



FEMA

June 6, 2005

Kerry Sleeper, Commissioner
Vermont Department of Public Safety
Waterbury State Complex
103 So. Main Street
Waterbury, VT 05671

Dear Commissioner Sleeper:

This letter officially informs you of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) identification of five Deficiencies which were observed during the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on May 24, 2005. These issues were discussed with exercise participants following the exercise and had not been classified as Deficiencies at that time. FEMA held a participants' briefing June 2, 2005, at the Vermont Yankee Corporate offices to discuss all issues in more detail.

As a result of this exercise, Deficiencies have been assessed in accordance with NUREG 0654 and FEMA-REP-14 page C.16-1. The Deficiencies are assessed against the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Town of Vernon EOC, and the Town of Halifax.

The Deficiencies being assessed against the State EOC are under Evaluation Area Sub-element 1.c, Direction and Control, Criterion 1.c.1; Evaluation Area Sub-element 5.a, Alert and Notification, Criteria 5.a.1, and 5.b.1.

The Deficiency assessed against the Town of Vernon is under Evaluation Area Sub-element 5.a, Alert and Notification, Criterion 5.a.1. The Town of Halifax is assessed a Deficiency on Evaluation Area Sub-element 5.a, Alert and Notification, Criterion 5.a.3, specifically, back up route alerting.

Direction and Control Deficiencies (1.c.1) are assessed when an organization and/or the person in charge of that organization do not direct activities outlined in their Radiological Emergency Response Plan in a manner that provides for the health and safety of the public living in the ten-mile radius surrounding a nuclear power plant.

At the State EOC the Direction and Control Deficiency (1.c.1) resulted from a large number of issues that were identified and attributed to the State of Vermont. There were four issues identified specifically under Criterion 1.c.1., as well as numerous issues on Criterion 5.b.1. The large number of issues in each of these areas tells FEMA there is a significant problem in this area and they should be

classified as Deficiencies in Direction and Control (1.c.1) and Information to the Public and Media (5.b.1). The State's failure to provide timely direction to the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) communities to sound their sirens for the second Alert and Notification sequence resulted in the classification of Criterion 5.a.1., primary alert and notification, as a Deficiency. It is the responsibility of the person in charge to ensure that tasks are completed by those assigned to that task. The significance of this failure was a delay in alerting the public to listen to their radio stations for the EAS message announcing a release of radiation at Vermont Yankee and the State's decision to evacuate the Towns of Vernon and Guilford shelter in place the remaining EPZ communities (5.a.1). This lack of direction and control extended to the review of message content throughout the entire exercise. The content of messages was misleading, inaccurate, lacked direction (5.b.1) and in many instances it was contradictory, confusing, and incomplete.

Deficiencies in Alert and Notification (5.a.1, 5.a.3) are assessed when the public is not alerted in about 15 minutes for primary alert and notification and 45 minutes in the case of back-up route alerting and (5.b.1) when the information provided to the public and the media is not clear, concise and accurate. A decision was made at 1302 to evacuate the Towns of Vernon and Guilford and shelter Brattleboro, Dummerston and Halifax due to a release of radiation. The message to the towns to sound their sirens at 1309, was not dispatched from the SEOC until 1326, 14 minutes after the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message was broadcast. (5.a.1) This could result in the public not hearing information to allow them to take protective actions. During the Plume phase of the exercise the State generated three EAS messages and 26 news advisories. As stated above, the content of messages was misleading, inaccurate, lacked direction (5.B.1) and in many instances it was contradictory, confusing, and incomplete. Specifically, as an example, News Advisory #15 was titled General Emergency and Evacuation Order Declared and was issued at 1241, listing all communities in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). This was 21 minutes prior to the official 1302 decision to evacuate the Towns of Vernon and Guilford and shelter the remaining three communities. EAS message #2 advised farmers in the Towns of Vernon and Guilford to milk their cows prior to evacuating. This could have kept farmers from evacuating the affected area in a timely manner. The third EAS message was re-issued at 1435 with that information deleted but with no further explanation.

In the Town of Vernon, the Town's Selectman had to assume the position of the Emergency Director who was unable to respond. Although he had never performed this function before he did a commendable job of following his plans and procedures. However, without proper training and experience he was not prepared to direct and control the organization. The first siren sounding that was to be simulated at 1052, did not occur until 1100, when the sirens were actually sounded by Vernon officials.

The fact that the simulated siren sounding at 1052 did not occur would have resulted in the residents in the Town of Vernon not being alerted to tune to their EAS stations to hear information on the emergency at Vermont Yankee. There is a requirement to sound sirens within about 15 minutes of a decision to do so (5.a.1). When sirens actually sounded eight minutes later than the time directed, the public could have believed an actual emergency was occurring and may have caused unnecessary panic.


The Town of Halifax, was unable to demonstrate completion of activities associated with activation of the alert and notification system, namely, backup alert and notification within 45 minutes following detection of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (5.a.3). It took the team one hour and 14 minutes to complete the route, 29 minutes longer than the requirement.

In accordance with 44 CFR 350.9 (d) and FEMA-REP-14, we have thoroughly reviewed and discussed these issues with FEMA Headquarters, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and FEMA Region I Radiological Assistance Committee members who participated in the exercise. FEMA-REP-14, page C.16-1, defines a Deficiency as "... an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant." Because of the potential impact of a Deficiency on the public health and safety, it should be corrected within 120 days after the exercise through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions, including plan revisions.

Please coordinate with my office the date and time of the pertinent remedial actions and identity of the State and local participants within 10 days from the date of this letter.

Your cooperation on this matter is greatly appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact Deborah S. Bell, Chairperson, Regional Assistance Committee, FEMA Region I, at (617) 832-4744.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kenneth A. Horak". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "K" and "H".

Kenneth A. Horak
Acting Regional Director



FEMA

June 6, 2005

Cristine McCombs, Director
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
400 Worcester Road
Framingham, MA 01701

Dear Director McCombs:

This letter officially informs you of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) identification of a Deficiency which occurred during the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on May 24, 2005. This issue was discussed with exercise participants following the exercise and had not been classified as a Deficiency at that time. FEMA held a participants' briefing June 2, 2005, at the Vermont Yankee Corporate offices, to discuss all issues in more detail.

As a result of this exercise, a Deficiency has been assessed in accordance with NUREG 0654 and FEMA-REP-14 page C.16-1. The Deficiency is assessed against the Town of Colrain for failure to demonstrate Evaluation Area Sub-element 5.a, Alert and Notification, Criterion 5.a.3, back-up route alerting. The Criterion states, "Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the Off-site Response Organization (ORO) of a failure of the primary alert and notification system." The route was completed in 53 minutes, eight minutes longer than the required 45 minutes.

In accordance with 44 CFR 350.9 (d) and FEMA-REP-14, we have thoroughly reviewed and discussed this issue with FEMA Headquarters, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and FEMA Region I Radiological Assistance Committee members who participated in the exercise. FEMA-REP-14, page C.16-1, defines a Deficiency as "... an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant." Because of the potential impact of a Deficiency on the public health and safety, it should be corrected within 120 days after the exercise through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions, including plan revisions.

On Wednesday, June 1, 2005, the back up route in Colrain was successfully re-demonstrated to the Vermont Yankee Site Specialist and the Regional Assistance Committee Chair. This demonstration

allows this issue to be designated as a Corrected Deficiency in the final Vermont Yankee Report due on August 26, 2005.

We appreciate your cooperation and that of your staff to correct this issue so promptly. If you have any questions, please contact Deborah S. Bell, Chairperson, Regional Assistance Committee, FEMA Region I, at (617) 832-4744.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kenneth A. Horak". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "K" and "H".

Kenneth A. Horak
Acting Regional Director



FEMA

June 6, 2005

Bruce G. Cheney, Director
Bureau of Emergency Management
10 Hazen Drive
Concord, NH 03305

Dear Director Cheney:

This letter officially informs you of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) identification of a Deficiency which occurred during the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on May 24, 2005. This issue was discussed with exercise participants following the exercise and had not been classified as a Deficiency at that time. FEMA held a participants' briefing June 2, 2005, at the Vermont Yankee Corporate offices to discuss all issues in more detail.

As a result of this exercise, a Deficiency has been assessed in accordance with NUREG 0654 and FEMA-REP-14 page C.16-1. The Deficiency is assessed against the Town of Richmond for failure to demonstrate Evaluation Area Sub-element 5.a, Alert and Notification, Criterion 5.a.3, back-up route alerting. The Criterion states, "Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the Off-site Response Organization (ORO) of a failure of the primary alert and notification system." The actual route was completed in one hour and 39 minutes, however, it took one hour for alerting teams to report to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and obtain their dosimetry before they could commence the route. This increased the time to two hours and 39 minutes, one hour and 54 minutes longer than the requirement.

In accordance with 44 CFR 350.9 (d) and FEMA-REP-14, we have thoroughly reviewed and discussed this issue with FEMA Headquarters, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and FEMA Region I Radiological Assistance Committee members who participated in the exercise. FEMA-REP-14, page C.16-1, defines a Deficiency as "... an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant." Because of the potential impact of a Deficiency on the public health and safety, it should be corrected within 120 days after the exercise through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions, including plan revisions.

We have coordinated with your staff to re-demonstrate this back up route on June 10, 2005, at 2:30 PM. We have every expectation that this Deficiency will be corrected at that time.

Your cooperation on this matter is greatly appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact Deborah S. Bell, Chairperson, Regional Assistance Committee, FEMA Region I, at (617) 832-4744.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kenneth A. Horak". The signature is stylized with a large initial "K" and a long, sweeping tail.

Kenneth A. Horak
Acting Regional Director