



Entergy

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

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OCAN050508

May 26, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Response to NRC Guidance Regarding
Mitigation Strategies
Arkansas Nuclear One – Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

REFERENCES:

1. March 15, 2002, *Entergy Operations, Inc. – Response to Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures* (OCAN030202)
2. February 25, 2005, letter from J. E. Dyer to Holders of Licenses for Operating Power Reactors as listed in Enclosure 1, *NRC Staff Guidance for Use in Achieving Satisfactory Compliance with February 25, 2002, Order Section B.5.b* (OCNA020511)

Dear Sir or Madam:

The NRC issued an Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures (Order EA-02-026 or Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order) dated February 25, 2002, for Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO).

Order EA-02-026 imposed requirements on nuclear power plants licensed pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Section III.A of the Order required licensees to implement certain changes in physical security and emergency planning on an interim basis until final requirements were established. Among other requirements, Entergy was required to complete implementation of the requirements of Section II.B.5.b of Order EA-02-026 by August 31, 2002.

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Subsequently, the NRC issued Orders dated April 29, 2003, *Issuance of Order Requiring Compliance with Revised Design Basis Threat for Operating Power Reactors* (Order EA-03-086 or Design Basis Threat Order) and other security related Orders (collectively "Orders") for ANO. In many ways, Order EA-03-086 complemented or superseded the interim measures imposed by Order EA-02-026.

As required by Order EA-03-086, the plans for the above-mentioned licensed facility have been implemented. Subsequently, Entergy was requested to respond to your letter dated February 25, 2005, *NRC Staff Guidance for Use in Achieving Satisfactory Compliance with February 25, 2002, Order Section B.5.b*, (NRC B.5.b Guidance) by May 31, 2005, and to implement appropriate enhancement to current mitigation strategies by August 31, 2005. Specifically, nuclear power plant licensees were requested by Enclosure 2 of the February 25, 2005, letter, *Developing Mitigating Strategies/Guidance for Nuclear Power Plants to Respond to Loss of Large Areas of the Plant in Accordance with B.5.b of the February 25, 2002, Order*, to review the Areas of Consideration delineated in Attachment A to that enclosure and evaluate additional considerations for potential inclusion in the licensees' mitigating strategies that licensees deemed appropriate in accordance with the expectations in Attachment B to that enclosure.

Subsequently, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), in conjunction with the NEI Security Working Group, developed and issued guidance for licensee use (NEI Guidance) to assist licensees in responding to the February 25, 2005, letter.

As requested in the February 25, 2005, letter, Entergy has reviewed the information in Attachments A and B in accordance with the NEI Guidance and is hereby submitting, as a Safeguards Information enclosure to this letter, Entergy's evaluation of the information the NRC provided. The enclosure reflects the results of the review of the guidance and describes the considerations that Entergy either has already, or intends to, implement at ANO by August 31, 2005.

The primary guiding principles used in the conduct of this evaluation were (1) whether or not equipment and resources were "readily available," and (2) if equipment is readily available, can it be effectively utilized in a licensee's mitigating strategy. Entergy considered "readily available" to mean that the equipment or resources were already licensee owned, under contract, or part of an existing memorandum of understanding. Further, even if equipment and resources are readily available, the second criterion is to ensure that the equipment can be used in a mitigating strategy in an effective manner. Even if the equipment is readily available, it is of no value if it cannot be effective in implementing the mitigating strategy.

In accordance with these principles, mitigative strategies are being implemented to address the NRC B.5.b Guidance. These strategies are considered to be commitments for that purpose and will be managed in accordance with Entergy's commitment management system.

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The attachment to this letter is the schedule that Entergy has developed regarding the implementation of identified commitments resulting from the evaluations documented in the enclosure.

Respectfully submitted,



Dale E. James
Acting Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

DEJ/rbm

Enclosure – ANO's Evaluation of NRC B.5.b Guidance

Attachment – Schedule for Completion of Actions and List of Regulatory Commitments

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