85<sup>t†</sup> is applied to painted surfaces. A conservative solar absorptivity coefficient of 1.0 is applied to all exposed overpack surfaces.

In Table 4.2.5, the heat capacity and density of the MPC, overpack and CSF materials are presented. These properties are used in performing transient (i.e., hypothetical fire accident condition) analyses. The temperature dependence of the viscosities of helium and air are provided in Table 4.2.6.

The heat transfer coefficient for exposed surfaces is calculated by accounting for both natural convection and thermal radiation heat transfer. The natural convection coefficient depends upon the product of Grashof (Gr) and Prandtl (Pr) numbers. Following the approach developed by Jakob and Hawkins [4.2.9], the product Gr×Pr is expressed as  $L^3\Delta TZ$ , where L is height of the overpack,  $\Delta T$  is overpack surface temperature differential and Z is a parameter based on air properties, which are known functions of temperature, evaluated at the average film temperature. The temperature dependence of Z is provided in Table 4.2.7.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> "Principles of Polymer Systems", F. Rodriguez, Hemisphere Publishing Company (Chapter 10). <sup>††</sup> This is conservative with respect to prior cask industry practice, which has historically utilized higher emissivities. For example, a higher emissivity for painted surfaces ( $\varepsilon = 0.95$ ) is used in the previously licensed TN-32 cask TSAR (Docket 72-1021).

Material	Emissivity	Conductivity	Density	Heat Capacity
Helium	N/A	Handbook [4.2.2]	Ideal Gas Law	Handbook [4.2.2]
Air	N/A	Handbook [4.2.2]	Ideal Gas Law	Handbook [4.2.2]
Zircaloy	EPRI [4.2.3]	NUREG [4.2.6], [4.2.7]	Rust [4.2.4]	Rust [4.2.4]
UO <sub>2</sub>	Not Used	NUREG [4.2.6], [4.2.7]	Rust [4.2.4]	Rust [4.2.4]
Stainless Steel	Kern [4.2.5]	ASME [4.2.8]	Marks' [4.2.1]	Marks' [4.2.1]
Carbon Steel	Kern [4.2.5]	ASME [4.2.8]	Marks' [4.2.1]	Marks' [4.2.1]
Boral <sup>†</sup>	Not Used	Test Data	Test Data	Test Data
Holtite-A	Not Used	Lower Bound Value Used	Not Used	Not Used
Concrete	Not Used	Marks' [4.2.1]	Marks' [4.2.1]	Handbook [4.2.2]
Lead	Not Used	Handbook [4.2.2]	Handbook [4.2.2]	Handbook [4.2.2]
Water	Not Used	ASME [4.2.10]	ASME [4.2.10]	ASME [4.2.10]
METAMIC§	Not Used	Test Data	Test Data	Test Data

# SUMMARY OF HI-STORM SYSTEM MATERIALS THERMAL PROPERTY REFERENCES

AAR Structures Boral thermophysical test data.

§ Test data provided by METAMIC Inc.

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# SUMMARY OF HI-STORM SYSTEM MATERIALS THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY DATA

Material	@ 200°F	@ 450°F	@ 700°F
	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)
Helium	0.0976	0.1289	0.1575
Air <sup>**</sup>	0.0173	0.0225	0.0272
Alloy X	8.4	9.8	11.0
Carbon Steel	24.4	23.9	22.4
Concrete <sup>††</sup>	1.05	1.05	1.05
Lead	19.4	17.9	16.9
Water	0.392	0.368	N/A

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<sup>\*\*</sup> At lower temperatures, Air conductivity is between 0.0139 Btu/ft-hr-°F (at 32°F) and 0.0176 Btu/ft-hr-°F.at 212°F.

tt Assumed constant for the entire range of temperatures.

# SUMMARY OF FUEL ELEMENT COMPONENTS THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY DATA

Zircaloy (	Cladding	Fuel (	UO <sub>2</sub> )
Temperature (°F)	Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F)	Temperature (°F)	Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F)
392	8.28 <sup>†</sup>	100	3.48
572	8.76	448	3.48
752	9.60	570	3.24
932	10.44	793	2.28 <sup>†</sup>

Lowest values of conductivity used in the thermal analyses for conservatism.

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Material	Emissivity
Zircaloy	0.80
Painted surfaces	0.85
Stainless steel	0.36
Carbon Steel	0.66

#### SUMMARY OF MATERIALS SURFACE EMISSIVITY DATA

Note: The emissivity of a metal surface is a function of the surface finish. In general, oxidation of a metal surface increases the emissivity. As stated in Marks' Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers: "Unless extraordinary pains are taken to prevent oxidation, however, a metallic surface may exhibit several times the emittance or absorptance of a polished specimen." This general statement is substantiated with a review of tabulated emissivity data from several standard references. These comparisons show that oxidized metal surfaces do indeed have higher emissivities than clean surfaces.

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# DENSITY AND HEAT CAPACITY PROPERTIES SUMMARY

Material	Density (lbm/ft <sup>3</sup> )	Heat Capacity (Btu/lbm-°F)
Helium	(Ideal Gas Law)	1.24
Zircaloy	409	0.0728
Fuel (UO <sub>2</sub> )	684	0.056
Carbon steel	489	0.1
Stainless steel	501	0.12
Boral	154.7	0.13
Concrete	142 <sup>†</sup>	0.156
Lead	710	0.031
Water	62.4	0.999
METAMIC	163.4 - 166.6	0.22 - 0.29

<sup>†</sup> For conservatism in transient heatup calculations, the density is understated.

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Temperature (°F)	Helium Viscosity (Micropoise)	Temperature (°F)	Air Viscosity (Micropoise)
167.4	220.5	32.0	172.0
200.3	228.2	70.5	182.4
297.4	250.6	260.3	229.4
346.9	261.8	-	· _
463.0	288.7	-	-
537.8	299.8	-	-
737.6	338.8	-	-

# GASES VISCOSITY<sup>†</sup> VARIATION WITH TEMPERATURE

Obtained from Rohsenow and Hartnett [4.2.2].

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<sup>†</sup> Obtained from Jakob and Hawkins [4.2.9].

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# VARIATION OF NATURAL CONVECTION PROPERTIES PARAMETER "Z" FOR AIR WITH TEMPERATURE<sup>†</sup>

Temperature (°F)	$Z(ft^{-3} \circ F^{-1})$
40	2.1×10 <sup>6</sup>
140	9.0×10 <sup>5</sup>
240	4.6×10 <sup>5</sup>
340	2.6×10 <sup>5</sup>
440	1.5×10 <sup>5</sup>

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# BORAL COMPONENT MATERIALS<sup>†</sup> THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY DATA

Temperature (°F)	B₄C Core Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F)	Aluminum Cladding Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F)
212	48.09	100.00
392	48.03	104.51
572	47.28	108.04
752	46.35	109.43

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Both  $B_4C$  and aluminum cladding thermal conductivity values are obtained from AAR Structures Boral thermophysical test data.

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Table 4.2.9

[INTENTIONALLY DELETED]

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# FIGURES 4.2.1 and 4.2.2

# [INTENTIONALLY DELETED]

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## 4.3 SPECIFICATIONS FOR COMPONENTS

HI-STORM System materials and components designated as "Important to Safety" (i.e., required to be maintained within their safe operating temperature ranges to ensure their intended function) which warrant special attention are summarized in Table 4.3.1. The neutron shielding ability of Holtite-A neutron shield material used in the HI-TRAC transfer cask is ensured by demonstrating that the material exposure temperatures are maintained below the maximum allowable limit. Long-term integrity of SNF is ensured by the HI-STORM System thermal evaluation which demonstrates that fuel cladding temperatures are maintained below design basis limits. Neutron absorber materials used in MPC baskets for criticality control (made from  $B_4C$  and aluminum) are stable up to 1000°F<sup>†</sup>. However, for conservatism, a significantly lower temperature limit is specified for thermal evaluation. The overpack concrete, the primary function of which is shielding, will maintain its structural, thermal and shielding properties provided that American Concrete Institute (ACI) guidance on temperature limits (see Appendix 1.D) is followed.

Compliance to 10CFR72 requires, in part, identification and evaluation of short-term off-normal and severe hypothetical accident conditions. The inherent mechanical characteristics of cask materials and components ensure that no significant functional degradation is possible due to exposure to short-term temperature excursions outside the normal long-term temperature limits. For evaluation of HI-STORM System thermal performance, material temperature limits for long-term normal, short-term operations, and off-normal and accident conditions are provided in Table 4.3.1. In Table 4.3.1, ISG-11 [4.1.4] temperature limits are adopted for Commercial Spent Fuel (CSF). These limits are applicable to all fuel types, burnup levels and cladding materials approved by the NRC for power generation.

## 4.3.1 Evaluation of Moderate Burnup Fuel

It is recognized that hydrides p resent in irradiated fuel rods (predominantly c ircumferentially oriented) dissolve at cladding temperatures above 400°C [4.3.8]. Upon cooling below a threshold temperature ( $T_p$ ), the hydrides precipitate and reorient to an undesirable (radial) direction if cladding stresses at the hydride precipitation temperature  $T_p$  are excessive. For moderate burnup fuel,  $T_p$  is conservatively estimated as 350°C [4.3.8]. In a recent study, PNNL has evaluated a number of bounding fuel rods for reorientation under hydride precipitation temperatures for MBF [4.3.8]. The study concludes that hydride reorientation is not credible during short-term operations involving low to moderate burnup fuel (up to 45 GWD/MTU). Accordingly, the higher ISG-11 temperature limit is justified for moderate burnup fuel and is adopted in the HI-STORM FSAR for short-term operations with MBF fueled MPCs (see Table 4.3.1).

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B4C is a refractory material that is unaffected by high temperature (on the order of 1000°F) and aluminum is solid at temperatures in excess of 1000°F.
 See Section 1.2.1.3.2

See Section 1.2.1.3.2.

#### Table 4.3.1

#### HI-STORM SYSTEM MATERIAL TEMPERATURE LIMITS

Material	Normal Long-Term Temperature Limits [°F]	Short-Term Temperature Limits [°F]
CSF cladding (zirconium alloys and stainless steel)	752	Short-Term Operations 752 (HBF) 1058 (MBF) Off-Normal and Accident 1058
Neutron Absorber	800	950
Holtite-A <sup>†††</sup>	N/A	350 (Short Term Operations)
Concrete <sup>‡</sup>	300	350
Water	N/A	307§ (Short Term Operations) N/A (Off-Normal and Accident)

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These values are applicable for concrete in the overpack body, the overpack lid and, where applicable, the overpack pedestal. As stated in Chapter 1 (Appendix 1.D, Table 1.D.1), these limits are compared to the through-thickness section average temperature.

<sup>§</sup> Saturation temperature at HI-TRAC water jacket design pressure.


# Tables 4.3.2 through 4.3.9 are intentionally deleted.

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# FIGURES 4.3.1 THROUGH 4.3.4 [INTENTIONALLY DELETED]

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## 4.4 THERMAL EVALUATION FOR NORMAL CONDITIONS OF STORAGE

Under long-term storage conditions, the HI-STORM System (i.e., HI-STORM overpack and MPC) thermal evaluation is performed with the MPC cavity backfilled with helium. Thermal analysis results for the long-term storage scenarios are obtained and reported in this section.

#### 4.4.1 <u>Thermal Model</u>

The MPC basket design consists of four distinct geometries to hold 24 or 32 PWR, or 68 BWR fuel assemblies. The basket is a matrix of square compartments designed to hold the fuel assemblies in a vertical position. The basket is a honeycomb structure of alloy steel (Alloy X) plates with full-length edge-welded intersections to form an integral basket configuration. All individual cell walls, except outer periphery cell walls in the MPC-68 and MPC-32, are provided with Boral neutron absorber sandwiched between the box wall and a stainless steel sheathing plate over the full length of the active fuel region.

The design basis decay heat generation (per PWR or BWR assembly) for long-term normal storage is specified in Table 2.1.26. The decay heat is conservatively considered to be non-uniformly distributed over the active fuel length based on the design basis axial burnup distributions provided in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1.11).

Transport of heat from the interior of the MPC to its outer surface is accomplished by a combination of conduction through the MPC basket metal grid structure, and conduction and radiation heat transfer in the relatively small helium gaps between the fuel assemblies and basket cell walls. Heat dissipation across the gap between the MPC basket periphery and the MPC shell is by a combination of helium conduction and radiation across the gap. MPC internal helium circulation is recognized in the thermal modeling analyses reported herein. Heat rejection from the outer surface of the MPC to the environment is primarily accomplished by convective heat transfer to a buoyancy driven airflow through the MPC-to-overpack annular gap. Inlet and outlet ducts in the overpack cylinder at its bottom and top, respectively, allow circulation of air through the annulus. A secondary heat rejection path from the outer surface of the MPC to the environment involves thermal radiation heat transfer across the annular gap, radial conduction through the overpack cylinder, and natural convection and thermal radiation from the outer surface of the overpack to the atmosphere.

4.4.1.1 Analytical Model - General Remarks

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Transport of heat from the heat generation region (fuel assemblies) to the outside environment (ambient air or ground) is analyzed broadly in terms of three interdependent thermal models.

- 1. The first model considers transport of heat from the fuel assembly to the basket cell walls. This model recognizes the combined effects of conduction (through helium) and radiation, and is essentially a finite element technology based update of the classical Wooton & Epstein [4.4.1] (which considered radiative heat exchange between fuel rod surfaces) formulation.
- 2. The second model considers heat transport within an MPC cross section by conduction and radiation. The effective cross sectional thermal conductivity of the basket region, obtained from a combined fuel assembly/basket heat conduction-radiation model developed on ANSYS, is applied to an axisymmetric thermal model of the HI-STORM System on the FLUENT [4.1.2] code.
- 3. The third model deals with the transmission of heat from the MPC exterior surface to the external environment (heat sink). The upflowing air stream in the MPC/cask annulus extracts most of the heat from the external surface of the MPC, and a small amount of heat is radially deposited on the HI-STORM inner surface by conduction and radiation. Heat rejection from the outside cask surfaces to ambient air is considered by accounting for natural convection and radiative heat transfer mechanisms from the vertical (cylindrical shell) and top cover (flat) surfaces. The reduction in radiative heat exchange between cask outside vertical surfaces and ambient air, because of blockage from the neighboring casks arranged for normal storage at an ISFSI pad as described in Section 1.4, is recognized in the analysis. The overpack top plate is modeled as a heated surface in convective and radiative heat exchange with air and as a recipient of heat input through insolation. Insolation on the cask surfaces is based on 12-hour levels prescribed in 10CFR71, averaged over a 24-hour period, after accounting for partial blockage conditions on the sides of the overpack.

Subsections 4.4.1.1.1 through 4.4.1.1.9 contain a systematic description of the mathematical models devised to articulate the temperature field in the HI-STORM System. The description begins with the method to characterize the heat transfer behavior of the prismatic (square) opening referred to as the "fuel space" with a heat emitting fuel assembly situated in it. The methodology utilizes a finite element procedure to replace the heterogeneous SNF/fuel space region with an equivalent solid body having a well-defined temperature-dependent conductivity. In the following subsection, the method to replace the "composite" walls of the fuel basket cells with an equivalent "solid" wall is presented. Having created the mathematical equivalents for the SNF/fuel spaces and the fuel basket walls, the method to represent the MPC cylinder containing the fuel basket by an equivalent cylinder whose thermal conductivity is a function of the spatial location and coincident temperature is presented.

Following the approach of presenting descriptions starting from the inside and moving to the outer region of a cask, the next subsections present the mathematical model to simulate the overpack. Subsection 4.4.1.1.9 concludes the presentation with a description of how the different models for the specific regions within the HI-STORM System are assembled into the final FLUENT model.

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## 4.4.1.1.1 Overview of the Thermal Model

Thermal analysis of the HI-STORM System is performed by assuming that the system is subject to its maximum heat duty with each storage location occupied and with the heat generation rate in each stored fuel assembly equal to the design-basis maximum value. While the assumption of equal heat generation imputes a certain symmetry to the cask thermal problem, the thermal model must incorporate three attributes of the physical problem to perform a rigorous analysis of a fully loaded cask:

- i. While the rate of heat conduction through metals is a relatively weak function of temperature, radiation heat exchange is a nonlinear function of surface temperatures.
- ii. Heat generation in the MPC is axially non-uniform due to non-uniform axial burnup profiles in the fuel assemblies.
- iii. Inasmuch as the transfer of heat occurs from inside the basket region to the outside, the temperature field in the MPC is spatially distributed with the maximum values reached in the central core region.

It is clearly impractical to model every fuel rod in every stored fuel assembly explicitly. Instead, the cross section bounded by the inside of the storage cell, which surrounds the assemblage of fuel rods and the interstitial helium gas, is replaced with an "equivalent" square (solid) section characterized by an effective thermal conductivity. Figure 4.4.1 pictorially illustrates the homogenization concept. Further details of this procedure for determining the effective conductivity are presented in Subsection 4.4.1.1.2; it suffices to state here that the effective conductivity of the cell space will be a function of temperature because the radiation heat transfer (a major component of the heat transport between the fuel rods and the surrounding basket cell metal) is a strong function of the temperatures of the participating bodies. Therefore, in effect, every storage cell location will have a different value of effective conductivity (depending on the coincident temperature) in the homogenized model. The temperature-dependent fuel assembly region effective conductivity is determined by a finite volume procedure, as described in Subsection 4.4.1.1.2.

In the next step of homogenization, a planar section of MPC is considered. With each storage cell inside space replaced with an equivalent solid square, the MPC cross section consists of a metallic gridwork (basket cell walls with each square cell space containing a solid fuel cell square of effective thermal conductivity, which is a function of temperature) circumscribed by a circular ring (MPC shell). There are four distinct materials in this section, namely the homogenized fuel cell squares, the Alloy X structural materials in the MPC (including neutron absorber sheathing), neutron absorber and helium gas. Each of the four constituent materials in this section has a different

conductivity of the MPC region must also be computed as a function of temperature. Finally, it is recognized that the MPC section consists of two discrete regions, namely, the basket region and the peripheral region. The peripheral region is the space between the peripheral storage cells and the MPC shell. This space is essentially full of helium surrounded by Alloy X plates. Accordingly, as illustrated in Figure 4.4.2 for MPC-68, the MPC cross section is replaced with two homogenized regions with temperature-dependent conductivities. In particular, the effective conductivity of the fuel cells is subsumed into the equivalent conductivity of the basket cross section. The finite element procedure used to accomplish this is described in Subsection 4.4.1.1.4. The ANSYS finite element code is the vehicle for all modeling efforts described in the foregoing.

In summary, appropriate finite-element models are used to replace the MPC cross section with an equivalent two-region homogeneous conduction lamina whose local conductivity is a known function of coincident absolute temperature. Thus, the MPC cylinder containing discrete fuel assemblies, helium, neutron absorber and Alloy X, is replaced with a right circular cylinder whose material conductivity will vary with radial and axial position as a function of the coincident temperature. Finally, HI-STORM is simulated as a radially symmetric structure with a buoyancy-induced flow in the annular space surrounding the heat generating MPC cylinder.

The thermal analysis procedure described above makes frequent use of equivalent thermal properties to ease the geometric modeling of the cask components. These equivalent properties are rigorously calculated values based on detailed evaluations of actual cask system geometries. All these calculations are performed conservatively to ensure a bounding representation of the cask system. This process, commonly referred to as submodeling, yields accurate (not approximate) results. Given the detailed nature of the submodeling process, experimental validation of the individual submodels is not necessary.

Internal circulation of helium in the sealed MPC is modeled as flow in a porous media in the fueled region containing the SNF (including top and bottom plenums). The basket-to-MPC shell clearance space is modeled as a helium filled radial gap to include the downcomer flow in the thermal model. The downcomer region, as illustrated in Figure 4.4.2, consists of an azimuthally varying gap formed by the square-celled basket outline and the cylindrical MPC shell. At the locations of closest approach a differential expansion gap (a small clearance on the order of 1/10 of an inch) is engineered to allow free thermal expansion of the basket. At the widest locations, the gaps are on the order of the fuel cell opening (~6" (BWR) and ~9" (PWR) MPCs). It is heuristically evident that heat dissipation by conduction is maximum at the closest approach locations (low thermal resistance path) and that convective heat transfer is highest at the widest gap locations (large downcomer flow). In the FLUENT thermal model, a radial gap that is large compared to the basket-to-shell clearance and small compared to the cell opening is used. As a relatively large gap penalizes heat dissipation by conduction and a small gap throttles convective flow, the use of a single gap in the FLUENT model understates both conduction and convection heat transfer in the downcomer region.

The FLUENT thermal modeling methodology has been benchmarked with full-scale cask test data (EPRI TN-24P cask testing), as well as with PNNL's COBRA-SFS modeling of the HI-STORM System. The benchmarking work has been documented in a Holtec topical report HI-992252

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("Topical Report on the HI-STAR/HI-STORM Thermal Model and Its Benchmarking with Full-Size Cask Test Data").

In this manner, a loaded MPC standing upright on the ISFSI pad in a HI-STORM overpack is replaced with a right circular cylinder with spatially varying temperature-dependent conductivity. Heat is generated within the basket space in this cylinder in the manner of the prescribed axial burnup distribution. In addition, heat is deposited from insolation on the external surface of the overpack. Under steady state conditions the total heat due to internal generation and insolation is dissipated from the outer cask surfaces by natural convection and thermal radiation to the ambient environment and from heating of upward flowing air in the annulus. Details of the elements of mathematical modeling are provided in the following.

## 4.4.1.1.2 Fuel Region Effective Thermal Conductivity Calculation

Thermal properties of a large number of PWR and BWR fuel assembly configurations manufactured by the major fuel suppliers (i.e., Westinghouse, CE, B&W, and GE) have been evaluated for inclusion in the HI-STORM System thermal analysis. Bounding PWR and BWR fuel assembly configurations are determined using the simplified procedure described below. This is followed by the determination of temperature-dependent properties of the bounding PWR and BWR fuel assembly configurations to be used for cask thermal analysis using a finite volume (FLUENT) approach.

To determine which of the numerous PWR assembly types listed in Table 4.4.1 should be used in the thermal model for the PWR fuel baskets (MPC-24, MPC-24E, MPC-32), we must establish which assembly type has the maximum thermal resistance. The same determination must be made for the MPC-68, out of the menu of SNF types listed in Table 4.4.2. For this purpose, we utilize a simplified procedure that we describe below.

Each fuel assembly consists of a large array of fuel rods typically arranged on a square layout. Every fuel rod in this array is generating heat due to radioactive decay in the enclosed fuel pellets. There is a finite temperature difference required to transport heat from the innermost fuel rods to the storage cell walls. Heat transport within the fuel assembly is based on principles of conduction heat transfer combined with the highly conservative analytical model proposed by Wooton and Epstein [4.4.1]. The Wooton-Epstein model considers radiative heat exchange between individual fuel rod surfaces as a means to bound the hottest fuel rod cladding temperature.

Transport of heat energy within any cross section of a fuel assembly is due to a combination of radiative energy exchange and conduction through the helium gas that fills the interstices between the fuel rods in the array. With the assumption of uniform heat generation within any given horizontal cross section of a fuel assembly, the combined radiation and conduction heat transport effects result in the following heat flow equation:

 $Q = \sigma C_{o} F_{e} A [T_{C}^{4} - T_{B}^{4}] + 13.5740 L K_{cs} [T_{C} - T_{B}]$ 

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where:

 $F_{\epsilon} = Emissivity Factor$ 

$$=\frac{1}{(\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{\rm C}}+\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{\rm B}}-1)}$$

 $\varepsilon_{\rm C}$ ,  $\varepsilon_{\rm B}$  = emissivities of fuel cladding, fuel basket (see Table 4.2.4)

 $C_o = Assembly Geometry Factor$ 

$$= \frac{4N}{(N+1)^2} \text{ (when N is odd)}$$
$$= \frac{4}{N+2} \text{ (when N is even)}$$

N = Number of rows or columns of rods arranged in a square array

A = fuel assembly "box" heat transfer area =  $4 \times \text{width} \times \text{length}$ 

L = fuel assembly length

 $K_{cs}$  = fuel assembly constituent materials volume fraction weighted mixture conductivity

 $T_C$  = hottest fuel cladding temperature (°R)

 $T_B = box temperature (°R)$ 

Q = net radial heat transport from the assembly interior

 $\sigma$  = Stefan-Boltzmann Constant (0.1714×10<sup>-8</sup> Btu/ft<sup>2</sup>-hr-°R<sup>4</sup>)

In the above heat flow equation, the first term is the Wooten-Epstein radiative heat flow contribution while the second term is the conduction heat transport contribution based on the classical solution to the temperature distribution problem inside a square shaped block with uniform heat generation [4.4.5]. The 13.574 factor in the conduction term of the equation is the shape factor for two-dimensional heat transfer in a square section. Planar fuel assembly heat transport by conduction occurs through a series of resistances formed by the interstitial helium fill gas, fuel cladding and enclosed fuel. An effective planar mixture conductivity is determined by a volume fraction weighted sum of the individual constituent material resistances. For BWR assemblies, this formulation is applied to the region inside the fuel channel. A second conduction and radiation model is applied between the channel and the fuel basket gap. These two models are combined, in series, to yield a total effective conductivity.

The effective conductivity of the fuel for several representative PWR and BWR assemblies is presented in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. At higher temperatures (approximately 450°F and above), the zircaloy clad fuel assemblies with the lowest effective thermal conductivities are the W-17×17 OFA (PWR) and the GE11-9×9 (BWR). A discussion of fuel assembly conductivities for some of the recent vintage  $10\times10$  array and certain plant specific BWR fuel designs is presented near the end of this subsection. As noted in Table 4.4.2, the Dresden 1 (intact and damaged) fuel assemblies are excluded from consideration. The design basis decay heat load for Dresden-1 intact and damaged

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fuel (Table 2.1.7) is approximately 58% lower than the MPC-68 design-basis maximum heat load (Table 2.1.6). Examining Table 4.4.2, the effective conductivity of the damaged Dresden-1 fuel assembly in a damaged fuel container is approximately 40% lower than the bounding (GE-11  $9 \times 9$ ) fuel assembly. Consequently, the fuel cladding temperatures in the HI-STORM System with Dresden-1 intact or damaged fuel assemblies will be bounded by design basis fuel cladding temperatures. Based on this simplified analysis, the W-17×17 OFA PWR and GE11-9×9 BWR fuel assemblies are determined to be the bounding configurations for analysis of zircaloy clad fuel at design basis maximum heat loads.

For the purpose of determining axial flow resistance for inclusion of MPC thermosiphon effect in the HI-STORM system modeling, equivalent porous media parameters for the W-17x17OFA and GE11-9x9 fuels are computed. Theoretically bounding expansion and contraction loss factors are applied at the grid spacer locations to conservatively maximize flow resistance. As an additional measure of conservatism, the grids are modeled by postulating that they are formed using thick metal sheets which have the effect of artificially throttling flow. Heat transfer enhancement by grid spacers turbulation is conservatively ignored in the analysis.

Having established the governing (most resistive) PWR and BWR SNF types, we use a finitevolume code to determine the effective conductivities in a conservative manner. Detailed conduction-radiation finite-volume models of the bounding PWR and BWR fuel assemblies developed on the FLUENT code are shown in Figures 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, respectively. The PWR model was originally developed on the ANSYS code, which enables individual rod-to-rod and rod-tobasket wall view factor calculations to be performed using the AUX12 processor. Limitations of radiation modeling techniques implemented in ANSYS do not permit taking advantage of quarter symmetry of the fuel assembly geometry. Unacceptably long CPU time and large workspace requirements necessary for performing gray body radiation calculations for a complete fuel assembly geometry on ANSYS prompted the development of an alternate simplified model on the FLUENT code. The FLUENT model is benchmarked with the ANSYS model results for a Westinghouse  $17 \times 17$  fuel assembly geometry for the case of black body radiation (emissivities = 1). The FLUENT model is found to yield conservative results in comparison to the ANSYS model for the "black" surface case. The FLUENT model benchmarked in this manner is used to solve the gray body radiation problem to provide the necessary results for determining the effective thermal conductivity of the governing PWR fuel assembly. The same modeling approach using FLUENT is then applied to the governing BWR fuel assembly, and the effective conductivity of GE-11 9×9 fuel determined.

The combined fuel rods-helium matrix is replaced by an equivalent homogeneous material that fills the basket opening by the following two-step procedure. In the first step, the FLUENT-based fuel assembly model is solved by applying equal heat generation per unit length to the individual fuel rods and a uniform boundary temperature along the basket cell opening inside periphery. The temperature difference between the peak cladding and boundary temperatures is used to determine an effective conductivity as described in the next step. For this purpose, we consider a twodimensional cross section of a square shaped block with an edge length of 2L and a uniform volumetric heat source ( $q_g$ ), cooled at the periphery with a uniform boundary temperature. Under the assumption of constant material thermal conductivity (K), the temperature difference ( $\Delta$ T) from the center of the cross section to the periphery is analytically given by [4.4.5]:

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$$\Delta T = 0.29468 \frac{q_g L^2}{K}$$

This analytical formula is applied to determine the effective material conductivity from a known quantity of heat generation applied in the FLUENT model (smeared as a uniform heat source,  $q_g$ ) basket opening size and  $\Delta T$  calculated in the first step.

As discussed earlier, the effective fuel space conductivity must be a function of the temperature coordinate. The above two-step analysis is carried out for a number of reference temperatures. In this manner, the effective conductivity as a function of temperature is established.

In Table 4.4.5,  $10 \times 10$  array type BWR fuel assembly conductivity results from a simplified analysis are presented to determine the most resistive fuel assembly in this class. The Atrium-10 fuel type is determined to be the most resistive in this class of fuel assemblies. A detailed finite-element model of this assembly type was developed to rigorously quantify the heat dissipation characteristics. The results of this study are presented in Table 4.4.6 and compared to the BWR bounding fuel assembly conductivity depicted in Figure 4.4.5. The results of this study demonstrate that the bounding fuel assembly conductivity is conservative with respect to the  $10 \times 10$  class of BWR fuel assemblies.

Table 4.4.23 summarizes plant specific fuel types' effective conductivities. From these analytical results, SPC-5 is determined to be the most resistive fuel assembly in this group of fuel. A finite element model of the SPC-5 fuel assembly was developed to confirm that its in-plane heat dissipation characteristics are bounded from below by the Design Basis BWR fuel conductivities used in the HI-STORM thermal analysis.

Temperature-dependent effective conductivities of PWR and BWR design basis fuel assemblies (most resistive SNF types) are shown in Figure 4.4.5. The finite volume results are also compared to results reported from independent technical sources. From this comparison, it is readily apparent that FLUENT-based fuel assembly conductivities are conservative. The FLUENT computed values (not the published literature data) are used in the MPC thermal analysis presented in this document.

#### 4.4.1.1.3 Effective Thermal Conductivity of Neutron Absorber/Sheathing/Box Wall Sandwich

Each MPC basket cell wall (except the MPC-68 and MPC-32 outer periphery cell walls) is manufactured with a neutron absorbing plate for criticality control. Each neutron absorber plate is sandwiched in a sheathing-to-basket wall pocket. A schematic of the "Box Wall - Neutron Absorber - Sheathing" sandwich geometry of an MPC basket is illustrated in Figure 4.4.6. During fabrication, a uniform normal pressure is applied to each "Box Wall - Neutron Absorber - Sheathing" sandwich in the assembly fixture during welding of the sheathing periphery on the box wall. This ensures adequate surface-to-surface contact for elimination of any macroscopic air gaps. The mean coefficient of linear expansion of the neutron absorber is higher than the thermal expansion | coefficients of the basket and sheathing materials. Consequently, basket heat-up from the stored SNF will further ensure a tight fit of the neutron absorber plate in the sheathing-to-box pocket. The | presence of small microscopic gaps due to less than perfect surface finish characteristics requires

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consideration of an interfacial contact resistance between the neutron absorber and box-sheathing surfaces. A conservative contact resistance resulting from a 2 mil neutron absorber to pocket gap is applied in the analysis. In other words, no credit is taken for the interfacial pressure between neutron absorber and stainless plate/sheet stock produced by the fixturing and welding process. Furthermore, no credit is taken for radiative heat exchange across the neutron absorber to sheathing or neutron absorber to box wall gaps.

Heat conduction properties of a composite "Box Wall - Neutron Absorber - Sheathing" sandwich in the two principal basket cross sectional directions as illustrated in Figure 4.4.6 (i.e., lateral "out-of-plane" and longitudinal "in-plane") are unequal. In the lateral direction, heat is transported across layers of sheathing, air-gap, neutron absorber and box wall resistances that are essentially in series (except for the small helium filled end regions shown in Figure 4.4.7). Heat conduction in the longitudinal direction, in contrast, is through an array of essentially parallel resistances comprised of these several layers listed above. Resistance network models applicable to the two directions are illustrated in Figure 4.4.7. It is noted that, in addition to the essentials series and parallel resistances of the composite wall layers for the "out-of-plane" and "in-plane" directions, respectively, the effect of small helium end regions is also included in the network resistance analogy. For the ANSYS based MPC basket thermal model, corresponding non-isotropic effective thermal conductivities in the two orthogonal sandwich directions are determined and applied in the analysis.

#### 4.4.1.1.4 Modeling of Basket Conductive Heat Transport

The total conduction heat rejection capability of a fuel basket is a combination of planar and axial contributions. These component contributions are calculated independently for each MPC basket design and then combined to obtain an equivalent isotropic thermal conductivity value.

The planar heat rejection capability of each MPC basket design (i.e., MPC-24, MPC-68, MPC-32 and MPC-24E) is evaluated by developing a thermal model of the combined fuel assemblies and composite basket walls geometry on the ANSYS finite element code. The ANSYS model includes a geometric layout of the basket structure in which the basket "Box Wall - Neutron Absorber - Sheathing" sandwich is replaced by a "homogeneous wall" with an equivalent thermal conductivity. Since the thermal conductivity of the Alloy X material is a weakly varying function of temperature, the equivalent "homogeneous wall" must have a temperature-dependent effective conductivity. Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 4.4.7, the conductivities in the "in-plane" and "out-of-plane" directions of the equivalent "homogeneous wall" are different. Finally, as discussed earlier, the fuel assemblies and the surrounding basket cell openings are modeled as homogeneous heat generating regions with an effective temperature dependent in-plane conductivity. The methodology used to reduce the heterogeneous MPC basket - fuel assemblage to an equivalent homogeneous region with effective thermal properties is discussed in the following.

Consider a cylinder of height, L, and radius,  $r_o$ , with a uniform volumetric heat source term,  $q_g$ , insulated top and bottom faces, and its cylindrical boundary maintained at a uniform temperature,  $T_c$ . The maximum centerline temperature ( $T_h$ ) to boundary temperature difference is readily obtained

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from classical one-dimensional conduction relationships (for the case of a conducting region with uniform heat generation and a constant thermal conductivity  $K_s$ ):

$$(T_h - T_c) = q_g r_o^2 / (4 K_s)$$

Noting that the total heat generated in the cylinder  $(Q_i)$  is  $\pi r_0^2 L q_g$ , the above temperature rise formula can be reduced to the following simplified form in terms of total heat generation per unit length  $(Q_i/L)$ :

$$(T_h - T_c) = (Q_t / L) / (4 \pi K_s)$$

This simple analytical approach is employed to determine an effective basket cross-sectional conductivity by applying an equivalence between the ANSYS finite element model of the basket and the analytical case. The equivalence principle employed in the thermal analysis is depicted in Figure 4.4.2. The 2-dimensional ANSYS finite element model of the MPC basket is solved by applying a uniform heat generation per unit length in each basket cell region (depicted as Zone 1 in Figure 4.4.2) and a constant basket periphery boundary temperature,  $T_c$ . Noting that the basket region with uniformly distributed heat sources and a constant boundary temperature is equivalent to the analytical case of a cylinder with uniform volumetric heat source discussed earlier, an effective MPC basket conductivity ( $K_{eff}$ ) is readily derived from the analytical formula and ANSYS solution leading to the following relationship:

$$K_{eff} = N (Q_f'/L) / (4 \pi [T_h - T_c])$$

where:

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N = number of fuel assemblies

 $(Q_f'/L) =$  per fuel assembly heat generation per unit length applied in ANSYS model T<sub>h</sub> = peak basket cross-section temperature from ANSYS model

Cross sectional views of MPC basket ANSYS models are depicted in Figures 4.4.9 and 4.4.10. Temperature-dependent equivalent thermal conductivities of the fuel regions and composite basket walls, as determined from analysis procedures described earlier, are applied to the ANSYS model. The planar ANSYS conduction model is solved by applying a constant basket periphery temperature with uniform heat generation in the fuel region. The equivalent planar thermal conductivity values are lower bound values because, among other elements of conservatism, the effective conductivity of the most resistive SNF types (Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2) is used in the MPC finite element simulations.

The basket in-plane conductivities are computed for intact fuel storage and containerized fuel stored in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFCs). The MPC-24E is provided with four enlarged cells designated for storing damaged fuel. The MPC-68 has sixteen peripheral locations for damaged fuel storage in generic DFC designs. The MPC-32 has eight peripheral locations for damaged fuel storage in generic DFC designs. As a substantial fraction of the basket cells are occupied by intact fuel, the overall effect of DFC fuel storage on the basket heat dissipation rate is quite small. Including the effect of reduced conductivity of the DFC cells in MPC-24E, the basket conductivity is computed to drop slightly (~0.6%). In a bounding calculation in which all cells of MPC-68 are assumed occupied

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by fuel in DFC, the basket conductivity drops by about 5%. In a bounding calculation in which all cells of an MPC-32 are assumed occupied by fuel in DFCs, the basket conductivity drops by about 17%. Conservatively, assuming 95% of intact fuel basket heat load adequately covers damaged fuel storage in the MPC-24E and MPC-68 and assuming 80% of intact fuel basket heat load adequately covers damaged fuel storage in the MPC-32.

The axial heat rejection capability of each MPC basket design is determined by calculating the area occupied by each material in a fuel basket cross-section, multiplying by the corresponding material thermal conductivity, summing the products and dividing by the total fuel basket cross-sectional area. In accordance with NUREG-1536 guidelines, the only portion of the fuel assemblies credited in these calculations is the fuel rod cladding (i.e., the contribution of fuel pellets to axial heat conduction is ignored).

Having obtained planar and axial effective thermal conductivity contributions as described above, an equivalent isotropic thermal conductivity that yields the same overall heat transfer can be obtained. Two-dimensional conduction heat transfer in relatively short cylinders cannot be readily evaluated analytically, so an alternate approach is used herein.

Instead of computing precise isotropic conductivities, an RMS function of the planar and axial effective thermal conductivity values is used as follows:

$$k_{iso} = \sqrt{\frac{k_{rad}^2 + k_{ax}^2}{2}}$$

where:

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 $k_{iso}$  = equivalent isotropic thermal conductivity  $k_{rad}$  = equivalent planar thermal conductivity  $k_{ax}$  = equivalent axial thermal conductivity

This formulation has been benchmarked for specific application to the MPC basket designs and found to yield conservative equivalent isotropic thermal conductivities and, subsequently, conservative temperature results from subsequent thermal analyses.

Table 4.4.3 summarizes the isotropic MPC basket thermal conductivity values used in the subsequent cask thermal modeling. It should be noted that the isotropic conductivities calculated as described above are actually higher than those reported in Table 4.4.3, imparting additional conservatism to the subsequent calculations.

- 4.4.1.1.5 Subsection Intentionally Deleted
- 4.4.1.1.6 Subsection Intentionally Deleted
- 4.4.1.1.7 <u>Annulus Air Flow and Heat Exchange</u>

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The HI-STORM storage overpack is provided with four inlet ducts at the bottom and four outlet ducts at the top. The ducts are provided to enable relatively cooler ambient air to flow through the annular gap between the MPC and storage overpack in the manner of a classical "chimney". Hot air is vented from the top outlet ducts to the ambient environment. Buoyancy forces induced by density differences between the ambient air and the heated air column in the MPC-to-overpack annulus sustain airflow through the annulus.

In contrast to a classical chimney, however, the heat input to the HI-STORM annulus air does not occur at the bottom of the stack. Rather, the annulus air picks up heat from the lateral surface of the MPC shell as it flows upwards. The height dependent heat absorption by the annulus air must be properly accounted for to ensure that the buoyant term in the Bernoulli equation is not overstated making the solution unconservative. To fix ideas, consider two cases of stack heat input; Case A where the heat input to the rising air is all at the bottom (the "fireplace" scenario), and Case B, where the heat input is uniform along the entire height (more representative of the ventilated cask conditions). In both cases, we will assume that the air obeys the perfect gas law; i.e., at constant pressure,  $\rho = C/T$  where  $\rho$  and T are the density and the absolute temperature of the air and C is a constant.

#### Case A: Entire Heat Input at the Bottom

In a stack of height H, where the temperature of the air is raised from  $T_i$  to  $T_o$  at the bottom (Figure 4.4.12; Case A), the net fluid "head"  $p_1$  is given by:

$$p_1 = \rho_i H - \rho_o H$$

 $\rho_I$  and  $\rho_o$  are the densities of air corresponding to absolute temperatures  $T_i$  and  $T_o$ , respectively.

Since 
$$\rho_i = \frac{C}{T_i}$$
 and  $\rho_o = \frac{C}{T_o}$ , we have:

$$p_1 = CH \left(\frac{1}{T_i} - \frac{1}{T_o}\right)$$

or

$$p_1 = \frac{CH \Delta T}{T_i T_o}$$

where:  $\Delta T = T_0 - T_i$ 

Let  $\Delta T \ll T$  i, then we can write:

$$\frac{1}{T_{o}} = \frac{1}{T_{i} \left(1 + \frac{\Delta T}{T_{i}}\right)}$$
$$= \frac{1}{T_{i}} \left[1 - \frac{\Delta T}{T_{i}} + \dots\right]$$

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Substituting in the above we have:

$$p_1 = \frac{CH}{T_i} \delta (1 - \delta + \dots)$$

where  $\delta = \frac{\Delta T}{T_i}$  (dimensionless temperature rise)

or  $p_1 = \rho_i H \delta - O(\delta^2)$ .

#### Case B: Uniform Heat Input

In this case, the temperature of air rises linearly from  $T_i$  at the bottom to  $T_o$  at the top (Figure 4.4.12; Case B):

$$T_o = T_i + \zeta h; 0 \le h \le H$$

where:

$$\zeta = \frac{T_{\circ} - T_{i}}{H} = \frac{\delta T_{i}}{H}$$

The total buoyant head, in this case, is given by:

$$p_{2} = \rho_{i} H - \int_{0}^{H} \rho dh$$
$$= \rho_{i} H - C \int_{0}^{H} \frac{1}{T} dh$$
$$= \rho_{i} H - C \int_{0}^{H} \frac{dh}{(T_{i} + \zeta h)}$$
$$= \rho_{i} H - \frac{C}{\zeta} \ell n (1 + \delta)$$

Using the logarithmic expansion relationship and simplifying we have:

$$p_2 = \frac{\rho_i H \delta}{2} - O(\Delta^2)$$

Neglecting terms of higher order, we conclude that  $p_2$  is only 50% of  $p_1$ , i.e., the buoyancy driver in the case of uniformly distributed heat input to the air is half of the value if the heat were all added at the bottom.

In the case of HI-STORM, the axial heat input profile into the annulus air will depend on the temperature difference between the MPC cylindrical surface and the rising air along the height (Case

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C in Figure 4.4.12). The MPC surface temperature profile, of course, is a strong function of the axial decay heat generation profile in the SNF. Previous analyses show that the HI-STORM "chimney" is less than 50% as effective as a classical chimney. As we explain in Subsection 4.4.1.1.9, this fact is fully recognized in the global HI-STORM thermal model implementation of FLUENT.

#### 4.4.1.1.8 Determination of Solar Heat Input

The intensity of solar radiation incident on an exposed surface depends on a number of time varying terms. The solar heat flux strongly depends upon the time of the day as well as on latitude and day of the year. Also, the presence of clouds and other atmospheric conditions (dust, haze, etc.) can significantly attenuate solar intensity levels. Rapp [4.4.2] has discussed the influence of such factors in considerable detail.

Consistent with the guidelines in NUREG-1536 [4.4.10], solar input to the exposed surfaces of the HI-STORM overpack is determined based on 12-hour insolation levels recommended in 10CFR71 (averaged over a 24-hour period) and applied to the most adversely located cask after accounting for partial blockage of incident solar radiation on the lateral surface of the cask by surrounding casks. In reality, the lateral surfaces of the cask receive solar heat depending on the azimuthal orientation of the sun during the course of the day. In order to bound this heat input, the lateral surface of the cask is assumed to receive insolation input with the solar insolation applied horizontally into the cask array. The only reduction in the heat input to the lateral surface of the cask is due to partial blockage offered by the surrounding casks. In contrast to its lateral surface, the top surface of HI-STORM is fully exposed to insolation without any mitigation effects of blockage from other bodies. In order to calculate the view factor between the most adversely located HI-STORM system in the array and the environment, a conservative geometric simplification is used. The system is reduced to a concentric cylinder model, with the inner cylinder representing the HI-STORM unit being analyzed and the outer shell representing a reflecting boundary (no energy absorption).

Thus, the radius of the inner cylinder  $(R_i)$  is the same as the outer radius of a HI-STORM overpack. The radius of the outer cylinder  $(R_o)$  is set such that the rectangular space ascribed to a cask is preserved. This is further explained in the next subsection. It can be shown that the view factor from the outer cylinder to the inner cylinder  $(F_{o\cdot i})$  is given by [4.4.3]:

$$F_{o \cdot i} = \frac{1}{R} \cdot \frac{1}{\pi R} \times [\cos^{-1}(\frac{B}{A}) - \frac{1}{2L} \{ \sqrt{(A+2)^2 - (2R)^2} \times \cos^{-1}(\frac{B}{RA}) + B \sin^{-1}(\frac{1}{R}) - \frac{\pi A}{2} \} ]$$

where:

 $\begin{array}{ll} F_{o\text{-}i} = & \text{View Factor from the outer cylinder to the inner cylinder} \\ R = & \text{Outer Cylinder Radius to Inner Cylinder Radius Ratio} \\ L = & \text{Overpack Height to Radius Ratio} \\ A = & L^2 + R^2 - 1 \\ B = & L^2 - R^2 + 1 \end{array}$ 

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Applying the theorem of reciprocity, the view factor  $(F_{i-a})$  from outer overpack surface, represented by the inner cylinder, to the ambient can be determined as:

$$F_{i-a} = 1 - F_{o-i} \frac{R_o}{R_i}$$

Finally, to bound the quantity of heat deposited onto the HI-STORM surface by insolation, the absorptivity of the cask surfaces is assumed to be unity.

#### 4.4.1.1.9 FLUENT Model for HI-STORM

In the preceding subsections, a series of analytical and numerical models to define the thermal characteristics of the various elements of the HI-STORM System are presented. The thermal modeling begins with the replacement of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) cross section and surrounding fuel cell space with a solid region with an equivalent conductivity. Since radiation is an important constituent of the heat transfer process in the SNF/storage cell space, and the rate of radiation heat transfer is a strong function of the surface temperatures, it is necessary to treat the equivalent region conductivity as a function of temperature. Because of the relatively large range of temperatures in a loaded HI-STORM System under the design basis heat loads, the effects of variation in the thermal conductivity of the Alloy X basket wall with temperature are included in the numerical analysis model. The presence of significant radiation effects in the storage cell spaces adds to the imperative to treat the equivalent storage cell lamina conductivity as temperature-dependent.

Numerical calculations and FLUENT finite-volume simulations have been performed to establish the equivalent thermal conductivity as a function of temperature for the limiting (thermally most resistive) BWR and PWR spent fuel types. Utilizing the most limiting SNF (established through a simplified analytical process for comparing conductivities) ensures that the numerical idealization for the fuel space effective conductivity is conservative for all non-limiting fuel types.

Having replaced the fuel spaces by solid square blocks with a temperature-dependent conductivity essentially renders the basket into a non-homogeneous three-dimensional solid where the non-homogeneity is introduced by the honeycomb basket structure composed of interlocking basket panels. The basket panels themselves are a composite of Alloy X cell wall, neutron absorber, and Alloy X sheathing metal. A conservative approach to replace this composite section with an equivalent "solid wall" was described earlier.

In the next step, a planar section of the MPC is considered. The MPC contains a non-symmetric basket lamina wherein the equivalent fuel spaces are separated by the "equivalent" solid metal walls. The space between the basket and the MPC, called the peripheral gap, is filled with helium gas. At this stage in the thermal analysis, the SNF/basket/MPC assemblage has been replaced with a two-zone (Figure 4.4.2) cylindrical solid whose thermal conductivity is a strong function of temperature.

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The fuel assembly and MPC basket effective conductivity evaluations are performed for two distinct scenarios described earlier in this section. In the first scenario, the MPC cavity is backfilled with helium only. In the second scenario, gaseous fission products from a hypothetical rupture of 10% of the stored fuel rods dilute the backfill helium gas. As previously stated, thermal analysis results for both scenarios are obtained and reported in this section.

The thermal model for the HI-STORM overpack is prepared as a two-dimensional axisymmetric body. For this purpose, the hydraulic resistances of the inlet ducts and outlet ducts, respectively, are represented by equivalent axisymmetric porous media. Three overpack configurations are evaluated -HI-STORM 100 and two shorter variations (HI-STORM 100S and 100S Version B). HI-STORM 100S features a smaller inlet duct-to-outlet duct separation and an optional enhanced gamma shield cross plate. Since the optional gamma shield cross plate flow resistance is bounding, the optional design was conservatively evaluated in the thermal analysis. The fuel cladding temperatures for MPC emplaced in a HI-STORM 100S overpack are confirmed to be bounded by the HI-STORM 100 System thermal model solution. Thus, separate table summaries for HI-STORM 100S overpack are not provided. HI-STORM 100S Version B features smaller inlet and outlet ducts with larger width to height aspect ratios and an even smaller inlet duct-to-outlet duct separation. Both the gamma shield cross plates and the duct "screens" in the 100S Version B are also modified. As the fuel clad temperatures for MPCs emplaced in a HI-STORM 100S Version B are confirmed to be bounded by the HI-STORM 100 System, only uniform loading conditions are evaluated for the Version B. The axial resistance to airflow in the MPC/overpack annulus (which includes longitudinal channels to "cushion" the stresses in the MPC structure during a postulated non-mechanistic tip-over event) is replaced by a hydraulically equivalent annulus. Finally, it is necessary to describe the external boundary conditions to the overpack situated on an ISFSI pad. An isolated HI-STORM will take suction of cool air from and reject heated air to, a semi-infinite half-space. In a rectilinear HI-STORM array, however, the unit situated in the center of the grid is evidently hydraulically most disadvantaged, because of potential interference to air intake from surrounding casks. To simulate this condition in a conservative manner, we erect a hypothetical cylindrical barrier around the centrally local HI-STORM. The radius of this hypothetical cylinder, Ro, is computed from the equivalent cask array downflow hydraulic diameter (D<sub>h</sub>) which is obtained as follows:

$$D_{h} = \frac{4 \times Flow Area}{Wetted Perimeter}$$

$$=\frac{4\left(A_{\circ}-\frac{\pi}{4}d_{\circ}^{2}\right)}{\pi d_{\circ}}$$

where:

$$A_o =$$
 Minimum tributary area ascribable to one HI-STORM (see Figure 4.4.24).  
 $d_o =$  HI-STORM overpack outside diameter

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The hypothetical cylinder radius,  $R_o$ , is obtained by adding half  $D_h$  to the radius of the HI-STORM overpack. In this manner, the hydraulic equivalence between the cask array and the HI-STORM overpack to hypothetical cylindrical annulus is established.

For purposes of the design basis analyses reported in this chapter, the tributary area  $A_0$  is assumed to be equal to 346 sq. ft. Sensitivity studies on the effect of the value of  $A_0$  on the thermal performance of the HI-STORM System shows that the system response is essentially insensitive to the assumed value of the tributary area. For example, a thermal calculation using  $A_0=225$  sq. ft. (corresponding to 15 ft. square pitch) and design basis heat load showed that the peak cladding temperature is less than 1°C greater than that computed using  $A_0=346$  sq. ft Therefore, the distance between the vertically arrayed HI-STORMs in an ISFSI should be guided by the practical (rather than thermal) considerations, such as personnel access to maintain air ducts or painting the cask external surfaces.

The internal surface of the hypothetical cylinder of radius  $R_o$  surrounding the HI-STORM module is conservatively assumed to be insulated. Any thermal radiation heat transfer from the HI-STORM overpack to this insulated surface will be perfectly reflected, thereby bounding radiative blocking from neighboring casks. Then, in essence, the HI-STORM module is assumed to be confined in a large cylindrical "tank" whose wall surface boundaries are modeled as zero heat flux boundaries. The air in the "tank" is the source of "feed air" to the overpack. The air in the tank is replenished by ambient air from above the top of the HI-STORM overpacks. There are two sources of heat input to the exposed surface of the HI-STORM overpack. The most important source of heat input is the internal heat generation within the MPC. The second source of heat input is insolation, which is conservatively quantified in the manner of the preceding subsection.

The FLUENT model consisting of the axisymmetric 2-D MPC space, the overpack, and the enveloping tank is schematically illustrated in Figure 4.4.13. The HI-STORM thermosiphonenabled solution is computed in a two-step process. In the first step, a HI-STORM overpack thermal model computes the ventilation effect from annulus heating by MPC decay heat. In this model, heat dissipation is conservatively restricted to the MPC shell (i.e., heat dissipation from MPC lid and baseplate <u>completely</u> neglected. This modeling assumption has the effect of overstating the MPC shell, annulus air and concrete temperatures. In the next step, the temperature of stored fuel in a pressurized helium canister (thermosiphon model) is determined using the overpack thermal solution in the first step to fashion a bounding MPC shell temperature profile for the MPC thermal model. The modeling details are provided in the Holtec benchmarking report [4.1.5]. A summary of the essential features of this model is presented in the following:

- A conservatively lower bound canister pressure of 5 atm is postulated for the thermosiphon modeling.
- Heat input due to insolation is applied to the top surface and the cylindrical surface of the overpack with a bounding maximum solar absorbtivity equal to 1.0.
- The heat generation in the MPC is assumed to be uniform in each horizontal plane, but to vary in the axial direction to correspond to the axial power distribution listed in Chapter 2.

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- The most disadvantageously placed cask (i.e., the one subjected to maximum radiative blockage), is modeled.
- The bottom surface of the overpack, in contact with the ISFSI pad, rejects heat through the pad to the constant temperature (77°F) earth below. For some scenarios, the bottom surface of the overpack is conservatively assumed to be adiabatic.

The finite-volume model constructed in this manner will produce an axisymmetric temperature distribution. The peak temperature will occur at the centerline and is expected to be above the axial location of peak heat generation. As will be shown in Subsection 4.4.2, the results of the finite-volume solution bear out these observations.

The HI-STORM 100 System is evaluated for two fuel storage scenarios. In one scenario, designated as uniform loading, every basket cell is assumed to be occupied with fuel producing heat at the maximum rate. Storage of moderate burnup and high burnup fuels are analyzed for this loading scenario. In another scenario, denoted as regionalized loading, a two-region fuel loading configuration is stipulated. The two regions are defined as an inner region (for storing hot fuel) and an outer region with low decay heat fuel physically enveloping the inner region. This scenario is depicted in Figure 4.4.25. The inner region is shown populated with fuel having a heat load of  $q_1$  and the outer region with fuel of heat load  $q_2$ , where  $q_1 > q_2$ . To permit hot fuel storage in the inner region, a uniform low decay heat rate is stipulated for the outer region fuel. In the HI-STORM 100 System, four central locations in the MPC-24 and MPC-24E, twelve inner cells in MPC-32 and 32 in MPC-68 are designated as inner region locations in the regionalized fuel-loading scenario. Results of thermal evaluations for both scenarios are present in Subsection 4.4.2.

## 4.4.1.1.10 Effect of Fuel Cladding Crud Resistance

In this subsection, a conservatively bounding estimate of temperature drop across a crud film adhering to a fuel rod during dry storage conditions is determined. The evaluation is performed for a BWR fuel assembly based on an upper bound crud thickness obtained from the PNL-4835 report ([4.3.2], Table 3). The crud present on the fuel assemblies is predominately iron oxide mixed with small quantities of other metals such as cobalt, nickel, chromium, etc. Consequently, the effective conductivity of the crud mixture is expected to be in the range of typical metal alloys. Metals have thermal conductivities several orders of magnitude larger than that of helium. In the interest of extreme conservatism, however, a film of helium with the same thickness replaces the crud layer. The calculation is performed in two steps. In the first step, a crud film resistance is determined based on a bounding maximum crud layer thickness replaced with a helium film on the fuel rod surfaces. This is followed by a peak local cladding heat flux calculation for the GE 7×7 array fuel assembly postulated to emit a conservatively bounding decay heat equal to 0.5kW. The temperature drop across the crud film obtained as a product of the heat flux and crud resistance terms is determined to be less than 0.1°F. The calculations are presented below.

Bounding Crud Thickness(s) =	:	130μm (4.26×10 <sup>-4</sup> ft) (PNL-4835)
Crud Conductivity (K) =	:	0.1 Btu/ft-hr-°F (conservatively assumed as helium)

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GE 7×7 Fuel Assembly:

Rod O.D.	=	0.563"		
Active Fuel Length	=	150"		
Heat Transfer Area	=	$(7 \times 7) \times (\pi \times 0.563) \times (150/144) = 90.3 \text{ ft}^2$		
Axial Peaking Factor	: =	1.195 (Burnup distribution Table 2.1.11)		
Decay Heat	=	500W (conservative assumption)		
Crud Re	sistance	$c = \frac{\delta}{K} = \frac{4.26 \times 10^{-4}}{0.1} = 4.26 \times 10^{-3} \frac{\text{ft}^2 - \text{hr} \cdot \text{°F}}{\text{Btu}}$		
Peak Heat Flux = $\frac{(500 \times 3.417) \text{ Btu/hr}}{90.3 \text{ ft}^2} \times 1.195$				
$=18.92 \times 1.195 = 22.6 \frac{Btu}{ft^2 hr}$				
	Temper	rature drop ( $\Delta T_c$ ) across crud film		
$= 4.26 \times 10^{-3} \frac{\text{ft}^2 - \text{hr}^{-\circ} \text{F}}{\text{Btu}} \times 22.6 \frac{\text{Btu}}{\text{ft}^2 - \text{hr}}$				
		$= 0.096^{\circ} F$		
		(i.e., less than 0.1°F)		

Therefore, it is concluded that deposition of crud does not materially change the SNF cladding temperature.

#### 4.4.1.1.11 Thermal Conductivity Calculations with Diluted Backfill Helium

In this subsection, the thermal conductivities of mixtures of the helium backfill gas and the gaseous fission products released from a hypothetical rupture of 10% of the stored fuel rods are evaluated. The gaseous fission products release fractions are stipulated in NUREG-1536. The released gases will mix with the helium backfill gas and reduce its thermal conductivity. These reduced thermal conductivities are applied to determine fuel assembly, and MPC fuel basket and basket periphery effective conductivities for thermal evaluation of the HI-STORM System.

Appendix C of NUREG/CR-0497 [4.4.7] describes a method for calculating the effective thermal conductivity of a mixture of gases. The same method is also described by Rohsenow and Hartnett [4.2.2]. The following expression is provided by both references:

$$\mathbf{k}_{\min} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{\mathbf{k}_{i} \mathbf{x}_{i}}{\mathbf{x}_{i} + \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^{n} \varphi_{ij} \mathbf{x}_{j}} \right)$$

where:

 $k_{mix}$  = thermal conductivity of the gas mixture (Btu/hr-ft-°F)

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- n = number of gases
- $k_i$  = thermal conductivity of gas component i (Btu/hr-ft-°F)
- $x_i =$  mole fraction of gas component i

In the preceding equation, the term  $\phi_{ij}$  is given by the following:

$$\varphi_{ij} = \varphi_{ij} \left[ 1 + 2.41 \frac{(M_i - M_j)(M_i - 0.142 \cdot M_j)}{(M_i + M_j)^2} \right]$$

where  $M_i$  and  $M_j$  are the molecular weights of gas components i and j, and  $\phi_{ij}$  is:

$$\varphi_{ij} = \frac{\left[1 + \left(\frac{k_i}{k_j}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \left(\frac{M_i}{M_j}\right)^{\frac{1}{4}}\right]^2}{2^{\frac{3}{2}} \left(1 + \frac{M_i}{M_j}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}}$$

Table 4.4.7 presents a summary of the gas mixture thermal conductivity calculations for the MPC-24 and MPC-68 MPC designs containing design basis fuel assemblies.

Having calculated the gas mixture thermal conductivities, the effective thermal conductivities of the design basis fuel assemblies are calculated using the finite-volume model described in Subsection 4.4.1.1.2. Only the helium gas conductivity is changed, all other modeling assumptions are the same. The fuel assembly effective thermal conductivities with diluted helium are compared to those with undiluted helium in Table 4.4.8. From this table, it is observed that a 10% rod rupture condition has a relatively minor impact on the fuel assembly effective conductivity. Because the fuel regions comprise only a portion of the overall fuel basket thermal conductivity, the 10% rod rupture condition will have an even smaller impact on the basket effective conductivity.

#### 4.4.1.1.12 Effects of Hypothetical Low Fuel Rod Emissivity

The value of emissivity ( $\epsilon$ ) utilized in this FSAR was selected as 0.8 based on:

- i. the recommendation of an EPRI report [4.1.3]
- ii. Holtec's prior licensing experience with the HI-STAR 100 System
- iii. other vendors' cask licensing experience with the NRC
- iv. authoritative literature citations

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Source	Reference	Zircaloy Emissivity
EPRI	[4.1.3]	0.8
TN-68 TSAR	Docket 72-1027	0.8
TN-40	Prairie Island Site Specific ISFSI	0.8
TN-32	Docket 72-1021	0.8
Todreas & Mantuefel	[4.4.8]	0.8
DOE SNF Report	[4.4.9]	0.8

The table below provides relevant third party information to support the emissivity value utilized in this FSAR.

The appropriateness of the selected value of  $\varepsilon$  is further supported by the information provided by PNL-4835 [4.3.2] and NUREG/CR-0497 [4.4.7]. PNL-4835 reports cladding oxidation thickness in U.S. Zircaloy LWR SNF assemblies (20 µm for PWR and 30 µm for BWR fuel). If these oxide thickness values are applied to the mathematical formulas presented for emissivity determination in [4.4.7], then the computed values are slightly higher than our assumed value of 0.8. It should be recognized that the formulas in [4.4.7] include a conservative assumption that depresses the value of computed emissivity, namely, absence of crud. Significant crud layers develop on fuel cladding surfaces during in-core operation. Crud, which is recognized by the above-mentioned NUREG document as having a boosting effect on  $\varepsilon$ , is completely neglected.

The above discussion provides a reasonable rationale for our selection of 0.8 as the value for  $\varepsilon$ . However, to determine the effect of a hypothetical low emissivity of 0.4, an additional thermal analysis adopting this value has been performed. In this analysis, each fuel rod of a fuel assembly is stipulated to have this uniformly low  $\varepsilon = 0.4$  and the effective fuel thermal conductivity is recalculated. In the next step, all cells of an MPC basket are assumed to be populated with this low  $\varepsilon$ fuel that is further assumed to be emitting decay heat at design basis level. The effective conductivity of this basket populated with low  $\varepsilon$  fuel is recalculated. Using the recalculated fuel basket conductivity, the HI-STORM system temperature field is recomputed. This exercise is performed for the MPC-24 basket because, as explained in the next paragraph, this basket design, which accommodates a fewer number of fuel assemblies (compared to the MPC-68 and MPC-32) has a higher sensitivity to the emissivity parameter. This analysis has determined that the impact of a low  $\varepsilon$  assumption on the peak cladding temperature is quite small (about 5°C). It is noted that these sensitivity calculations were performed under the completely suppressed helium thermosiphon cooling assumption. Consequently, as the burden of heat dissipation should red by radiation heat transfer under this assumption is much greater, the resultant computed sensitivity is a conservative upper bound for the HI-STORM system.

The relatively insignificant increase in the computed peak clad temperature as a result of applying a large penalty in  $\varepsilon$  (50%) is consistent with the findings in a German Ph.D. dissertation [4.4.11]. Dr. Anton's study consisted of analyzing a cask containing 4 fuel assemblies with a total heat load of 17

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kW and helium inside the fuel cavity. For an emissivity of 0.8, the calculated peak cladding temperature was 337°C. In a sensitivity study, wherein the emissivity was varied from 0.7 to 0.9, the temperature changed only by 5°C, i.e. to 342°C and 332°C. Dr. Anton ascribed two reasons for this low impact of emissivity on computed temperatures. Although the radiative heat emission by a surface decreases with lower emissivity, the fraction of heat reflected from other surfaces increases. In other words, the through-assembly heat dissipation by this means increases thereby providing some compensation for the reduced emission. Additionally, the fourth power of temperature dependence of thermal radiation heat transfer reduces the impact of changes in the coefficients on computed temperatures. For storage containers with larger number of fuel assemblies (like the HI-STORM System), an even smaller impact would be expected, since a larger fraction of the heat is dissipated via the basket conduction heat transfer.

#### 4.4.1.1.13 <u>HI-STORM Temperature Field with Low Heat Emitting Fuel</u>

The HI-STORM 100 thermal evaluations for BWR fuel are grouped in two categories of fuel assemblies proposed for storage in the MPC-68. The two groups are classified as Low Heat Emitting (LHE) fuel assemblies and Design Basis (DB) fuel assemblies. The LHE group of fuel assemblies are characterized by low burnup, long cooling time, and short active fuel lengths. Consequently, their heat loads are dwarfed by the DB group of fuel assemblies. The Dresden-1 (6x6 and 8x8), Quad+, and Humboldt Bay (7x7 and 6x6) fuel assemblies are grouped as the LHE fuel. This fuel is evaluated when encased in Damaged Fuel Containers (DFC). As a result of interruption of radiation heat exchange between the fuel assembly and the fuel basket by the DFC boundary, this configuration is bounding for thermal evaluation. In Table 4.4.2, two canister types for encasing LHE fuel are evaluated - a Holtec design and an existing canister in which some of the Dresden-1 fuel is currently stored (Transnuclear D-1 canister). The most resistive LHE fuel assembly (Dresden-1 8x8) is considered for thermal evaluation (see Table 4.4.2) in a DFC container. The MPC-68 basket effective conductivity, loaded with the most resistive fuel assembly (encased in a canister) is provided in Table 4.4.3. To this basket, LHE decay heat is applied and a HI-STORM 100 System thermal solution computed. The peak cladding temperature is computed as 513°F, which is substantially below the temperature limit (752°F).

A thoria rod canister designed for holding a maximum of twenty fuel rods arrayed in a 5x4 configuration is currently stored at the Dresden-1 spent fuel pool. The fuel rods were originally constituted as part of an 8x8 fuel assembly and used in the second and third cycle of Dresden-1 operation. The maximum fuel burnup of these rods is quite low (~14,400 MWD/MTU). The thoria rod canister internal design is a honeycomb structure formed from 12-gage stainless steel plates. The rods are loaded in individual square cells. This long cooled, part assembly (18 fuel rods) and very low fuel burnup thoria rod canister renders it a miniscule source of decay heat. The canister all-metal internal honeycomb construction serves as an additional means of heat dissipation in the fuel cell space. In accordance with fuel loading stipulation in the Technical Specifications, long cooled fuel is loaded toward the basket periphery (i.e., away from the hot centrol core of the fuel basket). All these considerations provide ample assurance that these fuel rods will be stored in a benign thermal environment and, therefore, remain protected during long-term storage.

4.4.1.2 <u>Test Model</u>

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A detailed analytical model for thermal design of the HI-STORM System was developed using the FLUENT CFD code and the industry standard ANSYS modeling package, as discussed in Subsection 4.4.1.1. As discussed throughout this chapter and specifically in Section 4.4.6, the analysis incorporates significant conservatisms so as to compute bounding fuel cladding temperatures. Furthermore, compliance with specified limits of operation is demonstrated with adequate margins. In view of these considerations, the HI-STORM System thermal design complies with the thermal criteria set forth in the design basis (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) for long-term storage under normal conditions. Additional experimental verification of the thermal design is therefore not required.

#### 4.4.2 Maximum Temperatures

All four MPC-basket designs developed for the HI-STORM System have been analyzed to determine temperature distributions under long-term normal storage conditions, and the results summarized in this subsection. A cross-reference of HI-STORM thermal analyses at other conditions with associated subsection of the FSAR summarizing obtained results is provided in Table 4.4.22. The MPC baskets are considered to be fully loaded with design basis PWR or BWR fuel assemblies, as appropriate. The systems are arranged in an ISFSI array and subjected to design basis normal ambient conditions with insolation.

As discussed in Subsection 4.4.1.1.1, the thermal analysis is performed using a submodeling process where the results of an analysis on an individual component are incorporated into the analysis of a larger set of components. Specifically, the submodeling process yields directly computed fuel temperatures from which fuel basket temperatures are then calculated. This modeling process differs from previous analytical approaches wherein the basket temperatures were evaluated first and then a basket-to-cladding temperature difference calculation by Wooten-Epstein or other means provided a basis for cladding temperatures. Subsection 4.4.1.1.2 describes the calculation of an effective fuel assembly thermal conductivity for an equivalent homogenous region. It is important to note that the result of this analysis is a function of thermal conductivity versus temperature. This function for fuel thermal conductivity is then input to the fuel basket effective thermal conductivity calculation described in Subsection 4.4.1.1.4. This calculation uses a finite-element methodology, wherein each fuel cell region containing multiple finite-elements has temperature-varying thermal conductivity properties. The resultant temperature-varying fuel basket thermal conductivity computed by this basket-fuel composite model is then input to the fuel basket region of the FLUENT cask model.

Because the FLUENT cask model incorporates the results of the fuel basket submodel, which in turn incorporates the fuel assembly submodel, the peak temperature reported from the FLUENT model is the peak temperature in any component. In a dry storage cask, the hottest components are the fuel assemblies. It should be noted that, because the fuel assembly models described in Subsection 4.4.1.1.2 include the fuel pellets, the FLUENT calculated peak temperatures reported in Tables 4.4.9 and 4.4.10 are actually peak pellet centerline temperatures which bound the peak cladding temperatures, and are therefore conservatively reported as the cladding temperatures.

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Applying the radiative blocking factor applicable for the worst case cask location, conservatively bounding axial temperatures at the most heated fuel cladding are shown in Figures 4.4.16 and 4.4.17 for MPC-24 and MPC-68 to depict the thermosiphon effect in PWR and BWR SNF. From these plots, the upward movement of the hot spot is quite evident. As discussed in this chapter, these calculated t emperature distributions i ncorporate many conservatisms. The maximum fuel clad temperatures for zircaloy clad fuel assemblies are listed in Tables 4.4.9, 4.4.10, 4.4.26, and 4.4.27, which also summarize maximum calculated temperatures in different parts of the MPCs and HI-STORM overpack (Table 4.4.36).

Figures 4.4.19 and 4.4.20, respectively, depict radial temperature distribution in the PWR (MPC-24) and the BWR (MPC-68) at the horizontal plane where maximum fuel cladding temperature occurs. Finally, axial variations of the ventilation air temperatures and that of the inner shell surface are depicted in Figure 4.4.26 for a bounding heat load.

The following additional observations can be derived by inspecting the temperature field obtained from the finite volume analysis:

- The fuel cladding temperatures are below the regulatory limit (ISG-11 [4.1.4]) under all storage scenarios (uniform and regionalized) in all MPCs.
- The maximum temperature of the basket structural material is within the stipulated design temperature.
- The maximum temperature of the neutron absorber is below the design temperature limit.
- The maximum temperatures of the MPC pressure boundary materials are well below their respective ASME Code limits.
- The maximum temperatures of concrete are within the guidance of the governing ACI Code (See Table 4.3.1).

For the regionalized loading scenario as depicted in Figure 4.4.25, outer region decay heat limits are stipulated in Table 4.4.30. The inner region heat load limits are provided in Table 4.4.31.

The calculated temperatures are based on a series of analyses, described previously in this chapter, that incorporate many conservatisms. A list of the significant conservatisms is provided in Subsection 4.4.6. As such, the calculated temperatures are upper bound values that would exceed actual temperatures.

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The above observations lead us to conclude that the temperature field in the HI-STORM System with a fully loaded MPC containing design-basis heat emitting SNF complies with all regulatory and industry temperature limits. In other words, the thermal environment in the HI-STORM System will be conducive to long-term safe storage of spent nuclear fuel.

## 4.4.3 Minimum Temperatures

In Table 2.2.2 of this report, the minimum ambient temperature condition for the HI-STORM storage overpack and MPC is specified to be -40°F. If, conservatively, a zero decay heat load with no solar input is applied to the stored fuel assemblies, then every component of the system at steady state would be at a temperature of -40°F. All HI-STORM storage overpack and MPC materials of construction will satisfactorily perform their intended function in the storage mode at this minimum temperature condition. Structural evaluations in Chapter 3 show the acceptable performance of the overpack and MPC steel and concrete materials at low service temperatures. Criticality and shielding evaluations (Chapters 5 and 6) are unaffected by temperature.

## 4.4.4 Maximum Internal Pressure

The MPC is initially filled with dry helium after fuel loading and drying prior to installing the MPC closure ring. During normal storage, the gas temperature within the MPC rises to its maximum operating basis temperature as determined based on the thermal analysis methodology described earlier. The gas pressure inside the MPC will also increase with rising temperature. The pressure rise is determined based on the ideal gas law, which states that the absolute pressure of a fixed volume of gas is proportional to its absolute temperature. Tables 4.4.12, 4.4.13, 4.4.24, and 4.4.25 present summaries of the calculations performed to determine the net free volume in the MPC-24, MPC-68, MPC-32, and MPC-24E, respectively.

The MPC maximum gas pressure is considered for a postulated accidental release of fission product gases caused by fuel rod rupture. For these fuel rod rupture conditions, the amounts of each of the release gas constituents in the MPC cavity are summed and the resulting total pressures determined from the Ideal Gas Law. Based on fission gases release fractions (per NUREG 1536 criteria [4.4.10]), net free volume and initial fill gas pressure, the bounding maximum gas pressures with 1% (normal), 10% (off-normal) and 100% (accident condition) rod rupture are given in Table 4.4.14. The maximum gas pressures listed in Table 4.4.14 are all below the MPC internal design pressure listed in Table 2.2.1.

The inclusion of PWR non-fuel hardware (BPRA control elements and thimble plugs) to the PWR baskets influences the MPC internal pressure through two distinct effects. The presence of non-fuel hardware increases the effective basket conductivity, thus enhancing heat dissipation and lowering fuel temperatures as well as the temperature of the gas filling the space between fuel rods. The gas volume displaced by the mass of non-fuel hardware lowers the cavity free volume. These two effects, namely, temperature lowering and free volume reduction, have opposing influence on the MPC cavity pressure. The first effect lowers gas pressure while the second effect raises it. In the HI-STORM thermal analysis, the computed temperature field (with non-fuel hardware <u>excluded</u>) has been determined to provide a conservatively bounding temperature field for the PWR baskets (MPC-

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24, MPC-24E, and MPC-32). The MPC cavity free space is computed based on volume displacement by the heaviest fuel (bounding weight) with non-fuel hardware included. This approach ensures conservative bounding pressures.

During in-core irradiation of BPRAs, neutron capture by the B-10 isotope in the neutron absorbing material produces helium. Two different forms of the neutron absorbing material are used in BPRAs: Borosilicate glass and B<sub>4</sub>C in a refractory solid matrix (At<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>). Borosilicate glass (primarily a constituent of Westinghouse BPRAs) is used in the shape of hollow pyrex glass tubes sealed within steel rods and supported on the inside by a thin-walled steel liner. To accommodate helium diffusion from the glass rod into the rod internal space, a relatively high void volume (~40%) is engineered in this type of rod design. The rod internal pressure is thus designed to remain below reactor operation conditions (2,300 psia and approximately 600°F coolant temperature). The B<sub>4</sub>C- Al<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub> neutron absorber material is principally used in B&W and CE fuel BPRA designs. The relatively low temperature of the poison material in BPRA rods (relative to fuel pellets) favor the entrapment of helium atoms in the solid matrix.

Several BPRA designs are used in PWR fuel that differ in the number, diameter, and length of poison rods. The older Westinghouse fuel (W-14x14 and W-15x15) has used 6, 12, 16, and 20 rods per assembly BPRAs and the later (W-17x17) fuel uses up to 24 rods per BPRA. The BPRA rods in the older fuel are much larger than the later fuel and, therefore, the B-10 isotope inventory in the 20rod BPRAs bounds the newer W-17x17 fuel. Based on bounding BPRA rods internal pressure, a large hypothetical quantity of helium (7.2 g-moles/BPRA) is assumed to be available for release into the MPC cavity from each fuel assembly in the PWR baskets. The MPC cavity pressures (including helium from BPRAs) are summarized in Table 4.4.14.

## 4.4.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses

Thermal stress in a structural component is the resultant sum of two factors, namely: (i) restrain of free end expansion and (ii) non-uniform temperature distribution. To minimize thermal stresses in load bearing members, the HI-STORM System is engineered with adequate gaps to permit free thermal expansion of the fuel basket and MPC in axial and radial directions. In this subsection, differential thermal expansion calculations are performed to demonstrate that engineered gaps in the HI-STORM System are adequate to accommodate thermal expansion. To facilitate structural integrity evaluations, temperature distributions are provided herein (Tables 4.4.9, 4.4.10, 4.4.26 and 4.4.27).

As stated above, the HI-STORM System is engineered with gaps for the fuel basket and MPC to thermally expand without restraint of free end expansion. Differential thermal expansion of the following gaps are evaluated:

- a. Fuel Basket-to-MPC Radial Gap
- b. Fuel Basket to MPC Axial Gap
- c. MPC-to-Overpack Radial Gap
- d. MPC-to-Overpack Axial Gap

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To demonstrate that the fuel basket and MPC are free to expand without restraint, it is required to show that differential thermal expansion from fuel heatup is less than the as-built gaps that exist in the HI-STORM System. For this purpose a suitably bounding temperature profile (T(r)) for the fuel basket is established in Figure 4.4.27 wherein the center temperature (TC) is set at the limit (752°F) for fuel cladding (conservatively bounding assumption) and the basket periphery (TP) conservatively postulated at an upperbound of 600°F (see Tables 4.4.9, 4.4.10, 4.4.26 and 4.4.27 for the maximum computed basket periphery temperatures). To maximize the fuel basket differential thermal expansion, the basket periphery-to-MPC shell temperature difference is conservatively maximized ( $\Delta T = 175^{\circ}F$ ). From the bounding temperature profile T(r) and  $\Delta T$ , the mean fuel basket temperature (T1) and MPC shell temperature (T2) are computed as follows:

$$T1 = \frac{\int_{0}^{1} rT(r)dr}{\int_{0}^{1} rdr} = 676^{\circ}F$$
$$T2 = TP - \Delta T = 425^{\circ}F$$

The differential radial growth of the fuel basket (Y1) from an initial reference temperature ( $To = 70^{\circ}F$ ) is computed as:

 $Y1 = R \times [A1 \times (T1 - To) - A2 \times (T2 - To)]$ 

where:

R = Basket radius (conservatively assumed to be the MPC radius)

A1, A2 = Coefficients of thermal expansion for fuel basket and MPC shell at T1 and T2 respectively for Alloy X (Chapter 1 and Table 3.3.1)

For computing the relative axial growth of the fuel basket in the MPC, bounding temperatures for the fuel basket (TC) and MPC shell temperature T2 computed above (assuming a maximum basket periphery-to-MPC shell temperature differential) are adopted. The differential expansion is computed by a formula similar to the one for radial growth after replacing R with basket height (H), which is conservatively assumed to be that of the MPC cavity.

For computing the radial and axial MPC-to-overpack differential expansions, the MPC shell is postulated at its design temperature (Chapter 2, Table 2.2.3) and thermal expansion of the overpack is ignored. Even with the conservative computation of the differential expansions in the manner of the foregoing, it is evident from the data compiled in Table 4.4.37 that the differential expansions are a fraction of their respective gaps.

# 4.4.6 Evaluation of System Performance for Normal Conditions of Storage

The HI-STORM System thermal analysis is based on a detailed and complete heat transfer model that conservatively accounts for all modes of heat transfer in various portions of the MPC and

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overpack. The thermal model incorporates many conservative features that render the results for long-term storage to be extremely conservative:

- 1. The most severe levels of environmental factors for long-term normal storage, which are an ambient temperature of 80°F and 10CFR71 insolation levels, were coincidentally imposed on the system.
- 2. A hypothetical rupture of 10% of the stored fuel rods was conservatively considered for determining the thermal conductivity of the diluted helium backfill gas.
- 3. The most adversely located\* HI-STORM System in an ISFSI array was considered for analysis.
- 4. A conservative assessment of thermosiphon effect in the MPC, which is intrinsic to the HI-STORM fuel basket design is included in the thermal analyses.
- 5. The MPC internal pressure is conservatively understated for performing temperature calculations. This maximizes calculated temperatures.
- 6. No credit was considered for contact between fuel assemblies and the MPC basket wall or between the MPC basket and the basket supports. The fuel assemblies and MPC basket were conservatively considered to be in concentric alignment.
- 7. The MPC is assumed to be loaded with the SNF type which has the maximum equivalent thermal resistance of all fuel types in its category (BWR or PWR), as applicable.
- 8. The design basis maximum decay heat loads are used for all thermal-hydraulic analyses. For casks loaded with fuel assemblies having decay heat generation rates less than design basis, additional thermal margins of safety will exist. This is assured by defining the burnup limits for the fuel assemblies based on the bounding (i.e., most heat emissive) fuel assembly types within each class (PWR or BWR). For all other fuel types, the heat emission rates at the design-basis burnup levels will be below the design-basis heat emission rate.
- 9. Not Used

Temperature distribution results obtained from this highly conservative thermal model show that the maximum fuel cladding temperature limits are met with adequate margins. Expected margins during normal storage will be much greater due to the many conservative assumptions incorporated in the analysis. The long-term impact of decay heat induced temperature levels on the HI-STORM System

<sup>\*</sup> In an ISFSI array, HI-STORM overpacks at interior locations are relatively more disadvantaged in their lateral access to ambient air and in their effectiveness to radiate heat to the environment. To bound these effects, a reference cask is enclosed in a hypothetical reflecting cylinder as described in Section 4.4.1.1.9.

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structural and neutron shielding materials is considered to be negligible. The maximum local MPC basket temperature level is below the recommended limits for structural materials in terms of susceptibility to stress, corrosion and creep-induced degradation. Furthermore, stresses induced due to imposed temperature gradients are within Code limits. Therefore, it is concluded that the HI-STORM System thermal design is in compliance with 10CFR72 requirements.
Fuel	@ 200°F	@ 450°F	@ 700°F
	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)
W - 17×17 OFA	0.182	0.277	0.402
W - 17×17 Standard	0.189	0.286	0.413
W - 17×17 Vantage	0.182	0.277	0.402
W - 15×15 Standard	0.191	0.294	0.430
W - 14×14 Standard	0.182	0.284	0.424
W - 14×14 OFA	0.175	0.275	0.413
B&W - 17×17	0.191	0.289	0.416
B&W - 15×15	0.195	0.298	0.436
CE - 16×16	0.183	0.281	0.411
CE - 14×14	0.189	0.293	0.435
$HN^{\dagger} - 15 \times 15 SS$	0.180	0.265	0.370
W - 14×14 SS	0.170	0.254	0.361
B&W-15x15	0.197	0.280	0.424
Mark B-11	0.187	0.289	0.424
CE-14x14 (MP2)	0.188	0.293	0.434
IP-1 (14x14) SS	0.125	0.197	0.293

## SUMMARY OF PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY EFFECTIVE THERMAL CONDUCTIVITIES

<sup>†</sup> Haddam Neck Plant B&W or Westinghouse stainless steel clad fuel assemblies.

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SUMMARY OF BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY EFFECTIVE
THERMAL CONDUCTIVITIES

Fuel	@ 200°F	@ 450°F	@ 700°F
	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)
Dresden 1 - 8×8 <sup>†</sup>	0.119	0.201	0.319
Dresden 1 - 6×6 <sup>†</sup>	0.126	0.215	0.345
GE - 7×7	0.171	0.286	0.449
GE - 7×7R	0.171	0.286	0.449
GE - 8×8	0.168	0.278	0.433
GE - 8×8R	0.166	0.275	0.430
GE10 - 8×8	0.168	0.280	0.437
GE11 - 9×9	0.167	0.273	0.422
AC <sup>††</sup> -10×10 SS	0.152	0.222	0.309
Exxon-10×10 SS	0.151	0.221	0.308
Damaged Dresden-1 8×8 <sup>†</sup> (in a Holtec damaged fuel container)	0.107	0.169	0.254
Humboldt Bay-7x7†	0.127	0.215	0.343
Dresden-1 Thin Clad 6x6†	0.124	0.212	0.343
Damaged Dresden-1 8x8 (in TN D-1 canister)†	0.107	0.168	0.252
8x8 Quad <sup>+</sup> Westinghouse†	0.164	0.276	0.435

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Cladding temperatures of low heat emitting Dresden (intact and damaged) SNF in the HI-STORM System will be bounded by design basis fuel cladding temperatures. Therefore, these fuel assembly types are excluded from the list of fuel assemblies (zircaloy clad) evaluated to determine the most resistive SNF type.

tt Allis-Chalmers stainless steel clad fuel assemblies.

Basket	@200°F (Btu/ft-hr-°F)	@450°F (Btu/ft-hr-°F)	@700°F (Btu/ft-hr-°F)
MPC-24 (Zircaloy Clad Fuel)	1.109	1.495	1.955
MPC-68 (Zircaloy Clad Fuel)	1.111	1.347	1.591
MPC-24 (Stainless Steel Clad Fuel) <sup>†</sup>	0.897	1.213	1.577(a)
MPC-68 (Stainless Steel Clad Fuel) <sup>†</sup>	1.070	1.270	1.451(b)
MPC-32 (Zircaloy Clad Fuel)	1.015	1.271	1.546
MPC-32 (Stainless Steel Clad Fuel) <sup>†</sup>	0.806	0.987	1.161 (c)
MPC-24E (Zircaloy Clad Fuel)	1.216	1.637	2.133
MPC-24E (Stainless Steel Clad fuel) <sup>†</sup>	0.991	1.351	1.766 (d)

# MPC BASKET EQUIVALENT ISOTROPIC THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY VALUES<sup>††</sup>

(a) Conductivity is 19% less than corresponding zircaloy fueled basket.

(b) Conductivity is 9% less than corresponding zircaloy fueled basket.

(c) Conductivity is 25% less than corresponding zircaloy fueled basket.

(d) Conductivity is 17% less than corresponding zircaloy fueled basket.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> The values reported in this table are conservatively understated.

<sup>\*</sup> Evaluated in a damaged fuel canister (conservatively bounding)

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### SUMMARY OF 10×10 ARRAY TYPE BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY EFFECTIVE THERMAL CONDUCTIVITIES<sup>†</sup>

Fuel Assembly	@ 200°F (Btu/ft-hr-°F)	@ 450°F (Btu/ft-hr-°F)	@ 700°F (Btu/ft-hr-°F)
GE-12/14	0.166	0.269	0.412
Atrium-10	0.164	0.266	0.409
SVEA-96	0.164	0.269	0.416

<sup>†</sup> The conductivities reported in this table are obtained by the simplified method described in the beginning of Subsection 4.4.1.1.2.

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This FSAR Revision has not yet been submitted as a periodic update per 10 CFR 72.248.

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# COMPARISON OF ATRIUM-10 BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CONDUCTIVITY<sup>†</sup> WITH THE BOUNDING<sup>††</sup> BWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CONDUCTIVITY

Temperature (°F)	Atrium-10 BWR Assembly		Bounding BW	R Assembly
	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(W/m-K)	(Btu/ft-hr-°F)	(W/m-K)
200	0.225	0.389	0.171	0.296
450	0.345	0.597	0.271	0.469
700	0.504	0.872	0.410	0.710

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The reported effective conductivity has been obtained from a rigorous finite-element model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> The bounding BWR fuel assembly conductivity applied in the MPC-68 basket thermal analysis.

## SUMMARY OF THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY CALCULATIONS FOR MPC HELIUM DILUTED BY RELEASED ROD GASES

Component Gas	Molecular Weight (g/mole)	Component Gas Mole Fractions and Mixture Conductivity (Btu/hr-ft-°F)	
		MPC-24	MPC-68
MPC Backfill Helium	4	0.951	0.962
Fuel Rod Backfill Helium	4	0.023	5.750×10 <sup>-3</sup>
Rod Tritium	3	1.154×10 <sup>-5</sup>	4.483×10 <sup>-5</sup>
Rod Krypton	85	2.372×10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.905×10 <sup>-3</sup>
Rod Xenon	131	0.024	0.030
Rod Iodine	129	1.019×10 <sup>-3</sup>	1.273×10 <sup>-3</sup>
Mixture of Gases (diluted		0.088 at 200°F	0.086 at 200°F
helium)	N/A	0.116 at 450°F	0.113 at 450°F
		0.142 at 700°F	0.139 at 700°F

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	@ 200°F (Btu/hr-ft-°F)	@ 450°F (Btu/hr-ft-°F)	@ 700°F (Btu/hr-ft-°F)
GE-11 9×9 Fuel Assembly with Undiluted Helium	0.171	0.271	0.410
GE-11 9×9 Fuel Assembly with Diluted Helium	0.158	0.254	0.385
$\underline{W}$ 17×17 OFA Fuel Assembly with Undiluted Helium	0.257	0.406	0.604
$\underline{W}$ 17×17 OFA Fuel Assembly with Diluted Helium	0.213	0.347	0.537

### COMPARISON OF COMPONENT THERMAL CONDUCTIVITIES WITH AND WITHOUT BACKFILL HELIUM DILUTION

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## HI-STORM<sup>†</sup> SYSTEM LONG-TERM NORMAL STORAGE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURES (MPC-24 BASKET)

Component	Normal Condition Temp. (°F)	Long-Term Temperature Limit (°F)		
HI-S	TORM			
Fuel Cladding	691	752 <sup>††</sup>		
MPC Basket	650	725 <sup>†††</sup>		
Basket Periphery	486	725 <sup>†††</sup>		
MPC Outer Shell	344	500		
HI-STORM 100S Version B				
Fuel Cladding	612	752		
MPC Basket	571	725		
Basket Periphery	487	725		
MPC Outer Shell	400	500		

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Bounding overpack temperatures are provided in Table 4.4.36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> This temperature limit is in accordance with ISG-11 [4.1.4].

tht The ASME Code allowable temperature of the fuel basket Alloy X materials is 800°F. This lower temperature limit is imposed to add additional conservatism to the analysis of the HI-STORM System.

## HI-STORM<sup>†</sup> SYSTEM LONG-TERM NORMAL STORAGE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURES (MPC-68 BASKET)

Component	Normal Condition Temp. (°F)	Long-Term Temperature Limit (°F)
HI-ST	ORM 100	
Fuel Cladding	740	752 <sup>††</sup>
MPC Basket	720	725 <sup>†††</sup>
Basket Periphery	501	725 <sup>†††</sup>
MPC Outer Shell	347	500 .
HI-STORM	100S Version B	
Fuel Cladding	673	752
MPC Basket	653	725
Basket Periphery	499	725
MPC Outer Shell	405	500

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Bounding overpack temperatures are provided in Table 4.4.36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> This temperature limit is in accordance with ISG-11 [4.1.4].

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> The ASME Code allowable temperature of the fuel basket Alloy X materials is 800°F. This lower temperature limit is imposed to add additional conservatism to the analysis of the HI-STORM System.

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## SUMMARY OF MPC-24 FREE VOLUME CALCULATIONS

Item	Volume (ft <sup>3</sup> )
Cavity Volume	367.9
Basket Metal Volume	39.7
Bounding Fuel Assemblies Volume	78.8
Basket Supports and Fuel Spacers Volume	6.1
Net Free Volume	243.3 (6,889 liters)*

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<sup>\*</sup> A conservative lowerbound value of 237.5 ft<sup>3</sup> (6,724 liters) is used for subsequent MPC internal pressure calculations.

### SUMMARY OF MPC-68 FREE VOLUME CALCULATIONS

Item	Volume (ft <sup>3</sup> )	
Cavity Volume	367.3	
Basket Metal Volume	34.8	
Bounding Fuel Assemblies Volume	93.0	
Basket Supports and Fuel Spacers Volume	11.3	
Aluminum Conduction Elements	5.9 <sup>†</sup>	
Net Free Volume	222.3 (6,294 liters)	

<sup>†</sup> Bounding 1,000 lbs weight assumed. Included herein to bound early production units with these optional items installed.

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Condition	Pressure (psig) <sup>‡</sup>
MPC-24:	
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3
Normal condition	66.4
With 1% rods rupture	66.1
With 10% rods rupture	72.2
With 100% rods rupture	132.5
MPC-68:	
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3
Normal condition	67.1
With 1% rods rupture	67.5
With 10% rods rupture	71.1
With 100% rods rupture	107.6
MPC-32:	
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3
Normal Condition	65.6
With 1% rods rupture	66.5
With 10% rods rupture	75.0
With 100% rods rupture	160.1
MPC-24E:	
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3
Normal Condition 65.8	
With 1% rods rupture	66.4
With 10% rods rupture 72.5	
With 100% rods rupture	133.5

Table 4.4.14 SUMMARY OF MPC CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY PRESSURES<sup>†</sup> FOR LONG-TERM STORAGE

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Per NUREG-1536, pressure analyses with ruptured fuel rods (including BPRA rods for PWR fuel) is performed with release of 100% of the ruptured fuel rod fill gas and 30% of the significant radioactive gaseous fission products.

All pressures reported in this table are calculated for MPCs in the HI-STORM 100 System. Bulk MPC cavity gas temperartures in the HI-STORM 100S Version B are lower than in the HI-STORM 100. As a consequence of the ideal gas law, the pressures in this table are therefore bounding for the HI-STORM 100S Version B.

Location	MPC-24	MPC-68	MPC-32	MPC-24E
HI-STORM 100				
MPC Basket Top:				
Basket periphery	485	501	496	488
MPC shell	344	348	351	346
Overpack Inner Shell	199	199	199	199
Overpack Outer Shell	124`	124	124	124
MPC Basket Bottom:				
Basket periphery	281	280	290	284
MPC shell	256	258	261	258
Overpack Inner Shell	106	106	106	106
Overpack Outer Shell	107	107	107	107
HI-STORM 100S Version B				
MPC Basket Top:				
Basket periphery	487	· 500	487	See Note
MPC shell	401	407	403	See Note
Overpack Inner Shell	241	243	243	See Note
Overpack Outer Shell	123	124	129	See Note
MPC Basket Bottom:				
Basket periphery	238	207	247	See Note
MPC shell	186	167	· 191	See Note
Overpack Inner Shell	104	101	107	See Note
Overpack Outer Shell	93	92	101	See Note

## SUMMARY OF HI-STORM SYSTEM COMPONENT TEMPERATURES FOR LONG-TERM STORAGE (°F)

Note: In the HI-STORM 100S Version B, the MPC-24E temperatures are essentially the same as those for the MPC-24.

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SUMMARY OF MPC CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY	
<b>TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTIONS</b>	

Location	MPC-24 (°F)	MPC-68 (°F)	MPC- 32 (°F)	MPC-24E (°F)
HI	-STORM 100		(-)	
MPC Lid Inside Surface at Centerline	463	502	487	462
MPC Lid Outside Surface at Centerline	427	454	447	425
MPC Lid Inside Surface at Periphery	371	381	383	372
MPC Lid Outside Surface at Periphery	360	375	372	358
MPC Baseplate Inside Surface at Centerline	207	209	214	209
MPC Baseplate Outside Surface at Centerline	200	203	208	202
MPC Baseplate Inside Surface at Periphery	243	246	249	245
MPC Baseplate Outside Surface at Periphery	194	196	199	195
HI-STO	RM 100S Vers	sion B		
MPC Lid Inside Surface at Centerline	472	492	479	See Note
MPC Lid Outside Surface at Centerline	440	456	445	See Note
MPC Lid Inside Surface at Periphery	395	403	387	See Note
MPC Lid Outside Surface at Periphery	375	382	378	See Note
MPC Baseplate Inside Surface at Centerline	171	161	181	See Note
MPC Baseplate Outside Surface at Centerline	170	160	179	See Note
MPC Baseplate Inside Surface at Periphery	169	157	177	See Note
MPC Baseplate Outside Surface at Periphery	164	153	172	See Note

Note: In the HI-STORM 100S Version B, the MPC-24E temperatures are essentially the same as those for the MPC-24.

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## MPC-24 DESIGN-BASIS MAXIMUM HEAT LOAD

Permissible Heat Load (kW)
27.77

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## MPC-68 DESIGN-BASIS MAXIMUM HEAT LOAD

Permissible Heat Load (kW)
28.19

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Scenario	Description	Ultimate Heat Sink	Analysis Type	Principal Input Parameters	Results in FSAR Subsection
1	Long Term Normal	Ambient	SS	N <sub>T</sub> , Q <sub>D</sub> , ST, SC, I <sub>O</sub>	4.4.2
2	Off-Normal Environment	Ambient	SS(B)	$O_T, Q_D, ST, SC, I_0$	11.1.2
3	Extreme Environment	Ambient	SS(B)	$E_{T}, Q_{D}, ST, SC, I_{O}$	11.2.15
4	Partial Ducts Blockage	Ambient	SS(B)	N <sub>T</sub> , Q <sub>D</sub> , ST, SC, I <sub>1/2</sub>	11.1.4
5	Ducts Blockage Accident	Overpack	TA	N <sub>T</sub> , Q <sub>D</sub> , ST, SC, I <sub>C</sub>	11.2.13
6	Fire Accident	Overpack	TA	Q <sub>D</sub> , F	11.2.4
7	Tip Over Accident	Overpack	AH	QD	11.2.3
8	Debris Burial Accident	Overpack	AH	QD	11.2.14

Table 4.4.22 MATRIX OF HI-STORM SYSTEM THERMAL EVALUATIONS

Legend:

- NT Maximum Annual Average (Normal) Temperature (80°F) Io All Inlet Ducts Open
- O<sub>T</sub> Off-Normal Temperature (100°F)
- E<sub>T</sub> Extreme Hot Temperature (125°F)
- Q<sub>D</sub> Design Basis Maximum Heat Load

SS - Steady State

- SS(B) Bounding Steady State
- TA Transient Analysis
- AH Adiabatic Heating

I1/2 - Half of Inlet Ducts Open

Ic - All Inlet Ducts Closed

ST - Insolation Heating (Top)

SC - Insolation Heating (Curved)

F - Fire Heating (1475°F)

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#### PLANT SPECIFIC BWR FUEL TYPES EFFECTIVE CONDUCTIVITY†

Fuel	@200°C [Btu/ft-hr-°F]	@450°F [Btu/ft-hr-°F]	@700°F [Btu/ft-hr-°F]
Oyster Creek (7x7)	0.161	0.269	0.422
Oyster Creek (8x8)	0.162	0.266	0.413
TVA Browns Ferry (8x8)	0.160	0.264	0.411
SPC-5 (9x9)	0.149	0.245	0.380
ANF 8x8	0.167	0.277	0.433
ANF-9X (9x9)	0.165	0.272	0.423

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> The conductivities reported in this table are obtained by a simplified analytical method in Subsection 4.4.1.1.2.

## SUMMARY OF MPC-32 FREE VOLUME CALCULATIONS

Item	Volume (ft <sup>3</sup> )
Cavity Volume	367.9
Basket Metal Volume	27.4
Bounding Free Assemblies Volume	105.0
Basket Supports and Fuel Spacers Volume	9.0
Net Free Volume	226.5 (6,414 liters)*

\* A conservative lowerbound value of 220.6 ft<sup>3</sup> (6,247 liters) is used for subsequent MPC internal pressure calculations.

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### SUMMARYOF MPC-24E FREE VOLUME CALCULATIONS

Item	Volume (ft <sup>3</sup> )
Cavity Volume	367.9
Basket Metal Volume	51.2
Bounding Fuel Assemblies Volume	78.8
Basket Supports and Fuel Spacers Volume	6.1
Net Free Volume	231.8 (6,564 liters)*

\* A conservative lowerbound value of 225.9 ft<sup>3</sup> (6,398 liters) is used for subsequent MPC internal pressure calculations.

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## HI-STORM<sup>†</sup> SYSTEM LONG-TERM NORMAL STORAGE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURES (MPC-32 BASKET)

Component	Component Normal Condition Temp. (°F)	
	HI-STORM 100	
Fuel Cladding	691	752 <sup>††</sup>
MPC Basket	660	725 <sup>†††</sup>
Basket Periphery	496	725 <sup>†††</sup>
MPC Outer Shell	351	500
	HI-STORM 100S Version B	
Fuel Cladding	595	752
MPC Basket	564	725
Basket Periphery	487	725
MPC Outer Shell	403	500

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Bounding overpack temperatures are provided in Table 4.4.36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> This temperature limit is in accordance with ISG-11 [4.1.4].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†††</sup> The ASME Code allowable temperature of the fuel basket Alloy X materials is 800°F. This lower temperature limit is imposed to add additional conservatism in the analysis of the HI-STORM Systems.

### HI-STORM<sup>†</sup> SYSTEM LONG-TERM NORMAL STORAGE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURES (MPC-24E BASKET)

Component	Normal Condition Temp. (°F)	Long-Term Temperature Limit (°F)
Fuel Cladding	691	752 <sup>††</sup>
MPC Basket	650	725***
Basket Periphery	492	725 <sup>†††</sup>
MPC Outer Shell	347	500

Note: Values presented in this table are all for the HI-STORM 100. In the HI-STORM 100S Version B, the MPC-24E temperatures are essentially the same as those for the MPC-24 (See Table 4.4.9).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Bounding overpack temperatures are provided in Table 4.4.36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>††</sup> This temperature limit is in accordance with ISG-11 [4.1.4].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†††</sup> The ASME Code allowable temperature of the fuel basket Alloy X materials is 800°F. This lower temperature limit is imposed to add additional conservatism to the analysis of the HI-STORM System.

## MPC-32 DESIGN BASIS MAXIMUM HEAT LOAD<sup>†</sup>

Permissible Heat Load (kW)
28.74

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## MPC-24E DESIGN BASIS MAXIMUM HEAT LOAD'

Permissible Heat Load (kW)
28.17

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## REGIONALIZED LOADING OUTER REGION HEAT LOAD LIMITS

МРС Туре	Inner Region Assemblies	Outer Region Assemblies	Outer Region Heat Load (kW)
MPC-24	4	20	18
MPC-24E	4	20	18
MPC-32	12	20	12
MPC-68	32	36	9.9

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## REGIONALIZED LOADING INNER REGION HEAT LOAD LIMITS (kW)

MPC-24	MPC-24E	MPC-32	<b>MPC-68</b>
5.88 <sup>†</sup>	6.16 <sup>†</sup>	13.58	16.02
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Inner region heat load governed by interface cladding temperature limit.

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Component <sup>†</sup>	Local Section Temperature <sup>††</sup> (°F)	Long-Term Temperature Limit (°F)
	HI-STORM 100	
Inner shell	199	350
Outer shell	145	350
Lid bottom plate	339	450
Lid top plate	196	450
MPC pedestal plate	208	350
Baseplate	111	350
Overpack Body Concrete	172	300
Overpack Lid Concrete	268	300
Overpack Pedestal Concrete	160	300
Air outlet <sup>†††</sup>	206	
	HI-STORM 100S Version B	
Inner shell	246	350
Outer shell	140	350
Lid bottom plate	393	450
Lid top plate	201	450
MPC pedestal plate	179	350
Baseplate	89	350
Overpack Body Concrete	193	300
Overpack Lid Concrete	297	300
Air outlet	200	

### BOUNDING LONG-TERM NORMAL STORAGE HI-STORM OVERPACK TEMPERATURES

Note: These lid bottom plate, lid top plate and lid concrete temperatures are calculated without crediting the heat shield on the underside of the HI-STORM 100 lid, shown on the drawings in Section 1.5. Actual temperatures will be lower if the heat shield is installed. Local areas of the overpack lid concrete exceed 300°F, with a maximum local value of 339°F. A discussion of the impact of these elevated local temperatures on the shielding performance of the lid concrete is presented in Section 5.3.2. All areas of the overpack body and pedestal concrete are below 300 °F.

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<sup>\*</sup> See Figure 1.2.8 for a description of HI-STORM components.

tt Section temperature is defined as the through-thickness average temperature.

ttt Reported herein for the option of temperature measurement surveillance of outlet ducts air temperature as set forth in the Technical Specifications.
#### Table 4.4.37

### SUMMARY OF HI-STORM DIFFERENTIAL THERMAL EXPANSIONS

Gap Description	Cold Gap U (in)	Differential Expansion V (in)	Is Free Expansion Criterion Satisfied (i.e., U > V)
Fuel Basket-to-MPC Radial Gap	0.1875	0.096	Yes
Fuel Basket-to-MPC Axial Gap	1.25	0.499	Yes
MPC-to-Overpack Radial Gap	0.5	0.139	Yes
MPC-to-Overpack Axial Gap	1.0	0.771	Yes

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×	GE11-9X9 CHANNELED FUEL ASSEMBLY MODEL	Nov 11 1997 Fluent 4.32 Fluent Inc.

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(b) "A Method for Determining the Spent-Fuel Contribution to Transport Cask Containment

Requirements", Sandia Report SAND90-2406, page II-132, (1992).

FIGURE 4.4.5; COMPARISON OF FLUENT CALCULATED FUEL ASSEMBLY CONDUCTIVITY RESULTS WITH PUBLISHED TECHNICAL DATA

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# FIGURE 4.4.9; MPC-24 BASKET CROSS-SECTION ANSYS FINITE-ELEMENT MODEL

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FIGURE 4.4.10; MPC-68 BASKET CROSS-SECTION ANSYS FINITE ELEMENT MODEL

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### 4.5 THERMAL EVALUATION OF SHORT TERM OPERATIONS

Prior to placement in a HI-STORM overpack, an MPC must be loaded with fuel, outfitted with closures, dewatered, dried, backfilled with helium and transported to the HI-STORM module. In [ the unlikely event that the fuel needs to be returned to the spent fuel pool, these steps must be performed in r everse. F inally, if r equired, transfer of a loaded MPC between HI-STORM overpacks or between a HI-STAR transport overpack and a HI-STORM storage overpack must be carried out in an assuredly safe manner. All of the above operations are short duration events that would likely occur no more than once or twice for an individual MPC.

The device central to all of the above operations is the HI-TRAC transfer cask that, as stated in Chapter 1, is available in two anatomically identical weight ratings (100- and 125-ton). The HI-TRAC transfer cask is a short-term host for the MPC; therefore it is necessary to establish that, during all thermally challenging operation events involving either the 100-ton or 125-ton HI-TRAC, the permissible temperature limits presented in Section 4.3 are not exceeded. The following discrete thermal scenarios, all of short duration, involving the HI-TRAC transfer cask have been identified as warranting thermal analysis.

- i. Normal Onsite Transport
- ii. MPC Cavity Drying
- iii. Post-Loading Wet Transfer Operations
- iv. MPC Cooldown and Reflood for Unloading Operations

Onsite transport of the MPC generally occurs with the HI-TRAC in the vertical orientation, which preserves the thermosiphon action within the MPC. However, there may be a scenario where onsite transport of an MPC must occur with the HI-TRAC in the horizontal configuration. Both orientations are evaluated in this section.

The fuel handling operations listed above place a certain level of constraint on the dissipation of heat from the MPC relative to the normal storage condition. Consequently, for some scenarios, it is necessary to provide additional cooling. For such situations, a new ancillary henceforth referred to as the Supplemental Cooling System (SCS) is required to provide additional cooling during short term operations. The specific design of an SCS must accord with site-specific needs and resources, including the availability of plant utilities. However, a set of specifications to ensure that the performance objectives of the SCS will be satisfied by any plant-specific design are set forth in Appendix 2.C.

The above listed conditions are described and evaluated in the following subsections. Subsection 4.5.1 describes the individual analytical models used to evaluate these conditions. Due to the simplicity of the conservative evaluation of wet transfer operations, Subsection 4.5.1.1.5 includes both the analysis model and analysis results discussions. The maximum temperature analyses for onsite transport and vacuum drying are discussed in Subsection 4.5.2. Subsections 4.5.3, 4.5.4 and 4.5.5, respectively, discuss minimum temperature, MPC maximum internal pressure and thermal data for stress analyses during onsite transport.

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### 4.5.1 Thermal Model

The HI-TRAC transfer cask is used to load and unload the HI-STORM concrete storage overpack, including onsite transport of the MPCs from the loading facility to an ISFSI pad. Section views of the HI-TRAC have been presented in Chapter 1. Within a loaded HI-TRAC, heat generated in the MPC is transported from the contained fuel assemblies to the MPC shell in the manner described in Section 4.4. From the outer surface of the MPC to the ambient air, heat is transported by a combination of conduction, thermal radiation and natural convection. Analytical modeling details of all the various thermal transport mechanisms are provided in the following subsection.

Two HI-TRAC transfer cask designs, namely, the 125-ton and the 100-ton versions, are developed for onsite handling and transport, as discussed in Chapter 1. The two designs are principally different in terms of lead thickness and the thickness of radial connectors in the water jacket region. The analytical model developed for HI-TRAC thermal characterization conservatively accounts for these differences by applying the higher shell thickness and thinner radial connectors' thickness to the model. In this manner, the HI-TRAC overpack resistance to heat transfer is overestimated, resulting in higher predicted MPC internals and fuel cladding temperature levels.

### 4.5.1.1 Analytical Model

From the outer surface of the MPC to the ambient atmosphere, heat is transported within HI-TRAC through multiple concentric layers of air, steel and shielding materials. Heat must be transported across a total of six concentric layers, representing the air gap, the HI-TRAC inner shell, the lead shielding, the HI-TRAC outer shell, the water jacket and the enclosure shell. From the surface of the enclosure shell heat is rejected to the atmosphere by natural convection and radiation.

A small diametral air gap exists between the outer surface of the MPC and the inner surface of the HI-TRAC overpack. Heat is transported across this gap by the parallel mechanisms of conduction and thermal radiation. Assuming that the MPC is centered and does not contact the transfer overpack walls conservatively minimizes heat transport across this gap. Additionally, thermal expansion that would minimize the gap is conservatively neglected. Heat is transported through the cylindrical wall of the HI-TRAC transfer overpack by conduction through successive layers of steel, lead and steel. A water jacket, which provides neutron shielding for the HI-TRAC overpack, surrounds the cylindrical steel wall. The water jacket is composed of carbon steel channels with welded, connecting enclosure plates. Conduction heat transfer occurs through both the water cavities and the channels. While the water jacket channels are sufficiently large for natural convection loops to form, this mechanism is conservatively neglected. Heat is passively rejected to the ambient from the outer surface of the HI-TRAC transfer overpack by natural convection and thermal radiation.

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In the vertical position, the bottom face of the HI-TRAC is in contact with a supporting surface. This face is conservatively modeled as an insulated surface. Because the HI-TRAC is not used for long-term storage in an array, radiative blocking does not need to be considered. The HI-TRAC top lid is modeled as a surface with convection, radiative heat exchange with air and a constant maximum incident solar heat flux load. Insolation on cylindrical surfaces is conservatively based on 12-hour levels prescribed in 10CFR71 averaged on a 24-hour basis. Concise descriptions of these models are given below.

#### 4.5.1.1.1 Effective Thermal Conductivity of Water Jacket

The 125-ton HI-TRAC water jacket is composed of an array of radial ribs equispaced along the circumference of the HI-TRAC and welded along their length to the HI-TRAC outer shell. Enclosure plates are welded to these ribs, creating an array of water compartments. The 100-ton HI-TRAC water jacket also has an array of radial ribs1 and enclosure plates creating an array of water compartments. Holes in the radial ribs connect all the individual compartments in the water jacket. Any combination of rib number and thickness that yields an equal or larger heat transfer area is bounded by the calculation. Thus, the annular region between the HI-TRAC outer shell and the enclosure shell can be considered as an array of steel ribs and water spaces.

The effective radial thermal conductivity of this array of steel ribs and water spaces is determined by combining the heat transfer resistance of individual components in a parallel network. A bounding calculation is assured by using the minimum number of ribs and rib thickness as input values. The thermal conductivity of the parallel steel ribs and water spaces is given by the following formula:

$$K_{ne} = \frac{K_r N_r t_r \ln\left(\frac{r_o}{r_i}\right)}{2\pi L_R} + \frac{K_w N_r t_w \ln\left(\frac{r_o}{r_i}\right)}{2\pi L_R}$$

where:

 $K_{ne}$  = effective radial thermal conductivity of water jacket

 $r_i = inner radius of water spaces$ 

 $r_o =$  outer radius of water spaces

 $K_r$  = thermal conductivity of carbon steel ribs

 $N_r$  = minimum number of radial ribs (equal to number of water spaces)

 $t_r$  = minimum (nominal) rib thickness (lower of 125-ton and 100-ton designs)

 $L_R$  = effective radial heat transport length through water spaces

 $K_w$  = thermal conductivity of water

 $t_w$  = water space width (between two carbon steel ribs)

Figure 4.5.1 depicts the resistance network to combine the resistances to determine an effective conductivity of the water jacket. The effective thermal conductivity is computed in the manner of the foregoing, and is provided in Table 4.5.1.

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#### 4.5.1.1.2 Heat Rejection from Overpack Exterior Surfaces

The following relationship for the surface heat flux from the outer surface of an isolated cask to the environment is applied to the thermal model:

$$q_{s} = 0.19 \left(T_{s} - T_{A}\right)^{4/3} + 0.1714 \varepsilon \left[\left(\frac{T_{s} + 460}{100}\right)^{4} - \left(\frac{T_{A} + 460}{100}\right)^{4}\right]$$

where:

 $T_S = cask surface temperatures (°F)$ 

 $T_A$  = ambient atmospheric temperature (°F)

 $q_s = surface heat flux (Btu/ft<sup>2</sup>×hr)$ 

 $\varepsilon =$ surface emissivity

The second term in this equation the Stefan-Boltzmann formula for thermal radiation from an exposed surface to ambient. The first term is the natural convection heat transfer correlation recommended by Jacob and Hawkins [4.2.9]. This correlation is appropriate for turbulent natural convection from vertical surfaces, such as the vertical overpack wall. Although the ambient air is conservatively assumed to be quiescent, the natural convection is nevertheless turbulent.

Turbulent natural convection correlations are suitable for use when the product of the Grashof and Prandtl (Gr×Pr) numbers exceeds 10<sup>9</sup>. This product can be expressed as  $L^3 \times \Delta T \times Z$ , where L is the characteristic length,  $\Delta T$  is the surface-to-ambient temperature difference, and Z is a function of the surface temperature. The characteristic length of a vertically oriented HI-TRAC is its height of approximately 17 feet. The value of Z, conservatively taken at a surface temperature of  $340^{\circ}$ F, is  $2.6 \times 10^5$ . Solving for the value of  $\Delta T$  that satisfies the equivalence  $L^3 \times \Delta T \times Z = 10^9$  yields  $\Delta T = 0.78^{\circ}$ F. For a horizontally oriented HI-TRAC the characteristic length is the diameter of a pproximately 7.6 feet (minimum of 1 00- and 125-ton d esigns), yielding  $\Delta T = 8.76^{\circ}$ F. The natural convection will be turbulent, therefore, provided the surface to air temperature difference is greater than or equal to 0.78°F for a vertical orientation and 8.76°F for a horizontal orientation.

#### 4.5.1.1.3 Determination of Solar Heat Input

As discussed in Section 4.4.1.1.8, the intensity of solar radiation incident on an exposed surface depends on a number of time varying terms. A twelve-hour averaged insolation level is prescribed in 10CFR71 for curved surfaces. The HI-TRAC cask, however, possesses a considerable thermal inertia. This large thermal inertia precludes the HI-TRAC from reaching a steady-state thermal condition during a twelve-hour period. Thus, it is considered appropriate to use the 24-hour averaged insolation level.

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### 4.5.1.1.4 MPC Temperatures During Moisture Removal Operations

### 4.5.1.1.4.1 Vacuum Drying

The initial loading of SNF in the MPC requires that the water within the MPC be drained and replaced with helium. For MPCs containing moderate burnup fuel assemblies only, this operation may be carried out using the conventional vacuum drying approach. In this method, removal of the last traces of residual moisture from the MPC cavity is accomplished by evacuating the MPC for a short time after draining the MPC. Vacuum drying may not be | performed on MPCs containing high burnup fuel assemblies. High burnup fuel drying is performed by a forced flow helium drying process as described in Section 4.5.1.1.4.2 and Appendix 2.B.

Prior to the start of the MPC draining operation, both the HI-TRAC annulus and the MPC are full of water. The presence of water in the MPC ensures that the fuel cladding temperatures are lower than design basis limits by large margins. As the heat generating active fuel length is uncovered during the draining operation, the fuel and basket mass will undergo a gradual heat up from the initially cold conditions when the heated surfaces were submerged under water.

The vacuum condition effective fuel assembly conductivity is determined by procedures discussed earlier (Subsection 4.4.1.1.2) after setting the thermal conductivity of the gaseous medium to a small fraction (one part in one thousand) of helium conductivity. The MPC basket cross sectional effective conductivity is determined for vacuum conditions according to the procedure discussed in 4.4.1.1.4. Basket periphery-to-MPC shell heat transfer occurs through conduction and radiation.

For total decay heat loads up to and including 20.88 kW for the MPC-24 and 21.52 kW for the MPC-68, vacuum drying of the MPC is performed with the annular gap between the MPC and the HI-TRAC filled with water. The presence of water in this annular gap will maintain the MPC shell temperature approximately equal to the saturation temperature of the annulus water. Thus, the thermal analysis of the MPC during vacuum drying for these conditions is performed with cooling of the MPC shell with water at a bounding maximum temperature of 232°F.

For higher total decay heat loads in the MPC-24 and MPC-68 or for any decay heat load in an MPC-24E or MPC-32, vacuum drying of the MPC is performed with the annular gap between the MPC and the HI-TRAC continuously flushed with water. The water movement in this annular gap will maintain the MPC shell temperature at about the temperature of flowing water. Thus, the thermal analysis of the MPC during vacuum drying for these conditions is performed with cooling of the MPC shell with water at a bounding maximum temperature of 125°F.

An axisymmetric FLUENT thermal model of the MPC is constructed, employing the MPC inplane conductivity as an isotropic fuel basket conductivity (i.e. conductivity in the basket radial and axial directions is equal), to determine peak cladding temperature at design basis heat loads. To avoid excessive conservatism in the computed FLUENT solution, partial recognition for

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higher axial heat dissipation is adopted in the peak cladding calculations. The boundary conditions applied to this evaluation are:

- i. A bounding steady-state analysis is performed with the MPC decay heat load set equal to the largest design-basis decay heat load. As discussed above, there are two different ranges for the MPC-24 and MPC-68 designs.
- ii. The entire outer surface of the MPC shell is postulated to be at a bounding maximum temperature of 232°F or 125°F, as discussed above.
- iii. The top and bottom surfaces of the MPC are adiabatic.

Results of vacuum condition analyses are provided in Subsection 4.5.2.2.

#### 4.5.1.1.4.2 Forced Helium Dehydration

To reduce moisture to trace levels in the MPC using a Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) system, a conventional, closed loop dehumidification system consisting of a condenser, a demoisturizer, a compressor, and a pre-heater is utilized to extract moisture from the MPC cavity through repeated displacement of its contained helium, accompanied by vigorous flow turbulation. A vapor pressure of 3 torr or less is assured by verifying that the helium temperature exiting the demoisturizer is maintained at or below the psychrometric threshold of 21°F for a minimum of 30 minutes. See Appendix 2.B for detailed discussion of the design criteria and operation of the FHD system.

The FHD system provides concurrent fuel cooling during the moisture removal process through forced convective heat transfer. The attendant forced convection-aided heat transfer occurring during operation of the FHD system ensures that the fuel cladding temperature will remain below the applicable peak cladding temperature limit for normal conditions of storage, which is well below the high burnup cladding temperature limit 752°F (400°C) for all combinations of SNF type, burnup, decay heat, and cooling time. Because the FHD operation induces a state of forced convection heat transfer in the MPC, (in contrast to the quiescent mode of natural convection in long term storage), it is readily concluded that the peak fuel cladding temperature under the latter condition will be greater than that during the FHD operation phase. In the event that the FHD system malfunctions, the forced convection state will degenerate to natural convection, which corresponds to the conditions of normal onsite transport. As a result, the peak fuel cladding temperatures will approximate the values reached during normal onsite transport as described elsewhere in this chapter.

#### 4.5.1.1.5 Maximum Time Limit During Wet Transfer Operations

In accordance with NUREG-1536, water inside the MPC cavity during wet transfer operations is not permitted to boil. Consequently, uncontrolled pressures in the de-watering, purging, and recharging system that may result from two-phase conditions are completely avoided. This

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requirement is accomplished by imposing a limit on the maximum allowable time duration for fuel to be submerged in water after a loaded HI-TRAC cask is removed from the pool and prior to the start of vacuum drying operations.

When the HI-TRAC transfer cask and the loaded MPC under water-flooded conditions are removed from the pool, the combined water, fuel mass, MPC, and HI-TRAC metal will absorb the decay heat emitted by the fuel assemblies. This results in a slow temperature rise of the entire system with time, starting from an initial temperature of the contents. The rate of temperature rise is limited by the thermal inertia of the HI-TRAC system. To enable a bounding heat-up rate determination for the HI-TRAC system, the following conservative assumptions are imposed:

- i. Heat loss by natural convection and radiation from the exposed HI-TRAC surfaces to the pool building ambient air is neglected (i.e., an adiabatic temperature rise calculation is performed).
- ii. Design-basis maximum decay heat input from the loaded fuel assemblies is imposed on the HI-TRAC transfer cask.
- iii. The smaller of the two (i.e., 100-ton and 125-ton) HI-TRAC transfer cask designs is credited in the analysis. The 100-ton design has a significantly smaller quantity of metal mass, which will result in a higher rate of temperature rise.
- iv. The smallest of the <u>minimum</u> MPC cavity-free volumes among the two MPC types is considered for flooded water mass determination.
- v. Only fifty percent of the water mass in the MPC cavity is credited towards water thermal inertia evaluation.

Table 4.5.5 summarizes the weights and thermal inertias of several components in the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask. The rate of temperature rise of the HI-TRAC transfer cask and contents during an adiabatic heat-up is governed by the following equation:

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{T}}{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{t}} = \frac{\mathrm{Q}}{\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{h}}}$$

where:

- Q = decay heat load (Btu/hr) [Design Basis maximum 28.74 kW = 98,205 Btu/hr]
- $C_h =$  combined thermal inertia of the loaded HI-TRAC transfer cask (Btu/°F)
- T = temperature of the contents (°F)
- t = time after HI-TRAC transfer cask is removed from the pool (hr)

A bounding heat-up rate for the HI-TRAC transfer cask contents is determined to be equal to  $3.77^{\circ}$ F/hr. From this adiabatic rate of temperature rise estimate, the maximum allowable time duration (t<sub>max</sub>) for fuel to be submerged in water is determined as follows:

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$$t_{max} = \frac{T_{boil} - T_{initial}}{(dT/dt)}$$

where:

 $T_{\text{boil}}$  = boiling temperature of water (equal to 212°F at the water surface in the MPC cavity)

T<sub>initial</sub> =initial temperature of the HI-TRAC contents when the transfer cask is removed from the pool

Table 4.5.6 provides a summary of  $t_{max}$  at several representative HI-TRAC contents starting temperature.

As set forth in the HI-STORM operating procedures, in the unlikely event that the maximum allowable time provided in Table 4.5.6 is found to be insufficient to complete all wet transfer operations, a forced water circulation shall be initiated and maintained to remove the decay heat from the MPC cavity. In this case, relatively cooler water will enter via the MPC lid drain port connection and heated water will exit from the vent port. The minimum water flow rate required to maintain the MPC cavity water temperature below boiling with an adequate subcooling margin is determined as follows:

$$M_{W} = \frac{Q}{C_{pW} (T_{max} - T_{in})}$$

where:

 $M_W = minimum water flow rate (lb/hr)$   $C_{pw} = water heat capacity (Btu/lb-°F)$   $T_{max} = maximum MPC cavity water mass temperature$  $T_{in} = temperature of pool water supply to MPC$ 

With the MPC cavity water temperature limited to 150°F, MPC inlet water maximum temperature equal to 125°F and at the design basis maximum heat load, the water flow rate is determined to be 3928 lb/hr (7.9 gpm).

#### 4.5.1.1.6 Cask Cooldown and Reflood Analysis During Fuel Unloading Operation

NUREG-1536 requires an evaluation of cask cooldown and reflood procedures to support fuel unloading from a dry condition. Past industry experience generally supports cooldown of cask internals and fuel from hot storage conditions by direct water quenching. The extremely rapid cooldown rates to which the hot MPC internals and the fuel cladding are subjected during water injection may, however, result in uncontrolled thermal stresses and failure in the structural members. Moreover, water injection results in large amounts of steam generation and unpredictable transient two-phase flow conditions inside the MPC cavity, which may result in overpressurization of the confinement boundary. To avoid potential safety concerns related to rapid cask cooldown by direct water quenching, the HI-STORM MPCs will be cooled in a

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gradual manner, thereby eliminating thermal shock loads on the MPC internals and fuel cladding.

In the unlikely event that a HI-STORM storage system is required to be unloaded, the MPC will be transported on-site via the HI-TRAC transfer cask back to the fuel handling building. Prior to reflooding the MPC cavity with water<sup>†</sup>, a forced flow helium recirculation system with adequate flow capacity shall be operated to remove the decay heat and initiate a slow cask cooldown lasting for several days. The operating procedures in Chapter 8 (Section 8.3) provide a detailed description of the steps involved in the cask unloading. An analytical method that provides a basis for determining the required helium flow rate as a function of the desired cooldown time is presented below, to meet the objective of eliminating thermal shock when the MPC cavity is eventually flooded with water.

Under a closed-loop forced helium circulation condition, the helium gas is cooled, via an external chiller, down to 100°F. The chilled helium is then introduced into the MPC cavity, near the MPC baseplate, through the drain line. The helium gas enters the MPC basket from the bottom oversized flow holes and moves upward through the hot fuel assemblies, removing heat and cooling the MPC internals. The heated helium gas exits from the top of the basket and collects in the top plenum, from where it is expelled through the MPC lid vent connection to the helium recirculation and cooling system. The MPC contents bulk average temperature reduction as a function of time is principally dependent upon the rate of helium circulation. The temperature transient is governed by the following heat balance equation:

$$C_{h} \frac{dT}{dt} = Q_{D} - m C_{p} (T - T_{i}) - Q_{c}$$

Initial Condition:  $T = T_0$  at t = 0

where:

T = MPC bulk average temperature (°F)
T<sub>o</sub> = initial MPC bulk average temperature in the HI-TRAC transfer cask (equal to 586°F)
t = time after start of forced circulation (hrs)

 $Q_D = \text{decay heat load (Btu/hr)}$ 

(equal to Design Basis maximum 28.74kW (i.e., 98,205 Btu/hr)

m = helium circulation rate (lb/hr)

- $C_p$  = helium heat capacity (Btu/lb-°F) (equal to 1.24 Btu/lb-°F)
- Q<sub>c</sub> = heat rejection from cask exposed surfaces to ambient (Btu/hr) (conservatively neglected)

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Prior to helium circulation, the HI-TRAC annulus is flooded with water to substantially lower the MPC shell temperature (approximately 100°F). For low decay heat MPCs (~10 kW or less) the annulus cooling is adequate to lower the MPC cavity temperature below the boiling temperature of water.

 C<sub>h</sub> = thermal capacity of the loaded MPC (Btu/°F) (For a bounding upper bound 100,000 lb loaded MPC weight and heat capacity of Alloy X equal to 0.12 Btu/lb-°F, the heat capacity is equal to 12,000 Btu/°F.)
T<sub>i</sub> = MPC helium inlet temperature (°F)

The differential equation is analytically solved, yielding the following expression for timedependent MPC bulk temperature:

$$T(t) = (T_i + \frac{Q_D}{m C_p}) (1 - e^{-\frac{m C_p}{C_b}t}) + T_o e^{-\frac{m C_p}{C_b}t}$$

This equation is used to determine the minimum helium mass flow rate that would cool the MPC cavity down from initially hot conditions to less than 200°F (i.e., with a subcooling margin for normal boiling temperature of water<sup>†</sup> (212°F)). For example, to cool the MPC to less than 200°F in 72 hours using 0°F helium would require a helium mass flow rate of 432 lb/hr (i.e., 647 SCFM).

Once the helium gas circulation has cooled the MPC internals to less than 200°F, water can be injected to the MPC without risk of boiling and the associated thermal stress concerns. Because of the relatively long cooldown period, the thermal stress contribution to the total cladding stress would be negligible, and the total stress would therefore be bounded by the normal (dry) condition. The elimination of boiling eliminates any concern of overpressurization due to steam production.

## 4.5.1.1.7 Study of Lead-to-Steel Gaps on Predicted Temperatures

Lead, poured between the inner and outer shells, is utilized as a gamma shield material in the HI-TRAC on-site transfer cask designs. Lead shrinks during solidification requiring the specification and implementation of appropriate steps in the lead installation process so that the annular space is free of gaps. Fortunately, the lead pouring process is a mature technology and proven methods to insure that radial gaps do not develop are widely available. This subsection outlines such a method to achieve a zero-gap lead installation in the annular cavity of the HI-TRAC casks.

The 100-ton and 125-ton HI-TRAC designs incorporate 2.5 inch and 4.5 inch annular spaces, respectively, formed between a 3/4-inch thick steel inner shell and a 1-inch thick steel outer shell. The interior steel surfaces are cleaned, sandblasted and fluxed in preparation for the molten lead that will be poured in the annular cavity. The appropriate surface preparation technique is essential to ensure that molten lead sticks to the steel surfaces, which will form a metal to lead bond upon solidification. The molten lead is poured to fill the annular cavity. The molten lead in the immediate vicinity of the steel surfaces, upon cooling by the inner and outer shells, solidifies forming a melt-solid interface. The initial formation of a gap-free interfacial

Certain fuel configurations in PWR MPCs are required to be flooded with borated water, which has a higher boiling temperature. Thus, greater subcooling margins are present in this case.

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bond between the solidified lead and steel surfaces initiates a process of lead crystallization from the molten pool onto the solid surfaces. Static pressure from the column of molten lead further aids in retaining the solidified lead layer to the steel surfaces. The melt-solid interface growth occurs by freezing of successive layers of molten lead as the heat of fusion is dissipated by the solidified metal and steel structure enclosing it. This growth stops when all the molten lead is used up and the annulus is filled with a solid lead plug. The shop fabrication procedures, being developed in conjunction with the designated manufacturer of the HI-TRAC transfer casks, shall contain detailed step-by-step instructions devised to eliminate the incidence of annular gaps in the lead space of the HI-TRAC.

In the spirit of a defense-in-depth approach, however, a conservatively bounding lead-to-steel gap is assumed herein and the resultant peak cladding temperature under design basis heat load is computed. It is noted that in a non-bonding lead pour scenario, the lead shrinkage resulting from phase transformation related density changes introduces a tendency to form small gaps. This tendency is counteracted by gravity induced slump, which tends to push the heavy mass of lead against the steel surfaces. If the annular molten mass of lead is assumed to contract as a solid, in the absence of gravity, then a bounding lead-to-steel gap is readily computed from density changes. This calculation is performed for the 125-ton HI-TRAC transfer cask, which has a larger volume of lead and is thus subject to larger volume shrinkage relative to the 100-ton design, and is presented below.

The densities of molten ( $\rho_l$ ) and solid ( $\rho_s$ ) lead are given on page 3-96 of Perry's Handbook (6<sup>th</sup> Edition) as 10,430 kg/m<sup>3</sup> and 11,010 kg/m<sup>3</sup>, respectively. The fractional volume contraction during solidification ( $\delta v/v$ ) is calculated as:

$$\frac{\delta v}{v} = \frac{(\rho_s - \rho_1)}{\rho_1} = \frac{(11,010 - 10,430)}{10,430} = 0.0556$$

and the corresponding fractional linear contraction during solidification is calculated as:

$$\frac{\delta L}{L} = \left[1 + \frac{\delta v}{v}\right]^{\frac{1}{3}} - 1 = 1.0556^{\frac{1}{3}} - 1 = 0.0182$$

The bounding lead-to-steel gap, which is assumed filled with air, is calculated by multiplying the nominal annulus radial dimension (4.5 inches in the 125-ton HI-TRAC) by the fractional linear contraction as:

$$\delta = 4.5 \times \frac{\delta L}{L} = 4.5 \times 0.0182 = 0.082 \cdot \text{inches}$$

In this hypothetical lead shrinkage process, the annular lead cylinder will contract towards the inner steel shell, eliminating gaps and tightly compressing the two surfaces together. Near the outer steel cylinder, a steel-to-lead air gap will develop as a result of volume reduction in the liquid to solid phase transformation. The air gap is conservatively postulated to occur between

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the inner steel shell and the lead, where the heat flux is higher relative to the outer steel shell, and hence the <u>computed</u> temperature gradient is greater. The combined resistance of an annular lead cylinder with an air gap ( $R_{cyl}$ ) is computed by the following formula:

$$R_{cyl} = \frac{\ln(R_o/R_i)}{2\pi K_{pb}} + \frac{\delta}{2\pi R_i[K_{air} + K_r]}$$

where:

 $R_i =$  inner radius (equal to 35.125 inches)  $R_o =$  outer radius (equal to 39.625 inches)  $K_{pb} =$  bounding minimum lead conductivity (equal to 16.9 Btu/ft-hr-°F, from Table

4.2.2)

- $\delta$  = lead-to-steel air gap, computed above
- $K_{air}$  = temperature dependent air conductivity (see Table 4.2.2)
- $K_r$  = effective thermal conductivity contribution from radiation heat transfer across air gap

The effective thermal conductivity contribution from radiation heat transfer  $(K_r)$  is defined by the following equation:

$$K_r = 4 \times \sigma \times F_e \times T^3 \times \delta$$

where:

 $\sigma = Stefan-Boltzmann constant$  $F_{\epsilon} = (1/\epsilon_{cs} + 1/\epsilon_{pb} - 1)^{-1}$  $\epsilon_{cs} = carbon steel emissivity (equal to 0.66, HI-STORM FSAR Table 4.2.4)$  $\epsilon_{pb} = lead emissivity (equal to 0.63 for oxidized surfaces at 300°F from McAdams,$ Heat Transmission, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.)

T = absolute temperature

Based on the total annular region resistance  $(R_{cyl})$  computed above, an equivalent annulus conductivity is readily computed. This effective temperature-dependent conductivity results are tabulated below:

Temperature (°F)	Effective Annulus Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F)
200	1.142
450	1.809

The results tabulated above confirm that the assumption of a bounding annular air gap grossly penalizes the heat dissipation characteristics of lead filled regions. Indeed, the effective conductivity computed above is an order of magnitude lower than that of the base lead material. To confirm the heat dissipation adequacy of HI-TRAC casks under the assumed overly pessimistic annular gaps, the HI-TRAC thermal model described earlier is altered to include the

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effective annulus conductivity computed above for the annular lead region. The peak cladding temperature results are tabulated below:

Annular Gap Assumption	Peak Cladding Temperature (°F)	Cladding Temperature Limit (°F)
None	872	1058
Bounding Maximum	924	1058

From these results, it is readily apparent that the stored fuel shall be maintained within safe temperature limits by a substantial margin of safety (in excess of 100°F).

## 4.5.1.2 <u>Test Model</u>

A detailed analytical model for thermal design of the HI-TRAC transfer cask was developed using the FLUENT CFD code, the industry standard ANSYS modeling package and conservative adiabatic calculations, as discussed in Subsection 4.5.1.1. Furthermore, the analyses incorporate many conservative assumptions in order to demonstrate compliance to the specified short-term limits with adequate margins. In view of these considerations, the HI-TRAC transfer cask thermal design complies with the thermal criteria established for short-term handling and onsite transport. Additional experimental verification of the thermal design is therefore not required.

## 4.5.2 <u>Maximum Temperatures</u>

## 4.5.2.1 <u>Maximum Temperatures Under Onsite Transport Conditions</u>

An axisymmetric FLUENT thermal model of an MPC inside a HI-TRAC transfer cask was developed to evaluate temperature distributions for onsite transport conditions. A bounding steady-state analysis of the HI-TRAC transfer cask has been performed using the hottest MPC, the highest design-basis decay heat load (Table 2.1.6), and design-basis insolation levels. While the duration of onsite transport may be short enough to preclude the MPC and HI-TRAC from obtaining a steady-state, a steady-state analysis is conservative. Information listing all other thermal a nalyses pertaining to the HI-TRAC cask and a ssociated subsection of the F SAR summarizing obtained results is provided in Table 4.5.8.

A converged temperature contour plot is provided in Figure 4.5.2. Maximum fuel clad temperatures are listed in Table 4.5.2, which also summarizes maximum calculated temperatures in different parts of the HI-TRAC transfer cask and MPC. As described in Subsection 4.4.2, the FLUENT calculated peak temperature in Table 4.5.2 is actually the peak pellet centerline temperature, which bounds the peak cladding temperature. We conservatively assume that the peak clad temperature is equal to the peak pellet centerline temperature.

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The maximum computed temperatures listed in Table 4.5.2 are based on the HI-TRAC cask at Design Basis Maximum heat load, passively rejecting heat by natural convection and radiation to a hot ambient environment at 100°F in still air in a vertical orientation. In this orientation, there is apt to be a less of metal-to-metal contact between the physically distinct entitities, viz., fuel, fuel basket, MPC shell and HI-TRAC cask. For this reason, the gaps resistance between these parts is higher than in a horizontally oriented HI-TRAC. To bound gaps resistance, the various parts are postulated to be in a centered configuration. MPC internal convection at a postulated low cavity pressure of 5 atm is included in the thermal model. The peak cladding temperature computed u nder these a dverse Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) a ssumptions is 872°F which is substantially lower than the temperature limit of 1058°F for moderate burnup fuel (MBF). Consequently, cladding integrity assurance is provided by large safety margins (in excess of 100°F) during onsite transfer of an MPC containing MBF emplaced in a HI-TRAC cask.

As a defense-in-depth measure, cladding integrity is demonstrated for a theoretical bounding scenario. For this scenario, all means of convective heat dissipation within the canister are neglected in addition to the bounding relative configuration for the fuel, basket, MPC shell and HI-TRAC overpack assumption stated earlier for the vertical orientation. This means that the fuel is centered in the basket cells, the basket is centered in the MPC shell and the MPC shell is centered in the HI-TRAC overpack to maximize gaps thermal resistance. The peak cladding temperature computed for this scenario (1025°F) is below the short-term limit of 1058°F.

For high burnup fuel (HBF), however, the maximum computed fuel cladding temperature reported in Table 4.5.2 is significantly greater than the temperature limit of 752°F for HBF. Consequently, it is necessary to utilize the SCS described at the beginning of this section and in Appendix 2.C during onsite transfer of an MPC containing HBF emplaced in a HI-TRAC transfer cask. As stated earlier, the exact design and operation of the SCS is necessarily site-specific. The design is required to satisfy the specifications and operational requirements of Appendix 2.C to ensure compliance with ISG-11 [4.1.4] temperature limits.

As discussed in Sub-section 4.5.1.1.6, MPC fuel unloading operations are performed with the MPC inside the HI-TRAC cask. For this operation, a helium cooldown system is engaged to the MPC via lid access ports and a forced helium cooling of the fuel and MPC is initiated. With the HI-TRAC cask external surfaces dissipating heat to a UHS in a manner in which the ambient air access is not restricted by bounding surfaces or large objects in the immediate vicinity of the cask, the temperatures reported in Table 4.5.2 will remain bounding during fuel unloading operations.

## 4.5.2.2 Maximum MPC Basket Temperature Under Vacuum Conditions

As stated in Subsection 4.5.1.1.4, above, an axisymmetric FLUENT thermal model of the MPC is developed for the vacuum condition. For the MPC-24E and MPC-32 designs, and for the higher heat load ranges in the MPC-24 and MPC-68 designs, the model also includes an isotropic fuel basket thermal conductivity. Each MPC is a nalyzed at its respective design maximum heat load. The steady-state peak cladding results, with partial recognition for higher

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axial heat dissipation where included, are summarized in Table 4.5.9. The peak fuel c lad temperatures for moderate burnup fuel during short-term vacuum drying operations with designbasis maximum heat loads are calculated to be less than 1058°F for all MPC baskets by a significant margin.

## 4.5.3 Minimum Temperatures

In Table 2.2.2 and Chapter 12, the minimum ambient temperature condition required to be considered for the HI-TRAC design is specified as 0°F. If, conservatively, a zero decay heat load (with no solar input) is applied to the stored fuel assemblies then every component of the system at steady state would be at this outside minimum temperature. Provided an antifreeze is added to the water jacket (required for ambient temperatures below 32°F), all HI-TRAC | materials will satisfactorily perform their intended functions at this minimum postulated temperature condition. Fuel transfer operations must be controlled to ensure that onsite transport | operations are not performed at an ambient temperature less than 0°F.

## 4.5.4 Maximum Internal Pressure

After fuel loading and vacuum drying, but prior to installing the MPC closure ring, the MPC is initially filled with helium. During handling in the HI-TRAC transfer cask, the gas temperature within the MPC rises to its maximum operating temperature as determined based on the thermal analysis methodology described previously. The gas pressure inside the MPC will also increase with rising temperature. The pressure rise is determined based on the ideal gas law, which states that the absolute pressure of a fixed volume of gas is proportional to its absolute temperature. The net free volumes of the four MPC designs are determined in Section 4.4.

The maximum MPC internal pressure is determined for normal onsite transport conditions, as well as off-normal conditions of a postulated accidental release of fission product gases caused by fuel rod rupture. Based on NUREG-1536 [4.4.10] recommended fission gases release fraction data, net free volume and initial fill gas pressure, the bounding maximum gas pressures with 1% and 10% rod rupture are given in Table 4.5.3. The MPC maximum gas pressures listed in Table 4.5.3 are all below the MPC design internal pressure listed in Table 2.2.1.

## 4.5.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses

Thermal expansion induced mechanical stresses due to non-uniform temperature distributions are reported in Chapter 3. Tables 4.5.2 and 4.5.4 provide a summary of MPC and HI-TRAC transfer cask component temperatures for structural evaluation.

#### 4.5.6 <u>Evaluation of System Performance for Normal Conditions of Handling and Onsite</u> <u>Transport</u>

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The HI-TRAC transfer cask thermal analysis is based on a detailed heat transfer model that conservatively accounts for all modes of heat transfer in various portions of the MPC and HI-TRAC. The thermal model incorporates several conservative features, which are listed below:

- i. The most severe levels of environmental factors bounding ambient temperature (100°F) and constant solar flux were coincidentally imposed on the thermal design. A bounding solar absorbtivity of 1.0 is applied to all insolation surfaces.
- ii. The HI-TRAC cask-to-MPC annular gap is a nalyzed based on the nominal design dimensions. No credit is considered for the significant reduction in this radial gap that would occur as a result of differential thermal expansion with design basis fuel at hot conditions. The MPC is considered to be concentrically aligned with the cask cavity. This is a worst-case scenario since any eccentricity will improve conductive heat transport in this region.
- iii. No credit is considered for cooling of the HI-TRAC baseplate while in contact with a supporting surface. An insulated boundary condition is applied in the thermal model on the bottom baseplate face.

Temperature distribution results (Tables 4.5.2 and 4.5.4, and Figure 4.5.2) obtained from this highly conservative thermal model show that the fuel cladding and cask component temperature limits are met with adequate margins for MBF. For HBF, supplemental cooling is required to comply with the applicable temperature limits. Expected margins during normal HI-TRAC use will be larger due to the many conservative assumptions incorporated in the analysis. Corresponding MPC internal pressure results (Table 4.5.3) show that the MPC confinement boundary remains well below the short-term condition design pressure. Stresses induced due to imposed temperature gradients are within ASME Code limits (Chapter 3). The maximum local axial neutron shield temperature is lower than design limits. Therefore, it is concluded that the HI-TRAC transfer cask thermal design is adequate to maintain fuel cladding integrity for short-term onsite handling and transfer operations.

The water in the water jacket of the HI-TRAC provides necessary neutron shielding. During normal handling and onsite transfer operations this shielding water is contained within the water jacket, which is designed for an elevated internal pressure. It is recalled that the water jacket is equipped with pressure relief valves set at 60 psig and 65 psig. This set pressure elevates the saturation pressure and temperature inside the water jacket, thereby precluding boiling in the water jacket under normal conditions. Under normal handling and onsite transfer operations, the bulk temperature inside the water jacket reported in Table 4.5.2 is less than the coincident saturation temperature at 60 psig (307°F), so the shielding water remains in its liquid state. The bulk temperature is determined via a conservative analysis, presented earlier, with design-basis maximum decay heat load. One of the assumptions that render the computed temperatures extremely conservative is the stipulation of a 100°F steady-state ambient temperature. In view of the large thermal inertia of the HI-TRAC, an appropriate ambient temperature is the "time-averaged" temperature, formally referred to in this FSAR as the normal temperature.

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Note that during hypothetical fire accident conditions (see Section 11.2) these relief valves allow venting of any steam generated by the extreme fire flux, to prevent overpressurizing the water jacket. In this manner, a portion of the fire heat flux input to the HI-TRAC outer surfaces is expended in vaporizing a portion of the water in the water jacket, thereby mitigating the magnitude of the heat input to the MPC during the fire.

During vacuum drying operations, the annular gap between the MPC and the HI-TRAC is filled with water. The saturation temperature of the annulus water bounds the maximum temperatures of all HI-TRAC components, which are located radially outside the water-filled annulus. As previously stated (see Subsection 4.5.1.1.4) the maximum annulus water temperature is only 125°F, so the HI-TRAC water jacket temperature will be less than the 307°F saturation temperature.

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#### EFFECTIVE RADIAL THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY OF THE WATER JACKET

Temperature (°F)	Thermal Conductivity (Btu/ft-hr-°F)
200	1.376
450	1.408
700	1.411

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#### HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK STEADY-STATE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURES

Component	Temperature [°F]	
Fuel Cladding	872*	
MPC Basket	852	
Basket Periphery	600	
MPC Outer Shell Surface	455	
HI-TRAC Inner Shell Inner Surface	322	
Water Jacket Inner Surface	314	
Enclosure Shell Outer Surface	224	
Water Jacket Bulk Water	258	
Axial Neutron Shield <sup>†</sup>	258	

<sup>†</sup> Local neutron shield section temperature.

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<sup>\*</sup> This calculated value exceeds the allowable limit for high-burnup fuel. A Supplemental Cooling System that satisfies the criteria in Appendix 2.C shall be used to comply with applicable temperature limits when an MPC contains one or more high burnup fuel assemblies.

Condition	Pressure (psig)	
MPC-24:		
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3	
Normal condition	76.0	
With 1% rod rupture	76.8	
With 10% rod rupture	83.7	
MPC-68:		
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3	
Normal condition	76.0	
With 1% rods rupture	76.5	
With 10% rod rupture	80.6	
MPC-32:		
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3	
Normal condition	76.0	
With 1% rods rupture	77.1	
With 10% rod rupture	86.7	
MPC-24E:		
Initial backfill (at 70°F)	31.3	
Normal condition	76.0	
With 1% rods rupture	76.8	
With 10% rod rupture	83.7	

## SUMMARY OF MPC CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY PRESSURES<sup>†</sup> FOR NORMAL HANDLING AND ONSITE TRANSPORT

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Includes gas from BPRA rods for PWR MPCs HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL HI-STORM FSAR REPORT HI-2002444

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# SUMMARY OF HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK AND MPC COMPONENTS NORMAL HANDLING AND ONSITE TRANSPORT TEMPERATURES

Location	Temperature (°F)
MPC Basket Top:	
Basket periphery	590
MPC shell	445
O/P <sup>†</sup> inner shell	280
O/P enclosure shell	196
MPC Basket Bottom:	
Basket periphery	334
MPC shell	302
O/P inner shell	244
O/P enclosure shell	199

<sup>†</sup> O/P is an abbreviation for HI-TRAC overpack.

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## SUMMARY OF LOADED 100-TON HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK BOUNDING COMPONENT WEIGHTS AND THERMAL INERTIAS

Component	Weight (lbs)	Heat Capacity (Btu/lb-°F)	Thermal Inertia (Btu/°F)
Water Jacket	7,000	1.0	7,000
Lead	52,000	0.031	1,612
Carbon Steel	40,000	0.1	4,000
Alloy-X MPC (empty)	39,000	0.12	4,680
Fuel	40,000	0.056	2,240
MPC Cavity Water <sup>†</sup>	6,500	1.0	6,500
			26,032 (Total)

<sup>†</sup> Conservative lower bound water mass.

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## MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TIME DURATION FOR WET TRANSFER OPERATIONS

Initial Temperature (°F)	Time Duration (hr)
115	25.7
120	24.4
125	23.1
130	21.7
135	20.4
140	19.1
145	17.8
150	16.4

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Scenario	Descriptio n	Ultimate Heat Sink	Analysis Type	Principal Input Parameters	Results in FSAR Subsection
1	Onsite Transport	Ambient	SS(B)	O <sub>T</sub> , Q <sub>D</sub> , ST, SC	4.5.2.1
2	Lead Gaps	Ambient	SS(B)	O <sub>T</sub> , Q <sub>D</sub> , ST, SC	4.5.1.1.7
3	Vacuum	HI-TRAC annulus water	SS(B)	QD	4.5.2.2
4	Wet Transfer Operation	Cavity water and Cask Internals	AH	QD	4.5.1.1.5
5	Fuel Unloading	Helium Circulation	TA	QD	4.5.1.1.6
6	Fire Accident	Jacket Water, Cask Internals	TA	Q <sub>D</sub> , F	11.2.4
7	Jacket Water Loss Accident	Ambient	SS(B)	O <sub>T</sub> , Q <sub>D</sub> , ST, SC	11.2.1

## MATRIX OF HI-TRAC TRANSFER CASK THERMAL EVALUATIONS

Legend:

- O<sub>T</sub> Off-Normal Temperature (100°F)
- Q<sub>D</sub> Design Basis Maximum Heat Load
- ST Insolation Heating (Top)

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- SC Insolation Heating (Curved)
- F Fire Heating (1475°F)

SS(B) - Bounding Steady State

- TA Transient Analysis AH Adiabatic Heating

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## PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURE IN VACUUM<sup>†</sup> (MODERATE BURNUP FUEL ONLY)

MPC	Lower Decay Heat Load	Higher Decay Heat Load
	Range Temperatures (°F)	Range Temperature (°F)
MPC-24	827	960
MPC-68	822	1014
MPC-32	n/a	1040
MPC-24E	n/a	942

<sup>†</sup> Steady state temperatures at the MPC design maximum heat load reported.

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FIGURE 4.5.3

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## 4.6 <u>REGULATORY COMPLIANCE</u>

#### 4.6.1 Normal Conditions of Storage

NUREG-1536 [4.4.10] and ISG-11 [4.1.4] define several thermal acceptance criteria that must be applied to evaluations of normal conditions of storage. These items are addressed in Sections 4.1 through 4.4.5 and results evaluated in Subsection 4.4.6. Each of the pertinent criteria and the conclusion of the evaluations are summarized here.

As required by ISG-11 [4.1.4], the fuel cladding temperature at the beginning of dry cask storage is maintained below the anticipated damage-threshold temperatures for normal conditions for the licensed life of the HI-STORM System. Maximum clad temperatures for long-term storage conditions are reported in Section 4.4.2.

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0,IV,3), the maximum internal pressure of the cask remains within its design pressure for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, assuming rupture of 1 percent, 10 percent, and 100 percent of the fuel rods, respectively. Assumptions for pressure calculations include release of 100 percent of the fill gas and 30 percent of the significant radioactive gases in the fuel rods. Maximum internal pressures are reported in Section 4.4.4. Design pressures are summarized in Table 2.2.1.

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0,IV,4), all cask and fuel materials are maintained within their minimum and maximum temperature for normal and off-normal conditions in order to enable components to perform their intended safety functions. Maximum and minimum temperatures for long-term storage conditions are reported in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, respectively. Design temperature limits are summarized in Table 2.2.3. HI-STORM System components defined as important to safety are listed in Table 2.2.6.

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0,IV,5), the cask system ensures a very low probability of cladding breach during long-term storage. For long-term normal conditions, the maximum CSF cladding temperature is below the ISG-11 [4.1.4] limit of 400°C (752°F).

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0,IV,7), the cask system is passively cooled. All heat rejection mechanisms described in this chapter, including conduction, natural convection, and thermal radiation, are completely passive.

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0, IV, 8), the thermal performance of the cask is within the allowable design criteria specified in FSAR Chapters 2 and 3 for normal conditions. All thermal results reported in Sections 4.4.2 through 4.4.5 are within the design criteria allowable ranges for all normal conditions of storage.

4.6.2 Short Term Operations

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As discussed ion Section 4.0, evaluation of short term operations is presented in Section 4.5. This section establishes complete compliance with the provisions of ISG-11 [4.1.4]. In particular, the ISG-11 requirement to ensure that maximum cladding temperatures under all fuel loading and short term operations be below 400°C (752°F) for high burnup fuel and below 570°C (1058°F) for moderate burnup fuel is demonstrated as stated below.

As required by ISG-11, the fuel cladding temperature is maintained below the applicable limits for HBF and MBF (Table 4.3.1) during short term operations.

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0,IV,3), the maximum internal pressure of the cask remains within its design pressure for normal and off-normal conditions, assuming rupture of 1 percent and 10 percent of the fuel rods, respectively. Assumptions for pressure calculations include release of 100 percent of the fill gas and 30 percent of the significant radioactive gases in the fuel rods.

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0,IV,4), all cask and fuel materials are maintained within their minimum and maximum temperature for all short term operations in order to enable components to perform their intended safety functions.

As required by NUREG-1536 (4.0, IV, 8), the thermal performance of the cask is within the allowable design criteria specified in FSAR Chapters 2 and 3 for all short term operations.

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- [4.3.3] Deleted
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## **APPENDIX 4.A:**

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## APPENDIX 4.B: CONSERVATISMS IN THE THERMAL ANALYSIS OF THE HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM

#### 4.B.1 OVERVIEW OF CASK HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

The HI-STORM 100 overpack is a large, cylindrical structure with an internal cavity suited for emplacement of a cylindrical canister containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The canister is arrayed in an upright manner inside the vertically oriented overpack. The design of the system provides for a small radial gap between the canister and the cylindrical overpack cavity. One principal function of a fuel storage system is to provide a means for ensuring fuel cladding integrity under long-term storage periods (20 years or more). The HI-STORM 100 overpack is equipped with four large ducts near its bottom and top extremities. The ducted overpack construction, together with an engineered annular space between the MPC cylinder and internal cavity in the HI-STORM 100 overpack structure, ensures a passive means of heat dissipation from the stored fuel via ventilation action (i.e., natural circulation of air in the canister-to-overpack annulus). In this manner a large structure physically interposed between the hot canister and ambient air (viz. the concrete overpack engineered for radiation protection) is rendered as an air flow device for convective heat dissipation. The pertinent design features producing the air ventilation ("chimney effect") in the HI-STORM 100 cask are shown in Figure 4.B.1.

A great bulk of the heat emitted by the SNF is rejected to the environment  $(Q_1)$  by convective action. A small quantity of the total heat rejection occurs by natural convection and radiation from the surface of the overpack  $(Q_2)$ , and an even smaller amount is dissipated by conduction to the concrete pad upon which the HI-STORM 100 overpack is placed  $(Q_3)$ . From the energy conservation principle, the sum of heat dissipation to all sinks (convective cooling  $(Q_1)$ , surface cooling  $(Q_2)$  and cooling to pad  $(Q_3)$ ) equals the sum of decay heat emitted from the fuel stored in the canister  $(Q_d)$  and the heat deposited by insolation,  $Q_s$  (i.e.,  $Q_d + Q_s = Q_1 + Q_2 + Q_3$ ). This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.B.2. In the HI-STORM 100 System,  $Q_1$  is by far the dominant mode of heat removal, accounting for well over 80% of the decay heat conveyed to the external environment. Figure 4.B.3 shows the relative portions of  $Q_d$  transferred to the environs via  $Q_1$ ,  $Q_2$ , and  $Q_3$  in the HI-STORM 100 System under the design basis heat load.

The heat removal through convection,  $Q_1$ , is similar to the manner in which a fireplace chimney functions: Air is heated in the annulus between the canister and the overpack through contact with the canister's hot cylindrical surface causing it to flow upward toward the top (exit) ducts and inducing the suction of the ambient air through the bottom ducts. The flow of air sweeping past the cylindrical surfaces of the canister has sufficient velocity to create turbulence that aids in the heat extraction process. It is readily recognized that the chimney action relies on a fundamental and immutable property of air, namely that air becomes lighter (i.e., more buoyant) as it is heated. If the canister contained no heat emitting fuel, then there would be no means for the annulus air to heat and rise. Similarly, increasing the quantity of heat produced in the canister would make more heat available for heating of annulus air, resulting in a more vigorous chimney action. B ecause the heat energy of the spent nuclear fuel itself a ctuates the chimney action,

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ventilated overpacks of the HI-STORM 100 genre are considered absolutely safe against thermal malfunction. While the removal of heat through convective mass transport of air is the dominant mechanism, other minor components, labeled  $Q_2$  and  $Q_3$  in the foregoing, are recognized and quantified in the thermal analysis of the HI-STORM 100 System.

Heat dissipation from the exposed surfaces of the overpack,  $Q_2$ , occurs principally by natural convection and radiation cooling. The rate of decay heat dissipation from the external surfaces is, of course, influenced by several factors, some of which aid the process (e.g., wind, thermal turbulation of air), while others oppose it (for example, radiant heating by the sun or blocking of radiation cooling by surrounding casks). In this appendix, the relative significance of  $Q_2$  and  $Q_3$  and the method to conservatively simulate their effect in the HI-STORM 100 thermal model is discussed.

The thermal problem posed for the HI-STORM 100 System in the system's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is as follows: Given a specified maximum fuel cladding temperature,  $T_c$ , and a specified ambient temperature,  $T_a$  what is the maximum permissible heat generation rate  $Q_d$ , in the canister under steady state conditions? Of course, in the real world, the ambient temperature,  $T_a$ , varies continuously, and the cask system is rarely in a steady state (i.e., temperatures vary with time). Fortunately, fracture mechanics of spent fuel cladding instruct us that it is the time-integrated effect of elevated temperature, rather than an instantaneous peak value, that determines whether fuel cladding would rupture. The most appropriate reference ambient temperature for cladding integrity evaluation, therefore, is the <u>average</u> ambient temperature is, however, selected to be the maximum yearly average for the ISFSI site. In the general certification of HI-STORM 100, the reference ambient temperature (formally referred to as the normal temperature) is set equal to 80°F, which is greater than the annual average for any power plant location in the U.S.<sup>\*</sup>

The thermal analysis of the cask system leads to a computed value of the fuel cladding temperature greater than  $T_a$  by an amount C. In other words,  $T_c = T_a + C$ , where C decreases slightly as  $T_a$  (assumed ambient temperature) is increased. The thermal analysis of HI-STORM 100 is carried out to compute C in a most conservative manner. In other words, the mathematical model seeks to calculate an upper bound on the value of C.

Dry storage scenarios are characterized by relatively large temperature elevations (C) above ambient (650°F or so). The cladding temperature rise is the cumulative sum of temperature increments arising from individual elements of thermal resistance. To protect cladding from overheating, analytical assumptions adversely impacting heat transfer are chosen with particular attention given to those temperature increments which form the bulk of the temperature rise. In this appendix, the principal conservatisms in the thermal modeling of the HI-STORM 100 System and their underlying theoretical bases are presented. This overview is intended to provide

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>•</sup> According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) publication, "Comparative Climatic Data for the United States through 1998", the highest annual average temperature for any location in the continental U.S. is 77.8°F in Key West, Florida.

a physical understanding of the large margins buried in the HI-STORM 100 design which are summarized in Section 4.4.6 of this FSAR.

#### 4.B.2 CONSERVATISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION SPECIFICATION

The ultimate heat sink for decay heat generated by stored fuel is ambient air. The HI-STORM 100 System defines three ambient temperatures as the environmental conditions for thermal analysis. These are, the Normal (80°F), the Off-Normal (100°F) and Extreme Hot (125°F) conditions. Two factors dictate the stipulation of an ambient temperature for cladding integrity calculations. One factor is that ambient temperatures are constantly cycling on a daily basis (night and day). Furthermore, there are seasonal variations (summer to winter). The other factor is that cladding degradation is an incremental process that, over a long period of time (20 years), has an accumulated damage resulting from an "averaged-out" effect of the environmental temperature history. The 80°F normal temperature stated in the HI-STORM 100 FSAR is defined as the highest annual average temperature at a site established from past records. This is a principal design parameter in the HI-STORM 100 analysis because it establishes the basis for demonstrating long-term SNF integrity. The choice of maximum annual average temperature is conservative for a 20-year period. Based on meteorological data, the 80°F is chosen to bound annual average temperatures reported within the continental US.

For short periods, it is recognized that ambient temperature excursions above 80°F are possible. Two scenarios are postulated and analyzed in the FSAR to bound such transient events. The Off-Normal (100°F) and Extreme Hot (125°F)<sup>•</sup> cases are postulated as continuous (72-hour average) conditions. Both cases are analyzed as steady-state conditions (i.e., thermal inertia of the considerable concrete mass, fuel and metal <u>completely</u> neglected) occurring at the start of dry storage when the decay heat load to the HI-STORM 100 System is at its peak value with fuel emitting heat at its design basis maximum level.

## 4.B.3 CONSERVATISM IN MODELING THE ISFSI ARRAY

Traditionally, in the classical treatment of the ventilated storage cask thermal problem, the cask to be analyzed (the subject cask) is modeled as a stand-alone component that rejects heat to the ambient air through chimney action  $(Q_1)$  by natural convection to quiescent ambient air and radiation to the surrounding open spaces  $(Q_2)$ , and finally, a small amount through the concrete pad into the ground  $(Q_3)$ . The contributing effect of the sun (addition of heat) is considered, but the dissipative effect of wind is neglected. The interchange of radiative heat between proximatecasks is also neglected (the so-called "cask-to-cask interactions"). In modeling the HI-STORM 100 System, Holtec International extended the classical cask thermal model to include the effect of the neighboring casks in a most conservative manner. This model represents the flow of supply air to the inlet ducts for the subject cask by erecting a cylinder around the subject cask. The model blocks all lateral flow of air from the surrounding space into the subject cask's inlet ducts. This mathematical artifice is illustrated in Figure 4.B.4, where the lateral air flow arrows

<sup>\*</sup> According to NOAA, the highest daily mean temperature for any location in the continental U.S. is 93.7°F, which occurred in Yuma, Arizona.

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are shown "dotted" to indicate that the mathematical cylinder constructed around the cask has blocked off the lateral flow of air. Consequently, the chimney air must flow down the annulus from the air plenum space above the casks, turn around at the bottom and enter the inlet ducts. Because the vertical downflow of air introduces additional resistance to flow, an obvious effect of the hypothetical enclosing cylinder construct is an increased total resistance to the chimney flow which, it is recalled, is the main heat conveyance mechanism in a ventilated cask. Throttling of the chimney flow by the hypothetical enclosing cylinder is an element of conservatism in the HI-STORM modeling.

Thus, whereas air flows toward the bottom ducts from areas of supply which are scattered in a three dimensional continuum with partial restriction from neighboring casks, the analytical model blocks the air flow completely from areas outside the hypothetical cylinder. This is illustrated in Figure 4.B.4 in which an impervious boundary is shown to limit HI-STORM 100 cask access to fresh air from an annular opening near the top.

Thus, in the HI-STORM model, the feeder air to the HI-STORM 100 System must flow down the hypothetical annulus sweeping past the external surface of the cask. The ambient air, assumed to enter this hypothetical annulus at the assumed environmental temperature, heats by convective heat extraction from the overpack before reaching the bottom (inlet) ducts. In this manner, the temperature of the feeder air into the ducts is maximized. In reality, the horizontal flow of air in the vicinity of the inlet ducts, suppressed by the enclosed cylinder construct (as shown in Figure 4.B.4) would act to mitigate the pre-heating of the feeder air. By maximizing the extent of air preheating, the computed value of ventilation flow is underestimated in the simulation.

## 4.B.4 CONSERVATISM IN RADIANT HEAT LOSS

In an array of casks, the external (exposed) cask surfaces have a certain "view" of each other. The extent of view is a function of relative geometrical orientation of the surfaces and presence of other objects between them. The extent of view influences the rate of heat exchange between surfaces by thermal radiation. The presence of neighboring casks also partially blocks the escape of radiant heat from a cask thus affecting its ability to dissipate heat to the environment. This aspect of Radiative Blocking (RB) is illustrated for a reference cask (shown shaded) in Figure 4.B.5. It is also apparent that a cask is a recipient of radiant energy from adjacent casks (Radiant Heating (RH)). Thus, a thermal model representative of a cask array must address the RB and RH effects in a conservative manner. To bound the physical situation, a Hypothetical Reflecting Boundary (HRB) modeling feature is introduced in the thermal model. The HRB feature surrounds the HI-STORM 100 overpack with a reflecting cylindrical surface with the boundaries insulated.

In Figures 4.B.6 and 4.B.7 the inclusion of RB and RH effects in the HI-STORM 100 modeling is graphically illustrated. Figure 4.B.6 shows that an incident ray of radiant energy leaving the cask surface bounces back from the HRB thus preventing escape (i.e., RB effect maximized). The RH effect is illustrated in Figure 4.B.7 by superimposing on the physical model reflected images of HI-STORM 100 cask surrounding the reference cask. A ray of radiant energy from an

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adjacent cask directed toward the reference cask (AA) is duplicated by the model via another ray of radiant energy leaving the cask (BB) and being reflected back by the HRB (BA'). A significant feature of this model is that the reflected ray (BA') initiated from a cask surface (reference cask) assumed to be loaded with design basis maximum heat (hottest surface temperature). As the strength of the ray is directly proportional to the fourth power of surface temperature, radiant energy emission from an adjacent cask at a lower heat load will be overestimated by the HRB construct. In other words, the reference cask is assumed to be in an array of casks all producing design basis maximum heat. Clearly, it is physically impossible to load every location of every cask with fuel emitting heat at design basis maximum. Such a spent fuel inventory does not exist. This bounding assumption has the effect of maximizing cask surface temperature as the possibility of "hot" (design basis) casks being radiatively cooled by adjacent casks is precluded. The HRB feature included in the HI-STORM 100 model thus provides a bounding effect of an infinite array of casks, all at design basis maximum heat loads. No radiant heat is permitted to escape the reference cask (bounding effect) and the reflecting boundary mimics incident radiation toward the reference casks around the 360° circumference (bounding effect).

#### 4.B.5 CONSERVATISM IN REPRESENTING BASKET AXIAL RESISTANCE

As stated earlier, the largest fraction of the total resistance to the flow of heat from the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the ambient is centered in the basket itself. Out of the total temperature drop of a pproximately  $650^{\circ}$ F (C= $650^{\circ}$ F) between the peak fuel cladding temperature and the ambient, over 400°F occurs in the fuel basket. Therefore, it stands to reason that conservatism in the basket thermal simulation would have a pronounced effect on the conservatism in the final solution. The thermal model of the fuel basket in the HI-STORM 100 FSAR was accordingly constructed with a number of conservative assumptions that are described in the HI-STORM 100 FSAR. We illustrate the significance of the whole array of conservatisms by explaining one in some detail in the following discussion.

It is recognized that the heat emission from a fuel assembly is axially non-uniform. The maximum heat generation occurs at about the mid-height region of the enriched uranium column, and tapers off toward its extremities. The axial heat conduction in the fuel basket would act to diffuse and levelize the temperature field in the basket. The axial conductivity of the basket, quite clearly, is the key determinant in how well the thermal field in the basket would be homogenized. It is also evident that the conduction of heat along the length of the basket occurs in an uninterrupted manner in a HI-STORM 100 basket because of its continuously welded honeycomb geometry. On the other hand, the in-plane transfer of heat must occur through the physical gaps that exist between the fuel rods, between the fuel assembly and the basket walls and between the basket and the MPC shell. These gaps depress the in-plane conductivity of the basket. However, in the interest of conservatism, only a small fraction of the axial conductivity of the basket is included in the HI-STORM 100 thermal model. This assumption has the direct effect of throttling the axial flow of heat and thus of elevating the computed value of mid-height cladding temperature (where the peak temperature occurs) above its actual value. In actuality, the axial conductivity of the fuel basket is much greater than the in-plane conductivity due to the

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continuity of the fuel and basket structures in that direction. Had the axial conductivity of the basket been modeled less conservatively in the HI-STORM 100 thermal analysis, then the temperature distribution in the basket will be more uniform, i.e., the bottom region of the basket would be hotter than that computed. This means that the temperature of the MPC's external surface in the bottom region is hotter than computed in the HI-STORM 100 analysis. It is a well-known fact in ventilated column design that the lower the location in the column where the heat is introduced, the more vigorous the ventilation action. Therefore, the conservatism in the basket's axial conductivity assumption has the net effect of reducing the computed ventilation rate.

To estimate the conservatism in restricting the basket axial resistance, we perform a numerical exercise using mathematical perturbation techniques. The axial conductivity ( $K_z$ ) of the MPC is, as explained previously, much higher than the in-plane ( $K_r$ ) conductivity. The thermal solution to the MPC anisotropic conductivities problem (i.e.  $K_z$  and  $K_r$  are not equal) is mathematically expressed as a sum of a baseline isotropic solution  $T_o$  (setting  $K_z = K_r$ ) and a perturbation  $T^*$  which accounts for anisotropic effects. From Fourier's Law of heat conduction in solids, the perturbation for T' is reduced to the following form:

$$K_z \frac{d^2 T^*}{dz^2} = -\Delta K \frac{d^2 T_o}{dz^2}$$

Where,  $\Delta K$  is the perturbation parameter (i.e. axial conductivity offset  $\Delta K = K_z - K_r$ ). The boundary conditions for the perturbation solution are zero slope at peak cladding temperature location (dT\*/dz = 0) (which occurs at about the top of the active fuel height) and T\* = 0 at the bottom of the active fuel length. The object of this calculation is to compute T\* where the peak fuel cladding temperature is reached. To this end, the baseline thermal solution T<sub>o</sub> (i.e. HI-STORM isotropic modeling solution) is employed to compute an appropriate value for d<sup>2</sup>T<sub>o</sub>/dz<sup>2</sup> which characterizes the axial temperature rise over the height of the active fuel length in the hottest fuel cell. This is computed as  $(-\Delta T_{ax}/L^2)$  where  $\Delta T_{ax}$  is the fuel cell temperature rise and L is the active fuel length. Conservatively postulating a lower bound  $\Delta T_{ax}$  of 200°F and L of 12 ft, d<sup>2</sup>T<sub>o</sub>/dz<sup>2</sup> is computed as  $-1.39^{\circ}F/ft^2$ . Integrating the perturbation equation shown above, the following formula for T\* is obtained:

$$T^* = \left(\frac{\Delta K}{K_z}\right) \frac{d^2 T_o}{dz^2} L^2$$

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Employing a conservative low value for the ( $\Delta K/K_z$ ) parameter of 0.15, T\* is computed as – 30°F. In other words, the baseline HI-STORM solution over predicts the peak cladding temperature by approximately 30°F.

## 4.B.6 HEAT DISSIPATION UNDERPREDICTION IN THE MPC DOWNCOMER

Internal circulation of helium in the sealed MPC is modeled as flow in a porous medium in the fueled region containing the SNF (including top and bottom plenums). The basket-to-MPC shell clearance space is modeled as a helium filled radial gap to include the downcomer flow in the thermal model. The downcomer region, as illustrated in Figure 4.4.2, consists of an azimuthally varying gap formed by the square-celled basket outline and the cylindrical MPC shell. At the

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locations of closest approach a differential expansion gap (a small clearance on the order of 1/10 of an inch) is engineered to allow free thermal expansion of the basket. At the widest locations, the gaps are on the order of the fuel c ell opening (~6" (BWR) and ~9" (PWR) MPCs). It is heuristically evident that heat dissipation by conduction is maximum at the closest approach locations (low thermal resistance path) and that convective heat transfer is highest at the widest gap locations (large downcomer flow). In the FLUENT thermal model, a radial gap that is large compared to the basket-to-shell clearance and small compared to the cell opening is used. As a relatively large gap penalizes heat dissipation by conduction and a small gap throttles convective flow, the use of a single gap in the FLUENT model understates both conduction and convection heat transfer in the downcomer region.

Heat dissipation in the downcomer region is the sum of four elements, viz. convective heat [ transfer (C1), helium conduction heat transfer (C2), basket-to-shell contact heat transfer (C3), and radiation heat transfer (C4). In the HI-STORM thermal modeling, one element of heat [ transfer (C3) is <u>completely</u> neglected, C2 is severely penalized and C1 is underpredicted. In other words the HI-STORM thermosiphon model has choked the radial flow of heat in the downcomer space. This has the direct effect of raising the temperature of fuel in the thermal solutions.

#### 4.B.7 CONSERVATISM IN MPC EXTERNAL HEAT DISSIPATION TO CHIMNEY AIR

The principle means of decay heat dissipation to the environment is by cooling of the MPC surface by chimney air flow. Heat rejection from the MPC surface is by a combination of convective heat transfer to a through flowing fluid medium (air), natural convection cooling at the outer overpack surface, and by radiation heat transfer. Because the temperature of the fuel stored in the MPC is directly affected by the rate of heat dissipation from the canister external surface, heat transfer correlations with robust conservatisms are employed in the HI-STORM simulations. The FLUENT computer code deployed for the modeling employs a so called "wall-functions" approach for computing the transfer of heat from solid surfaces to fluid medium. This approach has the desired effect of computing heat dissipation in a most conservative manner. As this default approach has been employed in the thermal modeling, it is contextually relevant to quantify the conservatism in a classical setting to provide an additional level of assurance in the HI-STORM results. To do this, we have posed a classical heat transfer problem of a heated square block cooled in a stream of upward moving air. The problem is illustrated in Figure 4.B.8. From the physics of the problem, the maximum steady state solid interior temperature ( $T_{max}$ ) is computed as:

$$T_{max} = T_{sink} + \Delta T_{air} + \Delta T_s$$

where,

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 $T_{sink}$  = Sink temperature (mean of inlet and outlet air temperature)  $\Delta T_{air}$  = Solid surface to air temperature difference

 $\Delta T_s$  = Solid block interior temperature elevation

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The sink temperature is computed by first calculating the air outlet temperature from energy conservation principles. Solid-to-air heat transfer is computed using classical natural convection correlation proposed by Jakob and Hawkins ("Elements of Heat Transfer", John Wiley & Sons, 1957) and  $\Delta Ts$  is readily computed by an analytical solution to the equation of heat conduction in solids. By solving this same problem on the FLUENT computer code using the in-built "wall-functions", in excess of 100°F conservative margin over the classical result for T<sub>max</sub> is established.

### 4.B.8 MISCELLANEOUS CONSERVATISMS

Section 4.4.6 of the FSAR lists eleven elements of conservatism, of which certain nontransparent and individually significant items are discussed in detail in this appendix. Out of the balance of conservatisms, the one of notable mention is the conservatism in fuel decay heat generation stipulation based on the most heat emissive fuel assembly type. This posture imputes a large conservatism for certain other fuel types, which have a much lower quantity of Uranium fuel inventory relative to the design basis fuel type. Combining this with other miscellaneous conservatisms, an aggregate effect is to overestimate cladding temperatures by a bout  $15^{\circ}$ F to  $50^{\circ}$ F.

#### 4.B.9 CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing narrative provides a physical description of the many elements of conservatism in the HI-STORM 100 thermal model. The conservatisms may be broadly divided into two categories:

- 1. Those intrinsic to the FLUENT modeling process.
- 2. Those arising from the input data and on the HI-STORM 100 thermal modeling.

The conservatism in Category (1) may be identified by reviewing the Holtec International Benchmark Report [4.B.1], which shows that the FLUENT solution methodology, when applied to the prototype cask (TN 24P) over-predicts the peak cladding temperature by as much as 79 °F. and as much as 37°F relative to the PNNL results (see Attachment 1 to Reference [4.B.1]) from their COBRA SFS solution as compared against Holtec's FLUENT solution.

Category (2) conservatisms are those that we have deliberately embedded in the HI-STORM 100 thermal model to ensure that the computed value of the peak fuel cladding temperature is further over-stated. Table 4.B.1 contains a listing of the major conservatisms in the HI-STORM 100 thermal model, along with an estimate of the effect (increase) of each on the computed peak cladding temperature.

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#### **Conservatism in the HI-STORM 100 Thermal Model**

MODELING ELEMENT	CONSERVATISM [°F]
Long Term Ambient Temperature	2 to 30
Hypothetical Cylinder Construct	~5
Axial Heat Dissipation Restriction	30
MPC Downcomer Heat Dissipation Restriction	50
MPC External Heat Dissipation Under-prediction	50
Miscellaneous Conservatisms	15 to 50

#### 4.B.9 <u>REFERENCES</u>

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[4.B.1] "Topical Report on the HI-STAR/HI-STORM Thermal Model and its Benchmarking with Full-Size Cask Test Data", Holtec Report HI-992252, Rev. 1.

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FIGURE 4.B.3: RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEAT DISSIPATION ELEMENTS IN THE HI-STORM 100





FIGURE 4.B.4: AIR ACCESS RESTRICTIONS IN THE HI-STORM THERMAL MODEL

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# FIGURE 4.B.5: IN-PLANE RADIATIVE COOLING OF A HI-STORM CASK IN AN ARRAY

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## FIGURE 4.B.6: IN-PLANE RADIATIVE BLOCKING OF A HI-STORM CASK BY HYPOTHETICAL REFLECTING BOUNDARY

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#### FIGURE 4.B.7: RADIATIVE HEATING OF REFERENCE HI-STORM CASK BY SURROUNDING CASKS

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### FIGURE 4.B.8: A CLASSICAL THERMAL SCENARIO: AIR COOLING OF A HEATED SQUARE BLOCK

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