(1)

From: A. Randolph Blough
To: Wiggins, James
Date: 4/18/05 7:59AM
Subject: *Fwd: Millstone Event - Suggested Areas for Followup - -*

these notes were developed in IRC to help formulate the followup team insp plan

CC: Collins, Samuel

A/1

From: Region 1 Incident Response Center
To: Barry Norris; Blough, A. Randolph; Brian Holian; John Monninger; Kevin Mangan; Max Schneider; Paul Krohn; Scott Barber; Silas Kennedy; Wayne Lanning
Date: 4/17/05 6:01PM
Subject: Millstone Event - Suggested Areas for Followup

See attached suggested areas for followup for your review and consideration.

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Subject:	Fwd: Millstone Event - Suggested Areas for Followup - -
Creation Date:	4/18/05 7:59AM
From:	A. Randolph Blough
Created By:	ARB@nrc.gov

Recipients	**Action**	**Date & Time**
nrc.gov		
kp1_po.KP_DO	Delivered	04/18/05 07:59AM
JTW1 (James Wiggins)	Opened	04/18/05 01:21PM
	Deleted	04/19/05 01:33PM
SJC1 CC (Samuel Collins)	Opened	04/18/05 08:00AM
	Deleted	04/18/05 08:21AM

Post Office	**Delivered**	**Route**
kp1_po.KP_DO	04/18/05 07:59AM	nrc.gov

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MESSAGE	422	04/18/05 07:59AM
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Options

Auto Delete:	No
Expiration Date:	None
Notify Recipients:	Yes
Priority:	Standard
Reply Requested:	No
Return Notification:	None
Concealed Subject:	No
Security:	Standard
To Be Delivered:	Immediate
Status Tracking:	All Information

SUGGESTED AREA FOR FOLLOW-UP

Millstone Unit 3
Reactor Trip/Safety Injection
EAL Alert Declared - Main Steam Line Safety Valve Failed to Reseat

1) Understand initiation of event and its cause(s), as well as the detailed event sequence (In particular, any relation to previous maintenance, equipment issues, or precursor events).

2) Understand safety system response, such a why only Train - 'A' SIAS/MSI actuated automatically.

3) Understand equipment performance, including:

- Trip of turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
- Charging system valve packing leakage (leaked ~ 1000 gallons of RCS into the Primary Auxiliary Building).
- Behavior of steam generator safeties, PORVs, primary reliefs.
- PORVs and primary safeties condition including an assessment of potential damage which could have occurred as a result of water relief.

4) Understand application of the Technical Specifications and Technical Specification action statement time limits (e.g., time required to reach hot shutdown with inoperable steam generator safety valves).

5) Understand licensee operational performance, including:

- Operator initial response.
- use of EAL's/implementation of EOP's, AOP's E-Plan.
- response to plant equipment issues, including:
  - continuing input into PRT (should they have investigated sooner and reacted sooner to indication of PORV leakage)
  - efforts to confirm that no primary-to-secondary leakage was occurring; including S/G sampling and other evaluations and analyses (also decisionmaking about steaming from the 'D' S/G w/o a sample).

6) Evaluate the licensee post-event assessments, including causal analyses, extent-of-condition reviews, prompt corrective actions before restart, and longer term corrective and preventive measures.