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# ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY CENTER

Illinois Indiana Michigan Minnesota Ohio Wisconsin

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Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch  
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Washington, DC 20555-0001

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Re: *Environmental Impact Statement for an Early Site Permit (ESP) at the Exelon ESP Site, Draft Report for Comment, NUREG-1815, Docket No. 52-007-ESP*

Dear Sir or Madam:

The Environmental Law and Policy Center ("ELPC"), a Midwest not-for-profit environmental quality and economic development organization, submits the following comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement ("Draft EIS") for Exelon's Early Site Permit ("ESP") application. This letter supplements the comments made by ELPC Staff Attorney Shannon Fisk at the April 19, 2005 public hearing held in Clinton, Illinois.

ELPC, along with the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Nuclear Energy Information Service, and Public Citizen, has been admitted as a party to the licensing proceeding for the Exelon ESP. As such, we trust that our comments and recommendations on the Draft EIS will be considered seriously and taken into account before a Final EIS is issued for this project.

The Staff's preliminary recommendation that the ESP should be issued (Draft EIS at 10-8) is undermined by a number of serious shortcomings in the Draft EIS. First, the Draft EIS fails to "rigorously explore and objectively evaluate" better, lower-cost, safer and environmentally preferable clean energy and energy efficiency alternatives to new nuclear power. 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a). Second, the Draft EIS does not address the impact of the Illinois nuclear moratorium law, 220 ILCS 5/8-406(c), which deems all potential sites in Illinois unacceptable for new nuclear power plants. Third, the Draft EIS fails to adequately consider impacts relating to the nuclear fuel cycle, waste storage, and safety. These and any other shortcomings must be adequately addressed before the NRC can claim to have complied with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").

The thorough examination of purpose and need, alternatives, and impacts required by NEPA is critical to ensuring that the NRC complies with its legal duty to protect the public health and safety. The NRC is required to make licensing decisions that are not "inimical to the

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common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public,” 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d), and must carry out its duties in a manner that is consistent with its “responsibility as an independent regulatory agency for protecting the radiological health and safety of the public.” 10 C.F.R. 51.10(b). These duties can be satisfied only if the NRC objectively considers and evaluates the important issues identified herein and in the other public comments received on this Draft EIS.

**I. The Draft EIS Fails to Rigorously Explore and Objectively Evaluate Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency Alternatives to New Nuclear Power.**

In the Draft EIS, the NRC Staff has failed to comply with its duty under NEPA to “rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives” to the granting of the ESP. 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a). The Draft EIS’s purported analysis of alternative energy sources is flawed because it: (1) assumes, but does not analyze, a need for power, (2) uses an improperly constrained purpose of creating baseload power to reject reasonable alternatives to new nuclear power, and (3) improperly concludes that clean energy alternatives are environmentally preferable and cheaper than new nuclear power. Because of these shortfalls, the Draft EIS improperly rejects better, lower-cost, safer, and environmentally preferable energy efficiency, renewable energy resource, distributed generation, and “clean coal” resource alternatives to the siting of a new nuclear power plant at the Clinton ESP site.

**A. The Draft EIS Fails to Analyze the Need For Power.**

The discussion of the Draft EIS starts off on the wrong foot by failing to analyze whether there is any need for the power that would be produced by Exelon’s proposed Clinton 2 nuclear power plant. Instead, the NRC Staff has accepted Exelon’s stated purpose that the Clinton 2 project is intended to create baseload power, and then refused to consider whether such power is needed. According to the NRC Staff, 10 C.F.R. 52.17 and 52.18 precludes the consideration of the need for power in determining whether or not to grant an ESP to Exelon. (Draft EIS at 8-15)

As the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently recognized in its comments on the Draft EIS for the ESP application in the North Anna case,<sup>1</sup> the failure to consider the need for power is plainly inconsistent with NEPA. The identification and discussion of the need for a project (here, the need for power) is a required and critical component of the NEPA-required alternative analysis because the need forms the baseline by which the reasonableness of various alternatives are measured. 40 C.F.R. 1502.13; *City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.*, 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997); *Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 120 F.3d 664, 666 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). Without an analysis of whether, how much, and what type of energy is needed, there is no way to accurately weigh alternatives against one another or to conclude whether it is appropriate to site a new nuclear power plant. Instead, as the U.S. EPA stated in the North Anna proceeding, the failure to consider the need for power “ignores the justification for the power plant addition in the early stage of project development as well as biases the subsequent energy alternative analysis toward nuclear power . . . .” The exact same

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Comments to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for an Early Site Permit (ESP) at the North Anna ESP Site – NUREG-1811 (North Anna ESP Project), Mar. 1, 2005, available at <http://www.citizen.org/documents/EPAcommentsDEIS.pdf>.

logic applies in this proceeding. Therefore, the Draft EIS must be revised in order to analyze whether or not there is actually any need for the power that Exelon is seeking to produce.

It is also important to note that the Draft EIS appears to demonstrate that there is not a need for the baseload power that Exelon is seeking to produce here. In particular, as the Draft EIS notes, Illinois is a net exporter of power. (Draft EIS at 8-4). The NRC Staff, therefore, must explain how it can accept Exelon's stated need for baseload power, and reject alternatives for purportedly failing to meet that need, when the need itself appears to not exist.

**B. The Draft EIS is Based on a Purpose for the Project – the Creation of Baseload Power – That Improperly Eliminates Reasonable Energy Efficiency Alternatives**

The Draft EIS also fails to comply with NEPA because it blindly accepts Exelon's goal of creating baseload power as the purpose for the project, and then uses that purpose to reject various reasonable alternatives to new nuclear power. This approach violates NEPA because, regardless of an applicant's goal for a project, the agency carrying out the NEPA review must still ensure that the purpose of the project is defined broadly enough so as to allow for the consideration of reasonable alternatives. *See, e.g., Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Dombeck*, 185 F.3d 1162, 1174-75 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999); *Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 120 F.3d 664, 669 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997); *Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 882 F.2d 407, 409 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989) (“obviously, an applicant cannot define a project in order to preclude the existence of any alternative sites and thus make what is practicable appear impracticable”); *Cf. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations (“Forty Questions”)*, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18027 (1981) (“reasonable alternatives include those that are practical or feasible from the technical and economic standpoint and using common sense, rather than simply desirable from the standpoint of the applicant”).

The Draft EIS is plainly inconsistent with this requirement of NEPA. The Draft EIS states that “any feasible alternative” to the proposed Clinton 2 plant “would need to generate baseload power,” and then proceeds to reject energy efficiency and other reasonable alternatives as inconsistent with this purpose. (Draft EIS at 8-3, 8-15). Yet the siting of a new nuclear power plant in Illinois could only be justified if it is necessary for meeting the future energy needs of Illinois customers. Energy efficiency (both individually and in combination with clean energy sources) is plainly a reasonable alternative to new base load energy generation for meeting those needs.

In fact, both the State of Illinois and the U.S. government have recognized that energy efficiency plays a key role in addressing future energy needs. *See, e.g., 20 ILCS 1120/2* (declaring the policy of Illinois “to become energy self-reliant to the greatest extent possible, primarily by the utilization of the energy resources available within the borders of this State, and by the increased conservation of energy”) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 6201 *et seq.* (Energy Policy and Conservation Act). Therefore, the Draft EIS's rejection of energy efficiency in order to comply with NEPA, the NRC must reject Exelon's attempt to define the purpose of the project in a way that would improperly exclude the reasonable energy efficiency alternative

In addition, while the Draft EIS asserts that energy efficiency efforts would not be cost effective, recent studies demonstrate that energy efficiency is a more viable and cost-effective alternative to new nuclear power generation. For example, the 2001 *Repowering the Midwest* study,<sup>2</sup> which is a comprehensive clean energy development analyses conducted on the Midwest's energy sector, demonstrates that energy efficiency efforts can significantly reduce the demand for power at a cost of 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour or less – lower than the cost of generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity from central power plants. Implementing modern new cost-effective energy efficiency technologies for commercial and residential lighting, heating, ventilation and cooling, industrial motors, refrigerators, and other appliances can flatten electricity demand over the next two decades. *Repowering the Midwest* relied on the methodology of the United States Department of Energy's 1997 "Five National Labs" Study, which is an analysis by a working group with members from five national energy laboratories,<sup>3</sup> in concluding that:

- Energy efficiency efforts can reduce electricity demand by 16% in 2010 and 28% in 2020 versus a projected base case scenario.
- Energy efficiency efforts can save 50,761 GWh of electricity annually by 2020 in Illinois alone.
- Energy efficiency efforts are highly cost-effective, requiring an average investment equivalent to only 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.
- Energy efficiency efforts can reduce net electricity costs in Illinois by \$1 billion by 2020.
- These energy efficiency initiatives use technologies and equipment that are widely available today.

Other analyses have reached similar conclusions on the availability and cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency. For example, an Interlaboratory Working Group following up on the Five National Labs study concluded adopting a number of policies directed at promoting energy-efficient technologies could reduce projected energy needs in 2020 by 20%.<sup>4</sup> The Interlaboratory Working Group determined that these energy efficiency efforts could save an amount of energy equal to 25% of the nation's current energy use.<sup>5</sup> The American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy ("ACEEE") found even greater potential for energy efficiency, concluding in a 2001 study that nine specific energy efficiency policies could reduce energy consumption by 11% by 2010 and 26% by 2020.<sup>6</sup> The net economic savings as a result of these efficiency efforts would be \$170 billion through 2010 and more than \$600 billion through 2020.<sup>7</sup> The ACEEE also

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<sup>2</sup> Environmental Law and Policy Center, et al., *Repowering the Midwest: The Clean Energy Development Plan for the Heartland* (2001).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of Energy, *U.S. Carbon Reductions: Potential Impacts of Energy Technologies by 2010 and Beyond* (1997).

<sup>4</sup> Interlaboratory Working Group, *Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future* (Nov. 2000), p. ES.6.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*

<sup>6</sup> Steven Nadel and Howard Geller, *Smart Energy Policies: Saving Money and Reducing Pollutant Emissions Through Greater Energy Efficiency* (Sept. 2001), p. vii.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at i.

determined that efficiency standards for 13 appliances and equipment alone could save 1.8 quads of energy, or 5% of projected residential and commercial sector energy use.<sup>8</sup> The benefit-to-cost ratio of such standards would be 5 to 1.<sup>9</sup> Finally, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Tellus Institute determined in their Clean Energy Blueprint that energy efficiency efforts throughout the United States could save 915 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity by 2010 and 2,512 billion kilowatt-hours by 2020.<sup>10</sup>

Energy efficiency efforts are feasible, and they also provide significant economic benefits. The follow-up *Job Jolt* analysis of the economic impacts of implementing the clean energy development recommendations in *Repowering the Midwest* concluded that investments in energy efficiency in Illinois would create 43,400 new jobs and \$4.6 billion in additional economic output by 2020.<sup>11</sup> A 1998 ACEEE study of energy efficiency potential in Illinois reached similar results, concluding that investments in energy efficiency would create 59,400 jobs by 2015 and save consumers and business \$76 billion in energy costs between 1999 and 2015.<sup>12</sup>

As the above studies show, energy efficiency is a technologically and economically feasible alternative – alone and in combination with other energy resources – to the siting of a new nuclear power plant at Clinton. Therefore, the Draft EIS must be revised to rigorously explore and objectively evaluate the reasonable energy efficiency alternative.

### **C. The Draft EIS Improperly Rejects Clean Energy Alternatives to New Nuclear Power.**

The Draft EIS also improperly rejects clean energy alternatives to new nuclear power. Wind, solar, natural gas, and “clean coal” generation, both individually and in combination, along with energy efficiency, are reasonable alternatives for satisfying whatever future energy needs that would be met by the Clinton 2 nuclear power plant.<sup>13</sup> Such alternatives would be not only environmentally preferable to and safer than new nuclear power, but would also cost less and bring important economic development benefits to Illinois.<sup>14</sup> As ELPC has explained in the proceeding regarding Exelon’s ESP application that is currently pending before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Docket number 52-007-ESP), however, the Draft EIS arbitrarily rejects such alternatives.

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<sup>8</sup> Toru Kubo, *Opportunities for New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards: Energy and Economic Savings Beyond Current Standards Programs* (Sept. 2001), p. ii.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*

<sup>10</sup> Steve Clemmer, et al., *Clean Energy Blueprint: A Smarter National Energy Policy for Today and the Future* (Oct. 2001), at 11.

<sup>11</sup> Environmental Law and Policy Center, et al., *Job Jolt: The Economic Impacts of Repowering the Midwest* (2002), p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Marshall Goldberg, et al., *Energy Efficiency and Economic Development in Illinois* (Dec. 1998).

<sup>13</sup> See, e.g., Environmental Law and Policy Center, et al., *Repowering the Midwest: The Clean Energy Development Plan for the Heartland* (2001); Supplemental Request and Petition to Intervene by Environmental Law and Policy Center, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Nuclear Energy Information Service, and Public Citizen, Docket No. 52-007-ESP (May 5, 2004), at 9-14 and Ex. 3-13.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

None of the reasons that the Draft EIS presents for rejecting clean energy alternatives withstand scrutiny. First, the Draft EIS claims that wind, solar, and other alternatives are not reasonable alternatives to new nuclear power because they do not generate baseload power. (Draft EIS at 8-17, 8-18). As explained in Section I.B above, however, the proper purpose of this project is meeting the future energy needs of Illinois, not creating baseload power. In addition, as the Draft EIS acknowledges, wind, solar, and other energy sources can contribute to a combination of alternatives that can serve the purpose of creating baseload power. (Draft EIS at 8-21, 8-22). Therefore, wind and solar power should not be rejected as reasonable alternatives to new nuclear power.

The Draft EIS is also erroneous in suggesting that wind, solar, and other alternatives should be rejected because they are “too expensive” or not “economical.” In fact, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration’s 2005 Annual Energy Outlook (“AEO 2005”) projects that wind power would cost only 4.5 to 6 cents per kWh.<sup>15</sup> By contrast, nuclear power is projected to cost 6.8 cents per kWh, leading the AEO 2005 to state that new nuclear power is “not likely to be economical.”<sup>16</sup> Similarly, a recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study projected that new nuclear power would cost 6.7 cents per kWh.<sup>17</sup> The NRC Staff has not explained how wind, solar, and other energy sources can be rejected as too expensive, when the U.S. DOE’s own projects show that new nuclear power is more costly and not likely to be economical.

Finally, the Draft EIS rejects a combination of clean energy alternatives on the ground that any combination would purportedly not be environmentally preferable to new nuclear power. (Draft EIS at 8-21, 8-22). In reality, however, the Draft EIS’s own analysis demonstrates that many more resources would be impacted by nuclear power than by clean energy alternatives. The Draft EIS concludes that nuclear power would have land use, air quality, thermal, aesthetic, water use and quality, human health, accident, ecological, and waste management impacts. (DEIS at 5-80 to 5-82, Table 5-15). By contrast, the only impacts that wind power would have are fairly minor impacts regarding land use, bird deaths, aesthetics, and noise. (Draft EIS at 8-17). Certainly an energy source that only has land use, bird deaths, aesthetic and noise impacts should be considered environmentally preferable to an energy source that impacts at least 10 resources including human health and air and water quality.

Similarly, the only major impact from natural gas generation identified by the Draft EIS is air quality impacts. (DEIS at 8-23). In reality, however, a combination of alternatives that uses a proper amount of wind and solar power would significantly reduce those air quality impacts. (DEIS at 8-13). In addition, the other impacts of natural gas are minor,<sup>18</sup> the Draft EIS

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<sup>15</sup> Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005 With Projects to 2025 (Jan. 2005), available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/index.html>.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*

<sup>17</sup> Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power (2003), available at <http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/>.

<sup>18</sup> The Draft EIS does assert that the ecological, water quality, and aesthetic impacts of natural gas range could be MODERATE or even LARGE. (DEIS 8-14, 8-15, 8-23). This claim that the impacts of natural gas on these resources might be greater than that of nuclear power is, however, arbitrary and capricious as no reason is provided for why building a natural gas plant on the Clinton site would have any greater ecological, aesthetic or water impacts than a new nuclear power plant.

acknowledges that human health impacts from natural gas are “not expected . . . [to] be detectable,” (DEIS at 8-13), and the NRC Staff have not claimed that natural gas presents the type of accident risks that nuclear power does. As with wind, it is arbitrary and capricious to suggest that an energy source that presents human health and accident risks is environmentally preferable to a clean energy alternative that does not. Certainly, those energy sources in combination, along with energy efficiency efforts, could not be considered to have greater environmental impacts than new nuclear power. Therefore, the NRC Staff must reconsider its rejection of clean energy alternatives, and engage in the rigorous and objective analysis of such alternatives that is required by NEPA but not found in the Draft EIS.

## **II. The Draft EIS Fails to Analyze the Impact of the Illinois Nuclear Moratorium Law.**

Illinois law states that no new nuclear plant can be located *anywhere* in Illinois until and unless the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“IEPA”) makes a finding that the U.S. government has identified a means for disposal of nuclear waste. In particular, 220 ILCS 5/8-406(c) provides as follows:

After the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1987, no construction shall commence on any new nuclear power plant to be located within this State, and no certificate of public convenience and necessity or other authorization shall be issued therefor by the Commission, until the Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency finds that the United States Government, through its authorized agency, has identified and approved a demonstrable technology or means for the disposal of high level nuclear waste, or until such construction has been specifically approved by a statute enacted by the General Assembly.

The IEPA has not made any such finding. Nor could the IEPA legitimately do so because no license for the suggested Yucca Mountain facility has been applied for, much less “approved.” In fact, the Department of Energy missed its plan to apply for such a license by the end of 2004, and recently delayed the planned filing even more.<sup>19</sup> In addition, a federal court of appeals last year struck down the U.S. EPA’s radiation safety guidelines for analyzing the Yucca Mountain proposal, and there have been recent allegations that various scientific studies used to justify the geologic suitability of the site were falsified. Plainly, there is little chance that a high-level waste repository will be approved, much less opened, in the near future. In addition, even if Yucca Mountain is approved, that site does not have the capacity to store all of the high-level wastes that will be created by existing nuclear power plants, much less a proposed new Clinton 2 plant.

Given these facts, it is plain that this ESP proceeding is premature and that Exelon’s ESP application should be denied until such time as Illinois lifts its moratorium. In essence, the moratorium answers with a resounding “no” the question presented in this ESP proceeding: Is the Clinton site (or any other site in Illinois) appropriate for a new nuclear power plant? Therefore, the NRC cannot approve the Clinton site and must deny the ESP at this time.

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<sup>19</sup> Suzanne Struglinski, DOE Expects More Delays in Filing for Yucca License, Las Vegas Sun (May 5, 2005).

Amazingly, despite the clear import of the Illinois nuclear moratorium, the Draft EIS does not even mention, much less analyze, the moratorium. This omission is especially glaring given that the Draft EIS includes an entire Appendix listing the “authorizations, permits, and certifications” that Exelon would have to obtain before construction the proposed Clinton 2 plant. Plainly, the NRC Staff must address the moratorium as part of the ESP process.

### **III. The Draft EIS Fails to Consider or Improperly Minimizes Impacts Related to the Fuel Cycle, Waste Storage, and Safety.**

The Draft EIS is also insufficient under NEPA because it fails to adequately consider the environmental impacts of new nuclear power. As part of the NEPA process, the NRC is required to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of a proposed action. *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). The discussion of environmental impacts is designed to provide a “scientific and analytical basis” for comparing the various alternatives for achieving the project’s goals. 40 C.F.R. 1502.16; *DuBois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture*, 102 F.3d 1273, 1286 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1996). A proper analysis of the alternatives, therefore, can be carried out only if the NRC provides a complete and accurate compilation of the environmental consequences of all reasonable alternatives. Unfortunately, the Draft EIS does not do so in a number of key areas.

First, the Draft EIS fails to adequately consider the environmental impacts of the entire fuel cycle from nuclear power. The Draft EIS’s conclusion that the impacts of exposure to radioactive wastes from uranium mining and processing are SMALL (DEIS at Table 5-15) fails to take into consideration particular impacts and new information. For example, the mining, enrichment, and fabrication of uranium fuel releases radionuclides such as Rn-222 can have significant adverse health effects. Similarly, the reliance on Tables S-3 and S-4 to conclude that the impacts of the uranium fuel cycle are SMALL fails to consider that new information regarding fuel reprocessing, the lack of a high-level waste depository, and changes in the transport of waste that may alter the conclusions about impacts included in those Tables. In fact, the regulations setting forth these Tables call for consideration of such new information, as they note that the Tables are simply a “basis for evaluating” such impacts and “may be supplemented.” 10 C.F.R. § 51.51. The NRC Staff should do so here.

Second, the Draft EIS does not consider the impacts of the storage of high-level nuclear waste. Despite noting some concern that the proposed Yucca Mountain repository will not open in a timely fashion, the NRC Staff continues to rely on the Waste Confidence Rule (“WCR”), 10 C.F.R. 51.23, to conclude that any impacts from the storage of high-level waste would be “acceptable.” (Draft EIS at 6-14). The Staff’s discussion of this issue, however, is clearly inadequate. The WCR is based on the assumption that sufficient repository capacity will exist to store all waste created by nuclear plants. As described in Section II above, however, the Draft EIS significantly downplays the significant delays and safety concerns that raise serious questions about whether Yucca Mountain will ever open. More importantly, the possible construction of new nuclear power plants entirely undermines the WCR. As previously mentioned, the proposed Yucca Mountain facility does not even have the capacity to store all of the high-level wastes that will be created by existing nuclear power plants, much less new plants.



Therefore, the NRC must consider the impacts of the storage of additional high level waste at the Clinton site.


Third, the Draft EIS fails to adequately consider the safety risks that would exist at the proposed Clinton 2 nuclear plant. Although the Draft EIS discusses the impacts of various postulated accidents, the document does not discuss the likelihood or impacts that would result if there were to be a terrorist act at the Clinton plant. This omission occurs at a time heightened security concerns and, apparently, real vulnerability of nuclear plants to infiltration and attack. In fact, the National Academy of Sciences recently concluded that "there are currently no requirements in place to defend against the kind of larger-scale, premeditated, skillful attacks that were carried out on September 11, 2001, whether or not a commercial aircraft is involved."<sup>20</sup> This is an issue that needs to be fully evaluated before any new nuclear power plants are sited.

#### IV. Conclusion

As demonstrated above, the Draft EIS simply fails to satisfy the basic requirements of NEPA or provide the information necessary for the NRC to ensure that its licensing decision is not "inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public," 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d). In particular, the Draft EIS improperly adopts Exelon's stated business goal for the project, and improperly rejects reasonable energy efficiency and clean energy alternatives to new nuclear power. The Draft EIS also fails to consider the import of the Illinois nuclear moratorium, which declares all potential sites in Illinois inappropriate for new nuclear power. Finally, the Draft EIS does not adequately consider the environmental impacts of the fuel cycle, waste storage, and safety concerns. A proper consideration of these issues would demonstrate that the ESP should be denied, because there are better, cheaper, safer, and environmentally preferable ways to meet future energy needs in Illinois and elsewhere.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Draft EIS and for your consideration of the comments.

Sincerely,



Shannon Fisk  
One of the attorneys for the  
Environmental Law and Policy Center

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<sup>20</sup> Committee on the Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, National Research Council, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report (2005), at 47.