

June 8, 2005

Mr. Joseph E. Venable
Vice President Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
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SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 (WATERFORD 3) - FINAL
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSOR ANALYSIS OF SEPTEMBER 2003
OPERATIONAL EVENT

Dear Mr. Venable:

Enclosed for your information is the Final Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Analysis of an operational event which occurred at Waterford 3 in September 2003. The condition was reported by Licensee Event Report No. 2003-002-00, dated November 26, 2003, and documented in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report No. 05000382/2003007, dated February 2, 2004. This is being issued as a final analysis since it is a non-controversial, lower risk precursor for which the ASP results are consistent with the results from the Significance Determination Process's final evaluation of the same condition. The review and comment resolution process for this event are eliminated and it is expected that this will reduce the burden for the NRC staff and the licensee.

Sincerely,

/RA/

N. Kalyanam, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-382

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/encl: See next page

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DATE	6/8/05	6/8/05	6/8/05

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SUMMARY OF FINAL ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSOR (ASP) ANALYSIS
FAILURE OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) 'A' FUEL OIL LINE AT
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3

This event is documented in Licensee Event Report 2003-002-00, with an event date of September 29, 2003.

Condition summary:

On September 29, 2003, at about 10:20 a.m. with the plant in Mode 1 (approximately 90 percent power and coasting down for refueling), EDG 'A' was started to perform the monthly surveillance run in accordance with station operating procedures. At approximately 1:09 p.m., with EDG 'A' running loaded, the left/right bank cross connect fuel oil tubing failed rendering the engine inoperable. Although, EDG 'A' testing surveillances were successfully completed prior to September 29, 2003, there is firm evidence that after the last successful surveillance on September 2, 2003, EDG 'A' may not have been able to complete a mission run time of 24 hours.

Results:

The ASP analysis calculated a delta core damage probability (Δ CDP) of 2×10^{-6} . Since the ASP program acceptance threshold is 1×10^{-6} , this condition is a precursor.

Significance Determination Process (SDP)/ASP comparison:

The result of the SDP analysis was a white finding. The SDP Phase 3 assessment estimated an increase in core damage frequency of 5.2×10^{-6} . Thus, the results from the SDP and ASP evaluations are consistent.

ENCLOSURE

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

cc:

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May 2005