

Table 1: Radionuclides of Concern

Radionuclide	Quantity of Concern ¹ (TBq)	Quantity of Concern ² (Ci)
Am-241	0.6	16
Am-241/Be	0.6	16
Cf-252	0.2	5.4
Cm-244	0.5	14
Co-60	0.3	8.1
Cs-137	1	27
Gd-153	10	270
Ir-192	0.8	22
Pm-147	400	11,000
Pu-238	0.6	16
Pu-239/Be	0.6	16
Ra-226 ³	-----	-----
Se-75	2	54
Sr-90 (Y-90)	10	270
Tm-170	200	5,400
Yb-169	3	81
Combinations of radioactive materials listed above ⁴	See Footnote Below ⁵	

¹ The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same radionuclide should be included when the total activity exceeds the quantity of concern.

² The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The curie (Ci) values are rounded to one significant figure for informational purposes only.

³ Ra-226 0.4 TBq (10 Ci) is not regulated by the NRC, but has been included for consistency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct.

⁴ Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material.

⁵ If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, I of radionuclide, n , $A_{(i,n)}$, to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n , $Q_{(n)}$, listed for that radionuclide exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) ÷ (quantity of concern for radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) ÷ (quantity of concern for radionuclide B)] + etc..... ≥ 1

Use the following method to determine which sources of radioactive material require protective measures (PMs):

- Include any single source larger than the quantity of concern in Table 1
- Include multiple co-located sources of the same radionuclide when the combined quantity exceeds the quantity of concern
- For combinations of radionuclides, include multiple co-located sources of different radionuclides when the aggregate quantities satisfy the following unity rule: $[(\text{amount of radionuclide A}) \div (\text{quantity of concern of radionuclide A})] + [(\text{amount of radionuclide B}) \div (\text{quantity of concern of radionuclide B})] + \text{etc.} \dots \geq 1$

Guidance for Aggregation of Sources

NRC supports the use of the IAEA's source categorization methodology as defined in TECDOC-1344, "Categorization of Radioactive Sources," (July 2003) (see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1344_web.pdf) and as endorsed by the agency's Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, January 2004 (see <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-2004.pdf>). The Code defines a three-tiered source categorization scheme. Category 1 corresponds to the largest source strength (greater than 100 times the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1.) and Category 3, the smallest (equal or exceeding one-tenth the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1.). Increased controls apply to sources that are greater than the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1, plus aggregations of smaller sources that add up to greater than the quantities in Table 1. Aggregation only applies to sources that are co-located.

Licensees who possess sources in total quantities that exceed the Table 1 quantities are required to implement increased controls. Where there are many small (less than the quantity of concern values) co-located sources whose total aggregate activity exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are to implement increased controls.

Some source handling or storage activities may cover several buildings, or several locations within specific buildings. The question then becomes: When are sources considered co-located for purposes of aggregation? For purposes of the additional controls, sources are considered co-located if breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the sources. Sources behind an outer barrier should be aggregated separately from those behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked source safe inside the locked storage room). However, if both barriers are simultaneously open, then all sources within these two barriers are considered to be co-located. This logic should be continued for other barriers within or behind the inner barrier.

The following example illustrates the point: A lockable room has sources stored in it. Inside the lockable room, there are two shielded safes with additional sources in them. Inventories are as follows:

The room has the following sources outside the safes: Cf-252, 0.12 Tbq (0.3 Ci); Po-210, 0.36 TBq (10 Ci), and Pu-238, 0.3 Tbq (8 Ci). Application of the unity rule yields: $(0.012 \div 0.2) + (0.36 \div 0.6) + (0.3 \div 0.6) = 0.06 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.2$. Therefore, the sources would require increased controls. If the sources are distributed and shipped individually, PMs would not apply because they do not exceed the quantities in Table 1.

Shielded safe #1 has a 1.9 Tbq (51 Ci) Cs-137 source and a 0.75 Tbq (20 Ci) Ra-226 source. In this case, both sources would require increased controls, because they exceed the quantities in Table 1. The Ra-226 source, although not licensed by NRC, was co-located with an NRC licensed source and therefore would need to be similarly protected.

Shielded safe #2 has two Po-210 sources, each having an activity of 0.2 Tbq (5 Ci). In this case, neither source would require increased controls. (total activity = 0.4 Tbq (10 Ci). They do not exceed the threshold quantity 0.6 Tbq (20 Ci).

Because certain barriers may cease to exist during source handling operations (e.g., a storage location may be unlocked during periods of active source usage), licensees should, to the

extent practicable, consider two modes of source usage — “operations” (active source usage) and “shutdown” (source storage mode). Whichever mode results in the greatest inventory (considering barrier status) would require increased controls for each location.