Millstone Power Station
Operational Focus Report
Monday, April 18, 2005



Dominion NBU Vision: We are a safe, competitive, world-class nuclear operator.

Dominion NBU Mission: Achieve superior safety standards; foster a rewarding work environment, achieve superior plant operations, grow shareholder wealth, and be a valued corporate neighbor.

Hardcopy Table of Contents

AM Meeting Notes:

The web version of the Millstone Status Report can be viewed at:

http://gamma/psrs_prod/StatusReport.asp?station=Millstone

Unit 2 Operations Turnover Report is now available from Document Explorer – Plant Reports, or
http://nwdata4.ct.dominionnet.com:8080/Documentation/Documents/Plant Reports/Ops Turnover Report Unit 2/1-turn.doc

Unit 3 Operations Turnover Report is now available from Document Explorer – Plant Reports, or
http://nwdata4.ct.dominionnet.com:8080/Documentation/Documents/Plant Reports/Ops Turnover Report Unit 3/1-turn.doc

Health Physics Daily Job Step Reports:

Unit 1 Daily Status Report:	http://mphplinux.ct.dominionnet.com/alara/js/unit1/index.html
Unit 2 Daily Status Report:	http://mphplinux.ct.dominionnet.com/alara/js/unit2/index.html
Unit 3 Daily Status Report:	http://mphplinux.ct.dominionnet.com/alara/js/unit3/index.html

A13

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR STATUS REPORT FOR 04/18/05

Formatted: 04/18/05 04:16

OPERATIONS

View Tolerances

Last Change Date Unit 2: 04/17/05 03:44 Last Change Date Unit 3: 04/17/05 05:09			
	Unit 2	**Unit 3**	
Power Level	0	100	%
Electrical Output (GROSS)	0	1215	MWe
Days Online (O) or Shutdown (S)	10 S	345 O	days
Days Since Last Automatic Trip	399	846	days
Days Since Any Trip from Power	399	846	days
RCS Boron Concentration	2177	701	ppm
RCS Identified Leakage	0	0.103	gpm
RCS Unidentified Leakage	0	0.155	gpm
RCS Total Leakage	0	0.258	gpm
Containment Sump Inleakage	0	0.04	gpm
Containment Temperature	76	104.3	deg F
Non-RCA Catch Containers	7	7	
Lighted Control Room Annunciators	237	3	
Active Temporary Mods, Total	1	0	
Active Temporary Mods, >6 Months	1	0	
Chemistry Index	0.00	1.00	
Condenser Air Ejector Flow Rate, Total	0	9	scfm
Service Water Temperature	44		deg F
Protected Train	Alpha	Bravo	
PRA Color	N/A	Green	
Comments			

LIMITING ACTION STATEMENTS

None

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Mark# Plant Issue #	Event Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
UNIT 3 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	11/16/03	3	UNPLANNED LCO/TRM ACTIONS ENTERED IN THE LAST 24 HR/WEEKEND: - None CHALLENGES TO GENERATION/ NUCLEAR SAFETY: - None SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FROM THE LAST 24 HOURS/WEEKEND: - Weekly Storm Drain analysis DSN-006 MAJOR SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS INCLUDE: - Routine Surveillances ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS: - 3SSR*CTV19A & D restoration to Operable status EXCEPTIONS TO SCHEDULED WORK RELEASE/RETURN: - None SIGNIFICANT CONDITION REPORTS FROM THE LAST 24 HR/Weekend: - None OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS DUE IN THE NEXT 7 DAYS: - None	04/17/05 03:49
UNIT 2			UNPLANNED TECH SPEC/TRM ACTIONS ENTERED IN THE LAST 24 HR/WEEKEND: - None CHALLENGES TO GENERATION/ NUCLEAR SAFETY: - None SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FROM LAST 24 HR: - Restored charging suction header. - Restored control room ventilation. - Commenced control room ventilation testing. - Installed transition spool piece for venting RCS. MAJOR SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES FOR THE NEXT 24 HR:	04/17/05

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	11/27/04	2	- Complete control room ventilation testing. - Drain RCS to hot leg centerline. EXCEPTIONS TO SCHEDULED WORK RELEASE/RETURN: - None SIGNIFICANT CONDITION REPORTS FROM THE LAST 24 HR/Weekend: - None - OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS DUE IN THE NEXT 7 DAYS: - OD#MP2-007-05 for Hanger 405425 on RBCCW having loose bolts due on 4/21/05.	03:49

POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE EVENTS

Event Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
03/23/05	3	CR-05-02350, AR 05001487, Impact of Inoperable Emergency Diesel Sequencer on Associated Emergency Diesel Generator. Licensing has the lead with a revised due date of 04/29/05.	04/14/05 08:33
04/12/05	2	CR-05-03196, AR 05002002-03, A Significant Mixture of Water and Oil Leakage Noted on the -22 foot Flooring Around Both RCP Oil Collection Tanks, T-109A and T-109B. ENGSPRT has the lead with a due date of 4/24/05 to provide input for the Reportability Determination.	04/12/05 17:20
04/12/05	2	CR-05-03129, AR 05001957-02, 2-MS-241 Failed As-Found Set Pressure Testing of 2730B. Licensing has the lead with a due date of 04/22/05 to document that this condition was not reportable.	04/12/05 17:18
04/12/05	2	CR-05-03112, AR 05001945-04, SP2605H, Rev 11, In May 1998 May Invalidate CIAS SO2605H Test of SSP-16.1 and 16.2. SPV2OPS has the lead with a due date of 04/22/05 to provide input for the Reportability Determination.	04/12/05 17:17
04/12/05	2	CR-05-03046, AR 05001922-05, Snubber Installed in Upper Hanger Location 413018A Has No Oil in Reservoir. Licensing has the lead with a due date of 04/24/05 to document that this condition was not reportable.	04/12/05 17:14

SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS

Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
01/20/05	3	Emergent Equipment Issues - Steam generator sample containment isolation valves are failing remote position indication surveillances at an increased frequency. SSR*CTV19D appears to have the the most failures. SSR*CTV19A and B have also failed recently. Currently SSR*CTV19A and D are inoperable. Need to determine coarse of action and address common mode failure issues for all valves. ***Unit 3 Focus Items can be found on the Shift Orders on the Ops port on the shared drives	04/13/05 02:23
03/12/04	2	Emergent Equipment Issues: - None ***Unit 2 Focus Items can be found in the Shift Orders on the Ops Port on the shared drives***	03/24/05 03:23

UPCOMING INSPECTIONS/SITE VISITS

From Visit Date	To Visit Date	Inspector/Visitor	Comment	Last Change Date
03/28/05	05/20/05	NRC - Mike Modes	MP2 RPV Head Replacement	12/28/04 09:13
04/11/05	04/15/05	NRC - Mike Modes	MP2 ISI and NRC Bulletin 2004-01	04/12/05 17:24
04/27/05	04/27/05	MP3 Joint Owners Mtg	Meeting Date tentatively rescheduled for 04/27/05.	04/05/05 07:45
05/09/05	05/13/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety - ALARA. ALARA Planning and Controls. MP2	04/12/05 17:26
06/06/05	06/10/05	NRC - Roy Fuhrmeister	Triennial Fire Protection Inspection - Week 1 - MP2	04/04/05 14:51
06/13/05	06/24/05	Self-Assessment - INPO	INPO Mid-Cycle Self Assessment (Internal review only)	12/21/04 14:58
06/20/05	06/24/05	NRC - Roy Fuhrmeister	Triennial Fire Protection Inspection - Week 2 - MP2	04/04/05 14:51
06/28/05	06/29/05	MSRC Meeting	MSRC Meeting at MILLSTONE	03/09/05 09:40
08/08/05	08/12/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Public Radiation Safety / RETS MP2 & MP3	12/20/04 14:35
08/29/05	09/02/05	NRC	SSDI - Week 1 - MP3	02/08/05 13:47
08/30/05	08/31/05	MSRC Meeting	MSRC Meeting at Millstone	10/26/04 15:55
09/05/05	09/09/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety - Access. Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas. MP2 & MP3	04/12/05 17:28
09/12/05	09/16/05	NRC - Nancy McNamara	EP Exercise Evaluation & EP PI Verification - MP2 & MP2	10/26/04 16:23
09/12/05	09/16/05	NRC	SSDI - Week 2 - MP3	02/08/05 13:48
10/17/05	10/21/05	NRC	MP3 ISI	12/28/04 09:19
10/24/05	10/28/05	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety - ALARA. ALARA Planning and Controls. MP2 & MP3	04/12/05 17:29
11/07/05	11/11/05	NRC	MP3 Operator License Requal	12/28/04 09:20

11/14/05	11/18/05	NRC	Site Mods (Unit 2&3) & 50.59	02/08/05 13:49
12/06/05	12/07/05	MSRC Meeting	MSRC Meeting at North Anna	10/26/04 15:56
02/13/06	02/17/06	NRC	PI&R - Week 1.	04/12/05 17:31
02/13/06	02/17/06	NRC - Tom Moslak	Occupational Radiation Safety. Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas.	04/12/05 17:33
02/27/06	03/03/06	NRC	PI&R - Week 2.	04/12/05 17:32

MAINTENANCE

Mark Number	Date-Time	Unit Applies To	Description	Last Change Date
Unit 2 and 3	09/30/03	All	SEE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	09/30/03 03:03

CHEMISTRY

View Tolerances

Last Change Date Unit 2: 04/16/05 08:40						
Last Change Date Unit 3: 04/16/05 07:36						
S/Gs	2 S/G 1	2 S/G 2	3 S/G 1	3 S/G 2	3 S/G 3	3 S/G 4
Sodium ppb	-	-	0.1	0.05	0.05	0.1
Chloride ppb	-	-	0.22	0.2	0.21	0.17
Sulfate ppb	-	-	0.16	0.1	0.1	0.1
Blowdown gpm	0	0	40	39	39	39
Molar Ratio	-	-	0.7	0.38	0.37	0.91

View Tolerances

Last Change Date:04/16/05 08:40		
Secondary	Unit 2	Unit 3
Calculated Condenser In Leakage, gpd	-	0
Feedwater Oxygen, ppb	-	0.18
Feedwater Ethanolamine, ppm	-	2.38
CPI	0.00	1.00
Feedwater Iron, ppb	-	2.32

View Tolerances

Last Change Date:04/16/05 08:40		
Primary	Unit 2	Unit 3
Boron ppm	2177	701
Hydrogen cc/kg	**0**	30.6
Dose Equivalent Iodine	1.21E-4	1.76E-4
I-131/I-133	-	0.0369
Primary to Secondary Leak Rate gpd	<1	<1

Significant Activity/Events/Trends
- MP2 is shut down for 2R-16. - MP3 commenced Amine SPROC on 4/7/05 with "D" polisher

EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/OFFSITE RESPONSE/COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES

Last Change Date:04/15/05 09:08		
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)	Operable	None
Emergency Response Facilities (ERFS):	Degraded	TR# 14MP1508 is still outstanding and has been issued and Site Facilities has called a outside contractor to assist in the investigation, of the condition of water coming out of the conduit from the outside transformer to the main 400 amp 480 volt switch to the EOF.
Emergency Comm Facilities and Equipment:	Operable	
Prompt Notification System, Including **159** Sirens:	Operable	
Plant Monitors for Accident Monitoring:	Operable	None

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Subsystem	Status	Notes	Last Change Date
Upcoming Events	Operable	Weekly outage SUN 4/17/2005 0030-0130 Millstone outage IT Change moratorium started 3/27 for the MP2 outage	04/14/05 17:49
eSoms(Tagging): Operate the Plant	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
PREM: Monitor and Control Radiation Exposure	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
EDMS: Provide Records Management & Document Control	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
EDTS: Provide Records Management & Document Control	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
PassPort: Provide Records Management & Document Control	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
SAP: Materials and Services	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
			04/14/05

SRS: Work Management	Operable	NONE	17:48
PMMS: Work Management	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48
LAN/WAN	Operable	NONE	04/14/05 17:48

PLANNING DEPARTMENT

Last Change Date:04/15/05 17:57	
Work Orders in Backlog	0
Completed Not Closed	171
POD Items (sched/comp/work)	82 / 18 / 10

HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

Last Change Date:04/13/05 09:55	
Contaminated Area/Contaminated Area Goal	2032 / 2189 sq ft
Station Exposure Since Last Report	3.068 REM
Station Exposure YTD/YTD Goal	17.752 / 19.103 REM
PCEs Since Last Report	1
PCEs Year-to-Date	8
RCA Catch Containers	43
MIDAS Operability	Operable
MIDAS Operability Comments	
Health Physics Comments	

ORGANIZATION & ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT

Last Change Date:04/17/05 02:46	
Human Performance Success Days	139
Previous Best Performance Success Days	97
Human Performance Success Days Reset Event Date	11/29/2004
	Supervisory Briefing Sheet - Saturday April 16, 2005 Recent Near Misses of Falling Material Background: Over the past few days there have been four near misses associated with dropped/falling material. The last two incidents could have resulted in serious injury to plant workers or damage to plant equipment. Just today, a piece of scaffolding tube lock dropped between the containment wall and the kick plate from the 38'-6" to the -3'-6" inside containment. Additionally today, a bag containing four 6-inch long, ¾ inch diameter bolts and two 4 to 6 inch washers weighing between 2 to 3 pounds fell from above the outlet nozzle to the No. 1 steam generator. In both cases personnel were in the vicinity of the dropped/falling material. It is important that the information in this briefing sheet along with the attached operating experience be reviewed with our staff on night shift 04.16.05 and day shift 04.17.05.

Reason For Human Performance Reset	Required Compensatory Actions: 1. Conduct a walk down of your work areas looking for various ways that material could fall. Remember that you are looking for the potential for tools and equipment to fall to areas beneath and endanger personnel and equipment. Examples include the top of toolboxes or horizontal beams, open "save" bags, material on the edge of scaffolding, etc. It is recommended that a peer be used, as two sets of eyes are better than one. 2. If the situation can be immediately fixed, do so (i.e., lay down floor covering, store equipment/material away from the opening, etc.). If it cannot be fixed immediately contact your supervisor for assistance. 3. Report to your supervisor the results of your walk down. It is important to know that your work area is satisfactory or unsatisfactory. 4. Initiate a CR to document as-found conditions that need to be fixed, regardless of whether you fixed them immediately or not. These will be incorporated into lessons learned for future outages/work evolutions. 5. Going forward it is expected that supervisors ensure that work areas are free of human performance traps, including openings through which equipment/material could fall.
Equipment Reliability Success Days	5
Previous Best Equipment Reliability Success Days	44
Equipment Reliability Success Days Reset Event Date	4/12/2005
Reason For Equipment Reliability Reset	The Equipment Reliability Success Days Indicator was RESET as of April 12, 2005. Reason for Reset: IT was responding to a call regarding ICC Links going down. At 16:44, Operations received MB4C 1-11, Computer Failure Alarm. The Host B died. Operations referred to the ARP. Host A was still available. IT tried resetting Host B at which time Host A was lost also. Operations entered the applicable LCO'S at 17:10. IT restored the computer at 17:49(Reference: CR-

	05-03429). Criteria Exceeded: An entry into unplanned Technical Specification LCO with shutdown required in 14 days or less that requires a department outside of operations response. Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 has a LCO of 7 days.
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Dominion) Since Last Report	0
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Dominion) Year-To-Date	1
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Supplemental Personnel) Since Last Report	0
OSHA Recordable Injuries (Supplemental Personnel) Year-To-Date	1
Injury Description	The Safety Success Days Indicator was RESET as of February 21, 2005. CR-05-01602: On February 21, 2005, during a snow storm, a DNC employee received a fracture to the left upper arm bone (humerus). The employee slipped in the parking lot north of the NAP. The incident occurred while the parking lot was still being cleared. The area was ultimately scraped, salted and sanded. The injury was classified as an OSHA Recordable.
Number of Supplemental Personnel On Site	279

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

Last Change Date:12/01/04 15:28	
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE STATUS	
Non-radiological monitoring systems status:	Operable
What was Degraded:	
Environmental events over the last 24 hours:	
Upcoming environmental inspections:	

2R16 Exposure Review

Saturday
April 16, 2005

Unit 2:	(REM)	Goal:		Unit 3:	(REM)	Goal:	
YTD	3.870	13.000	30%	YTD	1.534	9.500	16%
OTD	23.422	118.575	20%	MTD	0.102	0.735	14%
				WTD	0.016	0.075	21%

Top activities by dose for yesterday:

Unit 2:	3627 (mrem)
Replace B RCP motor	889
Staging in CTMT in HRA	619
S/G Sludge Lance preps	248
HP Job Coverage TSLHRA	192
HP Routine Activities	140
S/G ECT Preps	131
Staging in CTMT in RA	124
Insulation work in CTMT	120
S/G Sludge Lance	112
ISI Weld Inspections	111

Analysis of Significant Work:

Outage day: 7

U-2: (outage to date)	Actual:	Projected:
Cavity Pit Seal Replacement	8021 mrem	10000 mrem
S/G ECT; equipment set-up:	145 mrem	250 mrem
S/G Sludge Lance: Remove covers	523 mrem	200 mrem
ISI Weld Inspection:	773 mrem	2085 mrem
ISI Weld Profiles:	328 mrem	1200 mrem
Radiography	658 mrem	1200 mrem
Staging; installation:	7700 mrem	8000 mrem
Pressurizer Spray Bypass Valves:	19 mrem	2000 mrem
Insulation; removal:	1759 mrem	1600 mrem
B RCP Motor Replacement	1308 mrem	4500 mrem

Look Ahead:

Pit Seal Work continues
Steam Generator Sludge Lancing on-going
ISI Inspections
B RCP Motor replacement - Install new motor

Total (YTD) Exposure for Units 2 & 3 :	**39.248**	**REM**
NBU **2nd Quarter** Goal for Millstone Station:	**124.000**	**REM**
	32%	

Data Current as of: 04/16/2005 0:16

2R16 Exposure vs Goal



2R16 Exposure Goal.xls

2R16 Daily Exposure Report
143.575 REM

Repetitive Projects	Actual Dose	Estimate	Percent	Status	Owner
Rx Disassembly & Reassembly	1.716	12.000	14%		Dolishny
Steam Generator ECT	0.145	4.000	4%		Gardner
S/G Sludge Lance	0.523	3.550	15%		Gardner
Refueling & ICI Replacement	0.013	5.195	0%		Dolishny
ISI Weld Inspection & BACCP	1.269	4.000	32%		Beeman
Snubber Inspections	0.146	1.300	11%		O'Donald
Valve Repairs & MOVs	0.647	12.000	5%		Graves
Mechanical CMs & PMs	2.132	9.000	24%		Davis
Instrument & Controls	0.519	2.500	21%		Reyher
Electrical & GTS CMs & PMs	0.080	0.900	9%		Clorite
Staging	7.700	11.500	67%		O'Donald
Shielding	0.966	1.500	64%		Regan
Insulation	1.759	4.000	44%		O'Donald
Repetitive Projects Total	17.615	71.445	25%		

Specific Projects	Actual Dose	Estimate	Percent	Status	Owner
VCT Level Mods	0.000	1.000	0%		Hastings
Pressurizer Spray Bypass Valves	0.019	2.000	1%		Madden
Pzr Penetrations & Heater Elements	0.594	7.000	8%		Janes
RCS Penetrations	0.000	5.000	0%		Janes
Large Bore Service Water Piping	0.101	5.000	2%		Rein
FAC	0.008	0.200	4%		Hei
CTMT Clean-up	0.065	1.750	4%		Martin
Specific Projects Total	0.787	21.950	4%		

Work Groups	Actual Dose	Estimate	Percent	Status	Owner
Health Physics & Decon	3.193	13.200	24%		Laine
Operations & LLRT	0.874	5.000	17%		Hoffner
Chemistry	0.027	0.200	14%		Laine
Protection Services	0.009	0.100	9%		Campbell
Nuclear Oversight	0.027	0.600	5%		Heard
Management	0.046	0.075	61%		Sarver
Engineering, Pred. Maint., Radiography	0.770	2.700	29%		Langan
Waste Services	0.048	1.000	5%		Laine
Nuclear Support Services	0.026	0.500	5%		Meekhoff
Work Groups Total	5.020	23.375	21%		

2R16 Total Exposure:	*23.422*	*Exposure Savings:*	*1.805*

2R16 Exposure Goal:		*116.770*	*20.1%*
Rx Head Replacement:	*2.391*	*15.000*	*15.9%*
Permanent Pit Seal:	*8.021*	*10.000*	*80.2%*

Exposure for previous day:	*04/15/05*	*3.452*	*Friday*

All values in REM, unless otherwise specified.

Data current as of: 4/16/05 12:16 AM ALARA Hotline: x6700

MILLSTONE U3

Major Equipment Schedule

WW 0516 - WWC: Mike O'Neill

"B" TRAIN PROTECTED

Monday 4/18	Tuesday 4/19	Wednesday 4/20	Thursday 4/21	Friday 4/22	Saturday 4/23	Sunday 4/17
SIH01/02 B Train Sun, then A Train 3608.6-1 Strokes 72 Hr LCOs	**RSS99** Instrument Cal/Setpoint 6 Hr SCT	**SWP07** 3626.3-5 Both SWP Pumps Support RSS 4 Hr SCT 72 Hr LCO (0200-0600 for risk reduction)	**HVR99** Filter Runs AB 2200-0800 (4/20) SLCRS 0800-1800 CB 0100-1100			**CMS99** Containment Radmonitor Gas Sample 30 Day LCO 6 Hr SCT
DWS02 Vacuum Pump Oil Change 7 Hr SCT	**HVC99** Control Rm Pressure Filter Test w/ CBM 3614F.1-1 11 Hr SCT	**RSS01** 3626.3-12/14-1 Flow, Inspect, Flush E1A 9 Hr SCT 72 Hr LCO	**RSS03** 3626.14-1 Inspect & Flush E1C 9 Hr SCT 72 Hr LCO	**FPW99** CSP 600.6-1 Electric Fire Pump Op Test 2 Hr SCT		
15G10 LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk-Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT	**15G10** LNP Risk- Switchyard 10 Hr SCT 12.3 Day ACT
HVK01 SW/HVK Vlv Op Test with Chiller Swap and Pump Op Tests w/CBM 3 Hr SCT			**NMP99** 3441D02 Incore/Excore 7 Hr SCT			
PMS99 EN 31017 Secondary Plant Performance Test 2 Week Duration starts this week			**SRV99** CSP600.1 Siren Test			

CRs for Leadership Review 04/18/2005 4:19:38 AM

Revised 8/30/04

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03611 2 **UNABLE TO CALIBRATE MAIN TRANSFORMER TIS 4 TEMPERATURE INDICATOR.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

VENDOR MANUAL SUPPLIES INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTION FOR CALIBRATION AND/OR DASHPOT/LINKAGE COMPONENTS BROKEN.

Action Taken:

INFORMED FLS, WRITING CR.

CR-05-03665 2 **COATING FAILURE AND SIGNIFICANT CORROSION OF FLANGE AND PIPE WALL**

Local ID: M2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (SERVICE WATER SPOOL SK-3529, DWG 25203-20150, SH. 680) CRED requested from SEA WATER TEAM

Issue Detail:

CORROSION DAMAGE TO PIPE WALL ESTEND APPROXIMATELY 1 1/2 INCHES LONGITUDNALLY FROM FLANGE FACE AND APPROXIMATELY 2 1/2 INCHES CIRCUMFERENTIALLY. FIT-UP GAP BETWEEN FLANGE ID AND PIPE OD IS EXPOSED. SIGNIFICANT METAL LOSS TO FLANGE.

Action Taken:

PHOTOGRAPH, DOCUMENT IN INSPECTION REPORT, AND NOTIFY SEA WATER TEAM

CR-05-03666 2 **CONAX CONNECTOR WAS REMOVED UNDER DM2-00-1957-98**

Local ID: M22-SI-312 (N2 SUPPLY TO CTMT STOP VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

CONAX CONNECTORS WERE REMOVED UNDER DM2-00-1957-98, BUT ARE STILL LISTED IN THE EQR PAGE 47 OF EQR1205-01

Action Taken:

PLANNING NOTIFIED FLS

CR-05-03667 2 **COATING DAMAGE ON FLANGE FACES**

Local ID: M2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (SEA WATER SPOOL SK-3528, DWG 25203-20150, SH. 680)

Issue Detail:

COMPLETE COATING FAILURE ON DOWNSTREAM FLANGE FACE FROM GASKET SURFACE TO FLANGE OD WITH TWO AREAS OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE ON GASKET SURFACE AND ONE AREA ON TRANSITION FROM FLANGE FACE TO PIPE WALL. ONE AREA OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE ON UPSTREAM FLANGE AT TRANSITION FROM FLANGE FACE TO PIPE WALL.

Action Taken:

PHOTOGRAPH AND DOCUMENT DAMAGE IN INSPECTION REPORT AND NOTIFY SEA WATER TEAM.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03668	2	DEGRADED RUBBER LINER IDENTIFIED DURING VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE INTERIOR OF UNIT 2 CONDENSATE POLISHING FACILITY 'B' DEMINERALIZER.

Local ID: M22-CND-DEMIN-1B (CONDENSATE POLISHING FACILITY DEMINERALIZER '1B')

Issue Detail:

THE TANK INTERIOR IS LINED WITH A PROTECTIVE RUBBER MATERIAL. THIS LINER PREVENTS CORROSION OF THE TANK BASE METAL AND PROVIDES A BARRIER BETWEEN THE RESIN AND TANK INTERIOR SURFACES. THE LINER IS BELIEVED TO BE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT AND IS SHOWING SIGNS OF AGING. THERE ARE SEVERAL SPLITS IN THE LINER THAT DO NOT APPEAR TO BE DOWN TO BASE METAL. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE LINER HAS BEEN DAMAGED ON EDGES OF THE CHANNEL AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TANK (I.E., WHERE THE LATERAL HARDWARE IS BOLTED DOWN). THE DAMAGE APPEARS TO BE DUE TO MECHANICAL ABRASION FROM UNKNOWN SOURCE. THE LINER IS THIN IN THESE ABRADED AREAS AND BASE METAL MAY ALSO BE EXPOSED. THE LINER IN THE MANWAY IS BLISTERING. BLISTERING IN THE LINER MEANS THAT WATER HAS PERMEATED THROUGH THE LINER AND IS CAUSING DISBONDMENT.

Action Taken:

INITIATED CR.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03669	2	GROUND WATER INTRUSION IN UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING -45' "A" ESF ROOM NORTH WALL BY ROOM COOLER.

Local ID: M22390A (AUXILIARY BUILDING - MISCELLANEOUS ITEM)

Issue Detail:

GROUND WATER INTRUSION IN UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING -45' "A" ESF ROOM NORTH WALL SURROUNDING THE ROOM COOLER. REFERENCE CR-02-05499. THIS CR DOCUMENTS CONTINUAL LEAKAGE IN THE AREA.

Action Taken:

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03670	2	DOCUMENT LEVEL 2 PCR (16K CCPM)

Issue Detail:

AN INDIVIDUAL BECOME CONTAMINATED WELDING ON THE UNIT 2 PIT SEAL. SEE PCR # M2-05-009 FOR DETAILS

Action Taken:

REMOVED PARTICLE.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03671	2	2-CH-516 HAS A BODY TO BONNET LEAK.

Local ID: M22-CH-516 (LETDOWN HEADER CIAS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

2-CH-516 HAS A BODY TO BONNET LEAK AS EVIDENCED BY BORIC ACID BUILDUP ON VALVE BODY. BORIC ACID BUILDUP PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED BY CR-05-03488 WHICH IDENTIFIED BORIC ACID ON BOLTING. VALVE CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO HAVE ACTUATOR WORK PERFORMED. TR GENERATED BY CR-05-03488 IS STILL IN THE ACTIVE STATUS.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED SM/US

SM Comments: THIS SHOULD BE EVALUATED FOR WORK THIS OUTAGE.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03673	2	DURING CALIBRATION OF LT-110Y FOUND OUT SPEC LOW. ALSO NOTICED SLOW TIME RESPONSE. THIS MAY BE INDICATIVE OF ROSEMOUNT LOSS OF OIL

Local ID: M2LT-110Y (PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER)

Issue Detail:

DURING CALIBRATION OF LT-110Y FOUND OUT SPEC LOW. ALSO NOTICED SLOW TIME RESPONSE. THIS MAY BE INDICATIVE OF ROSEMOUNT LOSS OF OIL. SEARCH HISTORY AND FOUND THE TRANSMITTER WAS REPLACED IN 2001. SINCE THEN IT HAS BEEN CALIBRATED THREE TIMES INCLUDING THIS CALIBRATION, AND HAS BEEN FOUND OUT OF SPEC LOW EACH TIME. RECOMMEND REPLACEMENT OF LT-110Y TRANSMITTER.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED FLS AND ENGINEERING

SM Comments: VERIFIED WITH THE SM THAT THE AS LEFT CALIBRATION RESTORED TO WITHIN THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS.OPERATIONS RECOMMENDS REPLACEMENT OF QUESTIONABLE LEVEL TRANSMITTER. A LOSS OF LT 110X AND 110Y WOULD PUT MP2 IN THE POSITION OF HAVING ONLY THE COLD CALIBRATED LT-103 REMAINING. T.S. 3.4.4 REQUIRES PRZR LEVEL BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN 35 AND 70%. THE TRM WILL REQUIRE THE ROVE OF FIRE AREAS IF LT 110X OR 110Y ARE INOPERABLE.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03675	2	LT-110X VALVE STEM HEADS ROUNDED.

Local ID: M2LT-110X (PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER)

Issue Detail:

LT-110X VALVE STEM HEADS ROUNDED. I&C WAS ABLE TO TORQUE VALVE STEMS BUT THE VALVE STEMS SHOULD BE REPLACED NEXT OUTAGE.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED FLS

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03676	3	EMERGENCY DIESEL AIR STARTING DRYER SKIDS REQUIRE EVALUATION FOR MID-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS VERSUS SHORT TERM REPAIRS TO IMPROVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY

Local ID: M33EGA-DRY2B-L ("B" DIESEL STARTING AIR DRYER 2B LEFT TOWER)

Issue Detail:

DURING REPLACEMENT OF THE 2B STARTING AIR DRYER COALESING FILTERS TO CORRECT A BLOWDOWN DEFICIENCY, IT WAS IDENTIFIED THAT SIGNIFICANT FILTER CLOGGING IS OCCURRING CAUSED BY INTERNAL CORROSION PARTICLES. THE FILTER HOUSINGS THEMSELVES ARE INTERNALLY DISCHARGING HEAVY RUST PARTICLES. THIS ISSUE, COUPLED WITH AN EXISTING ISSUE PRESENTLY WITH ENGINEERING REGARDING CORROSION DEGRADATION OF THE NEW CONTROL BALL VALVES INSTALLED OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS ON THE FOUR DRYER SKIDS WARRANTS AN EVALUATION FOR MID-TERM IMPROVEMENTS OF THE AIR DRYER SKIDS. THIS REQUEST WAS INITIATED BY OPERATION'S SHIFT CREWS AND MANAGEMENT. FOR THE SHORT TERM, MAINTENANCE WILL CONTINUE TO RESOLVE EACH COMPONENT FAILURE USING THE CR/TR WORK CONTROL PROCESS.

Action Taken:

REPLACED COALESING FILTERS, CLEANED OUT FILTER HOUSINGS AND RESTORED AIR DRYER TO SERVICE.

SM Comments: ENGINEERING SHOULD EVALUATE. NO OPERABILITY ISSUE WITH THIS CR. FAILURES ARE ADDRESSED FOR EACH CR. DIESEL AIR COMPRESSORS AND DRYERS ARE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. RECIEVER AIR PRESSURE IS REQUIRED FOR DIESEL OPERABILITY.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03677	3	THE PROTECTIVE CAP ON 3LWS-P1B HAS SHEARED AWAY FROM THE PUMP.

Local ID: M33LWS-P1B (WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED PUMP)

Issue Detail:

THE PROTECTIVE CAP ON 3LWS-P1B HAS SHEARED AWAY FROM THE PUMP.

Action Taken:

INITIATED TR

SM Comments: PROTECTIVE COVER IS A DRIP COVER ON TOP OF MOTOR. IT IS STILL ATTACED BUT NEEDS TO BE REPLACED.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03678 2 **MAIN TURBINE THRUST BEARING BUMP CHECK OUT OF SPEC.**

Local ID: M2H2 (MAIN TURBINE)

Issue Detail:

MAIN TURBINE THRUST BEARING BUMP CHECK MOVEMENT WAS 0.020 INCHES AND THE GE SPECIFICATION FOR THIS MOVEMENT IS 0.012 TO 0.014 INCHES. THIS WILL REQUIRE A SHIM CHANGE DURING ASSEMBLY TO BRING THE ROTOR MOVEMENT BACK INTO SPECIFICATION.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED TURBINE TEAM OF NEED TO SHIM THRUST BEARING

CR-05-03679 2 **3 OF THE 4 HILTI BOLTS FOR SERVICE WATER SUPPORT 427067 ARE LOOSE.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX () CRED requested from GIL OLSEN

Issue Detail:

THE SUPPORT IS BEING REMOVED TO SUPPORT THE REMOPVAL OF LARGE BORE SERVICE WATER PIPING. THIS IS AN EXISTING CONDITION. ENGINEERING TO EVALUATE PRIOR TO REINSTALLING SPOOL PIECE.

Action Taken:

NONE - NOTIFIED EDM, POM AND PROJECT MANAGER

CR-05-03680 2 **PIECE OF TUBELOK FELL THROUGH OPENING BETWEEN GRATING AND EQUIPMENT HATCH DOOR ON THE 14'6" ELEV. OF CONTAINMENT TO THE -3'6" ELEV.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

AT APPROXIMATELY 1115 HOURS, AN 8' PIECE OF TUBELOK WHICH WAS STORED ON THE GRATING BETWEEN THE DUCTWORK AND THE EQUIPMENT HATCH DOOR ON THE 14'6" ELEV. OF CONTAINMENT ROLLED THROUGH THE GAP BETWEEN THE GRATING AND THE DOOR AND FELL TO THE -3'6" ELEV. THE TUBELOK LANDED ON STAGING PLANKS AND BOUNCED OFF ONTO THE GRATING FLOOR ON THE -3'6" ELEV AND CAME TO REST. THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL INJURIES AND NO EQUIPMENT DAMAGE NOTED. AT THE TIME THAT THE TUBELOK FELL, THE MATERIAL STORED BEHIND THE DUCTWORK WAS BEING DEMOBILIZED INTO STORAGE RACKS LOCATED ON THE 14'6" ELEV. THERE IS NO KICKPLATE ON THE EDGE OF THE GRATING AND THE OPENING BETWEEN THE GRATING AND THE EQUIPMENT HATCH DOOR (WHEN IN THE OPEN POSITION) IS APPROXIMATELY 8".

Action Taken:

INVESTIGATED THE AREA FOR DAMAGE, REVIEWED THE 14'6" ELEV GAP, NOTIFIED THE OCC, AND GENERATED THIS CR.

CR-05-03681 2 **SGFP OIL PUMP P172B SHAFT RUN OUT DOES NOT MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA**

Local ID: M2P172B ('B' SGFP MOTOR DRIVEN OIL PUMP ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

SGFP P172B SHAFT RUNOUT DOES NOT MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AS SPECIFIED IN MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE MP 2703G3 SECTION 4.3.3. MP 2703G3 REQUIRES THAT THE SHAFT RUNOUT BE LESS THAN 0.003 INCHES AND THE RECORDED READING WAS 0.005 INCHES.

Action Taken:

DISCUSSED WITH TURBINE TEAM COORDINATOR

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03682 2 **AS FOUND READINGS WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING ADV TRANSMITTER CAL.**

Issue Detail:

DURING PERFORMANCE OF CAL PROCEDURE SP 2402F ON PT 4224 THE AS FOUND READINGS FOR THE 25% AND 50% POINTS WERE FOUND READING HIGHER THAN TOLERANCE. CALIBRATED TRANSMITTER AND MADE ADJUSTMENTS AS NECESSARY. AS LEFT DATA MEETS TOLERANCES.

Action Taken:

CALIBRATED TRANSMITTER PER PROCEDURE, NOTIFIED FLS AND WROTE CR.COMPLETED SURVAILLANCE

CR-05-03683 2 **2-MS-190 INDICATOR LIGHT NOT WORKING**

Local ID: M22-MS-190A (#1 STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC DUMP CONTROL VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

2-MS-190 "A" ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE OPEN INDICATION ON C05 DID NOT LIGHT WITH THE VALVE IN THE FULL OPEN POSITION

Action Taken:

VERIFIED BULB GOOD

SM Comments: MCB DIFICIENCY

CR-05-03684 2 **AS FOUND DATA FOR TS-221 DID NOT MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.**

Local ID: M2T-221 (REGEN HEAT EXCH X21 TEMP LOOP)

Issue Detail:

DURING THE LOOP CALIBRATION AS DIRECTED BY AWO M20400922, PS-221 (HI-HI) BISTABLE AS FOUND DATA WAS LOW (0.96 MADC) NOT MEETING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED FLS AND ADJUSTED SET POINT ADJUSTMENT. AS LEFT DATA MEETS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.

CR-05-03685 2 **OUT OF TOLERANCES FOUND DURING THE INSTALLATION OF THE PERMANENT CAVITY SEAL SUPPORT STRUCTURE SEGMENTS.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

SUPPORT STRUCTURE FITUP OUT OF TOLERANCES:
SUPPORT STRUCTURE SEGMENTS #3 AND #4 HAVE A 0.079" OUT OF TOLERANCE FROM SEAL LEDGE TO EDGE OF SUPPORT STRUCTURE ID. SEGMENT #3 IS OUT OF TOLERANCE IN TWO (2) LOCATIONS AND SEGMENT #4 IS OUT OF TOLERANCE IN ONE (1) LOCATION. ALLOWED TOLERANCE IS 0.015", ACTUAL IS 0.094".
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION WILL BE USED-AS-IS.

Action Taken:

EVALUATING AREVA CR (NCR)

SM Comments: DISCUSSED WITH PROJECTS,GIL OLSEN CRED IS WRITTEN TO STATE USE AS IS.

CR-05-03686 3 **DRAWING UPDATE REQUIRED (NOT OPERATIONS CRITICAL)**

Local ID: M33ABF-P3A (AUXILIARY BOILER CONDENSATE MAKEUP PUMP)

Issue Detail:

DRAWING 25212-32001-06DV (ESK-6DV) INCORRECTLY SHOWS MCC BUCKET 32-3D-3H AS THE POWER SOURCE FOR 3ABF-P3A.
THE CORRECT MCC POWER SOURCE IS 32-1D-3H

Action Taken:

WROTE CR

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03687	2	2-TB-156C, X13C GENERATOR HYDROGEN COOLER WATER RELIEF VALVE, (LONERGAN LCT-20) HAS CORROSION PRODUCT BUILD UP INSIDE 3/4" MOUNTING FLANGE.

Local ID: M22-TB-156C (X13C GENERATOR HYDROGEN COOLER WATER RELIEF VALVE)

Issue Detail:

A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS MADE OF THE 3/4" X 3" STUB PIPE MOUNTING FLANGE OFF 6"-HBD-76 IN THE 31'6" EL NORTH END OF THE CONDENSER. JUST INSIDE THE ¾" PIPE STUB OF THE 4-BOLT FLANGE THERE APPEARS TO BE ABOUT A TABLE SPOON OF CORROSION PRODUCTS THAT HAVE LATTICED TOGETHER PARTIALLY BLOCKING THE OPENING TO THE RELIEF VALVE. THIS CRUD WILL HAVE TO BE REMOVED PRIOR TO RESTORING 2-TB-156C.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED EDM

CR-05-03689	3	LOSS OF FME-IN 3ABF-P2B SUCTION STRAINER

Local ID: M33ABF-P2A (AUXILIARY BOILER CONDENSATE PUMP)

Issue Detail:

PERFORMING AWO3 M30500732 ABF-P2B SUCTION STRAINER CLEANOUT. UPON REMOVING STRAINER COVER, FOUND 1 PIECE OF 1/16 INCH RED RUBBER APPROX 3 SQUARE INCHES, 1 PIN 1/8 INCH DIA. 1 3/4 INCHES LONG. AND APPROX 4OZ OF OTHER DEBRIS/RUST.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED FLS. CONTINUED WORK.

CR-05-03690	2	EVALUATE AND POSSIBLY REMOVE "NOTICE ENGINE EXHAUST FREE AREA" SIGNS FROM UNIT 2 TURBINE BUILDING WEST OUTSIDE WALL

Issue Detail:

THE TWO SIGNS THAT STATE, "NOTICE ENGINE EXHAUST FREE AREA" LOCATED ON THE WEST OUTSIDE WALL OF THE UNIT 2 TURBINE BUILDING SERVE NO PURPOSE SINCE THE "C" AIR COMPRESSOR HAS BEEN RETIRED IN PLACED AND THE ASSOCIATED AIR INTAKE LOUVERS LOCATED IN THIS AREA WILL NOT BE USED. THESE SIGNS WERE ORIGINALLY USED TO PROTECT THE BREATHING AIR SOURCE, IF "C" AIR COMPRESSOR WAS PROVIDING THE SOURCE OF AIR.

Action Taken:

NONE

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03692 **2** **2-HV-208 AND 2-HV-211 FAILED THEIR CLOSE TIMING TEST**

Local ID: M22-HV-208D (CONTROL ROOM EXHAUST TO OUTSIDE HEADER ISOLATION DAMPER) CRED requested from DAVE PRESUTTI

Issue Detail:

AS PART OF THE RETEST FOR 2-HV-208 AND 2-HV-211 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE NEEDED TO STROKE TIME TEST AT THE RETEST FOR AWO'S M20310991 AND M20310990. IN THE RETEST OF THE AWO'S IT REQUIRES OPS AND MAINTENANCE TO STROKE TIME TEST THE DAMPERS PER MP 2701J-92A. THE DAMPERS IDENTIFIED FAILED THE OPEN TIME TEST AT 18 SECONDS AND THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IS 15 SECONDS.

Action Taken:

WROTE CR AND CONTACTED ENGINEERING AND THE OCC

SM Comments: ER SYSTEM ENGINEER AND RETEST REQUIREMENTS, THERE IS NO STROKE TIME REQUIREMENT FOR STROKE TIME ON AIR OPERATED DAMPERS 2-HV-208 OR 2-HV-211. MP 2701J-092A. 2-HV-208 AND 2-HV-211 ARE AIR OPERATED DAMPERS(REF. P&ID 25203-26027 SH. 3 AND MP2701J-092A PG. 2 OF 5). THESE ARE NORMALLY CLOSED DAMPERS AND THE SAFETY FUNCTION IS TO BE CLOSED. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THESE DAMPERS IN MP 2701J-092A IS OPERATES SMOOTHLY AND NO EXCESSIVE AIR LEAKAGE OR NOISE. ALSO, THE AWO SAYS TO STROKE DAMPER IN ACCORDANCE MP 2701J-092A. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO OPERABILITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH CR-05-03692/3693/3694. REVISE MNTC PROCEDURE.

CR-05-03693 **2** **HV-211 FAILED STOKE TIME TESTING**

Local ID: M22-HV-211D (OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE HEADER ISOLATION DAMPER) CRED requested from D. PERZUTTI

Issue Detail:

HV211 FAILED TO MEET THE THE 15 SECOND STROKE TIME

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED SYS. ENG. AND FLS

SM Comments: PER DAVID PRESUTTI OF ENGINEERING, THERE IS NO STROKE TIME REQUIREMENT ON AIR OPERATED DAMPERS, 2-HV-208 OR 2-HV-211. 2-HV-208 AND 211 ARE AIR OPERATED DAMPERS (REF. P&ID 25203-26027 SH. 3 AND MP2701J-092A PG 2 OF 5), ARE NORMALLY CLOSED DAMPERS AND THE SAFETY FUNCTION IS TO BE CLOSED. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THESE DAMPERS IN MP-2701J-092A IS "OPERATES SMOOTHLY" AND "NO EXCESSIVE AIR LEAKAGE OR NOISE". ALSO THE AWO SAYS TO STROKE THE DAMPER IN ACCORDANCE WITH MP-2701J-092A. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO OPERABILITY ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CR.

CR-05-03694 **2** **HV-208 FAILED STROKE TIME TESTING**

Local ID: M22-HV-208D (CONTROL ROOM EXHAUST TO OUTSIDE HEADER ISOLATION DAMPER) CRED requested from D. PERZUTTI

Issue Detail:

HV-208 FAILED TO MEET THE THE 15 SECOND STROKE TIME

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED SYS. ENG. AND FLS.

SM Comments: PER DAVID PRESUTTI OF ENGINEERING, THERE IS NO STROKE TIME REQUIREMENT ON AIR OPERATED DAMPERS, 2-HV-208 OR 2-HV-211. 2-HV-208 AND 211 ARE AIR OPERATED DAMPERS (REF. P&ID 25203-26027 SH. 3 AND MP2701J-092A PG 2 OF 5), ARE NORMALLY CLOSED DAMPERS AND THE SAFETY FUNCTION IS TO BE CLOSED. THE REQUIREMENT FOR THESE DAMPERS IN MP-2701J-092A IS "OPERATES SMOOTHLY" AND "NO EXCESSIVE AIR LEAKAGE OR NOISE". ALSO THE AWO SAYS TO STROKE THE DAMPER IN ACCORDANCE WITH MP-2701J-092A. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO OPERABILITY ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CR.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03695	2	DOCUMENT LEVEL 2 PCR (15K CCPM)

Issue Detail:

INDIVIDUAL BECAME CONTAMINATED WHILE HANDING WELDING WIRE TO WELDERS AT THE CTMT. PERSONNEL HATCH. SEE PCR# M2-05-010 FOR MORE DETAILS.

Action Taken:

CR-05-03696 2 **INDIVIDUAL TOUCHED SCAFFOLD OUTSIDE CONTAMINATED AREA 38'6" WEST PEN AND FELT TINGLE**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (VACUUM CLEANER)

Issue Detail:

AN INDIVIDUAL EXITING THE CONTAMINATED AREA IN THE 38'6" WEST PEN TOUCHED A SCAFFOLD ERECTED NEXT TO THE HORSESHOE COUNTER AND REPORTED HE FELT A TINGLE.

Action Taken:

THE OCC WAS NOTIFIED AND LATER INDICATED AN ELECTRICIAN WOULD BE DISPATCHED. PERSONNEL EXITING THE CONTAMINATED AREA WERE REROUTED TO EXIT AT THE ENTRANCE. AN EXTENSION CORD FROM A WET VACUUM OUTSIDE THE CONTAMINATED AREA, WEST SIDE HAD BEEN RUN THROUGH THE SCAFFOLD AND PLUGGED IN ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE WEST PEN. THE VACUUM WAS NOT IN OPERATION. THE EXTENSION CORD WAS UNPLUGGED AND WRAPPED AROUND THE VACUUM. AN ATLANTIC ELECTRICIAN IN THE AREA VERIFIED THE SCAFFOLD WAS NOW SAFE. THE SITE FACILITIES SUPERVISOR WAS EXITING CONTAINMENT AND DIRECTED THAT AN ELECTRICIAN CHECK THE VACUUM AND THE OUTLET IT WAS PLUGGED INTO. THE VACUUM WAS LABELED DO NOT USE.

SM Comments: THERE WAS A REPORT THAT THERE WAS NO GFCI ON THE EXTENSION CORD TO THE VACUUM. THE VACUUM REMAINS OUT OF SERVICE.

CR-05-03697 2 **2-HV-203B DAMPER ARM SET SCREW MISSING ONE SET OF THE TWO SET SCREWS.**

Local ID: M22-HV-203BD ('B' CONTROL ROOM A/C UNIT FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER) CRED requested from TOM LYONS

Issue Detail:

BASED ON LOOKING AT THE OTHER DAMPER ARMS THEY ALL HAVE 2 SET SCREWS AND 2-HV-203B HAS ONLY ONE INSTALLED, THERE IS NOTHING IN DESIGN TO IDENTIFY WHAT SUPPOSED TO BE THERE AND A LOOK IN SAP REVEALED NO MATERIAL NUMBER THAT COULD MATCH SET SCREW.

Action Taken:

CONTACTED EOM FOR DIRECTION AND HE STATED TO WRITE CR.

SM Comments: NEW SET SCREW IS BEING QUALIFIED BY PROCUREMENT. IT WILL BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO DECLARING TRAIN OF CR A/C OPERABLE.

CR-05-03698 2 **SOLENOID VALVE IS BLOWING AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF AIR. SOLENOID NEEDS REPLACED.**

Local ID: M22-MS-183C (MAIN STEAM 2-MS-61C AFTER SEAT DRAIN CONTROL VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

SOLENOID VALVE IS BLOWING AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF AIR. SOLENOID NEEDS REPLACED. VALVE SHOULD LEAK ONLY MINIMAL AIR. THIS IS CURRENTLY LEAKING A REALLY WASTEFUL AMOUNT OF AIR.

Action Taken:

WROTE THIS CR.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03699	3	10CFR21 REPORTABLE NOTIFICATION ABOUT WOODWARD GOVERNOR "COMPENSATING" EG SERIES ACTUATORS

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (UNIT 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS)

Issue Detail:

ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC. RECENTLY ISSUED A 10CFR21 REPORTABLE NOTIFICATION ABOUT WOODWARD GOVERNOR "COMPENSATING" EG SERIES ACTUATORS. THE DETAILS ARE CONTAINED IN REPORT 10CFR21-0089, REVISION 0. THE ACTUATORS ON THE UNIT 3 EDGS FALL INTO THE SCOPE OF THE NOTIFICATION. THE ACTUATORS FOR THE UNIT 2 EDGS, THE SBO DIESEL, AND THE STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS AT UNITS 2 AND 3 ARE NOT WITHIN SCOPE OF THE NOTIFICATION. THE UNIT 3 EDG ACTUATORS DO NOT EXHIBIT THE CONDITION DESCRIBED IN THE NOTIFICATION.

THE NOTIFICATION WAS THE RESULT OF AN INVESTIGATION OF AN INDUSTRY EVENT THAT OCCURRED AT ANOTHER NUCLEAR PLANT. SPECIFICALLY, THE PLANT HAD JUST COMPLETED A 24 HOUR ENDURANCE RUN, SHUT THE DIESEL DOWN AND WAS ATTEMPTING THE HOT RESTART TEST THAT IS PERFORMED WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF SHUTTING DOWN THE DIESEL. THE DIESEL FAILED TO START. TROUBLESHOOTING DETERMINED THAT THE ACTUATOR "NULL" VOLTAGE HAD DRIFTED AND HAD BECOME APPROXIMATELY 0 VOLTS. THE COMPENSATING ACTUATOR REQUIRES A SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE NULL VOLTAGE IN ORDER FOR THE ACTUATOR TO MOVE THE RACKS TO FULL FUEL DURING THE STARTING SEQUENCE.

THE COMPENSATING ACTUATOR RECEIVES CONTROL SIGNALS FROM AN EGA CONTROLLER. THIS IS AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE. THE EGA CONTROLLER RECEIVES ITS POWER FROM GENERATOR OUTPUT. THE EGA CONTROLLER SENSES SPEED BY MONITORING GENERATOR OUTPUT FREQUENCY. DURING A START, THE EGA CONTROLLER IS NOT POWERED AND CANNOT PROVIDE SIGNALS TO THE ACTUATOR UNTIL GENERATOR OUTPUT IS DEVELOPED. UNTIL THAT TIME, THE SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE NULL VOLTAGE ENSURES THE RACKS GO TO FULL FUEL DURING THE STARTING SEQUENCE. A NULL VOLTAGE OF 0 VOLTS DOES NOT ALLOW THE ACTUATOR TO MOVE THE RACKS TO FULL FUEL, DURING A START. IF THE NULL VOLTAGE DRIFTS TO A POSITIVE VOLTAGE, THE ACTUATOR CHANGES FROM A "FAIL TO MAXIMUM FUEL" ACTUATOR TO A "FAIL TO MINIMUM FUEL" ACTUATOR. THIS CHANGE HAS THE POSSIBILITY OF AFFECTING THE START TIME OF A DIESEL IF THE ACTUATOR ALONE IS RELIED UPON FOR STARTING.

THE AFFECTED PLANT ASKED MEMBERS OF THE FAIRBANKS-MORSE OWNERS GROUP AND THE EMD OWNERS GROUP IF THEY HAD NOTICED ANY DRIFTING OF NULL VOLTAGE OR IF THEY HAD FAILED A HOT RESTART DUE TO DRIFTING NULL VOLTAGE. NONE OF THE MEMBERS NOTICED ANY DRIFT OR FAILED HOT RESTART TESTS DUE TO DRIFTING NULL VOLTAGE. THE 10CFR21 NOTIFICATION ACKNOWLEDGES THAT NOT ALL COMPENSATING ACTUATORS WILL EXPERIENCE NULL VOLTAGE DRIFT.

A REVIEW OF START TIMES AT MILLSTONE UNIT 3 SHOWS NO ADVERSE TREND IN START TIMES. START TIMES FOR HOT RESTART TESTS WERE REVIEWED AND COMPARED TO THE START TIMES FOR THE EDG STARTS THAT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE HOT RESTART TEST. THE STARTS THAT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE HOT RESTART, ARE FROM STANDBY CONDITIONS. IN ALL CASES THE HOT RESTART START TIMES WERE LESS THAN THE START THAT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE HOT RESTART. A REVIEW OF PAST GOVERNOR MONITORING SHOWS THAT THE NULL VOLTAGE ON THE UNIT 3 EDG ACTUATORS HAS NOT CHANGED BETWEEN THE MONITORING INTERVALS. ONE OF THE INTERVALS SPANNED 5 YEARS.

THE DIESEL THAT FAILED THE HOT RESTART TEST IS FROM A DIFFERENT MANUFACTURER THAN THE UNIT 3 DIESELS. THE UNIT 3 DIESELS ARE PIELSTICK DIESELS. THERE IS A DEVICE ON THE PIELSTICK THAT MOVES THE FUEL RACKS, INDEPENDENT OF THE ACTUATOR, DURING A START. IN THE CASE OF A PIELSTICK, IF THE NULL VOLTAGE WAS TO DRIFT TO 0 VOLTS, THE DIESEL WOULD STILL BE CAPABLE OF STARTING AND PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION.

IN CONCLUSION, WHILE THE ACTUATORS ON THE UNIT 3 EDGS ARE IN SCOPE TO THE 10CFR21 NOTIFICATION, AVAILABLE INFORMATION SHOWS THAT UNIT 3 EDG ACTUATORS DO NOT EXHIBIT THE CONDITION DESCRIBED IN THE NOTIFICATION. DESIGN OF THE UNIT 3 EDG DIESEL IS SUCH THAT IF COMPENSATING ACTUATOR NULL VOLTAGE WERE TO DRIFT TO 0 VOLTS, THE EDG WOULD START AND BE CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. FURTHERMORE, NO OTHER NUCLEAR PLANT UTILIZING THE COMPENSATING ACTUATOR HAS EXPERIENCED THE CONDITION DESCRIBED IN THE NOTIFICATION. THE UNIT 3 EDGS REMAIN OPERABLE. NO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED.

Action Taken:

EVALUATED APPLICABLITY TO UNIT 2 AND 3 EDGS

SM Comments: THIS CR WAS BASED ON AN ADVANCE COPY OF A PROPOSED PART 21 NOTIFICATION OBTAINED FROM THE OWNERS GROUP. NO OPERABILITY ISSUE BASED ON INFORMATION IN THE CR

CR #	Unit	Title
		REGARDING NO OBSERVED DRIFT AT UNIT 3 AND DESIGN OF EDG ALLOWING FOR FUEL RACK MOVEMENT ON STARTUP INDEPENDENT OF THE GOVERNOR. ENGINEERING SHOULD REVIEW THE PART 21 WHEN FORMALLY ISSUED AND DOCUMENT RESPONSE

CR-05-03700 **2** **#4 MAIN CONTROL VALVE LIFT**

Local ID: M22-MS-61A (#4 STEAM CONTROL VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION OF THE #4 MAIN CONTROL VALVE (2-MS-61A) HAS REVEALED THAT THE VALVE LIFT IS OUT OF SPEC AT .030 MILS. EXPECTED LIFT IS .089 MILS. THIS LIFT VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LIFT CHECK FROM THE PREVIOUS DISASSEMBLY IN 2000. THIS CR IS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THE DISCREPANCY WITH THE AS-FOUND LIFT. DISC SEAT INDICATIONS MAY REQUIRE THE NEED FOR A NEW REPLACEMENT PART. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS THIS CONDITION ARE BEING EVALUATED BY THE TURBINE TEAM.

WORK TO CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY WILL BE PERFORMED UNDER AWO M2-00-12104. THIS CR IS WRITTEN TO DOCUMENT THE AS-FOUND CONDITION. THIS CR WILL BE USED AS THE PARENT DOCUMENT IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT A CRED IS REQUIRED TO ADDRESS.

Action Taken:

CR-05-03701 **3** **3CHS*FCV111B DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE FOLLOWING DILUTION**

Local ID: M33CHS*FCV111B (MAKEUP TO VOLUME CONTROL TANK ISOLATION)

Issue Detail:

PERFORMED A 45 GALLON DILUTION OF THE RCS TO MAINTAIN POWER PER SECTION 4.24 OF OP 3304C. WHEN THE 45 GALLON DILUTION WAS FINISHED, 3CHS*FCV111A CLOSED, HOWEVER, 3CHS*FCV111B FAILED TO GO CLOSED IN AUTO. THE GUIDANCE IN OP 3304C STEP 4.24.8 FOLLOWING DILUTION IS TO "VERIFY" 3CHS*FCV111B CLOSED. CLOSED 3CHS*FCV111B WITH MAIN BOARD CONTROL SWITCH. FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH CONTROL ROOM TEAM, RESTORED MAKEUP SYSTEM TO AUTO (INCLUDING 3CHS*FCV111B) USING OP 3304C, SECTION 4.1 AND SECTION 4.24 CONCURRENTLY.

Action Taken:

DISPATCHED PEO TO VISUALLY INSPECT 3CHS*FCV111B AND CONTACTED I&C TO INVESTIGATE. A REVIEW OF THE APPLICABLE ESKS INDICATE THAT A CONTACT IN THE CIRCUIT FOR 3CHS*SOV111B FED FROM 1-MUX3 MAY NOT BE REOPENING FOLLOWING THE DILUTION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT CIRCUIT FOR 3CHS*FCV111A SHARE THE SAME INPUTS AS 3CHS*FCV111B, HOWEVER, 3CHS*FCV111A CLOSED FOLLOWING THE DILUTION.

CR-05-03702 **2** **CAPACITY OF CONTAINMENT CLOSURE FORK LIFT MAY BE INADEQUATE.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

A CRAFT IDENTIFIED THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CONTAINMENT CLOSURE FORK LIFT WAS BIG ENOUGH. A CONTAINMENT COORDINATOR LOOKED INTO THE ISSUE. THE FORK LIFT WITH LIFT RIG IS CAPABLE OF LIFTING APP. 2400 LBS. THE PIECE OF PLATE WHICH BRIDGES THE HATCH OPENING WEIGHS APP. 3000 LBS. BASED ON ROUGH CALCS.

Action Taken:

IMMEDIATELY UPON IDENTIFICATION WASTE SERVICES WAS CONTACTED AND ASKED THEN TO KEEP AN ADEQUATELY SIZED FORK LIFT AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE USE. THE MOTOR POOL WAS CONTACTED, THEY DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATELY SIZED FORK LIFT TO REPLACE THE ONE THAT IS STATIONED AT THE EQUIPMENT HATCH. WASTE SERVICES WAS CONTACTED AND HAS PERMINANTLY STATIONED AN ADEQUATELY SIZED FORKLIFT AT THE HATCH.

SM Comments: ENSURE THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB IS INCORPORATED.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03703 3 **CHLORINE ROOM SUPPLY DAMPER GRATING CLOGGED**

Local ID: M33HVY-AOD30 (CHLORINE RM INL DMPR)

Issue Detail:

3HVY-AOD30 CHLORINE ROOM SUPPLY DAMPER AROUND 50% CLOGGED

Action Taken:

INFORMED US AND WROTE CR

CR-05-03704 2 **THE CABLE ON THE KNUCKLE CRANE WAS FOUND CRIMPED.**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

THE KNUCKLE CRANE, USED IN CONTAINMENT TO ASSIST IN LIFTING, WAS FOUND WITH THE LIFT CABLE CRIMPED. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY FOLDING THE CRANE UP INTO THE TRAVEL STORAGE CONDITION.

Action Taken:

CABLE WAS REPLACED.

CR-05-03707 2 **TAPE FOUND ON 2-CH-314 AND UPSTREAM ELBOW, ALSO BLANK FLANGE NOT RE-INSTALLED.**

Local ID: M22-CH-314 (CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER HYDRO TEST CONNECTION VALVE)

Issue Detail:

WHILE PERFORMING VT-2 INSPECTION FOR AWO M2-04-11544, AGED WHITE DUCT TAPE WAS NOTICED ON THE OUTLET SOCKET OF 2-CH-314, AND ON THE ELBOW UPSTREAM OF 2-CH-314. TAPE LOOKS OLD, MAY BE FROM NEARBY WELDING ON SOCKOLET TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER. ALSO, THE BLANK FLANGE WAS NOT INSTALLED DOWNSTREAM OF 2-CH-314, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE BEFORE TURNING AWO OVER TO OPS FOR RETEST.

Action Taken:

INFORMED SM/US AND MAINTENANCE.

SM Comments: ENGINEERING TO EVALUATE EFFECTS OF TAPE.

CR-05-03708 2 **DISCRETE AREAS OF COATING FAILURE ON PIPE SPOOL FLANGE TRANSITION**

Local ID: M2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (SPOOL SK-925 OUTLET FLANGE, DWG 25203-20150, SH 106)

Issue Detail:

APPROXIMATELY 20 DISCRETE AREAS OF COATING PERORATION ON THE TRANSITION FROM FLANGE FACE TO PIPE WALL (LARGE RADIUS). SURFACE RUST ONLY, NO PITTING OBSERVED.

Action Taken:

PHOTOGRAPH, DOCUMENT IN INSPECTION REPORT, AND NOTIFY SEA WATER TEAM

CR-05-03710 2 **PIT SEAL LIFT RIG REQUIRES EIGHT SLINGS**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (REACTOR CAVITY PIT SEAL LIFT RIG)

Issue Detail:

THE UNIT 2 PIT SEAL LIFT RIG WAS ASSEMBLED FOR LIFTING THE NEW CAVITY SEAL, WITH THE NORMAL FOUR SLINGS. A REVIEW OF THE ENGINEERED LIFT IDENTIFIED EIGHT LIFT POINTS. EIGHT SLINGS WERE OBTAINED AND THE LIFT PERFORMED.

Action Taken:

OBTAIN THE REQUIRED RIGGING AND PERFORM THE LIFT.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03711 2 **FOLLOW-UP TO CR-05-03381 AND CR-05-03333**

Local ID: M22-EB-89 ('B' CONTAINMENT AIR MONITOR ISOLATION CONTROL VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

SP 2604X-025 WAS PERFORMED AGAIN ON 4-16-05 IN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY CAUSE OF UNSAT DROP TEST ON 4-11-05 (CF-05-03381). BALLOONS WERE PLACED OVER NORMAL IA SUPPLY CHECK VALVE 2-IA-615 INLET AND SOV DUMP PORT. MINOR LEAKAGE FROM CHECK VALVE WAS EVIDENT AND DROP RATE WAS 28.5 PSIG/HR. SPEC IS 10 PSIG/HR. NORMAL IA SUPPLY WAS RECONNECTED TO CHECK VALVE 2-IA-615. NORMAL IA SUPPLY ISOLATION 2-IA-614 WAS OPENED TO PRESSURIZE CHECK VALVE INLET AND THEN CLOSED. DROP TEST WAS REPEATED AND DROP RATE WAS 28.0 PSIG/HR. THIS EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES CHECK VALVE 2-IA-615 AS THE CAUSE OF UNSAT ON 4/11/05. ACCESSIBLE PORTIONS OF BACKUP AIR SYSTEM WERE SNOOPED AND ONLY VERY MINOR LEAKAGE WAS FOUND ON REGULATOR BONNET BOLT AND BACKUP AIR SUPPLY VALVE 2-IA-611 OUTLET SWAGELOK FITTING. THESE LEAKS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO CAUSE DROP TEST FAILURE. SYSTEM WAS RESTORED TO NORMAL. SUSPECT SOLENOID VALVE MAY BE LEAKING BY CLOSED SEAT AND AIR IS SUBSEQUENTLY LEAKING FROM DIAPHRAGM CASE LEAK IDENTIFIED IN CR-05-03333.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED SM, SURVEILLANCE TEAM SRO, AND DISCUSSED WITH VALVE TEAM ENGINEER AND FLOW SCAN OPERATOR.

SM Comments: TR CREATED TO TRACK WITH AWO

CR-05-03712 2 **MAIN GENERATOR FIELD VOLTAGE METER FOUND OUT OF SPEC DURING CALIBRATION.**

Local ID: M2MB038 (VOLTAGE MAIN GEN FIELD MTR TRANSDUCER & COMPUTER PT EE005F C07F)

Issue Detail:

MB038 MAIN GENERATOR FIELD VOLT METER ON C07F FOUND OUT OF CALIBRATION.THE AS FOUND OUT OF SPEC READINGS WERE 435 (TOLERANCE FROM 438 TO 462) AND 580 (TOLERANCE FROM 588 TO 612) VOLTS. ALL OTHER AS FOUND READINGS SAT. M2-02-07168. 25203-32005 SHEET 12.

Action Taken:

ADJUSTED METER INTO SPEC. AS LEFT DATA SAT.

CR-05-03713 2 **LOW CHARGING FLOW AFTER STARTING PUMP**

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (CHARGING SYSTEM)

Issue Detail:

SP 2601J-010 VCT HEADER CHECK VALVE 2-CH-118 SURVEILLANCE WAS COMPLETED. THIS TEST VERIFIES THE VCT OUTLET CHECK VALVE CLOSED. THE SHIFT THEN PRO CEDED TO START THE "A" CHARGING PUMP TO RESTORE EXCESS LETDOWN. INITIALLY OBSERVED NORMAL CHARGING FLOW AND PRESSURE. SHORTLY AFTER PUMP START FLOW AND PRESSURE DEGRADED AND THE CONTROL OPERATOR SECURED THE "A' CHARGING PUMP WITH US CONCURRENCE. A COUPLE OF POSSIBILITIES COULD BE THE VCT OUTLET CHECK THAT WAS BEING CHECKED IN THE CLOSED POSITION STUCK CLOSED, OR IF THERE WAS AIR IN THE BORIC ACID SYSTEM, IT TRAVELED TO THE CHARGING PUMP SUCTION DURING THE TEST WHEN BORIC ACID SYSTEM ISOLATION CH 514 WAS OPENED. OF NOTE, CHARGING AND EXCESS LETDOWN WAS OPERATING SATISFACTORY PRIOR TO STARTING THE TEST.

Action Taken:

SECURED PUMP AND LETDOWN

SM Comments: PUMPS WERE VENTED AND RUN FOR 15 MINUTES EACH. VERIFIED CORRECT DISCHARGE FLOW AND PRESSURE FOR PLANT CONDITIONS.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03714 2 RECOVERY OF "G" DEMIN OUTLET STRAINER RIGIMESH SCREEN PIECES

Local ID: M2XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (MULTIPLE SYSTEMS INCLUDING CONDENSATE, MAIN FEEDWATER, AND STEAM)

Issue Detail:

FOLLOWING STARTUP FROM 2R15, THE RIGIMESH SCREEN IN THE RECENTLY INSTALLED "G" DEMIN OUTLET STRAINER FAILED, WITH APPROXIMATELY 0.92 SQ. FT. (399 GRAMS) OF SCREEN BREAKING UP AND TRAVELING DOWNSTREAM. EFFORTS TO RECOVER THESE PIECES OF SCREEN HAVE BEEN ONGOING DURING 2R16. TO DATE, SCREEN PIECES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND RECOVERED FROM THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

X7A OUTLET	26 GRAMS	
X7B OUTLET	98 GRAMS	
X4A OUTLET	5 GRAMS	
X4B OUTLET	6 GRAMS	
X2B OUTLET	1 GRAMS	
#2 S/G	4-7 GRAMS	REMOVED VIA SLUDGE LANCING
#2 S/G	2 GRAMS	LOCATED ON THE TUBESHEET DURING INSPECTION AND YET TO BE REMOVED.
TOTAL	~144 GRAMS	(~36% OF THE MISSING SCREEN)

Action Taken:

COLLECTED SCREEN FRAGMENTS, WEIGHED, AND TRACKED TOTAL RECOVERED.

CR-05-03717 2 FME BAGS/COVERS QAUNITY AND DELIVERY SERVICE FOR RCA SIDE AND NON-RCA .

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

DELIVERY OF RCA FME BAGS WERE NOT PROPERLY SET UP. THEY WERE GETTING WASHED AND BEING LEFT IN WAREHOUSE 9. NO DELIVERY PROCESS SET UP BACK TO THE RCA TO DESIGNATED STORAGE AREAS SUCH AS CONTAINMENT HATCH AREA AND HOT TOOL CRIB -5 FOOT ENCLOSURE BUILDING. WE ALSO NEED TO DETERMINE IF IT IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONS TO COVER OPENING SUCH AS VENT LINES OPEN FOR VENT PATHS. IF THAT IS DETERMINED TO BE THE PATH THEN WE NEED TO DETERMINE IF OPERATIONS IS GOING TO BE REQUIRED TO PURCHASE MAYBE DIFFERENT COLORED FME BAGS FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE.

Action Taken:

PURCHASED MORE FME BAGS. DETERMINED THAT THE DELIVERY OF WASHED FME BAGS INTO THE RCA IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HP DEPARTMENT, AND VERIFIED THAT WITH HP MANAGEMENT AND ENTERED IT IN E-SOMS. HP DEPARTMENT IS DELIVERING WASHED FME BAGS TO THE CONTAINMENT HATCH AREA FOR IN CONTAINMENT, AND DELIVERING THEM TO THE -5 TOOL CRIB.

CR-05-03718 2 #2 STEAM GENERATOR POST SLUDGE LANCE INSPECTION RESULTS

Local ID: M2X26 (#2 STEAM GENERATOR)

Issue Detail:

POST SLUDGE LANCE INSPECTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED FOR THE #2 STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY SIDE WITH FIFTEEN ITEMS IDENTIFIED AND DOCUMENTED FOR RETRIEVAL:

SEVEN PIECES OF FLEXITALLIC GASKET MATERIAL

FOUR PIECES OF RIGIMESH SCREEN FROM THE "G" DEMINERALIZER OUTLET STRAINER

ONE SMALL SELF TAPPING SCREW

ONE PIECE OF WELD WIRE

TWO PIECES OF METAL TURNINGS

Action Taken:

SPECIFIC LOCATIONS OF THE ITEMS WERE DOCUMENTED.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03719	2	WELD DEFECT,LACK-OF-FUSION, W-1; FAC REPLACEMENT PIPING WELD,AWO M20405597.

CRED requested from MIKE LALIKOS

Issue Detail:

RADIOGRAPHY REVEALED A LACK-OF-FUSION INDICATION FOR WELD W-1 ON FAC REPLACEMENT PIPING. THE INDICATION HAS AN AGGREGATE LENGTH OF 2-INCHES. 1-1/2" ON ONE VIEW (0-1) AND 1/2" IN ANOTHER VIEW (3-0).

Action Taken:

THE RADIOGRAPHER HAS MARKED UP THE REPAIR AREAS ON WELD W-1.

CR-05-03720 2 **RELIEF VALVE BOSS ON SUPPLY PIPE INSTALLED IN WRONG LOCATION**

Local ID: M2X34A ('A' CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM COOLER) CRED requested from LEE JOHNSON

Issue Detail:

RELIEF VALVE BOSS FOR 2-RB-344 ON THE CEDM COOLER X34A SUPPLY LINE WAS INSTALLED IN THE WRONG LOCATION DURING FABRICATION. THE BOSS IS LOCATED APPROX. 3" SOUTH OF DESIGN LOCATION. THIS HAS CREATED AN INTERFERENCE WITH SUPPORT 616651. ENGINEERING HAS ISSUED A DCN TO RELOCATE THE SUPPORT STRUCTURE ON THE BASE PLATE.
AWO M2-04-05820

Action Taken:

CONTACTED ENGINEERING TO DETERMINE IF NEW BOSS IS REQUIRED TO BE INSTALL LED IN THE CORRECT LOCATION.CR GENERATED FOR CRED.

CR-05-03721 2 **CONTROL ROOM IN-LEAKAGE TEST FAILED WHEN FACILITY 1 AND 2 CRAC SYSTEM OPERATED IN THE RECIRCULATION MODE.**

Local ID: M22315A (CONTROL ROOM AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM - MISCELLANEOUS ITEM)

Issue Detail:

WHEN TESTED USING SP 21205, THE CONTROL ROOM IN-LEAKAGE RESULTS FOR BOTH FACILITY 1 AND 2 WERE FOUND TO BE UNACCEPTABLE.

Action Taken:

INFORMED SM AND ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR.

SM Comments: AWO CHANGE GENERATED TO REPAIR LEAKAGE. TESTING SCHEDULED FOR 4/18/05 AT 2300

CR-05-03722 2 **LIFTING OF TEMP. MOD TAG MISSED DURING ENGINEERING WALK DOWN ON NON-OPERATIONAL SYSTEM. *TEMP MOD FOR RAPID BORATION # 2-03-003.***

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

TEMP MOD TAG SHOULD HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED FOR REMOVAL DURING ENG. WALK DOWN. THE SYSTEM WAS IN A NON-OPERATIONAL CONDITION. THE TEMP MOD INCLUDED THE OPTION TO INSTALL A CONTROLLATRON TO MONITOR FLOW DURING THE RAPID BORATION EVOLUTION. THE CONTROLLATRON WAS INSTALLED IN THE PERMANENT PORTION OF THE PIPING SYSTEM. DURING TEMP MOD REMOVAL WALK DOWN, ENGINEERING FOCUSED ON THE TEMPORARY HOSES AND FITTINGS INSTALLED/REMOVED AND DID NOT REMEMBER THE CONTROLLATRON WAS INSTALLED. AS A RESULT, THE CONTROLLATRON WAS NOT REMOVED IN A TIMELY MANNER. OPERATIONS WORK CONTROL IDENTIFIED THE TAGGING DISCREPANCY TO ENGINEERING AND COACHED ENGINEERING ON THIS OVERSIGHT.

Action Taken:

DISCUSSED WITH OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AND RE-REVIEWED WC 10. CBM REMOVED THE CONTROLLATRON AND TURNED IN THE TAG.

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03724 2 **MP2 F34A MAIN EXHAUST FAN EXHIBITS INCREASED VIBRATION**

Local ID: M2F34A ('A' MAIN EXHAUST FAN ASSEMBLY (MTR HTR BKR LH32-3))

Issue Detail:

MP2 F34A MAIN EXHAUST FAN DRIVE END BEARING EXHIBITS ELEVATED VIBRATION THAT IS INDICATIVE OF MECHANICAL LOOSENESS. SPECTRAL ANALYSIS RESULTS SHOW MULTIPLE HARMONICS OF ROTATIONAL SPEED THAT HAVE INCREASED OVER TIME. THE CONDITION OF THE OPPOSITE DRIVE END BEARING IS UNKNOWN SINCE IT IS LOCATED INSIDE THE PLENUM AND IS NOT MONITORED. PMMS HISTORY SHOWS THAT THE FAN DRIVE END BEARING WAS REPLACED ON 7/13/01 UNDER AWO M2-00-18271. SINCE THEN, THE LOCKING COLLAR THAT HOLDS THE INNER RACE IN PLACE HAS HAD TO BE ADJUSTED. HOWEVER, VIBRATION HARMONICS CONTINUE TO TREND UPWARDS. EVEN THOUGH VIBRATION IS ELEVATED, THE FAN IS STILL CONSIDERED TO BE OPERABLE. HOWEVER, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE FAN BE SCHEDULED IN THE NORMAL WORK PROCESS TO BE OVERHAULED.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED THE CONTROL ROOM AND SYSTEM ENGINEER.

SM Comments: TR GENERATED TO TRACK FOR OVERHAUL

CR-05-03726 2 **2-RB-251B (B RBCCW PUMP DSICHARGE B/C HX CROSS TIE) DOES NOT STROKE FROM C-06.**

Local ID: M22-RB-251B (RBCCW PP. 'B' DISCHARGE CROSS-TIE TO HX 'C' (CO-6) VALVE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

2-RB-251B (B RBCCW PUMP DSICHARGE B/C HX CROSS TIE) DOES NOT STROKE FROM C-06. THE VALVE IS PRESENTLY OPEN. WHEN THE HANDSWITCH IS TAKEN TO CLOSED, AIR PORTS HOWEVER THE VALVE DOES NOT STROKE.

Action Taken:

WROTE THE CR

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03731	N	RECOMMENDATIONS IDENTIFIED DURING SELF-ASSESSMENT MP-SA-05-41 "EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ELECTRICIAN REPLACEMENT PROGRAM IN 2003 - 2004"

Issue Detail:

SELF-ASSESSMENT MP-SA-05-41 WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE:

- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 2003 - 2004 ELECTRICIAN REPLACEMENT PROGRAM IN TRANSFERRING REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE TO THE NEWLY HIRED ELECTRICIANS.

- IDENTIFY GOOD PRACTICES IN SELECTING, TRAINING AND QUALIFYING MEMBERS OF THIS CLASS OF ELECTRICIANS.

- IDENTIFY POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS THAT COULD BE USED IN THE FUTURE REPLACEMENT OF WORKERS.

THE SELF-ASSESSMENT EVALUATED THE PROGRAM INITIATED IN 2003 - 2004 FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF MAINTENANCE ELECTRICIANS TO PREPARE REPLACEMENTS FOR THE 19 ELECTRICIANS WHO LEFT THE DEPARTMENT. A GOAL OF THE PROGRAM WAS TO HAVE THE ELECTRICIANS QUALIFIED TO WORK INDEPENDENTLY BEFORE THE 3R9 OUTAGE. ANOTHER GOAL WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE NECESSARY SKILL SET WAS RETAINED IN THE ELECTRICIAN POSITION. THE SELF-ASSESSMENT TEAM IDENTIFIED FOUR (4) AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT. THEY WERE:

1. PROVIDE A TRAINING AID, REFERENCE SHEET, OR OTHER DOCUMENT THAT PROVIDES GUIDANCE TO TRAINEES ON COMPANY RESOURCES. A LIST OF WHO CAN PROVIDE INFORMATION, DOCUMENTS, EQUIPMENT, OR ASSISTANCE ON ANY OF THE TOPICS THAT A TRAINEE MIGHT NEED.

2. ADOPT THE CONCEPT USED IN I & C OF A "CANNED BRIEF" TO USE ON EACH JOB AS A WAY OF CAPTURING KNOWLEDGE HELD BY VETERAN WORKERS. THIS COULD BE PART OF THE AWO, OR IT COULD BE PROCEDURALIZED.

3. TRAINEES COULD BENEFIT FROM BETTER COORDINATION OF THEIR IN-PLANT ACTIVITIES WITH SUBSEQUENT TRAINING. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PROVIDING THE TRAINEES WITH GUIDANCE ON SUGGESTED SYSTEM TOURS, WORK ACTIVITIES, AND READING ASSIGNMENTS DURING THE IN-PLANT PART OF THEIR TRAINING.

4. SOME TRAINEES HAD PROBLEMS FINDING SELF-STUDY GUIDES. THESE SHOULD BE MADE READILY AVAILABLE.

Action Taken:

DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH THE ASSISTANT MAINTENANCE MANAGER AND GENERATED THIS CR.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03741	3	THIS CR IS TO NOTIFY THE UNIT 3 IST COORDINATOR THAT UNIT 3 HAS ESTABLISHED LONG RECYCLE AT 1622 ON 4/17/05 AND MUST BE EVALUATED.

Local ID: M33FWS-HIC43 (FLUSH LINE TO CONDENSATE ISOLATION VALVE 3FWS-HV43 MANUAL STATION)

Issue Detail:

THIS CR IS TO NOTIFY THE UNIT 3 IST COORDINATOR THAT UNIT 3 HAS ESTABLISHED LONG RECYCLE AT 1622 ON 4/17/05 AND MUST BE EVALUATED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE STEP 4.3.4.D OF OP 3319A.

Action Taken:

CR #	Unit	Title

CR-05-03742 2 PERSONEL STUCK IN UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT ELEVATOR

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (CTMT ELEVATOR)

Issue Detail:

AT APPROX. 1945 SITE FIRE RECEIVED A CALL STATING THAT THE ELEVATOR ATTENDANT WAS STUCK ON THE -22' 6" ELEVATION OF THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT ELEVATOR. WHILE RESPONDING TO THE -22' 6" ELEVATION SITE FIRE WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE ATTENDANT HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET THE DOORS OF THE ELEVATOR OPEN AND EXITED THE ELEVATOR. SITE FIRE MADE CONTACT WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WHOM WAS STUCK AND DETERMINED THAT NO MEDICAL EVALUATION WAS NEEDED DUE TO THE INDIVIDUAL STATING THAT THEY WERE OK. SITE FIRE INVESTIGATED THE PROBLEM WITH THE ELEVATOR AND CONFIRMED THAT THE ELEVATOR CAR WAS STUCK ON THE -22' 6" ELEVATION OF CONTAINMENT, AND WAS NOT WORKING WHEN THE BUTTON ON THE -3' ELEVATION WAS PRESSED. SITE FIRE MADE CONTACT WITH THE CONTAINMENT COORDINATOR, OCC HELP DESK, AND HP AND NOTIFIED THEM OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONTAINMENT ELEVATOR. AT APPROX. 2050 THE OCC HELP DESK CALLED SITE FIRE AND STATED THEY HAD CONTACTED OTIS ELEVATOR REPAIR.

Action Taken:

SITE FIRE RESPONDED TO CALL OF THE ELEVATOR ATTENDANT STUCK IN THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT ELEVATOR AND MADE CONTACT WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AFTER THEY WERE ABLE SO OPEN THE DOORS TO THE ELEVATOR CAR. NO MEDICAL ATTENTION NEEDED. OCC HELP DESK CONTACTED OTIS ELEVATOR REPAIR.

CR-05-03743 2 DEGRADED SLIDING SUPPORT PLATES

Local ID: MPXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ()

Issue Detail:

THE SLIDING SUPPORT PLATES ON BOTH CONDENSER STEAM DUMP LINES GOING INTO THE ALPHA CONDENSER ARE SEVERELY DEGRADED. THEY ARE LOCATED ON THE LAST SUPPORT PRIOR TO THE LINES ENTERING THE CONDENSER, JUST UPSTREAM OF THE DUMP VALVES.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED EDM

CR-05-03744 2 INDIVIDUAL RECEIVED 2ND DEGREE BURN TO UNDERSIDE OF UPPER ARM.

Issue Detail:

A SUPPLEMENTAL WORKER WAS WORKING ON THE HEAD VENT LINE PROJECT IN UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT ON THE 38'6" LEVEL. THE PIPE FITTER WAS HELPING A WELDER FIT UP A HANGER IN A TIGHT AREA UNDER SOME SCAFFOLDING. THE WORKER WAS LEANING OVER A WELDERS LEAD THAT WAS DRAPED OVER THE SCAFFOLDING WHEN HE RECEIVED THE BURN. INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT REVEALED THAT THE ELECTRODE HOLDER ON THE END OF THE LEAD HAD A CRACK IN THE INSULATION. AS THE WORKER WAS LEANING ON IT THE CRACK OPENED UP AND SHORTED AGAINST THE SCAFFOLDING CAUSING THE BURN TO THE WORKERS ARM.

Action Taken:

NOTIFIED OCC AND SITE FIRE BRIGADE TO OBTAIN MEDICAL TREATMENT. THE CONSTUCTION REP. ON THE JOB REMOVED THE ELECTRODE HOLDER FROM SERVICE.

CR-05-03745 2 BROKEN AIR LINE ON REFUELING MACHINE ASSEMBLY.

Local ID: M2H12 (REFUEL MACHINE ASSEMBLY)

Issue Detail:

THE BROKEN AIR LINE ON REFUELING MACHINE ASSEMBLY TR# 17M2134556 REQUIRES HALF INCH POLY-FLOW AND FITTINGS THAT ARE NOT CURRENTLY A STOCKED ITEM. THE REPAIR WILL NOT TAKE LONG ONCE THE PARTS BECOME AVAILABLE.

Action Taken:

WORKED WITH I&C PLANNER TO BUILD A STOCK CODE AND ORDER THE NECESSARY PARTS.

CR #	Unit	Title
CR-05-03747	2	RAD MONITOR RM8262A/B FAILED

Local ID: M2RM-8262A (CTMT AIR PARTICULATE RADIATION MONITOR LOOP (F39B))

Issue Detail:

CONTAINMENT RAD MONITOR, RM8262A/B FAILED AND THE BLOWER MOTOR STOPPED WITHOUT CLOSING THE TARGET ROCK VALVES. THE 'OPERATE LIGHTS WERE FLASHING SLOWLY, AND THE MONITOR PROCESSED A PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SIGNAL.

Action Taken:

SECURED RAD MONITOR IAW OP2383A, ISOLATED THE RAD MONITOR FROM CONTAINMENT, SUBMITTED CR