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From:

Patrick Louden | | | | |

To:

Harold Chernoff PM

Date:

Tue, Apr 13, 2004 2:01 PM

Subject:

Fwd: Questions Pertaining To PBNP RCS Vent Path Event

Relatel

71-2

From:

"Connolly, James W." < James. Connolly@nmcco.com>

To:

<pll@nrc.gov> P. Louden PIII

Date:

Mon, Apr 12, 2004 8:53 PM

Subject:

Questions Pertaining To PBNP RCS Vent Path Event

Pat,

The following is a response to the questions that you forwarded to me this afternoon:

1. How many or what barriers in place to prevent installation of the Steam Generator nozzles without a hot side were broken during the event that recently occurred at Point Beach?

## Answer:

- \* The 50.59 for the nozzle dam installation procedure specified that there be a hot side vent prior to installation of the nozzle dams.
- \* The PBNP commitment to comply with Generic Letter 88-17 as it pertains to a hot side vent was not complied with.
- \* The identified condition was not assessed using Safety Risk Monitor in a configuration with the nozzles dams installed without a hot side vent.
- \* The procedure for performing Infrequently Performed Evolution briefings was not complied with since it was not signed by a senior line manager. The on-shift Engineering representative signed as the senior line manager which is contrary to procedural requirements.
- \* The procedure governing reduced inventory requirements (OP 4F) was not written in conformance with plant commitments and permitted nozzle dams to be installed with out a hot side vent being open. Additionally, the procedure was not complied with as written.
- 2. When in an orange path risk condition, what controls were in place regarding schedule logic changes.

## Answer:

At the time of the event, there were no controls in place regarding schedule logic changes.

CC:

<rmm3@nrc.gov>