

FPL Energy Seabrook Station P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 773-7000

Nay 19, 2005 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-05084

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Seabrook Station Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-004-00 for Noncompliance with the Technical Specification for Offsite AC Sources

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-004-00. This LER reports an event that occurred at Seabrook Station on March 29, 2005. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. James M. Peschel, Regulatory Programs Manager (603) 773-7194.

Very truly yours,

FPL ENERGY SEABROOK, LLC

Mark E. Warner Site Vice President

cc: S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator
 V. Nerses, NRC Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2
 G. T. Dentel, NRC Senior Resident Inspector



ENCLOSURE TO SBK-L-05084

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NRC FOR	RM 366			U.S. NUCLE	AR R	EGULATOR	RY COMMI	SSION	API	PROVE	D BY OMB	: NO. 3150-010	4	EXPIRES:	06/30/2007	
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)								Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
	1. FACILITY NAME Seabrook Station								2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE				OF 3			
4. TITLE	_												_			
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<u>5. E</u>	VENT D		6.			<u>7. R</u>	EPORT D	ATE		ACILITY		OTHER FAC	LITIES INV	DOCKET	UMBER	
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9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)																
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12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)																
	James M. Peschel, Regulatory Programs Manager 603-773-7194															
	13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT															
CAUSE				MPONENT MANU- FACTURER		REPORTABLE TO EPIX			CAUSE			COMPONENT	MANU- FACTUREF		REPORTABLE TO EPIX	
		14	. SUPPL	EMENTAL RE	POR		ED	1				XPECTED	MONTH	 DAY	YEAR	
T YES (If yes, comp)		comolet	ate 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSI			ON DATE)						MISSION				
	YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) Image: No state ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)															
	Durin	ıg oper	ation i	n Mode 1 a	at 95	% powe	er on M	arch 2	29,	2005		-				
	-			comply wi			-							-	,	
	14, the circuit breaker for the reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) supply to the train A 4,160															
volt emergency bus was removed from service with the bus energized from the unit auxiliary																
	transformer, rendering inoperable one of the two offsite AC sources required by TS 3.8.1.1. The															
station had historically implemented the TS such that only one offsite AC source was required																
for each train of emergency buses, provided the sources to the two trains of emergency buses																
were physically independent. Consequently, the periodic surveillance requirement specified in																
TS 3.8.1.1, action a, was not performed, resulting in a condition prohibited by the TS. This																
	condition continued for approximately 9.5 days and exceeded the 72-hour allowed outage time															
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]	-			AC source		-						-		-		
				ge time. The									-		•	
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	of the electrical configuration needed to meet the TS for two independent offsite AC sources. No adverse consequences resulted from this event.															

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3.8.1.1, AC uxiliary transf removed from . This activit uired by TS 3 offsite AC so rains of emer AT supply to periodic surv urce within c	Sources. O former (RAT n service wh ty rendered in 3.8.1.1. The ource was rec rgency buses the emerge veillance req one hour and	In February () [EA, XFM (noperable of e station had quired for e ency bus wa quirement, v d every eight	v 14, 2009 remained one of the d historic ach train sically ind as not con verificatio nt hours t	5 at 052 y to the d energe two, ally of eme depend nsidere on of the thereaft	25, th train jized ergen ent. d a lo er,	e A cy
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prohibited by the TS. This condition exceeded the 72-hour allowed outage time permitted by action a of TS 3.8.1.1 by continuing for approximately 9.5 days until the RAT supply breaker to the emergency bus was returned to operable status at 1538 on February 23, 2005. In addition, in August 2003, the plant operated with the train B emergency bus energized from the RAT to support maintenance on the UAT from 0321 on August 18 until 1703 on August 21. In this condition, the offsite AC source through the UAT was inoperable for approximately 85 hours, which exceeded the 72-hour TS allowed outage time.

II. Cause of Event

The cause of this event was a misapplication of the electrical configuration needed to meet the TS requirement for two independent offsite AC sources. Since initial licensing, the station implemented the TS such that only one offsite AC source is required for each train of emergency buses, provided the sources to the two trains of emergency buses are independent. However, after a review of the plant licensing basis and meeting with the NRC staff, it was determined that the historical implementation of the TS was incorrect and an operable offsite AC source must be aligned to both trains of emergency buses. Subsequent evaluation identified the two instances of noncompliance with both the LCO and actions of TS 3.8.1.1.

III. Analysis of Event

The Seabrook Station design includes three offsite lines and two independent offsite AC sources: (1) one offsite circuit through each UAT to both trains of emergency buses, and (2) a second independent offsite circuit through each RAT to both trains of emergency buses. A separate UAT and RAT supply each bus. A total of four independent transformers, with individual breakers, supply power to the two emergency buses. Historically, the station considered that the minimum requirements of TS 3.8.1.1 were met with one UAT and one RAT inoperable if the operable UAT and RAT were connected to the onsite 1E distribution system. This connection was considered acceptable since there were still two

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physically independent circuits (one UAT and one RAT) from the transmission network to the onsite distribution system. On this basis, the actions of TS 3.8.1.1 were not applied to the loss of the RAT supply to the train A emergency bus. However, the licensing basis review and NRC meeting determined that the two independent power supplies should be provided to each train of the 1E distribution system. For this reason, the unavailability of the RAT supply to the emergency bus rendered one offsite AC source inoperable.

This event is of regulatory significance because it met the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(I)(B) for a condition prohibited by the TS. In addition, the event was reported to the NRC on March 29, 2005 at 1524 (event # 41543) in accordance with the Facility Operating License Condition 2.G for a violation of the TS.

This event had no adverse impact on the plant or on the health and safety of the public. No plant transients, systems actuations, or consequences resulted from this event. This event did not involve a Safety System Functional Failure since two independent offsite AC sources remained available to the train B emergency bus. No inoperable structures, systems, or components contributed to the event.

IV. Corrective Actions

The corrective actions for this event included:

- 1. Revising the TS bases and the UFSAR as necessary to reflect that operability of an offsite AC source requires the source be available to both trains of emergency buses, and
- 2. Communicating to station managers, supervisors, and licensed operators the revised criteria for operability of offsite AC sources.

Similar Events

Seabrook Station has had one previous occurrence of an event in which incorrect procedure implementation resulted in a condition prohibited by the TS. On August 15, 2003, LER 2003-001 reported that station personnel incorrectly concluded that surveillance testing of an emergency diesel generator was not required to meet the actions of a TS. A review of the condition determined that such testing was required, and the failure to meet the actions while in noncompliance with the LCO resulted in a condition prohibited by the TS.