

release

From: "Connolly, James W." <James.Connolly@nmcco.com>
To: <pll@nrc.gov> P. Loudon, RIII
Date: 4/12/04 7:53PM
Subject: Questions Pertaining To PBNP RCS Vent Path Event

Pat,

The following is a response to the questions that you forwarded to me this afternoon:

1. How many or what barriers in place to prevent installation of the Steam Generator nozzles without a hot side were broken during the event that recently occurred at Point Beach?

Answer:

- * The 50.59 for the nozzle dam installation procedure specified that there be a hot side vent prior to installation of the nozzle dams.
- * The PBNP commitment to comply with Generic Letter 88-17 as it pertains to a hot side vent was not complied with.
- * The identified condition was not assessed using Safety Risk Monitor in a configuration with the nozzles dams installed without a hot side vent.
- * The procedure for performing Infrequently Performed Evolution briefings was not complied with since it was not signed by a senior line manager. The on-shift Engineering representative signed as the senior line manager which is contrary to procedural requirements.
- * The procedure governing reduced inventory requirements (OP 4F) was not written in conformance with plant commitments and permitted nozzle dams to be installed with out a hot side vent being open. Additionally, the procedure was not complied with as written.

2. When in an orange path risk condition, what controls were in place regarding schedule logic changes.

Answer:

At the time of the event, there were no controls in place regarding schedule logic changes.

CC: <rmm3@nrc.gov>

K-1