

**From:** Marc Dapas *R111*  
**To:** Stacey L. Rosenberg *OEPO*  
**Date:** 9/2/03 8:25AM  
**Subject:** DPO Panel Report

Per your request last Friday, attached are the few comments I had regarding report inaccuracies. Please call me if you have any questions. Thanks.

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The following comments are provided regarding the accuracy of selected statements in the Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) panel report:

- (1) The second paragraph in the section entitled "Review" for "Issue 3" (on page 10) contains the statement, "The licensee addressed this issue [whether or not the special lifting devices for the Cask Transfer Facility and the Reactor Building Crane meet the requirements of ANSI Standard N14.6] relative to the lifting yoke in a letter (Ref. 33) that was sent to the NRC in response to an RAI (Ref. 11) that was initiated as a result of the same DPV."

This sentence is inaccurate in that the TIA was not initiated in response to the DPV, but rather it was initiated (as noted on page 5 of the subject DPO panel report) to request NRR review and comment on a proposed backfit (including the supporting regulatory analysis) that had been developed by Region III to address concerns regarding the seismic qualification of the Dresden Reactor Building superstructure and Unit 2/3 crane.

- (2) Minor comment: On page 14 of the subject report under the "Conclusion" section, the last sentence of the first paragraph states, "This conclusion has the same basic effect and is consistent with that contained in the TIA dated 2/21/03 and the DPV resolution dated 4/30/02." The statement should reference the TIA response which is dated 2/21/03 vice TIA.
- (3) On page 22 of the subject report in the "Conclusion" section, the first sentence states, "The DPO Panel concluded that the reactor building crane was qualified for lifting heavy loads of 110 tons including lifting devices." While this statement is offered as a conclusion of the DPO panel, the crane is in fact qualified to 110 tons as a **single-failure-proof crane**. This is noted on page 21 of the report in the last sentence of the first paragraph under the "Review" section. The rated capacity of the crane is 125 tons, meaning the licensee can use the crane to lift loads up to 125 tons. The licensee, however, cannot use the crane to lift loads between 110 and 125 tons if the load path would result in the load traversing over equipment that is required for an operating unit to reach and maintain safe-shutdown. If the load is equal to or less than 110 tons, then the licensee does not have to restrict the load path (other than to ensure that interaction coefficients do not exceed 1.0) since a load drop is not considered a credible event given the single-failure-proof pedigree of the crane. Suggest that the subject statement be re-worded to state, "The DPO Panel concluded that the reactor building crane is qualified as a **single-failure-proof crane** for lifting heavy loads of 110 tons including lifting devices."
- (4) On page 22 of the subject report in the "Conclusion" section, the last sentence states, "The licensee was outside the licensing basis when loads were lifted with an inoperable load cell [emphasis added]." This would imply

that the DPO panel verified that the licensee actually used the crane in the single-failure-proof mode while the load cell was inoperable. As noted in NRC Inspection Report 07200037/2001-002 (DNMS), dated August 13, 2001,

“The licensee lifted at least 68 fuel casks between 1976 and 1984. The inspectors did not identify, nor was the licensee able to provide, plant records to indicate the status of the load cell during that time frame. Consequently, it appears likely that the load cell and its associated overload protective feature were out-of-service, and therefore inoperable, during these heavy load lifts. This lack of digital load indication and associated overload protection reduced the effectiveness of the defense-in-depth design approach to ensuring the crane was not overloaded. This condition may have resulted in overloading the crane when the weight of a lifted load was determined via calculation instead of through direct measurement.”

Because the Region III inspectors were not able to actually verify, with specific times and dates, that the load cell was out-of-service when being used as a single-failure-proof crane (crane operating mode requiring an operable load cell), Region III could not issue a violation.

Unless the DPO panel has obtained specific information (dates and times) regarding the inoperability of the load cell when the crane was used in the single-failure-proof mode, Region III suggests that the subject sentence in the DPO panel report be changed to “If the licensee operated the crane in the single-failure-proof mode with an inoperable load cell, then the crane was operated outside its licensing basis.”

- (5) Minor comment: On page 24 of the report, the last sentence makes reference to “CFR installations”. Did the DPO panel intend to say “CTF installations”, meaning Cask Transfer Facility, rather than Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)?