QUESTION REQUEST FORM ENVY NRC 2004 INSPECTION

REQUEST#	_237	DATE	8-26-2004	
NRC INSPECTOR_		Bower		
ENVY COUNTERPA	ART:	Flynn		

ENVY ASSIGNED PERSON K. Sweet

Info Request Question Potential CR

CR-VTY-2004-02741 written to include in the PM data base his work done in the early 90's to improve the switchyard program.

QUESTION/REQUEST:

Provide copies of maintenance procedures to address to the switchyard issues identified in NRC Information Notice 91-81; Switchyard problems that contribute to loss of offsite power.

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS:

Act, exemptions FOIA- 2005

- Battery Chargers and Batteries: PM Basis: E087 & E093, Proc OP 4210 & OP 5247
- 2) Switchyard Protective Relays: PM Basis E044, Proc RP 5226, OP 5243, RP 5257, RP 5258, RP 5259, OP 5260,
- 3) Breakers: PM Basis EO39, E041
- Insulators & Arrestors, Thermography: PM Basis E005, E052, E053, Proc AP 0211
- 5) Vernon Tie: PM Basis E125, E133 OP4142, Proc OP5216, OP5222
- 6) Transformers: PM Basis E051, E126, E128, E130 Proc DP0216

RESOLUTION COMPLETE: _	X	YES	NRC Revie
K. Sweet		/ 8/30/2004	
ENVY ASSIGNED PERSON S	IGNATUR	E / DATE	
NA.	/		
INDEPENDENT TECH REVIE (N/A FOR DOCUMENT REQUEST)		DATE	
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rdance with the Freedom of Informatio	n		

ENVY TEAM LEADER

DATE

DATABASE UPDATED / DATE

*NOTE:

- INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE NRC IS ONLY AFTER ENVY TEAM LEADER SIGNATURE

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- VY TEAM LEADER DECIDES WHO IT WILL BE ASSIGNED QUESTION/REQUEST
- RETURN SIGNED OFF FORM TO ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR DATABASE UPDATE.

To: Rick McCullough, Assess. Coord.

December 16, 1991

From: Fraig Nichols, Maint. Prod. Supervisor, Electrical

Subject: Response to Commitment BVY 91-068 MT8

The Maintenance Department has evaluated the subject commitment and has the following response:

1

COMMITMENT:

AN EVALUATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE FROGRAMS FOR NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY (NNS) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT WILL BE PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT OTHER SWITCHYARD AND PLANT COMPONENTS SIMILAR TO THE BATTERY CHARGERS MEET THE APPROPRIATE RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

RESPONSE:

Flant equipment under the cognizance of the Maintenance Department required to be operable by Technical Specification, but which are not Nuclear Safety Related, have been evaluated for adequacy of surveillance and preventive maintenance requirements and all appropriate changes have been submitted for review under the AP 0200 process for FM changes.

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Diesel Fire Pump, Switchyard and Neutron Monitoring Batteries & Chargers - This equipment, which is required to be operable to meet Technical Specifications 3.13.B.1.a and 3.10.A.2 is maintained in accordance with OP 4210, Maintenance and Surveillance of Lead Acid Storage Batteries, and OP 5245, Maintenance of Battery Chargers, the same procedures used for maintenance and surveillance of safety related batteries and chargers. The frequency of testing and 593 surveillance is also the same as for safety related batteries and 5087 chargers. **Machine Submitted Formall physics** (PROC of 4210 Upon Workstement and chargers and FORT of 4210

Switchyard Protective Relays - Protective relays are required to support the availability of offsite power as required in Section 3.10.A.4. All protective relays associated with the switchyard, main generator and major transformers, T-1, T-2, T-3A, T-3B, and T4, are calibrated each refueling outage (approximately every 18 €044 months). This frequency exceeds the Northeast Power Coordinating OP 5243 Council (NPCC) recommendations of once per two years.

OP 522-6 RP 525 RP 525 6523 ax or serd 305254

Switchyard breakers - Switchyard breakers are required to support the availability of offsite power as required in Section 3.10.A.4. All 115KV and 345KV breakers are tested each outage. All breakers Breakers and associated air compressors are are trip tested. 1×03 maintained in accordance with the vendor instruction manuals at a maintenance interval which experience has shown to be appropriate Ap and which reflects the 18 month operating cycle. Breakers are leak p_{ρ} tested and refilled with SF-6 as necessary. Compressors are 0211 overhauled as necessary based on run time. Phase and have been Se submitted of our switch ward the safer to the the the presently Performed and the sector de the the vendor manuals Switchyard Insulators and lightning arresters - This equipment is Switchyard insufactors and regulation of offsite power as required 5%5in Section 3.10.A.4. Although there is no preventive maintenance FORS required or recommended by the insulator and lightning arrestor vendors, Wardidameniodically inspectmentationsmand withuneplace E053 AP OZLJ EIZE E125 24142 · P 5216 Major Transformers - This equipment is required to support the De Ch 0 availability of offsite power as required in Section 3.10.A.4. Op 520 Major transformers such as the Main Step-up T-1-1A, Auxiliary T-2-1A, Startup T-3A, T-3B, and Auto-transformer T4 are visually 5051 inspected weekly by VY electricians and a more thorough inspection 5126 is performed by contractors pimontary. Oil is part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas analysis monthly and the results are part of the Eiconbustible gas are part of the Eic Maintenance Department trending program. The Main transformer has £130 a major inspection each refueling outage including Doble and TTR a major inspection each requesting outage including formed by testing. Other major transformers have major inspections ever 2other refueling outage. PM minanger hug been submitted dom flect A 2 the BM submission sently performed when the submission of the second seco <u>manuals</u>. Construction of the second s E003 AP 021) This level of maintenance of NNS Electrical Technical Specification related equipment is adequate to ensure the reliability of the equipment since it meets or exceeds vendor recommendations. Naintenance frequencies may be adjusted as necessary based on the results of inspections or vendor/industry recommendations.

A review of mechanical equipment required to be operable by Technical Specifications that are classified as NNS identified two areas of concern:

1. FCV-102-35 - Air operated suction isolation for the Mechanical Vacuum Pump (P-53-1A) required to be operable per Section 3.2.F.1 has no currently identified preventive maintenance other than the required annual surveillance test.

2. All Vitai Fire Protection system components identified in Sections 3.13.B, C, D, E, F, & G including fire pumps, valves, hydrants, hose stations, CO2 system, penetration seals, sprinklers, etc. Some new PM's have been added to these components but no comprehensive assessment has been made on the reliability and effectiveness of these programs.

Additional review of maintenance histories and vendor recommendations for all the above mechanical components is required to assess the adequacy of the existing or newly implemented PM programs.


This assessment has not yet been completed and will be undertaken as a specific project in 1992. A branch commitment should be established to complete this review by 6/1/92.

Subject to Operations Superintendent concurrence, this commitment is considered closed.

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t APPROVED: Projects Supervisor





UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

May 19, 1994

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 91-81, SUPPLEMENT 1: SWITCHYARD PROBLEMS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this supplement to Information Notice (IN) 91-81, "Switchyard Problems That Contribute To Loss Of Offsite Power," dated December 16, 1991, to alert addressees to a possible zener diode failure that could cause false operation in stuck breaker failure unit (SBFU) relays and certain (SA-1) generator differential relays. The SBFU and differential relays in question were manufactured by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse). It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Background

The original information notice (IN 91-81) described an event on April 23, 1991, during which the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Fower Station (Vermont Yankee) experienced a loss of offsite power when the 345-kV and 115-kV circuit breakers in the switchyard opened. An NRC augmented inspection team sent to investigate this event determined that zener diodes installed in the SBFU relays failed due to a voltage spike in the direct current control system, causing the 345-kV and 115-kV circuit breakers to open.

In a separate event on October 22, 1984, at Vermont Yankee, SA-1 relays used in a diesel generator protection circuit failed and caused the diesel generator breaker to trip and lock out. The failure of the SA-1 relays was attributed to the shorting of zener diodes.

Discussion

In both instances, Vermont Yankee, with the help of the vendor, installed a redesigned curcuit, eliminating the zener diodes that were vulnerable to shorting. Similar vulnerable zener diodes could still be in use in the SBFU

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IN 91-81, Supp. 1 May 19, 1994 Page 2 of 2

relays protecting switchyard circuit breakers and SA-1 relays in safetyrelated circuit breakers at other operating reactors. The failure of these zener diodes could result in failures that affect the availability of either the offsite or onsite power source that would be required during normal plant operation or under accident conditions.

Information Notice No. 91-81

In 1990, Westinghouse sold its relay division, which manufactures the SBFU and SA-1 relays, to ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB). ABB, which now has the 10 CFR Part 21 reporting responsibility, is not certain that all potentially affected licensees have been alerted to the problem with the zener diodes. The relay division of ABB mailed the attached product advisory letter (PAL 94-98) to its known customers. The NRC is forwarding PAL 94-98, without attachments, as an attachment to this information notice to ensure that all nuclear power plants using these relays are aware of the problem.

Related Generic Communications

The NRC has issued the following generic communications related to this problem:

- Information Notice 83-63, "Potential Failures of Westinghouse Electric Corporation Type SA-1 Differential Relays," September 26, 1983
- 2. Information Notice 83-63, Supplement 1, February 15, 1984

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/s/'d by BKGrimes

Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Kamalakar R. Naidu, NRR (301) 504-2980

Attachments:

- 1. ABB Product Advisory Letter PAL 94-98, w/o atts
- 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 91-81, Supp. 1 May 19, 1994 Page 1 of 2

Dear Customer,

This Product Advisory Letter (PAL 94-98) has been sent to advise you of a possible component failure that can cause a false operation in the commercial grade SA-1 Generator Differential relay and the SBFU Static Breaker Failure relay. (Class 1E SA-1 is not affected--see note below).

The SA-1 relay was first manufactured during 1959. In 1964 the SA-1 relay was re-designed with a zener diode (Z3) in parallel with the trip SCR for additional transient protection. During the years 1964 to 1974, various false operations were reported with some other solid-state relays that had similar thyristor (SCR) trip output circuits with zener protection due to the failure (shorting) of the zener and as a result, this component was removed from the production SA-1 in 1974. In 1984 a false trip of a pre 1974 SA-1 was again traced to the failure of the zener protection diode with the recommendation to that user at that time, by Westinghouse, to remove the device.

While there have been no additional reported false operations due to zener failure since 1984, ABB believes you should be aware of this problem on any SA-1 relay you purchased between 1964 and 1974 that may still be in service, as it is recommended this zener (Z3) diode be removed. Please refer to the attached information for the location of zener diode (Z3).

Note: The Class 1E SA-1 (S/N 1329D62A01) was designed in 1977 without SCR zener protection and is not effected with the problem outlined in this PAL.

In 1991 a false operation of an SBFU Static Breaker Failure relay was reported. This false operation was traced to the failure (shorting) of the SCR transient protection zeners Z1 and Z2 in the SBFU trip module (S/N

Information Notice No. 91-81

899C826G01). These zener diodes were added to this module in 1970, thus any SBFU purchased before 1970 is not effected with this problem. In 1973 the trip module was re-designed to style number 265C975G01 and these protection zeners were eliminated.

Note: The SBFU was not manufactured as a Class 1E qualified relay. There have not been any additional reported false operations of SBFU's due to zener failures, but ABB recommends the SBFU module (S/N 899C826G01) be examined for zeners Z1 and Z2 if the unit was purchased between 1970 and 1973. Attachment 1

Attachment 1 IN 91-81, Supp. 1 May 19, 1994 Page 2 of 2

If this module has Z1 and Z2, it is recommended these devices be removed. Please refer to the attached figures for the location of Z1 and Z2.

If after review of this information you should have any questions, please contact Russ Gonnam or John Wilson at 305-752-6700 or 305-345-5329 (Fax).

Note: The manufacturer of the product involved in this Advisory is Westinghouse Electric Corporation. ABB Power T&D Company Inc. acquired from Westinghouse in late December of 1989 that portion of Westinghouse's business which manufactures electrical equipment similar to that involved in this Advisory. Although ABB Power T&D Company Inc: is a successor to certain businesses of Westinghouse, Westinghouse has retained complete liability for products manufactured prior to February 14, 1989. The product which is the subject of this Advisory was made by Westinghouse and not ABB Power T&D Company Inc. In providing guidance in the form of this Advisory, ABB Power T&D Company Inc. assumes no responsibility whatsoever for the product manufactured by Westinghouse.

CAR 91-37

reactor was shutdown and an Unusual Event declared.

A detailed investigation was performed which included discussions with the relay manufacturer (Westinghouse) recently aquired by ABB and performance of an independent failure analysis. A summary of the results are as follows:

The specific cause of the diode failures could not be positively determined. The zener diode failures probably CAUSE: resulted from component end of life or from the cumulative damage from normally experienced switching transients within the DC system.

The zener diode was rated at 200VDC and was applied in the 125VDC circuit. It was determined at the time that the manufacturer had discontinued using the zener surge suppression circuit in 1974 due to reliability problems. Vermont Yankee replaced the relays with new units.

The 1984 event is different in that the failures did not result from a transient or surge. Similarity exists in that zener diode failures occurred and it was subsequently determined that the circuit design was changed by the manufacturer, the same manufacturer of the BFI relays in the 345 KV and 115 KV switchyard.

Due to the fact that in the present case, and in the 1984 Diesel event, it was determined that there had been reliability problems in zener diode surge suppression circuitry in 125 VDC circuits, a review for other similar applications should be performed. This was not a startup issue but will be addressed as a long term corrective action. In both events equipment operated in the safe direction and there is no reason to believe that additional failures will occur.

SUMMARY ROOT CAUSE OF EVENTS

Root Cause

1.

Failure to recognize the implications of operating a DC bus without a connected battery by the repair department. Future to consider the proprietions of neurously agreed assumptions. 1JA Contributing Factors e/n/9/

- 345KV and 115KV breaker failure relays were susceptible 1. to false initiation due to control voltage translents. Both the 345KV and 115KV breaker BFR's are fed from one bus (DC-4A) making them susceptible to a single system transient.
- The switchyard battery chargers were in a degraded mode such that they created DC bus control voltage disturbance 2. when the chargers were disconnected from associated batteries. This includes the installation of incorrect capacitor fuses and other degraded components. Lack of switchyard battery charger and overall switchyard
- 3. preventive maintenance.

MASTER LIST

OF Commitments

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/DISPOSITION RECOMMENDATIONS:

Short Term Recommendations

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REMVEC COMMUNICATIONS -Maintain_i a once-per-shift CARGIO370P1 communication between the Control Room and REMVEC during any CARGIO370P1 on-going switchyard problems. Assign single Vermont Yankee CARGIO370P4 point of contact (Switchyard Coordinator) to interface with REMVEC. A memo for interim direction was issued to direct

- REMVEC. A memo for interim direction was issued to direct Operations and Maintenance to coordinate all switchyard activities and communication during similar events. RESPONSIBILITY: OPERATIONS Due 8/31/91. (page 7,8) CANCEL GUIDELINE REV Cancel the current revision of the Maintenance Department Guideline immediately. ACTION COMPLETE: The current revision of the guideline has been removed from the files, declared void, and routed for information to all appropriate personnel. (page 6) REVIEW GUIDELINE FOR SWYD The previous revision of the Guideline be reviewed prior to its use for dealing with any evolution requiring switchyard battery removal. 2.
- 3. evolution requiring switchyard battery removal. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE/ENGINEERING - Due 7/31/91. (page6) 4.
 - OPTIMIZE BACKFRED ABILITIES Optimize the time required for the backfeed disconnect to ensure the evolution can be performed within the stipulated time of six hours at all times. An optimization study was completed prior to start-up, see attached addendum to this report. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE - Due 7/31/91.
 - Assign backfeed crews to an inside crew and outside crew positions for as long as the gas problem exists in the plant. This will be handled by on-shift Maintenance supervision as conditions warrant during assignment of tasks. (page9)
 - **b.**] Arrange to have a CVPS bucket truck housed in Brattleboro available for use in this type of event including skilled transformer grounding personnel. See attached addendum to this report. (page 9) Pursue release of Type C funds to purchase a power lift.

ċ. (page 9)

NEED FOR BACKFEED INITIATION - Consider the need to revise the Any proced Emergency Procedures for Loss of Off-Site Power to direct the ress Stall of memo was issued to provide interim guidance to consider the requer fress and need for and time associated with backfeeding during future similar events. RESENSIBILITY: OPERATIONS - Due 7/31/91.

similar events. RESENSIBILITY: OPERATIONS - Due 7/31/91. (page 8)
OC BUS SWITCHING - Review all other plant guidelines and LERGION Procedures for battery switching operations. RRSPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS - Due 8/31/91. (page 5)
AU037 OP3 8. NOTIFICATION OF NRC - An LER was generated and presented to PORC to notify the NRC of our actions regarding this event. The LER commits to a supplement containing a final list of corrective actions based on the information presented in this CAR. RESPONSIBILITY: EEC - Due 7/15/91.
9. NOTIFICATION OF INDUSTRY - A Network entry was made to describe this event to the industry. ACTION COMPLETE.

describe this event to the industry. ACTION COMPLETE.

Long Term Corrective Actions

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LERGIOGEE1

Note: Due date for all long term Corrective Actions is 12/31/91. See additional information below.

CAR91037 m11

2. BUY 91068 mr 4

1.

1N591130501 4.

CAR9037m72

-BV49 1068 MT7 and MT10

SEE BUY 91068

The club, 9. CAR91037MT3

m18 n.

BV491068 m17

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12. 13.

BUY9 1068mite

b.

CAR91037 EEC2

controlling and updating Department Guidelines and determining

USE/APPROVAL OF GUIDELINES - Review the methods used for

Guideline use versus PORC approved procedures. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE (page 6) REPLACEMENT OF BFR'S - Procurement of newer vintage breaker failure relays will be pursued. ACTION COMPLETE: PO 44979 HAS BEEN ISSUED TO ABB FOR NEW RELAYS. PMR'S HAVE BEEN GENERATED TO COMPLETE THIS REPLACEMENT DURING THE: 1992 REFUELING OUTAGE. (page 6)

REFUELING OUTAGE. (page 6) REMVEC COMMUNICATION - Further investigate communication issue with REMVEC personnel. RESPONSIBILITY: OSD. (page 7,8) USE OF CHARGERS AS BATTERY BLIMINATORS - Verify vendor specifications and VYEM for battery chargers, related to operation without a battery connected to the battery output. This evaluation shall consider the types of loads connected to each affected bus. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page 5)

MAINTENANCE. (page 5) RELAY TECH RESPONSE - Pursue plans for ensuring quicker 5. from relay technicians. response **RESPONSIBILITY:** REC.8 (completed) MAINTENANCE. (page 9)

REC.8 (completed) MAINTENANCE: (page 9) 6. DC BUS TRANSIENTS - Evaluate the potential for voltage transients present when any station DC bus is operated without its battery. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE/OPERATIONS.(page5) 7. SWYD PM PROGRAM - Review switchyard preventative maintenance Buyquo68 mt7 + MTO requirements. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page 9,10) Estlish a 8. EMERG. HP AND SAFETY PRACTICES - Initiate-a review of philosof (carquo37RP1 guidelines and procedures for emergency situations relative recticed practices. This information will be provided to the Training 6/24/9 (Red Photeotic Department for consideration. RESPONSIBILITY: -PHANT MANAGER/TRAINING. (page 9)

Rad Protection Department In. HAMAGER/TRAINING. (page 9)

BACKFEED OP - Perform an in-depth review of the backfeeding procedures to ensure the lessons learned from this event are ARGIO37MT3 Incorporated. KESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page 8,9) 10. BACKFEED SUPPORT - Investigate the use of CVPS personnel to CARGIOS7MT4/ provide grounding services in support of Backfeed initiation.

RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page 9)

CHARGER PM'S - Review and modify as appropriate all battery charger preventive maintenance programs. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page 10) CHARGER SURVEILLANCE - Create a battery charger PM and surveillance procedure. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page10)

DESIGN REVIEW - Perform an engineering review of the following (RESPONSIBILITY: ENGINEERING):

Review breaker failure relaying power supply assignments to determine if improvements to reliability can be made a. by reassigning power supplies. (page 6) Review other static protective relays installed at VY to

determine if vendor has recommended design changes to increase surge withstand capabilities. (page 6,11,12) Review switchyard DC control circuitry for other common mode possibilities. (page 6) Review plant off-site power availability for compliance

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BUY GIOGS GEC 2

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16. CAR91037 MT5

BUY 91068 mg 917.

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to general design criteria #17 issues. (page 6) A review of the FSAR has been completed with regard to to general design criteria #17 issues. A review of the ran has been completed with regard to explanations for off-site power access. The need for some revisions to Appendix F was identified. (page 6)
 f. Review design modifications to BFR's (removal of zeners) and use of incorrect fuses with respect to 10CFR Part 21 applicability. (page 10)
 NNS TS CH REQUIREMENTS - Evaluate Technical Specification NNS

relaction and the plant components, RESPONSIBILITY: RECINE AND TO PLAN A CONTRACT PROVINCE PERMITTER PROVIDENTS AND AND A CONTRACT AND A CON RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE/ILC. (page 10)

SWYD MAINT. PLANNING - Review scheduling of switchyard aintenance during all modes of plant operation. maintenance plant operation. **RESPONSIBILITY:** MAINTENANCE/OPERATIONS.

SWID PARTS - Review invetory requirements for all switchyard equipment. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page 8) equipment. RESPONSIBILITY: MAINTENANCE. (page 8) 18. CONFIGURATION TRAINING - Provide training to appropriate plant personnel on the need to verify and maintain plant conditions, durgen or configuration that provides the basis of a planned activity (MR, TH, OP, etc.). RESPONSIBILITY: TRAINING. (page 5)

Date: 6/24/91

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(MR, TM, OP, etc.). RESPONSIBILITIE TRAINING. (Page -, All long term corrective actions shall be completed by December 31, 1991. For those items that require implementation after 12/31/91 or continuing efforts a schedule for their completion shall be completed by December 31, 1991.

Reviewed/Approved By Date: 6 Mainténance Engineer Independent Review Required By: BBC Reviewed/Approved By Date: 6 Meintenance Supervisor PORC Review: Mtg. No.: 91-41 Date: 06-12-91 Secretary

Approved By: Plant Manager

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS REQUIRED:

· Send to Sr UP, OR for Reliew.

LER GIOGEEL O EFEC & defenie if LER up lat is rog &. LERGIOGMEZ 0 OSD to drald letter to NRC on Swand & SY CAR'S - due toplay 15.

Electrical PM Bases Index

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(Page 1) ·

Batteries E081-UPS2A/6A E085-UPS1A/1B E093-NNS E094-ECCS E098-DG-3-1A E099-AS-1 E100-AS-2 E101-1A &1B		Handswitch E007-SCE E008-SCE E009-NNS E043-NB E127-SBM	Lights E056-EXIT E115-APP R E116-NAPP R	<u>Small Tfmr</u> E071-SCE E079-480/NNS E080-480/SCE
<u>Control Panel</u> E012-HV E021-SCE E023-400DC E028-D/G E118-ADS E121-RPS E132-VAC	Dist/Ltg Panel E014-NNS E068-SCE E073-LOCAL	<u>Prot. Panel</u> E084-PPP	<u>Heaters</u> E067	ERFIS UPS E082-UPS2A
<u>ATS</u> E045-IAC/VAC E076-G1 E124-JDDG	<u>MTS</u> E048-125DC E113-13-1/13-2 E114-DC-3A E123-TK-115-1	<u>M/G Sets</u> E054-NB E069-PROTREL E074-UPS E097-3-1A/1B	<u>Gnd Trucks</u> E001	<u>D50 Ckt Bkrs</u> E091
125VDC MCC E089-SCENOEQ E090-SCEEQ E110- E111 E141		<u>Station Tfmr</u> E016-NNS E083-T8/T9	E051-MAIN E095-GND	HV/Swyd Components E005-YARDS E039-GE ATB E040-COGENEL E041-115OCB E052-DISCONNECTS E053-BUSSES E077-ISOPHASE E092-T/G E138-GD-1
Meters/Transdu	icers (Plant) Meters	/Transducers (Sw	vd)	
E020 – 4.5 yr. Ca	al	E050 – 1.5 yr. Ca		
E022 – 3 yr. Cal.	· .	E143 – No PM		
EDSS - 61m Cal	•	Eldd 2 to Cal	•	

E055 – 6 yr. Cal. E105


E144 – 3 yr. Cal. E145 – 6 yr. Cal. E129

Oct. 29, 1999 - PM Bases Review still in progress

Electrical PM Bases Index (Page 2)

E025-AGA E026-DIFF E027-OV E029-OC E030-FIELD E031-N/GND	Various Plant Relays E002-HGA (BUS3&4) E003-AUX 3YR E004-UV (BUS3&4) E006-OC-SC E010-OC NNS E038-OC GND E042-O/L E046-AUX NO PM E049-AUX 4.5YR E070-LOAD SHED E072-ASEA E078-SEQUENCE	Agastat (Plant) Relays E047-NNS E122-SCE	Degraded Grid Relays E015-INSTANT E017-TD PLACE OF TOM IULES
<u>Swyd Relays</u> E044-2YR NEW-1.5YR NEW-NO PM	<u>Agastat (Swyd) Relays</u> NEW-1.5YR & EQ	<u>4KV_Swgr</u> E018-SCE E119 (May Delete) E135-NNS	4KV Breakers E019-CAT III E133-CAT 1 E134-CAT II E136-CAT IV E137-CAT V
480VAC MCC E059 E060 E061 E062 E063 E064 E065 E066 E106 E107 E108 E109 E117	480VAC Swgr E057 - NNS E058 - SCE E139 E140		

Oct. 29, 1999 - PM Bases Review still in progress



CONDITION REPORT

CR-VTY-2004-02741

Originator: Sweet, Kenneth J Originator Group: Eng SUP Project Staff Supervisor Name: McKenney, Patrick M Discovered Date: 08/27/2004 18:10 Originator Phone: 8024513308 Operability Required: Y Reportability Required: N

Initiated Date: 08/27/2004 18:33

Condition Description:

CAR 91-37 was not used as a source document when the PM basis database was developed.

On 8/26/2004, the NRC asked for the procedures that address switchyard issues identified in NRC Information Notice 91-18. The subject of the NRC information notice is "Switchyard Problems that Contribute to Loss of Offsite Power." The event described is a Loss of Normal Power (LNP) at Vermont Yankee on April 23, 1991. It is addressed internally by LER 91-09 and CAR 91-37.

VY committed in response to this event to an evaluation of the adequacy of maintenance and surveillance programs for non-nuclear safety (NNS) technical specification equipment will be performed to ensure other switchyard components similar to the battery charger meet the appropriate reliability requirements. Attached is a letter from Craig Nichols to Rick McCullough that responded to this commitment. From a review of the documentation and discussion with maintenance, some of the commitments have been changed. The maintenance letter to the commitment includes a statement that frequencies may be adjusted as necessary based on the results of the inspections or vendor recommendations.

Some examples where the commitments have changed are:

1. Switchyard Batteries: In the paragraph on the switchyard battery chargers, the letter states the frequency of testing is the same as for safety related chargers. Switchyard battery charger BC-5A-4A was removed from the preventive maintenance (PM) basis to checkout before use. The charger is the swing charger and infrequently used.

2. Switchyard Protective Relays: In the paragraph on switchyard protective relays, it states all protective relays are calibrated each refueling outage, approximately every 18 months. Per PM basis document E044, the relay calibration is performed every two years. A two year calibration is per Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) requirements. This was confirmed with maintenance. Reference E044.

3. Switchyard Breakers: In the paragraph on breakers, it states that compressors are overhauled as necessary on run time. In discussion with maintenance, there is no run-time based overhaul, but the overhauls are based on the condition of the compressors.

4. Switchyard Insulators and Lightning Arrestors: In the paragraph on breakers, it states that VY will replace all horizontal insulators with in four refueling cycles. This replacement has not been completed and confirmed with maintenance. Instead, an inspection is completed. Reference PM Basis documents E005, E052, and E053.

5. Major Transformers: In the paragraph on main transformers, it states a more thorough inspection is done bi-monthly. Per a discussion with maintenance, this was done by CVPS and then stopped. The major transformers do have major inspections per E051, E126, E128, and E130 and weekly inspections by electricians.

6. Major Transformers: In the paragraph on main transformers, it states that the oil is sampled for combustible gas. Only recently has a monthly sampling been instituted based on operating experience and for several years, sampling has been less frequent, typically six months. Six months is typically recommended by industry guidance.

Operability Recommendation:

These PM changes do not affect operability because in the cases identified alternate methods have been implemented to meet the CAR 91-37 requirements and the PM basis is used to currently perform the switchyard related PM's. The condition represented is related to including the CAR 91-37 commitments in the PM data base and updating these commitments for changes in implementation.

Immediate Action Description:

None



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Suggested-Action-Description:

Add LER 91-09, CAR 91-37, and NPPC requirements (Document A-4) as source documents to the PM basis.

Per a discussion with maintenance engineer who worked on resolving the commitment, there was project after the event to make the switchyard PM's consistent with CVPS and VELCO practices at the time. Many PM changes were written at the time. Also, the NPCC requirements for maintenance (Document A-4) were used as a basis. In 1991, the PM's were based on Visicards since MPAC was still being developed. The initial PM Basis database was written in about 1994 using MPAC. The PMCR process has then been used for several years to change PM's and this documentation includes a technical basis for changes. LER 91-09 and CAR 91-37 is not listed as a reference in PM basis database except for E053 (busses). NPPC document A-4 is not listed as a basis document for E087 (chargers) and E093 (batteries) but is for E044 (protective relays). Thus, LER 91-09, CAR 91-37, and NPPC equirements (Document A-4) should be added as source documents to the PM basis for the applicable PM's.

Attachments:

Condition Description Letter from Nichols to McCullough for CAR 91-37