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DRP

Docket Number 50-346
License Number NPF-3
Serial Number 1-1426

July 1, 2005

Mr. James L. Caldwell, Administrator
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III
2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210
Lisle, IL 60532-4352

Subject: Submittal of Revision 1 - 2005 Independent Corrective Action Program Implementation Assessment Plan for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Dear Mr. Caldwell:

The purpose of this letter is to submit Revision 1 to the assessment plan and related information for the 2005 independent external assessment of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Corrective Action Program (CAP) implementation. The original 2005 CAP Implementation Assessment Plan was submitted on April 12, 2005, via DBNPS letter Serial Number 1-1414.

In accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter, dated March 8, 2004, "Approval to Restart the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Closure of Confirmatory Action Letter, and Issuance of Confirmatory Order," (letter Log 1-4524) the DBNPS is submitting Revision 1 to the Corrective Action Implementation Independent Assessment Plan, including the identification and qualifications of the assessors. This CAP Assessment Plan, Revision 1 is being submitted due to the need to replace two (2) of the assessors. One of the initial assessors became unavailable due to a health issue and the other resigned and will not be available for the assessment. The need to replace the assessors has been discussed with Ms. Christine Lipa, NRC Branch Chief for the DBNPS on June 22, 2005.

The onsite portion of the assessment remains scheduled to commence on July 11, 2005, with this portion of the assessment lasting approximately two weeks. The final debrief, marking the end of the assessment, will be conducted with the DBNPS staff within 14 days of completion of the onsite assessment. The final assessment report and action plans, if required, will be submitted to the NRC within 45 days following the final debrief.

The changes to the CAP Implementation Assessment Plan (Attachment 2) are identified with a revision bar in the right hand margin. This revision of the CAP Implementation Assessment Plan and the attached biographies supercedes the original submittal in its entirety.

If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Mr. Clark A. Price, Manager - Regulatory Compliance, at (419) 321-8585.

Sincerely yours,



JCS

Attachments

cc: USNRC Document Control Desk
DB-1 NRC/NRR Project Manager
DB-1 Senior Resident Inspector
Utility Radiological Safety Board

COMMITMENT LIST

The following list identifies those actions committed to by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC) Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the DBNPS. They are described only for information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Compliance (419-321-8585) at the DBNPS of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENTS	DUE DATE
None	N/A

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Attachment 2

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Independent Corrective Action Program
Implementation Assessment Plan, Revision 1

(6 pages to follow)

Corrective Action Program
Implementation Assessment Plan, Revision 1 - 2005

NUMBER:

COIA-CAP-2005

ASSESSMENT AREA:

Corrective Action Program Implementation

PURPOSE:

The purpose is to provide the 2005 independent and comprehensive assessment of the Corrective Action Program implementation at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

The purpose of Revision 1 is to replace two (2) of the assessors.

The assessment will be performed in accordance with the requirements of the March 8, 2004, Confirmatory Order Modifying License Number NPF-3, and Davis-Besse Business Practice DBBP-VP-0009, "Management Plan for Confirmatory Order Independent Assessments." The assessment will be used to identify areas for improvement requiring corrective actions with action plans, and observations for other improvement opportunities. The assessment will also be used to assess the rigor, criticality, and overall quality of available Davis-Besse internal self-assessment activities in this performance area.

SCOPE:

The Independent Assessment Team will evaluate the following areas associated with the Corrective Action Program implementation.

Corrective actions taken in response to the Noteworthy Items and Areas for Improvement identified during the 2004 Independent Assessment of the Davis-Besse Corrective Action Program.

Corrective Action Program implementation primarily since the 2004 Independent Assessment of the Davis-Besse Corrective Action Program as follows:

- Identification, Classification and Categorization of Conditions Adverse to Quality,
- Evaluation and Resolution of Problems,
- Corrective Action Implementation & Effectiveness,
- Effectiveness of Program Trending,
- Effect of Program Backlogs,
- Effectiveness of Internal Assessment Activities, and
- Open corrective actions proposed in response to the NRC Special Team Inspection - Corrective Action Program Implementation - Report 05000346/2003010.

The Assessment Team will conduct the following activities:

1. Review of corrective actions from 2004 Independent Assessment of the Davis-Besse Corrective Action Program

The Assessment Team will review the corrective actions proposed and taken in response to the Noteworthy Items and Areas for Improvement identified during the 2004 Independent Assessment of the Davis-Besse Corrective Action Program.

Identify any strengths and any weaknesses or slow response identified during the detailed analysis above.

2. Identification, Classification and Categorization of Conditions Adverse to Quality

The Assessment Team will perform a review of activities to assess the effectiveness of the identification, classification and categorization of Conditions Adverse to Quality, such as:

a. Evaluate the actual identification, classification, and categorization of at least twenty-five selected Condition Reports categorized as Conditions Adverse to Quality.
b. Through interviews with a selected sample of at least ten individuals from various parts of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's staff, ascertain the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station staff's and management's commitment to the Corrective Action Program, the extent of their understanding of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's problem identification process, and their willingness to report problems.
c. Evaluate the adequacy of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's identification, classification, and categorization of at least twenty Conditions Adverse to Quality corrective actions for operational experience feedback.
d. Evaluate the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's Corrective Action Program for broad implementation problems or program deficiencies, if the above review indicates the potential for such problems.

3. Evaluation and Resolution of Problems

The Assessment Team will perform an analysis of at least five selected issues or problems, that have gone through the entire applicable Corrective Action Program process, to identify strengths and weaknesses in their evaluation and resolution.

a. Analyze the apparent cause or root cause evaluation of at least five selected Condition Reports.
b. Analyze selected issues, which should have been identified as Conditions Adverse to Quality on corrective action documents but were not or were only partially identified.
c. Analyze the problems selected above. Determine the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's effectiveness in implementing the Corrective Action Program.
d. Identify any strengths and any weaknesses or slow response identified during the detailed analysis above.

4. Corrective Action Implementation & Effectiveness

The Assessment Team will perform an analysis of Conditions Adverse to Quality corrective action implementation and effectiveness.

a. Evaluate the timeliness of corrective actions for at least twenty Condition Reports.
b. Review the number of repeat condition reports and corrective actions and evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions.
c. Evaluate the adequacy of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's implementation of corrective actions for operational experience feedback.
d. Review the activities of the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) and evaluate the effectiveness of the CARB.

5. Effectiveness of Program Trending

The Assessment Team will perform an analysis of the effectiveness of the trending of corrective actions.

a. Review the deficiencies tracked in the Corrective Action Program.
b. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Corrective Action Trending Program.

6. Effect of Program Backlogs

The Assessment Team will perform an analysis of the effect of program backlogs on organizational and operational effectiveness.

a. Review program backlogs and the trend of the backlogs.
b. Evaluate the impact of the backlog and backlog trend on organizational and operational effectiveness.

7. Effectiveness of Internal Assessment Activities

Self-Assessments

The Assessment Team will evaluate the effectiveness of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's self-assessment activities associated with the implementation of the Corrective Action Program.

a. Review the results of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station audits/reviews conducted since the 2004 Independent Assessment of the Corrective Action Program that evaluated the effectiveness of the implementation of the Corrective Action Program. Determine if the audits/reviews were comprehensive and whether effective actions were taken to correct problems or weaknesses identified.
b. Evaluate the effectiveness of self-assessment capability by reviewing corrective actions associated with at least ten of the following: self-assessment reports, audits/reviews (including audits/reviews of both onsite and offsite safety committee activities), and evaluations conducted on the implementation of the Corrective Action Program since the 2004 Independent Assessment. Evaluate the significance of a sample of at least five other self-assessment findings to determine the effectiveness of the self-assessment effort.

c. Determine if the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is aggressive in correcting self-assessment findings on the implementation of the Corrective Action Program by determining whether the corrective actions are adequate, timely, properly prioritized, and that effectiveness reviews are ensuring the desired results.

d. Interview at least four selected individuals involved with the oversight function, as well as the audited organization, to gain their insight on the effectiveness of their effort and the responsiveness of FENOC management and staff to issues raised.

Onsite and Offsite Safety Review Committee Activities

The Assessment Team will evaluate the effectiveness of the safety review committees' oversight of the implementation of the Corrective Action Program by reviewing committee minutes, audits/reviews, or other actions initiated by the committees as they relate to risk significance, or major corrective action successes or failures. The Assessment Team will review the following as necessary:

a. Identify what issues are reviewed by the safety review committees and review at least five actions initiated by the safety committees to identify, assess, and correct areas of weakness.
b. Review audits/reviews of the Corrective Action Program conducted within the last twelve months under the cognizance of the offsite safety review committee and determine if the audit/review findings were consistent with such external assessments as INPO, NRC and consultants.
c. Evaluate the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's follow-up to ten items on the Corrective Action Program identified by the safety review committees, including committee-initiated audit/review findings and any recurring problems.

Other Assessments

The Assessment Team will evaluate the effectiveness of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station's self-assessment activities associated with at least two other Corrective Action Program performance areas. Based on the observations and findings of the assessment of the implementation of the Corrective Action Program, the Assessment Team may select assessments of other performance areas for review and evaluation.

8. Evaluate any open corrective actions taken in response to the NRC Special Team Inspection - Corrective Action Program Implementation - Report 05000346/2003010

The Assessment Team will conduct an evaluation of the open corrective actions proposed in response to the NRC Special Team Inspection - Corrective Action Program Implementation - Report 05000346/2003010.

INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM (Biographies attached):

- Marquis Orr, ATL, Team Leader
- Charles Willbanks, ATL
- Jon Johnson, ATL
- James O'Neill, Quad Cities Corrective Action Program Manager
- Joseph Reynolds, Indian Point Corrective Action and Assessments Supervisor
- Bruce Terrell, Diablo Canyon Corrective Action Program Supervisor

SCHEDULE:

- June 1, 2005, send selected documentation to team members to begin off-site preparations.
- June 1, 2005 to July 10, 2005, offsite (in office) review in preparation for onsite assessment.
- July 10, 2005, assessment team will assemble at the plant for final assessment preparations.
- July 11 - July 22, 2005, conduct onsite portion of assessment and provide Davis Besse with preliminary results in a debrief prior to leaving site.
- August 5, 2005, draft team assessment report and final debrief (marks the completion of the assessment) will be provided to Davis-Besse.
- August 12, 2005, Final Davis-Besse assessment report will be provided to Davis-Besse.
- Final Davis-Besse assessment report and action plans (if required by findings) will be submitted to the NRC within 45 days of the completion of the assessment.

ASSESSMENT METHODS:

The Independent Assessment Team will use an approach similar to the NRC Inspection Procedure 40500, "Effectiveness Of Licensee Process To Identify, Resolve, And Prevent Problems", and NOBP-LP-2001 "FENOC Focused Self-Assessment" to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of the Corrective Action Program.

The assessment methodology may include, but is not limited to, any combination of the following:

- Observing activities.
- Interviewing personnel.
- Reviewing documentation.
- Evaluating or performing trend analysis.
- Reviewing procedures, instructions, and programs.
- Comparing actual performance levels with pre-established performance indicators.

The following general standards of acceptable corrective actions will apply to the Assessment of Davis-Besse Corrective Action Program implementation:

- The problem is identified in a timely manner commensurate with its significance and ease of discovery.
- Identification of the problem is accurate and complete, and includes consideration of the generic implications and possible previous occurrences.
- The problem is properly prioritized for resolution commensurate with its safety significance.
- The root causes of the problem are identified and corrective actions are appropriately focused to address the causes and to prevent recurrence of the problem.
- Corrective actions are completed in a timely manner.

The assessment team will review the referenced procedure/documents during the Preparation Period prior to site arrival.

The Assessment Team will identify, as applicable, areas of strength, areas in need of attention, and areas for improvements as defined in Davis-Besse Business Practice DBBP-VP-0009, "Management Plan for Confirmatory Order Independent Assessments." The Team will provide an overall concluding statement on the effectiveness of the Corrective Action Program implementation using the rating categories of DBBP-VP-0009.

REFERENCES:

NRC Inspection Procedure 40500, "Effectiveness of Licensee Process To Identify, Resolve, and Prevent Problems"
NOP-LP-2001, "Condition Report Process"
NOBP-LP-2001, "FENOC Focused Self Assessment"
NOBP-LP-2007, "Effectiveness Reviews"
NOBP-LP-2008, "Corrective Action Review Board"
Davis-Besse Business Practice DBBP-VP-0009, "Management Plan for Confirmatory Order Independent Assessments"
Condition Reports and CR trend reports, June 1, 2004, through July 2005
Past NRC inspection reports (CATI, RRATI, M&HP) that are applicable to the area assessed
Past applicable Self-Assessments
QA quarterly assessments for past four quarters
Related Operating Experience (past two years)
CNRB meeting minutes from last four CNRB intervals
Field Observation reports
Applicable Section or area Performance Indicators
Previous Independent Assessment Reports and Action Plans (subsequent to first annual assessments)

ASSESSMENT PLAN APPROVALS:

Prepared by: Marquis P. Orr Date: 6/29/2005
Marquis P. Orr, Assessment Team Lead

Approved by: Lori J. Strauss Date: 6/29/05
Lori J. Strauss, Project Manager

Approved by: Jeannie M. Rinckel Date: 6-30-05
Jeannie M. Rinckel, Executive Sponsor

Docket Number 50-346
License Number NPF-3
Serial Number 1-1426
Attachment 3

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Independent Corrective Action Program
Implementation Assessment, Revision 1

Assessors and Qualifications

(6 pages to follow)

Marquis P. Orr
Senior Program Manager
ATL International, Inc.

- 2000 - Present: *Advanced Technologies and Laboratories International, Inc. (ATL)*, Team member and project manager for performance assessments and site evaluations at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) facilities. Supported development of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety analysis reports (SAR) and environmental impact statements (EIS) for license renewal applications. Responsible for development of draft regulatory guides and standard review plans to assist NRC staff with review of license renewal applications.
- 1992 - 2000: *Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)*, Joined SAIC to assist DOE with program development for inspection, decontamination, decommissioning, and disposal of obsolete and formerly utilized nuclear weapons buildings and facilities. Assisted DOE Headquarters with the development of intra-departmental administrative procedures to standardized activities for construction project reporting between DOE headquarters, field offices, and laboratories. Reviewed technical scope, approach, and budget of Armenian nuclear power plant in Yerevan, Armenia for US-AID and the World Bank as part of loan request verification. Evaluated impact of existing and proposed Federal regulations on radioactive and hazardous waste disposal facility being built for U.S. DOE in Hanford, Washington. Managed cost-benefit evaluation of decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) options for U.S. Army disposal of shut down nuclear power plants. Developed cost and performance guidelines for Quality Assurance (QA) and In-Service Inspection (ISI) and chemical decontamination program and procedures at Lucent Technologies.
- 1983 - 1992: *Duquesne Light Company, Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station*, Served as Site Maintenance Support Coordinator for dual unit commercial nuclear power plant. Responsible for Supervised maintenance engineers and technicians supporting the Site Maintenance Department at a 2-unit nuclear power plant. Served as Maintenance Department representing to on-site safety review committee. Responsible for review and analysis of proposed plant activities to verify compliance with NRC license requirements and safety regulations. Lead investigator for accident and equipment performance failures. Investigated accidents and occurrences for safety and root cause of failure. Performed off-site assessments of maintenance and repair parts manufacturing facilities for capabilities and compliance with NRC and ANI-QA requirements.
- 1985 - 1992: *Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation*, Served as Corporate Mechanical Engineer responsible for environmental compliance audits, installation of major plant upgrades, and the design and implementation of new environmental remediation programs for rolling mills, continuous casting facilities, and foundries. Member of engineering team charged with upgrading the company's 80-inch hot strip mill. Worked with plant performance improvement team as Pollution Control Engineer. Responsible for the design, development, and installation of pollution abatement and performance enhancement projects at various steel manufacturing facilities and processing plants. In charge of the design and installation of various air, water, and soil pollution control projects at coke and steel processing plants.

Charles R. Willbanks
Director, Nuclear Services
ATL International, Inc.

- 2004 - present; *ATL International, Inc.*: Director, Nuclear Services - Develops and manages business opportunities. Team member of Beaver Valley Corrective Action Program (CAP) Assessment. Report developer for Nuclear Energy Plant Optimization (NEPO) status update.
- 1996-2004; *Scientech, Inc.*: General Manager, Staff Augmentation and Technical Services - provided professional engineering and technical personnel to nuclear utilities including Davis-Besse, Perry and Beaver Valley. Project Manager, License Renewal Application (LRA) and Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) report regulatory analysis. Project Manager for developing personnel database software. Director for Annual Procedures Symposium.
- 1980-1996; *Halliburton NUS Corporation:* General Manager, Staff Augmentation – provided engineering personnel to nuclear utilities and government entities. Regulatory Analyst for Maintenance Programs, Conduct of Operations and Training and Qualification of Personnel. Licensing Engineer for Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR). Report developer for study on Economic Competitiveness of Nuclear Power in the United States. Project Manager for public registration process for the New Production Reactor (NPR). Balance of Plant Test Engineer for HVAC and Water Treatment Systems at River Bend. Project Engineer for Post Accident System at North Anna.
- 1978-1980; *General Electric Company*: System Test Supervisor for Water Treatment Systems at Fermi.
- 1973-1978; *Georgia Power Company*: Preoperational Test Supervisor for Nuclear Steam Supply Systems as Hatch 1 and 2.

Jon R. Johnson
Senior Executive Consultant
ATL International, Inc.

- 2003-Present: Senior Executive Consultant-Nuclear Safety - Chair of Executive Assessment Board for DOE M&O spent fuel repository contractor. Member of Executive Team providing regulatory advice and licensing guidance for a geological repository for the Department of Energy. Member of Off-Site Safety Committee for major US nuclear utility providing advice on all aspects of operations and maintenance. Advise national and international nuclear utility and governmental managers regarding safety and regulatory policies for risk-informed licensing approaches and inspection techniques for existing reactors license renewal, and advanced reactor designs. Principle expert speaker at utility manager and regulatory agency workshops for the IAEA.
- 1978-2003: Senior Executive, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-assisted the Director in managing a staff of 600 highly skilled personnel in the licensing, inspection, assessment, event response, and rulemaking activities at all nuclear reactor facilities in the US. Responsibilities included certification and licensing of advanced reactors and renewal of power reactor operating licenses.
- Joined the NRC in 1978 as a Reactor Inspector and held progressively more responsible supervisory positions including Senior Resident Inspector and Branch Chief in Philadelphia and Director of Reactor Projects and Deputy Regional Administrator in the Atlanta office. Responsible for assessment, enforcement, and emergency response. Qualified in boiling and pressurized water reactor technologies, nuclear criticality controls for nuclear fuel facilities, and root cause analyses.
- 1970-1978: Nuclear Trained Officer, United States Navy - Reactor Mechanical Assistant on nuclear powered ship in charge of dual-reactor operations and assessment of nuclear mechanical systems, chemistry and radiological control programs. As Director, Reactor Principles, supervised 15 instructors and 800 students in course of instruction for the application of nuclear physics to a nuclear power plant. Directly supervised and operated reactors at sea and during a refueling overhaul.

James P. "Pat" O'Neil
Corrective Action Program Manager
Exelon Nuclear

- 2001 - present; *Exelon:* Corrective Action Program (CAP) Manager - Coordinates Site Corrective Action Program including: Departmental CAP Coordinators, Root Cause Investigators, and Site Coding and Trending. Develops and implements CAP Improvement Plans and Procedure and acts as Root Cause Subject Matter Expert (SME). Team Lead for four Problem Identification and Resolution (PI & R) inspections and participated in Kewaunee INPO Evaluation & Accreditation as a CAP peer.
- 1999-2001; *Exelon*; Root Cause Coordinator (CAP Analyst) - Facilitate Corrective Action Review Board (CARB), Review Root Cause and Apparent Cause packages, and SME Root Cause Analysis. Team Lead for PI & R Inspection. Corporate CAP Improvement Team Member.
- 1997-1999; *Entergy*: Senior Technical Specialist - Nuclear Safety & Regulatory (Licensing - Reportability / Licensee Event Reports / Inspection Support / presentation preparation). Areas of specialty within Licensing included Operations, Emergency Preparedness, and Corrective Action Program. Team Lead for three NRC 40500 CAP inspections. Non-departmental work included: Significant Event Response Team Root Cause Expert, Team Leader Stop-Think-Act-Review (STAR) Trainer, Team Leader Human Performance Team, Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) Representative, and Alternate Employee Concern Coordinator.
- 1996-1997; *Entergy*: Employee Concerns Coordinator - Investigation and disposition of sensitive confidential issues.
- 1994-1996; *Entergy*: In-House Events Analysis (IHEA) Root Cause Analysis SME Event Review, and CARB Package Review
- 1990-1994; *Entergy*: Operations Training Instructor - Developed and administered training including Fundamentals, Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Systems, General Systems, Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) and Initial License Operator. Supervised Licensed Operator Training Manual (LOTM) upgrade project, Operations Management Monitoring Team, and System Responsibility Program Development.
- 1987-1990; Various Nuclear Contract Outage Positions at seven plants while attending Graduate School for various utilities including CECO, Duke, PECO, and GPU and GSU including Radiation Protection, Instrument Calibration and Repair, and Training.
- 1978-1986; *U.S. Navy;* Nuclear Repair Facility (AD-38): Overseas assignment, Supervised Instrument Repair and Calibration Facility, Supervised Training Program, Managed (Senior enlisted) Nuclear Repair Facility. Reactor Operator USS Nathan Hale SSBN 623. Navy Training included: Boot Camp, Basic Electricity and Electronics (BE&E), Electronic Technicians School, six-month assignment teaching BE&E, Nuclear Power School, and S3G Prototype Training.

Joseph A. Reynolds
Supervisor Corrective Action and Assessments
Entergy Indian Point Energy Center

- 2002-present; *Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Indian Point Energy Center*: Corrective Action and Assessment Department Supervisor - Provide overall proactive management of the site corrective action process function including support for cause investigations, training of site personnel and assisting same in preparing stand alone quality condition report responses. Accountable for corrective action department budget monitoring, short-term and long term staffing, development, compensation, and related human resource needs for 5 assigned employees. Coordinated the integration of the CA&A Department processes and procedures at IPEC (organization changed from a two single unit sites, to one two unit site), and fostered continued standardization of procedures and processes throughout Entergy Nuclear (North and South) Fleet.
- 2000-2002; *Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Indian Point Energy Center*: Site Operating Experience Program Specialist - Accountable for the review, distribution, use and resolution of Industry Operating Experience to foster site process/program/systems performance improvement. Developed and performed training to site personnel in the use, value and access to industry operating experience databases. This included all work planning, supervisors and personnel who evaluate plant issues from all department (support and line) organizations. Actively participated in industry Operating Experience Conference meeting at Callaway Power Nuclear Power Plant and as a peer participant in a Learning Organization assessment at Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Plant.
- 1998-2000; *Consolidated Edison - Indian Point Station Unit 2*: Nuclear Mechanic Technician - Responsible for performing corrective and preventive maintenance repairs to plant electrical and mechanical components. Qualified in support activities (work permit holder, fire watch, confined space monitor, asbestos worker, radiological control worker, etc) as needed to support repair activities.

  1976-1998; *United States Navy - Nuclear Mechanical Operator*: Retired Nuclear Chief Machinist Mate - Managed all aspects of the operation and maintenance of all mechanical systems associated with Naval Nuclear Power Plants. Directly responsible for the development of 15 staff personnel including training, qualification, continued professional development and all human resource associated activities. During this period, assigned to key positions of increasing authority including instructor, recruiting, and public affairs positions associated with the operation and promotion of Naval Nuclear Power plants. Qualified as Shift Manager on three different Naval Nuclear Power plants.

Bruce E. Terrell
Corrective Action Program Supervisor
Diablo Canyon Power Plant

- 1999 - present; *Diablo Canyon*: Corrective Action Program (CAP) Supervising Engineer. Managing the Corrective Action Program. Defining implementation standards/processes and monitoring implementation/effectiveness. Overall responsibility for plant implementation of CAP, including problem identification, classification via daily screening team (member), cause analyses (root and apparent), Corrective Action Review Board (advisor), and resolution. Also supervise the plant Operating Experience and Trending programs.
- 1997-1999; *Diablo Canyon*: Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Supervising Engineer. Created and managed the plant's ECP to investigate employee concerns related to plant technical issues and harassment, intimidation, retaliation & discrimination (HIRD) issues. Reported results and recommendations directly to the Plant Manager, working closely with the NRC.
- 1986-1997; *Diablo Canyon*: Training Supervising Engineer. During this 11 year period, supervised all of the major INPO accredited training programs. The majority of this time was in the supervision of the Licensed Operator Requalification and Initial Operator Licensing programs. Primary oversight of the simulator training and examinations, classroom, and on-the-job (OJT) training. Supervised the Maintenance and Engineering programs during this tenure in Learning Services. Completed BS degree in Nuclear Technology during this time frame. Maintained an active SRO during this 11-year period passing all weekly and yearly examinations. Participated, as an industry peer evaluator, in three INPO Accreditation teams (*Wolf Creek, Pilgrim, and Turkey Point*).
- 1982-1986; *Diablo Canyon*: Operations Training Instructor. Taught classroom, simulator and OJT to licensed and non-licensed operators. Conducted simulator and classroom examinations. Completed, and maintained active, an NRC Senior Reactor Operator Instructor Certification.
- 1980-1982; *Diablo Canyon*: Plant Operator. Operated and monitored plant equipment both in the plant and in the control room.
- 1971-1979; *US Navy Submarine Service*: Completed all training and qualifications as a nuclear plant operator at the S1W prototype. Retained as an instructor after training was completed. Served aboard the USS Sam Rayburn (SSBN 635) qualifying on all (S5W power plant) watch stations up to, and including, supervisory positions in the propulsion plant engine room.