

From: James Trapp
To: A. Randolph Blough; Brian Holian; Kenneth Jenison; Kevin Mangan; Lawrence Doerflein; Max Schneider; Silas Kennedy; Terrence Reis; Victor Nerses; Wayne Schmidt
Date: Mon, Mar 22, 2004 2:44 PM
Subject: Millstone Unit 2 - MD 8.3 Evaluation - March 15, 2004 Trip

Based on the attached MD 8.3 evaluation, Branch 6 has determined that no special reactive inspection is needed for the March 15, 2004 reactor trip. This conclusion is based on the deterministic criteria not being met; additionally, the CCDP associated with the trip is low (low E-6). This trip along with 3 others in the past 12 months will be reviewed as part of a 95001 inspection, due to the reactor trip PI exceeding the green/white threshold.

On March 15, 2004, the "B" SGFP tripped during surveillance testing. The cause for the SGFP trip was determined to be a trip blocking switch that was not held completely in the block position for the duration of the test. The trip of the SGFP resulted in a low S/G level reactor trip. All safety systems responded as expected with two exceptions noted below.

Complications following the trip were main steam safety valves opening and torn enclosure building boots on the safeties. The licensee has verified the safety setpoints are in an acceptable range. They are currently evaluating the transient/safety setpoints to verify this is a desired response following a loss of feedwater. The resident inspectors will follow this activity. The enclosure boots were evaluated and found they were not needed for operability.

CC: Neil Perry

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