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COMBUSTION ENGINEERING

September 4, 1986

W. L. Axelson, Chief
Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Rd
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Axelson:


License No. SNM-33
Docket No. 70-36

The enclosed report is submitted as requested by your letter dated August 7, 1986, concerning Inspection Report No. 70-36/86001.

Please advise if additional information is required.

Very truly yours,

COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.



H. E. Eskridge
Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing,
Safety and Accountability

/eg
Enclosure

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SEP 8 1986

NIS/86/4023
September 4, 1986

STATUS OF VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED
IN INSPECTION REPORT 70-36/86001

1. Tamper Safe Seal Program

- a. A Type E seal applied in a manner that would permit the container to be opened without destroying the seal was not previously identified during an NRC inspection. The size of the seal wire loops on some containers had raised this question, but testing showed that the containers could not be opened. Windsor auditors questioned the integrity of 4 containers which were missing one of the eyelets, through which seal wire is normally threaded, during the January inventory. These containers were remeasured as part of the inventory. All containers having the same type closure ring were inspected and defective rings were replaced. Operators have been instructed to not seal containers having defective closure rings.

Although this item involves Type E seals, it was previously unrecognized. We believe it should be classed as an item identified and corrected by the licensee.

- b. All personnel who apply seals have been reinstructed to keep issued seals in their physical possession at all times, and to return unused seals to their locked storage location or to their supervisor when a sealing assignment is completed.
- c. The door to the room containing the master seal log has been equipped with an automatic closing device and a lock that engages upon closing. This will ensure that the log is in a locked location under all conditions.

2. Security Guards Procedure

Our definition of "direct surveillance" of the front gate has been tightened to exclude surveillance by an employee working in front of the building or by a guard from the front lobby. All affected personnel have been advised of this change.

We are currently in full compliance on all the above items. They will continue to be routinely audited by the plant management to avoid further violations.