

Point Beach Questions for Followup based on last outage ISI summary report.

- 1) Provide drawings for 1CH-10 core drilled hole in keyway area of liner plate and condition reports/evaluations accepting corrosion in this area (Code Category E4.11, E4.12 and E5.30).
(Reason selected - very little margin to acceptable limits). Counts toward PI&R sample.
- 2) Provide drawings for component 1Q-15 which received a visual VT-1 and UT as supplemental inspection October 01, 2002 under 01U1-L004).
(Reason selected - not sure why licensee inspects a component without a Code Category/designation required VT-1 and UT exam). Counts towards PI&R sample.
- 3) Provide corrective action documents which evaluated IN 91-05 and supporting documents which directed inspection of the water level nozzles for the safety injection accumulators. Explain why time lag between IN and identification of nozzle indications and identify any remaining areas that require augmented inspections and the schedule for these inspections.
(Reason selected - not sure why it took licensee over ten years to implement/identify vulnerability of nozzles in IN 91-05). Counts towards PI&R timeliness sample.
- 4) What new thermal sleeves were added to reactor vessel internals in September of 2002 (baseline VT-3 under summary 004100)? Please provide all welding related records and Code repair/replacement records if these were welded to a pressure boundary component.
Reason selected - not sure why licensee is installing new thermal sleeves inside reactor vessel (might be for interior of CRDMS which they had to remove to complete J-groove weld exams). Counts towards PI&R sample may count toward review of welds to Class 1 system.
- 5) Provide summary report 004500 for CRD housings 1-49 (Code cat B-O item B14.10). Specifically, provide exam report identifying linear recordable indication and record accepting this conditions.
(Reason - counts as indication evaluated and left in service).
- 6) Why were the limited examinations on the reactor vessel head to shell weld (summary 010000, cat B-B) and Shell to outlet nozzle (summary 010800, cat B-D) not identified during the prior ISI interval? If they were why isn't there an existing relief request to cover these?
(Reason - counts as PI&R threshold evaluation point if this was error from last interval and not entered into corrective action system).
- 7) Provide the governing procedure that assigns responsibility and identifies how limited ISI examinations are tracked to ensure that relief requests are issued. Provide an example from the prior Unit 1 ISI examination summary report of who is responsible for issuing the relief requests for the limited examinations and by what milestone dates actions need to occur so this happens.
Reason - Licensee has a large number of limited reactor vessel examinations and not sure why this was not identified in prior interval and submitted in current program. Also, if process not in place to track with owner and milestone relief requests may not occur. Counts toward PI&R threshold evaluation.
- 8) Provide UT procedure used and the examination record for pipe to elbow weld (summary 032300) and pipe to valve weld (summary 039400) - cat R-A, item R1.11.

Reason - Thermal fatigue category requires expanded exam volumes which did not get into procedures at Clinton and could result in deficient exam. Counts toward the sample of Code examinations observed/reviewed.

9) Provide procedure/document which identify's the required examination extent (coverage) and type (vol/surf/vis) for category R-A item R1.20 weldments. If your basis is Code Case N-578-1 please include a copy of the NRC safety evaluation which has approved use of this Code Case and your local procedures that implement this document.

Reason - Risk based topical report does not contain these requirements and our NRC safety evaluations do not endorse CC N-578-1, so licensee procedures must define this. Counts towards PI&R threshold evaluation if licensee is not doing this in a procedurally controlled manner.

10) For the 2 inch branch connection and weldolet in the SIS (summaries 348450, 348460 cat R-A, item R1.20), why was a PT examination done instead of a volumetric examination as specified in CC N-578-1? Provide a copy of these examinations and the governing document which specified the extent of these examinations and the technical basis for this exam.

Reason - appears to deviate from CC N-578 (requires volumetric) and may not have a technically defensible basis since PT only identifies outside initiated flaws. Counts toward PI&R sample.

11) The body-to-bonnet joint was seal welded for a number of Code valves in the SI and chemical volume control systems. Were these activities performed under a design change process? If not, what evaluations reviews were performed to confirm the affect on joint design, bolt preload, bolt corrosion, and flange integrity and provide a copy of these documents. Was the welding done in accordance with Code welding procedures?

Reason -Never seen seal welds used as frequently at any other site to fix leaking joints. Counts toward PI&R sample.

12) What FME needed to be removed from RHR & SI system (reference 2 inch hole and vent valve installation under WO 0202449, 0205506, CAP 030632, 030647)? Provide documents which identify source, extent of FME and items retrieved.

Reason - FME in RHR system can affect many risk significant components. Count towards PI&R.

13) Provide repair replacement records (Section XI, Articles IWA-4000, 5000, 7000), including any associated corrective action records for reactor coolant valves/piping under WO 9812062 (RR 2002-0066, 67, 98, 104).

Reason -No reason given for design change and it appears to involve pressure boundary welding of a class 1 system which inspectors were told had not occurred. Counts towards review of repair replacement activities.

14) Provide repair replacement records (Section XI, Articles IWA-4000, 5000, 7000), including any associated corrective action records for safety injection valves/pipe pup piece under WO 0207877 (RR 2002-0082).

Reason -No reason given for design change and it appears to involve pressure boundary welding of a class 2 system which inspectors were told had not occurred. Counts towards review of repair replacement activities.

15) Provide repair replacement records (Section XI, Articles IWA-4000, 5000, 7000), including any associated corrective action records for modified safety injection nozzles under WO 0212602, 0212615, 0212696, 0212682 (RR 2002-0095, 101, 103).

Reason -Appears to involve a substantive design change and pressure boundary welding of a class 2 system which inspectors were told had not occurred. Counts towards review of repair replacement activities.