

February 16, 1996

Branch

Mr. Bruce Kaiser
Vice President, Fuel Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering
3300 State Road P
Hematite, MO 63047

SUBJECT: ROUTINE SAFETY INSPECTION - ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING,
HEMATITE, MO (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 070-00036/96001(DNMS))

Dear Mr. Kaiser:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. J. M. Jacobson of this office from January 22 through January 24, 1996, at the Hematite facility. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with Mr. R. Sharkey and other members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations of activities in progress.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. Although the violation appeared to have met the criteria for a non-cited violation, the violation is nonetheless being cited because of the potential significance of the incident and the need to ensure like materials are identified and properly controlled to prevent a recurrence.

The report documents the results of your final status survey for the area of the site creek contaminated with sludge or silt from the sewage treatment plant. The results indicate that the area was successfully remediated to the levels identified in the survey plan submitted to Region III which was based on NUREG/CR-5849 criteria for license termination and site decommissioning. However, as identified in discussions with your staff and previous correspondence, the survey does not constitute a free release survey for that portion of your Hematite premises.

L-105

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addressed the required response. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.

The response directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1990, Public Law 96-511.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,
Original Signed By
Gary L. Shear, Chief
Fuel Cycle Branch

Docket No. 70-36
License No. SNM-33

Enclosure: Inspection Report
No. 070-00036/96001(DNMS)

cc w/encl: R. S. Siudek, President, ABB CE Nuclear Fuel
R. W. Sharkey, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
A. E. Scherer, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
C. B. Brinkman, Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations
J. F. Conant, Manager, Nuclear Materials Licensing
G. Page, Manager, Assembly Operations
H. E. Eskridge, Senior Consultant, Regulatory Compliance
R. A. Kucera, Missouri Department of Natural Resources

bcc w/encl: M. Tokar, NMSS
S. Soong, NMSS
PUBLIC (IE07)

DOCUMENT NAME: A:\COM96001.DNM

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box "C" - Copy without attach/encl "E" - Copy with attach/encl "N" - No copy

OFFICE	RIII	E	RIII	N				
NAME	Jacobson ^{gml} /cah		Shear	OLS				
DATE	02/15/96		02/16/96					

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Hematite, Missouri

License No. SNM-33
Docket No. 070-00036

During an NRC inspection conducted from January 22 through January 24, 1996, one violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600 (60 FR 34381; June 30, 1995), the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 70.42(a) and (b)(5) require, in part, that no licensee transfer special nuclear material except to a person authorized to receive such special nuclear material under the terms of a specific or general license issued by the Commission or Agreement State.

Contrary to the above, on or about December 7, 1995, the licensee transferred a conversion reactor fragment containing special nuclear material (uranium enriched in U-235) to a representative of St. Louis Testing Laboratories, a person who was not authorized to receive such special nuclear material under the terms of a specific or general license issued by the Commission or Agreement State.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VI).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2.201, ABB Combustion Engineering is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.

Dated at Lisle, Illinois
this 16th day of February 1996

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 070-00036/96001(DNMS)

Docket No. 070-00036

License No. SNM-33

Licensee: ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.
3300 State Road P
Hematite, MO 63047

Facility Name: Hematite Facility

Inspection At: Hematite, MO

Inspection Conducted: January 22-24, 1996

Inspector: John M. Jacobson
John M. Jacobson
Fuel Facilities Inspector

2/16/96
Date

Approved By: Gary L. Shear
Gary L. Shear, Chief
Fuel Cycle Branch

2/16/96
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection from January 22 through January 24, 1996 (Report No. 070-00036/96001(DNMS))

Areas Inspected: This was an unannounced, routine and reactive inspection to evaluate compliance with requirements specified in NRC regulations, the license and license conditions, including a review of the following activities: Operations Review (IP 88020), Radioactive Waste Management (88035, 84850), Environmental Protection (IP 88045), Radiation Protection (IP 83822, 88005), and Followup on Open Items (IP 92701, 92702).

Results: The plant was not operating, as a number of capital improvement projects were underway. Activities observed by the inspector during plant tours indicated that contractors, operators, and maintenance personnel were following radiation protection and nuclear criticality safety requirements. Likewise, the licensee's new radiation work permit program appeared to be implemented effectively for the workers involved in the construction projects. A leak in one of the sewage sludge hold tanks during the inspection resulted in the release of liquid to the site pond containing elevated levels of uranium which were nonetheless below the annual average concentration limits of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B. Expeditious processing of like materials in other storage tanks appeared to be warranted. The licensee had begun cleanup of the radioactive waste stored in the back yard of the pellet plant and had made an initial shipment of contaminated metals to a waste processor. The licensee completed the analyses of the soil and sediment samples taken to

support the remediation project to clean up contaminated sewage silts in the site creek. The licensee's survey results indicated that the criteria (based on NUREG/CR-5849) in the survey plan submitted to the NRC had been met. The inspector requested that the survey report be formally submitted to Region III. A review of an incident reported to Region III on December 11, 1995, indicated that a fragment of a former conversion reactor contaminated with special nuclear material had been transferred to a laboratory which was not authorized to receive such material. Although the amount of removable contamination on the fragment was negligible and there was no direct radiation hazard to laboratory personnel, the violation is being cited because of the potential significance of the incident and the need to ensure like materials are identified and properly controlled to prevent a recurrence.

Violation:

- (1) Transfer of reactor fragment contaminated with licensed special nuclear material to a laboratory not authorized to receive it, 10 CFR 70.42(a) and (b)(5). (Section 7, Radiation Protection)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *S. Borell, Manager, Ceramic Operations
- *E. Criddle, Health Physics Supervisor
- *M. Eastburn, Criticality Safety Specialist
- *H. Eskridge, Senior Consultant
- *R. Griscom, Facility Engineer
- *G. Page, Manager, Assembly Operations
- *E. Saito, Health Physicist
- *R. Sharkey, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

*Denotes attendance at the exit meeting held on January 24, 1996.

2. Licensed Program

Combustion Engineering's Hematite facility produces uranium dioxide (UO_2) fuel for the commercial nuclear power industry. Low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF_6), limited to a maximum of 5 weight percent U-235, is received from the United States Enrichment Corporation in 2.5-ton cylinders. The solid UF_6 is vaporized, then reacted with steam and hydrogen in heated fluid-bed reactors, which converts the UF_6 into UO_2 powder. The plant pelletizes the UO_2 powder, loads the pellets into fuel rods, and loads the rods into fuel assemblies for shipment to nuclear power plants.

3. Operations Review (IP 88020)

The licensee had ceased operating the conversion, pelletizing, and rod loading plants (except for fuel bundle inspections) and was in the process of upgrading a number of areas in the plant. The licensee was replacing the R-2 and R-3 reactors and associated thermal jackets. The licensee was also preparing to put in a clean room in the back of the oxide pellet plant. The old maintenance stores and laboratory areas were being cleared. The licensee planned to restart operations sometime during March 1996.

The inspector observed operators, contractors, and postings during plant tours for adherence to radiation work permits (RWPs) and postings. In addition, the inspector toured a trailer rented by the licensee for use as a temporary changeroom for contractors working on the capital improvement projects. A health physics (HP) tech was stationed at the trailer during changeout periods to ensure licensee dress-out and survey procedures were adhered to. The inspector did not identify any practices which did not conform to licensee procedures, and the contamination control requirements in Section 3.2.1 of the license application appeared to have been met for the rented trailer.

While the inspector was onsite, one of the licensee's sewer sludge hold tanks sprung a leak. The liquid from the tank, the contents of which had already been processed through the licensee's sewage treatment plant, initially drained into a nearby storm sewer until the licensee was able to divert it back into the sewage treatment aeration basin. The licensee took grab samples of runoff at the storm sewer outfall to determine the magnitude of uranium in the liquid released to the site pond. Three samples during and after the release yielded gross alpha results of between 1.3 and 2.0 x 10⁻⁷ microcuries per milliliter (uCi/ml) - below the annual average concentration limit of 3 x 10⁻⁷ uCi/ml for uranium in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B. Thus, although the levels were elevated, they were still below annual average release limits. The inspector questioned the licensee about the integrity of the remaining tanks and was told that the other tanks were newer than the tank that leaked. Visual inspection of the tanks did not identify any problems. The licensee agreed, however, that expeditious processing of the material in the other storage tanks was warranted.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Radioactive Waste Management (IP 88035, 84850)

The licensee had begun the process of disposing of the contaminated wastes stored in the back yard of the pellet plant. The inspector has continued to track the licensee's progress in this area under IFI 070-00036/95002-01. The licensee had segregated the wastes, placed and locked all the combustibles in trailers for storage before incineration, and begun shipping contaminated metals to a processor for decontamination. In addition, the inspector noted that the South Vault had been cleaned and a rope had been posted around the ammonia tanks to prevent combustibles being stored within 50 feet of the tanks. The licensee had also constructed and began operating a decontamination spray room for removing surface contamination. The inspector noted that progress had been made in cleaning up the area and improving the licensee's management of radioactive wastes, although a significant amount of the accumulated waste remained to be processed.

The licensee had made one shipment of contaminated metals since the inception of the cleanup project. The inspector reviewed the waste manifest. The waste manifest was completed in compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20 and 71.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Environmental Protection (IP 88045)

The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's final status survey conducted to demonstrate cleanup of the area of the site creek which was contaminated with sewage solids containing uranium. The remediation project was undertaken to ensure that the area, located outside the fence, was decontaminated to levels which would provide no health risks to members of the public. The licensee essentially conducted the survey

in conformance with the guidelines for decommissioning published in NUREG/CR-5849, "Manual for Conducting Radiological Surveys in Support of License Termination." However, the licensee agreed that this survey did not constitute a final release survey for this area of the site, and additional surveys will need to be performed at such time as the licensee decides to decommission the site. In addition, the inspector reviewed selected elements of the licensee's environmental monitoring program.

a. Site Creek Final Status Survey

As reported in Inspection Report 070-00036/95004(DNMS), the inspector observed the licensee's final status survey for the site creek remediation project conducted on October 17, 1995. In addition to observing the soil and sediment sampling, the inspector split nine samples with the licensee. The results of Region III's independent analysis of the samples were provided in the subject inspection report.

Prior to performing the survey, the licensee submitted a survey plan to the Region in which the licensee committed to remediating the area to an average concentration of 30 picocuries per gram (pCi/g) or less, with no individual sample exceeding 90 pCi/g (the basic criteria outlined in NUREG/CR-5849). The licensee took 49 samples inside and around the affected area and 5 samples from the creek on the other side of the railroad tracks. This area of the site creek was not expected to be affected because of the barrier to suspended solids presented by the raised sluice pipe underneath the tracks. The licensee contracted with an independent laboratory to analyze the samples using the kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA) method. The results (in micrograms uranium per gram [ug/g] of material) were multiplied by the plant historic average specific activity of 2.0 pCi/ug (essentially 4 percent enriched uranium) to obtain the concentration in pCi/g. Natural background of 2 pCi/g for the area was also subtracted.

The average for the 49 samples taken from the affected area was 18 pCi/g with a standard deviation of 18 pCi/g. The maximum individual sample was 85 pCi/g. All other samples were less than 62 pCi/g. The licensee did have one sample analyzed by the contract laboratory which indicated a concentration of 191 pCi/g. However, a second sample taken at the location yielded 2.5 pCi/g; an analysis of a fraction of the original sample retained onsite yielded 1.8 pCi/g; and, a reanalysis by the contract laboratory yielded 1.6 pCi/g. Thus, the 191-pCi/g result was discounted. It may have been caused by cross-contamination at the lab or a sample which was not fully homogenized. The upper 95% confidence level of the mean was 22 pCi/g which indicates that, based on the number of samples taken, there was a 95% chance that the average contamination remaining in the creek sediment and surrounding area was below 22 pCi/g. Samples taken 1 meter in from and 1 meter beyond the confluence of the site creek and the Joachim Creek at

the site boundary yielded 1.3 pCi/g and 1.0 pCi/g. These results indicated that none of the uranium contamination extended down to the Joachim Creek.

A comparison of the licensee's results and the NRC's results indicated general agreement for the split samples, with only one result being significantly different. The comparison involved two different analysis methods - KPA and gamma spectrometry - and different assumptions - NRC counted the 185-keV gamma ray for U-235 and assumed a correction factor of 23 (assuming approximately 5 weight percent enrichment) to account for the U-238 and U-234 specific activities. Also, the homogenization of these types of samples may not always be complete, and the Regional analysis did not account for background natural uranium in the soil. However, the results were comparable and indicated that the licensee's results were reasonable. A tabulated comparison is provided below. In addition, the licensee's quality control program consisting of spiked, blank, and duplicate samples indicated the laboratory performed the analyses satisfactorily.

Comparison of NRC and ABB Combustion Engineering (CE) Survey Results		
Sample Location	CE Results (pCi/g)	NRC Results (pCi/g)
A-51	13 +/- 2	14 +/- 2
B-1	8.8 +/- 1.6	42 +/- 4
B-21	21 +/- 3	25 +/- 3
B-36	20 +/- 3	19 +/- 2
B-51	44 +/- 6	47 +/- 5
C-8	51 +/- 7	70 +/- 7
C-13	41 +/- 6	56 +/- 6
D-21	17 +/- 2	12 +/- 2
E-8	7.4 +/- 1.4	14 +/- 3
1 m out from Confluence of Site Creek and Joachim Creek	1.3 +/- 0.2	4 +/- 1

Based upon the review of the NRC's and licensee's results, the inspector concluded that the licensee had met the commitments in the final status survey plan and had remediated the creek to acceptable levels. The inspector followup item (IFI 070-00036/95002-02) opened to track the licensee's remediation project is thus considered closed.

b. Routine Environmental Sampling Results

The inspector reviewed the 1995 sampling results for the licensee's environmental air sampling and liquid effluent sampling for compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 and license requirements. The licensee maintained the environmental sampling program outlined in Chapter 5 of the license application.

The air sampling program consisted of 3 air sampling stations located outside the fence line on the licensee's property which were run continuously. Particulate filters were analyzed weekly for uranium. The annual average concentrations for all 3 samplers were less than 5×10^{-15} microcuries per milliliter (uCi/ml) which is 10% of the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B limit for Class Y U-234, the most restrictive isotope.

The inspector also reviewed the 1995 sampling results for the sewage treatment outfall, the storm drain runoff outfall, and the site dam overflow. The two outfalls were sampled weekly with grab samples. The storm drain outfall fed into the site pond, and the overflow from the pond was sampled continuously with a composite sampler. The composite sample was analyzed weekly. The maximum sampling result for uranium was 2.2×10^{-7} uCi/ml, while the annual average concentrations were all below 5×10^{-8} uCi/ml. The Appendix B limit for uranium in liquid effluents to unrestricted areas is 3×10^{-7} uCi/ml.

In summary, the licensee's final status survey of the site creek indicated that the area had been remediated to the level identified in the survey plan based upon NUREG-5849. The licensee continued the routine environmental air and sampling program for the areas identified as outlined in the license application. No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Radiation Protection (IP 83822, 88005)

The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding an incident reported to NRC on December 11, 1995, regarding contaminated items transported offsite, one of which was transferred to a non-destructive analysis laboratory which did not have a license to receive special nuclear material (SNM). The inspector also reviewed selected elements of the licensee's health physics (HP) program for compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements and the license commitments contained in Chapter 3 of the renewal application.

a. Control of Contaminated Items

The inspector followed up on a phone call made to the Region on December 11, 1995, by the licensee regarding the removal of two fragments of a former oxide conversion reactor from the plant site. The fragments, approximately 0.5 inches by 0.25 inches by

4 inches, were cut from a reactor which had been used in the process over a period of years. Sometime in the mid 1980s, a number of pieces were apparently released from the licensee's contamination control area pursuant to the release procedures then in existence. They were stored in desk drawers in the plant engineering offices which are located outside the controlled area. They were not labelled as radioactive material because they apparently met the free release criteria in effect at the time. On or about December 7, 1995, a series of meetings occurred which involved engineers and technicians from Hematite, the corporate office in Windsor, Connecticut, and a representative from St. Louis Testing Laboratories to discuss modifications and material testing for the licensee's planned replacement of its R-2 and R-3 conversion reactors. As part of the discussions, the facility manager recalled there were pieces of a former reactor available and handed them over to the engineers involved as examples. He was not aware that the pieces were to leave the site. Subsequent to these meetings, a Windsor engineer and a representative from the laboratory brought pieces to Windsor and St. Louis for tests. The root cause of the incident appeared to be that the individuals involved were not aware or did not realize that they had potentially contaminated materials.

The piece that arrived at Windsor underwent some grinding before one of the engineers involved became concerned that these items might be contaminated and notified the Health Physics (HP) Department. Once HP was notified, a call was placed to Windsor and the HP supervisor was dispatched to the laboratory. Surveys at Windsor identified negligible removable contamination (less than 100 disintegrations per minute) on the grinding wheel, and personnel surveys did not identify any skin contamination. Surveys of the laboratory offices did not identify any loose contamination. The metal fragments themselves had negligible removable contamination which is the primary mode of exposure for uranium contamination: the piece sent to St. Louis had 119 dpm/cm² removable alpha and 95 dpm/cm² removable beta. (The free release criteria are 1,000 dpm/cm² removable alpha for uranium and its associated decay products.) However, the fragments did have significant amounts of fixed contamination - approximately 7700 dpm/cm² alpha and 85,000 dpm/cm² beta - which were above the current release total contamination criteria. Moreover, St. Louis Testing did not possess a license for special nuclear material and was not authorized to receive materials contaminated with enriched uranium, although it did possess a license to receive byproduct material.

The HP supervisor took possession of the metal fragment in St. Louis and returned it to Hematite where it was subsequently labelled, placed into a plastic bag, and controlled as radioactive material. Windsor HP personnel recovered the other fragment and were able to secure it without sending it back to Hematite, since Windsor is authorized to possess SNM. The HP department performed

a survey of the engineering offices and held discussions with engineers to identify any other items of this nature and discovered three more which were then bagged and labelled. Training was provided to the engineers and staff in the area concerning the need to contact HP if there is any question about whether or not material is contaminated and should be released.

10 CFR 70.42(a) and (b)(5) require, in part, that no licensee transfer special nuclear material except to a person authorized to receive such special nuclear material under the terms of a specific or general license issued by the Commission or Agreement State. The transfer of a fragment of a former oxide conversion reactor containing levels of fixed contamination of enriched uranium above current release limits is considered a violation. Although the licensee identified and promptly corrected the inadvertent transfer, the violation is nonetheless being cited because of the potential significance of the incident and the need to ensure like materials are identified and properly controlled to prevent a recurrence. (VIO No. 070-00036/96001-01)

b. Radiation Work Permits

The inspector reviewed the licensee's recently implemented radiation work permit (RWP) program. Previously, control of non-routine jobs involving radioactive material had been accomplished by special evaluation travelers (SETs). To improve communication and job control, the licensee developed an RWP program to communicate the radioactive and industrial hazards, the personnel protective equipment (PPE) requirements, pre-job survey results, and level of HP control required for workers and contractors performing non-routine activities. The permits were being issued on a monthly basis and controlled in accordance with HP Procedure 330, Revision 0, "Radiation Work Permits." Workers were required to read and sign that they understood the requirements of an RWP before beginning work or entering an area controlled by an RWP. The inspector noted that the clarity of some of the RWP PPE requirements could be improved, but did not identify any individuals not complying with RWP requirements during tours of the facility. In general, the new RWP program appeared to be an improvement in controlling non-routine work at the facility.

c. Respiratory Protection

The inspector reviewed the training, medical certifications, and fit testing results for contractors required to wear respirators pursuant to an RWP for scrubbing the floor of the area of the pellet plant in which the licensee was installing a clean room. The contractors were in respirators because of the significant potential for generating airborne uranium for this operation which involves removing a layer of concrete floor with pressurized metal shot. The inspector noted that the licensee had a medical certification by a physician and fit test results on file for the

individuals involved. In addition, each individual had passed an exam documenting completion of training for appropriate use of respirators. Based upon the review, the inspector concluded that the licensee was controlling contractors using respirators in capital improvement projects in compliance with license and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements for a respiratory protection program.

One violation involving transfer of special nuclear material to an unauthorized recipient was identified. The violation is being cited because of the potential significance of the incident and the need to ensure like materials are identified and properly controlled to prevent a recurrence.

7. Followup on Open Items (IP 92701, 92702)

(CLOSED) Violation No. 070-00036/95004-01. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for this violation which was issued because areas identified with contamination above licensee action levels were not decontaminated within the timelines specified by HP Procedure 307. In a response to a letter to the Region dated December 11, 1995, the licensee indicated that a cleaning log had been established to track the status of deconning areas above action levels. The inspector reviewed the entries for December 1995 and January 1996 for the "HIGH SMEAR CLEANING LOG." The log had a unique identification number for each smear above limits, the area involved, the responsible foreman's name and initials for receipt, the date and time the results were provided to the foreman, and the date and time the area was cleaned and cleared by HP after a followup survey. If an area was not cleaned within the established timeframe, it was quarantined and posted, and an Exception Report was submitted to management for followup. Only one such report had to be written for the two months of surveys (approximately 60) reviewed. Based upon this review, the inspector considered that the licensee had met the commitments made in the response letter and considered the violation closed.

(CLOSED) IFI No. 070-00036/94003-02. This IFI was opened to follow the licensee's progress in tracking the items identified in quarterly inspections and the annual HP and criticality safety audits to closure. The inspector noted that the Regulatory Compliance Manager was receiving written responses from the plant managers assigned to the various items identified during the quarterly inspections. These written responses detailed the corrective actions taken. In addition, the inspector noted that the health physicist and criticality safety specialist had responded in writing to the findings, recommendations, and observations made in the last annual audit. The Regulatory Compliance Manager has developed a commitment tracking system for tracking such

open items through to closure. Based on this review, the licensee appeared to be tracking items identified in inspections and audits through to closure, with written documentation of corrective actions. The inspector thus considered the IFI closed.

8. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with the individuals denoted in Section 1 of this report at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on January 24, 1996. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection and indicated that a potential violation of 10 CFR 70.42 had occurred. The inspector also requested that the licensee make a formal submittal of the results of its final status survey for the site creek to the Region.

The licensee did not identify any of the information discussed at the exit meeting as proprietary.

IFS Data Entry Form

Reviewed By: Taryn S. Shick
Date: 7/16/96

Reactor/Vendor Inspection (IFS Option 1) _____ Docket Related/P21 Items (IFS Option 4) _____
Items Opened (Y/N): _____
 Material Inspection (IFS Option 2) _____ LER Items (IFS Option 5) _____
SR: (Y/N): Y
Letter (Y/N): Y
Clear (Y/N): N Non-Docket Related Items (IFS Option 6) _____

Site/Name: AAB Combustion Engineering
Report Transmittal Date: 02/16/96 Hemansote, MO

Lead Inspector: 570 Responsible Org. Code: 3999 Report End Date: 1/24/96 Region: 3

	Report NBR	Docket NBR	Materials Only License NBR	*Docket Name
A	<u>96001</u>	<u>070-00036</u>	<u>SNM-33</u>	
B				
C				

Update? (Y/N): N Opened IR/LER/P21 LOG/IFS Number: _____

***Sequence NBR: 01 Item Type: V10 **Severity: 4 **Supplement: 6

Status	*UPD I/R	*Proj. Closeout	*Actual Closeout	10 CFR	Materials Only License Cond.	Tie Down
A	<u>Open</u>	<u>12/31/96</u>	<u>1/1</u>	<u>70.24</u>		
B		<u>1/1</u>	<u>1/1</u>			
C		<u>1/1</u>	<u>1/1</u>			

Title: Transfer of contaminated item to unauthorized recipient (55 character width)
*Closeout Org: _____ *Closeout EMP: _____ *Contact EMP: _____ *Procedure: _____ *Functl Area: _____
*Cause CD: _____ **EA Number: _____ **NOV/NNC Issue Date: 1/1

Text: The licensee inadvertently transferred a fragment of a conversion reactor contaminated with uranium to a lab which was not authorized to receive special nuclear material.

Update? (Y/N): Y Opened IR/LER/P21 LOG/IFS Number: 95002

***Sequence NBR: 02 Item Type: FPI **Severity: _____ **Supplement: _____

Status	*UPD I/R	*Proj. Closeout	*Actual Closeout	10 CFR	Materials Only License Cond.	Tie Down
A	<u>Closed</u>	<u>96001</u>	<u>1/24/96</u>			
B		<u>1/1</u>	<u>1/1</u>			
C		<u>1/1</u>	<u>1/1</u>			

Title: Site Creek Remediation Project (55 character width)
*Closeout Org: _____ *Closeout EMP: _____ *Contact EMP: _____ *Procedure: _____ *Functl Area: _____
*Cause CD: _____ **EA Number: _____ **NOV/NNC Issue Date: 1/1

Text: The licensee completed the survey documenting the contamination in the site creek from contaminated sludge had been cleaned to acceptable levels based on ~~the licensee's~~ licensee's survey plan.

- Optional Fields.
- ** Severity, Supplement, and NOV/NCC only applicable for Violations; EA Number only applicable for Apparent Violations.
- *** Sequence NBR is not applicable for docket related/P21, LER, or non-docket related items.

IFS Data Entry Form

Reviewed By: Stacy Shear

Date: 2/16/96

Reactor/Vendor Inspection (IFS Option 1) Docket Related/P21 Items (IFS Option 4)
 Material Inspection (IFS Option 2) LER Items (IFS Option 5)
 501 (Y/N): _____
 Letter (Y/N): _____
 Clear (Y/N): _____ Non-Docket Related Items (IFS Option 6)

Site Name: _____

Report Transmittal Date: 02/16/96

Lead Inspector: Responsible Org. Code:

Report End Date: / / Region: _____

Report NBR	Docket NBR
A _____	_____
B _____	_____
C _____	_____

Materials Only License NBR

*Docket Name

Update? (Y/N): Y Opened IR/LER/P21 LOG/IFS Number: 9500A

***Sequence NBR: 01 Item Type: VIO **Severity: 4 **Supplement: 6

Status	*UPD I/R	*Proj. Closeout	*Actual Closeout
A <u>closed</u>	<u>96001</u>	<u> / / </u>	<u>1/24/96</u>
B _____	_____	<u> / / </u>	<u> / / </u>
C _____	_____	<u> / / </u>	<u> / / </u>

10 CFR	Materials Only License Cond.	Tie Down
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Title: Failure to decontaminate areas above action levels (55 character width)

*Closeout Org: _____ *Closeout EMP: _____ *Contact EMP: _____ *Procedure: _____ *Functl Area: _____

*Cause CD: _____ **EA Number: _____ **NOV/NNC Issue Date: / /

Text: The licensee has implemented a new log for tracking areas of the plant identified as having loose contamination above action levels. Based on a review of 12/95-1/96 surveys the licensee has met the commitments identified in the NOV response for timely decontamination.

Update? (Y/N): Y Opened IR/LER/P21 LOG/IFS Number: 94003

***Sequence NBR: 02 Item Type: IFI **Severity: _____ **Supplement: _____

Status	*UPD I/R	*Proj. Closeout	*Actual Closeout
A <u>closed</u>	<u>96001</u>	<u> / / </u>	<u>1/24/96</u>
B _____	_____	<u> / / </u>	<u> / / </u>
C _____	_____	<u> / / </u>	<u> / / </u>

10 CFR	Materials Only License Cond.	Tie Down
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Title: Failure to track and document audit responses (55 character width)

*Closeout Org: _____ *Closeout EMP: _____ *Contact EMP: _____ *Procedure: _____ *Functl Area: _____

*Cause CD: _____ **EA Number: _____ **NOV/NNC Issue Date: / /

Text: The inspector noted that the licensee is now tracking items identified in quarterly inspections and annual audits through the closure. Written documentation of corrective actions was also provided for the latest audits and inspections.

Optional Fields.

** Severity, Supplement, and NOV/NCC only applicable for Violations; EA Number only applicable for Apparent Violations.

*** Sequence NBR is not applicable for docket related/P21, LER, or non-docket related items.

From: Philip Ting (PXT)
To: NCD2.TTR:HMS3:CH1:CH2(CAH3)
Date: Wednesday, February 14, 1996 7:31 am
Subject: Combustion Engr Report -Reply

Gary: I have no problem with the report. It is a good job.
Phil

Region III - RITS System
Inspection Report Tracking Subsystem (IRTS)
Data Input/Update Sheet

Instructions: Each record in this database is defined by the Docket Number and the Report Number combination. For each IRTS update, this specific data must be included. Please fill out all fields in **BOLD** that apply. Upon completion of this form, please forward it to the Resource Management Branch (RMB, DRMA), for data entry.

DOCKET/LIC NO. 070-00036 REPORT NO. 96001 INSP. TYPE R
-Regular
T-Team
S-SALP

DOCKET/LIC NO. _____ REPORT NO. _____

REGION: 3 RITS INITIALS: _____ MPS_ORG: _____

LEAD INSPECTOR'S NAME: J. M. Jacobson (DNMS)

INSP COMP DATE: 01 12 1996 REPORT DUE: 02 13 96
(Date Inspection Ended)

REPORT SENT: 02 16 1996 POSTED DUE: 1 1
(Date Inspection Report Mailed)

RESPONSE: Y (Y-YES, N-NO) RESPONSE DUE: 03 16 1996

STATUS: O (C-CLOSED, X-CANCELLED, _____ OPEN)

COMPLETED DATE: 1 1
(Date Licensee Response Received)

COMMENTS:

Form Filled Out By: C. Hausman Date: 02 16 1996 Rev 4-7-94/lS:RMB