



EA-03-009

Palo Verde Nuclear  
Generating Station

David Mauldin  
Vice President  
Nuclear Engineering  
and Support

Tel: 623-393-5553  
Fax: 623-393-6077

Mail Station 7605  
PO Box 52034  
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034

102-05248-CDM/SAB/DGM/DFH  
April 14, 2005

ATTN: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

**Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)  
Unit 1  
Docket No. STN 50-528  
Special Report 1-SR-2005-001  
Report of Boron Deposit at Control Element Drive  
Mechanism Vent**

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Special Report 1-SR-2005-001 prepared and submitted by Arizona Public Service (APS) pursuant to NRC Revised Order EA-03-009, dated February 20, 2004. Section IV.D of the Order requires licensees to perform certain visual inspections to identify potential boric acid leaks from pressure-retaining components above the Reactor Pressure Vessel head. Section IV.E of the Order requires licensees to submit reports detailing the inspection results within sixty (60) days after returning plants to operation.

This special report details the results of visual inspections performed at PVNGS Unit 1 subsequent to a reactor shutdown on February 09, 2005. The visual inspections were performed in accordance with the Boric Acid Corrosion Prevention Program which APS implements to identify and prevent boric acid corrosion of reactor pressure boundary components.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4(b)(1), copies of this report are being provided to the Region IV Administrator and the Palo Verde NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance

Callaway • Comanche Peak • Diablo Canyon • Palo Verde • South Texas Project • Wolf Creek

Special Report 1-SR-2005-001  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Page 2

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Dan Marks, Section Leader, Compliance, at (623) 393-6492.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "David Mauldin".

CDM/SAB/DGM/DFH/ca

Attachment

cc: B. S. Mallet, Region IV Administrator  
M. B. Fields, PVNGS Project Manager  
G. G. Warnick, Sr. Resident Inspector  
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement  
Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff

**Attachment**  
**Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1**  
**Special Report No. 1-SR-2005-001**  
**Boron Deposit Found at Control Element Drive Mechanism Vent**  
**Docket No. STN 50-528**

**Reporting Requirement:**

The NRC Revised Order EA-03-009, "Interim Inspection Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at Pressurized Water Reactors," dated February 20, 2004, Section IV.D requires that certain visual inspections be performed to identify potential boric acid leaks from pressure-retaining components above the reactor pressure vessel head.

Additionally, Section IV.E of the NRC Order requires that licensees submit reports detailing the inspection results performed per section IV.D within sixty (60) days after returning the plant to operation if a leak or boron deposit was found during the inspection.

**Background:**

On February 09, 2005, Palo Verde Unit 1 was shutdown due to a fault in switchgear breaker 1ENANS06J. Subsequent to the reactor shutdown, routine visual inspections were performed in accordance with the Boric Acid Corrosion Prevention Program (APS procedure 70TI-9ZC01). APS implemented the Boric Acid Corrosion Prevention Program to prevent boric acid corrosion of reactor pressure boundary components and to ensure the provisions of USNRC Generic Letter No. 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants" were met.

**Report Detailing Inspection Results:**

During boric acid walk-downs on February 09, 2005, two Unit 1 boric acid residue sites were identified above the RPV head. The sites were located on the Versa Vents for control element drive mechanisms (CEDM) no. 58 and 82. None of the sites exhibited evidence of an active leak, nor did the boric acid residue contact the RPV head or related insulation.

No carbon steel was affected and none of the leak sites were active. Versa Vent no. 58 and 82 were reworked prior to restarting Unit 1.

Unit 1 was returned to operation (Mode 1) on February 19, 2005.