Millstone Power Station
Operational Focus Report
Tuesday, April 19, 2005



Dominion NBU Vision: We are a safe, competitive, world-class nuclear operator.

Dominion NBU Mission: Achieve superior safety standards, foster a rewarding work environment, achieve superior plant operations, grow shareholder wealth, and be a valued corporate neighbor.

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AM Meeting Notes:

The web version of the Millstone Status Report can be viewed at:

http://gamma/psrs_prod/StatusReport.asp?station=Millstone

Unit 2 Operations Turnover Report is now available from Document Explorer – Plant Reports, or
http://nwdata4.ct.dominionnet.com:8080/Documentation/Documents/Plant Reports/Ops Turnover Report Unit 2/1-turn.doc
Unit 3 Operations Turnover Report is now available from Document Explorer – Plant Reports, or
http://nwdata4.ct.dominionnet.com:8080/Documentation/Documents/Plant Reports/Ops Turnover Report Unit 3/1-turn.doc

Health Physics Daily Job Step Reports:

Unit 1 Daily Status Report:	http://mphplinux.ct.dominionnet.com/alara/js/unit1/index.html
Unit 2 Daily Status Report:	http://mphplinux.ct.dominionnet.com/alara/js/unit2/index.html
Unit 3 Daily Status Report:	http://mphplinux.ct.dominionnet.com/alara/js/unit3/index.html

A14

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MILLSTONE NUCLEAR STATUS REPORT FOR 04/19/05

Formatted: 04/19/05 04:18

OPERATIONS

View Tolerances

Last Change Date Unit 2: 04/19/05 03:56 Last Change Date Unit 3: 04/17/05 05:09			
	Unit 2	**Unit 3**	
Power Level	0	100	%
Electrical Output (GROSS)	0	1215	MWe
Days Online (O) or Shutdown (S)	11 S	346 O	days
Days Since Last Automatic Trip	400	847	days
Days Since Any Trip from Power	400	847	days
RCS Boron Concentration	2182	2206	ppm
RCS Identified Leakage	0	0.103	gpm
RCS Unidentified Leakage	0	0.155	gpm
RCS Total Leakage	0	0.258	gpm
Containment Sump Inleakage	0	0.04	gpm
Containment Temperature	76	104.3	deg F
Non-RCA Catch Containers	7	7	
Lighted Control Room Annunciators	242	3	
Active Temporary Mods, Total	1	0	
Active Temporary Mods, >6 Months	1	0	
Chemistry Index	0.00	↓ 0.00	
Condenser Air Ejector Flow Rate, Total	0	9	scfm
Service Water Temperature	44		deg F
Protected Train	Alpha	Bravo	
PRA Color	N/A	Green	
Comments			

LIMITING ACTION STATEMENTS

None

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Mark# Plant Issue #	Event Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
UNIT 3 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	11/16/03	3	UNPLANNED LCO/TRM ACTIONS ENTERED IN THE LAST 24 HR/WEEKEND: - None CHALLENGES TO GENERATION/ NUCLEAR SAFETY: - None SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FROM THE LAST 24 HOURS/WEEKEND: - Weekly Storm Drain analysis DSN-006 MAJOR SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS INCLUDE: - Routine Surveillances ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS: - 3SSR*CTV19A & D restoration to Operable status EXCEPTIONS TO SCHEDULED WORK RELEASE/RETURN: - None SIGNIFICANT CONDITION REPORTS FROM THE LAST 24 HR/Weekend: - None OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS DUE IN THE NEXT 7 DAYS: - None	04/17/05 03:49
UNIT 2			UNPLANNED TECH SPEC/TRM ACTIONS ENTERED IN THE LAST 24 HR/WEEKEND: - None CHALLENGES TO GENERATION/ NUCLEAR SAFETY: - None SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FROM LAST 24 HR: - Restored charging suction header. - Restored control room ventilation. - Commenced control room ventilation testing. - Installed transition spool piece for venting RCS. MAJOR SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES FOR THE NEXT 24 HR:	04/17/05

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS			- Complete control room ventilation testing. - Drain RCS to hot leg centerline. EXCEPTIONS TO SCHEDULED WORK RELEASE/RETURN: - None	03:49
	11/27/04	2	SIGNIFICANT CONDITION REPORTS FROM THE LAST 24 HR/Weekend: - None - OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS DUE IN THE NEXT 7 DAYS: - OD#MP2-007-05 for Hanger 405425 on RBCCW having loose bolts due on 4/21/05.	

POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE EVENTS

Event Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
03/23/05	3	CR-05-02350, AR 05001487, Impact of Inoperable Emergency Diesel Sequencer on Associated Emergency Diesel Generator. Licensing has the lead with a revised due date of 04/29/05. Licensing Point of Contact: Bartron.	04/18/05 15:29
04/18/05	2	CR-05-03354, AR 05002108-04, Analysis Results of Substance Discovered on Pressurizer Heater Penetration. ENGSPRT has the lead with a due date of 4/26/05 to provide input for the Reportability Determination. Licensing Point of Contact: Bartron.	04/18/05 15:28
04/18/05	2	CR-05-03527, AR 05002210-04, VCT Outlet Valve Failed to Close. ENGSPRT has the lead with a due date of 4/29/05 to provide input for the Reportability Determination. Licensing Point of Contact: Fredericks.	04/18/05 15:26
04/18/05	2	CR-05-03463, AR 05002164-03, Data Sent to the NRC During the Quarterly ERDS Operability Test Was Not Useable Due to the Unit Being Shutdown. Emergency Preparedness has the lead with a due date of 4/28/05 to provide input for the Reportability Determination. Licensing Point of Contact: Elmaghrabi.	04/18/05 15:26
04/12/05	2	CR-05-03196, AR 05002002-03, A Significant Mixture of Water and Oil Leakage Noted on the -22 foot Flooring Around Both RCP Oil Collection Tanks, T-109A and T-109B. ENGSPRT has the lead with a due date of 4/24/05 to provide input for the Reportability Determination. Licensing Point of Contact: Cleary.	04/18/05 15:23
		CR-05-03129, AR 05001957-02, 2-MS-241 Failed As-Found Set Pressure Testing of 2730B.	

04/12/05	2	Licensing has the lead with a due date of 04/22/05 to document that this condition was not reportable. Licensing Point of Contact: McIntosh.	04/18/05 15:23
04/12/05	2	CR-05-03112, AR 05001945-04, SP2605H, Rev 11, In May 1998 May Invalidate CIAS SO2605H Test of SSP-16.1 and 16.2. SPV2OPS has the lead with a due date of 04/22/05 to provide input for the Reportability Determination. Licensing Point of Contact: Closius.	04/18/05 15:23
04/12/05	2	CR-05-03046, AR 05001922-05, Snubber Installed in Upper Hanger Location 413018A Has No Oil in Reservoir. Licensing has the lead with a due date of 04/24/05 to document that this condition was not reportable. Licensing Point of Contact: McIntosh.	04/18/05 15:22

SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS

Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
01/20/05	3	Emergent Equipment Issues - Steam generator sample containment isolation valves are failing remote position indication surveillances at an increased frequency. SSR*CTV19D appears to have the the most failures. SSR*CTV19A and B have also failed recently. Currently SSR*CTV19A and D are inoperable. Need to determine coarse of action and address common mode failure issues for all valves. ***Unit 3 Focus Items can be found on the Shift Orders on the Ops port on the shared drives	04/13/05 02:23
03/12/04	2	Emergent Equipment Issues: - None ***Unit 2 Focus Items can be found in the Shift Orders on the Ops Port on the shared drives***	03/24/05 03:23

UPCOMING INSPECTIONS/SITE VISITS

From Visit Date	To Visit Date	Inspector/Visitor	Comment	Last Change Date
03/28/05	05/20/05	NRC - Mike Modes	MP2 RPV Head Replacement	12/28/04 09:13
04/11/05	04/15/05	NRC - Mike Modes	MP2 ISI and NRC Bulletin 2004-01	04/12/05 17:24
04/27/05	04/27/05	MP3 Joint Owners Mtg	Meeting Date tentatively rescheduled for 04/27/05.	04/05/05 07:45
05/09/05	05/13/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety - ALARA. ALARA Planning and Controls. MP2	04/12/05 17:26
06/06/05	06/10/05	NRC - Roy Fuhrmeister	Triennial Fire Protection Inspection - Week 1 - MP2	04/04/05 14:51
06/13/05	06/24/05	Self-Assessment - INPO	INPO Mid-Cycle Self Assessment (Internal review only)	12/21/04 14:58
06/20/05	06/24/05	NRC - Roy Fuhrmeister	Triennial Fire Protection Inspection - Week 2 - MP2	04/04/05 14:51
06/28/05	06/29/05	MSRC Meeting	MSRC Meeting at MILLSTONE	03/09/05 09:40
08/08/05	08/12/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Public Radiation Safety / RETS MP2 & MP3	12/20/04 14:35
08/29/05	09/02/05	NRC	SSDI - Week 1 - MP3	02/08/05 13:47
08/30/05	08/31/05	MSRC Meeting	MSRC Meeting at Millstone	10/26/04 15:55
09/05/05	09/09/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety - Access. Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas. MP2 & MP3	04/12/05 17:28
09/12/05	09/16/05	NRC - Nancy McNamara	EP Exercise Evaluation & EP PI Verification - MP2 & MP2	10/26/04 16:23
09/12/05	09/16/05	NRC	SSDI - Week 2 - MP3	02/08/05 13:48
10/17/05	10/21/05	NRC	MP3 ISI	12/28/04 09:19
10/24/05	10/28/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety - ALARA. ALARA Planning and Controls. MP2 & MP3	04/12/05 17:29
11/07/05	11/11/05	NRC	MP3 Operator License Requal	12/28/04 09:20

11/14/05	11/18/05	NRC	Site Mods (Unit 2&3) & 50.59	02/08/05 13:49
12/06/05	12/07/05	MSRC Meeting	MSRC Meeting at North Anna	10/26/04 15:56
02/13/06	02/17/06	NRC	PI&R - Week 1.	04/12/05 17:31
02/13/06	02/17/06	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety. Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas.	04/12/05 17:33
02/27/06	03/03/06	NRC	PI&R - Week 2.	04/12/05 17:32

MAINTENANCE

Mark Number	Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
Unit 2 and 3	09/30/03	All	SEE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	09/30/03 03:03

CHEMISTRY

View Tolerances

Last Change Date Unit 2: 04/18/05 07:24						
Last Change Date Unit 3: 04/18/05 16:02						
S/Gs	2 S/G 1	2 S/G 2	3 S/G 1	3 S/G 2	3 S/G 3	3 S/G 4
Sodium ppb	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chloride ppb	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sulfate ppb	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blowdown gpm	0	0	0	0	0	0
Molar Ratio	-	-	-	-	-	-

View Tolerances

Last Change Date:04/18/05 16:02		
Secondary	Unit 2	Unit 3
Calculated Condenser In Leakage, gpd	-	-
Feedwater Oxygen, ppb	-	-
Feedwater Ethanolamine, ppm	-	-
CPI	0.00	↓ 0.00
Feedwater Iron, ppb	-	-

View Tolerances

Last Change Date:04/18/05 16:02		
Primary	Unit 2	Unit 3
Boron ppm	2182	2206
Hydrogen cc/kg	**0**	↓ **20**
Dose Equivalent Iodine	1.78E-4	4.53E-6
I-131/I-133	-	-
Primary to Secondary Leak Rate gpd	<1	<1

Significant Activity/Events/Trends
- MP2 is shut down for 2R-16. - MP3 is shut down for forced outage. MP3 commenced Amine SPROC on 4/7/05 with "D" polisher

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/OFFSITE RESPONSE/COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES

Last Change Date:04/18/05 10:37		
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)	Operable	None
Emergency Response Facilities (ERFS):	Degraded	TR# 14MP1508 is still outstanding and has been issued and Site Facilities has called a outside contractor to assist in the investigation, of the condition of water coming out of the conduit from the outside transformer to the main 400 amp 480 volt switch to the EOF.
Emergency Comm Facilities and Equipment:	Operable	
Prompt Notification System, Including **159** Sirens:	Operable	
Plant Monitors for Accident Monitoring:	Operable	None

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Subsystem	Status	Notes	Last Change Date
Upcoming Events	Operable	Weekly outage SUN 4/17/2005 0030-0130 Millstone outage IT Change moratorium started 3/27 for the MP2 outage	04/14/05 17:49
eSoms(Tagging): Operate the Plant	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
PREM: Monitor and Control Radiation Exposure	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
EDMS: Provide Records Management & Document Control	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
EDTS: Provide Records Management & Document Control	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
PassPort: Provide Records Management & Document Control	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
SAP: Materials and Services	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
			04/14/05

SRS: Work Management	Operable	NONE	17:48
PMMS: Work Management	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
LAN/WAN	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48

PLANNING DEPARTMENT

Last Change Date:04/18/05 16:59	
Work Orders in Backlog	0
Completed Not Closed	196
POD Items (sched/comp/work)	82 / 18 / 10

HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

Last Change Date:04/18/05 07:27	
Contaminated Area/Contaminated Area Goal	2032 / 2189 sq ft
Station Exposure Since Last Report	1.132 REM
Station Exposure YTD/YTD Goal	32.833 / 36.383 REM
PCEs Since Last Report	0
PCEs Year-to-Date	11
RCA Catch Containers	43
MIDAS Operability	Operable
MIDAS Operability Comments	
Health Physics Comments	

ORGANIZATION & ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT

Last Change Date:04/18/05 11:32	
Human Performance Success Days	140
Previous Best Performance Success Days	97
Human Performance Success Days Reset Event Date	11/29/2004
	Supervisory Briefing Sheet - Saturday April 16, 2005 Recent Near Misses of Falling Material Background: Over the past few days there have been four near misses associated with dropped/falling material. The last two incidents could have resulted in serious injury to plant workers or damage to plant equipment. Just today, a piece of scaffolding tube lock dropped between the containment wall and the kick plate from the 38'-6" to the -3'-6" inside containment. Additionally today, a bag containing four 6-inch long, ¾ inch diameter bolts and two 4 to 6 inch washers weighing between 2 to 3 pounds fell from above the outlet nozzle to the No. 1 steam generator. In both cases personnel were in the vicinity of the dropped/falling material. It is important that the information in this briefing sheet along with the attached operating experience be reviewed with our staff on night shift 04.16.05 and day shift 04.17.05.

Reason For Human Performance Reset	Required Compensatory Actions: 1. Conduct a walk down of your work areas looking for various ways that material could fall. Remember that you are looking for the potential for tools and equipment to fall to areas beneath and endanger personnel and equipment. Examples include the top of toolboxes or horizontal beams, open "save" bags, material on the edge of scaffolding, etc. It is recommended that a peer be used, as two sets of eyes are better than one. 2. If the situation can be immediately fixed, do so (i.e., lay down floor covering, store equipment/material away from the opening, etc.). If it cannot be fixed immediately contact your supervisor for assistance. 3. Report to your supervisor the results of your walk down. It is important to know that your work area is satisfactory or unsatisfactory. 4. Initiate a CR to document as-found conditions that need to be fixed, regardless of whether you fixed them immediately or not. These will be incorporated into lessons learned for future outages/work evolutions. 5. Going forward it is expected that supervisors ensure that work areas are free of human performance traps, including openings through which equipment/material could fall.
Equipment Reliability Success Days	1
Previous Best Equipment Reliability Success Days	44
Equipment Reliability Success Days Reset Event Date	4/17/2005
Reason For Equipment Reliability Reset	The Equipment Reliability Success Days Indicator was RESET as of April 17, 2005. Reason for Reset: At 08:29 on 4/17/05, Millstone 3 reactor automatically tripped and safety injection actuated. The unexpected equipment responses included the Terry Turbine tripped, valve 3CHS*V661 leakage, and multiple S/G safety valves lifted. An Alert C1 was declared and SERO activated at 0842. An event review team was formed. ERT is in progress and collecting/analyzing data.

	(Reference: CR-05-03723). Criteria Exceeded: Reactor Trip due to Equipment Issues.
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Dominion) Since Last Report	0
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Dominion) Year-To-Date	1
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Supplemental Personnel) Since Last Report	0
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Supplemental Personnel) Year-To-Date	1
Injury Description	The Safety Success Days Indicator was RESET as of February 21, 2005. CR-05-01602: On February 21, 2005, during a snow storm, a DNC employee received a fracture to the left upper arm bone (humerus). The employee slipped in the parking lot north of the NAP. The incident occurred while the parking lot was still being cleared. The area was ultimately scraped, salted and sanded. The injury was classified as an OSHA Recordable.
Number of Supplemental Personnel On Site	279

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

Last Change Date:12/01/04 15:28	
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE STATUS	
Non-radiological monitoring systems status:	Operable
What was Degraded:	
Environmental events over the last 24 hours:	
Upcoming environmental inspections:	

Unit 1 Daily Status Report - 04-18-05

YTD Dose mRem* = 227
Unit 1 Goal = 3600
6.31 Percent of Annual Goal

Unit 1 Power Operations Goal = 3600
6.31 Percent of Power Operations Goal

Top activities by dose since yesterday (by Day Dose in mRem)

RWP-JobStep	Description	Day Dose	YTD

Total for 04-18-05 = 0

Unit 2 Daily Status Report - 04-18-05

YTD Dose mRem* = 50819
Unit 2 Goal = 156840
32.40 Percent of Annual Goal

Unit 2 Power Operations Goal = 13265
383.11 Percent of Power Operations Goal

Top activities by dose since yesterday (by Day Dose in mRem)

RWP-JobStep	Description	Day Dose	YTD
2050406-5	Pit Seal Replacment Project - Install Permanent Pit Seal to include decon, weld prep, grinding, fit up, welding, and all necessary support activities.	1408	7582
2050301-4	Rx Disassembly - Reassembly Phase I - ICI greylocks and bullet noses, ICI temporary platforms remove, install, inspect, walkdowns, necessary support activities.	584	584
2050306-2	Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing (ECT) - Manways & diaphrams remove, install manways and diapragms, install, remove, modify ventilation amd FME covers, pump out channel heads, FME duties, other necessary support activities.	333	362
2050310-2	Pressurizer Heater Replacement - Replace Pzr heaters; remove, install heater element, walkdowns, inspections, necessary support activities.	303	303
2050351-5	Specific Valve Repairs in Containment - Perform Diagnostics and overhaul actuator on 2-CH-515 and 2-CH-516	241	449
2050201-2	Health Physics General RWP - Job coverage activities in RCAs, Radiation Areas, and High Radiation Areas and necessary support activities.	190	1204
2050331-1	Staging Work in Containment - CTMT staging work in Radiation Areas; erect, dismantle, modify, inspect staging; walkdowns, and necessary support activities.	164	976
2050308-2	Steam Generator Secondary Side Work - Lower - Perform sludge lancing; inspection, foreign object search and retrieval of secondary side; necessary support activities.	159	451
2050324-2	ISI Weld Inspections in Containment - (HRA) CTMT ISI weld inspections in High Radiation Areas, weld preparations; walkdowns, necessary support activities.	145	1296
2050331-2	Staging Work in Containment - (HRA) CTMT staging work in High Radiation Areas; erect, dismantle, modify, inspect staging; walkdowns, and necessary support activities.	128	7710

Total for 04-18-05 = 4800

Unit 3 Daily Status Report - 04-18-05

YTD Dose mRem* = 1604
Unit 3 Goal = 163940
0.98 Percent of Annual Goal

Unit 3 Power Operations Goal = 8915
17.99 Percent of Power Operations Goal

Top activities by dose since yesterday (by Day Dose in mRem)

RWP-JobStep	Description	Day Dose	YTD
3050001-1	Health Physics General RWP - Health Physics activities in RCAs, Radiation Areas, and High Radiation Areas.	20	234
3050190-1	Containment Entry - TSLHRA - (TSLHRA) CTMT entry with Tech Spec Locked High Radiation Area controls. Perform electrical, mechanical maintenance, instrumentation, operations activities and surveillances and necessary support activities.	16	16
3050005-1	Operations General RWP - Operations activities in RCAs, Radiation Areas, and High Radiation Areas. Replace waste stream filters, when contact dose rate on filter housing is <100 mr/hr.	13	210
3050004-1	Chemistry Activities General RWP - (HRA) Chemistry activities in RCAs, Radiation Areas, and High Radiation Areas.	2	35
3050102-2	Decon and Waste Services Activities General RWP - (HRA) Decon Charging Cubicles, Aux 24' and Aux 4'6" levels, and necessary support activities.	2	2
3050020-1	Filter Change RWP - (<50 R/hr) Remove, replace, transfer filters and strainers < 50 R/hr, obtain filter samples, necessary support activities.	1	207
3050105-1	Operations General RWP - Operations activities in RCAs, Radiation Areas, and High Radiation Areas. Replace waste stream filters, when contact dose rate on filter housing is <100 mr/hr.	1	1
3050032-2	Emergency Plan Drills, Exercises, and Events - Emergency Plan-initiated events; access to areas at Millstone Station for LOW to MODERATE risk assignments.	1	3
3050115-1	Site Fire Protection General RWP - (HRA) Site Fire Protection activities in RCAs, Radiation Areas, and High Radiation Areas.	1	1

Total for 04-18-05 = 57

MILLSTONE U3

Major Equipment Schedule

WW 0516 - WWC: Mike O'Neill

"B" TRAIN PROTECTED

Monday 4/18	Tuesday 4/19	Wednesday 4/20	Thursday 4/21	Friday 4/22	Saturday 4/23	Sunday 4/17
15G10 LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT
			SRV99 CSP600.1 Siren Test	**FPW99** CSP 600.6-1 Electric Fire Pump Op Test 2 Hr SCT		**CMS99** Containment RM Gas Sample 30 Day LCO 6 Hr SCT

CRs for Leadership Review 04/19/2005 4:21:00 AM

Revised 8/30/04

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03707 2 **TAPE FOUND ON 2-CH-314 AND UPSTREAM ELBOW, ALSO BLANK FLANGE NOT RE-INSTALLED.**

Local ID: M22-CH-314 (CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER HYDRO TEST CONNECTION VALVE)

Issue Detail:

WHILE PERFORMING VT-2 INSPECTION FOR AWO M2-04-11544, AGED WHITE DUCT TAPE WAS NOTICED ON THE OUTLET SOCKET OF 2-CH-314, AND ON THE ELBOW UPSTREAM OF 2-CH-314. TAPE LOOKS OLD, MAY BE FROM NEARBY WELDING ON SOCKOLET TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER. ALSO, THE BLANK FLANGE WAS NOT INSTALLED DOWNSTREAM OF 2-CH-314, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE BEFORE TURNING AWO OVER TO OPS FOR RETEST.

Action Taken:

INFORMED SM/US AND MAINTENANCE.

SM Comments: ENGINEERING HAS EVALUATED THE AFFECT OF THE TAPE PREVIOUSLY, NO ADVERSE AFFECTS. THIS IS A HOUSE KEEPING ISSUE AND ONE OF RE-IDENTIFICATION. REQUEST FIN USE AN APPROVED SOLVENT AND REMOVE ALL PIECES OF TAPE AND RESIDUE.

CR-05-03723 3 **MILLSTONE UNIT 3 REACTOR TRIP & SAFETY INJECTION**

Issue Detail:

AT 0829 ON 4/17/05, MILLSTONE 3 REACTOR AUTOMATICALLY TRIPPED AND SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED. PRELIMINARY DIRECT CAUSE APPEARS TO BE S/G SAFETY VALVE ACTUATION RESULTING IN LOW STEAMLINE PRESSURE AND SAFETY INJECTION. UNEXPECTED EQUIPMENT RESPONSES INCLUDE ONLY "A" TRAIN OF SAFETY INJECTION AUTOMATICALLY ACTUATING, VALVE CHS-V661 LEAKAGE, MULTIPLE S/G SAFETY VALVE LIFTS. ALERT C1 DECLARED AND SERO ACTIVATED AT 0842.

Action Taken:

EVENT REVIEW TEAM FORMED PER OP3263 STEP 1.7. THIS CR INITIATED PER OP3263 STEP 1.15. ERT IN PROGRESS AND COLLECTING/ANALYZING DATA.

CR-05-03725 3 **ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF STEAM GENERATOR TRANSIENT**

Issue Detail:

THE MILLSTONE 3 REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION ON 4/17/05 WAS ASSOCIATED WITH MULTIPLE S/G SAFETY VALVES LIFTING THAT RESULTED IN AN UNISOLABLE STEAM LEAK FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. OP3263 STEP 1.16.1 - REQUIRES ENGINEERING NOTIFICATION OF THE NEED TO EVALUATE THE APPLICABILITY OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.4.5.3.C "STEAM GENERATORS" FOR A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OR FEEDWATER LINE BREAK. THIS CR IS TO DOCUMENT THE NEED TO PERFORM THIS ENGINEERING EVALUATION.

Action Taken:

DISCUSSED THE ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS WITH THE EDM, PETE LESSARD, WHO CONCURRED WITH THIS CR AND ASSIGNMENT.

CR-05-03727 2 **RBCCW SUPPORT 405718 CANNOT MAKE WELD IN FIELD AS DESIGNED**

Local ID: M2X34C ('C' CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM COOLER) CRED requested from LEE JOHNSON

Issue Detail:

RBCCW SUPPORT 405718 REQUIRES A CHANNEL TO BE WELDED ALL AROUND. INTERIOR WELD COULD NOT BE MADE TO SPECIFIED SIZE. ACCESS TO MAKE THE WELD WAS RESTRICTED BY NEW SPOOL AND EXISITNG SPACER PLATE. DRAWING CALLS FO RA 1/8" FILLET WELD AROUND THE CHANNEL. THE BACK SIDE OR INTERIOR SIDE TO THE PIPE WELDER COULD ONLY GET A SEAL WELD COMPLETED. QC HAS INSPECTED THE WELDS, THEY ARE ACCEPTABLE.

Action Taken:

GENERATED CR FOR ENGINEERING TO ISSUE CRED.

SM Comments: WELD IS ON CEDM COOLER, THIS WILL NEED A CRED BEFORE UNISOLATING AND RESTORING THIS PORTION OF RBCCW TO THE "A SUPPLY HEADER.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03728 3 **ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF SNUBBERS**

Issue Detail:

THE MILLSTONE 3 REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION MAY HAVE BEEN A POTENTIALLY DAMAGING TRANSIENT. OP3263 STEP 1.16.2 REQUIRES THAT AN EVALUATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.7.10.D "TRANSIENT EVENT INSPECTION OF SNUBBERS" BE PERFORMED. THIS CR IS TO DOCUMENT THE REQUEST THAT ENGINEERING PERFORM THIS EVALUATION.

Action Taken:

DISCUSSED THE ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS WITH THE EDM, PETE LESSARD, WHO CONCURRED WITH THIS CR AND ASSIGNMENT.

CR-05-03729 2 **POWER CABLE CONDUITS BETWEEN 2-CH-429 AND ITS JUNCTION BOX ARE OFF AXIS.**

Local ID: M22-CH-429 (CHARGING HEADER CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

CONDUITS RUN SHOULD BE PARALELL TO THE FLOOR AND RISE SHOULD BE VERTICAL.

Action Taken:

WROTE CR AND CONTACTED CONTROL ROOM.

SM Comments: THIS IS A CTMT ISOLATION VALVE, OPERABILITY EXISTS, THERE IS A CONCERN THAT THE VIBRATIONS ON THE CONDUIT RUNS COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION. ENGINEERING TO VERIFY CONDUIT RUNS ARE WITHIN DESIGN. REQUEST MAINTENANCE TO ADJUST AND RETIGHTEN CONDUIT CONNECTIONS. MNTC TO CHECK ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TO VERIFY TIGHT.

CR-05-03730 2 **ACTUATOR LEAK ON M22-MS-79A**

Local ID: M22-MS-79AO ('1A' MAIN STEAM LOW LOAD MOISTURE SEPARATOR VALVE AIR OPERATOR)

Issue Detail:

WHEN PERFORMING CALIBRATION AND FLOWSCAN ON M22-MS-79A A DROP TEST WAS PERFORMED. ACTUATOR FAILED DROP TEST AND VALVE WOULD NOT FULL STROKE.

Action Taken:

INFORMED FLS AND GENERATED CR

SM Comments: FIX BEFORE MODE 2

CR-05-03732 2 **M2-FW-43A STICKING IN SEAT**

Local ID: M22-FW-43A (#1 STEAM GENERATOR AUX FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

WHEN PERFORMING CALIBRATION AND FLOWSCAN, IT WAS NOTED THAT VALVE STICKS IN SEAT. ENG INFORMED AND LOOKED AT VALVE AND SAID VALVE WAS UNSAT.

Action Taken:

INFORMED ENG. AND GENERATED CR

SM Comments: MUST BE FIXED PRIOR TO MODE 3

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03733 3 **STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY VALVE ACTUATION**

Local ID: M33MSS*RV22B ("B" STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY VALVE)

Issue Detail:

DURING THE MP3 REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION ON 4/17/05, ONE OR MORE STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY VALVES LIFTED AND FAILED TO RESEAT PROPERLY, RESULTING IN AN EXCESS STEAM DEMAND.

Action Taken:

VALVE(S) RESEATED WHEN S/G PRESSURE DECREASED. PLANT COOLDOWN COMMENCED.

SM Comments: WORK ORDERS ALREADY MADE FOR REPAIRS

CR-05-03734 3 **MSV5 AFW PUMP TURBINE STOP VALVE**

Local ID: M33MSS*MSV5 (TERRY TURBINE TRIP THROTTLE VALVE)

Issue Detail:

DURING THE MP3 REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION ON 4/17/05, THE AFW PUMP TURBINE STEAM STOP VALVE MSV5 WAS FOUND TRIPPED.

Action Taken:

VALVE WAS RESET.

SM Comments: TDAFW TRIPPING ON AUTO START NEEDS TO BE EVALUATED BY ENGINEERING/MAINTENANCE/OPERATIONS.

CR-05-03735 3 **CHS*V661, CHS*MV8511B PACKING LEAKS**

Local ID: M33CHS*V661 (CHARGING PUMP 3C RELIEF A ISOLATION)

Issue Detail:

DURING THE MP3 REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION ON 4/17/05, CHS*V661 AND CHS*MV8511B DEVELOPED SIGNIFICANT PACKING LEAKS.

Action Taken:

VERIFIED WITH SHIFT MANAGER & OMOC - DOCUMENTED IN THIS CR.

SM Comments: REPAIRS IN PROGRESS

CR-05-03737 2 **2-GR-11.1 (PEN-51, A,I) EXCEEDS ADMIN LIMIT.**

Local ID: M22-GR-11.1 (PRIMARY DRAIN TANK & QUENCH TANK VENT HEADER ISOLATION VALVE ASSY)

Issue Detail:

2-GR-11.1 (PEN-51, A,I) EXCEEDS ADMIN LIMIT. ADMIN LIMIT IS 8000 SCCM. LEAKRATE IS 15050 SCCM.

Action Taken:

CR WRITTEN, SM/US NOTIFIED

SM Comments: MODE 4 HOLD, REPAIR ASAP TO PROVIDE TIME FOR RE-LLRT

CR-05-03738 2 **2-GR-11.2 (PEN-51,B,O) EXCEEDS ADMIN LIMIT.**

Local ID: M22-GR-11.2 (PRIMARY DRAIN TANK & QUENCH TANK VENT HEADER ISOLATION VALVE ASSY)

Issue Detail:

2-GR-11.1 (PEN-51, B,O) EXCEEDS ADMIN LIMIT. ADMIN LIMIT IS 8000 SCCM. LEAKRATE IS 15450 SCCM.

Action Taken:

CR WRITTEN, SM/US NOTIFIED

SM Comments: MODE 4 HOLD, REPAIR ASAP FOR RE-TESTING.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03739 2 PORTABLE EMERGENCY EYEWASH STATION USED TO COOL SPARKS AND WELDING SLAG.

Issue Detail:

SITE FIRE PROTECTION WAS ASKED TO PROVIDE A EMERGENCY PORTABLE EYEWASH STATION FOR THE PAINTERS WORKING IN THE UNIT TWO CONTAINMENT PIT SEAL AREA. THE PAINT THEY WERE USING HAD AN MSDS REQUIREMENT TO HAVE A EYEWASH STATION IN STANDBY. SFP PROVIDED THE PORTABLE EYEWASH STATION TO THE PAINTERS, IN AN ADJACENT CLEAN AREA.

AT ONE POINT, PERSONNEL WORKING FOR CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, WHO WERE PERFORMING HOT WORK ON THE SEAL PIT, (I.E. PLASMA CUTTING), TOOK THE EMERGENCY PORTABLE EYEWASH STATION AND RELEASED THE WATER INTO THE PIT SEAL AREA, TO COOL THE SPARKS / SLAG. THE EMERGENCY PORTABLE EYEWASH STATION WAS THEN LEFT BEHIND. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EMERGENCY PORTABLE EYEWASH STATIONS HAVE CHEMICAL ADDED TO BALANCE THE PH IN THE WATER. THIS CHEMICAL IS CALLED HYDROSEP.

THE HOT WORK PERMIT WAS NUMBER 25451-05-IS. AWO NUMBER M2-04-11549.

HYDROSEP DOMINION PRODUCT CODE IS 1276.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED THE FLS OF THE PIT SEAL HOT WORK THAT IT WAS IMPROPER TO TAKE AN EMERGENCY PORTABLE EYEWASH STATION FOR SUCH USE, AND THAT THEIR WAS CHEMICAL IN THE WATER. THE FLS STATED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM WITH THE CHEMICALS, AND THAT THEY NEEDED THE WATER.

SFP IS IN THE PROCESS OF RECHARGING THE EYEWASH STATION FOR PAINTERS USAGE.

CR-05-03740 2 AIR FLOWS FOR UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM AC EXCEED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN EN21063B.

Local ID: M22315A (CONTROL ROOM AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM - MISCELLANEOUS ITEM)

Issue Detail:

AIR FLOW TESTING WAS PERFORMED ON UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM AC. THE AIR FLOW TESTING WAS PERFORMED AS A RETEST FOR REPLACEMENT OF DAMPERS 2-HV-203A/B, 2-HV-206A/B AND 2-HV-212A/B(REF. DM2-01-0226-03). THE AWO'S THAT PERFORMED THE AIR FLOW TESTING ARE M2-01-09008 AND M2-01-09009. THE AIR FLOW FOR THE CABLE VAULT EXHAUST ON FACILITY 1 HAD A FLOW RATE OF 957CFM. THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN EN21063B IS 440 TO 720 CFM. THE FLOW RATE FOR THE FRESH AIR SUPPLY ON FACILITY 2 WAS 1285 CFM AND THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN EN21063B IS 440-720 CFM. THE EXHAUST FLOW TO THE CABLE VAULT FOR FACILITY 2 IS 894 CFM AND THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IS 440-720 CFM. THE OUTSIDE AIR FLOW RATE IS IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THE FLOW RATE MUST BE REDUCED TO WITHIN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA OR A JUSTIFICATION MUST BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO FUEL MOVENT OR CORE ALTS. THIS WILL ALSO NEED TO BE RECONCILED BEFORE THE DAMPER REPLACEMENT AWO'S CAN BE SIGNED BY ENGINEERING. THE CONTROL ROOM AC SYSTEM IS CURRENTLY INOPERABLE UNTIL THE RETESTS FOR THE WORK IS COMPLETE.

Action Taken:

THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SM STEVE MEYERS, THE EOM AND THE EDM.

SM Comments: REPAIR IMMEDIATELY, NO CORE ALTERATIONS OR MOVEMENT OF IRRADIATED FUEL ASSEBLIES ALLOWED UNTIL REPAIRED

CR-05-03746 3 3CHS-TK130 HUNTING WHEN IN AUTO

Local ID: M33CHS-TK130 (LETDOWN HTX OTLT 3CHS*E2 OTLT TEMP CONT,ALRM,AND IND OPERATOR)

Issue Detail:

NEEDED TO PLACE 3CHS-TK130 IN MANUAL DUE TO GROSS HUNTING (UP TO PLUS/MINUS 15 DEGREES)

Action Taken:

PLACED CONTROLLER FOR 3CHS-TK130 IN MANUAL

SM Comments: OTHER CCP RELATED OPERATIONS WERE ONGOING AT THE TIME

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03748 3 **3CCP*AOV178B FAILED CLOSED ON LOSS OF AIR**

Local ID: M33CCP*AOV178B (RPCCW RETURN 2 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP THERMAL BARRIER)

Issue Detail:

DURING RX TRIP AND SI ON 4/17/2005 3CCP*AOV178B FAILED CLOSED. VALVE IS DESIGNED TO LOCKUP ON LOSS OF AIR.

Action Taken:

CR-05-03749 3 **3CCP*AOV178D FAILED CLOSED ON LOSS OF AIR**

Local ID: M33CCP*AOV178D (RPCCW RETURN 4 RCP THERMAL BARRIER)

Issue Detail:

DURING RX TRIP FOUND 3CCP*AOV178D CLOSED. LOCKUP VALVE SHOULD KEEP VALVE OPEN ON LOSS OF AIR.

Action Taken:

CR-05-03750 2 **FT-306 INSTRUMENT ISOLATION VALVES HAVE STEM SEAL LEAKAGE.**

Local ID: M2FT-306 (SHUTDOWN COOLING BYPASS THROTTLE VALVE FLOW)

Issue Detail:

APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 5 DROPS PER MINUTE ARE COMING FROM THE INSTRUMENT ISOLATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF FT-306.

Action Taken:

HP CLEANED UP WATER, ROPED OFF AREA, PLACED CATCH PAN.

SM Comments: REPAIR NOW (TIGHTEN PKG). IF VALVE REPLACEMENT NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE, REPAIR DURING SI-306 WORK WINDOW THIS OUTAGE.

CR-05-03751 2 **2-IA-583, NORMAL SUPPLY TO 2-CH-517 HAS STEM LEAKAGE AND IS INSTALLED BACKWARDS.**

Local ID: M22-IA-583 (BACKUP AIR SUPPLY LOCAL ISO TO 2-CH-517)

Issue Detail:

2-IA-583 HAS STEM LEAKAGE, WHICH AFFECTS ALL 5 VALVES IN THIS BACKUP AIR SECTION, AS IT'S LEAKAGE IS INCLUDED IN ALL OF THE LEAKRATES RECORDED ON SP 2604X-025. IF IT WERE INSTALLED LIKE 2-IA-585 AND 2-IA-587, THE STEM LEAKAGE WOULD BE ONLY INCLUDED IN THE LEAK TEST OF 2-CH-517 OPERATOR, MAKING IT EASIER TO LOCATE AND REPAIR.

Action Taken:

SM Comments: FIN REPAIR NOW FOR LEAK TESTS.

CR-05-03752 2 **MECHANICAL DAMAGE ON FLANGE FACE**

Local ID: M2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (SPOOL SK-1516 INLET FLANGE, DWG 25203-20150, SH 249)

Issue Detail:

SMALL AREA OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE ON FLANGE FACE CAUSES IRREGULAR SURFACE CONTOUR (BUMP) ON GASKET SEATING SURFACE

Action Taken:

PHOTOGRAPH AREA AND NOTIFY SEA WATER TEAM

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03753 2 **COATING FAILURE AND CORROSION OF BASE METAL**

Local ID: M2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (SPACER PLATE, AT SPOOL SK-1516A INLET, DWG 25203-20150, SH 249)

Issue Detail:

COATING FAILURE IN TWO LOCATIONS ON ID SURFACE WITH SIGNIFICANT METAL LOSS (APPROXIMATELY 1 1/4" X 1 1/4" BY FULL THICKNESS OF PLATE) AT ONE LOCATION

Action Taken:

PHOTOGRAPH AREA, RECORD IN INSPECTION REPORT, AND NOTIFY SEA WATER TEAM

CR-05-03754 2 **2-CS-5B (PEN-5 , I) EXCEEDS ADMIN LIMIT.**

Local ID: M22-CS-5B (CTMT. SPRAY CONTAINMENT SIDE 'B' HEADER CHECK VALVE)

Issue Detail:

2-CS-5B (PEN-5 , I) EXCEEDS ADMIN LIMIT. ADMIN LIMIT IS 10000 SCCM. LEAKRATE IS 12530 SCCM.

Action Taken:

CR WRITTEN, SM/US NOTIFIED

SM Comments: MODE 4 HOLD.

CR-05-03755 2 **FESTOON RELOCATION MODIFICATION NOW HAS A OPERATION ISSUE WITH A 2" AIR (COPPER) BEING TO CLOSE ON THE SOUTH END OF STEAM GENERATOR #2 BLOCK HOUSE**

Local ID: M2RFP (REFUELING POOL) CRED requested from GEORGE W SHUTE

Issue Detail:

FESTOON RAIL NEEDS 2" OF CLEARANCE ON EACH SIDE FOR SUSPENDED TRAVELERS TO OPERATE PROPERLY. 2" AIR LINE IS LOCATED 1" TO THE WEST OF FESTOON RAIL ASSEMBLY.

Action Taken:

DESIGN ENGINEERING REVIEW HAS INDICATED THAT 2" AIR LINE IS NOT PARALLEL TO FACE OF BLOCK HOUSE WALL & FESTOON RAIL

SM Comments: CORRECT OR EVALUATE AS ACCEPTABLE PRIOR TO USE OF REFUEL BRIDGE/CRANE

CR-05-03756 2 **FE-6467 PORTS PLUGGED**

Local ID: M2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (FE-6467 DWG 25203-20150, SH 249)

Issue Detail:

SENSING PORTS FOR FE-6467 ARE PLUGGED OR PARTIALLY PLUGGED. PORT ON SPOOL SK-1516A OUTLET IS PLUGGED WITH CORROSION PRODUCT AND BIOFOULING. CORROSION PRODUCT APPEARS TO BE GENERATED BY THE EXTERNAL CONNECTION TO THE FLANGE AND THE HOLE THROUGH THE FLANGE. PORT ON SPOOL SK-1516 PARTIALLY BLOCKED WITH BIOGROWTH.

Action Taken:

PHOTOGRAPH AREAS AND NOTIFY SEA WATER TEAM

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03757 2 **INDIVIDUAL INJURED FINGER WHILE MOVING 12 X 12 CRIBBING.**

Issue Detail:

RIGHT MIDDLE FINGER WAS SMASHED BETWEEN AN OAK 12" X 12" PIECE OF CRIBBING AND THE STEEL STRONGBACK USED TO SUPPORT THE H.A.U.P. THE CRIBBING WAS BEING PLACED ON TOP OF THE STRONG BACK SO A FORKLIFT COULD CARRY THE CRIBBING VS. CARRYING IT BY HAND. WHILE PLACING ONE OF THE PIECES ON TOP OF THE STEEL, IT SLIPPED AND SMASHED MY FINGER ONTO THE STRONGBACK. LEATHER GLOVES WERE WORN WHEN THE INJURY OCCURRED.

Action Taken:

COMPLETED THE JOB, THEN REPORTED THE INJURY TO MY NIGHT-SHIFT SUPERVISOR. RECEIVED ICE TREATMENT BY S.F.P. AND RETURNED TO WORK. WROTE THIS C.R.

CR-05-03758 2 **FREQUENT NUISANCE ALARMS ON INVERTERS 3 & 5**

Local ID: M22345B (VITAL REGULATED 120 VOLT INST AC SYSTEM - MISCELLANEOUS ITEM)

Issue Detail:

STARTING ON ABOUT 4/7/05 INVERTERS 3 & 5 HAVE HAD ALARMS COME IN AND QUICKLY CLEAR. THE ALARMS ARE IN AND OUT QUICKER THAN PEOPLE CAN BE DISPATCHED TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE ALARM. THE ALARMS APPEAR TO BE PRIMARILY OCCURING IN THE 2200 TO 0900 TIME FRAME. THE TWO ALARMS (INVERTER 3 & 5) OFTEN COME IN AT THE SAME TIME, BUT NOT ALWAYS. INVERTER 3 APPEARS TO THE ONE ALARMING MOST OFTEN WHEN NOT SIMULTANEOUS.

Action Taken:

NONE

SM Comments: REQUEST ELEC ENGINEERING TO EVALUATE AND FEED BACK TO OPS

CR-05-03759 3 **3MSS-PDV37B HAS DUAL INDICATION ON MB6.**

Local ID: M33MSS-PDV37B (MSR B STEAM CONTROL VALVE BYPASS)

Issue Detail:

3MSS-PDV37B HAS DUAL INDICATION ON MB6. LOCAL INDICATION INDICATES THAT 3MSS-PDV37B IS CLOSED BY STEM INDICATION.

Action Taken:

SM Comments: IF POSSIBLE SHOULD BE LOOKED AT PRIOR TO PLANT STARTUP

CR-05-03760 2 **INDIVIDUAL WAS BURNED ON RIGHT THIGH THROUGH PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND PPE.**

Issue Detail:

INDIVIDUAL WAS MOVING A METAL CATCH CAN AFTER CUTTING THROUGH THE OLD RX CAVITY PIT SEAL. THE HOT SLAG IN THE CATCH CAN IMMEDIATELY BURNED THROUGH HIS PPE, PC'S AND SCRUBS AND CAUSED A MINOR BURN TO THE RIGHT THIGH. INDIVIDUAL RECEIVED MEDICAL TREATMENT AND RETURNED TO WORK.

Action Taken:

REPORTED INCIDENT TO ME, TOOK INDIVIDUAL TO MEDICAL.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03761 2 **TEMPERATURE RELAY FAILED AS FOUND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA**

Local ID: M2RB120 (49 CONDENSATE PUMP P2A HIGH TEMPERATURE-H106)

Issue Detail:

TEMPERATURE RELAY RB120 FAILED AS FOUND ACCEPTANCE TEST. TEMPERATURE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IS FROM 118 TO 122 DEGREES CELSIUS, WHICH CORRESPONDS TO AN RTD INPUT OF 13.583 TO 13.737 OHMS. RELAY WAS FOUND BOUND UP AND WOULD NOT ACTUATE EVEN UNDER TEMPERATURES EXCEEDING 172 DEGREES OR, 15.662 OHMS.

Action Taken:

INFORMED SUPERVISION, DIRECTED TO ADJUST INTO ACCEPTANCE RANGE

CR-05-03762 3 **HOST B OF THE MP3 PPC FAILED FOR THE FOURTH TIME IN 24 HOURS**

Local ID: M33CPS-HARDWARE (UNIT 3 PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM HARDWARE)

Issue Detail:

HOST B OF THE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER FAILED. THE FAILURES ARE NOW OCCURRING AT BETWEEN 3 AND 5 HOUR INTERVALS. THIS FAILURE RATE NECESSITATES ATTEMPTED CORRECTION BY REPLACEMENT OF MOST LIKELY FAILED COMPONENT(S).

Action Taken:

STABILIZED PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM, MADE PREPARATIONS TO REPLACE THE HOST B CPU BOARD WITH SPARE.

CR-05-03763 2 **SOLENOID VALVE 2-CND-SOV-78 LEAKS BY.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (2-CND-SOV78, SOLENOID OPERATOR FOR 2-CND-V78)

Issue Detail:

SOLENOID OPERATOR FOR G CONDENSATE POLISHING DEMINERALIZER PRESSSURIZING AIR VALVE, 2-CND-78 LEAKS BY.

Action Taken:

NOE REQUIRED.

SM Comments: REQUEST FIN TEAM REPAIR OR REPLACE SOLENOID VALVE.

CR-05-03764 2 **2-CND-SOV116 LEAKS BY**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (2-CND-SOV116, SOLENOID OPERATOR FOR 2-CND-V116)

Issue Detail:

2-CND-SOV116, SOLENOID OPERATED AIR VALVE FOR F CONDENSATE POLISHING DEMINERALIZER PRESSURIZING AIR VALVE, LEAKS BY.

Action Taken:

NONE REQUIRED

SM Comments: REQUEST FIN REPAIR DURING THIS OUTAGE IF POSSIBLE

CR-05-03765 2 **M2P67M BRUSH HOLDERS**

Local ID: M2P67M (EMERGENCY HYDROGEN SEAL OIL PUMP MOTOR)

Issue Detail:

3 OF 4 BRUSH HOLDERS FOR H2 SEAL OIL UNIT, 125 VDC MOTOR, HAVE BENT SPRINGS.

Action Taken:

INFORMED FLS AND PLANNING, WROTE CR

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03766	2	ATLANTIC INDIVIDUAL RECEIVED MINOR BURN WHILE WORKING ON THE DISPOSAL OF THE OLD CAVITY SEAL RING

Issue Detail:

INDIVIDUAL WORKING ON THE DISPOSAL OF THE OLD CAVITY PIT SEAL RECEIVED A BURN TO HIS RIGHT LEG. HOT CUTTING DEBRIS HAD BEEN PLACEE IN A BUCKET AND THE INDIVIDUAL LEG CAME IN CONTACT WITH THE BUCKET. HE WENT TO THE MEDICAL FACILITY TO HAVE IT LOOKED AT.

Action Taken:

ENSURED THE WORKER WAS ATTENDED TO AND ENSURED THE WORK SITE WAS LEFT IN A SAVE CONDITION.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03769	2	CONTRACTORS ARRIVED AT IN-PROCESSING WITHOUT REQUIRED 5 DAY ADVANCED NOTICE.

Issue Detail:

TWO (2) GE CONTRACTORS THAT WILL BE SUPPORTING THE TURBINE TEAM ARRIVED AT THE IN-PROCESSING CENTER ON MONDAY. APRIL 18, 2005. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARRIVED WITHOUT NOTIFYING THE IN-PROCESSING CENTER A MINIMUM OF 5 DAYS IN ADVANCE AS REQUIRED BY MILLSTONE POLICY. THE CONTRACTORS WERE TOLD TO COME BACK ON TUESDAY, APRIL 19, 2005 TO START IN-PROCESSING. GE IS INVESTIGATING WHY THE 5 DAY ADVANCED NOTICE POLICY WAS NOT ADHERED TO.

Action Taken:

GE PROJECT MANAGER FOR TURBINE TEAM NOTIFIED. CR GENERATED

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03770	N	RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOUND OUTSIDE THE RCA

Issue Detail:

A LOW ACTIVITY SAMPLE OF BORIC ACID WAS FOUND UNATTENDED ON A DESK IN BLDG 475. THE SAMPLE WAS LABELED WITH A "RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL" LABEL AND WAS ATTACHED TO A GAMMA ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS PRINT-OUT. THE SAMPLE WAS NOT A SOURCE OF RADIATION EXPOSURE DUE TO ITS LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY (30,000 DPM). THE SAMPLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONTAINED WITHIN THE RCA OR CONTROLLED BY A TRAINED RAD WORKER.

Action Taken:

SAMPLE RETRIEVED AND PLACED IN THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCE LOCKER AT UNIT 3, RPM CONTACTED, WROTE THIS CR.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03771	3	INCREASED LEAKAGE ON 3RHS*E1A

Local ID: M33RHS*E1A (RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGE A)

Issue Detail:

LEAKAGE ON 3RHS*E1A HAS INCREASED. A PENCIL LEAD THICKNESS STREAM OF WATER IS ISSUING FROM THE LOWER FLANGE OPPOSITE THE RHR PUMP.

Action Taken:

INFORMED US/SM AND HP. INITIATED CR

SM Comments: MNTC/ENGINEERING EVALUATE PRIOR TO MODE CHANGE

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03772	3	3CND-DMN1A HAD LOW FLOW THRU IT AFTER THE RX TRIP. "A" DEMIN HAD A FLOW OF 15GPM THRU WHILE THE REST OF THE DEMIN'S AVERAGED 725GPM.

Local ID: M33CND-DEMN1A (CONDENSATE POLISHING DEMINERALIZER)

Issue Detail:

STATE EXPECTED STANDARD AND DEVIATION FROM STANDARD

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED SUPERVISION,INITATED THIS CR

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03773 2 **90-DGREE FW ELBOW BETWEEN FEED PUMPS AND FW HTR 1A FOUND BELOW CODE T MIN.**

Local ID: M22-FW-2A ('1A' FEEDWATER HEATER INLET STOP VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

UT READINGS ON THE SUBJECT 18" DIA. SCH 80 ELBOW WERE FOUND BELOW TCRITICAL. THIS RESULTED IN A 100% SCAN OF THE AFFECTED AREA AND ADDITIONAL UT(S) PER THE PROGRAM MANUAL/PROCEDURE. THE LOW READING FROM THIS AREA WAS FOUND TO BE 0.713 INCHES. THE CODE TMIN.. VALUE IS 0.794 INCHES, CONTROLLED BY INTERNAL PRESSURE. A CODE CASE 597 EVALUATION WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE IF THE LOW READINGS COULD BE ACCEPTED. THE LOW READING WAS STILL FOUND TO BE BELOW THE ACCEPTABLE WALL THICKNESS CALCULATED USING THE CODE CASE. THIS COMPONENT IS RECOMMENDED FOR REPLACEMENT BASED ON THE EXTREMELY HIGH POINT TO POINT WEAR OBSERVED AND THE LOW READINGS THAT WE ARE ALREADY AT. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO REPLACEMENT WOULD BE TO PERFORM A MORE DETAILED EVALUATION (I.E., FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS) TO ACCEPT THIS COMPONENT TO THE NEXT OUTAGE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE EVALUATION WOULD FIND THE COMPONENT ACCEPTABLE.

THE COMPONENT IS IDENTIFIED ON THE FAC DRAWINGS AS COMPONENT 20150-508-001. THE ISO DRAWING IS ALSO 20150-508. THE SUBJECT ELBOW IS LOCATED IN THE OVERHEAD OF THE TB 14'-6" ELEVATION AND IS THE FIRST 90-DEGREE ELBOW UPSTREAM OF VALVE 2-FW-2A.

Action Taken:

SM Comments: MODE 3 HOLD. THIS NEEDS TO BE EVALUATED IMMEDIATELY FOR REPLACEMENT AND ANY SCOPE EXPANSION REQUIREMENTS.

CR-05-03774 N **UNABLE TO MEET 5 DAY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IN-PROCESSING.**

Issue Detail:

SC 1 REQUIRES SPONSORS PROCESSING EMPLOYEES AT MILLSTONE POWER STATION TO PROVIDE ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FORMS TO IN-PROCESSING PERSONNEL A MINIMUM OF 5 DAYS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL FOR SELF-SCREENERS. IN AN EFFORT TO SUPPORT MANPOWER ISSUES OF SECURITY PERSONNEL, PROTECTION SERVICES IS REQUESTING 2 INDIVIDUALS BE PROCESSED WITHIN THE 5 DAY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.

Action Taken:

ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FORMS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO IN-PROCESSING.

CR-05-03776 N **SERO MP2 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ME QUALIFICATION EXPIRED**

Issue Detail:

DURING THE MP3 4/17/05 EVENT OFFERED ASSISTANCE TO TSC STAFF. HOWEVER, LATER I SELF IDENTIFIED THAT ONE OF MY QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (EP-001-076) HAD LAPSED RESULTING IN MY SERO MP2 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ME QUALIFICATION EXPIRING.

Action Taken:

INFORMED MY MANAGER, POSITION OWNER, AND ISSUED CR

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03777	3	XENON FOLLOW (3R9) COMPUTER PROGRAM STOPPED RUNNING FOLLOWING MILLSTONE 3 REACTOR TRIP ON APRIL 17, 2005

Issue Detail:

FOLLOWING THE MILLSTONE 3 REACTOR TRIP ON APRIL 17, 2005, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE CALCULATED VALUE FOR XENON REACTIVITY (CVXER) HAD NOT UPDATED SINCE 0900 ON APRIL 17, 2005. I DISCUSSED THIS WITH A COMPUTER SERVICES REPRESENTATIVE AT ABOUT 1730 HOURS ON APRIL 17, 2005 AND WE DECIDED THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS PROBLEM ON MONDAY MORNING. ON APRIL 18, 2005, I WAS INFORMED THAT THE FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION OF THE XENON FOLLOW (3R9) PROGRAM STATES THAT THE "PROGRAM ONLY NEEDS TO BE DYNAMICALLY UPDATED WHEN THE PLANT IS AT POWER (OPERATING MODES 1 OR 2). TO ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY PROGRAM OPERATION, THE PROGRAM MODULE THAT PERFORMS THE UPDATE CALCULATION FUNCTION (PR9C) IS CODED TO RUN ONLY WHEN THE CALCULATED ANALOG DATA POINT CVMODE INDICATES THE PLAN IS IN MODE 1 OR 2." CONTRARY TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT, IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE XENON FOLLOW PROGRAM CALCULATE AND UPDATE THE THE FISSION PRODUCT POISON CONCENTRATIONS AND FISSION PRODUCT POISON REACTIVITY VALUES WHEN THE PLANT IS SHUTDOWN. THESE REACTIVITY VALUES ARE USED BY THE REACTOR OPERATORS AND REACTOR ENGINEERS TO PERFORM ESTIMATED CRITICAL CONDITION (ECC) AND SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) CALCULATIONS. FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO THIS MATTER REVEALED THAT THE APPROVED FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION FOR THE XENON FOLLOW (3R9) PROGRAM HAD BEEN CHANGED TO ADD THE REQUIREMENT TO ONLY PERFORM THE UPDATES WHEN THE PLANT IS IN MODES 1 OR 2. THIS CHANGE WAS NOT APPROVED BY REACTOR ENGINEERING AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ADDED BY COMPUTER SERVICES WHEN MAKING SOFTWARE CHANGES FOR THE BURNUP DEPENDENT XENON CONSTANTS (OCTOBER 2004).

Action Taken:

REQUESTED COMPUTER SERVICES TO REMOVE THE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENT TO ONLY PERFORM THE UPDATES IN MODES 1 OR 2, AND TO UPDATE THE XENON FOLLOW (3R9) PROGRAM TO PERFORM THE UPDATES IN ALL OPERATING MODES.

CR-05-03778	2	TWO CONDENSER TUBES REQUIRE PLUGGING IN THE 'D' WATERBOX M2X8B-D

Local ID: M2X8B-D ('B' MAIN CONDENSER (WATER BOX 'D')) CRED requested from BOB MCGUINNESS

Issue Detail:

MAIN CONDENSER EDDY CURRENT TESTING AND BOROSCOPE INSPECTION DURING 2R16 DETERMINED THAT TWO ADDITIONAL CONDENSER TUBES REQUIRE PLUGGING IN THE 'D' WATERBOX M2X8B-D. THE EDDY CURRENT VENDOR, ITI, INC RECOMMENDS PLUGGING ONE TUBE, LOCATED IN THE 'D' WATERBOX, SECTION 2, ROW 78, TUBE #1, BECAUSE WALL THINNING HAS INCREASED SINCE PREVIOUS REFUELING OUTAGE INSPECTIONS, AND MAY CONTINUE TO DEGRADE BEYOND ACCEPTANCE LIMITS IN THE NEXT CYCLE. ECT INSPECTION REPORTS THAT THIS TUBE HAS 48% RECORDED WALL LOSS. THE SECOND TUBE, SECTION 1, ROW 7, TUBE #1 WAS PARTLY BLOCKED, RODDED CLEAR, AND PARTLY ECT INSPECTED. A BOROSCOPE INSPECTION DETERMINED THERE IS A SHARP-EDGE 20-PERCENT DIAMETER DENT IN THE TOP OF THE TUBE. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, THIS TUBE WILL ALSO BE PLUGGED. THUS, TUBE 2-78-1 AND TUBE 1-7-1 REQUIRE PLUGGING. ADJACENT TUBES ARE IN GOOD CONDITION. RECOMMEND CRED AND CHANGE TO AWO M2-0305630 TO INSTALL PLUGS.

Action Taken:

REVIEWED ECT AND BOROSCOPE RESULTS, WROTE CRED, UPDATED 2R16 SEAWATER TEAM LEAD AND MAINTENANCE FLS.

SM Comments: BOB MCGUINESS HAS PROCESSED THE AWO CHANGE (AWO M2-0305630) TO INSTALL PLUGS. CLOSE THIS CR TO THAT AWO.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03779 2 **FOLLOWUP INSPECTION OF SERVICE WATER RETURN SPOOL SK-1505A IDENTIFIED DEGRADED COATING AND BASE METAL ON ASSOCIATED SPOOLS SK-1505 AND SK-1506**

Local ID: M2SK1505A (TBCCW HEAT EXCHANGER COMMON OUTLET HEADER SPOOL) CRED requested from MIKE LALIKOS

Issue Detail:

CR-05-03643 WAS WRITTEN ON 4/15/05 TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF SERVICE WATER PIPE SPOOL SK-1505A. UPON REMOVAL OF THE SPOOL ON 4/18/05, THE FOLLOWING DEGRADED CONDITIONS WERE IDENTIFIED: 1) THE OUTLET FLANGE OF SPOOL SK-1505 WILL REQUIRE A WELD REPAIR AT THE 1000 O'CLOCK LOCATION AND SUBSEQUENT RECOATING. 2) THE INLET FLANGE OF SPOOL SK-1505A DOWNSTREAM OF THE "B" TBCCW HX AT THE 5 O'CLOCK LOCATION WILL REQUIRE A WELD REPAIR AND SUBSEQUENT RECOATING. 3) THE INLET MATING FLANGE OF SPOOL SK-1506 TO SK-1505A HAS DEGRADED PVC COATING. PVC CUTBACK AND RECOATING IS REQUIRED.

Action Taken:

DISCUSSED WITH THE SEAWATER TEAM, WELDING ENGINEER & NUCLEAR SUPPORT SERVICES

CR-05-03780 2 **LIGHT BULBS IN THE CWMT/CWRT CUBICLE NEED REPLACEMENT.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

THE LIGHT BULBS IN THE CWMT/CWRT CUBICLES NEED REPLACEMENT. THE ROOM IS BARELY LIT, AND THE PITS ARE DARK. THIS ISSUE WAS PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED WITH NO RESOLUTION.

Action Taken:

INITIATED THIS CR.

SM Comments: IDENTIFIED AS A SAFETY ISSUE, REPLACE THE LIGHT BULBS OR BARRACADE ENTRANCE PROHIBITING ENTRY

CR-05-03781 2 **BORIC ACID BUILDUP ON 2-LRR-94**

Local ID: M22-LRR-94 (LV-9060 INLET STOP VALVE)

Issue Detail:

VALVE HAS DRY, INACTIVE BORIC ACID BUILDUP IN PACKING AREA APPROXIMATELY LESS THAN 1/8" THICK. THE LEAK IS NOT DRIPPING ON ANY OTHER COMPONENT AND NO OTHER COMPONENTS ARE AFFECTED.

Action Taken:

TR AND CR WRITTEN.

SM Comments: FIN TO INVESTIGATE.

CR-05-03782 2 **BORIC ACID BUILDUP ON 2-CH-198**

Local ID: M22-CH-198 (REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS BLEADOFF CONTROL VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

VALVE HAS DRY, INACTIVE BORIC ACID BUILDUP IN PACKING AREA APPROXIMATELY LESS THAN 1/8" THICK. THE LEAK IS NOT DRIPPING ON ANY OTHER COMPONENT AND NO OTHER COMPONENTS ARE AFFECTED.

Action Taken:

TR AND CR WRITTEN.

SM Comments: REQUEST FIN INVESTIGATE AND CLEAN.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03783 2 **BORIC ACID BUILDUP ON 2-SI-145**

Local ID: M22-SI-145 (HPSI TO LOOP '2B' FT-341 STOP VALVE)

Issue Detail:

VALVE HAS DRY, INACTIVE BORIC ACID BUILDUP IN PACKING AREA APPROXIMATELY LESS THAN 1/8" THICK. THE LEAK IS NOT DRIPPING ON ANY OTHER COMPONENT AND NO OTHER COMPONENTS ARE AFFECTED.

Action Taken:

TR AND CR WRITTEN.

SM Comments: REQUEST FIN INVESTIGATE AND CLEAN.

CR-05-03784 2 **BORIC ACID BUILDUP ON 2-SI-406**

Local ID: M22-SI-406 (HPSI PUMP 'C' DISCHARGE STOP VALVE)

Issue Detail:

VALVE HAS DRY, INACTIVE BORIC ACID BUILDUP IN PACKING AREA APPROXIMATELY LESS THAN 1/8" THICK. THE LEAK IS NOT DRIPPING ON ANY OTHER COMPONENT AND NO OTHER COMPONENTS ARE AFFECTED.

Action Taken:

TR AND CR WRITTEN.

SM Comments: REQUEST FIN INVESTIGATE AND CLEAN.

CR-05-03785 2 **BORIC ACID BUILDUP ON 2-SSP-10A**

Local ID: M22-SSP-10A (COOLANT WASTE MONITOR TANK COMPARTMENT DRAIN ISOLATION VALVE)

Issue Detail:

VALVE HAS DRY, INACTIVE BORIC ACID BUILDUP IN PACKING AREA APPROXIMATELY LESS THAN 1/8" THICK. THE LEAK IS NOT DRIPPING ON ANY OTHER COMPONENT AND NO OTHER COMPONENTS ARE AFFECTED.

Action Taken:

TR AND CR WRITTEN.

SM Comments: REQUEST FIN INVESTIGATE AND CLEAN.

CR-05-03786 2 **UNABLE TO GIVE PROCESSING FIVE (5) NOTIFICATION FOR TRAINING**

Issue Detail:

STATE EXPECTED STANDARD AND DEVIATION FROM STANDARD

Action Taken:

GENERATED CR AND STARTED THE INDIVIDUAL PROCESSING.

CR-05-03787 2 **BORIC ACID BUILDUP ON 2-CH-319**

Local ID: M22-CH-319 (CHARGING PUMP 'B' SUCTION VALVE)

Issue Detail:

VALVE HAS DRY, INACTIVE BORIC ACID BUILDUP IN PACKING AREA APPROXIMATELY LESS THAN 1/8" THICK. THE LEAK IS NOT DRIPPING ON ANY OTHER COMPONENT AND NO OTHER COMPONENTS ARE AFFECTED.

Action Taken:

TR AND CR WRITTEN.

SM Comments: REQUEST FIN INVESTIGATE AND CLEAN.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03788 3 **3HVC-C1A NOT WORKING PROPERLY.**

Local ID: M33HVC-C1A (CONTROL RM PRESSURIZATION AIR BOTTLE CHG COMPRESSOR)

Issue Detail:

WHILE CHARGING UP CONTROL ROOM AIR BANKS IT WAS NOTED THAT 3HVC-C1A WAS BLOWING DOWN EXCESSIVELY AND NOT ACHIEVING THE PROPER 2ND AND 3RD STAGE AIR PRESSURES. FIN WAS NOTIFIED AND CONFIRMED THIS WHILE THE COMPRESSOR WAS RUNNING. IT APPEARS AS THOUGH THE PROBLEM MAY BE WITH THE 2ND STAGE BLOWDOWN. 1ST STAGE PRESSURE WAS WITHIN THE REQUIRED BAND. THE 2ND STAGE PRESSURE WAS NOT MUCH ABOVE 100# (NORMAL IS 225-245). 3RD STAGE PRESSURE DID NOT GET ABOVE ABOUT 400# (NORMAL IS 758-865).

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED SUPERVISION. CR'D.

SM Comments: IMPORTANT EQUIPMENT TO MAINTAIN CONTROL ROOM PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM OPERABLE.

CR-05-03789 3 **FAILED UNIVERSAL LOGIC BOARDS IDENTIFIED IN "A" TRAIN OF SSPS.**

Local ID: M33RPS*RAKLOGA (SSPS LOGIC CABINET)

Issue Detail:

SP3446B11 WAS BEING PERFORMED ON "A" SSPS TO SUPPORT TROUBLESHOOTING/REPAIR UNDER M3-05-06296 TO IDENTIFY CAUSE/FAILURE THAT INITIATED U3 RX TRIP/SI INITIATION ON 4-17-05. SEE CR-05-03723. MANY LOGIC AND MEMORY FAILURES WERE IDENTIFIED WHEN AS FOUND DATA WAS OBTAINED. THIS WAS BECAUSE REACTOR TRIP, FWI, SLI, TURBINE TRIP, AND SI OUTPUTS WERE ALWAYS PRESNET, REGARDLESS OF TEST INPUTS. REPLACED LOGIC BOARDS A213 AND A307 WITH TESTED SPARES. ALL AS LEFT LOGIC AND MEMORY DATA WAS SATISFACTORY. TRAIN A SSPS IS NOW REPAIRED AND FULLY OPERABLE.
ROMPS TESTING IDENTIFIED LOGIC BOARD A213 AS FAILED WITH OUTPUT O2 ALWAYS LOW, WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH ACTUATIONS THAT OCCURRED ON 4/17/05.

Action Taken:

REPAIR AND RETEST PERFORMED UNDER M3-05-06296.

CR-05-03790 3 **CRED REQUIRED FOR U3 HOT SHUTDOWN AWO'S FOR REGULATORS.**

Local ID: M33MSS*HV28B (STEAM GENERATOR 2 MSIV BYPASS) CRED requested from BOB KELLER

Issue Detail:

A CRED IS REQUIRED FOR 2 U3 HOT SHUTDOWN AWO'S FOR REGULATORS. AWO M30406970 AND M30406767 ARE FOR M33MSS*HV28B AND M33MSS*HV28C, RESPECTIVELY. INSTALLED REGULATORS ARE OBSOLETE AND REQUIRE REPLACEMENT DURING HOT SHUTDOWN.

Action Taken:

CONTACTED EDM FOR EE/DCN AND DISCUSSED ISSUE WITH ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR AND SCM COORDINATOR.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03792 N **SPECIAL DOSIMETRY REQUIREMENTS APPARENTLY NOT COMMUNICATED TO DOSIMETRY OFFICE**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (WORK SCHEDULING)

Issue Detail:

U2 STEAM GENERATOR NOZZLE DAM INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES 2SGAP00105 AND -110 ARE SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE AFTER 2000 HOURS THIS EVENING USING RWP 306.
WHEN VERIFYING AVAILABILITY OF 3-4 DOSIMETRY 'JUMP PACKS,' IT WAS FOUND THAT DOSIMETRY WAS UNAWARE OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE JUMP PACKS HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED. NEITHER AN RWP, PROJECT SCHEDULE, NOR DOSIMETRY REQUEST HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO DOSIMETRY BY EITHER ALARA OR THE STEAM GENERATOR TEAM.
IN ADDITION, A DIFFERENT WORK ACTIVITY (RWP 301, ICI GRAYLOCKS AND BULLET NOSES) HAD ALSO RECENTLY REQUESTED 28 JUMP PACKS FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. JUMP PACKS CAN TAKE HOURS TO ASSEMBLE; DOSIMETRY IS NOT STAFFED TO HANDLE SHORT-TURNAROUND REQUESTS OF THIS MAGNITUDE. INVAILABILITY OF THE PACKS CAUSES WORK DELAYS.

Action Taken:

SUBMITTED REQUEST; DOSIMETRY IS RESPONDING; INFORMED ALARA AND SG SUPERVISORS; SUBMITTED 'LESSON LEARNED.'

CR-05-03793 3 **PRESSURIZER PORV ISOLATED DUE TO LEAKAGE**

Local ID: M33RCS*PCV456 (PRESSURIZER PRESSURE RELIEF)

Issue Detail:

PRESSURIZER PORV PCV 456 WAS IDENTIFIED AS LEAKING BY FOLLOWING THE TRANSIENT ON MILLSTONE 3.

Action Taken:

THE PORV BLOCK VALVE WAS SHUT TO ISOLATE THE LEAKAGE.

SM Comments: PRIORITY 5 PENDING EVALUATION IF HIGHER PRIORITY

CR-05-03794 3 **"D" MSIV CLOSED INDICATION**

Local ID: M33MSS*CTV27D (MAIN STEAM ISOLATION TRIP VALVE)

Issue Detail:

FOLLOWING THE TRANSIENT ON MILLSTONE 3 ON 4/17/05, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE BOTTOM CLOSED LIGHT INDICATION ON THE "D" MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE DID NOT WORK.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED MAINTENANCE OUTAGE MANAGER, WROTE CR.

SM Comments: MAIN BOARD EFFICIENCY

CR-05-03796 3 **EEQ TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED**

Issue Detail:

DURING THE TRANSIENT ON MILLSTONE 3, POINTS CS02 AND CS04 EXCEEDED EEQ TEMPERATURE LIMITS. POINT CS03 EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFCIATIONS LIMITS.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED ENGINEERING OUTAGE MANAGER, WROTE CR.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03797	N	RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE LOAD DIRECTOR AND POLAR CRANE OPERATOR HAVE NOT BEEN RELIABLE

Issue Detail:

TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS AND POSITIVE CONTROL OVER ALL CRANE EVOLUTIONS RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS IN ADDITION TO HAND SIGNALS MUST BE AVAILABLE. THE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED RADIO SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN RELIABLE. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN WEAK(LOW VOLUME), INTERMITTENT, CUTTING OUT, OR TOTALLY OUT AS WAS EXPERIENCED DURING THE MISSILE SHIELD LIFT AT 1400, 18 APRIL. APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR OF CRITICAL PATH TIME WAS LOST WHILE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CRANE WERE RESTORED.

Action Taken:

SUSPENDED CRANE OPERATION UNTIL COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE RESTORED. CALLED IN RE FUEL TEAM COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT AND RESET BREAKERS.

CR-05-03798	3	"C" CHARGING PUMP MOTOR

Local ID: M33CHS*P3C (CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL CHARGING PUMP)

Issue Detail:

DURING THE OPERATIONS CREW DEBRIEF OF THE MILLSTONE 3 SAFETY INJECTION, IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL WATER LEAKAGE IN THE "C" CHARGING PUMP CUBICLE AND THE CHARGING PUMP MOTOR MAY HAVE BEEN WETTED.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED ASOM/AMOM OF THE NEED TO TEST "C" CHARGING PUMP MOTOR PRIOR TO USE. WROTE CR.

CR-05-03799	3	C RCP MOTOR OIL ADD SHOULD BE DONE THIS SHUTDOWN.

Local ID: M33RCS*M1C (REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR)

Issue Detail:

DURING CTMT ENTRY NOTED ABOUT 8 GALLONS IN C RCP MOTOR OIL DRAIN TANK. BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH MIKE HESS WE SHOULD PERFORM AN OIL ADDITION THIS OUTAGE.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED MOM

CR-05-03800	2	TIMER TC101 FAILED AS FOUND ACCEPTANCE

Local ID: M2TC101 (DELAY ANNUN ALARM ON HYDROGEN SEAL OIL VACUUM TK HI-LO LEVEL)

Issue Detail:

TIMER FAILED HIGH FROM ACCEPTANCE RANGE

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED FLS AND ADJUSTED TIMER WITHIN DESIRED AS LEFT SETTING.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03801 2 **NEAR MISS SAFETY INCIDENT DUE TO FALLING BOLTS AND WASHERS IN CTMT**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

AT APPROXIMATELY 1130 ON 4-16-05, TWO WASHERS FOLLOWED BY A BAG OF BOLTS FELL TO THE GRATING IN THE STEAM GENERATOR #1 LOOP AREA. THEY LANDED WITHIN ARMS REACH OF A WORKER AND LESS THAN ONE MINUTE EARLIER THE ANII HAD BEEN STANDING IN THIS SPOT. THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL INJURIES AND NO EQUIPMENT DAMAGE NOTED. THE WASHERS WERE 5 3/8"OD X 4"ID X 1/8" THICK. THE BAG CONTAINED FOUR 1/2" DIAMETER X 4" LONG STUDS WITH TWO NUTS EACH. THE BAG IS LABELED "RBCCW FLEX". THE ITEMS FELL ON THE GRATING BETWEEN THE 'HOT LEG' AND RCP 'B'.

Action Taken:

WARNED NEARBY WORKERS / NOTIFIED SUPERVISION

CR-05-03802 3 **3HDL-LV37A1 PACKING LEAK AND INSULATION FELL ON GROUND.**

Local ID: M33HDL-LV37A1 (FEEDWATER HEATER 4A NORMAL DRAIN LEVEL CONTROL VALVE)

Issue Detail:

3HDL-LV37A1 HAS A 2-3 DROP/SEC PACKING LEAK THAT HAS SOAKED THE INSULATION BELOW IT TO THE POINT OF THE INSULATION FALLING ON THE GROUND BELOW IT. LEAK IS DUE TO PLANT COOLDOWN. PACKING ADJUSTMENT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY. INSULATION SHOULD BE REPAIRED/REPLACED.

Action Taken:

CR'D.

SM Comments: LEAK SHOULD BE RE-EVALUATED FOLLOWING PLANT HEATUP

CR-05-03803 2 **2-TB-148A FAILED AS FOUND SET POINT TESTING**

Local ID: M22-TB-148A (X11A TURBINE LUBE OIL COOLER WATER RELIEF VALVE (LCT-20))

Issue Detail:

DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF AWO M29219100 TO PERFORM SET POINT TESTING OF 2-TB-148A, TEV RELIEF VALVE FAILED TO LIFT AT THE CORRECT SETPOINT OF 128.7 PSIG. THE LIFT OCCURRED AT 139 PSIG.

Action Taken:

ADJUSTED VALVE SETPOINT TO CORRECT VALUES AND REINSTALLED.

CR-05-03804 2 **EXPANSION JOINT MATERIAL BETWEEN BUILDINGS IN -5 WEST PEN FOUND ON FLOOR.**

Local ID: M22390C (ENCLOSURE BUILDING SYSTEM - MISCELLANEOUS ITEM)

Issue Detail:

WHILE PERFORMING WORK IN -5 WEST PEN NOTED THAT EXPANSION MATERIAL ON FLOOR. THE EXPANSION MATERIALS SEEMS TO HAVE FALLEN ON THE FLOOR FROM JOINT BETWEEN THE BUILDINGS ABOUT 10 FT UP IN THE OVERHEAD

Action Taken:

CONTACTED OCC

SM Comments: DISCUSSED WITH EDM AND ASSIGNED EDM# 216 TO INVESTIGATE THIS ISSUE. POTENTIALLY THIS COULD IMPACT THE ABILITY OF THE EBFS TO MEET ITS PULL DOWN REQUIREMENTS AND THEREFORE MUST BE DISPOSITIONED PRIOR TO MODE 4.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03805 3 **C RCP MOTOR NEEDS OIL ADDED TO IT**

Local ID: M33RCS*M1C (REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR)

Issue Detail:

C RCP MOTOR NEEDS OIL ADDED TO IT. ON CONTAINMENT ENTRY 4/18/05 APPROXIMATELY 5 TO 8 GALLONS OF OIL WAS DRAINED FROM THE C RCP OIL COLLECTION TANK. WE NEED TO REPLACE THIS OIL PRIOR TO STARTUP

Action Taken:

WROTE CR NOTIFIED OCC

CR-05-03806 N **TEST LEADS FOR QA TEST EQUIPMENT MISPLACED**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

WHEN CHECKING OUT A PIECE OF TEST EQUIPMENT FROM THE CAL LAB IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE TEST LEADS WERE MISPLACED. THE PIECE OF EQUIPMENT MTE#01389 IS A BREAKER ANALYZER THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY STORED IN THE U2 TOOL CRIB. THE TEST EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN RELOCATED TO THE CAL LAB BUT THE TEST LEADS ARE MISSING.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED THE CALIBRATION LAB SUPERVISOR

CR-05-03807 3 **3RCS-FG47 LEAKS BADLY , NEEDS REPAIR**

Local ID: M33RCS-FG47 (SIGHT FLOW GLASS)

Issue Detail:

3RCS-FG47 LEAKS BADLY, NEEDS REPAIR. DURING THE CONTAINMENT ENTRY ON 4/18/05 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT RCS-FG47 WAS LEAKING BADLY. IT HAD A 15 FOOT PLUME OF WATER COMING OUT WHEN THE PRT WAS BEING FILLED

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED CONTROL ROOM, AND OCC

CR-05-03808 3 **3CHS*V457 HAS DRIED BORIC ACID IN THE PACKING AREA. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ACTIVE LEAKAGE.**

Local ID: M33CHS*V457 (REACTOR COOLANT PUMP "B" SEAL PT152 ISOLATION)

Issue Detail:

3CHS*V457 HAS DRIED BORIC ACID IN THE PACKING AREA. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ACTIVE LEAKAGE.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED CONTROL ROOM, WROTE CR

CR-05-03809 3 **INVERTER 6 PRE-CHARGE LIGHT WILL NOT LIGHT**

Local ID: M33VBA-INV6 (INVERTER 6)

Issue Detail:

INVERTER 6 PRE-CHARGE LIGHT WILL NOT LIGHT. THIS WAS DETERMINED WHILE PERFORMING EOP 35 GA-1 TO ENERGIZE 32-3T AFTER SI ACTUATION. WHEN PRECHARGE BUTTON DEPRESSED, PRE-CHARGE LIGHT DID NOT LIGHT. ALSO FOUND THE PUSHBUTTON WAS STUCK IN PARTIALLY IN POSITION AND HAD TO PULLED OUT. ALSO DISCUSSED WITH SYSTEM ENGINEER ON STEPS TO RESTORED INVERTER 6 TO NORMAL OPERATION. DETERMINED THAT PROCEDURE (OP3345A) DOES NOT ADDRESS RESTORING INVERTER 6 TO SERVICE FOLLOWING LOP, CDA, OR SI SIGNAL.

Action Taken:

DISCUSSION WITH US AND SYSTEM ENGINEER.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03811	3	3SIL*MV8808A HAS A PACKING LEAK OF ABOUT 1 GPM WHILE CLOSED WITH THE A SI ACCUMULATOR PRESSURIZED

Local ID: M33SIL*MV8808A (SAFETY INJECT ACCUMULATOR TANK #1 OUTLET ISOLATION (GRAFOIL PACK))

Issue Detail:

3SIL*MV8808A HAS A PACKING LEAK OF ABOUT 1 GPM WHILE CLOSED WITH THE A SI ACCUMULATOR PRESSURIZED. A WORK ORDER WAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN TO REPLACE THE SCORED STEM ON MV8808A (M3-04-02293) THE VALVE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE LEAKING WHEN THE MOV IS OPEN

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED CONTROL ROOM AND WROTE CR

CR-05-03812	N	NMN SERO COMMUNICATION TOOLS AT HARTFORD ARMORY NOT 100% AVAILABLE

Issue Detail:

THE COMPUTER DID NOT AND WOULD NOT AFTER INSPECTION BY EP ESTABLISH AN ON LINE CONNECTION TO THE NETWORK VIA MODEM SUCH THAT E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS AND NEWS RELEASES COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY DEVELOPED.

THE FAX MACHINE WAS THE ONLY MEANS OF WRITTEN COMMUNICATION FOR THE NMN. ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION THE POWER STRIP POWERING THE MACHINE TRIPPED, SECURING POWER TO THE MACHINE AND DELAYING RECEIVED FAXES.

THE PHONE NUMBER JOB AID NEEDS TO BE UPDATED WITH CURRENT CALL NUMBERS FOR THE PITA AND ALSO CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS.

NOTE - THE EQUIPMENT ISSUES ABOVE DID NOT PREVENT THE SCHEDULED RELEASE OF NEWS RELEASES NOR DID THEY BLOCK COMMUNICATIONS. RATHER, THE LACK OF E-MAIL COMBINED WITH NEED TO BE CONSTANTLY CHECK THE POWER TO THE FAX MADE COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULT AT TIMES.

ALSO NOTE - THE EQUIPMENT APPEARS TO BE OLDER THAT SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT SHOWING UP FOR USE AT THE POWER STATION, AND ALSO IS IN AN AREA OF THE ARMORY WHERE IT MAY BE SUBJECTED TO USE FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN SERO, OR MOVED AT TIMES TO MAKE MORE DESK SPACE FOR OTHER WORK.

Action Taken:

ATTEMPTED TO RESTORE COMPUTER, NO SUCCESS

MONITORED FAX POWER STRIP PERIODICALLY

INFORMED KEY SERO STAKE HOLDERS TO CONTACT NMN BY PHONE ONLY.

CR-05-03813	3	FIRE WATER TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FOUND CLOSED AFTER SPURIOUS TRIP AND SI.

Issue Detail:

DURING BOARD WALKDOWN, OPERATOR NOTED THAT FIREWATER TO CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE WAS CLOSED. VALVES ACTUALLY WENT CLOSED DURING SPURIOUS SI. SHOULD HAVE ENTERED TRM FOR FIRE WATER ISOLATED TO CONTAINMENT.

Action Taken:

ENTERED TRM, REOPENED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE AND EXITED TRM

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03814 2 MID LOOP INDICATION INSTRUMENT L-112 DEVIATED ABOUT 2 INCHES OF WATER FROM THE OTHER TWO MID LOOP INSTRUMENTS WHEN THE #1 S/G HOT AND COLD LEG MANWA

Local ID: M2L-112 (LOOP #1 HOT LEG LEVEL LOOP)

Issue Detail:

MID LOOP INDICATION INSTRUMENT L-112 DEVIATED ABOUT 2 INCHES OF WATER FROM THE OTHER TWO MID LOOP INSTRUMENTS WHEN THE #1 S/G HOT AND COLD LEG MANWAYS WERE REMOVED. I&C WAS DIRECTED TO VERIFY PROPER OPERATION OF THE INSTRUMENT. THE LINE-UP WAS CORRECT. I&C DECLARES THIS OPERATING PROPERLY.

Action Taken:

CONTACTED I&C VERIFIED LINEUP CORRECT.

CR-05-03815 3 AUX BUILDING FILTER WAS RUNNING IN SI MODE WITH HIGH TEMPERATURES

Local ID: M33HVR*FLT1A (AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTER)

Issue Detail:

DURING EVENTS OF 4/17/05 A FIRE ALARM WAS RECIEVED FOR A AUX BUILDING FILTER. THIS HAS HAPPENED PREVIOUSLY WHEN NOT ENOUGH FLOW WAS IS GOING THROUGH THE FILTERS. DECISION WAS MADE TO SHUT DOWN THE FILTER DUE TO SLCRS RUNNING PROVIDING FILTERED EXHAUST PATH. NEED TO REVIEW CAUSE OF HIGH TEMPERATURES, DAMPER ALIGNMENTS, AND DECISION TO SHUT DOWN FILTER.

Action Taken:

FILTER WAS SHUT DOWN

SM Comments: TROUBLE SHOOTING/ INVESTIGATION ON GOING

CR-05-03816 2 VENDOR SUPPLIED 24 INCH CARBON STEEL ELBOW FOUND TO BE PAINTED.

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX () CRED requested from OCC-POM

Issue Detail:

REPLACEMENT OF THE OUTLET OF 2B FEEDWATER HEATER PIPING IS BEING PERFORMED UNDER AWO M20504396. THE 24 INCH ELBOW SHIPPED TO US FROM VENDOR WAS PAINTED AT THEIR FACILITY. THIS PAINT MUST BE PARTIALLY REMOVED TO PERFORM WELDING. ENGNIEERING TO EVALUATE REMOVAL OF ALL OF THE PAINT ON THIS ELBOW.

Action Taken:

NONE.

CR-05-03817 2 MP2 HP TURBINE DIAPHRAGMS

Local ID: M2H2THP (MAIN TURBINE HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE)

Issue Detail:

INSPECTION OF THE MP2 HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE DIAPHRAGMS HAS REVEALED THE NEED FOR REWORK OF THE DIAPHRAGM PARTITIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH VPROC ENG01-002 (GE PROCEDURE P8A-AL-0001). THIS WORK IS EXPECTED DIAPHRAGM WELDING FOLLOWING INSPECTION OF THE DIAPHRAGM PARTITIONS.

THIS CR WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THE CONDITION AND REFERENCE THE AWO WHICH THIS WORK WILL BE PERFORMED UNDER (AWO M2-95-04375). DIAPHRAGM REPORTS WILL BE ADDED TO THE AWO. THIS CR CAN BE CLOSED IMMEDIATELY.

Action Taken:

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03818	2	SP 2604X TESTING DOES NOT ENSURE THAT VALVES WILL PERFORM THEIR DESIGN FUNCTION.

Issue Detail:

THE STATED OBJECTIVE IN SECTION 1.1 IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT INSTRUMENT AIR ACCUMULATOR CHECK VALVES RETAIN THE REQUIRED AIR SUPPLY TO ASSURE THE VALVE FULFILLS ITS DESIGN SAFETY FUNCTION AFTER A COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR. THIS DOES NOT APPLY SPECIFICALLY TO EB-88 AND EB-89, AS THEY DO NOT HAVE ACCUMULATORS, AND IT DOES NOT ADDRESS OTHER COMPONENTS BESIDES CHECK VALVES THAT COULD BE JUST AS OR MORE LIKELY TO CAUSE A FAILURE TO MEET THE DESIGN SAFETY FUNCTION.

THE PROCEDURE STATES THAT THIS TEST IS INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT A VALVE EQUIPPED ONLY WITH BACKUP AIR WILL NOT EXHAUST A BACKUP AIR BOTTLE WITHIN 24 HOURS. THE TEST PROCEDURE DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATE THAT FOR 2-EB-88/89. THE TESTS FOR EB-88 AND EB-89 DO NOT ENSURE THAT THE VALVES WILL MEET THEIR MISSION, BECAUSE IT ONLY REQUIRES THE ABILITY TO STROKE OPEN THE VALVES FOLLOWING LEAK RATE DETERMINATION TESTS. TO MEET THEIR MISSION, THE VALVES MUST BE ABLE TO STAY OPEN FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME, AND THAT IS NOT TESTED FOR IN SECTION 4.20 AND 4.21.

CURRENTLY 2-EB-89 HAS A DIAPHRAGM LEAK, WHICH WOULD SURELY EXCEED 5 CFM IF IT WERE TESTED. THIS LEAK MAY HAVE EXISTED DURING SATISFACTORY TESTING OF THIS VALVE, AS IT WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSED AN UNSATISFACTORY TEST RESULT. AT THIS RATE THE BACKUP AIR BOTTLE WOULD LAST APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES, THEN EB-88 AND EB-89 WOULD SHUT.

Action Taken:

SM Comments: REVIEWED TECH EVAL M2-EV-98-0214, REV.1 AND ERC 25203-34-98-0189. IT APPEARS THAT THE BACK UP BOTTLE PRESSURE MUST BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE VALVE OPEN FOR A MINIMUM OF 8 HOURS WHICH IS CONSIDERED ENOUGH TIME TO ALLOW FOR BOTTLE CHANGE OUT. THE INTIATOR DOES BRING UP A GOOD POINT THAT TESTING OF THIS VALVE IN THE CLOSED POSITION DOES NOT TEST THE LEAK TIGHTNESS OF ALL COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR MAINTAINING THAT VALVE OPEN. THIS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A MISSED SURVEILLANCE. THE OPEN FUNCTION OF THIS VALVE (FOR WHICH THE BACK UP AIR IS SUPPLIED) IS NECESSARY FOR H2 MONITORING POST LOCA. RECO NOT REQUESTED DUE TO THE SYSTEM NOT BEING REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE IN THE CURRENT CONDITION. THIS ISSUE MUST BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO STARTUP.

CR-05-03820	3	TRAVELING SCREEN "E" FISH SPRAY NOZZLES CLOGGED

Local ID: M33SWT-SSC1E (TRAVELING SCREEN)

Issue Detail:

TWO TRAVELING SCREEN "E" FISH SPRAY NOZZLES CLOGGED. NOZZLES ARE ALL THE WAY TO THE RIGHT

Action Taken:

INFORMED US AND WROTE CR

CR-05-03821	3	3TFC-M1A DID NOT CLEAR THE HIGH SPEED STOP "RED" LIGHT WHEN ATTEMPTING TO LOWER SPEED.

Local ID: M33TFC-M1A (FDW PP TURB DC MOTOR)

Issue Detail:

WHILE PERFORMING STEP 4.14.7 OF OP 3321 (REMOVING 'A' TDFW PUMP FROM SERVICE), THE STEP DIRECTS PLACING 3TFC-M1A IN "SLOW LOWER" UNTIL THE LOW SPEED STOP IS REACHED (UNTIL JUST THE GREEN LIGHT IS LIT). THE GREEN LIGHT CAME ON BUT THE RED LIGHT NEVER CLEARED AS EXPECTED. THIS COULD BE A POTENTIAL START UP ISSUE FOR THE 'A' TDFW PUMP.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED SHIFT SUPERVISION, ISSUED CR.

SM Comments: NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED PRIOR TO PUMP START UP

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03822	2	HEAD VENT PIPING VALVE STATION LINED UP 1 1/2" TOO FAR WEST ON S/G #1 WALL. VALVE 2-RC-415 WELD IS TOUCHING A HANGER.

CRED requested from POM

Issue Detail:

WHEN VALVE STATION WAS INSTALLED IT WAS LINED UP 1 1/2" TOO FAR TO THE LEFT, RESULTING IN VALVE TOUCHING HANGER. WORK WAS PERFORMED UNDER AWO M2-04- 02573 .

Action Taken:

CONTACTED ENGINEER TO ASSESS THE SITUATION NOTIFIED POM.

CR-05-03823 **3** **3CNM-MOV100; PACKING LEAK 5 DPS, VALVE IS CLOSED**

Local ID: M33CNM-MOV100 (TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY TCV BYPASS)

Issue Detail:

5 DPS LEAK, VALVE IS CLOSED, VALVE NORMALLY CLOSED AT POWER

Action Taken:

INFORM US

CR-05-03824 **3** **3CCS-PI174B READS 80 PSIG SHOULD READ ABOUT 120 PSIG**

Local ID: M33CCS-PI174B (CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL PUMP SEAL WTR COOLER (3ARC-E1B)OUTLET PRESS)

Issue Detail:

GUAGE SHOULD READ SAME AS OPPOSITE PUMP UNLESS HX IS BLOCKED, SUSPECT OUT OF CALIBRATION.

Action Taken:

INFORM US

CR-05-03825 **3** **3HVR-RE15 DEVELOPED EQUIPMENT FAILURES AND TURNED OFF PUMPS ON BOTH CHANNELS.**

Local ID: M33HVR-RE15A (PMP 3HVR-P4 PART AND GAS RAD MNTRNG PART RAD BETA DET W/MVNG FLTR)

Issue Detail:

3HVR-RE15 DEVELOPED EQUIPMENT FAILURES AND TURNED OFF PUMPS ON BOTH CHANNELS.

Action Taken:

INFORMED SUPERVISOR, FOLLOWED ACTIONS OF OP 3362, TOOK HVR15 OFF LINE

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03826 2 **LLRT BOX (VLRM) FAILED PRESSURE INTEGRITY CHECK**

Issue Detail:

MTE-01240 FAILED DURING IT'S PRESSURE INTEGRITY PRESTART CHECK. THE PRESSURE AND FLOW DISPLAYS WERE FLICKERING, AND THE BOX WOULD NOT HOLD PRESSURE.

PENETRATIONS CHECKED WITH THIS BOX WERE:
PEN 5 (I), 2-CS-5B (PRE)
PEN 2 (A,I), 2-CS-515 (PRE)
PEN 2 (B,I), 2-CS-516
PEN 21 (A, I), 2-RC-001
PEN 21 (B, I), 2-RC-002
PEN 21 (O), 2-RC-045

Action Taken:

CR WRITTEN, PRIMARY SRO NOTIFIED, VLRM REMOVED FROM CONTAINMENT TO RETURN TO METROLOGY

CR-05-03827 3 **3CND-MOV29A; PACKING LEAK ABOUT 1 CUP A MINUTE.**

Local ID: M33CND-MOV23A (1A DEMIN INFLUENT)

Issue Detail:

VALVE IS CLOSED, PACKING LEAKING VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN AT POWER.

Action Taken:

INFORM US

SM Comments: RE-EVALUATE AFTER PLANT STARTUP

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03828	3	UNRELIABLE POSITION INDICATION FOR REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES

Local ID: M33RCS*SV8095A (A REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT ISOLATION UPSTREAM)

Issue Detail:

DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SP3601F.5-5 AND SP3601F.5-6 THE POSITION INDICATION FOR 3RCS*SV8095A, *SV8095B, *SV8096A, AND *SV8096B WAS UNRELIABLE. LISTED BELOW IS THE SEQUENCE OF OBSERVED INDICATIONS:

FIRST TRIED TO OPEN 3RCS*SV8095A - NO OPEN INDICATION OBSERVED. REPORTED TO UNIT SUPERVISOR, STATED UNRELIABLE INDICATION AND RECOMMENDED PROCEDING ON WITH B TRAIN VALVES STARTING WITH 3RCS*SV8096B FIRST.

SUCESSFULLY STROKED 3RCS*SV8096B WITH PROPER INDICATION. NEXT, STROKED OPEN 3RCS*SV8095B, GOT OPEN INDICATION. HOWEVER, ALSO GOT OPEN INDICATION FOR 3SV8095A. INFORMED US, CLOSED 3RCS*SV8095A AND 3RCS*SV8095B.

SUCESSFULLY STROKED 3RCS*SV8095B, THEN 3RCS*SV8096A.

NEXT STROKED OPEN 3RCS*SV8095A, GOT OPEN INDICATION BUT ALSO GOT OPEN THEN CLOSED INDICATION FOR 3RCS*SV8096A AND 3RCS*SV8095B.

THEN CLOSED 3RCS*SV8095A.

NOTE, THAT DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SURVEILLANCE, ALL VALVES THAT WERE STROKED FOR TIME MEASUREMENT WERE WITHIN ALL CRITERIA.

AFTER COMPLETION OF SURVEILLANCE, UTILIZED REAL TIME TO TRY AND FURTHER DETERMINE VALVE POSITIONS. AT THIS POINT IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE COMPUTER HAD OPEN INDICATION FOR 3RCS*SV8095A FROM THE TIME OF THE FIRST OPEN STROKE AND IT REMAINED OPEN UNTIL WAS CLOSED AFTER GETTING OPEN INDICATION WHEN 3RCS*SV8095B WAS OPENED.

Action Taken:

INFORMED UNIT SUPERVISOR AND SHIFT MANAGER

SM Comments: ENGINEERING ASSESS