

August 1, 2005

Mr. James A. Gresham, Manager
Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing
Westinghouse Electric Company
P.O. Box 355
Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0355

SUBJECT: DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION FOR TOPICAL REPORT (TR) WCAP-16259-P,
REVISION 0, "WESTINGHOUSE METHODOLOGY FOR APPLICATION OF 3-D
TRANSIENT NEUTRONICS TO NON-LOCA ACCIDENT ANALYSIS"
(TAC NO. MC3036)

Dear Mr. Gresham:

By letter dated April 29, 2004, and as supplemented by letters dated December 16, 2004, and March 22, 2005, Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse) submitted Topical Report (TR) WCAP-16259-P, Revision 0, "Westinghouse Methodology for Application of 3-D Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident] Accident Analysis," to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff for review. The TR presents the Westinghouse Electric Company methodology for the analysis of non-LOCA transients and accidents for pressurized-water reactors using a three-dimensional core kinetics model. The staff has concluded that use of the subject report as part of the Westinghouse design code system is acceptable. Enclosed for Westinghouse review and comment is a copy of the NRC staff's draft safety evaluation (SE) for the TR.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390, we have determined that the enclosed draft SE does not contain proprietary information. However, we will delay placing the draft SE in the public document room for a period of 10 working days from the date of this letter to provide you with the opportunity to comment on the proprietary aspects. If you believe that any information in the enclosure is proprietary, please identify such information line-by-line and define the basis pursuant to the criteria of 10 CFR 2.390. After 10 working days, the draft SE will be made publicly available, and an additional 10 working days are provided to you to comment on any factual errors or clarity concerns contained in the draft SE. The final SE will be issued after making any necessary changes and will be made publicly available. The staff's disposition of your comments on the draft SE will be discussed in the final SE.

To facilitate the staff's review of your comments, please provide a marked-up copy of the draft SE showing proposed changes and provide a summary table of the proposed changes.

J. Gresham

-2-

If you have any questions, please contact Brian Benney at 301-415-3764.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Project No. 700

Enclosure: Draft Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl:

Mr. Gordon Bischoff, Manager
Owners Group Program Management Office
Westinghouse Electric Company
P.O. Box 355
Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0355

J. Gresham

-2-

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***SE input**

NRR-043

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DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

TOPICAL REPORT WCAP-16259-P, REVISION 0,

“WESTINGHOUSE METHODOLOGY FOR APPLICATION OF 3-D TRANSIENT
NEUTRONICS TO NON-LOCA ACCIDENT ANALYSIS”

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY

PROJECT NO. 700

1 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
2

3 By letter dated April 29, 2004, and as supplemented by letters dated December 16, 2004, and
4 March 22, 2005, (References 1, 2, and 3) Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse)
5 submitted Topical Report WCAP-16259-P, “Westinghouse Methodology for Application of 3-D
6 [three-dimensional] Transient Neutronics to Non-LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident] Accident
7 Analysis,” to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for review and approval. The objective
8 of this report is to provide the information and data necessary to license WCAP-16259-P,
9 Revision 0, as a methodology for a complete nuclear design code system for core design,
10 safety and operational calculations. This report presents the Westinghouse Electric Company
11 developed methodology for the analysis of non-LOCA transients and accidents for pressurized-
12 water reactors (PWRs) using a 3-D core kinetics model.
13

14 2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
15

16 Part 50.34 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), “Contents of applications;
17 technical information,” requires that safety analysis reports be submitted that analyze the
18 design and performance of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of
19 accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. As part of the core reload
20 design process, licensees (or vendors) perform reload safety evaluations to ensure that their
21 safety analyses remain bounding for the design cycle. To confirm that the analyses remain
22 bounding, licensees confirm that key inputs to the safety analyses (such as neutronic and
23 thermal hydraulic parameters), are and will remain conservative with respect to the current
24 design cycle. If key safety analysis parameters are not bounded, a reanalysis or reevaluation of
25 the affected transients or accidents is performed to ensure that the applicable acceptance
26 criteria are satisfied.
27

28 The staff review was based on the evaluation of technical merit and compliance with all
29 applicable regulations associated with reviews of topical reports, including NUREG-0800
30 (Reference 4).

1 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

2
3 The objective of this report is to present the Westinghouse methodology for the application of
4 three-dimensional core neutron kinetics and thermal hydraulics to the analysis of non-LOCA
5 final safety analysis report (FSAR) transient and accident events. This methodology uses the
6 NRC-approved core neutron kinetics code SPNOVA (References 5 and 6) and the
7 NRC-approved core thermal-hydraulics code VIPRE-01 (VIPRE) (References 7 and 8), in
8 conjunction with the NRC-approved reactor coolant system (RCS) loop thermal/hydraulics code
9 RETRAN-02 (RETRAN) (References 9 and 10).

10
11 The codes are linked using an external communication interface. No changes were made to
12 the codes other than changes necessary to facilitate the data transfer between the codes. The
13 linkage of the codes documented herein is based on the NRC-approved linkage of the
14 SPNOVA and VIPRE codes for the analysis of control rod ejection accidents (Reference 11).
15 This report demonstrates that with the additional linkage to the RETRAN computer code, the
16 updated methodology allows for a more realistic, yet conservative non-LOCA analysis with
17 respect to the current licensing acceptance criteria. The independent code limitations and
18 uncertainties will continue to be applicable when the codes are linked using an external
19 communication interface. The same computer codes employed herein have been used in
20 licensing applications for many Westinghouse-designed 2-, 3- and 4-loop plants with various
21 fuel designs, and by Westinghouse for a Combustion Engineering (CE)-designed analog
22 protection system plant. The computer codes and method of data transfer between the codes
23 (the external communication interface) are applicable to any PWR for which a licensed
24 methodology is available for the base codes (i.e., SPNOVA, VIPRE, and RETRAN).

25
26 3.1 Overview of Computer Codes

27
28 The analysis of reactor system transients using a 3-D representation of the reactor core
29 requires that the nuclear calculations, the core thermal/hydraulic and fuel temperature
30 calculations, and the RCS calculations be performed in a linked manner in both the steady state
31 mode (for initialization) and the transient mode. The 3-D methodology utilizes computer
32 programs previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. The codes are: the SPNOVA
33 computer program for the neutron kinetics, the VIPRE computer program for the core thermal
34 hydraulics and fuel temperature calculation, and the RETRAN code for the reactor coolant
35 system response calculation. In addition, the VIPRE code is used in separate stand-alone
36 calculations for the hot rod departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) and for peak fuel/clad
37 temperature transient evaluation. These codes are described in more detail below. The data
38 transfer between the codes has been automated to prevent errors that could occur with hand
39 manipulation of data. All programming changes within the interface program were limited to
40 those needed to facilitate the data transfer and interface; no changes or additions have been
41 made to the NRC-approved models within the codes as a result of the updated 3-D core
42 transient methodology. The use of the 3-D SPNOVA and VIPRE codes, and the method of
43 data transfer, were reviewed and approved by the NRC for a severe rod ejection transient event
44 in WCAP-15806-P-A, (Reference 11). The methodology for using VIPRE with RETRAN to
45 provide input to SPNOVA for core reactivity and power calculations for other non-LOCA
46 transient and accident analyses has not been previously reviewed by the staff. In addition, the

1 use of VIPRE for peak fuel/clad post DNBR temperature transient evaluation has not been
2 previously reviewed by the staff. The staff's evaluations for these two new uses of VIPRE are
3 discussed in this safety evaluation report.
4

5 In performing the required analyses for reload cores, Westinghouse will use already approved
6 methodology (Reference 12), which provides for use of conservative code input so as to bound
7 the expected conditions for subsequent reloads. For each reload, the "bounding" safety
8 analysis input parameters are compared to the reload cycle's actual design values to ensure
9 that they remain bounding. If a reload parameter is not bounded by the value used in the safety
10 analysis, the impacted analyses are either re-analyzed or evaluated to ensure that the required
11 margin of safety is maintained for the analyses in question.
12

13 The RAVE methodology will be implemented in accordance with the Westinghouse Quality
14 Management System (QMS), which has been reviewed and approved by the NRC staff. The
15 QMS provides the basis for implementation of programs such as RAVE. Work instructions are
16 provided with detailed steps of the specific work activities. Westinghouse will maintain training
17 guidelines that assure only qualified analysts perform and verify the analyses being performed.
18

19 3.1.1 Use of SPNOVA in Westinghouse RAVE Methodology 20

21 The current Westinghouse standard core design methodology uses a 3-D nodal expansion
22 method for the static analysis of the cores. This methodology is approved and has been
23 incorporated into the NRC-approved SPNOVA computer program. The static neutronics
24 solution in SPNOVA is also consistent with the NRC-approved ANC computer program
25 (References 13, 14, 15, and 16).
26

27 The basic inputs used in the SPNOVA static nuclear model are the same cross-section sets,
28 burnup distributions, fuel rod, fuel assembly, control rod geometry, and other models used in
29 the nuclear design model for the specific plant reload cycle design.
30

31 A potential cycle history factor is utilized to account for the impact at beginning-of-cycle (BOC)
32 due to the previous cycle length. Since the safety analysis calculations may be performed prior
33 to the shutdown of the previous cycle, the BOC evaluations need to encompass the impact of
34 the potential variability of the previous cycle length.
35

36 The Westinghouse methodology, as presented in this submittal, will continue to use the reload
37 safety evaluation process. Through this process, the impact of the reload cycle can be
38 determined from static nuclear design calculations. The transient safety analysis calculations
39 are re-performed only if the evaluated results are outside of the space defined by previously
40 utilized key parameter limits and criteria. Key parameters for each accident are defined in
41 Chapter 3 of the April 29, 2004, (Reference 1) submittal. All key parameters were found to be
42 consistent with the key parameters identified in the current Westinghouse reload cycle
43 methodology presented in Reference 12. Computational methods of typical current static kinetic
44 parameters, such as Doppler, moderator feedback, delayed neutron fraction and trip reactivity
45 worth, that may affect the transient accident analysis, were also provided in the April 29, 2004,
46 submittal.

1 The SPNOVA computer code also includes a neutron kinetics capability. The time-dependent
2 solution is based on the stiffness confinement method which is designed to efficiently and
3 accurately solve the time dependent equations. This method modifies the static cross-sections
4 and utilizes the same flux solution module as the static calculations. Thus, improvements to the
5 static solution capabilities are directly utilized for the transient solution. The applicable
6 limitations and compliance associated with the use of SPNOVA for static and transient analyses
7 are contained in the conclusion of the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation (SE), (Reference 5).
8

9 Results of the staff's review of SPNOVA show that the kinetics benchmarking provided in
10 Reference 5, demonstrate that SPNOVA provides an accurate method for determining both the
11 core-wide and local power and flux response during core reactivity transients. In licensing
12 applications of SPNOVA, these conditions and limitations are required to ensure an acceptable
13 margin to the fuel safety limits and must be provided in plant-specific submittals. These
14 conditions and limitations apply to any application of SPNOVA within the context of the
15 methodology proposed in the April 29, 2004, submittal of topical report WCAP-16259-P and in
16 the supplements provided in response to NRC staff questions.
17

18 3.1.2 Use of RETRAN-02 in Westinghouse RAVE Methodology 19

20 RETRAN-02 is a flexible, general purpose, thermal/hydraulic computer code that is used to
21 evaluate the effect of various upset reactor conditions on the RCS. The code models the
22 reactor coolant as a single phase or as two equilibrium phases with the exception that a
23 non-equilibrium pressurizer component can be included. Conductive heat structures can be
24 described, including the fuel elements in the reactor core. Changes in reactor power from
25 neutron kinetics and decay heat considerations can be calculated to occur with time.
26

27 RETRAN-02 was developed by Energy, Incorporated, for the Electric Power Research Institute
28 (EPRI) and is similar to the RELAP4 thermal/hydraulic computer code developed by the NRC.
29 The first version, RETRAN-01, was released by EPRI in December 1978. The code was
30 subsequently improved to account for the slip between the phases, two-phase natural
31 convection heat transfer, improved numerics, and other improvements. The revised code as
32 described in reference 9, was submitted to the NRC for review as RETRAN-02. The NRC staff
33 completed review of RETRAN-01 Mod003 and RETRAN-02 Mod002 as described in
34 Reference 17. The countercurrent flow logic and the slip flow modeling were modified and a
35 new heat slab model was added to the non-equilibrium pressurizer in Mod003. A new control
36 rod model was added as an option to produce Mod004. These modifications were also
37 approved by the NRC staff (Reference 18). The 1979 ANS 5.1 decay heat model was added to
38 the code as Mod005. This version was also approved by the NRC staff (Reference 19). The
39 staff's generic approval of RETRAN-02 is subject to limitations defined in the SERs for the
40 various RETRAN-02 versions and in the technical evaluation reports (TERs) prepared by the
41 NRC staff's contractors. In addition, because of the large flexibility in user-supplied input
42 selection and choice of nodalization schemes, the NRC staff required that proposed
43 applications of RETRAN-02 be accompanied by a detailed review of the suitability of the code
44 for each specific application. These concerns were addressed by Westinghouse in
45 WCAP-14882-P-A (Reference 10) which contains the staff SER approving use of RETRAN-02
46 Mod005 by Westinghouse for analysis of non-LOCA transients and accidents in 2-, 3-, and

1 4-loop operating plants designed by Westinghouse. This is the version of RETRAN that
2 Westinghouse will use in the RAVE methodology. The transients and accidents for which
3 Westinghouse received NRC staff approval for use of the RETRAN methodology in
4 WCAP-14882-P-A are listed in Table 1.

5
6 **Table 1**
7 Non-LOCA Transients To Be Analyzed Using RETRAN

- 8
9 • Feedwater system malfunctions
10 • Excessive increase in steam flow
11 • Inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve
12 • Steamline break
13 • Loss of external load/turbine trip
14 • Loss of offsite power
15 • Loss of normal feedwater flow
16 • Feedwater line rupture
17 • Loss of forced reactor coolant flow
18 • Locked reactor coolant pump rotor/sheared shaft
19 • Control rod cluster withdrawal at power
20 • Dropped control rod cluster/dropped control bank
21 • Inadvertent increase in coolant inventory
22 • Inadvertent opening of a pressurizer relief or safety valve
23 • Steam generator tube rupture

24
25 In addition to the events listed above, the Westinghouse methods and codes have been
26 successfully applied to the analysis of asymmetric steam generator transients for CE-designed
27 plants. Westinghouse may utilize the RAVE coupled code methodology for the analyses of
28 CE-designed plants including asymmetric steam generator transients provided that all
29 applications of the codes within the RAVE methodology have been reviewed and approved by
30 the NRC staff. The conditions which the staff finds acceptable for application of the RAVE
31 methodology including CE designs are discussed in Section 4.0, "Conclusions," to this SER.
32

33 The calculational assumptions that Westinghouse will use with the RETRAN code to describe
34 currently operating nuclear plants were derived from the input models previously approved for
35 use with the LOFTRAN code (Reference 20). Models for currently operating Westinghouse 2-,
36 3-, and 4-loop plants are described (Reference 10). Westinghouse has developed a set of
37 "RETRAN Safety Analysis Standards" to govern the development of the input models and to
38 define the options to be used in application to specific plant transients. Westinghouse will
39 continue to utilize the approved RETRAN input with the RAVE methodology with the exception
40 of the core nodding and power calculation.

41
42 The principal difference between utilization of the RETRAN code as previously approved by the
43 NRC staff and its utilization in the RAVE methodology is in the calculation of core power and
44 the transfer of heat from the nuclear fuel to the coolant. When RETRAN was run separately,
45 core power was calculated using the RETRAN point kinetics model and heat generated in the
46 fuel was transferred through the cladding and into the coolant. In the RAVE methodology, core
47 power will be calculated by SPNOVA and heat transfer from the fuel through the cladding to the
48 coolant will be calculated by VIPRE. Heat flow from the fuel elements to the coolant as

1 calculated by VIPRE is a dynamic input to the RETRAN core fluid model. The RETRAN core
2 noding is increased from that of Reference 10 to facilitate this transfer. The NRC staff
3 determined that the core noding in the stand-alone RETRAN model was of sufficient detail.
4 The finer noding in the RETRAN model for RAVE is therefore also acceptable.
5

6 For analysis of main steam line breaks using the previous methodology, the iteration between
7 the point kinetics model in RETRAN and more sophisticated multidimensional neutron kinetics
8 computer codes was required. This is because, if the most reactive control rod is assumed to
9 be in a stuck-out position, skewed radial power profiles could be produced which cannot be
10 adequately addressed by the point kinetics model in RETRAN. With the previous methodology
11 the reactivity coefficients (moderation, boron, and power) were calculated separately and input
12 into RETRAN from a more sophisticated multidimensional neutronics compilation. Iteration was
13 performed until the total reactivity change during the accident was conservatively predicted by
14 RETRAN in comparison to the multidimensional neutronics code. Using this methodology,
15 conservative predictions of reactor power were obtained by the RETRAN code point kinetics
16 model. With the RAVE methodology, reactor power will be directly calculated using the
17 SPNOVA 3-dimensional neutronics computer code using core thermal/hydraulic information
18 from RETRAN and VIPRE so that this iterative procedure will no longer be necessary.
19

20 3.1.3 Use of VIPRE in Westinghouse RAVE Methodology

21
22 VIPRE is a subchannel thermal/hydraulic computer code that is typically used to describe the
23 reactor core of a nuclear power plant. The code requires that users enter the boundary
24 conditions describing the coolant entering the core, the power generation, and the dimensional
25 and material properties of the nuclear fuel. The boundary conditions for the coolant entering
26 the core include the inlet flow rate, enthalpy, and pressure or the pressure, inlet enthalpy, and
27 differential pressure from which the inlet flow rate can be derived. The core power generation
28 input includes spatial as well as temporal variations. The code input is versatile and flexible,
29 providing the user with numerous options. These include choices among correlations for heat
30 and mass transfer that are built into the code. Multiple channels can be described and cross
31 flow is calculated based on user supplied input.
32

33 VIPRE was developed by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories under the sponsorship of the
34 EPRI and submitted to the NRC for generic review (Reference 7). The staff's generic review as
35 discussed in our SER (Reference 21) was limited to PWR applications and to heat transfer
36 regimes up to the critical heat flux. The review included an audit calculation using the
37 COBRA-IV code (Reference 22) and the comparison of VIPRE results to experimental test
38 data. The review was stated to consist primarily of an evaluation of the internal program,
39 including the governing conservation equations and constitutive equations, including the two-
40 phase flow and heat transfer models and the numerical solution techniques. The staff required
41 each VIPRE user to submit documentation describing the proposed use for the code, other
42 computer codes with which it will interact, the source of each input variable, and the selected
43 correlations, including justification for using the selected correlations. In particular, it was
44 required that any new critical heat flux (CHF) correlations that are to be used within VIPRE be
45 evaluated against their experimental database to determine the appropriate DNBR safety limit.
46 In April 1997, Westinghouse submitted topical report WCAP-14545 describing use of VIPRE for
47 departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) analysis for those FSAR Chapter 15 transients and
48 accidents for which DNB might be of concern.

1 Use of VIPRE for this type of analysis replaced the THINC-IV (Reference 23) and FACTRAN
2 (Reference 24) codes, both of which were previously approved by the NRC staff. The
3 THINC-IV code performs thermal/hydraulic calculations within the fuel channels, including
4 DNBR evaluation at the fuel pin surface. For calculations in which transient heat conduction
5 within the fuel pins is important, this calculation is performed by FACTRAN. FACTRAN
6 describes the conductive heat transfer within the fuel pin interior and the convective heat
7 transfer at the surface. Iteration may be required between the two codes. Both the
8 thermal/hydraulic and the conduction/convection calculations are performed simultaneously in
9 VIPRE. The NRC staff approved use of VIPRE for Westinghouse use in making DNBR
10 calculations as described in the SER included with WCAP-14545-P-A (Reference 8).

11
12 With the coupled computer code RAVE methodology, Westinghouse will use three types of
13 VIPRE models. To describe the detailed thermal hydraulics conditions in the reactor core for
14 use by the SPNOVA neutronics computer code, Westinghouse has developed a whole-core
15 VIPRE model. Each node in the whole-core VIPRE model will communicate to a corresponding
16 node in the SPNOVA reactor physics model. Additionally, to the whole-core model,
17 Westinghouse will continue to use stand-alone VIPRE models described in WCAP-14545-A to
18 calculate DNBR. In addition, Westinghouse plans to use stand-alone VIPRE to calculate post-
19 CHF core heat-up in a manner similar to that which the NRC staff has approved using
20 FACTRAN.

21
22 These stand-alone models differ in that for DNBR and core heat-up evaluation only a portion of
23 the core need be described in the simulation, as opposed to the entire core for coupling to
24 SPNOVA. Furthermore, core heat transfer is made to be conservative in the heat-up and
25 DNBR simulations, whereas the whole-core model uses more realistic assumptions to calculate
26 core heat transfer. Since the purpose of the whole-core VIPRE model is to provide fuel and
27 coolant conditions to evaluate reactivity in the reactor physics calculation, the selection of
28 conservative heat transfer assumptions is not obvious and the use of more realistic
29 assumptions is appropriate.

30
31 VIPRE does not model the effects of burn-up within the fuel rods. These effects include fuel
32 pellet swelling, clad shrinkage, and increased internal gas pressure. The Westinghouse fuel
33 design computer codes which do evaluate these effects are utilized to calibrate the VIPRE fuel
34 rod input over the range of burn-up needed to represent the fuel. The initial gap size and fuel
35 conductivity are adjusted until the resulting VIPRE calculated fuel and cladding temperatures
36 compare with the temperatures from the design model at all power levels. Sample temperature
37 calibration results showing agreement between the VIPRE predictions and those of the design
38 models are presented in Reference 2.

39 40 3.1.4 Staff Review of Whole-core VIPRE Model

41
42 As a part of the RAVE methodology, Westinghouse has developed a whole-core
43 thermal/hydraulic model to continuously provide core moderator densities and fuel
44 temperatures for the purpose of determining local reactivity feedback with the SPNOVA
45 neutronics computer code. The whole-core VIPRE model will continuously receive core inlet
46 flows, and temperature and exit pressures from the RETRAN reactor system model. Because

1 the entire core is modeled, a burn-up specific rod type can be described for each bundle in the
2 core. The VIPRE initial temperature for each rod type is calibrated against Westinghouse's fuel
3 design codes as a function of power level.
4

5 There will be a one-to-one correspondence between the nodes within the SPNOVA simulation
6 of the core and that of VIPRE. Therefore each neutronics node in the SPNOVA model will
7 receive moderator density and fuel temperature information from the corresponding VIPRE
8 thermal/hydraulic node. The NRC staff agrees that this degree of noding detail is appropriate
9 since interpolation errors that could occur, if the thermal/hydraulic and neutronics noding
10 schemes were different, are avoided. The noding detail for the whole-core model provides
11 additional detail from the DNBR stand-alone model which was previously shown to be
12 adequate. The staff concludes that the whole-core model noding detail as proposed by
13 Westinghouse is adequate.
14

15 Other input assumptions which the staff questioned as part of the whole-core model review
16 were the modeling of the fuel-to-cladding gap, core voiding and core inlet flow mixing. The
17 initial fuel-to-cladding gap thickness is a function of fuel burn-up. This is an input to the VIPRE.
18 During a transient, the gap thickness will change as a function of the fuel temperature and
19 differential pressure across the cladding. In the DNBR stand-alone model, Westinghouse uses
20 bounding values of the gap conductance. Use of bounding values for providing input to
21 SPNOVA is not appropriate since assumptions which are conservative for predicting fuel or
22 cladding temperatures may not be conservative for the neutronics calculation. In the whole-
23 core model, Westinghouse will use the dynamic gap model in VIPRE. This model was
24 approved by the NRC staff in the generic review of VIPRE. The model was found to be similar
25 to the NRC staff-developed computer codes GAPCON and FRAP and to be extensively
26 benchmarked to experimental data. Changes in gap width caused by elastic and thermal
27 stresses are evaluated. The staff concluded that the fuel rod heat-conduction model including
28 the dynamic gap conduction model is acceptable for licensing analysis.
29

30 Voiding in the coolant provides a negative reactivity contribution for the reactor cores designed
31 by Westinghouse. It will therefore be conservative to minimize the calculated core voiding in
32 the whole-core VIPRE model used to provide values of coolant density to SPNOVA. In the
33 DNBR stand-alone VIPRE model which the staff has already approved, Westinghouse uses
34 assumptions which underpredict the rate of steam separation from the water in the core and
35 hence tend to overpredict the amount of core voiding. This is conservative for calculating
36 DNBR. For the whole-core model, Westinghouse will use assumptions which minimize the
37 reactivity feedback from core voiding while the coolant is below the boiling temperature. For
38 core channels in which the bulk coolant temperature reaches saturation, bulk boiling will occur.
39 Comparisons of VIPRE predictions with experimental data (Reference 7) did not show any
40 significant deviation from the measured void fraction for low steam qualities regardless of the
41 steam/water separation model used to predict core voiding. Westinghouse performed
42 sensitivity studies which demonstrate that the reactor power calculated by SPNOVA is
43 insensitive to the core voiding model used in the whole-core VIPRE model up to a steam void
44 fraction of 30 percent. Westinghouse does not believe that steam voiding will be an issue for
45 calculating reactivity feedback using the RAVE methodology. If the maximum void fraction in
46 any RAVE reactivity feedback calculation exceeds 30 percent, additional justification will be
47 provided for the steam/water separation model utilized in the VIPRE whole-core model.
48

1 During the evaluation of the Westinghouse application for RETRAN (Reference 10), the NRC
2 staff reviewed the assumptions available to the user for the amount of mixing that occurs in the
3 coolant entering and exiting the core. Coolant mixing is important for analysis of transients and
4 accidents such as the asymmetric cooldown that would occur as the result of the break of a
5 single main steam line. Cooler water entering the core from the affected loop will cause space-
6 dependent reactivity changes in the core, which will affect the calculation of power. For
7 analysis of thermal asymmetry within the coolant loops, Westinghouse uses mixing inputs
8 previously approved for use with LOFTRAN. These inputs are called "design mixing" and are
9 based on scale mixing tests for the Indian Point 2 reactor vessel. The tests were set up to
10 simulate 2-, 3-, and 4-loop plants. The mixing coefficients were confirmed by comparison with
11 data from 3-loop scale model reactor vessel experiments in Europe. The data used to verify
12 "design mixing" assumptions were all taken at flow conditions designed to simulate reactor
13 coolant pump operation. Westinghouse uses the "design mixing" assumptions with RETRAN to
14 analyze most of the transients and accidents for which the reactor coolant pumps are assumed
15 to be in operation. For other transients, such as loss of offsite power, Westinghouse assumes
16 perfect mixing of the fluid entering and exiting the core. This is acceptable since asymmetric
17 cold-leg temperatures will not occur for these transients.

18
19 For natural-circulation conditions, data taken at a European reactor have demonstrated that
20 perfect mixing is a valid assumption for computing the temperature of water exiting a reactor
21 vessel and this is the assumption that Westinghouse will use for natural-circulation conditions.
22 The NRC staff reviewed the European data and confirmed perfect mixing to be valid for reactor
23 vessel thermal/hydraulic analysis during natural circulation (Reference 10).

24
25 Similar to the mixing assumed using RETRAN, Westinghouse will input inlet mixing
26 assumptions to the whole-core VIPRE model. Since the whole-core VIPRE model has more
27 core detail than does the RETRAN core model, Westinghouse will use a "fine mesh model" to
28 describe the inlet temperature distribution. With the fine mesh model the total core mass flow
29 and enthalpy are preserved. As a result of staff questions, Westinghouse provided validation
30 for the fine mesh mixing model. Validation included benchmarking of the model against the
31 original data from the reactor vessel scale model tests until the predicted local core inlet
32 enthalpies closely matched those of the test data. Thus, the fine mesh mixing factors to be
33 used in the whole-core VIPRE model are consistent with the measured mixing factors across
34 the core inlet and are in good agreement with the design mixing model used with RETRAN.

36 3.1.5 NRC Staff Review of VIPRE for DNBR Prediction

37
38 Use of VIPRE for DNBR prediction in the hot channels of a reactor core undergoing a design-
39 basis non-LOCA transient or accident has been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC
40 staff (Reference 8). VIPRE input options are versatile and flexible to permit numerous
41 applications. A number of the options are evaluated in Volume 4 of the EPRI VIPRE manual
42 (Reference 7). By comparison with experimental data, Westinghouse chose to use options that
43 would make VIPRE results approximate those previously approved THINC-IV and FACTRAN
44 codes. A summary of the input options chosen by Westinghouse appears in Table 3-1 of
45 Reference 8.

46
47 Westinghouse uses a multi-channel model to determine DNBR for the hot rod so that the effect
48 of coolant channel cross flow can be included. For cores containing only one type of fuel, a

1 one-eighth core segment is modeled. Reference 8 contains diagrams of the radial nodding for
2 2-, 3- and 4-loop plants. When a reactor core is loaded with more than one type of fuel
3 element, the coolant may preferentially flow through one type of fuel, thereby reducing flow in
4 the other. Under these conditions, a DNBR penalty is applied to account for the reduced
5 coolant flow rate (Reference 25). Extra axial nodding detail is applied to evaluate flow
6 redistribution. Conservative assumptions are made for thermal mixing. When the DNBR
7 penalty is applied to plant-specific transient analysis, Westinghouse will ensure that the
8 conditions for the analysis under consideration are within the range of applicability or are
9 bounded by conditions considered in any generic VIPRE calculation of the transition core.
10 Westinghouse will continue to follow current practice of assuming fuel cladding failure for any
11 fuel rod which exceeds the DNBR limit.
12

13 Several of the transients and accidents that are part of the design basis for Westinghouse
14 operating plants, for example a steam line break with a stuck control rod cluster, involve
15 perturbed neutron flux distributions that cannot be assessed using the point kinetics model in
16 RETRAN. With the current methodology, Westinghouse used a separate multidimensional
17 neutronics computer code to determine the perturbed neutron flux shape. The resulting
18 neutron flux shape is then input into the VIPRE stand-alone DNBR model to determine the hot-
19 channel critical heat flux (CHF). With the RAVE methodology, the perturbed flux shape from
20 the SPNOVA neutronics calculation will be input into the stand-alone VIPRE models for CHF or
21 fuel rod heat-up evaluations.
22

23 3.1.6 Staff Review of Stand-alone VIPRE for Post-CHF Fuel Heat-up Calculations

24
25 The NRC staff considers certain design-basis accidents to be sufficiently unlikely to occur within
26 the lifetime of a plant that a certain amount of calculated fuel failure is permitted (Reference 4).
27 Post-CHF core heat-up is therefore evaluated to determine the extent of any fuel failure for
28 calculation of the offsite dose and to ensure that the reactor core remains in a coolable
29 geometry. Staff's review of VIPRE in Reference 8 did not extend to: (1) the use of VIPRE for
30 post-CHF heat-up calculations, and (2) the generic review of VIPRE (Reference 7) into that
31 range. Westinghouse currently analyzes post-CHF fuel heat-up using the FACTRAN code in
32 combination with THINC-IV or VIPRE.
33

34 As part of the RAVE review, Westinghouse has submitted additional information, which
35 demonstrates that the post DNBR core heat-up assumptions which Westinghouse will use with
36 VIPRE are the same as those with the FACTRAN code which has been approved by the NRC
37 staff. The staff evaluated the post-DNBR heat-up assumptions for VIPRE as a part of the
38 RAVE review. The convective heat transfer and zirconium-water reaction correlations for the
39 VIPRE model are the same as what the NRC staff previously approved for FACTRAN and are,
40 therefore, acceptable. Other features of the VIPRE fuel rod model include the pellet power
41 profile model and the pellet-clad gap conductance model. These are also the same as
42 previously approved for FACTRAN and are also acceptable. For fuel heat-up calculations with
43 VIPRE, Westinghouse will use the multi-channel modeling detail approved by the NRC staff in
44 Reference 8.

1 In response to NRC staff questions, Westinghouse submitted analyses showing that for post-
2 CHF core heat-up, VIPRE input as modified by Westinghouse and FACTRAN produce virtually
3 identical results. Therefore, the NRC staff considers VIPRE to be equivalent to FACTRAN for
4 performing post-CHF core heat-up calculations. As is permitted for FACTRAN, VIPRE can be
5 used to show compliance with acceptance criteria for peak cladding temperature for a locked
6 rotor event, fuel melting, and pellet enthalpy criteria as well as for DNBR evaluation. Neither
7 VIPRE nor FACTRAN includes the time-dependent physical changes that may occur in a fuel
8 rod at elevated temperatures. Therefore VIPRE cannot be used to predict such failures and
9 another fuel code should be used to predict mechanical behavior.

10 3.2 Coupling Issues (Sensitivity Studies and Convergence)

11 In using the RAVE methodology Westinghouse will retain the basic conservatisms of current
12 safety analyses. In calculation of reactor power, uncertainty allowances will be applied to the
13 Doppler and moderator feedback as well as to the delayed neutron fraction. Shutdown
14 reactivity will be reduced by the assumption that a single rod cluster or shutdown bank fails to
15 insert. Control rod insertion rates and reactor trip set points will be applied using technical
16 specification conservatisms. Initial thermal/hydraulic conditions will be determined using
17 existing approved methodology which account for uncertainty using statistical methodology or
18 by applying the maximum steady-state allowances. The uncertainty values are determined on a
19 plant-specific basis and will not be affected by use of the RAVE methodology. Assumptions for
20 local peaking factor uncertainty, local engineering peaking factor penalties, and core
21 calorimetric uncertainty will also remain unchanged. These and other conservatisms that
22 Westinghouse will use with the RAVE methodology and which are unchanged from the current
23 methodology of running the neutronics and thermal/hydraulic codes separately are described in
24 Sections 2.5 and 2.6 of WCAP-16259-P.
25
26

27 Using the existing methodology for which SPNOVA, RETRAN, and VIPRE were run separately,
28 assumptions were made which lead to conservative results for each code. For example, in
29 running VIPRE for hot channel DNBR analysis it is usually conservative to assume an upward
30 tilted power shape in the core so that the hottest fluid region will be adjacent to coolant that has
31 been heated by traveling up most of the core length. For the neutronics calculations, it is
32 conservative to assume a bottom tilted flux shape so that following a reactor trip the maximum
33 time will be required for the control rods to reach the location of peak power. With the RAVE
34 coupled code methodology, the same power shape will be assumed for both the DNBR and the
35 neutronics calculations. Because of competing effects between the coupled computer codes,
36 the most conservative assumptions will in many cases no longer be obvious. Sensitivity studies
37 will need to be performed in which input assumptions are varied to enable the most
38 conservative plant conditions to be determined. Appendix C to WCAP-16259-P describes
39 sensitivity studies performed by Westinghouse for the postulated complete loss of forced
40 coolant flow, locked reactor coolant pump rotor, and main steam line break events. These
41 analyses were for a typical operating plant designed by Westinghouse with three reactor
42 coolant loops. Westinghouse recognizes that different core designs may exhibit different
43 sensitivities. Therefore, Westinghouse will perform sensitivity studies for every new reactor
44 type, core type or fuel combination to which the RAVE methodology is applied to ensure that
45 the limiting conditions have been identified.
46

1 With three computer codes running simultaneously and constantly transferring information, it is
2 important that convergence among the three codes be maintained. The RAVE methodology
3 provides many warning messages and error checks to help ensure that the code set is being
4 used correctly. If during an analysis using the RAVE methodology certain key parameters
5 begin to diverge, a warning message is generated. The code analyst will then be required to
6 determine the cause of the imbalance and take corrective action. The NRC staff reviewed the
7 error checks to be performed and agrees that the code convergence checks and remedial
8 actions proposed by Westinghouse are sufficient.
9

10 3.3 Comparison of RAVE Results with NEA Main Steam Line Break Benchmark

11
12 Following a main steamline break (MSLB) the cooling of the reactor core by the increased
13 steam flow might cause a return to power even after the control rods are tripped. The
14 assumption that one control assembly did not insert would cause significant perturbations within
15 the reactor core which could only be adequately addressed by a 3-D neutronics code coupled
16 with thermal/hydraulic methodology. In an international cooperative program sponsored by the
17 Nuclear Science Committee of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the NRC staff with the
18 assistance of Penn State University developed a PWR main steam break test problem
19 (MSLB-TP). The purpose of the MSLB-TP is to compare the results from international
20 participants using different methodologies so that deviations in the calculated predictions can
21 be evaluated. Since the MSLB-TP does not utilize an experimental test facility, no definitive
22 conclusions can be made for the accuracy of the predictions. The comparisons do provide
23 opportunity for examination of deviations between the predicted results which may aid in the
24 identification of code or modeling errors.
25

26 Westinghouse provided the staff with comparisons of their predictions with those of the other
27 participants. In general the Westinghouse predictions are within one standard deviation from
28 those of the other participants for break flow rate, cold leg temperature, and core power versus
29 time. Late in the analysis, the Westinghouse predictions deviate from the responses of most of
30 the other participants. This is because Westinghouse modeled the once-through steam
31 generators (OTSGs) in the test problem as having homogenous flow with the steam and water
32 having the same velocity. The OTSGs did not have internal steam separating equipment.
33 However, the homogeneous flow assumption used by Westinghouse predicted excessive water
34 to be discharged from the break and reduced the calculated reactor system cooling from that
35 predicted by most of the other participants. The Westinghouse 2-, 3-, and 4-loop operation
36 plants, for which Westinghouse has requested NRC staff approval for the RAVE methodology,
37 do not have OTSGs and instead have U-tube type steam generators which have internal steam
38 separation equipment. For analysis of the operating Westinghouse plants, Westinghouse will
39 assume perfect steam separation within the steam separation equipment so that the steam
40 generator water will remain in the steam generators for maximum heat removal. This
41 assumption is conservative for predicting reactor system cooldown following a main steam line
42 break and has been accepted by the NRC staff (Reference 10).
43

44 4.0 CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS

45
46 The NRC staff accepts the methodology described in WCAP-16259-P, subject to the following
47 conditions and limitations:
48

- 1 1. Consistent with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 88-16, "Removal of Cycle-
2 Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications," a methodology that is used in
3 the evaluation of the cycle-specific safety limits and plant safety analyses needs to be
4 incorporated into the technical specification (TS) list of references. Therefore, the
5 implementation of RAVE on a plant-specific basis requires a TS amendment by the
6 plant when the RAVE methodology is first implemented for that plant.
7
- 8 2. Because of competing effects between the coupled computer codes, the most
9 conservative assumptions will, in many cases, no longer be obvious. Sensitivity studies
10 will need to be performed to determine the most conservative plant conditions. Since
11 different core designs may exhibit different sensitivities, the first implementation of the
12 RAVE sensitivity studies should be performed to ensure that the limiting conditions have
13 been identified. The sensitivity results will accompany the analyses using the RAVE
14 methodology whenever the RAVE methodology is first implemented for a plant and must
15 be presented to the NRC staff for review and approval.
16
- 17 3. As support for the TS amendment, licensees implementing RAVE should provide
18 justification that SPNOVA, VIPRE, and RETRAN computer codes and methodology are
19 approved for use in compliance with the conditions identified in the NRC staff SEs. The
20 methodology for use of the VIPRE code shall be considered to be reviewed and
21 approved for use in the RAVE methodology, if all three applications of VIPRE have been
22 reviewed and approved by the NRC staff. The three applications of VIPRE are the
23 whole-core model, the DNBR model, and the post-CHF fuel heat-up model.
24
25 If a specific plant has not been licensed for the use of the computer codes and
26 methodology that are utilized by RAVE then that licensee will need to take appropriate
27 licensing action for application of these computer codes. Licensees will need to verify
28 that the conditions and limitations imposed on each of the three NRC approved codes
29 (SPNOVA, RETRAN, and VIPRE), encompassing the RAVE methodology, will continue
30 to be satisfied each time the RAVE methodology is utilized.
31
- 32 4. Westinghouse submitted analyses showing that for post-CHF core heat-up, VIPRE
33 input, as modified by Westinghouse and FACTRAN, produce virtually identical results.
34 Therefore, the NRC staff considers VIPRE to be equivalent to FACTRAN for performing
35 post-CHF core heat-up calculations. As is permitted for FACTRAN, VIPRE can be used
36 to show compliance with acceptance criteria for peak cladding temperature for a locked
37 rotor event, fuel melting, and pellet enthalpy criteria as well as for DNBR evaluation.
38 Neither VIPRE nor FACTRAN include the time-dependent physical changes that may
39 occur in a fuel rod at elevated temperatures. Therefore, VIPRE cannot be used to
40 predict such failures and another fuel code should be used to predict mechanical
41 behavior.
42
- 43 5. The code option selected for use with whole-core VIPRE model may not be conservative
44 for calculation of reactivity feedback for elevated steam void fractions. Westinghouse
45 performed sensitivity studies which demonstrated that the reactor power calculated by
46 the RAVE methodology is insensitive to assumptions for core voiding up to a maximum
47 steam void fraction of 30 percent. If the maximum void fraction in any RAVE reactivity
48 feedback calculation exceeds 30 percent, additional justification will need to be provided

1 for the steam/water separation model utilized in the VIPRE whole-core model to the staff
2 for additional review of that application of RAVE.

3
4 5.0 CONCLUSION

5
6 Based on NRC's review of WCAP-16259-P and its analyses and supplements, the staff
7 concludes that the information and data presented provide the basis for its approval as a
8 methodology for the analysis of non-LOCA transients and accidents. All issues associated with
9 the review of this submittal were resolved by Westinghouse and the NRC staff. In addition, the
10 April 29, 2004, submittal, as supplemented, is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.34, "Contents of
11 applications; technical information" and the applicable sections of NUREG-800.

12
13 In addition, the staff considers the methodology as described in topical report WCAP-16259-P
14 as more realistic and consistent with present core behavior and management, but also still
15 conservative. The methodology utilizes the NRC-approved codes SPNOVA (References 4 and
16 5), VIPRE-01 (References 6 and 7), and RETRAN-02 (Reference 9 and 10), which have been
17 linked through an external communication interface to pass the necessary data for the nuclear,
18 core fluid and fuel temperature, and reactor coolant system calculations. The solution methods
19 are the same as those previously approved for each code. No new calculational models were
20 developed within these codes. The external communication interface between the SPNOVA
21 and VIPRE codes, for use in the Westinghouse 3-D control rod ejection accident analysis
22 methodology, has already received NRC approval (Reference 11).

23
24 Therefore, on the basis of the above review and justification, the staff concludes that the
25 proposed methodology presented in WCAP-16259-P is acceptable, subject to the above
26 discussed conditions and limitations.

27
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