



Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S.R. 333
Russellville, AR 72802
Tel 501 858 5000

2CAN060504

June 16, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: 10CFR21 Report
Arkansas Nuclear One – Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NPF-6

Dear Sir or Madam:

The attached report is being submitted in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR21 to provide information regarding a replacement valve disc manufactured by Crane-Aloyco.

There are no commitments contained in this submittal. If you have any questions regarding the report, contact Richard Scheide at 479-858-4618.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dale E. James", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Dale E. James
Acting Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

DEJ/rhs
Attachment

IE19

cc: Dr. Bruce S. Mallett
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011-8064

NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Arkansas Nuclear One
P.O. Box 310
London, AR 72847

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Mr. Drew Holland
Mail Stop 0-7 D1
Washington, DC 20555-0001

**Attachment
to
2CAN060504**

10CFR21 Report

On March 19, 2005, during refueling Outage 2R17, it was identified that a Flex-wedge valve disc drawn from inventory and intended for installation in a Containment Sump isolation valve did not have a machined slot around the disc edge, as required by the purchase specifications. A feature of the flex-wedge design is to allow the disc faces to flex, thereby reducing the potential for thermal binding.

The inboard and outboard containment sump isolation valves (2CV-5647-1, 2CV-5648-2, 2CV-5649-1, and 2CV-5650-2) for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2), are 24 inch motor operated gate valves manufactured by Crane-Aloyco. The outboard containment sump isolation valve is normally closed and receives a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) to open when the Refueling Water Tank volume is depleted (post-LOCA) in order to shift the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) suction to the containment sump. Had the subject disc been installed in this valve, the discrepancy could have resulted in thermal binding of the disc, thereby potentially preventing the valve from opening and rendering a complete train of ECCS inoperable upon initiation of a RAS.

The discrepancy was identified during pre-installation inspection; therefore, the disc was not installed in the plant. Considering that extensive machining and handling of the disc is necessary during installation, it is extremely unlikely that the discrepancy could have gone undetected. This type valve disc is not utilized in any other safety related applications at ANO.

The subject disc was delivered to Arkansas Nuclear One as a spare part in 1991.

This condition was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR21 on 5/17/2005 and the NRC Operations Center was notified at 1024 CDT on that date (EN# 41702).