

Open Branch 3 Allegation Status Summary

Alleg. No.	Site	Description	Status/Actions
2004-0020	S/HC	<p>1) The Salem/Hope Creek Notification system allows equipment deficiencies to be entered without requiring corrective maintenance/preventative maintenance activities to be scheduled. In March 2003, approximately 1800 Notifications were open without work orders being assigned. Approximately half of these addressed very minor issues such as painting and missing insulation. Of the remaining half, approximately 25% involved safety related equipment and/or tech spec requirements. The Notification system requires that any deficiencies tied to a preventive maintenance (PM) item be recoded to a corrective maintenance (CM) item for scheduling purposes and there needs to be recognition that there is a CM along with a PM. PMs are supposed to be scheduled within six months of the date of the notification; however, in some cases, that time limit is being exceeded by a year or more. An example of that minor repair work on the emergency diesels generators and governor oil leaks.</p> <p>2) Because of a lack of progress and priority in correcting underlying equipment deficiencies documented in the Notification system, this is "discouraging" to people to continue to identify new concerns.</p> <p>3) Boron buildup due to valve packing leaks at Salem are being cleaned up; however, no efforts are being made to address the underlying leak. The focus is strictly on cleaning up the boron buildup. By example, in 2002, a notification Salem valve (exact valve location was not specified) had a boron leak from the packing gland area. It was cleaned up and the Notification was closed. In 2003, the boron leak recurred, a Notification was written, the valve was again cleaned up and no Notification was written to address the underlying packing leak. This Notification was dispositioned in the February 2004 time frame. Notifications written address the matter in a superficial manner and do not address the root cause of the problem.</p>	Initial ARB on 4/1. Ack letter issued. Referral letter in final concurrence on 4/21.

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~~NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE~~

August 10, 2004 (10:49AM)

Open Branch 3 Allegation Status Summary

Alleg. No.	Site	Description	Status/Actions
2004-0010	Hope Creek	<p>The allegor indicated a number of concerns with the work control process and the way that station management interacted with staff regarding concerns in this area. He/she described seven discrete concerns and one involving discrimination. He/she indicated that: 1) certain first line supervisors in maintenance department have been pressured to inappropriately close work orders for as-found testing of both safety and non-safety related relief valves without all specified work being completed; 2) a union chief was told not to write notifications regarding broken equipment; specifically, he identified that certain service water gates and valves were not installed correctly nor did they operate as designed; 3) in March 2003, during a forced outage, the allegor directly observed rub marks on auxiliary (aux) impeller for the "B" reactor recirculation pump that he attributed to clearance problems between the aux impeller and stuffing box and felt that an internal pump inspection was necessary. Management disagreed with his assertion on the need for an internal inspection and considered it a business decision. He noted that the notification was not updated with their rationale and considered this a corrective action program weakness; 4) he/she learned from certain groups of people onsite that repair parts and critical spares that maintenance needs to do safety-related work are routinely sent back to the wholesaler or manufacturer to limit in-house inventory to minimize PSEG's taxes; 5) he/she wrote a [REDACTED] because of abuses in the work control process in the planning and implementation of work orders and nothing was done to address it; 6) people are afraid to identify tagging errors that involved human errors because they feared that someone will get in trouble, but nothing will get fixed; 7) a first line maintenance supervisor is being pressured to work a HC Chiller job that has been mismanaged and that significant additional work has been added without following the work control process. The supervisor feels his job is in jeopardy every time he raises a concern on this issue. 8) The allegor believes that PSEG did not select him for his new position in the September 2003</p>	<p>Initial ARB on 2/19/04.</p> <p align="center">N</p>