

Salem / Hope Creek Allegation Approach

1. Overall - Are Salem and Hope Creek unsafe to operate?

Based on current NRC understanding and activities, while regulatory concerns exist, there is currently no basis that Salem and Hope Creek should be shut down for being unsafe.


- A. NRC has been monitoring Salem and Hope Creek closely. There have been many issues identified in Salem and Hope Creek inspections and assessments; these issues indicate a need for improvement at the facility, but also indicate that the plants still have substantial safety margins. Salem Unit 1 is in Regulatory Response Column of the Action Matrix; Unit 2 and Hope Creek in the Licensee Response Column. Beginning in February 2003 and also in July 2003 ROP assessment meetings, NRC determined Salem and Hope Creek had substantive cross-cutting issues for PI&R.
- B. The NRC has four full time inspectors assigned to the site, two at Salem and two at Hope Creek. There has been a high level of inspections, including three special inspections over the last 12 months. Through the first 8 months of 2003, Salem has accumulated over 5200 hours of regional inspection and assessment, more than any other Region I site, and the combined Salem/HC total is over 8100 hours. (The average in Region I for dual unit sites is about 3900.)
- C. NRC Regional Senior Management has made three detailed site visits over the last 10 months to monitor the facility and interact with PSEG managers and staff, including the new CNO, Roy Anderson.
- D. NRC has closely evaluated PSEG actions during recent events, including readiness for a plant restart after shutdowns. Some issues have been identified, but PSEG follow-up has been acceptable overall. Although the allegations show considerable internal PSEG discussions existed, the appropriate actions appear to have been taken.
- E. Several key managers (CNO, site VP, Hope Creek plant manager, and Salem Ops Manager) are new to the site since March 2003. This provides an opportunity for improvement but no assurance or guarantee.

2. Management Attitudes - Is production favored over safety by senior managers?

Concerns

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions S, 7A, 7C
FOIA- 2004-314

N-71



Exempt

7A

Allegor-provided listing of 29 people aware of problems to varying degrees and possibly willing to corroborate issues and concerns.

Sound bites from taped discussions with senior managers

Approach

1. Interview managers who have left site [redacted] 7C
2. Interview some managers who the allegor believes can provide additional insights - allegor's list of 29 names.
3. SCWE - Is the PSEG staff able to raise safety issues?
 - March 17, 2003 at Hope Creek - [redacted] told allegor he did not have the authority to stop the evolution (reactivity excursion during the bypass valve shutdown?) even though he knew it was ill-conceived. 7C
 - Excessive use of temporary logs to monitor degraded equipment (NEOs can provide)
 - Comments (mostly negative) from ECP survey - 4Q 2002 & 1Q 2003

Approach -

October 2, 2003

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Exemption 5.
deliberative
process Page 3 of 3
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