



SERIAL: HNP-05-064
10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

MAY 9 2005

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63
Report of Changes Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), Carolina Power & Light Company (doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.) submits the attached report for the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP). The report provides a brief description of changes to the facility and a summary of the evaluations required per 10CFR50.59 for those items, regardless of implementation status, between May 18, 2003 and December 31, 2004.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this submittal at (919) 362-3137.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. H. Corlett', written in a cursive style.

D. H. Corlett
Supervisor, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Harris Nuclear Plant

DHC/rg

c: Mr. R. A. Musser, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Mr. C. P. Patel, NRC Project Manager
Dr. W. D. Travers, NRC Regional Administrator

10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments

Log Number / Implementing Document	Description of Change	Evaluation Summary
04-0601 EC 55938	During reevaluation of the Safe Shutdown Analysis, HNP identified that control of both Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) Electrical Equipment Protection Room ventilation system recirculation dampers could be lost during a postulated fire in certain fire areas. The dampers would fail shut upon loss of power preventing them from allowing recirculation of the air in the room. This modification changed these recirculation dampers failure modes upon loss of power from shut to open. Additionally, circuit changes were made to satisfy the objectives for post-fire safe shutdown contained in General Design Criteria 3, "Fire Protection," that are concerned with preventing spurious operation from hot shorts and other affects of thermal and smoke damage.	There are no safe shutdown conditions that require either of these dampers to be in a position other than open. The modification enhanced safe shutdown capability by eliminating the requirement for local manual actions to open the dampers. In addition, reliability of the system was improved by installing a control switch in the main control room to isolate the control power to one of the dampers to provide an alternate means of opening the damper to prevent spurious operations from hot shorts. This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
04-0628 AP-557 (RM-1FR-3566ASA)	One detector of one of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Area Radiation Monitors (ARM) was out of service for more than thirty-days until maintenance was performed.	The function of this ARM is to generate an isolation signal for the FHB normal ventilation and initiate emergency ventilation in the event of a fuel handling accident. Technical Specifications state that a channel is operable when one or more detectors are operable. This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.
04-1152 AP-557 (RM-1FR-3564BSB & RM-1FR-3567BSB)	Two FHB radiation monitor detectors failed check source testing and the associated FHB radiation monitors were declared inoperable for a period of greater than 30 days until maintenance was performed.	The function of these radiation monitors is to generate an isolation signal for the FHB normal ventilation and initiate emergency ventilation in the event of a fuel handling accident. One monitor was inoperable in the FHB North area and one in the South area. Technical Specifications state that a channel is operable when one or more detectors are operable. This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.