



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
STANDARD REVIEW PLAN
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

Section 7.3. Engineered Safety Features Systems

Review Responsibilities

Primary — Instrumentation and Controls Branch (HICB)

Secondary — None

I. Areas of Review

This SRP section describes the review process and acceptance criteria for the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS), which is a portion of the protection system used to initiate the engineered safety features (ESF) systems and essential auxiliary supporting (EAS) systems. The ESFAS provides both automatic and manual initiation of these systems. This SRP section also includes the review criteria for control systems that regulate the ESF systems. The ESF control systems include both the automatic and manual features.

The review of instrumentation and control systems that regulate the operation of EAS systems is included in the SRP section that addresses each EAS system. SRP Section 7.5 provides the review criteria for the information systems important to safety, which includes instrumentation that indicates the need for manual initiation and control of ESF systems.

Typical ESF systems are:

- Containment and reactor vessel isolation systems.

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USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.

Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience.

Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C. 20555.

- Emergency core cooling systems.
- Containment heat removal and depressurization systems.
- Pressurized water reactor auxiliary feedwater systems.
- Boiling water reactor standby gas treatment systems.
- Containment air purification and cleanup systems.
- Containment combustible gas control systems.
- Control room isolation and emergency heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC).

Typical EAS systems are:

- Electric power systems.
- Diesel generator fuel storage and transfer systems.
- Instrument air systems.
- HVAC systems for ESF areas.
- Essential service water and component cooling water systems.

The objective of the review is to confirm that the ESFAS and ESF control systems satisfy regulatory acceptance criteria, guidelines, and performance requirements.

SRP Section 7.0 describes the coordination of reviews, including the information to be reviewed and the scope required for each of the different types of applications that the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) may review. Refer to that section for information regarding how the areas of review are affected by the type of application under consideration and for a description of coordination between HICB and other branches.

II. Acceptance Criteria

Acceptance criteria and guidelines applicable to the ESFAS and ESF control systems are identified in SRP Section 7.1. The review of Section 7.1 of the SAR confirms that the appropriate acceptance criteria and guidelines have been identified for these systems. The review of the ESFAS and ESF control systems confirms that these systems conform to the requirements of the acceptance criteria and guidelines.

Acceptance criteria for the review of ESFAS and ESF control systems are the relevant requirements of the following regulations:

1. Acceptance criteria applicable to any ESFAS and ESF control systems

10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), "Quality Standards."

General Design Criterion 1, "Quality Standards and Records."

General Design Criterion 2, "Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena."

General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and Missile Design Basis."

General Design Criterion 13, "Instrumentation and Control."

General Design Criterion 19, "Control Room."

Item II.Q, "Defense Against Common-Mode Failures in Digital Instrument and Control Systems," of the Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-087, "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs."

2. Additional acceptance criteria applicable to the ESFAS

10 CFR 50.55a(h), "Protection Systems," which requires compliance with ANSI/IEEE Std 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

10 CFR 50.34(f), "Additional TMI-Related Requirements," or equivalent TMI action requirements imposed by Generic Letters.

(2)(v), "Bypass and Inoperable Status Indication."

(2)(xii), "Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication."

(2)(xiv), "Containment Isolation Systems."

General Design Criterion 20, "Protection System Function."

General Design Criterion 21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability."

General Design Criterion 22, "Protection System Independence."

General Design Criterion 23, "Protection System Failure Modes."

General Design Criterion 24, "Separation of Protection and Control Systems."

General Design Criterion 29, "Protection against Anticipated Operational Occurrences."

3. Additional acceptance criteria applicable to ESF control systems

General Design Criterion 34, "Residual Heat Removal."

General Design Criterion 35, "Emergency Core Cooling."

General Design Criterion 38, "Containment Heat Removal."

General Design Criterion 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup."

4. Additional acceptance criteria applicable to ESFAS and ESF control systems proposed for design certification under 10 CFR 52

10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(iv), "Resolution of Unresolved and Generic Safety Issues."

10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(vi), "ITAAC in Design Certification Applications."

10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(vii), "Interface Requirements."

10 CFR 52.47(a)(2), "Level of Detail."

10 CFR 52.47(b)(2)(i), "Innovative Means of Accomplishing Safety Function."

5. Additional acceptance criteria applicable to ESFAS and ESF control systems proposed as part of combined license applications under 10 CFR 52

10 CFR 52.79(c), "ITAAC in Combined License Applications."

As described in Reg. Guide 1.153, "Criteria for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Portions of Safety Systems," compliance with IEEE Std 603, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," as modified and supplemented by the regulatory guide, is considered by the NRC staff to satisfy the provisions of ANSI/IEEE Std 279.

Section 7.1, Table 7-1 and Appendix 7.1-A list standards, regulatory guides, and branch technical positions that provide information, recommendations, and guidance that describe a basis acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing the relevant requirements of the NRC regulations identified above for the ESFAS and ESF control systems.

III. Review Procedures

Section 7.1 describes the general procedures to be followed in reviewing any instrumentation and control system. Section 7.3 highlights specific topics that should be emphasized in the ESFAS review.

The review should include an evaluation of the ESFAS design against the requirements of ANSI/IEEE Std 279, or Reg. Guide 1.153 (which endorses IEEE Std 603), depending upon the applicant/licensee's commitment regarding these design criteria. This procedure is detailed in Appendix 7.1-B for ANSI/IEEE Std 279 and in Appendix 7.1-C for IEEE Std 603. The procedures in Appendices 7.1-B and 7.1-C address specific design requirements only. For example, paragraph 4.9 of ANSI/IEEE Std 279 requires that the design include the means for checking the availability of each system input sensor during operation. Appendix 7.1-B outlines a procedure that can be used to determine whether or not this requirement is met.

Appendices 7.1-B and 7.1-C discuss the requirements of ANSI/IEEE Std 279 and IEEE Std 603, and how they are used in the review of the ESFAS. Although the primary emphasis is on the equipment comprising the ESFAS, the reviewer must consider the overall ESF functions on a system level. The ESFAS design should be compatible with the SAR Chapter 15 design bases accident analyses. It is not sufficient to evaluate the adequacy of the ESFAS only on the basis of the design meeting the specific requirements of ANSI/IEEE Std 279 or IEEE Std 603.

The ESFAS review should address the applicable topics identified in Table 7-1. Appendix 7.1-A describes review methods for each topic. Major design considerations that should be emphasized in the review of the ESFAS are identified below.

- Design basis — See Appendix 7.1-B item 1 or Appendix 7.1-C item 4.
- Single-failure criterion — See Appendix 7.1-B item 3 or Appendix 7.1-C item 6.
- Quality of components and modules — See Appendix 7.1-B item 4 or Appendix 7.1-C item 8.
- Independence — See Appendix 7.1-B items 7 and 8 or Appendix 7.1-C items 11 and 24.
- Completion of protective action — See Appendix 7.1-B item 17 or Appendix 7.1-C item 25.
- Defense-in-depth and diversity — ESFAS systems should incorporate multiple means for response to each event discussed in Chapter 15 of the SAR. At least one pair of these means for each event should have the property of signal diversity, i.e., the use of different sensed parameters to initiate protective action, in which any of the parameters may independently indicate an abnormal condition, even if the other parameters are sensed incorrectly (see NUREG/CR-6303, "Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems"). The diverse means may actuate the same protective function or different protective functions, and may be automatically or manually activated, consistent with the response time requirements of the function. For digital computer-based ESFAS systems the applicant/licensee should have performed a defense-in-depth and diversity analysis. Additionally, for advanced reactor design under 10 CFR 52, the design should provide for manual, system-level actuation of critical safety functions. BTP HICB-19 provides guidance for the review of defense-in-depth and diversity.
- System testing and inoperable surveillance — See Appendix 7.1-B items 10 and 11 or Appendix 7.1-C item 12, 13, and 27.
- Use of digital systems — See Appendix 7.0-A.
- Setpoint determination — See Draft Reg. Guide DG-1045 (the proposed revision 3 to Reg. Guide 1.105, "Instrument Setpoints for Safety Systems"), and BTP HICB-12.
- ESF control systems — Conformance to the single-failure criterion on a system basis, and operability from onsite and offsite electrical power as required by GDC 34, 35, 38, and 41.

In each safety review, the Staff should determine the elements of the design that require additional review emphasis. Typical reasons for such a non-uniform emphasis are the introduction of new design features or the

utilization in the design of features previously reviewed and found acceptable. However, in all cases, the review must be sufficient to conclude conformance to the acceptance criteria, i.e., the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations.

IV. Evaluation Findings

The Staff verifies that sufficient information has been provided and the review supports the following conclusions as stated in the SER:

The review of the instrumentation and control aspects of the engineered safety feature (ESF) systems includes the engineered safety features actuation systems (ESFAS) and the ESF control systems. The ESFAS detects a plant condition requiring the operation of an ESF system and/or essential auxiliary supporting (EAS) system and initiates operation of these systems. The ESF control systems regulate the operation of the ESF systems following automatic initiation by the protection system or manual initiation by the plant operator.

The NRC staff concludes that the design of the ESFAS is acceptable and meets the relevant requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 4, 13, 19-24, 29, 34, 35, 38, and 41 and 10 CFR 50.34(f), 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), and 10 CFR 50.55a(h).

The Staff conducted a review of these systems for conformance to the guidelines in the regulatory guides, industry standards and branch technical positions applicable to these systems. The Staff concludes that the applicant/licensee acceptably identified the guidelines applicable to these systems. Based upon the review of the system design for conformance to the guidelines, the Staff concludes that the systems conform to the guidelines applicable to these systems. Therefore the Staff finds that the requirements of GDC 1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1) have been met.

The review included the identification of those systems and components of the ESFAS and ESF control systems that are designed to survive the effects of earthquakes, other natural phenomena, abnormal environments, and missiles. Based upon the review, the Staff concludes that the applicant/licensee has identified those systems and components consistent with the design bases for those systems. Sections 3.10 and 3.11 of the SER address the acceptability of the qualification programs to demonstrate the capability of these systems and components to survive the above effects. Therefore, the Staff finds that the identification of these systems and components satisfies the requirements of GDC 2 and 4.

Based on the review of ESFAS and ESF control system status information, manual initiation capabilities, control capabilities, and provisions to support safe shutdown, the Staff concludes that information is provided to monitor the system over the anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls are provided for manual initiation and control of ESF functions. ESF controls appropriately support actions to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions, and to achieve and maintain a safe condition under accident conditions. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS and ESF control design satisfies the requirements of GDC 13 and 19.

Based on the review of system functions, the Staff concludes that the ESFAS conforms to the requirements of [ANSI/IEEE Std 279 OR IEEE Std 603] and 10 CFR 50.34(f). The ESFAS setpoint methodology conforms to the guidance of Draft Reg. Guide DG-1045. Based upon this review and coordination with those having primary review responsibility for the accident analysis, the Staff concludes that the ESFAS includes the provision to sense accident conditions and anticipated operational occurrences consistent with the accident analysis presented in Chapter 15 of the SAR and evaluated in the SER. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 20.

The ESFAS conforms to the guidelines for periodic testing in Reg. Guide 1.22 and Reg. Guide 1.118. The bypassed and inoperable status indication conforms to the guidelines of Reg. Guide 1.47. The ESFAS conforms to the guidelines on the application of the single-failure criterion in ANSI/IEEE Std 379 as supplemented by Reg. Guide 1.53. Based on the review, the Staff concludes that the ESFAS satisfies the requirement of [ANSI/IEEE Std 279 OR IEEE Std 603] with regard to system reliability and testability. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies these requirements of GDC 21.

The ESFAS conforms to the guidelines in Reg. Guide 1.75 for protection system independence. Based on the review, the Staff concludes that the ESFAS satisfies the requirement of [ANSI/IEEE Std 279 OR IEEE Std 603] with regard to the system's independence. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 22.

Based on the review of the failure modes and effects analysis for the ESFAS, the Staff concludes that the system is designed to fail into a safe state if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy, or a postulated adverse environments are experienced. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 23.

Based on the review of the interfaces between the ESFAS and plant control systems, the Staff concludes that the system satisfies the requirements of [ANSI/IEEE Std 279 OR IEEE Std 603] with regard to control and protection system interactions. Therefore, the Staff finds the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 24.

The Staff conducted a review of the ESF control systems for conformance to the requirements for testability, operability with onsite and offsite electrical power, and single failures. The Staff concludes that the ESF control systems are testable and are operable using either onsite or offsite power (assuming only one source is available). Additionally, the controls associated with redundant ESF systems are independent and satisfy the single-failure criterion and, therefore, meet the relevant requirements of GDC 34, 35, 38, and 41.

The conclusions noted above are based upon the requirements of [ANSI/IEEE Std 279 OR IEEE Std 603] with respect to the design of the ESFAS. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(h).

The applicant/licensee has also incorporated in the system design the [recommendations of the TMI task action plan items OR the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f)], [identify item number and how implemented] which the Staff has reviewed and found acceptable.

In the review of the ESFAS, the Staff examined the dependence of this system on the availability of essential auxiliary systems. Based on this review and coordination with those having primary review responsibility of EAS systems, the Staff concludes that the design of the ESFAS is compatible with the functional requirements of EAS systems.

Note: the following finding applies only to systems involving digital computer-based components.

Based on the review of software development plans and the inspections of the computer development process and design outputs, the Staff concludes that the computer systems meet the guidance of Reg. Guide 1.152. Therefore, the special characteristics of computer systems have been adequately addressed, and the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies these requirements of GDC 1 and 21.

Based on the review of the applicant/licensee's defense-in-depth and diversity analysis, the Staff concludes that the ESFAS complies with the criteria for defense against common-mode failure in digital instrumentation and control systems. Therefore, the Staff finds that adequate diversity and

defense against common-mode failure has been provided to satisfy these requirements of GDC 21, GDC 22, and the Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-087.

Note: the following findings apply only to applications under 10 CFR 52.

The ESFAS design appropriately addresses the applicable unresolved and generic safety issues. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(iv).

The review of the ESFAS examined the proposed inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC). Based upon the review and coordination with those having primary responsibility for ITAAC, the Staff concludes that if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria are met, the plant will operate in accordance with the [design certification OR combined license]. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of [10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(vi) OR 10 CFR 52.79(c)].

The application for design certification does not seek certification for the following portions of the ESFAS [insert list]. Based upon review of the completed safety analysis, the Staff finds that the requirements for these portions of the design were sufficiently detailed. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS design satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(vii).

The ESFAS contains the following features which differ significantly from plant designs that have been licensed for commercial operation before April 18, 1989. [Insert list.] Based upon the review of [analysis OR test programs OR operating experience], the Staff concludes that the performance of these features has been demonstrated; interdependent effects among the safety features are acceptable; sufficient data exist to assess the analytical tools used for safety analysis; and the scope of the design is complete except for site-specific elements. Therefore, the Staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 52.47(b)(2)(i).

Based upon the review of the scope and content of the material submitted by the applicant, and the completed review with respect to the technical items above, the Staff finds that the application contained appropriate detail about the ESFAS design to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 52.47(a)(2).

Note: the following conclusion is applicable to all applications.

The conclusions noted above for the ESFAS are applicable to all portions of the systems except for the following, for which acceptance is based upon prior NRC review and approval as noted [List applicable system or topics and identify references].

V. Implementation

Except in those cases in which the applicant/licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the NRC's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the NRC staff in its evaluation of conformance with NRC regulations.

VI. References

ANSI/IEEE Std 279-1971. "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

ANSI/IEEE Std 379-1988. "Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems."

Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1045. Proposed Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Instrument Setpoints for Safety Systems." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1997.

IEEE Std 603-1991. "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

NUREG/CR-6303. "Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems." December 1994.

Regulatory Guide 1.118. "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1995.

Regulatory Guide 1.152. "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1996.

Regulatory Guide 1.153. "Criteria for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Portions of Safety Systems." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1996.

Regulatory Guide 1.22. "Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1972.

Regulatory Guide 1.47. "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1973.

Regulatory Guide 1.75. "Physical Independence of Electrical Systems." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1978.

Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-087. "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs." July 15, 1993.

