

For Information Only. Passport is the Application of Record.

Nuclear Condition Reports Initiated Last Day

AR Owed To Facility: HNP

Criteria: AR Type = NCR; AR Origination Date >= CurrentDate - 1 Day; AR Owed to Facility = HNP; Sorted by AR Number Ascending

AR NBR	AR TYPE	ORIGINATION DATE	DISCOVERY DATE	STATUS	ORIGINATOR	ORIG. DEPT	PRIORITY
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AR Owed To Facility: HNP

00116959 NCR 20040202 20040202 H/APPR

Subject: FIRE IN FIRE AREA [REDACTED] COULD CAUSE LOSS OF [REDACTED]

Description: FOUND THAT THE [REDACTED] WHICH IS CREDITED TO BE AVAILABLE DURING A FIRE IN THE [REDACTED] COULD BE DAMAGED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA. THIS DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE CURRENT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS. THIS IS A HISTORICAL ERROR. THIS WAS FOUND DURING THE ONGOING REVIEW OF THE COMMENTS MADE BY SARGENT & LUNDY ON TA SK 6 OF THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS REEVALUATION.

[REDACTED]

AND [REDACTED] THIS CHILLER IS CREDITED FOR A FIRE IN THIS AREA. [REDACTED] WHICH IS MAINLY THE TRAIN OF EQUIPMENT IS THE CREDITED TRAIN OF EQUIPMENT FOR A FIRE IN THIS AREA. THE [REDACTED] IS NOT CREDITED FOR A FIRE IN THIS AREA. WITHOUT THIS [REDACTED] THE EQUIPMENT CREDITED FOR A FIRE IN THIS AREA MAY NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED COOLING. THE MOST LIMITING COMPONENT [REDACTED] EVALUATION OF HOW THE LOSS OF COOLING WILL AFFECT THIS ROOM AND HOW LONG THE ROOM WILL TAKE TO REACH A POINT WHERE [REDACTED] WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION IN THIS CONDITION (E) (R) ONLY) WILL NEED TO BE PERFORMED. [REDACTED] GIVES INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO RESPOND TO [REDACTED] INCLUDING ACTIONS TO PROP OPEN THE DOOR TO [REDACTED] THIS WILL REQUIRE THE ADDITION OF A 1-HOUR FIRE WATCH TO THE [REDACTED] THE HOURLY FIRE WATCH ALREADY PASSES THROUGH THESE AREAS DURING ROUNDS.

AR Originating Facility: HNP

RHODES, ROBERT OPER SUPPORT

Attributes:

1A POT'L OPER/REPORT	Y
2 SUPERVISOR REVIEW	
2A CR VALID?	Y
2B FURTHER INVN REQD	Y
2C RECOMMENDED OWNER	
2D OPER/REPORT ISSUE	N
2E MAINT RULE APPLIC	Y
2F SYSTEM	5195
3 OPERATIONS REVIEW	
3A IMMEDIATE REPT ISSUE	N
3B1 OPER ISSUE	N
3B2 REPORT ISSUE	N
3B3 REV	
3B OCR	N
3C TRACKING NUMBER	
4 REG AFF REVIEW	
4A1 OPER ISSUE	
4A2 REPORT ISSUE	
4A OPER/REPORT ISSUE	
4B FOLLOWUP ASG REQD	
4C T. SPEC VIOLATION	
4D ADD'L REPORT REQD	
4E PNSC/CIRP REQD	
5 CLASSIFN/ASSIGNMNT	
5A CR VALID?	
5B FURTHER INVN REQD	

EPM

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Nuclear Condition Reports Initiated Last Day

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AR Owed To Facility: HNP

00116967 NCR 20040202 20040202 H/APPR

Subject: FIRE IN [REDACTED] COULD CAUSE LOSS OF [REDACTED]

Description: FOUND THAT THE CONTROL CIRCUIT FOR [REDACTED] WHICH IS CREDITED TO BE AVAILABLE DURING A FIRE IN [REDACTED] COULD BE DAMAGED BY A FIRE IN THIS AREA. THIS DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE CURRENT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS. THIS IS A HISTORICAL ERROR. THIS WAS FOUND DURING THE ONGOING REVIEW OF THE COMMENTS MADE BY SARGENT & LUNDY ON TASK 6 OF THE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS RE EVALUATION.

[REDACTED] THIS VALVE HAS THE POWER TO THE HYDROMOTOR SUPPLIED FROM [REDACTED] IN THIS INVERTER AND ASSOCIATED BUS ARE LOCATED IN FIRE AREA [REDACTED] A FIRE IN THIS AREA COULD DAMAGE [REDACTED] WITH THIS WOULD FAIL THIS VALVE OPEN TO MAINTAIN [REDACTED] WOULD REQUIRE EITHER CYCLING OF THE DC MOV OUTLET VALVE, A MANUAL ACTION TO LOCALLY THROTTLE THE VALVE, OR CYCLING OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WITH NO OTHER CONTINGENCY. THIS WILL REQUIRE THE ADDITION OF A 1 HOUR FIRE WATCH TO [REDACTED] THE HOURLY FIRE WATCH ALREADY PASSES THROUGH THESE AREAS DURING ROUNDS.

AR Originating Facility: HNP

RHODES, ROBERT OPER SUPPORT

Attributes:

1A POTL OPER/REPORT Y
 2 SUPERVISOR REVIEW
 2A CR VALID? Y
 2B FURTHER INVN REQD Y
 2C RECOMMENDED OWNER
 2D OPER/REPORT ISSUE N
 2E MAINT RULE APPLIC
 2F SYSTEM 3065
 3 OPERATIONS REVIEW
 3A IMMED REPT ISSUE N
 3B1 OPER ISSUE N
 3B2 REPORT ISSUE N
 3B3 REW
 3B OCR N
 3C TRACKING NUMBER
 4 REG AFF REVIEW
 4A1 OPER ISSUE
 4A2 REPORT ISSUE
 4A OPER/REPORT ISSUE
 4B FOLLOWUP ASG REQD
 4C T. SPEC VIOLATION
 4D ADD'L REPORT REQD
 4E PNSC/CIRP REQD
 5 CLASSIFN/ASSIGNMNT
 5A CR VALID?
 5B FURTHER INVN REQD

Description of Problem:

As described in the AR text a fire in Fire Area [REDACTED] could result in the loss of the [REDACTED] which is credited for SSD. Specifically [REDACTED] has its control power from [REDACTED] located in fire zone [REDACTED]. A fire in this area could damage the [REDACTED].

Evaluation:

Description of Area

The Control Room Fire Area [REDACTED] is composed of two separate fire zones [REDACTED].

Occupancy

Fire zone [REDACTED] contains 480 Volt and lower electrical cabinets, the kitchen area and [REDACTED].

Boundaries

The fire zone [REDACTED] is separated for the control room by a non rated concrete wall with sealed openings and two metal doors. Within fire zone [REDACTED] the kitchen and [REDACTED] are separated from the main cabinet room by full height walls with sealed openings and metal doors.

Combustible Loading

The in-situ combustible load is considered negligible [REDACTED] there are no cable trays or other significant exposed materials. The only significant materials are located in the electrical cabinets within the room. [REDACTED] classifies the entire fire area [REDACTED] a "no storage location" and transient combustibles may not be left in the area.

Fire Protection Features

The [REDACTED] has automatic detection and the kitchen area is protected by an automatic sprinkler fed from the potable water system. The main termination cabinet room contains automatic detection. The fire zone contains a hose station and CO2 fire extinguisher coverage for manual fire suppression.

Postulated Fires

The cabinets containing the chiller circuits are located within the main cabinet room. For the purposes of this fire scenario, fires originating in the kitchen and surge tank areas are not considered to be able to cause damage to the chiller circuits due to the combination of physical separation, lack of intervening combustibles, the automatic detection and the suppression in the kitchen area.

E44

The HNP Fire IPEEE was submitted to the NRC staff via letter HNP-95-061. The IPEEE contains a detailed discussion of the postulated effects of a fire originating the electrical cabinets within the control room fire area. The following are details from the analysis.

- Based on the ventilation rate the time available to suppress a fire before the smoke is assumed to reach a level of visual impairment is 15-30 minutes.
- Due to the presence of early warning detection in the fire zone the fire is assumed to be detected at incipient stage.
- For a cabinet fire, if a solid intervening wall or barrier exists between cabinets the fire is assumed to be contained entirely within the cabinet.

The cabinets of concern within the [REDACTED] are the [REDACTED] E44

[REDACTED] The loss of either the power panel or inverter will cause a loss of [REDACTED]. Based on physical proximity, the worst case is the separation between the [REDACTED] which are separated by approximately 10 ft.

Effects of a Postulated Fire

The panels are 480 V and below and are solid enclosed metal cabinets. Based on the IPEEE and fire events data, a fire originating in closed metal cabinets of this type will generate sufficient smoke to initiate a detection system control room alarm. Before the fire can develop into a larger fire it will self extinguish due to oxygen starvation within the cabinet or be suppressed using manual suppression by the Control Room Operators. Because of the lack of intervening combustibles and the spatial separation between the cabinets, any one cabinet fire is not postulated to damage the adjacent cabinets of concern. Due to the lack of transient combustibles in the area a transient fire with size to cause damage to a cabinet is not postulated.

Conclusion

For the most credible fire impacting these circuits, the fire will be confined to either the [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. This will only impact equipment powered from the [REDACTED]. Should this occur, since offsite power should not be lost and [REDACTED] equipment, while not credited, would be available to mitigate this fire, this condition does not significantly degrade level of safety of the plant.